CASE # 6

FROILAN M. BERGONIO, JR., DEAN G. PELAEZ, CRISANTO O. GEONGO,

WARLITO O. JANAYA, SALVADOR VILLAR, JR., RONALDO CAFIRMA,
RANDY LUCAR, ALBERTO ALBUERA, DENNIS NOPUENTE and ALLAN
SALVACION, Petitioners,
vs.
SOUTH EAST ASIAN AIRLINES and IRENE DORNIER, Respondents.
G.R. No. 195227

April 21, 2014

BRION, J.:
FACTS:
the petitioners filed before the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal
suspension with prayer for reinstatement against respondents South East Asian
Airlines (SEAIR). the LA found the petitioners illegally dismissed and ordered the
respondents, among others, to immediately reinstate the petitioners with full
backwages.
the respondents manifested their option to reinstate the petitioners in the payroll.
The payroll reinstatement, however, did not materialize. Thus, the petitioners filed
before the LA a manifestation for their immediate reinstatement, which the LA
immediately granted.
The respondent appealed the LAs ruling to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the
respondents appeal for non-perfection prompting the respondents to file before
the CA a petition for certiorari.
The LA also issued another writ of execution. 14 A Notice of Garnishment was
thereafter issued to the respondents depositary bank Metrobank-San Lorenzo
Village Branch, Makati City in the amount of P1,900,000.00 on June 6, 2007.
the CA rendered its decision (on the illegal dismissal ruling of the LA) partly
granting the respondents petition. The CA declared the petitioners dismissal
valid and awarded them P30,000.00 as nominal damages for the respondents
failure to observe due process.
The CA agreed that the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision is immediately
executory even pending appeal, such that the employer is obliged to reinstate
and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until
the decision (finding the employee illegally dismissed including the reinstatement
order) is reversed by a higher court. Applying this principle, the CA noted that the
petitioners accrued wages could have been properly computed until December

18, 2007, the date of the CAs decision finding the petitioners validly dismissed.
The CA, however, pointed out that when the LAs decision is "reversed by a
higher tribunal, an employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages if
shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without
fault" on the employers part.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are barred from collecting the accrued wages if shown
that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on
the employers part?
HELD:
No, the petitioners are not barred.
Under paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code, the employer must reinstate
the employee either by physically admitting him under the conditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal, and paying his wages; or, at the employers option, merely
reinstating the employee in the payroll until the decision is reversed by the higher
court. Failure of the employer to comply with the reinstatement order, by
exercising the options in the alternative, renders him liable to pay the employees
salaries.
Moreover, and equally worth emphasizing, is that an order of reinstatement
issued by the LA is self-executory. On the reinstatement aspect of a labor
decision under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the Court concluded that to
otherwise "require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as
prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray
and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate
execution of a reinstatement order."
The reversal by a higher tribunal of the LAs finding (of illegal dismissal),
notwithstanding, an employer, who, despite the LAs order of reinstatement, did
not reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal up to the reversal
by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the accrued wages of the
employee, i.e., the unpaid salary accruing up to the time the higher tribunal
reverses the decision. The rule, therefore, is that an employee may still recover
the accrued wages up to and despite the reversal by the higher tribunal. This
entitlement of the employee to the accrued wages proceeds from the immediate
and self-executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision.
By way of exception to the above rule, an employee may be barred from
collecting the accrued wages if shown that the delay in enforcing the

reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer. To
determine whether an employee is thus barred, two tests must be satisfied: (1)
actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not
executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employers
unjustified act or omission. Note that under the second test, the delay must be
without the employers fault. If the delay is due to the employers unjustified
refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the
reversal of the LAs decision.
Lets apply the two-fold test: First, the existence of delay - whether there was
actual delay or whether the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not
executed prior to its reversal? We answer this test in the affirmative. Second, the
cause of the delay whether the delay was not due to the employers unjustified
act or omission. We answer this test in the negative; we find that the delay in the
execution of the reinstatement pending appeal was due to the respondents
unjustified acts.
All told, under the facts and the surrounding circumstances, the delay was due to
the acts of the respondents that we find were unjustified. We reiterate and
emphasize, Article 223, paragraph 3, of the Labor Code mandates the employer
to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee, either by actually reinstating
him/her under the conditions prevailing prior to the dismissal or, at the option of
the employer, in the payroll.

CASE #7
MANILA MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
LOWITO AMOR, ET. AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 182800
April 20, 2015
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents Lowito Amor, Rollybie Ceredon, Julius Cesar, Ronito Martinez and
Fermin Tabili, Jr. were regular employees of petitioner Manila Mining Corporation,
a domestic corporation which operated a mining claim in Placer, Surigao del
Norte.
In compliance with existing environmental laws, petitioner maintained Tailing
Pond No. 7 (TP No. 7), a tailings containment facility required for the storage of
waste materials generated by its mining operations. Upon reaching its maximum

level, petitioner temporarily shut down its mining operations pending approval of
its application to increase said faciltys capacity by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-Environment Management Bureau (DENREMB).
Petitioner served a notice, informing its employees and the Department of Labor
and Employment Regional Office No. XII (DOLE) of the temporary suspension of
its operations for six months and the temporary lay-off of two-thirds of its
employees. After the lapse of said period, petitioner notified the DOLE that it was
extending the temporary shutdown of its operations for another six months.
Adversely affected by petitioners continued failure to resume its operations,
respondents filed the complaint for constructive dismissal and monetary claims.
Executive Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez rendered a Decision holding
petitioner liable for constructive dismissal in view of the suspension of its
operations beyond the six-month period allowed under Article 286 7 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines. Finding that the cause of suspension of petitioners
business was not beyond its control, 8 the Labor Arbiter applied Article 2839 of the
same Code declaring respondents to have been constructively dismissed.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA upheld the LA ruling and ruled that
petitioner failed to perfect its appeal therefrom considering that the copy of
its 3 December 2004 Memorandum of Appeal intended for respondents was
served the latter by registered mail only on 7 February 2005. Aside from
posting an unusually smaller sum as appeal bond, petitioner was likewise
faulted for replenishing the check it issued only on 1 April 2005 or 24 days
before the rendition of the assailed NLRC Decision. Applying the principle
that the right to appeal is merely a statutory remedy and that the party who
seeks to avail of the same must strictly follow the requirements therefor,
the CA decreed that the Labor Arbiters Decision had already attained
finality and, for said reason, had been placed beyond the NLRCs power of
review.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct?
HELD:
Yes, the CA is correct.
Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a
part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 23 A party who seeks
to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules,
failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.

Insofar as appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter are concerned, Article 223
of the Labor Code of the Philippines 25 provides that, "(d)ecisions, awards, or
orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the [NLRC]
by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of such
decisions, awards or orders." In case of a judgment involving a monetary award,
the same provision mandates that, "an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the [NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from." Alongside the requirement that
"the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other
party."
The issue that has be devilled labor litigation for long has been clarified by the
ruling in McBurnie v. Ganzon, et al., 35 which built on and extended the ruling that
while it is true that reduction of the appeal bond has been allowed in meritorious
cases36 on the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowing
appeals on the merits,37 it has been ruled that the employer should comply with
the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on
meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce
bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
In this case, we see that with no proof to substantiate its claim, petitioner moved
for a reduction of the appeal bond on the proferred basis of serious losses and
reverses it supposedly sustained in the years prior to the rendition of the Labor
Arbiter's decision.
Without necessarily resulting to a termination of employment, an employer may
at any rate, bona fide suspend the operation of its business for a period of not
exceeding six months under Article 286 of the Labor Code. 43 While the employer
is, on the one hand, duty bound to reinstate his employees to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights if the operation of the business is
resumed within six months, employment is deemed terminated where the
suspension exceeds said period.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
CASE #8
G.R. No. 154113

December 7, 2011

EDEN GLADYS ABARIA, ET. AL.

V.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, METRO CEBU COMMUNITY

HOSPITAL, INC., ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET. AL.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
MCCHI is a hospital owned by UCCP. The NFL is a National Federation which
acts as the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of
the MCCHI.
NFL is represented by Atty. Alforque. NFL has a LOCAL chapter called
NAMAMCCH-NFL, which is NOT INDEPENDENTLY REGISTERED. The local
chapters President is NAVA.
In 1995, since the CBA was about to expire NAVA wrote the administrator of
MCCHI, REV. IYOY, expressing the UNIONs desire to renew the CBA, attaching
to her letter a statement of proposals signed/endorsed by 153 union members.
Before responding to NAVA, MCCHI first checked with Atty. Alforque as NFL
representative whether NFL endorses NAVAs proposal. MCCHI found out from
Atty. Alforque that the proposed CBA submitted by NAVA was never referred to
NFL and that NFL has not authorized any other legal counsel or any person for
collective bargaining negotiations.
Atty. Alforque communicated with NAVA and other UNION officers that they were
suspended from the union membership for serious violation of the CBL of NFL.
The letter revealed that NAVA and other UNION officers of the local chapter
openly declared during a General Membership Meeting of the Union that they
submit to the authority of another union KMU and no longer to NFL.
The next day, several union members led by NAVA and her group launched a
series of mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands,
marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards, posters and
streamers. NFL disowned the concerted activities.
On March 13 and 19, 1996, the DOLE Regional Office issued certifications
stating that there is nothing in their records which shows that NAMA-MCCH-NFL
is a registered labor organization, and that said union submitted only a copy of its
Charter Certificate on January 31, 1995. Because of this MCCHI then sent
individual notices to all union members asking them to submit within 72 hours a
written explanation why they should not be terminated for having supported the
illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality
as per DOLE records.

The Local Chapter filed a Notice of Strike with NCMB but this was denied.
Despite such denial, NAVA and her group still conducted a strike. The striking
Union members failed to attend the investigations of MCCHI. Hence, MCCHI
sent termination letters to union leaders and other members who participated in
the strike and picketing activities. For their continued picketing activities despite
the said warning, more than 100 striking employees were dismissed. Unfazed,
the striking union members held more mass actions. The means of ingress to
and egress from the hospital were blocked, patients and employees were barred
from entering the premises; Placards were placed at the hospitals entrance gate
stating: Please proceed to another hospital and we are on protest.;
Employees and patients reported acts of intimidation and harassment
perpetrated by union leaders and members. Because of this, MCCHI suffered
heavy losses due to low patient admission rates.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON MCCHI is guilty of unfair labor practice?
2. WON petitioning employees were illegally dismissed?
HELD:
1. No ULP.
Records of the NCMB and DOLE Region 7 confirmed that NAMA-MCCHNFL had not registered as a labor organization, having submitted only its
charter certificate as an affiliate or local chapter of NFL. Not being a
legitimate labor organization, NAMAMCCH-NFL is not entitled to those
rights granted to a legitimate labor organization under Art. 242.
Aside from the registration requirement, it is only the labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit which is the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining, as
provided in Art. 255. NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor organization
certified or designated by the majority of the rank-and-file hospital
employees to represent them in the CBA negotiations but the NFL, as
evidenced by CBAs concluded in 1987, 1991 and 1994. To prove majority
support of the employees, NAMA-MCCH-NFL presented the CBA proposal
allegedly signed by 153 union members.
However, the petition signed by said members showed that the signatories
endorsed the proposed terms and conditions without stating that they
were likewise voting for or designating the NAMA-MCCH-NFL as their
exclusive bargaining representative.

Even assuming that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had validly disaffiliated from its

mother union, NFL, it still did not possess the legal personality to enter
into CBA negotiations.
A local union which is not independently registered cannot, upon
disaffiliation from the federation, exercise the rights and privileges granted
by law to legitimate labor organizations; thus, it cannot file a petition for
certification election. Besides, the NFL as the mother union has the right to
investigate members of its local chapter under the federations
Constitution and By-Laws, and if found guilty to expel such members.
MCCHI therefore cannot be faulted for deferring action on the CBA
proposal submitted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL in view of the union leaderships
conflict with the national federation. We have held that the issue of
disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be resolved in a different
forum in an action at the instance of either or both the federation and the
local union or a rival labor organization, not the employer.
2. Union officers legal, Union members illegal.
The termination of UNION OFFICERS NAVA, Alsado, Baez, Bongcaras,
Canen, Gerona and Remocaldo was valid and justified. BUT with respect
to the dismissed UNION MEMBERS, although MCCHI submitted
photographs taken at the picket line, it did not individually name those
striking employees and specify the illegal act committed by each of them.
Hence, the dismissal of union members who merely participated in the
illegal strike was illegal.

CASE #9
G.R. No. 164301
August 10, 2010
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN
BPI UNIBANK, Respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
In 2000, Far East Bank and trust Company (FEBTC) merged with Bank of the
Philippine Islands. Petitioner had a Union Shop agreement with respondent BPI
Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (the
Union). Pursuant to the merger, respondent requested BPI to terminate the
employment of those new employees from FEBTC who did not join the union.

BPI refused to undertake such action and brought the controversy before a
voluntary arbitrator. Although BPI won the initial battle at the Voluntary Arbitrator
level, BPIs position was rejected by the Court of Appeals, which ruled that the
Voluntary Arbitrators interpretation of the Union Shop Clause was at war with the
spirit and rationale why the Labor Code allows the existence of such provision.
This was followed and affirmation by the Supreme Court of the CA decision
holding that former employees of the Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) "absorbed" by BPI pursuant to the two banks merger. The absorbed
employees were covered by the Union Shop Clause in the then existing
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) of BPI with respondent BPI Employees
Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (the Union).
Petitioners, despite the August 2010 decision moved for a Motion for
reconsideration of the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Union Shop agreement violated the constitutional right of
security of tenure of the FEB employees absorbed by BPI.
HELD:
No. As a general rule, the State protects the workers right to security of tenure.
An employees services can only be terminated upon just and authorized causes.
In this case, the presence of a Union Shop Clause in the CBA between BPI and
BPI Union must be respected. Failure of an employee to join the union pursuant
to the clause is an authorized cause for BPI not to continue employing the
employee concerned and BPI must respect that provision of the CBA. In the
hierarchy of labor rights, unionism is favored over security of tenure. A contrary
interpretation of the Union Shop Clause would dilute its efficacy and put the
certified union that is supposedly being protected thereby at the mercy of
management. Nevertheless, the FEB employees are still entitled to the twin
notice rule this is to afford them ample opportunity to whether or not join the
union.

CASE #10
G.R. No. 173154

December 9, 2013

SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or SANG IK JANG, JISSO JANG, WISSO

JANG
and
NORBERTO
TADEO,Petitioners,
vs.
SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEE UNION - OLALIA, represented
by PORFERIA SALIBONGCOGON,1, Respondents.

x---------------x
G.R. No. 173229
SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION - OLALIA, represented
by
PORFERIA
SALIBONGCOGON, Petitioners,
vs.
SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or SANG IK JANG, JISSO JANG, WISSO
JANG, and NOREBERTO TADEO, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts:
On July 25, 2003, during the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiations
between Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. Employees Union Olalia (SPEU) and
Sangwoo Philippines, Inc.(SPI), the latter filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a letter-notice of temporary suspension of operations for
one (1) month, beginning September 15, 2003, due to lack of orders from its
buyers. SPEU was furnished a copy of the said letter. Negotiations on the CBA,
however, continued and on September 10, 2003, the parties signed a
handwritten Memorandum of Agreement, which, among others, specified the
employees wages and benefits for the next two (2) years, and that in the event of
a temporary shutdown, all machineries and raw materials would not be taken out
of the SPI premises.
On September 15, 2003,SPI temporarily ceased operations. Thereafter, it
successively filed two (2) letters with the DOLE, copy furnished SPEU, for the
extension of the temporary shutdown until March 15, 2004. Meanwhile, on
October 28, 2003, SPEU filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal closure,
illegal dismissal, damages and attorneys fees before the Regional Arbitration
Branch IV of the NLRC. Subsequently, or on February 12, 2004, SPI posted, in
conspicuous places within the company premises, notices of its permanent
closure and cessation of business operations, effective March 16, 2004, due to
serious economic losses and financial reverses. The DOLE was furnished a copy
of said notice on February 13, 2004, together with a separate letter notifying it of
the companys permanent closure. SPEU was also furnished with a copy of the
notice of permanent closure. Forthwith, SPI offered separation benefits of onehalf () month pay for every year of service to each of its employees. 234
employees of SPI accepted the offer, received the said sums and executed
quitclaims. Those who refused the offer, i.e., the minority employees, were
nevertheless given until March 25, 2004 to accept their checks and
correspondingly, execute quitclaims. However, the minority employees did not
claim the said checks.
ISSUES:

a) whether or not the minority employees are entitled to separation pay; and
b) whether or not SPI complied with the notice requirement of Article 297
(formerly Article 283) of the Labor Code.
.
A. Non-entitlement to Separation Benefits.
Article [297] of the Labor Code does not obligate an employer to pay separation
benefits when the closure is due to serious losses. To require an employer to be
generous when it is no longer in a position to do so, in our view, would be unduly
oppressive, unjust, and unfair to the employer. Ours is a system of laws, and the
law in protecting the rights of the working man, authorizes neither the oppression
nor the self-destruction of the employer.
In this case, the LA, NLRC, and the CA all consistently found that SPI indeed
suffered from serious business losses which resulted in its permanent shutdown
and accordingly, held the companys closure to be valid. It is a rule that absent
any showing that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the appellate court
are not supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine a new the evidence
submitted by the parties. Perforce, without any cogent reason to deviate from the
findings on the validity of SPIs closure, the Court thus holds that SPI is not
obliged to give separation benefits to the minority employees pursuant to Article
297 of the Labor Code as interpreted in the case of Galaxie. As such, SPI should
not be directed to give financial assistance amounting to P15,000.00 to each of
the minority employees based on the Formal Offer of Settlement. If at all, such
formal offer should be deemed only as a calculated move on SPIs part to further
minimize the expenses that it will be bound to incur should litigation drag on, and
not as an indication that it was still financially sustainable. However, since SPEU
chose not to accept, said offer did not ripen into an enforceable obligation on the
part of SPI from which financial assistance could have been realized by the
minority employees.
B.Insufficient Notice of Closure.
Article 297 of the Labor Code provides that before any employee is terminated
due to closure of business, it must give a one (1) month prior written notice to the
employee and to the DOLE. In this relation, case law instructs that it is the
personal right of the employee to be personally informed of his proposed
dismissal as well as the reasons therefor; and such requirement of notice is not a
mere technicality or formality which the employer may dispense with. Since the
purpose of previous notice is to, among others, give the employee some time to
prepare for the eventual loss of his job, the employer has the positive duty to
inform each and every employee of their impending termination of employment.

To this end, jurisprudence states that an employers act of posting notices to this
effect in conspicuous areas in the workplace is not enough. Verily, for something
as significant as the involuntary loss of ones employment, nothing less than an
individually-addressed notice of dismissal supplied to each worker is proper. As
enunciated in the case of Galaxie:
Finally, with regard to the notice requirement, the Labor Arbiter found, and it was
upheld by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, that the written notice of closure
or cessation of Galaxies business operations was posted on the company
bulletin board one month prior to its effectivity. The mere posting on the
company bulletin board does not, however, meet the requirement under
Article [297] of "serving a written notice on the workers."The purpose of the
written notice is to inform the employees of the specific date of termination or
closure of business operations, and must be served upon them at least one
month before the date of effectivity to give them sufficient time to make the
necessary arrangement. In order to meet the foregoing purpose, service of
the written notice must be made individually upon each and every
employee of the company