Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
S.
Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo,
Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school
officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded
not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with
preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Branch
VII
alleging
that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the
case due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed
for
the
offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1)
the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run toreclusion
perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter
were the legislative department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV
where the respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A.
No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation
fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.
Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction
over the case.
Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court the
responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of
imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative department
of the government.
Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the
case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828,
considers crimes punishable by fine of not more than Php
3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts.
Decision:
The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge
Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is
hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of
Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
b.
Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the
subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims?
Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the
conditions for its applicability, namely:
1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both
of them move for provisional dismissal,
2) offended party notified
3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,
4)public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional
dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, w/c in this
case hasnt been done.
US vs. Ah Chong
The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendantappellant.
En Banc
Carson, March 19, 1910
Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) Mistake of fact
Facts:
The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No.
27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a
house boy or muchacho
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40
meters from the nearest building
No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door
of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of
the building
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its
entire length and height
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt
or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached
a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the
habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening
the door by placing against it a chair
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the
defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force
open the door of the room
He called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the
door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon
forcing his way into the room
The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will
kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow,
the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered
the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers
who slept in the next house and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable
terms prior to the incident, and had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock that the door
and acquaint his companion with his identity
The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as
personal protection because of repeated robberies in Fort
McKinley
Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he
did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)"
because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite the defendant's warnings
Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and
sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally
responsible
Holding:
No.
Ratio:
By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts
were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a
thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it
would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state
of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he
would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention
were so"
The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without
which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances
as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
which will justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he
does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate
right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as
to the facts
RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.
FACTS:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani
Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12
years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison
temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to
reclusion
perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to
run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the
evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public
plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused
Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they
were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda.
Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline
and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness)
told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on
fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the
same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their
written
statements.
ISSUES:
Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be
the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the
accused?
There
is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the
felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence
of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at
the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the
same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the
accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of
the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the
accused
is
to
make
fun
of
miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT
collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was
committed
by
him.
**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the
assailants
in
confronting
the
victim.
Criminal
Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid
every undesirable consequence arising from any act
committed by his companions who at the same time were
making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING
TO
HOMICIDE
SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears
in the record establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery,
conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he
never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF
HOMICIDE
HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS
LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.
Panganiban,
Garcia v CA
GR 157171; March 14, 2006
In 1995, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ran for the senatorial elections.
Meanwhile, in Alaminos, Pangasinan, Arsenia Garcia was one
of the designated election officers. Garcia was accused by
Pimentel of violating the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
Pimentel alleged that Garcia decreased Pimentels vote by
5,000 votes.
The trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal, Garcia invoked
that the trial court erred in ruling that her defense of good faith
was not properly appreciated. She averred that due to the
workload given to her during said elections, she got fatigued
and that caused the error in the tabulation of Pimentels votes.
Pimentel argued that the Electoral Reforms Law is a special
law hence it is a malum prohibitum law and therefore, good
faith is not a defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged violation of Garcia of the
Electoral Reforms Law is a malum prohibitum.
HELD: No. Generally, mala in se crimes refer to those felonies
in violation of the Revised Penal Code. However, it must be
noted that mala in se are crimes which are inherently immoral.
Hence, even if the crime is punished by a special law, if it is
inherently immoral, then it is still a crime mala in se.
In this case, the said violation of the Electoral Reforms Law is
a mala in se crime because it is inherently immoral to decrease
the vote of a candidate. Note also that what is being punished
is the intentional decreasing of a candidates votes and not
those arising from errors and mistakes. Since a violation of this
special law is a malum in se, good faith can be raised as a
defense.
However, Garcias defense of good faith was not proven. Facts
show that the decreasing of Pimentels vote was not due to
error or mistake. It was shown that she willingly handled
certain duties which were not supposed to be hers to perform.
Thats a clear sign that she facilitated the erroneous entry.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN
and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants, FERNANDO
ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS y
ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and
Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1
convicting them of the crime of murder and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for
the latters death and P256,960 representing the victims
unrealized
income.
On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was
filed against Fernando Iligan, Edmundo Asis and Juan
Macandog:chanrobles.com.ph
:
virtual
law
library
"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II,
barangay Sto. Domingo, municipality of Vinzons, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring and
mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan armed with
a bolo (sinampalok) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a
sudden unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr.,
on his face, thus causing fatal injuries on the latters face which
resulted to (sic) the death of said Esmeraldo Quiones.
"CONTRARY
TO
LAW."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
witness Dr. Abas to the effect that Quiones, Jr. died because
of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the
lower court, in its decision of May 7, 1986,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court
that the Certificate of Death have shown that the victims death
was caused by a vehicular accident. To this, notwithstanding,
the Court cannot give credit for some reasons. First, the fact of
the alleged vehicular accident has not been fully established.
Second, Esmeraldo Quiones, Sr., (the) father of the victim,
testified that Dr. Abas told him that if his son was hacked by a
bolo on the face and then run over the entire head by a
vehicles tire, then that hacking on the face could not be visibly
seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981) Third,
Exhibit 2 (the photograph of the victim taken immediately after
his body had been brought home) is a hard evidence. It will
attestly (sic) show that the entire head was not crushed by any
vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that only half of the face and
head, was damaged with the wound starting on a sharp edge
horizontally. There are contusions and abrasions on the upper
left shoulder and on the neck while the body downwards has
none of it, while on the right forehead there is another wound
caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is simple, that if the
victim was run over by a vehicle, the other half portion of his
head and downward part of his body must have been likewise
seriously
damaged,
which
there
are
none."
17
The lower court also found that Iligans group conspired to kill
anyone or all members of the group of the victim to vindicate
the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery and accordingly convicted Iligan and Edmundo Asis
of the crime of murder and imposed on them the
aforementioned
penalty.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing
innocence of the crime for which they were convicted. For the
second time, they attributed Quiones, Jr.s death to a
vehicular
accident.
No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiones, Jr.
was run over by a vehicle. The defense relies on the testimony
of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore that the multiple
fracture on the head of Quiones, Jr. was caused by a
vehicular accident 18 which opinion was earlier put in writing
by the same witness in the postmortem examination. Dr. Abas
justified his conclusion by what he considered as tire marks on
the victims left shoulder and the right side of his neck. 19 He
also testified that the incised wound located at the victims right
eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so
superficial that it could not have caused the victims death. 20
Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity
of the actual occurrence of the vehicular mishap. One such
evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis
that when he helped bring home the body of Quiones, Jr., he
told the victims father, Esmeraldo Quiones, Sr. that "before
Esmeraldo Quiones (Jr.) was run over by a vehicle, he was
hacked by Fernando Iligan." 21 When asked why he
mentioned an automobile, Zaldy Asis said that he did not
notice any vehicle around but he mentioned it "because his
(Quiones, Jr.) head was busted." 22 It is therefore not
farfetched to conclude that Zaldy Asis had actual knowledge of
said accident but for understandable reasons he declined to
declare it in court. Defense witness Marciano Mago, the
barangay captain of Sto. Domingo, also testified that when he
went to the scene of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the
victim scattered across the road where he also saw tire marks.
23
For its part, the prosecution, through the victims father,
presented evidence to the effect that Iligan authored the
maceration of half of the victims head. Quiones, Sr. testified
that from their house, which was about five meters away from
the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding a "sinampalok" as
he, together with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, chased
someone. During the second time that he saw the three
accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na yan." 24 Hence,
the lower court concluded that the victims head was "chopped"
resulting in the splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It
should be emphasized, however, that the testimony came from
a
biased
witness
and
it
was
uncorroborated.
While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given
due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a criminal
case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by
commission or omission, as may be imputable to the trial court.
26 In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the
maceration of one half of the head of the victim was also
caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different
conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that
indeed, after Quiones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking
perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This
finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from
liability for the death of Quiones, Jr.chanrobles.com : virtual
law
library
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential
requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has
been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony committed by the offender. 28 We hold that these
requisites
are
present
in
this
case.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head
of Quiones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial
by the physician who autopsied Quiones is beside the point.
What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking
Quiones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was
meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him
as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the
head.
29
The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30
where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such
vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis,
running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of
around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented
highway,
was
run
over
by
a
vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligans hacking
of Quiones, Jr.s head might not have been the direct cause, it
was the proximate cause of the latters death. Proximate legal
cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom." 31 In other words, the
sequence of events from Iligans assault on him to the time
Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very
short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of
events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape
liability.chanrobles
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library
We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot
turn the tide in favor of Iligan because he was positively seen
at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution
witnesses.
32
But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings
on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower
court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of
Quiones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however, does not
by itself show treachery. 33 There must be evidence that the
mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to
make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend
himself. 34 In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan
followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a
warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile
attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiones, Jr. was
therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against
them.
35
People v. Mananquil
GR No L-35574, Sep 28, 1994, Cuevas, J.
FACTS
Prosecutions version
o 1965 Mar 6: At about 11pm, Valentina
Manananquil went to the NAWASA Building
at Pasay City, where her husband was
working as a security guard
o She had just purchased 10 centavos worth
of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station
at Taft Avenue. She placed the gasoline in a
coffee bottle
o She was angry at her husband, Elias Day,
because the latter had burned her clothing,
was maintaining a mistress, and had been
taking all the food from their house
o Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she
knocked at the door
o Immediately after the door was opened,
Elias Day shouted at his wife and castigated
her, saying PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON
o The appellant, tired of hearing the victim,
then got the bottle of gasoline and poured
the contents thereof on the face of the victim
o Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo
shirt of the victim aflame
Defenses version
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
ISSUES/HELD
RATIONALE
Quinto v. Andres
G.R. No. 155791 March 16, 2005
Lessons Applicable: Proximate cause, EX to Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
FACTS:
November 13, 1995 7:30 am: Edison Garcia, 11 year-old and
Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson
Quinto saw Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the
mouth of a drainage culvert.
Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them
inside the drainage culvert. Wilson agreed while Garcia seeing
that it was dark inside, opted to remain seated in a grassy area
about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system
Only Pacheco had a flashlight. Pacheco, who was holding a
fish, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a
word. Then, Andres came out, went back inside, and emerged
again carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid his body
down in the grassy area.
Garcia, shocked, fled from the scene. Andres went to the
house of Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that
her son had died. They rushed to the drainage culvert. Wilson
was buried without any complaints filed.
November 28, 1995: National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
took the sworn statements of Pacheco, Garcia and Quinto
Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage
system catching fish with Andres and Wilson
Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBIs autopsy showed that the cause
death is drowning with traumatic head injuries as contributory
NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against Andres and
Pacheco with the RTC
Dr. Dominic Aguda testified that Wilson could have fallen, and
that the occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt
object, That the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of
Wilsons head could have rendered the him unconscious so he
drowned. The 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of
Wilsons face could have also been caused by rubbing against
a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough
surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of
mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.
RTC: granted demurer to evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence
CA: Affirmed RTC
ISSUE: W/N Acquittal in criminal case bars a civil action where
the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit
the criminal acts imputed to them
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
o The civil liability of such person established in Articles 100,
102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages
GR: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action
EX: the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform
and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation
or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage
or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act
of the accused
o While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required
to prove the cause of action of the private complainant against
the accused for damages and/or restitution.
o Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the
prosecution or the private complainant is burdened to adduce
preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence.
failed
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally
foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the drainage
culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he
refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either
respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was
invited to join them in fishing
GR: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his
way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano
went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there
he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier
admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel
ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo,
and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27,
1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano
paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November
14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had
lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be
caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in
his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with
homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on
appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new
trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated
that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation
canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the
proximate cause of the latters death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared
on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on
the second day from theonset time. The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by
the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was
not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering
the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A
prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
People v Domasian
Appealed
ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping
kidnapping
with
serious
illegal
detention
HELD:
YES.
appealed
decision
is
AFFIRMED
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may
consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the
sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he
says
is
not
punishable.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same
article,
which
clearly
applies
to
him,
thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been
committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent improbability of its
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or
ineffective means. The sending of the ransom note would have
had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the
last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have
been possible under the new Constitution.
People v Marco
GR Nos L-28324-5; May 19, 1978
FACTS:
November 5, 1964 2:30 pm: It was raining and there was a
fiesta being celebrated within the vicinity of the market place of
Barrio Subang, Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur. Constancio
Sabelbero was approached by Simeon Marco who asked him if
he was the one who boxed the latter's brother the previous
year. Constancio denied. Then Simeon asked if he had
cigarettes and when he said he had none, Simeon said, "I have
cigarettes; here is my cigarette", as he pulled out a one-foot
long hunting knife. Frightened, Constancio ran away and
Simeon chased him. As Constancio was passing by Rafael
Marco, father of Simeon, he struck Constancio with a round
cane, hitting him on the left ear and left shoulder.
Vicente, the father of Constancio, who was in the crowd
heard a shout of "Fight! Fight!". He saw Simeon about to stab
Constancio, so he grabbed the hand of Simeon that was
holding the knife. Then, Rafael Marco approached him armed
with a cane and a hunting knife. Sensing danger, Vicente
shouted to Constancio and his other son Bienvenido, who
appeared on the scene, to run away. Vicente and Constancio
was able to run away but Bienvenido was chased and stabbed
by Rafael which wounded his left hand. Bienvenido tried to run
Vicente, but his foot got caught in a vine on the ground and he
fell. Out of nowhere, Dulcisimo Beltran, who was accused
arrived and stabbed Bienvenido near his anus while he had his
two hands touching the floor and both feet in a forward
position. Beltran was followed by Simeon who stabbed
Bienvenido on the left breast and the upper part of the left
arm. Then, Rafael, Simeon and Beltran ran away. Bienvenido
got up slowly and walked zigzagly towards the store of Pinda
where he fell to the ground. Vicente asked him what happened
and he said he was ganged up then died.
Criminal Case No. 2758: Rafael Marco was convicted of
slight physical injuries and his son, Simeon, was acquitted
Criminal Case No, 2757: Rafael Marco, Dulcisimo Beltran,
and Simeon Marco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Sentenced Rafael Marco to reclusion perpetua. While,
Dulcisimo Beltran and Simeon Marco who surrendered
voluntarily sentenced EACH to an indeterminate penalty
consisting of 10 YEARS and 1 DAY of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS, and 1 DAY of reclusion
temporal
as
maximum
ISSUE: W/N Rafael Marco should be guilty of murder.
HELD: NO. modified Rafael Marco guilty of slight physical
injuries
while it is true that Rafael started by stabbing Bienvenido on
the left hand, there is no clear evidence connecting his act with
those of Beltran and Simeon. If Rafael had any intention to
really kill Bienvenido, he did not have to await for Simeon and
Beltran
to
do
it.
The stabbing by the 3 was not simultaneous. Rather, it was
successive. The manner in which the incident occurred
indicates that there was no pre-conceived plan among the 3.
There is absolutely no showing that Rafael knew of the criminal
intentions of Dulcisimo Beltran or Simeon Marco as to the
decedent. Neither is there any showing that after the decedent
was able to run away that Rafael shouted to Dulcisimo Beltran
or Simeon Marco for assistance. Or that he gave them any
inciting or encouraging words, or that he even joined them
The accused must be shown to have had guilty participation
in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this
presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It
is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by
the principal and those attributed to the person charged as coprincipal or accomplice; it is furthermore, necessary that the
latter, with knowledge of the former's criminal intent, should
cooperate with moral or material aid in the consummation of
the
crime.
The ensuing death was not the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the wound inflicted by Rafael. There was an
active intervening cause, which was no other than the sudden
and appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and
Beltran.