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FOUNDATIONS
Volume 1, Number 1
Date of publication: 01 November 2005
EDITORIAL
Alexander Riegler (Free University of Brussels)
Editorial.The Constructivist Challenge
OPINIONS
Radical constructivism:
Ernst von Glasersfeld (University of Massachussetts)
Thirty Years Constructivism
Second order cybernetics:
Diederik Aerts (Free University of Brussels)
Ceci nest pas Heinz von Foerster
SURVEY
Enactive cognitive science:
Kevin McGee (Linkping University)
Enactive Cognitive Science.
Part 1: Background and Research Themes
CONCEPTUAL
Epistemic structuring:
Herbert F. J. Mller (McGill University)
People,Tools, and Agency: Who Is the Kybernetes?
EMPIRICAL
Radical constructivism:
Dewey Dykstra (Boise State University)
Against Realist Instruction.
Superficial Success Masking Catastrophic Failure and an Alternative
An interdisciplinary journal
http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal
Ranulph Glanville
CybernEthics Research, UK
Vincent Kenny
Inst. of Constructivist Psychology, Italy
Klaus Krippendorff
University of Pennsylvania, USA
Humberto Maturana
Institute Matrztica, Chile
Josef Mitterer
University of Klagenfurt, Austria
Karl Mller
Wisdom, Austria
Bernhard Prksen
University of Hamburg, Germany
Gebhard Rusch
University of Siegen, Germany
Siegfried J. Schmidt
University of Mnster, Germany
Bernard Scott
Cranfield University, UK
Sverre Sjlander
Linkping University, Sweden
Stuart Umpleby
George Washington University, USA
Terry Winograd
Stanford University, USA
Editor-In-Chief
Alexander Riegler
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
Editorial Board
Pille Bunnell
Royal Roads University, Canada
Olaf Diettrich
Center Leo Apostel, Belgium
Dewey Dykstra
Boise State University, USA
Stefano Franchi
University of Auckland, New Zealand
Timo Honkela
Helsinki Univ. of Technology, Finland
Theo Hug
University of Innsbruck, Austria
Urban Kordes
Institut Jozef Stefan, Slovenia
Albert Mller
University of Vienna, Austria
Herbert F. J. Mller
McGill University, Montreal, Canada
Markus Peschl
University of Vienna, Austria
Bernd Porr
University of Glasgow, UK
John Stewart
SUBMISSIONS
Language: Papers must be written in English. If English is a foreign language for you
please let the text be proofread by an English native speaker.
Copyright: With the exception of reprints of classical articles, all papers are
original work, i.e., they must not have been published elsewhere before nor
must they be the revised version (changes amount to less than 25% of the
original) of a published work. However, the copyright remains with the author
and is licensed under a Creative Commons License.
Authors guidelines at http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/guideline.pdf
Send all material to Alexander Riegler ariegler@vub.ac.be.
Important: Use Constructivist Foundations in the Subject: field.
Tom Ziemke
University of Skvde, Sweden
conceptual
constructivism
EDITORIAL
lized (cf. the If it aint broken dont fix it syndrome, Riegler 1998, 2001b), caught in the
momentary situational context as determined by the way we have learned to deal with
things. But secondly, the analogy also warns
us of authoritarian attempts to think there is
only true solution to a whatever we identify as
a problem. Their appeal to reality as the
ultimate arbiter of (scientific) disputes gives
rise to the belief that there exists a mind-independent reality which defines what is true and
what is not. However, as Mitterer (1992)
pointed out, isnt claiming authority by referring to an external truth the attempt to make
ones own point of view unassailable? The two
analogies above should make it clear that science and philosophy gain from variety and
the possibility of choosing from other
options.
Such variety and freedom of choice has
always been a major aspect a constructivist
philosophies and sciences. Heinz von Foersters (1973/2003, p. 227) ethical imperative: Act always so as to increase the number
of choices does not only anthropo-morphize
W. Ross Ashbys (1956) Law of Requisite Variety which states that the variety of actions
available to a control system must be at least
as large as the variety of actions in the system
to be controlled (so by having more choice
you stay in control). Foersters imperative is
also a reminder to the fact that most problems
in science are undecidable in principle. These
are problems of organized complexity
(Weaver 1948), characterized by a sizeable
number of factors which are interrelated into
an organic whole (p. 539). Any attempt to
conceptual
constructivism
EDITORIAL
The plurality of
constructivism
When some 30 years ago by Ernst von Glasersfeld started publishing on a concept he called
radical constructivism (Glasersfeld 1995;
cf. also his recollection article in this edition)
he pioneered the philosophical-epistemological approach. He maintains that knowledge is
not passively received but actively built up by
the cognizing subject (first principle of radical constructivism). Furthermore the function of cognition is adaptive; it serves the
organization of the experiential world, not
the discovery of ontological reality (second
principle). He calls his version radical
because he claims that constructivism has to
be applied to all levels of description. Those
who ... do not explicitly give up the notion
that our conceptual constructions can or
should in some way represent an independent, objective reality, are still caught up in
the traditional theory of knowledge (Glasersfeld 1991).
Glasersfeld refers to the skeptic tradition
in philosophy, especially to Sextus Empiricus,
Berkeley (Esse est percipi, i.e., to be is to be perceived), Vico (Verum ipsum factum, i.e., the
truth is the same as the made), and to Hans
Vaihingers (1911/1952) as-if philosophy. For
Glasersfeld, skepticism points the way to the
insight that whatever world view we construct
we do not have any means of validating it. He
also quotes Jean Piaget from whom he took
over the idea that the child constructs his or
her world by means of assimilation and
accommodation.
Another philosophically oriented perspective is Herbert Mllers (2000; cf. also his
article in this edition) epistemic structuring (of
experience) approach. It assumes mental
structures to be tools for mastering unstructured experience. The principle of zero-derivation claims that reality structures are not
derived from any given pre-structured entities inside or outside the subject thus obviat-
Psychologist Ulric Neisser (1975) developed a theory of schemata controlled information pickup. A cognitive schema accepts
information as it becomes available at sensory
surfaces and is changed by that information.
It directs movements and exploratory activities that make more information available, by
which it is further modified (p. 55).
For Kevin ORegan and Alva No (2001)
seeing is knowing sensorimotor dependencies, and the brain is a device to extract algebraic structures between perception and
action. The authors refer to the work of
Donald MacKay (1969) on sensorimotor
contingencies and continued the work of
Paul Bach-y-Rita (1972) who pioneered with
work on sensory substitution. In particular,
Bach-y-Rita showed how a blind person could
gain some notion of sight by converting visual
camera images into tactile information, and
interpreted this as expression of brain plasticity.
The theory of autopoietic systems formulated by biologists Humberto R. Maturana
and Francisco J. Varela can be referred to as the
biological-neurobiological approach. Autopoietic systems are a sub-class of self-organizing
systems which, if they exist in the physical
domain, are the class of living systems. For
them, the nervous system is a closed network
of interacting neurons where any change in
the state of relative activity of a collection of
neurons leads to a change in the state of relative activity of other or the same collection of
neurons. This is referred to as the organizational closure of the nervous system. It can
be argued that organizational closure represents the starting point for the formal interpretation of radical constructivism (Riegler
2001a).
The work of neurophysiologist Rudolfo R.
Llins (2001) provides empirical backing. He
too formulated a closed-system hypothesis:
[The brain] is capable of doing what it does
without any sensory input whatsoever (p.
94). According to his dreaming machineargument, we are basically dreaming
machines that construct virtual models.
Neurophysiologist Gerhard Roth (Haynes
et al. 1998) maintains that the limbic system,
the unconsciously working part of the brain
responsible for evaluations, is the ultimate
instance of volitional cognition. In their view,
consciousness is just a pseudo-ruling ego. It is
not the ego who constructs; it is constructed,
Constructivist Foundations
conceptual
constructivism
EDITORIAL
Does constructivism
matter?
Will constructivism change science? Carnap
discussed the effect of epistemology in his
well-known thought experiment of two geographers a realist and an idealist who travel
to Africa to investigate claims about an
unusual mountain. Carnaps conclusion is
that the two geographers will come to the
same result not only about the existence of the
mountain, but also about its other characteristics, namely position, shape, height, etc. In
all empirical questions there is unanimity
[The epistemological] divergence between
the two scientists does not occur in the empirical domain, for there is complete unanimity
so far as the empirical facts are concerned.
(Carnap 1928/1967, p. 334). Similarly, Hel-
conceptual
constructivism
EDITORIAL
The common
denominator
Let us pick up again the initial question, What
is constructivism? As argued above, giving a
one-dimensional answer does not only contradict constructivist principles, it is above all
counterproductive for scientific and philosophical endeavors. It would be difficult if not
impossible to lump together the many independent disciplinary roots and proponents of
constructivism. However, it is possible and
desirable to distill their common denominator. From what has been said so far in this editorial but without going into further details
(and thereby violating the idea of a denominator being wide enough to cover various paradigms) I present the constructivist program.
It encompasses the following ten aspects.
1. Constructivist approaches question the
Cartesian separation between objective world
and subjective experience. As argued by Josef
Mitterer (2001), such dualistic approaches,
being the prevailing scientific orientation, are
based on the distinction between description
Constructivist Foundations
conceptual
constructivism
EDITORIAL
Since many scientists and philosophers have developed their respective version of constructivism
without necessarily paying much attention to historical or contemporary parallels a number of
labels for constructivist research have emerged.Therefore authors may align their submission to
Constructivist Foundation to any from the following (incomplete) list of schools (or paradigms).
[ constructivist evolutionary epistemology
[ cybersemiotics
[ enactive cognitive science (cf. McGees survey in this number)
[ epistemic structuring of experience (cf. Mllers conceptual paper)
[ radical constructivism (cf. Glasersfelds recollection article)
[ second order cybernetics (cf. Aertss interview with Foerster)
[ theory of autopoietic systems
Dimension 3: Types of inquiry
As different disciplines prefer different types of inquiry, submissions to Constructivist Foundations investigations too may focus on different ways of how to use their insights. Contributions
will be classified according the following dimension.
Opinions are written from the personal perspective of constructivist researchers and philosophers (and are therefore subject to editorial editing only).
Surveys provide an extensive overview with the goal to bracket single insights and results to
provide a global picture.
Conceptual papers develop philosophical-argumentative support.
Empirical studies focus on psychological, biological, physical etc. evidence.
Synthetic studies try to turn conceptual or empirical insights of constructivist theories into
models, simulation, or hardware devices.
The articles
in this edition
The present first edition provides a sample of
the sort of articles that will be published in
upcoming editions of Constructivist Foundations. It starts with a recollection of Ernst von
Glasersfeld who summarizes the (personal)
history of the radical constructivist paradigm.
Newcomers to constructivism may find the
text particularly appealing. Glasersfeld writes
conceptual
constructivism
EDITORIAL
sion of thinking by thoroughly applying constructivism at all levels. As a result the author
claims that many hard problems in philosophy such as the mindbody problem may
find easy solutions. The article not only introduces a new constructivist variation, it has
also been shaped in a novel way. Originally
written as a target article for the world-wideweb-based discussion forum Karl Jaspers
Forum at http://www.kjf.ca, it received such
a large number of comments (which in turn
spurred many responses by the author) that
the author wrote a revised version that
includes the criticism and support from the
comments. In other words, the paper has
undergone public reviewing which served
as a sufficient criterion for publication in
Constructivist Foundations. Also in future,
the editors of the journal intend to exploit this
mode as an alternative to the standard double-blind peer reviewing used for other
papers in the journal.
The last paper in this edition is an empirical study of constructivist education that has
become a well-known education paradigm in
the US. Its author Dewey Dykstra dismisses a
number of allegations against constructivist
education and presents a new constructivist
alternative to the elitist-realist paradigm.
The selection of papers for this edition
reflects the flexibility of constructivist strategies. It is evident that a broad variety of topics
and types of paper is difficult to find in most
other journals. Variety and diversity, however,
do not mean shallowness as the reviewed
papers show; they are distinct in their deep
References
Constructivist Foundations
conceptual
constructivism
EDITORIAL
conceptual
constructivism
EDITORIAL
Constructivist Foundations
historical
radical constructivism
OPINION
historical
radical constructivism
OPINION
10
Constructivist Foundations
historical
radical constructivism
OPINION
Note
what we call
knowledge can be
constructed without
reference to anything
outside the experiential
confines
There have been many others whose
thinking contained constructivist elements
Rorty, Feyerabend, Bruner, Dewey, Brouwer,
Fleck, Bogdanov, and probably some I have
never heard of; but, apart from the radical
constructivists I mentioned above, I know
none who tried to model the generation of
knowledge without reference to an ontic reality. Yet, if the skeptics are right and two
thousand five hundred years of Western philosophy have not been able to prove them
wrong neither the structure nor the texture
References
Ceccato, S. (ed.) (1969) Corso di linguistica
operativa. Longanesi: Milan.
Diels, H. (1957) Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Rowohlt: Hamburg.
Fischer, H. -R. & Schmidt, S. J. (eds.) (2000)
Wirklichkeit und Welterzeugung. Carl
Auer Systeme: Heidelberg.
Foerster, H. von (1972) An epistemology for
living things. In: Motin, E. & Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (eds.) Lunit de lhomme. di-
11
historical
radical constructivism
OPINION
12
Links
Further material on Ernst von Glasersfeld can
be obtained from his new hormepage at
http://www.vonglasersfeld.com/
Constructivist Foundations
historical
OPINION
stein. He asked to have a little picture of Einstein printed next to the announcement of his
talk in the conference programme booklet, a
wish we were glad to grant. As he explains in
the interview below, over time he had become
convinced that semantics-related problems
are more important even for the ontological
nature of things than he estimated himself
in his earlier days. He saw a striking resemblance in the ways both Einstein and Magritte
revolutionized their respective fields of
inquiry and activity by making explicit the
influence of the semantic level on the syntactic level. Like no one before, Magritte played
with the insight that the model is not the
thing, while Einstein shook the foundations
of all of physics with his theory of relativity.
Here, observation influences space as well as
time two physical concepts that until then
were largely considered to be purely objective,
or even a priori.
The way Heinz von Foerster arrived at the
Einstein meets Magritte conference is itself a
surrealistic story of pure Magrittean quality.
It is worth telling it in some detail. On Friday
evening, the last evening of the conference,
there was to be a performance by the dance
and theatre group of Anne Teresa De Keersmaker. To allow the troupe to prepare for their
performance, the large university hall, where
the Einstein meets Magritte conferences were
normally scheduled, therefore had to be made
available to them on Friday afternoon. That is
why the conference booklet announced that
the last three lectures of the invited speakers,
including von Foersters, would take place in
an old cinema building on the premises of a
military site close to the university campus.
The organising committee of the conference
had provided all invited speakers with vouchers for free taxi rides in Brussels on the days of
the conference. The vouchers were also
intended to be used on arrival at the airport to
get to the location where the conference was
held. However, for some mysterious reason,
rather than taking him from the airport to the
university, the taxi driver drove Heinz von
Foerster to the university clinic, at the opposite end of town. This was to be only the
beginning of von Foersters Magrittean odyssey. It took some time before von Foerster was
told that the university clinic was not the place
where he was supposed to be. He then took
another taxi, and showed the driver the conference booklet in which his talk was
announced, thinking that this would get him
to the right place. He was right, for this time
the taxi did take him to the military site. But
this was not to be the end of his predicament.
The barracks site is not an area where civilians
can easily enter, and it was only after von Foerster had marshalled his persuasive power,
wielding the conference booklet as conclusive
evidence, that the guards at the gate allowed
him to enter the military zone. He was
escorted to the cinema building, which had
conference announcements posted on its
walls. Indeed, some of the young conference
assistants, during earlier visits undertaken to
check that it could be used as an alternative to
the university hall that Friday afternoon, had
been eagerly putting up the posters at the cinema entrance. But neither the military, nor
the guards at the gate, nor any of the cinema
staff watching a movie (Dracula!, von Foerster would comment later in a mysterious
voice) now seemed to know anything about
the conference.
All in all, it took von Foerster six long
hours to get from the airport to the campus
longer than it took him to cross the Atlantic
from the United States. I remember very vividly the state in which he arrived just after his
unexpected adventure. He was all excited, a
bit angry, but fascinated at the same time. He
told about the amazing excitement he felt
when being walked several times past and
close by military horses standing in line.
The horses snorted and stamped like hell
each time I walked by, they knew that this was
a person who did not belong there, but
They definitely were the only ones to know
this for like three full hours so you see
everything is relative, Einstein and Magritte
would agree, in certain circumstances a horse
can be more intelligent than a human being.
These horses would have let me escape immediately.
13
historical
OPINION
Despite his six-hour odyssey and threehour captivity in Belgian barracks, he was
delighted to grant the organisers the following
interview, in which he tells us about an even
longer journey that of his remarkable life and
scientific career. The transcription follows
Heinz von Foersters wording as closely as possible in order to capture his unique conversational charm. The endnotes were added later.
14
Constructivist Foundations
historical
OPINION
I didnt think myself of this! You mean Einstein when he was carefully reflecting on the
observers, how time and space got completely transformed by these indeed semantic reflections?
HVF: Exactly, precisely! I will bring about
tomorrow. I will not give it away at the
moment in our interview but I
found a wonderful perception of
Einstein in his early days when he
was wrestling with a notion which
is later found in the special theory of
relativity where
he came up
with a metaphorical statement of his. If
you read that
today and you
think he had
told his notion
to a physician at
an insane asylum he would
probably be put
inside that asylum. This man is
crazy. He thinks
about things that dont exist, he is talking
about them freely as if they were existing. I
thought this is a wonderful example of ingenuity.
15
historical
OPINION
16
way but today you would do it with transistors. He had this machine standing in his lab
in London and you were allowed with a
sledgehammer to destroy 500 tubes. It was
doing some particular things I dont know
what but anyway you went there with a
sledgehammer for a moment the pointers
wiggled but then brrrr! moved into stability.
So you could see if systems are constructed so
that they can self repair autodynamics etc
etc. it is the key for the brain. He had a wonderful example.
The example of a man who was working in
a rolling mill, a big rotary mill where, for
instance, steel rods are being built and what
you do is you come with a thick piece of metal,
which is red hot, go through the first wheels
where its squeezed to a smaller one and
becomes longer and is shot into the next mill,
shot and shot and shot, and becomes thinner
and thinner, longer and longer. At one instant
this rod glowing missed the next mill, shot
into the eye of a worker, penetrated the brain,
was sticking out at the other end. They
stopped the mill, carried the man, cut the
sticks, and brought him to Ross Ashby. The
man was talking! The man could talk! They
removed the rod because the man could die.
Of course the man had difficulties talking but
it was a functional creature. This is an example of self repair, of switching certain functions of the brain into the part which is still
intact, taking over what was lost, and the man
still functioned.
So Ashby became interested in these very
general systemic structures which maintain
themselves.
And then I had Humberto Maturana15 as
a guest for one or one and a half years who
brought in the autopoietic notion generated
in my lab. Things of that sort. And then at the
last contract with the institute of health, the
national institute of health, we worked on
haematology and population dynamics etc.
etc.
So we were playing in many different
domains but with the same, should I say
philosophicalepistemological attitude. It
produces a lot of different things and this I
think is what I enjoyed mostly.
Francisco Varela16 came in too?
HVF: Varela never was in, I only knew Francisco as a young man he was first staying in
Chile with
Constructivist Foundations
historical
OPINION
Notes
1. Warren McCulloch (18991969) neurophysiologist and cybernetician working
on mathematically neural network modeling. Together with Walter Pitts he showed
in the 1943 paper A logical calculus of the
ideas immanent in nervous activity how
a neural network consisting of binary
threshold neurons can carry out logical inferences at the level of first-order logic.
2. Norbert Wiener (18941964) became
eventually known as the founder of cybernetics based on this book (Cybernetics or
Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine) which he published in 1948.
3. John von Neumann (19031957) not only
made contributions to various mathematical fields but also had a major impact on
quantum physics, game theory, set theory,
computer science, and economics.
He was cured.
HVF: He had no time to see the doctor. My
friend the mathematician, What did you do
to that man? I said, Nothing! I told him a
problem which I could not solve. So this
immediately put him on the track. And I
really dont know the mathematics; this guy
knows much more than I. But I know the
problem, I know who might be able to go
about.
4. Gregory Bateson (19041980) was a highly interdisciplinarily working anthropologist, linguist, social scientist, and
psychiatrist.
5. Margaret Mead (19011978) was an anthropologist focusing on psychologically
oriented field work as well as building interdisciplinary links between anthropology and other fields.
6. Cybernetics. Circular causal, and feedback mechanisms in biological and social
systems. Transactions of the Sixth Conference 1949, edited by Heinz von Foerster. Republished together with the
following four transactions by Claus Pias
(2003).
7. Mexican physiologist Arturo S. Rosenblueth (19001970) researched the chemical mechanism of nervous impulses
transmission at the Departments of Physiology and Pharmacology at the Instituto
Nacional de Cardiologa in Mexico City.
17
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OPINION
18
15.Humberto Maturana (1928) is neurobiologist at the University of Chile who developed the concept of autopoiesis.
16.Francisco Varela (19462002), a former
student of Maturana. Later he pursued his
own vision to develop a calculus of selfreference.
17.Gordon Pask (19281996) developed a
Conversation Theory which he applied to
education. It grew out of his cybernetic
understanding of human-machine interaction as a form of conversation and dynamic process in which the participants
learn about each other.
18.Referring to Pirsigs talk at the conferences
that started about when this interview ended. Robert Pirsig (1928) became famous
with his 1974 book called Zen and the Art
of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry
into Value, which introduced the Metaphysics of Quality to account for the link
between quality, morality and reality.
References
Mller, A. (2000) Eine kurze Geschichte des
BCL. sterreichische Zeitschrift fr
Geschichtswissenschaften 11: 930. Also:
http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/
papers/mueller/mueller00-bcl.html
Pias, C. (ed.) (2003) Cybernetics | Kybernetik.
The Macy-Conferences 19461953. Volume 1 Transactions/Protokolle. Diaphanes: Zrich, Berlin.
Further links
The entire interview can be downloaded as
audio file from http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/1.1/interview.mp3
Constructivist Foundations
engineering-computer scientific
SURVEY
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to introduce
enactive cognitive science and to provide a
brief survey of some concerns and research
work that could be said to fall within this
emerging discipline.
The paper is in two parts. The first part,
published here, provides some background
and an overview of some major research
themes of enactive cognitive science. The second part, to be published in a later issue, will
look more closely at some of enactive cognitive sciences research methods and proposed
explanations, mechanisms, and models of
enactive cognitive science; more recent
research; applications; and open questions
and areas of future research.
The plan of this part is as follows. The
remainder of this section presents some brief
preliminary comments about constructivism, radical constructivism, and related issues
of vocabulary (readers familiar with the standard constructivist caveats can safely skip this
section). The paper proper begins in the next
section by presenting several examples of
results from cognitive research in perception;
these are intended to contextualize for the
reader why some researchers feel dissatisfied
with the dominant objectivist, cognitivist
paradigm, and why they are motivated to seek
or develop alternative paradigms such as
enactive cognitive science. This part then concludes by highlighting several of the disciplines major research themes.
In such a short paper, the topics and examples are obviously meant to be illustrative
rather than fully detailed or comprehensive;
the various references and bibliography
should provide good indications of where to
look for more details.
Before starting, it is important to highlight
a few things that this paper is not. It assumes
a certain basic degree of familiarity with con-
19
engineering-computer scientific
SURVEY
20
From objectivism to
radical constructivism
In order to situate enactive cognitive science,
it will help to sketch some of the contributing
philosophical models: objectivism, subjectivism, realist constructivism, and radical constructivism. Briefly, objectivism takes as
largely unproblematic the belief that human
beings are objectively real cognitive agents
that exist as separate entities in an objective,
independently-existing real world with real
properties. Cognition, by this view, consists of
perceiving (or recovering) information
about that world, processing it, and acting
upon it. And cognition can be (more or less)
true or false to the extent that human perception and models, opinions, and beliefs correspond to this world. In the transition from
philosophy to cognitive science, this model
has been largely couched in terms of perception and processing (inner) and features
(outer). Similarly, the issues of cognitive
change have been largely formulated in terms
of genetic and environmental determinism
(nature versus nurture) and the degree to
which cognitive mechanisms are innately
given at birth, the result of maturation, triggered by environmental phenomena, or otherwise emerge out of experience.
One of the major alternatives to the objectivist perspective is subjectivism, which leaves
the inside/outside dichotomy largely
untouched and simply reverses the emphasis
by arguing that The World is a projection
of mind. Objectivist concerns (and in certain
ways, subjectivist concerns as well) inform
much of conventional cognitive science or
cognitivism and cut across such distinctions
as preferences for employing symbolic or
connectionist computational models.
Another alternative to objectivism, constructivism, challenges a number of assumptions shared by both objectivism and subjectivism in particular, the notion that minds
and worlds are pre-given and that cognition
consists entirely of recovery (on the part of the
individual) or responding (to transmissions
from the environment). One of the key figures
in the constructivist tradition is Kant who
Constructivist Foundations
engineering-computer scientific
SURVEY
ture; similarly, it is possible to identify, propose, and model possible mechanisms of such
active construction, whether they are in the
individual or in a system that includes (or
enacts) the individual.
We now turn to look at some of the major
research themes of enactive cognitive science
that can be seen as broadly resonant with the
major concerns of radical constructivism.
Enactive cognitive
science
the enactive approach consists of two points:
(1) perception consists in perceptually guided
action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from
the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable
action to be perceptually guided. The overall concern is not to determine how some perceiverindependent world is to be recovered; it is, rather,
to determine the common principles or lawful
linkages between sensory and motor systems
that explain how action can be perceptually
guided in a perceiver-dependent world.
Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991, p. 173
During the 20th century, Jean Piaget, Lev
Vygotsky, Jakob von Uexkll and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty initiated pioneering research
to propose possible constructivist methods
for studying cognition and to empirically
support possible constructivist models and
mechanisms for explaining cognition. Relevant research also occurred in both the natural and artificial sciences: from biology,
neurophysiology, psychology, linguistics,
semiotics, sociology, and anthropology to
structuralism, cybernetics, systems theory,
artificial intelligence, robotics, and the more
recent sciences of complexity (e.g., artificial life). (For a popular account of this history that is sympathetic to the concerns of
enactive cognitive science, see Capra 1996;
for a treatment that concentrates on biology
and some implications for contemporary
work in robotics, see Sharkey & Ziemke
1998.) And, of course, during the same
period there have been more philosophically-oriented discussions of related topics,
e.g., James (1907), Dewey (1916), Whitehead (1979), Heidegger (1962), Wittgenstein
(1963), Mead (1934), Gadamer (1976),
Goodman (1978), Rorty (1979), Glasersfeld
(1995).
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sistent correlations between percepts and sensory-responses. They found that there could
be different responses to the same percepts
and the same sensory responses to different
percepts. Being good scientists, they did
doubt their own results; they tried in various
ways to control their experiments and to
ensure there were not other complicating factors involved (something, again, typical for
many of the other researchers discussed here).
In the end, they felt compelled to entertain a
more radical reorientation.
As a result of this work, Maturana
(together with Francisco Varela and others)
went on to develop an autopoietic model of
biological functioning and cognition. By this
view, any physical structure with an autopoietic that is, self-producing and self-maintaining organization is both living and cognitive. We will not defend this definition here
(although, for more detail, see Maturana &
Varela 1980, 1987, and for a critique, see
Boden 2000), but merely note that by this definition, a biological cell is the smallest known
unit of life (and cognition). And, for the
remainder of this paper will use this definition as a way to loosely circumscribe the scope
of enactive cognitive science; that is, we will
consider cognitive phenomena from the cellular to the social.
Olfactory system
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but rather participates crucially in the generation of perception. Freeman and Skarda
provide the best summary of their results and
their interpretation of them.
For more than 10 years we tried to say that
each spatial pattern was like a snapshot, that
each burst served to represent the odorant
with which we correlated it, and that the pattern was like a search image that served to
symbolize the presence or absence of the
odorant that the system was looking for. But
such interpretations were misleading. They
encouraged us to view neural activity as a
function of the features and causal impact of
stimuli on the organism and to look for a
reflection of the environment within by correlating features of the stimuli with neural
activity. This was a mistake. After years of sifting through our data, we identified the problem: it was the concept of representation.
Our research has now revealed the flaws
in such interpretations of brain function.
Neural activity patterns in the olfactory bulb
cannot be equated with internal representations of particular odorants to the brain for
several reasons. First, simply presenting an
odorant to the system does not lead to any
odor-specific activity patterns being formed.
Only in motivated animals, that is, only when
the odorant is reinforced leading to a behavioral change, do these stereotypical patterns
of neural activity take shape. Second, odorspecific activity patterns are dependent on the
behavioral response; when we change the
reinforcement contingency of a [conditioned
response] we change the patterned activity.
Third, patterned neural activity is context
dependent: the introduction of a new reinforced odorant to the animals repertoire
leads to changes in the patterns associated
with all previously learned odorants. Taken
together these facts teach us that we who have
looked at activity patterns as internal representations of events have misinterpreted the
data. Our findings indicate that patterned
neural activity correlates best with reliable
forms of interaction in a context that is behaviorally and environmentally co-defined
(Freeman & Skarda 1990, p. 376)
We have spent some time on the details of
this for a couple of reasons. First, it provides
more textured insight into the kinds of experimental challenges Freeman and other
researchers have faced; the point is that they
did not shift orientation because it was easy.
The traditional theory of concepts and categories has manifested itself in a number of
ways in the history of western philosophy and
science. One manifestation is the assumption
that there are natural kinds that is, that the
world (nature) is objectively categorized. The
related cognitive assumption is that concepts
mirror those natural categories. Freemans
work on the olfactory system is a particular
example of classification and categorization:
what, operationally, does it mean to recognize
(or classify) an odorant or for one odorant
to be the same as another? Or, consider the
problem of categories from the various western philosophical perspectives sketched earlier. Are colors categories in the world
(light, object-reflectance) or concepts in the
head (receptors, internal processing mechanisms)? Are colors universal categories of the
world, universal (abstract) concepts of the
mind, or are they personally or culturally relative?
The cognitive equivalent of categories are
concepts, and as Eleanor Rosch so bluntly
puts it, If ever there was a domain where
youd think cognitivism could get it right, it
is concepts (Rosch 1999, p. 61). Rosch is a
psychologist who, together with her colleagues, is widely credited with revolutionizing the study of concepts in cognitive science
through a pioneering, systematic, large-scale,
long-term, cross-cultural research effort
devoted to concepts, categorization, and language. Through her research, she has
amassed enormous evidence to suggest that
cognitivism does not get it right when it
comes to concepts, and one of her interpretations of her results is that, given some of cognitivisms assumptions, it may not even be
able to get it right (for more detailed summaries of this research and its implications, see,
e.g., Rosch 1999, Lakoff 1987, Rosch & Lloyd
1978).
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What are some of the cognitivist assumptions about concepts and categories and
what does her research show?
Concepts as abstract universals . The classical,
abstract model of concepts and categories is
strongly influenced by formal logic. In
essence, it claims that categories have two
basic characteristics: categories have clear and
distinct boundaries and membership in a
category is based on necessary and sufficient
shared features. In Roschs work, she has
shown significant exceptions to these requirements and to virtually all of the major
entailments of such assumptions. Thus, she
has shown that the boundaries of categories
are not always well-defined, there are degrees
of membership, and that there are best
examples for categories (about which there is
wide consensus). To give a specific example,
consider the last point. In some of her work
she demonstrated that people have a notion of
a best example of a category, such as the
color red. But, as Rosch argued, if the classical
model of categories is correct, then any member of a category (that is, any member that is
a member by virtue of having the same features as another member) should be as good
a category-example as any other member of
the category.
A further entailment of classical theory is
that taxonomic systems of categories consist
of abstract, universal, hierarchical structures.
That is, there are universal concepts (such as
object), some are more general than others
(object is more general than tree), and
that these concepts existing in an unchanging,
hierarchical relationship to each other. Further, these abstract categories are universal,
rather than specific to human experience.
Rosch showed that cognition relies crucially
on other taxonomic structures, that human
concepts are very dependent on human experience (a table is a concept that only makes
sense relative to the human activity of using
tables), and that although there is cross-cultural agreement about what she, following
Berlin and Kay (1969, Brown 1958), calls
basic-level categories, these are closer to the
schemas of Kant than to pre-existing categories in the world or abstract universal concepts in the mind.
Finally, one of the strong assumptions of
this abstract notion of concepts is that it
asserts a model of knowledge that is separate
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To conclude this brief survey of cognitive phenomena that challenge cognitivist models of
cognition, we turn to research on the architecture of the visual system.
We have already encountered problems
with the conventional model of perceptionas-recovery in the description of Freemans
work above. But there is a more startling challenge to the conventional transmission
model. Namely, that although most sensoryneurons are not stimulated by other neurons
26
(that is, they respond only to surface stimulation and relay electrical signals on to a different layer of neurons) the neurons at that
secondary layer receive something on the
order of 80% of their neural signals from other
neurons within the organism (Churchland &
Sejnowski 1992, Singer 1980). In other words,
neurons at this layer (and most subsequent
layers) do not act as telegraph stations in a
one-way relay from outside to inside, but
more like polling stations with contributions from all their neighbors, and the results
of such polls do not move in a single direction
along some path from outer to inner. This
does not even take into account that there are
many other kinds of neuronal interactions
chemical releases, and the like that may be
more cognitively relevant or significant. To
put it in the starkest possible terms, it seems
that most perception-based neural activity is
the result of processes that spread outward
rather than proceed inward.
Thus, even without entertaining radical
new paradigms of interpretation, conventional neuroscience needs to develop some
plausible explanation of how this relates to
perceiving things in the world. It is important to note that this observation is not controversial; if anything, it is simply not
acknowledged in most conventional texts. To
the extent that it is acknowledged, the typical
response tends to consist of quickly mentioning it and then continuing with cognitivist
proposals as usual. The assumption seems
to be that someone else will solve this problem
in a way that is compatible with conventional
cognitivist models of perception (e.g., perhaps by showing that different classes of neurons have different significance in the transmission and recovery of percepts).
As noted earlier, Maturana, Rosch, and
Freeman started with conventional assumptions, pursued their research along conventional lines, and arrived at similar impasses
when they tried to reconcile their research
results with conventional, objectivist interpretations. In each case, they concluded that
something was required other than traditional models of genetic/environmental
determinism and the long-held western alternatives of objectivism, subjectivism, relativism, and solipsism. In many cases, the particular research themes of enactive cognitive
science have arisen out of similar research
impasses.
Research themes
We propose as a name enactive to emphasize
the growing conviction that cognition is not the
representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven
mind but is rather the enactment of a world and
a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of
actions that a being in the world performs
Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991, p. 9
The examples of research from the previous
section have a distinctly biological flavor, but,
as indicated earlier, the discipline is concerned with a broad range of cognitive phenomena. In their own work, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch were particularly interested in
the development of methods for studying and
understanding first-person cognition (consciousness), so that aspect has been further
developed in the years since then. Similarly,
there is now a more encompassing emphasis
on social aspects of cognition. Much of this
was implicit in their original proposal, but as
they themselves acknowledged, at the time
they were simply trying to sketch the broad
outlines of an emerging discipline. At this
point, we can say that a number of distinctive
research themes can be identified as central to
enactive cognitive science.
[ Umwelt, embodiment, and situated action
[ Autonomy, change, and creativity
[ Groundlessness,
non-correspondence,
and viability
[ Emergence and self-organization
[ Consciousness and first-person cognition
[ Social cognition and intersubjectivity
[ Co-enaction
The remainder of this part of the paper
borrowing freely from (Varela 1999b, Varela,
Thompson & Rosch 1991) provides a more
detailed examination of these enactivist
research themes. In reading about the research
themes, it will also help to have some guiding
idea of co-enaction, a concept that is significant
in virtually all aspects of enactive research and
thought, but not always highlighted as such
(although, see Varela 1999b). This concept
emphasizes that the shift to an enactive perspective does not involve a simple change from
one absolute frame of reference to another
(e.g., internal to external, individual to social,
physical to linguistic, etc.). Rather, the shift is
to a perspective of co-specification and codetermination. Susan Oyama (2000a, p. 180)
expresses this succinctly when she writes,
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Natural biological persons are constructed, not only in the sense that they are
actively construed by themselves and others,
but also in the sense that they are, at every
moment, products of, and participants in,
ongoing developmental processes.
This shift to co-enaction raises a number
of methodological issues, so after looking at
the other research themes, we will treat it last,
where it will serve also as a bridge to the second part of the paper.
Umwelt, embodiment, and
situated action
the importance of embodiment (see Anderson 2003 for an overview). Much of this work
even references Rosch as a positive influence,
interpreting her results in ways that she herself does not. The perspective of many
researchers who now champion embodiment
tends to focus on what they see as the fundamental problem of abstract models in cognitivism: the assumption of an independent
objective world leads to problems grounding symbols in that world, e.g., (Harnad
1990). Their alternative is to develop embodied models, where sensory inputs and motor
outputs play an important part in the cognitive processing. Another alternative being
explored is to try and do away with internal
mediating mechanisms altogether and
focus on models of direct perception or various behavior-based approaches in which the
environment functions as its own representation. (For an overview of much of the
recent work on robotics, see Pfeifer & Scheier
1999.) Notice that none of this requires any
radical reorientation away from objectivism,
and in many cases there is no such reorientation.
But the enactive emphasis on embodiment
is more than a physicalist assertion about perception and motor activity. Rather it is about
how worlds are enacted, how those worlds are
for individuals, and how they relate to
embodiment. The key point for enactive cognitive science is that the Umwelt is enacted
rather than given, independently existing, and
directly accessible.
As we will see below, this concept of the
Umwelt has a number of consequences, not
least for the notion of whether/how a cognitive being recovers the world. To take one
example, the issue of cognitive activity can
look very different from an enactive perspective. The emphasis on cognitive activity has
been an essential focus for constructivist
models of cognition, e.g., Dewey (1896), Gruber & Voneche (1977), Mead (1934), Vygotsky
(1978), Leontev (1978), Luria (1976). More
recent formulations tend to emphasize situated action which involves a shift of perspective from abstract, general (albeit, possibly
active) models of cognition to models that
involve moment-by-moment pragmatic
(James 1907, Dewey 1916) coping and adapting. As a result, researchers have started to
describe such situated (cognitive) activity in
such terms as readiness-to-hand (Heidegger
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highlighting these distinctions and highlighting some of the potential risks of cognitive science fooling itself with wishful attribution if new terms such as embodiment are
used without actually changing any of its epistemological commitments. Nonetheless, as
we will see in part two of this paper, it is not
always clear how and to what extent such
enactive understanding translates into actual
research or implementation choices.
The issue of autonomy raises, by extension, the issues of cognitive change and creativity. Again, the standard view inherited
from physics is that both change and novelty
are illusions. Although these are early days
yet, the enactive claim is that genuine change
and creativity can be made reasonably rigorous, rather than, say, being an alternative way
to talk about limited knowledge or predictability (e.g., chaos theory). In the second part of
this paper we will look at several proposals for
possible formalisms, mechanisms, and models of innovation, e.g., dissipative structures
(Prigogine & Stengers 1984), symbiosis (Margulis & Fester 1991), autopoiesis (Maturana &
Varela 1980), a schema mechanism (Drescher
1991), dynamical systems models (Thelen &
Smith 1994), and self-organization (Kauffman 1993).
Groundlessness,
non-correspondence, and viability
The worlds enacted by various histories of structural coupling are amenable to detailed scientific
investigation, yet have no fixed, permanent substrate or foundation and so are ultimately groundless Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991, p. 217
Classical objectivist models of epistemology
tend to focus on aspects of knowledge related
to Truth; that is, whether some knowledge is
correct in its correspondence to what is True,
how one can verify such correspondence, and
the like. The influence of this tradition is felt
in many of the guiding assumptions of objectivist science, with its attempt to identify the
ultimate elements of objective, material reality or to understand cognition by various
models of correspondence between mind and
world. Correspondence models of cognition
tend to focus on the level of perception or
concepts. At the level of perception, the problem is treated as: how does sense-perception
retrieve raw sensory-data (which leaves as a
problem how that sense-data is transformed
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into what we experience); the work of Maturana and Freeman, sketched earlier, talks to
this. The second approach is to develop some
model for how concepts (in the head) correspond to natural categories (in the world); the
work of Rosch raises serious questions about
that alternative.
In keeping with the radical constructivist
claim that human cognition has no access to
an objective reality, the models and explanations of enactive cognitive science do not
assume ultimate foundations and the modeled systems do not rely on correspondence.
It is clear that the notion of information preexisting in the world must be rejected (Reeke
& Edelman 1988). By this view, cognitive
agents are not successful by virtue of their
access to an independent reality, nor do they
operate upon more or less accurate representations (or models) of such a reality, nor could
they even have such access. A major assumption, then, is that although cognition is constrained and viable, it is largely provisional.
Concepts and categories and mind and world
change sometimes in ways we barely notice,
and other times in ways that are radical reorientations. By this view, theories and models
are not provisional because we have yet more
to learn about the full Truth, but the processes that give rise to the viable regularities of
our world also enact the challenges and discrepancies we experience (in our theories and
our experiences). For many, this rejection of
absolute foundations tends to raise concerns
about relativism. But, as Mark Johnson notes,
this fear of relativism is predicated upon a
false assumption about the nature of objectivity that either we have absolute foundations,
or there are not foundations of any sort whatever (Johnson 1987, pp. 199200).
Note that the turn away from ultimate
grounds and correspondence is not based
solely on a critique of objectivist attempts to
discover ultimate material foundations or referents. This point is not always so clear, since
some theorists critical of assumptions about
ultimate physical grounding have proposed
alternative ultimate grounds, such as society, language, activity, interaction, consciousness, or experience. Such a substitution, of
one ultimate ground for another, is not the
proposal made by enactive cognitive science.
Rather, the turn is to models and mechanisms
of viability. We will examine this topic more
closely in the part devoted to possible models
Cognition is enactively emergent co-determination of neural elements (local) and cognitive subject (global) Varela 1999a, p. 81
Traditionally, science has tended towards
models of linear causality. With the rise of statistical mechanics and computational-based
approaches to science, a number of phenomena gained prominence (e.g., probability,
concurrency, emergence, and the like).
Within objectivist approaches to cognition,
the study and modeling of emergent systems is
often concerned with how surprising and
complex results can emerge as a result of specifying and running simple rules or, how centralized results can be produced by decentralized activities. A related sense of emergence,
one more common in disciplines influenced
by systems theory, is that higher-level phenomena can emerge (as epiphenomena)
out of the interactions between lower-level
entities (e.g., Holland 1998).
This second sense is close to the concerns
informing certain kinds of work in enactive
cognitive science. By this view, although
macro-phenomena emerge out of the microscale, they are not entirely reducible to it; the
macro-level has certain characteristics and
regularities specific to it. (For brief history of
this version of the concept, see OConnor &
Wong 2005). In some cases, this is expressed
in terms of the macro-level constraining the
micro-level (Pattee 1973, Freeman 2001), in
other cases, the claim is that the macro may
also have causal efficacy upon the micro (out
of which it emerges) (Martinerie et al. 1998;
van Quyen et al. 1997). In either case, the
claims such as, e.g., wholes are not the simple
sum of their parts (Lazlo 1972, p. 28), should
be resonant for phenomenologists who argue
that is not meaningful to discuss properties
(in the abstract) separate from the particular
whole that is of concern.
One of the key claims of structuralism,
Gestalt psychology (Khler 1992), general
systems theory (Bertalanffy 1968, Lazlo
1972), and the more recent sciences of complexity (Kauffman 1993), is that it is not
enough to consider constituent elements and
their causal influences, one needs to also
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if cognitive science is to include human experience, it must have some method for exploring and
knowing what human experience is
Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991, p. 23
Standard accounts in psychology texts tend to
assert that studies of consciousness (and the
use of introspective methods) were abandoned as unscientific at the end of the 19th
century and that twentieth century psychology had little to say about either consciousness as some extra-physical mental phenomenon (awareness) or consciousness as the
experience of what it is to actually taste an
apple or see the color blue (first-person
experience). This version of history, however, glosses over a number of substantial
contributions to both theory and study of
consciousness during this same period (e.g.,
Vygotsky 1979). Phenomenology, for example, was developed as a philosophy of lived
experience (Husserl 1962, Heidegger 1962)
and also formed the basis of cognitive
research, e.g., (Merleau-Ponty 1963). And
this notion of lived experience informs much
of the enactive concern with Umwelt with
the phenomenal world.
As a number of commentators (e.g.,
Skarda 1999) have noted, the majority of
research in both neuroscience and psychology
still tends to avoid the question of how percepts are transformed into experience. This
issue is independent of whether or not one is
a realist indeed, it may be more challenging
for realist research that assumes, say, some
objective light-signals are transformed into
the colors of the phenomenal experience.
Indeed, attempts to explain color perception
and experience in terms of objective properties of light, materials, or biological mechanisms are famously problematic. (For a thorough analysis of all the different attempts to
resolve this in the area of color-perception, see
Thompson 1995).
In recent years, there has been a steady
resurgence of interest and study of the topic
(see, for example, the Journal of Consciousness
30
Studies; and for a collection of articles representing the diversity of approaches being
explored, along with peer-commentary and
critiques, see Varela & Shear 1999). Such work
attempts to address such issues as whether
consciousness can be studied scientifically,
how such research can proceed, what constitute results of such research, the degree to
which such results can be shared, possible
applications of such research (e.g., therapy),
and the like.
Unfortunately, certain aspects of this issue
has informed much of the critical reaction to
enactive cognitive science. When Varela et. al.
proposed enactive cognitive science in their
book, The Embodied Mind, they did so by
describing one possible approach to the study
of consciousness and first-person experience,
namely methods and insights from Buddhist
meditation and epistemology and also by
suggesting ways in which contemporary western cognitive science could inform Buddhist
epistemology. Much otherwise careful commentary on the book seems to have not interpreted the portions devoted to Buddhism as
an extended example; instead, comments
have tended towards dismissing this aspect of
the book as championing some form of eastern mysticism.
The topic of consciousness not only raises
problems of method for its study, the role of
consciousness raises questions of method for
cognitive science. The role of the observer, for
example, has raised the familiar constructivist
critique, objectivity is the delusion that
observations could be made without an
observer (Foerster, quoted in Glasersfeld
1995). Taken seriously, the role of the
observer raises a number of challenging issues
in most of contemporary science. This is perhaps most widely-known in the context of
quantum mechanics, but we will return to
this topic of the observer, and its possible
implications for method in cognitive science,
in the second part of this paper (but see, e.g.,
Maturana 1988).
Social cognition & intersubjectivity
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determination, selection, circularity, or generation, and the like. Cybernetics, for example,
has a long history of addressing questions of
circular-causality and even the role of the
observer in such systems (e.g., second-order
cybernetics, Foerster 1996).
One reason for choosing the term co-enaction for this paper is that many of the other
terms tend to contribute to our difficulty in
thinking about and understanding simultaneous phenomena; we do not have very well
developed intuitions about them and thus,
it is easy to assume that such proposals involve
such things as circular sequences of causality,
e.g., first a has an effect on b, and then (as a
result), b has an effect on a. This phenomenal
pattern is one possibility, but another involves
simultaneous acting-upon, constraining,
influencing, and, yes, even generating each
other.
More importantly, the term co-enaction
emphasizes that worlds-as-worlds (and individuals-as-individuals) are enacted and that
References
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Constructivist Foundations
philosophical-epistemological
epistemic structuring
CONCEPTS
Purpose: This conceptual-epistemological paper deals with the old problem of inversion
of thinking, as typified by traditional metaphysics-ontology. It is proposed that a thorough
constructivism which views structures of mind, nature, and all, as not derived from (not
referring to) any pre-structured given mind-independent reality (zero-derivation, 0-D)
can go beyond this conceptual impasse; it can also serve as a fall-back position for positive
ontologies. Practical implications: The practical result of 0-D is that all structures of
experience are understood as tools serving individual and collective subjects.
Conclusions: This conceptual correction results in a simplification for the understanding
of some conceptual puzzles, such as the mind-brain relation, but also in a considerable
increase of responsibility, because entities and agents formerly considered responsible,
and outside the mind, are recognized to be extensions of the subjects. Key words: Inversion of experience, 0-D constructivism, problem of metaphysics-ontology, mind-brain
relation.
Note:This paper is a revised version of the Karl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca Target
Article 78. It is enlarged by the discussion of selected comments and responses in the forum.
Overview
1 Cybernetic concepts like feedback and sta-
35
philosophical-epistemological
epistemic structuring
CONCEPTS
First part:
People and tools
evant for what happens in subjective experience, and this results in some conceptual puzzles. What is a system? The usual meaning is
objective, that is, a functional unit of technical
type which people have made and use (for
instance a missile guidance system, or a ther-
36
Constructivist Foundations
philosophical-epistemological
epistemic structuring
CONCEPTS
Second part:
Tool problems
Subjects, objects, Descartes, leaps,
and Achilles
18 But the distancing (objectivation) procedure is commonly over-interpreted beyond
the distancing, in the sense that the structure
(thing, process, or situation) in-itself has a
mind-independent or even absolute (ontological = metaphysical) structure, existence, and
significance. This notion tends to promote a
belief in a primary or ontological split between
subject and object, as it has for instance been
formulated by Descartes. His procedure
(Augustinus dubito ergo sum cogito ergo
sum) has had a peculiar effect: his starting
point was subjectivity (res cogitans, perhaps
implying that Descartes saw himself as a
thinking object, a sort of internalized outside
agency). He posited this subjectivity as a
doubt-free basis of certainty (or stability in the
cybernetic sense) for all knowledge, but the res
cogitans remained so fuzzy that for instance
Hume and Kant questioned its validity.
19 Perhaps as a response to this problem of
fuzziness, there are debates like whether the
self is diachronic (in terms of a self-produced narrative, that one posits as ones
essence) or episodic in time (involving
memory to a lesser extent) (Strawson 2004).
Others, like Crick (1994), went further, denying the self altogether; his former collaborator
Koch (2004) has recently mitigated this opinion by saying (in agreement with Searle 2004,
cf. 22 ff) that though consciousness is part
of the ordinary physical world, yet it is not
ontologically reducible to brain processes
and that, to resolve this paradox, an ultimate
theory of consciousness is needed. The fuzziness endures, evidently.
20 In contrast, Descartes second notion,
of objective outside reality (res extensa),
remained mostly unchallenged, although it is
no less nebulous. It is commonly assumed to
be the basis for a postulated mind-independently pre-structured reality (MIR, traditional metaphysics-ontology) and also often
seen as basis for all knowledge to which not
only philosophers (since at least Parmenides)
but also many scientists still subscribe, often
only implicitly. Consider a simple example:
you look at a roof and say it is red, although it
appears black to everyone (i.e., at night). You
37
philosophical-epistemological
epistemic structuring
CONCEPTS
tool can be Kants observation that phenomena rather than MIR itself (noumena or
onta) are all one can ever know. This problem was also the start-point for the phenomenological-existential philosophers since
Hegel. But for stability reasons, and chiefly
because they did not renounce the ontological
subject-object split explicitly, they had a disconcerting tendency to fall back onto MIRontology, which they paradoxically implied
could be done on a phenomenological basis
(they missed the point that phenomena are
constructed). Heidegger even wanted to write
a fundamental ontology. Logical and other
positivists, despite their anti-metaphysical
start, had an even quicker relapse into MIRmetaphysics (if they had ever left it). Realists
simply disregard Kants finding (and the lesson from Platos cave parable) until now and
stick with MIR-belief; this can lead to notions
like Minkowskis 4-dimensional MIR-blockuniverse and pre-destination, a particularly
striking side-effect of thought-inversion. This
paradox vanishes with change from MIR to
working-MIR (see 62 ff).
30 Constructivism is an attempt to
improve on phenomenology in overcoming
this problem, but the possibility of MIRrelapse remains here as well.
31 All ontological truths are subject to falsification or de-construction qua onta, by
38
instance, for qualia, as compared to other realities, such as preferably physical objects
(which are in MIR-belief thought to be the real
reality), shapes or numbers. Qualia present
conceptual problems in an MIR-framework,
because they cannot easily be MIRs. Realists
(naturalists) discuss for instance whether qualia like color, smell, or pain exist; but this
question has meaning only in a traditional
MIR-view; in 0-D, qualia-creation requires
the subjects activity, as do all other mind-andnature-and-all structures.
37 Wood (C12, 13) writes that pain disappears with anaesthesia but the fear of its
return does not; I agree, these are different
questions.
38 For structuring and stability thinking
needs overall encompassing structures. However, these are not provided by ordinary experience, including perception, but rather by
extrapolation from scientific theories, by
intuition, or by religious revelations.
39 We are inside the encompassing (experience or structures), and thus these structures cannot be defined inside experience;
they are what is often called ineffable. If one
tries to comprehend such (non-)entities (cf.
56) as-if they were circumscribed MIR-entities, one faces the conceptual paradoxes of
theism and of various other types of MIRconcepts-of-everything. Though they cannot
become circumscribed entities, they can have
names (cf. 63), which makes this more puzzling (but nothing also has a name).
40 Most of us are born into one or another
tradition of the many practiced religious or
semi-religious creeds; thus for most people
the question of choosing between them does
not come up. Still, because they are arbitrary
in the sense that there are so many competing
offers for help with the need for structure,
they need and receive social enforcement for
persistence and effectiveness. In theistic religion the emphasis is on establishing the belief
with help of an ontological leap to MIReality,
and thereafter its reinforcement by indoctrination, preaching, rituals, and punishment
for disagreement. In any of these views, strong
beliefs tend to cause conflict with experiences
that cannot be understood within them.
41 In science and philosophy, discussions
can in contrast result either in strengthening
or in weakening of the discussed structures.
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structed, as in 0-D (C37; the practical question is further discussed in R9 and R12 to
Dykstra).
48 In McCarthys opinion (C2) equating
consciousness with the encompassing makes
knowledge merely subjective (also in C17,
12). This statement is misleading; encompassing experience, and its knowledge function, are subject-inclusive, but not solipsistic.
49 McCarthy (C5, 3) also expresses his
uneasiness with the concept of trust: I am
not happy with the word trust I would seek
a greater certitude than this implies. I think
to be absolutely certain is not a recommendable wish. It is dangerous, and it can be
desired only if you postulate MIR; to be
clearer for this particular aspect, one could
perhaps call it mind-exclusive reality. McCarthy suggests that some phenomena are special (non-mind-independent reality, nMIR),
as suggested in Goethes Anschauende Urteilskraft (or I would add, Husserls WesensSchau) but this does not change the construction aspect, and Husserl fell back into
MIR. I dont believe that nMIR can help here.
McCarthy (C5, 3) says that thinking is not
subjective nor objective but hyperjective
this term may, or may not, be compatible with
the notion of the pragmatic (rather than
ontological) SO split.
50 The answer to the question How do we
move from 0-D to mind-inclusive experience? (McCarthy C17, 4) must be: by structuring self-world-and-all within the otherwise unstructured. But McCarthys further
questions like How does knowledge arise?
What is the criterion of epistemic closure?
What sort of feedback do we need? the content confronting it? (C17, 5) suggest MIRbelief on his part. We have to see the necessary postulate at the theoretical level by a pure
act from the depths of our own selves (This
would make closure) and find its equivalent
in our actual experience. (C17, 6) In my
opinion things are less complicated: we create
structures, and accept them if they fit well,
some of them with a compelling feature of
closure, but this closure does not imply an
equivalent everywhere. That my definition
of consciousness locks knowledge into subjectivity (C2, 1) etc., corresponds to a frequent objection to constructivism; it neglects
the encompassing quality of consciousness,
within which both subject and object are
structured, with no ontological SO split.
39
philosophical-epistemological
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40
Third part:
Remedy. 0-D tool
structuring within
encompassing
experience
The encompassing mind and
subject-inclusive structuring
56 Consciousness (awareness, experience,
quently, he wants to know what 0-D contributes beyond that. In my opinion, social construction is only one aspect of epistemic
construction; all mental tools are constructed, including those which are private to
one person, though many structures have in
addition a social input. My main aim is an
access to the mind-brain question, and constructivism is the only one I know of so far;
since this implies changes in conceptual view,
it has general ramifications. The no explanation statement is correct, it expresses an
expectation based on MIR-belief. Explanations (C15, 5) can only be structures inside
experience; attempts to explain experience
itself imply reduction of experience to something inside experience, which is self-contradictory. As Adams writes (C15, 24), 0-D is
phenomenal, descriptive.
58 I dont say that structured mind and
world exist, as Adams claims (C15, 3) that I
do; rather the structures are created, and if
they are invested with trust they may or may
not be said to exist (C15, 25); Adams statement as quoted would, in contrast, imply
MIR-belief.
59 Although we can (actually have to)
consider and handle ourselves as finite subjective entities, our mind also encompasses all of
self-and-world. In other words, the subject or
self (which we posit as our personal identity),
is structured inside experience (which one
confronts as given in unstructured condition)
as are also objects, the subject-object and similar dichotomies, qualia, numbers, universal
and theistic word-concepts. This makes experience subject-inclusive (but not subjectiveonly, i.e., not solipsistic constructivism is
commonly mis-interpreted as solipsistic).
Structuring the self tolerates a greater degree
of arbitrariness than structuring in many
other fields of knowledge does. This has
prompted the statement that we invent ourselves (Foerster & Glasersfeld 1999).
60 The encompassing aspect of consciousness is an important consideration, although
Jaspers did not quite manage to leave traditional ontology behind. Since he was aware of
the impossibility as well as of the necessity of
metaphysics (which he called ciphers (Jaspers 1947, p. 1030)), he finally decided on
what he called peri-echontology (p.158),
which is still a kind of MIR. It seems to me
instead more helpful to deal with this paradox
in terms of working-metaphysics (as-if-
Constructivist Foundations
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CONCEPTS
41
philosophical-epistemological
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42
In summary
79 Although conscious experience can only
Fourth part:
The kybernetes
The real self as helmsman
80 But now really: is the mind real or not?
Constructivist Foundations
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developed, such as perceptual gestalt formations (as animals already have), and in addition specifically human tools like words, to
elaborate and fortify these formations, in
word-concepts, ideas, and numbers. The latter start out as words for counting activity and
its results; machines like computers have been
added. Some of the tools have turned out to
be useful, both for individuals doing things,
43
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44
Constructivist Foundations
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102 Absolute beliefs can strengthen ethical conviction, since they eliminate doubt
(and facilitate fanaticism as well). But the recognition that there are no ethics absolutes
does not imply moral arbitrariness (or relativism), which would mean a lack of obligatory guidelines. The reference values are collectively posited and made obligatory, and
although social construction is only one of the
forces at work in structuring, these days this
becomes a world-wide collective task. Traditional sacred texts are among the sources for
such guidelines.
103 As it turns out, however, humans rediscover their leadership actually that there
is no choice now but to reclaim it, because
absolutes are blind alleys. In a constructivist
framework, Kants categorical imperative (or
the Golden Rule) can provide the method for
ethical goal setting. Communal and global
agreements on such maxims become important and difficult tasks.
104 McCarthy (C5, 17) says that in constructivism duty is imposed from outside I
am not sure why he thinks so; invoking
instructions from outside contradicts the
basic tenets of constructivism.
assumptions (a) that mind and brain are primarily (ontologically) separate, la Descartes, and (b) that science is defined by MIRobjectivity, that is, by traditional metaphysics. The subject then disappears necessarily.
107 If in contrast we see the separation as
pragmatic (secondary), as a working-proposition, the subject automatically is and
remains a part of all experience. And studies
of brain activity occur in the mind, not the
mind in brain activity, whether or not it is a
topic of study. For objectivists, that may be an
unfamiliar aspect: but because one cannot
leave the bubble of encompassing experience
(consciousness), it is impossible to look at
the mind from outside. The realists inability
to understand this is a striking consequence
of thought-inversion.
108 Suppose that in some time from now
it will be possible to provide a complete
simultaneous demonstration of the objective
events going on during subjective experience
(such as electrical and chemical brain activity
both overall and at the cellular and molecular
level). Will these events be identical with the
subjective experience? To ask this question is
to deny it (that is, in my opinion, but as mentioned in 83 some insist that they are identical). The only possible relationship between
the two is that awareness of brain activity
(including ones own) occurs inside experience, which is the only available starting
point. In 0-D, physiological knowledge can
help to understand and deal with ourselves
better: a formulation of this or similar type
could replace the intractable mindbrain
problem (cf. 68, 86, 106), an artefact of
the MIR-view.
109 Artificial intelligence research created
much discussion in the 1950s and 1960s, and
many enthusiasts are still now at work in this
field. Recently the evaluations are more
restrained, confined to specific tasks, and
some philosophers have even declared the AI
proposition to be incoherent, impossible, or
also immoral (cf. McCarthy 2004). AI efforts
are undertaken as extensions of human intelligence, the aims and means of such machines
and programs are determined by people who
design and finance them.
Conclusion: Reality is labor-intensive
110 Human goal-setting, decision-making,
45
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46
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Public reviewing
Note:This is the list of comments and selected
responses of the author. that were used to augment the line of argumentation of the paper.
Since not all comments were used and the
numbering should stay in sync with the original
number in the Karl Jaspers Forum, the numbering here is non-consecutive.
C1 van der Meijden, A. (2005) The in-verse.
http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78-C1MEI.htm
C2 McCarthy, M. (2005) On the kybernetes.
http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78-C2MCC.htm
C3 Chumakin, M. (2005) How ideal phenomena are real. http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78C3CHU.htm
C4 Wood, G. C. (2005) Transcendence, etc.
http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78-C4WOO.htm
C5 McCarthy, M. (2005) Steering through the
ranges of knowledge. http://www.kjf.ca/
kjf/78-C5MCC.htm
C8 Glasersfeld, E. von (2005) Subject/object
split.
http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78C8GLA.htm
C12 Wood, G. C. (2005) Reality as I see it.
Comment to R3. http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78C12WO.htm
C13 Chumakin, M. (2005) A realist approach
to mind/brain problem. Comment to R2.
http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78-C13CH.htm
C15 Adams, W. A. (2005) Four premises in
search of an explanation. Comment on R3
to C8 by Glasersfeld. http://www.kjf.ca/
kjf/78-C15AD.htm
C17 McCarthy, M. (2005) Why consciousness
should not be equated with experience.
Comment to R1. http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78C17MC.htm
C21 Chumakin, M., Models. Comment to
R2. http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78-C21CH.htm
C22 van der Meijden, A. (2005) Rilke, mystics, and anaesthesia. http://www.kjf.ca/
kjf/78-C22ME.htm
C24 Pivnicki,
D. (2005) Response, but no
question.
http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78C24PI.htm
C32 Dykstra, D. I. Jr. (2005) The problem of
incommensurability in debates on education (and other issues). Comment to R9.
http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78-C32DY.htm
C33 Nixon, G. (2005) 0-D and absolutes in
education.
http://www.kjf.ca/kjf/78C33NI.htm
C37 Dykstra, D. I. Jr. (2005) Challenge of
References
Chalmers, D. J. (1995) The puzzle of conscious experience. Scientific American
273: 8086.
Crick, F. (1994) The astonishing hypothesis.
Scribners: New York.
Damasio, A. R. (1994) Descartes error. Emotion, reason, and the human brain. Quill,
Harper Collins: New York, pp. 245252.
Foerster, H. von & Glasersfeld, E. von (1999)
Wie wir uns erfinden. Carl-Auer-Systeme
Verlag: Heidelberg.
Glasersfeld, E. von (2004) The constructivist
approach: Toward a theory of representation. Karl Jaspers Forum TA73. http://
www.kjf.ca/kjf/73-TAGLA.htm. This is my
translation, corrected by the author, of a
lecture given by von Glasersfeld at the Universit du Qubec Montral on 21
November 1985, and published as : Glaser-
47
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epistemic structuring
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48
Constructivist Foundations
education
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EMPIRICAL
Purpose: Often radical constructivists are confronted with arguments why radical constructivism is wrong.The present work presents a radical constructivist alternative to such
arguments: a comparison of the results of two instructional practices, the standard, realistbased instruction and a radical constructivist-based instruction, both in physics courses.
Design: Evidence from many studies of student conceptions in standard instruction (Duit
2004) is taken into account. In addition, diagnostic data, pre and post instruction, were
collected from over 1,000 students in multiple institutions across the U. S. over a period
of about 15 years via an established diagnostic of conceptual understanding of motion and
force. Findings: Evidence from many studies of student conceptions in standard instruction
(Duit, 2004) is that little or no change in student conceptions happens in standard instruction. About half the students in the particular study reported, all science and engineering
majors, experienced standard, realist-based instruction and show an average effect size of
0.6 standard deviations and an average normalized gain of 15%.The other half of the students, none of whom were science and engineering majors, experienced radical constructivist-based instruction and show an average effect size over 2.5 standard deviations and an
average normalized gain over 60%. Diagnostic pre scores were nearly the same for both
groups. Practical implications:The outcome, that students, neither science nor engineering majors, made changes in understanding foundational topics in physics far greater than
science and engineering students, poses (1) an ethical challenge to the continued adherence
to standard, realist-based instructional practices and (2) an intellectual challenge to the
usefulness and appropriateness of the elitist-realist paradigm on which such standard
instruction is based. Conclusions:This radical constructivist argument uses the effect of
paradigms to judge their pragmatic value, not their truth-value. Based on pragmatic value,
radical constructivism results in superior outcomes when applied to physics instruction.
The approach to instruction can be applied generally in education.
Key words: elitism, physics, paradigm, realism.
Prologue
Introduction
In the Fall of 1969 a young man started teaching high school physics. He believed that the
students should leave an instructional experience understanding the phenomena studied
differently than they began the instructional
experience. As it turns out, this was nave, but
for him it was the point of teaching and education. He quickly realized it was not happening in his own classroom and, as we shall see,
later he and others found it does not happen
in most classrooms. As a new teacher, he had
mentors who tried to help. Because at the time
he could not articulate what the problem was
and because the development of understanding is not central to education as we know it,
his mentors, though sincere, were unable to
assist him in some way that would settle his
dissatisfaction.
Understanding
When students can repeat something verbatim,
it is obvious that they have learned it. Whether
they have understood it, is a question these tests
avoid. (Ernst von Glasersfeld 2001)
What might be meant by understanding? Von
Glasersfeld suggests that understanding is
avoided in typical test results. Gardner makes
a kind of operational definition.
students who receive honor grades in
college-level physics courses are frequently
unable to solve basic problems and questions
encountered in a form slightly different from
that on which they have been formally
instructed and tested.
If, when the circumstances of testing are
slightly altered, the sought-after competence
can no longer be documented, then understandingin any reasonable sense of the
termhas simply not been achieved.
(Howard Gardner 1991), pp. 3 and 6)
The orientation to the meaning of understanding in the present work is focused on the
nature of a persons understanding, not on the
nature of what might be claimed to be independent of that person. Hence, if one observes
another to act in a certain way in some context,
one can formulate an explanation, a constructed understanding, under which the
other person seems to be operating by a process known as abduction. (Peirce 1955) If, later
in another context, ones explanation of the
other fits the others understanding, then it is
reasonable to be able to predict the behavior of
49
education
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EMPIRICAL
On the prevalence of
change in understanding
in physics instruction
Early work
students from a wide variety of courses confused the concepts of velocity and acceleration. At the completion of instruction,
fewer than half of the students demonstrated
sufficient qualitative understanding of acceleration as a ratio to be able to apply this concept in a real situation. Even with assistance in
making the necessary observations, these students were unable to combine this information in a manner that permitted successful
comparison of two accelerations. (Trowbridge & McDermott 1981)
Electric circuits. We have examined students
explanations of an extremely simple electric
circuit, one that involved only three major
components. We found that many students
were unable to interpret the circuit correctly.
One suspects, therefore, that a significant
proportion of students in physics courses will
have this type of difficulty. Even more disturbing is the fact that the misconception persisted in some students who had been
through a calculus-based course in electricity
which included five experiments on electric
circuits. (Fredette & Clement 1981)
Real image formation. It was clear from the
interviews with the post-students that it is
probably not uncommon to emerge from an
introductory physics course without understanding the essential role of a converging lens
or a concave mirror in the formation of a real
image There is often a tacit assumption that
students who have performed satisfactorily in
the geometrical optics portion of an introductory physics course can respond correctly
to the basic questions presented at the beginning of this paper. The discussion above demonstrates that, although they might have been
able to give correct verbal responses to these
questions, the students who participated in
our study were frequently unable to relate
their knowledge to simple, but real, optical
systems. (Goldberg & McDermott 1987)
Scope of findings
Kinematics-acceleration. The conceptual difficulties with acceleration that were encountered by the students in our study appeared to
be very persistent. Often, as illustrated by the
pairs of interview excerpts on Acceleration
Comparison Task 1, the procedures used by a
particular student were the same before and
after instruction. A significant number of
50
By 1990 many such articles had been published in many journals and books were being
written on the topic of students conceptions
in science. Several groups had been maintaining bibliographies of these works in the middle 1980s including our young man, now
older. These efforts were combined and can
be found in a regularly updated bibliography
Constructivist Foundations
education
radical constructivism
EMPIRICAL
During the 1990s several diagnostics of student conceptions concerning various topics
in physics were developed. One of these was
used before and after science and engineering
students studied motion and force in introductory physics courses from institutions
across the U. S. over a period of a dozen years.
Most of the institutions from
which the data was received are
large state supported universities of the sort producing the
bulk of the engineering and science graduates in the U. S.
Pre and post data were provided from both of two different
levels of introductory physics at
the university level. One level of
course is one involving only
algebra and trigonometry and is
typically taken by majors in biology, geology, kinesiology, construction management, and prehealth professions, such as premedical. The other level of introductory physics course involves
the calculus and is taken by
majors in physics, chemistry,
geophysics, and engineering.
The same topics are treated and
similar laboratory exercises and
homework problems are carried
out. The significant difference
between these two courses is the
Figure 1: This is a poster made by students at the very
level of mathematics. The teachbeginning of their study of the nature of force. Most
ing practices in the courses are
students regardless of the introductory course, whether
essentially the same. Students
they are in secondary school or college make very
are expected to attend lecture
similar posters in that they express the person-on-theand read a textbook by which
street (pots) view of the nature of force.
they are informed about the
51
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EMPIRICAL
52
Constructivist Foundations
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Average Scores
Pre (015)
Year
Term
pots
New
Effect Size
Post (015)
pots
New
(st dev)
Normalized
Loss
Gain
New
<L>
<g>
0.47
0.59
0.16
0.13
0.40
0.66
0.13
0.13
0.30
0.47
0.11
0.14
pots
99
10.1
1.5
8.5
3.3
SP
112
10.3
0.9
2.7
72
9.6
1.7
8.5
3.5
Wint.
87
9.3
2.6
6.5
5.4
0.62
0.60
0.30
0.26
1999
SP
73
9.1
2.3
7.6
4.0
0.36
0.38
0.17
0.13
2000
SP
115
9.2
2.4
7.2
4.8
0.50
0.59
0.21
0.19
0.08
0.54
0.03
0.09
SP
38
9.8
0.6
9.6
1.7
Realism in instruction
Evidence calling for explanation
53
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54
Constructivist Foundations
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Year
Term
pots
New
Effect Size
Post (015)
pots
New
(st dev)
pots
Normalized
Loss
Gain
New
<L>
<g>
An alternative paradigm
As it turns out, the young physics teacher, now
older, started out, without realizing it, on the
outside of the established paradigm. He mistakenly thought the point of teaching was that
students develop new understanding as a
result of their experience in the classroom.
For him the typical outcomes of conventional
teaching were disturbing. Without yet being
able to articulate the nature of this anxiety, he
searched for an answer. He found it when the
work of the Genetic Epistemologist, Jean
Piaget, was described so that he could see it as
a theory base from which to operate in the
classroom. (Fuller, Karplus & Lawson 1977)
In a sense this theory base would enable him
to do science as he taught with the goal of
empowering his students to develop new
understanding.
A different teaching practice
2000
FL
90
9.3
0.8
2.5
9.2
2.20
2.50
0.66
0.59
2001
SP
87
9.8
0.8
2.2
9.6
2.40
2.40
0.74
0.62
2002
FL
66
9.4
0.8
2.2
8.8
2.19
2.26
0.72
0.57
2004
SP
69
7.9
2.2
1.8
10.8
1.85
2.31
0.78
0.67
2005
SP
53
9.9
0.8
1.5
11.1
3.08
3.38
0.85
0.73
FLa
23
11.3
0.6
0.6
13.3
5.4
6.3
0.95
0.89
2001
FLb
24
10.6
0.9
0.8
13.1
3.7
6.1
0.93
0.86
55
education
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EMPIRICAL
capacities one is aware of in ones own consciousness. By experience, trial and error, and
reasoning, one is continually building and
modifying a kind of look-up table that connects the symbols of language with meanings
that appear to fit experience (Glasersfeld in
press). Through copious interaction with
others, we develop look-up tables that work
sufficiently well that we can take our own
look-up table as shared with others. This
taken-as-shared communication process
enables us to interact enough to decide certain experiences can be taken-as-shared and
that explanations can be taken-as-shared.
The ability to make these mental constructions is considered a capacity of all human
beings. Elitism plays no role in this paradigm,
either in the teaching practice or in explaining
the outcomes of the teaching.
Piaget describes a mechanism that drives
this process of meaning construction. What
drives meaning construction is the need or
desire for equilibration between ones explanatory mental constructs and ones experiences. (Piaget 1985) One moves to modify or
construct new explanation when one perceives ones existing mental constructs do not
fit experience, i.e., when one disequilibrates.
Because the resolution of the disequilibration
is new mental constructs that do fit experience, the resulting accommodation is always
one that fits a greater range of experience,
hence, a kind of pragmatic progress. In a nutshell, for change in understanding to occur,
the teacher first needs to engage the students
attentions in comparing their existing conceptions with some behavior of the phenomenon that likely does not fit those conceptions.
Some results of this alternative
teaching practice
56
A high school teacher trying out the alternative teaching practice for the first time also
used the FMCE diagnostic. The only modes of
communication between this teacher and the
author were electronic mail and telephone.
The teacher was conducting a project as part
of the requirements for a masters degree in
science education. Table 2 displays data collected in these two different classroom settings.
A comparison between Table 1 and Table 2
shows a marked difference in conceptual
change on the diagnostic scores. The initial
average scores for each view in Table 2 are not
particularly different than those in Table 1.
This is because these students experienced
similar standard instruction in elementary
school and in the 8th or 9th grades to that
experienced by the science and engineering
majors in Table 1. The magnitudes of the
changes in table 2 are much larger. The effect
sizes are larger and the normalized changes
are larger. The effect sizes easily meet Blooms
challenge of a change of two-sigma over the
results of normal instruction. (Bloom 1984)
Clearly, non-science, non-engineering
majors in this alternative teaching practice,
guided by radical constructivism, consistently and routinely change their understanding of these phenomena by an amount several
times larger than science and engineering
majors in standard physics instruction guided
by an elitist realism. This is far beyond statistical significance. Typical statistical significance in educational research is claimed for
the kind of changes (0.5 standard deviations)
seen in Table 1. Yet, we see that the level of
understanding actually accomplished in
Table 1 post-scores is so small as to be impractical as a justification for the instruction.
Two reasons can be imagined to explain
that standard instruction is so entrenched
and so widespread, but with such little actually learned. The first comes out of the
broader explanatory scheme used here. The
standard elitist-realist paradigm, as is a characteristic of paradigms, has developed an
explanation for everything it deems relevant.
Such outcomes as seen in Table 1 are just the
way things are. Very few really are deserving,
so we spread a wide net to catch the few
good people. Add to this an assessment
scheme which consists of (1) checking to see
if the catechism can be recited (assessment of
the students) and (2) looking to see if every-
In this alternative program of physics teaching, the teacher plays a fundamentally different role.
a physics major has to be trained to use
todays physics whereas a physics teacher has
to be trained to see a development of physical
theories in ... students minds. (Niedderer
1992), p. 151)
Having the students read a standard text or
the teacher present the canon, not only is a
waste of time; it stifles the process of developing new understanding. In standard instruction there is a text to be read and relied upon
and most class time is taken up by instructor
lectures, yet we see no useful change in understanding in Table 1. Instead, most of the class
time needs to be occupied with students
explaining to each other their conceptions,
discussing how well the various conceptions
fit the experiences with the phenomena, planning with each other what adjustments might
be called for when the fit to experience is
found lacking, and discussing the results of
tests of these accommodations against further
experience with the phenomena.
In order to see the development of physical
theories in students minds, the teacher must
have access to copious amounts of student
explanations and predictions concerning the
phenomena being studied. The teacher needs
to be familiar with ways of thinking about the
phenomena the students are likely to have. A
teacher candidate can begin developing this
familiarity by studying the efforts of others
who have examined students conceptions.
The bibliography (Duit 2004) is a major
source in such study. Ultimately, it is necessary to listen to and watch many students as
Constructivist Foundations
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radical constructivism
EMPIRICAL
ence. The students are encouraged to construct possible modifications to those initial
conceptions or whole alternatives. To achieve
an accommodation, it is necessary to test
these modifications or alternatives. Such tests
are carried out by first working out predicted
outcomes based on the proposed changes and
then checking to see what happens. Iterations
are continued until most students report satisfactory equilibration.
4. Application: The testing of possible
accommodations constitutes a nesting of
additional phases (1) & (2) repeated within
the third phase. Alternatively it can be seen as
a kind of 4th phase, one of application in which
not only the testing of potential modifications
to explanation is conducted, but the phenomenon is further explored, using apparently
successful explanatory schemes. In effect then
the phenomenon is seen through the new perspective made possible by the new explanation. In the process how well and broadly this
scheme applies to the phenomenon is determined. Often, new aspects of the phenomenon are discovered and deeper understanding
of the explanatory scheme is realized.
Superficial success:
Training and indoctrination of scientists in
the elitist-realist paradigm is accomplished
It takes 35 or more cycles of standard
instruction for understanding to be
accomplished
Spectacular failure:
For nearly all of society there is
no change in understanding concerning the
phenomena studied
In any science
In any country
For the last century or more
Students, including those who become
scientists, learn
Only a few special people can understand
science.
We must rely on scientists for scientific
truth.
Table 3: Outcomes of elitistrealist
science instruction. Not unique to science
instruction
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Conclusions
Standard physics instruction is effectively
described as the presentation of the established
canon by approved methods for the benefit of
the deserving. It runs on an inform, verify,
practice cycle. Teaching practices based in this
description result in almost no practical
change in understanding of the phenomena
studied on the part of the students. On the
other hand, there is change in understanding
as a result of this instruction. Unfortunately,
the change is that students learn a caste system
based on who can understand the phenomena in standard instruction and who cannot.
Since most of them leave the instruction not
understanding, most decide they are not in
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FUTURE WORK
Regardless whether one agrees or disagrees with the above line of reasoning, one still faces a
moral, ethical dilemma in terms of social justice in education.The outcomes of standard instruction are unsatisfactory and destructive. At least one alternative with good outcomes has been
demonstrated.
In the name of social justice in education, are we not obligated to respond in a careful, but serious,
reasoned way, that rises above sectarian bickering?
Are we not obligated to end, with all possible haste, the negative outcomes of standard
instruction? Are we not obligated to end, with all possible haste, the training of teachers to inflict
such intellectual and social damage by thoroughly revising their training to equip teacher candidates not to inflict such damage? Unless we accomplish paradigm change from the elitistrealist paradigm, that paradigm will remain hegemonic and the destruction will continue. Got
change for a paradigm?
Paradigm change occurs when people become dissatisfied with things as they are. One can
reasonably argue that our young man started outside the prevailing paradigm.What drove him
to develop an alternative practice of teaching and to consciously define for himself his paradigm
was his disequilibration over the discrepancy between his expectations about the outcomes of
teaching and his observations of the outcomes when he began teaching. Can teacher candidates be engaged in the same discrepancy? This may be what Niedderer (1992) was referring
to when he wrote: a physics teacher has to be trained to see a development of physical
theories in ... students minds.
It is possible to imagine a RC-based course of study for teacher candidates in any subject.
This course of study would have as its central focus; the evidence of a persons understanding
in whatever subject is to be taught. Surrounding this central focus should be the examination
of how, why and under what circumstances understanding appears to change and methods of
facilitating this change process in the students.The presentation of the established canon of the
subject and approved methods would cease to determine anything in the course of study for
teacher candidates, though the established canon might remain a presence at the periphery in
the course of study for teachers.
Students who learn in this radical constructivist paradigm not only develop significant,
deeper understanding of the phenomena studied, but also develop a different self-image. This
self-image is positive and empowering. Students come to see the value in understanding the
point of view of others and develop skills for working with others to create better common
understanding of issues they face. Every student in every classroom can do this. Wouldnt the
world they create be far better than the one we have now? When do we start changing how
we teach? If not us, who? If not now, when?
Constructivist Foundations
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radical constructivism
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References
Aldridge, W. G. (1995) Invited Paper. The Science Teacher. October: 8.
Astolfi, J.-P. (1997) Preface. In: Trabal, P. (ed.)
La violence de lenseignement des mathmatiques et des sciences: Une autre
approche de la sociologie des sciences.
LHarmattan: Montreal.
Bloom, B. S. (1984) The 2 sigma problem: The
search for methods of group instruction as
effective as one-to-one tutoring, Educational Researcher 13: 416.
Cromer, A. (1997) Connected knowledge:
Science, philosophy and education.
Oxford University Press: New York.
Duit, R. (2004) Students and teachers conceptions in science: A bibliography. Available
at
http://www.ipn.uni-kiel.de/
aktuell/stcse/stcse.html
de la Torre, A. C. & Zamorano, R. (2001)
Answer to question #31. Does any piece of
mathematics exist for which there is no
application whatsoever in physics? American Journal of Physics 69: 103.
Ehrlich, R. (2002) How do we know if we are
doing a good job in physics teaching?
American Journal of Physics 70: 2428
Epilogue
Presently our young physics teacher, now
much older, is accomplishing his goal of engaging students in developing new understanding
of physical phenomena. His still developing
understanding of the work of Piaget and of
Radical Constructivism play significant roles
in the on-going development of this successful
teaching practice. The results for college students in Table 2 reveal that his students make
changes in their understanding of the phenomena in quantity far superior to that of students experiencing standard instruction. He
continually works at engaging the unengaged
in his classrooms in order that even more
achieve the results of the rest of the class.
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Constructivist Foundations