GENARO GOI, etc. Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, Respondents-Appellees. [G.R. No. L-27434.

September 23, 1986.]

FACTS OF THE CASE: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals. The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and
Dulce Nombre de Maria were originally owned by the Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas [TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T.
Villanueva negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. As he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the
consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Private respondent Gaspar
Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA.
Villanueva further contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00.
Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the purchase price. However, as
only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount was debited from private respondents account. The
difference was supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such payment was presented.
On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva. Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent
Vicente.
On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted, among the properties included in the inventory submitted to the court were
fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
Private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages. He sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de
Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24, 1949.
the trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields
nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed lower Court.
ISSUE: May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, which constitutes a claim or demand upon his
estate, in violation of Rule 130, sec. 20 par. (a)

RULING: YES. The object and purpose of Rule 130, Sec. 20 par. (a) (commonly known as the SURVIVORSHIP DISQUALIFICATION RULE or DEAD
MAN STATUTE) is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and
further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party
plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of
fictitious claims against the deceased.
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit
of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedents
right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained
from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to
establish, if living.
HOWEVER, the protection under the Rules, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver
occurs when plaintiffs deposition is taken by the representatives of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceaseds lifetime." It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente
thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and
surrender of fields nos. 13 and 14. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before
the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate of representatives of the estate/deceased person.
Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person
which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must
be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20 (a) of Rule
130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the
formers lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goni could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to
sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goni testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal
contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

[G.R. No. 30472. January 20, 1930. ]

MARIANO MARALIT AND EMETERIO LOTA, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. REYNALDO LARDIZABAL, as judicial administrator of the estate of Germana
Solis, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:
On February 15, 1920, the deceased Germana Solis hired the plaintiffs to repair her house in Lipa, Batangas, for the sum of P14,000. Plaintiffs alleged that
they have performed the work, but have only received P11,550 from Solis. They also allege that they performed additional work not included in the contract.
They pray that the defendant, who is the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Solis, be ordered to pay them the remainder of the price stipulated in
the contract, the value of the additional work done, and damages, which they allege they sustained by reason of the contract.

In turn, the defendant filed a cross-complaint for the foreclosure of the mortgage given by Maralit, to secure the fulfillment of his obligations under the
contract, and a counterclaim for the value of the materials and labor engaged by defendant on account of the plaintiffs having abandoned the work, and for
damages caused by the delay in the completion thereof.
The lower court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the remaining balance plus the legal interest. The court likewise absolved the defendant from all
causes of action and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim and the cross-claim. Both parties appealed the decision.

Issue: Whether the lower court erred in refusing to admit the testimony of plaintiff Mariano Maralit to prove that the deceased Germana Solis, in the course of
the work, ordered some additional repairs to be made not included in the contract

Held:
The Court ruled that that the refusal of the lower court to admit the testimony of Maralit is with merit.
This decision is based on section 383, paragraph 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that parties or assignors of parties to an action or
proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
It was alleged that this provision is inapplicable because Solis died only after the complaint had been filed against her. But the law does not state that it only
refers to cases where the deceased died before the action was instituted. Moreover, the purpose of the prohibition, which is to discourage perjury may be
applied where the deceased died either before or after the filing of the suit against her, if, when the testimony is given, she is already dead and cannot disprove
it.

ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ

GR No.143439
October 14, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal case or arson pending before the RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo Alvarez,
stranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was called to the witness stand as the first witness against
petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on
marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the
other witnesses. On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her
testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This
prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On
May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the objection of her estranged husband on the ground of marital privilege.
HELD:
Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court has its exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved. The acts of the petitioner stamp
out all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the State has an interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, and must have the right
to offer the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of her husband.

People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]

En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur
Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao
City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in
person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the
motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura (@Boboy), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ Bobong), SPO1 Paguidopon had no
occasion to see him prior to 8 August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be
passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao
City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1
Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team
were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a trisikad carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and
Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the trisikad. SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where

Mula and Molina were accosted. The police officers then ordered the trisikad to stop. At that point, Mula, who was holding a black bag, handed the same to
Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will
settle this. SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the
police officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but this was likewise denied. The accused waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the
offense charged, and sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section
10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their
possession.
Held: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a
search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article
III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The foregoing constitutional proscription,
however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest
which must precede the search. Still, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. Herein,
Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that Molina responded Boss, if possible we will settle this to the request of
SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the arresting officers that Mula and Molina were committing a
crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1
Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the names and
addresses of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of validity on the
arrest effected by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence,
the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against
them.
In Molina, the accused while holding a bag on board a tricycle cannot be said to be committing, attempting to commit or to have committed a crime. It matters
not that the accused responded, Boss, if possible, we will settle this, as such response is an equivocal statement which, standing alone, will not constitute
probable cause to effect an in flagrante arrest. This is reiterated in People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 136790, March 26, 2001, and People v. Conde, G.R. No.
113269, April 10, 2001, although in these cases, for failure of the accused to assert their constitutional right prior to arraignment, and by entering a plea of not
guilty and participating actively in the trial, they were deemed to have waived their right to raise the issue of the illegality of the arrest.
But to constitute a valid in flagrante arrest, as held in People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001, reiterated in People v. Sy Chua, G.R. Nos.
136066-67, February 4, 2003, in People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003, and in the more recent People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233,
February 22, 2007, reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause to justify the arrest. It is necessary that two requisites concur: [1] the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he had just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and [2] such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.

Defendant: Nerio Gaddi y Catubay

FACTS: Nerio Gaddi y Catubay was charged with murder for the death Augusto Esguerra y Navarro:
Information reads as follow:
On or about Dec. 11, 1981, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines Nerio Gaddi with intent to kill, without any justifiable cause, qualified with treachery
and with evident pre-meditation (sic), did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
AUGUSTO ESGUERRA y NAVARRO, by then and there stabbing him several times with a knife, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
offended party in such amount as maybe awarded under the provision of the Civil Code.
Gaddi pleaded not guilty, and trial Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City handed down nmbn a verdict of
guilt for the crime charged.
The Court finds the accused NERIO GADDI y CATUBAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, as charged in the information, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay his heirs of Augusta Esguerra the sum of P50,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs
Hence the appeal.
Issues: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ERNESTO GUZMAN AND IN TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE;

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON HIS WRITTEN STATEMENT (EXH. "F") WHICH IS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PRE-MEDITATION
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses before the court a quo, namely: Ernesto Guzman, Pat, Arturo Angeles, Cpl. Rogello Castillo, Pat. Jesus Patriarca
and Dr. Gregorio C. Blanco. On the other hand, the accused Gaddi was the sole witness presented for the defense.
According to the prosecution:
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 11, 1981, at San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw appellant Nerio Gaddi and
the victim Augusto Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, December 12, 1981, appellant told Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking
partner Augusto Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised appellant to surrender to the police. After work, Guzman went to the police
and reported what appellant told him (
At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, December 12, 1981, Corporal Rogelio Castillo and Detective Rodrigo Salamat arrested appellant at
Manrey Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City. Gaddie told Corporal Castillo that he killed the victim and where he buried the body. Later, Pat. Jesus
Patriarca arrived. Appellant himself led the policeman and Barangay residents to where the body was in a toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto Guzman. The
policeman, with the help of the Barangay residents, dug out the body. The body of the victim was Identified by Ernesto Guzman, his wife, and Jose Esguerra,
victim's brother. Pat. Patriarca took pictures of the body, noted the statements of Ernesto Guzman and Jose Esguerra, and took down the confession of
appellant . Later, the cadaver was subjected to autopsy A man's T-shirt with collar, colored yellow, red and blue, and red shorts, were recovered from the pit
where the body of the victim was dug out. The T-shirt and shorts were Identified by Ernesto Guzman as those worn by appellant while he was drinking with
the victim on December 11, 1981 ..A small table, rubber slipper, bottle of wine and glass were likewise recovered from the same pit
On the other hand, the defense's version of the facts are as follows:
Accused Nerio Gaddi a resident of Novaliches, Quezon City, testified that on December 11, 1981, at around 2:00 to 5:00 p.m., he was drinking with Augusta
Esguerra (Bong Kuleleng) near the house of Ernesto Guzman. At about 5:00 p.m., be was requested by Ernesto Guzman to buy gin. He left Ernesto Guzman
and Augusta Esguerra (who were allegedly drinking) in order to buy a bottle of gin in a nearby store, about 200 meters away. At the store, he met an
acquaintance and they talked for a while before returning. Upon his arrival at the place (where they had a drinking spree) he noticed stain of blood in the place
where they had been drinking and Augusta Esguerra, alias Bong Kuleleng was not there anymore. He inquired from Ernesto Guzman the whereabouts of
Augusta Esguerra and was told that the latter "went home already". He then asked Guzman about the blood and was told that it was the blood stain of a
"butchered chicken." At about 12:00 o'clock midnight, Ernesto Guzman informed him about the killing of Augusta Esguerra. Guzman narrated to him that
Bong Kuleleng (Augusta Esguerra) held his rooster by the neck and that his tattoo mark BCJ (Batang City Jail) will be erased by him. He did not report the
killing to the authorities. Guzman likewise requested ban to admit the killing but he refused. While in the house, Guzman filed the case ahead. He was later
arrested and investigated while looking for the corpse. When brought to the police station, he was forced to admit the killing of Augusto Esguerra (TSN, pp. 314 August 20, 1984). [Appellant's Brief, p. 4-5; Rollo, p. 38.]
The Court finds the instant appeal unmeritorious.
Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on circumstantial evidence, as in this case, it is essential for the validity of such conviction that: 1) there
be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt [Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, People v. Modesto, G.R. No. L-25484, September 21,
1968, 25 SCRA 36; People v. Pajanustan, G.R. No. L-38162, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 699.] Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity
of circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, yet all that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty [People v. Constante,
G.R. No. L-14639, December 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 653; People v. Caneda, G.R. No. L-19132, September 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 9.]
In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution sufficiently satisfies the quantum of proof necessary to uphold a judgment of
conviction. The following circumstances proven by the prosecution indubitably point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime committed against Augusto
Esguerra.
1. The fact that said victim was last seen on the day he was killed in the company of the accused, drinking gin at the back of the house of Ernesto Guzman
[TSN, August 9,1983, p. 1.]
2. The fact that on the day after the drinking spree, December 12, 1981, the accused himself admitted to Ernesto Guzman that he stabbed his drinking
companion and that the latter was 'nadisgrasya niya" so he dumped the body of the victim in a hole being dug out for a toilet, located at the yard of Ernesto
Guzman [TSN, August 9,1983, p. 7.]
3. The fact that when he was turned over to Pat. Arturo Angeles and Pat. Rogelio Castillo of the Northern Police District by the barangay people who
apprehended him, be admitted the truth of the charge of the barangay residents that he killed someone and that he dumped the body of the victim in a place
being dug out as an improvised toilet [TSN, July 14, 1983, p. 5; TSN, August 24, 1983, p. 8.] At the time the barangay people started digging for the body of
the victim, the appellant was even instructing them as to the exact location where the body was buried [TSN, August 24, 1983, p. 6.]
4. The fact that the place where be led the police officers and the barangay residents, i.e. the toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto Guzman, was indeed the site
where he buried the victim as the body of the victim was found there after the digging [TSN, January 3, 1984, p. 5.]
5. The fact that the T-shirt and shorts which the accused was wearing during the drinking spree were later recovered from the place where the victim was
buried [TSN, September 2, 1982, p. 3.]
Appellant however disputes the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as a basis for his conviction. As a rule, the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is entitled to great weight and respect [People v. Valentino, G.R. Nos. L-49859- 60, February 20,

1986, 141 SCRA 397; People v. Dagangon, G.R. Nos. L-62654-58, November 13, 1986, 145 SCRA 464] since it has the advantage of observing the demeanor
of a witness while on the witness stand and therefore can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not [People v. Ornoza, G.R. No. 56283, June 30, 1987,
151 SCRA 495.]
Moreover, appellant's claim that Ernesto Guzman's testimony on Gaddi's confession of the crime to him cannot be given credence for being hearsay is
unavailing. This Tribunal bad previously declared that a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no
person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience [People v. Salvador, G.R. No. L77964, July 26, 1988 citing People v. Castaneda; G.R. No. L-32625, August 31, 1979, 93 SCRA 59.] Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a
crime can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule [Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court] which only prohibits a witness
from testifying as to those facts which he merely learned from other persons but not as to those facts which he "knows of his own knowledge: that is, which
are derived from his own perception." Hence, while the testimony of a witness regarding the statement made by another person, if intended to establish the
truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish
the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement [People v. Cusi Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]Here, when
Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as
Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that is, be was testifying to the fact that the appellant told him that he
stabbed Augusta Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's statement.
That the testimony of Guzman on appellant's oral confession is competent evidence finds support in People v. Tawat [G.R. No. L-62871, May 25, 1984, 129
SCRA 4311 which upheld the trial court's reliance on an extrajudicial confession given, not to a police officer during custodial interrogation, but to an
ordinary farmer as the basis for conviction. The Court's pronouncements in the aforesaid case find relevance in the instant case:
The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him' (Sec. 29 Rule 130, Rules of
Court). What Felicito told Ogalesco may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae.
The Rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he
heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.)
Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and
remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused [citing Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., Niblack, Sec. 278, p. 551.) [at
pp. 436-437; Emphasis supplied.]
The trial court found no reason to doubt Guzman's credibility as a witness considering his stature in the community as a member of a religious movement
participating in such activities as "maanita" and procession of the Fatima and Black Rosary [Rollo, p. 30.] In fact, on the day the killing took place, he left
his house where appellant and his companion, Esguerra were still drinking and went to the house of Junior Isla to attend a "maanita" and participate in the
weekly activity of bringing down the crucifix and the image of the Fatima [TSN, September 2, 1982. p. 2] Besides, there was no showing at all that he was
actuated by improper motives in testifying against appellant so as to warrant disregard of his testimony [People v. Magdueno, G.R. No. L-68699, September
22, 1986, 144 SCRA 210.] On the contrary, the evidence shows that even though the appellant is not related at all to Guzman, the latter, as an act of
generosity, allowed the former to sleep in the porch of his house as the former had no immediate relatives in Quezon City [TSN, August 9, 1983, p. 14.]
As to the testimony of Pat. Angeles and Pat. Castillo, the police officers who apprehended the appellant, credence should be given to their narration of how the
appellant was apprehended and how he led the police and the barangay residents to the place where he dumped the body of his victim since those police
officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence to the contrary [People v. Boholst, G.R. No. L-73008, July
23, 1987, 152 SCRA 263 citing People v. Gamayon, G.R. No. L-25486, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 642; People v. Campana, G.R. No. L-37325, August 30,
1983, 124 SCRA 271; People v. Rosas, G.R. No. L-72782, April 30 1987, 149 SCRA 464.]
Appellant's defense to the prosecution's charge rests on an uncorroborated and purely oral evidence of alibi. It has been ruled time and again that courts look
upon the evidence of alibi with suspicion [People v. Bondoc, 85 Phil. 545 (1950)] and always receive it with caution [People v. Cinco, 67 Phil. 196 (1939);
People v. de Guzman, 70 Phil. 23 (1940)] not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of its easy fabrication [People v. Rafallo, 86
Phil. 22 (1950).] To overcome the evidence of the prosecution, an alibi must satisfy the test of "full, clear and satisfactory evidence" [U.S. v. Pascua, 1 Phil.
631 (1903); U.S. v. Oxiles, 29 Phil, 587 (1915); U.S. v. Olais, 36 Phil 828 (1917).] This test requires not only proof that the accused was somewhere else other
than the scene of the crime but clear and convincing proof of physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the place of the commission of the crime
[People v. Pacis, G.R. Nos. L-32957- 58, July 25, 1984. 130 SCRA 540; People v. Coronado, G.R. No. 68932, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 250; People v.
Ferrera, G.R. No. 66965, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 113.]
The testimony of the accused himself believes any claim of physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime since according to him, the store
where he allegedly bought another bottle of gin was only 200 meters away. He was able to return to Guzman's house only after half an hour since he still had a
chat with an acquaintance at the store. Even granting the truth of appellant's story that he was ordered by Guzman to buy a bottle of gin at about 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon and that he was back after thirty minutes, it was not impossible for him to have committed the crime since Guzman and his wife left appellant
alone with the victim at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening to attend the mananita at the house of Junior Isla. Thus, his statements on the witness stand, far
from demonstrating physical impossibility of being at the scene of the crime, cast serious doubt on the veracity of his alibi.
As the culpability of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution, there is no need to dwell on the
admissibility of appellant's extra-judicial confession [Exh. F to F-9; Rollo, p. 20, et seq.] His conviction can be sustained independently of said confession.
Issue # 3:
However, in the absence of proof as to how the victim was killed, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation cannot be properly
appreciated. The killing must be considered as homicide only and not murder since the circumstance qualifying the killing must be proven as indubitably as
the killing itself [People v. Vicente, G.R. No. L-31725, February 18, 1986, 141 SCRA 347.] This Tribunal clearly pointed out in a previous case that

As heretofore stated, not a single eyewitness to the stabbing incident had been presented by the prosecution. Thus, the record is totally bereft of any evidence
as to the means or method resorted to by appellant in attacking the victim. It is needless to add that treachery cannot be deduced from mere presumption,
much less from sheer speculation. The same degree of proof to dispel reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be reached respecting the
attendance of alevosia[People v. Duero, G.R No. 65555, May 22, 1985, 136 SCRA 515, 519-520; Emphasis supplied. ]
Neither can the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation be considered, absent a clear showing of
1. the time when the of tender determined to commit the crime;
2. an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his dead termination; and
3. a sufficient laspe of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act [People v. Diva, G.R. No. L22946, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468; People v. Pacada, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-44444-45, July 7, 1986, 142 SCRA 427.]
As the evidence on record does not disclose the existence of treachery and evident premeditation in the stabbing of the victim, the crime committed is only
HOMICIDE and not murder, Since there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty for homicide which is reclusion temporal should be
imposed in its medium period.

PEOPLE vs. NENITA MARIA OLIVIA GALLARDO (at large), and REMEDIOS MALAPIT
[G.R. Nos. 140067-71. August 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Remedios Malapit and Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo were charged with one (1) count of illegal recruitment committed in large-scale, three (3) counts of
estafa, and one (1) count of simple illegal recruitment before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
Only accused-appellant Remedios Malapit was brought to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Her co-accused, Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo, remained at large.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. The five (5) cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
On June 6, 1997, accused-appellant introduced Marie to co-accused Nenita Maria Olivia-Gallardo in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. On the same day, Marie
submitted herself to a physical examination and personally handed to Gallardo a partial payment of P18,000.00, for which the latter issued a receipt. Marie
made another payment in the amount of P52,000.00, for which accused-appellant issued a provisional receipt. This amount included the placement fee of her
sister, Araceli Abenoja, who became interested in the opportunity to work abroad. Accused-appellant issued to Marie the receipt for Araceli in the amount of
P35,000.00, signed by Gallardo.
Three months lapsed without any news on Maries deployment to Canada.
After three months of waiting with no forthcoming employment abroad, Marilyn and the other applicants proceeded to the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency, Regional Administrative Unit, of the Cordillera Administrative Region in Baguio City, where they learned that accused-appellant and Gallardo were
not authorized recruiters. Marilyn confronted accused-appellant about this, whereupon the latter assured her that it was a direct hiring scheme. Thereafter,
Marilyn reported accused-appellant and Gallardo to the NBI.
After trial on the merits, accused-appellant was found guilty of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE RESULTING
FROM THE FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS TO APPEAR AND SUBSTANTIATE HER COMPLAINT.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION SUCCEEDED IN PROVING THE GUILT OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIMES OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA.
RULING:
NO.
The Court held that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily
absolve an accused from any criminal liability. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1)
there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when scrutinized and taken together, leads to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant and co-accused
Gallardo conspired in recruiting and promising a job overseas to Araceli Abenoja. Moreover, Marie Purificacion Abenoja had personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the charges filed by her sister, Araceli, for simple illegal recruitment and estafa. Marie was privy to the recruitment of Araceli

as she was with her when both accused-appellant and Gallardo required Araceli to undergo physical examination to find out whether the latter was fit for the
job abroad. Accused-appellant even admitted that she was the one who introduced Marie and Araceli to Gallardo when they went to the latters house. Marie
was the one who shouldered the placement fee of her sister Araceli.
NO.
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was guilty of estafa under the Revised Penal Code, Article 315 paragraph (2) (a),
which provides that estafa is committed:
The evidence is clear that in falsely pretending to possess the power to deploy persons for overseas placement, accused-appellant deceived Marie, Araceli and
Marilyn into believing that the recruitment would give them greener opportunities as caregivers in Canada. Accused-appellants assurance constrained the
private complainants to part with their hard-earned money in exchange for a slot in the overseas job in Canada. The elements of deceit and damage for this
form of estafa are indisputably present. Hence, the conviction of accused-appellant for three (3) counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 15323-R, 15327-R
and 15571-R should be upheld.

GOTESCO v CHATTO [G.R. No. 87584. June 16, 1992.] GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GLORIA E. CHATTO and LINA
DELZA CHATTO, respondents.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie 'Mother Dear' at
Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the
number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into
darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street
they walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto
from June 5 to 11. Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment (Exh. "E") She
was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the
Cook County Hospital five (5) or six (6) times.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: ordered the defendant, herein petitioner, to pay the plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto
ISSUE:
Whether Gotesco is liable
RULING:
Yes
Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr.
Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed."
Clearly, there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. Jesus
Lim Ong is not an engineer, he is a graduate of architecture from the St. Louie (sic) University in Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the
government examination for architects. (TSN, June 14, 1985, p. 4) In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their
theater cannot be equated as an act of God. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence."
Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause.
That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.

Verily, the post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed
by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was
constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was no shown that any of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately
before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in
keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the
accident. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the
structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not
at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever
inspected at all. It is settled that: "The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement
devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract
against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means." This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: "Where a patron of a theater
or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a
presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant." That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.
As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure, for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have
exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.

PEOPLE v. LAQUINON (1985)

Doctrine: A dying declaration not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration sif the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration
would fail to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for
admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule." It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae (Secondhand statements
considered trustworthy for the purpose of admission as evidence in a lawsuit when repeated by a witness because they were made spontaneously and
concurrently with an event).
Facts:
Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder for killing Pablo Remonde with a gun in Davao del Sur. TC found him guilty and imposed upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He appealed.
The Peoples version:
At about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat, barrio captain of Clib, Hagonoy was at his residence. He heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river
some three hundred meters to the south of his house. His brother, Leocario Buat, arrived and told him that a man was shouting for help from the riverbank.
Samama Buat found a man with his hands tied lying on the sand. The man identified himself as Pablo Remonde.
Samama Buat took the ante-mortem statement of Pablo Remonde. Remonde said Gregorio Laquinon shot him. Buat reported the shooting to Vice Mayor
Antonio Biran. Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of the incident and asked the victim who shot him to which the latter answered again that he was shot by
Gregorio Laquinon. Remonde later died in the hospital.
Laquinons defense:
He was a KM member (The case doesnt say what KM means) and was ordered by one Noli Cabardo to fetch Pablo Remonde. Cabardo asked Remonde why,
having been commanded to buy some provisions in Matanao, he never returned. Remonde answered that he spent the money 'in drinking and gambling.
Cabardo got mad and as Remonde attempted to escape, Laquinon heard a shot which must have been fired by Cabardo as he was holding a .38 cal. revolver.
The lower court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the statement attributed to the deceased Pablo Remonde, as the foregoing
statement is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-mortem declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death.
Issue/s: WON Remondes dying declaration is admissible as an ante-mortem declaratiom
Held: No, it is not. Still, accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery.
The dying declaration of Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not.
The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole
basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae (Secondhand statements considered trustworthy for the purpose of admission as evidence in a lawsuit
when repeated by a witness because they were made spontaneously and concurrently with an event) since the statement was made immediately after the
incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.
The Court cannot believe that Cabardo did the killing. When the deceased was allegedly delivered to Cabardo, he was already hand-tied at his back and
Cabardo was with ten men excluding the accused. Under these circumstances, it is hard to believe that the deceased would attempt to flee. Also, if the
deceased truly tried to flee, the logical thing to do would be to flee away from and not towards Cabardo. In doing the former he would turn to his right or to
his left or towards his back. The evidence however, shows that the deceased had only one would which was in the abdomen. This shows he was fired upon
frontally, contradicting the accuseds testimony.
Most important to remember on this point is that at the time the deceased gave his "dying" statement, Cabardo was still alive and had no previous differences
with the deceased or with the barrio captain. It is hard to believe that the deceased would name the accused with whom he had no quarrel if that was really not
the truth.