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upper hand in the Russian Civil War, having dealt crippling blows to the Russian White Movement.[4] Vladimir
Lenin viewed Poland as a bridge to bring communism to
Central and Western Europe, and the PolishSoviet War
seemed the perfect way to test the Red Army's strength.
The Bolsheviks speeches asserted that the revolution was
to be carried to western Europe on the bayonets of Russian soldats and that the shortest route to Berlin and Paris
lay through Warsaw.[5] The conict began when Polish
head of state Jzef Pisudski formed an alliance with the
Ukrainian nationalist leader Symon Petlyura (on April
21, 1920) and their combined forces began to overrun
Ukraine, occupying Kiev on May 7.
The Battle of Warsaw refers to the decisive Polish victory in 1920 during the PolishSoviet War. Poland, on
the verge of total defeat, repulsed and defeated the invading Red Army. It was, and still is, celebrated as
a great victory for the Polish people over Soviets and
communism.
As Soviet forces invaded Poland in summer 1920, the
Polish army retreated westward in disorder. The Polish forces seemed on the verge of disintegration and observers predicted a decisive Soviet victory.
The battle of Warsaw was fought from August 12
25, 1920 as Red Army forces commanded by Mikhail
Tukhachevsky approached the Polish capital of Warsaw
and the nearby Modlin Fortress. On August 16, Polish
forces commanded by Jzef Pisudski counterattacked
from the south, disrupting the enemys oensive, forcing the Russian forces into a disorganized withdrawal
eastward and behind the Neman River. Estimated Russian losses were 10,000 killed, 500 missing, 30,000
wounded, and 66,000 taken prisoner, compared with Polish losses of some 4,500 killed, 10,000 missing, and
22,000 wounded.
Wadysaw Sikorski with sta of the Polish 5th Army during battle of Warsaw
Prelude
BATTLE PLANS
2.2 Russian
3 Battle plans
3.1 Polish
Polish defences at Miosna, near Warsaw
2
2.1
Orders of battle
Polish
By the beginning of August, the Polish retreat had become more organized, as their supply lines were steadily
3 Fronts (Northern, Central, Southern), 7 Armies, a to- shortened. At rst, Jzef Pisudski wanted to stop the Sotal of 32 divisions: 46,000 infantry; 2,000 cavalry; 730 viets at the Bug River and the city of Brest-Litovsk, but
machine guns; 192 artillery batteries; and several units of the Soviet advance resulted in their forces breaching that
line, making that plan obsolete.[7] On the night of August
(mostly FT-17) tanks.
56, Pisudski, staying at the Belweder Palace in Warsaw,
Fronts:
conceived a revised plan. In the rst phase, it called for
Polish forces to withdraw across the Vistula River and de Northern Front: 250 km., from East Prussia, along fend the bridgeheads at Warsaw and at the Wieprz River,
the Vistula River, to Modlin:
a tributary of the Vistula southeast of Warsaw. A quarter of the available divisions would be concentrated to the
5th Army
south for a strategic counteroensive. Next, Pisudskis
1st Army Warsaw
plan called for the 1st and 2nd Armies of General Jzef
Hallers Central Front (10 divisions) to take a passive
2nd Army Warsaw
role, facing the Soviet main westward thrust and holding
Central Front:
their entrenched positions, Warsaws last line of defence,
3.2
Russian
at all costs. At the same time, the 5th Army (5 divisions) under General Wadysaw Sikorski, subordinate to
Haller, would defend the northern area near the Modlin
Fortress; when it became feasible they were to strike from
behind Warsaw, thus cutting o Soviet forces attempting
to envelop Warsaw from that direction, and break through
the enemy front and fall upon the rear of the Soviet Northwestern Front. Additionally, ve divisions of the 5th
Army were to protect Warsaw from the north. General
Franciszek Latinik's 1st Army would defend Warsaw itself, while General Bolesaw Roja's 2nd Army was to hold
the Vistula River line from Gra Kalwaria to Dblin.[1][7]
The crucial role, however, was assigned to the approximately 20,000-strong, newly formed Task Force (also
translated as Assault Group or Shock Army, from
Polish Grupa Uderzeniowa), under the personal command of Pisudski. This unit, composed of the most
elite Polish units from the southern front, was to be reinforced by General Leonard Skierski's 4th Army and
General Zygmunt Zieliskis 3rd Army. After retreating
from the Bug River area, those armies had not moved directly toward Warsaw but had crossed the Wieprz River
and broken o contact with their pursuers, thus confusing
the enemy as to their whereabouts. The Assault Groups
assignment was to spearhead a rapid oensive from their
southern position in the Vistula-Wieprz River triangle.
They were supposed to advance north, targeting a weak
spot that the Polish intelligence thought to have found
in between the Soviet Western and Southwestern Fronts,
where their communications relied on the weak Mazyr
Group. The aim of this operation was to throw the Soviet Western Front into chaos, and separate it from its
reserves. According to the plan, Sikorskis 5th Army
and the advancing Assault Group would meet near the
East Prussian border, leaving the Soviets trapped in an
encirclement.[1]
Although based on fairly reliable information provided
by Polish intelligence and intercepted Soviet radio
communications,[8][9][10] the plan was called 'amateurish'
by many high-ranking army ocers and military experts,
from Polish ocers to the advisors from the French Military Mission to Poland who were quick to point out Pisudskis lack of formal military education.
Criticism was levied on the logistical side, as suggested
concentration points were as far as 100 to 150 miles (150
to 250 km) from many Polish units, most of them engaged
on the front lines, and all of that a mere week before the
planned date of the counterattack. All regrouping was
within striking distance of the enemy; if Pisudski and his
sta mistimed when the Soviet oensive would begin, the
Polish counter-attack and even the cohesion of the entire
Polish front would be in chaos. Pisudski himself admitted in his memoirs that it was a gamble; he decided to go
forward with it due to the defeatist stance of politicians,
fear for the safety of the capital, and the prevailing feeling that if Warsaw were to fall, all would be lost. Only the
desperate situation persuaded other army commanders to
3
go along with it, as they realized that under the circumstances it was the only possible way to avoid a devastating defeat. The plan seemed so desperate and inept, that
when a copy of it was intercepted by the Soviets, it was
discarded as a poor deception attempt.[1]
The authorship of the plan is a matter of some controversy. Due to Pisudskis political image, he was largely
unpopular with the right wing of Polish politics.[1] Furthermore, Paderewski told top Allied leaders that Weygand had the idea; Paderewski knew better, but he was
trying to use American support for a comeback in Polish politics.[11] After the battle, many reports suggested
that the plan was in fact prepared either by the French
general Maxime Weygand or by the Polish Chief of
Sta Tadeusz Jordan-Rozwadowski.[1] According to recent research,[12] the French Military Mission proposed
only a minor tactical counter-attack of two divisions towards Misk Mazowiecki. Its aim would have been to
push the Red Army 30 kilometres back in order to ease
subsequent ceasere negotiations.[13] On the other hand,
General Rozwadowskis plan called for a deeper thrust
into Russian lines from the area of Wieprz. However,
Pisudski proposed a large-scale operation, with signicant forces committed to beating the enemy forces rather
than merely pushing them back. The plan was opposed
by the French mission, which did not believe that the Polish army would be able to regroup after a 600 kilometre retreat.[14] Nonetheless for many years, a myth persisted that it was the timely arrival of Allied forces that
had saved Poland, a myth in which Weygand occupied
the central role.
Davies points out Pisudski was left with only one serious
possibility a counter-oensive to the right of centre, at a
point where a strike-force could be assembled from both
northern and southern fronts. He pondered and checked
these considerations during the night of 56 August, ruminating alone in his study at Belweder in Warsaw. In
the morning, he received Rozwadowski and together they
worked out the details. Rozwadowski pointed out the
value of the River Wieprz by the evening, Order No.
8358/3 was ready and issued. Gen. Weygand admitted in his memoirs that "la victoire tait polonaise, le plan
polonais, l'arme polonaise." (the victory was Polish, the
plan Polish, the army Polish)[15]:197198, 222
3.2 Russian
Mikhail Tukhachevsky planned to encircle and surround
Warsaw by crossing the Vistula River, near Wocawek,
to the north and south of that city, northwest of Warsaw,
and launch an attack from the northwest. With 24 divisions in four armies under his command, he planned to repeat the classic maneuver of Ivan Paskevich, who in 1831,
during the November Uprising, had crossed the Vistula at
Toru and reached Warsaw practically unopposed, crushing the Polish uprising.[7][16] This move would also cut the
Polish forces o from Gdask, the only port open to ship-
4 BATTLE
4 Battle
(Olsztyn)
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4. Army
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Zambrw
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Vis
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5.Army
WyszkwB
Radzymin
Modlin
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Mazowieckie
Narew
ug
Liw
Wgrw
iec
Drohiczyn
14. Aug.
Ossw
16. Army
Sollohub
Garwolin
ula
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Kalwaria
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Vis
Latinik
Dblin
Kozienice
Bug
Roja
Krzn
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Kock
4.Army
Lubartw
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Pisudski
nt
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ra z-
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Cavalry
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2. Army
Ce
Infantry
division
(Brze)
1. Aug.
M
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Pili
Brest
Siedlce
Misk
Mazowiecki
1.Army
on
Fr
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th H
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Wart
50 km
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N
Bzura
Battle
Kork
Fr
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Makinia
Narew
Wyszogrd
Sokka
Lazarevich
Putusk
14. Aug.
Sikorski
Tu W
kh es
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he rn
Biaystok
vs
ky
apy
3. Army
Gay
Ciechanw
Raci
Sierpc
19. Jul
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2. Aug.
Ostroka
Shuvayev
Nieszawa
Grodno
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Bie
Gonidz
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East Prussia
Vis
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(yn
stow
Alle
ski
Lublin
czna
3. Army
Chem
4.3
Third phase
quency used by the 4th Army. It thus lost contact with its
headquarters and continued marching toward Toru and
Pock, unaware of Tukhachevskys order to turn south.[1]
The raid by the 203rd Uhlans is sometimes referred to as
the Miracle of Ciechanw.[1]
At the same time, the Polish 1st Army under General
Franciszek Latinik resisted a direct Red Army assault on
Warsaw by six rie divisions. The struggle for control of
Radzymin forced Jzef Haller, commander of the Polish Northern Front, to start the 5th Armys counterattack
earlier than planned.[7]
During this time, Pisudski was nishing his plans for the
counter-oensive. He decided to supervise the attack,
personally handing in a letter of resignation from all state
functions so he could concentrate on the military situation
and so that if he died, it would not paralyze the state.[7]
He succeeded in raising the morale of the troops, between
August 12 and August 15, visiting units of the 4th Army
concentrating near Puawy, about 100 kilometres south
of Warsaw.[7]
At that time, Pisudski also commented on the dreadful
state of logistics of the Polish army: In the 21st Division, almost half of the soldiers paraded in front of me
barefoot. The newly created Polish army had little choice
in its equipment; its ries and artillery pieces were produced in at least six countries, each of them using dierent ammunition.[7]
4.2
Second phase
5
ank of the battle (from the perspective of the Soviet
advance).[7] At the same time, south of Warsaw, on the
battles left front, the vital link between the Northwestern and Southwestern Fronts was much more vulnerable, protected only by a small Soviet force, the Mozyr
Group.[7][19] Further, Semyon Budyonny, commanding
the 1st Cavalry Army, a unit much feared by Pisudski and other Polish commanders, disobeyed orders by
the Soviet High Command, which at Tukhachevskys insistence, ordered him to advance at Warsaw from the
south. Budyonny resented this order, inuenced by a
grudge between commanding South-Western Front generals Alexander Ilyich Yegorov and Tukhachevsky.[7] In
addition, the political games of Joseph Stalin, at the
time the chief political commissar of the South-Western
Front, further contributed to Yegorovs and Budyonnys
disobedience.[7][19][20] Stalin, looking for personal glory,
aimed to capture the besieged Lww (Lviv), an important industrial center. Ultimately, Budyonnys forces
marched on Lww instead of Warsaw, and thus missed
the battle.[19]
The Polish 5th Army counterattacked on August 14,
crossing the Wkra River. It faced the combined forces
of the Soviet 3rd and 15th Armies (both numerically and
technically superior).[19] The struggle at Nasielsk lasted
until August 15 and resulted in near complete destruction
of the town. However, the Soviet advance toward Warsaw and Modlin was halted at the end of August 15, and
on that day Polish forces recaptured Radzymin, which
boosted the Polish morale.[21]
From that moment on, Sikorskis 5th Army pushed exThe 27th Infantry Division of the Red Army managed to hausted Soviet units away from Warsaw, in an almost
reach the village of Izabelin, 13 kilometres northwest of Blitzkrieg-like operation. Sikorskis units were given the
the capital, but this was the closest that Russian forces support of almost all of the small number of mechanized
units tanks and armoured cars that the Polish army
would come.[7]
had, as well as that of the two Polish armoured trains. It
was able to advance rapidly at the speed of 30 kilometres a day, disrupting the Soviet enveloping northern
manoeuvre.[1]
5 AFTERMATH
taken prisoner or briey interned after crossing the border into German East Prussia. The 3rd Army was the
least aected; due to the speed of its retreat, the pursuing
Polish troops could not catch up with it.[7]
Red Army losses were about 15,000 dead, 500 missing, 10,000 wounded, and 65,000 captured, compared
to Polish losses of approximately 4,500 killed, 22,000
wounded, and 10,000 missing. Between 25,000 and
30,000 Soviet troops managed to reach the borders of
Germany. After crossing into East Prussian territory,
they were briey interned, then allowed to leave with their
arms and equipment. Poland captured about 231 pieces
of artillery and 1,023 machine guns.[7]
Aftermath
7
21), once again defeating the Red Army. After the Battle
of the Szczara River, both sides were exhausted. On October 12, under heavy pressure from France and Britain,
a ceasere was signed. By October 18, the ghting was
over, and on March 18, 1921, the Treaty of Riga was
signed, ending hostilities.
Bolshevik propaganda before the Battle of Warsaw had
described the fall of Polands capital as imminent, and
its anticipated fall was to be a signal for the start of
large-scale communist revolutions in Poland, Germany,
and other European countries, economically devastated
by the First World War. Due to the Polish victory, however, the Soviet attempts to overthrow the government of
Lithuania (planned for August) had to be canceled.[23]
The Soviet defeat was therefore considered a setback
for Soviet leaders supportive of that plan (particularly
Vladimir Lenin).
A National Democrat Sejm deputy, Stanisaw Stroski,
coined the phrase, Miracle at the Wisa (Polish: Cud
nad Wis"), to underline his disapproval of Pisudskis
earlier Ukrainian adventure.[24] Stroskis phrase was
adopted with approval by some patriotically or piously
minded Poles unaware of Stroskis ironic intent.[1]
5.1
According to documents found in 2005 at Polands Cencudu nad Wis" (A Remarkable Discovery: There Was
No Miracle at the Vistula), Gazeta Wyborcza, online.
tral Military Archives, Polish cryptologists broke intercepted Russian ciphers as early as September 1919. At
[10] Jan Bury, Polish Codebreaking during the Russo-Polish
least some of the Polish victories, not only the Battle of
War of 19191920, Cryptologia (2004) 28#3 pp 193
Warsaw but also other battles, can be attributed to this.
203 online
Lieutenant Jan Kowalewski, credited with the original
breakthrough, received the Order of Virtuti Militari in [11] Biskupski 1987
1921.[8][9][10][25]
See also
Blue Army
Siege of Warsaw (1939)
Stefan Mazurkiewicz
Battle of Warsaw 1920, a 2011 lm by Jerzy Homan
EXTERNAL LINKS
[20] Stalin: The Man and His Era, Beacon Press, 1987, ISBN
0-8070-7005-X, Google Print, p.189
Further reading
Biskupski M. B. Paderewski, Polish Politics, and
the Battle of Warsaw, 1920, Slavic Review (1987)
46#3 pp. 503512 he was trying to get American
support for his comeback in Polish politics in JSTOR
Edgar Vincent D'Abernon, The Eighteenth Decisive
Battle of the World: Warsaw, 1920, Hyperion Press,
1977, ISBN 0-88355-429-1.
Davies, Norman. White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish
Soviet War, 191920, Pimlico, 2003, ISBN 0-71260694-7.
Davies, Norman. The Soviet Command and the
Battle of Warsaw, Soviet Studies (1972) 23#4 pp.
573585 says the Soviet failure of command was responsible for its defeat
Fiddick, Thomas. The 'Miracle of the Vistula': Soviet Policy versus Red Army Strategy, Journal of
Modern History (1973) 45#4 pp. 626643 in JSTOR
Fuller, J.F.C.. The Decisive Battles of the Western
World, Hunter Publishing, ISBN 0-586-08036-8.
Hetherington, Peter. Unvanquished: Joseph Pilsudski, Resurrected Poland, and the Struggle for Eastern
Europe (2012) pp 42558 excerpt and text search
8.1 In Polish
M. Tarczyski, Cud nad Wis, Warszawa, 1990.
Jzef Pisudski, Pisma zbiorowe, Warszawa, 1937,
reprinted by Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1991,
ISBN 83-03-03059-0.
Mikhail Tukhachevski, Lectures at Military
Academy in Moscow, February 710, 1923,
reprinted in Pochd za Wis (March across the
Vistula), d, 1989.
9 External links
Robert Szymczak, PolishSoviet War: Battle of
Warsaw, Historynet
3 scans Polish maps
(Polish) Bolszewik zamany Gazeta Wyborcza article about breaking of Soviet ciphers.
10
10.1
10.2
Images
10
10
File:Tukhachevsky-mikhail-2.jpg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c6/Tukhachevsky-mikhail-2.jpg
License: Public domain Contributors: Taken from marxists.org, direct link Original artist: Unknown<a href='//www.wikidata.org/
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10.3
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