SOCSCI 3812-001: Prehistoric Archaeology November 1, 2016 Approaching the problem of cognitive science with the broader characterization we might want to define its goal, together with Ian Davidson (2010), as the discover [of] the representational and computational capacities of the human mind and their structural and functional realization in the human brain. (p. 214) To refer these studies against the background of biological and cultural evolution of primates, hominids and humans as preserved by the material culture can be called archeology of cognition. These changes explored diachronically are referred as cognitive evolution. Finally, when talking about cognitive evolution in the timeline that concerns prehistoric archeology, specific questions are to be addressed: How does hominid and humans cognition evolved? What are the similarities and differences in cognition that underlie human and nonhuman primate tool behavior? (Davidson, 2011, p. 2) and, more important for this paper, how it can be visible with current tools of archeological investigation? The present paper will investigate how cognitive evolution has been extrapolated from the evidence of stone-tool making, what is the relationship between cognitive evolution, language evolution and stone-tool making, how are the former being inferred from the latter and under what grounds. Thus, the categories to be considered are: on the one hand stone-tool making, which is the only actual archeological evidence; language which currently presents evidence for three types of coevolutionary interaction with stone-tool making involving shared neural substrates, shared social context, and shared reliance on general capacities. (Stout, p. 159) Due to the space of this paper we will just treat its interaction as dependable upon a shared social context. One of the most problematic backdrops the investigation of cognitive evolution has to face is the explanation of brain size/changes. Some of the most misleading aspects that continue in the form this data is investigated are the presentation of evidence often in terms of the summary statistics for particular species rather than patterns of variation through time for individual specimens. (Davidson, 2010, p.216) The problem with this approach is that by focusing in quantitative changes rather than specifically where these changes happen in the skull morphology is ignoring the real issue. Imprecise dating of these
changes just complicates its possibility of being a useful reference
completely. In terms of brain development, the social brain hypothesis has suggested that the selection for cognition is present only when the social relationships in large groups are particularly demanding. (Davidson, 2010, p. 218) Additionally, the fact that the main differential factor between human and non-human brain size is ontogenetic rather than phylogenetic, with the notable increase on post-natal encephalization, and thus, infant dependency, point to the existence of a social structure from which these products emerge. Thus, social brain hypothesis argues for models of the mind that should be about the whole of cognition in its social and material contexts and not just the inner working of the brain. (Davidson, 2010, p. 219) In terms of language and tool making skills this seems relevant as it takes us beyond chicken-egg problems, towards questions of interaction and coevolution. Tomasello remain us that the principal selective context for changes in cognition and brain size was the need for children to learn to make and use artifacts (Tomasello, as qtd in Davidson, 2010, p. 219). Moreover, Stout (2011) argues that cultural learning facilitates human acquisition of complex skill by involving mental state attribution and joint attention. Cultural learning interrelates with language as it relied on shared attention to particular task features and causal/intentional understanding of technical and communicative actions (p. 175). However, the question remains on how to identify the relevant characteristics of culture given that by some criteria, tool production by early hominids might not define their behavior as cultural. (Davidson, 2010, 218) Thus, the question still remains (1) To what extent can the features of brain architecture or function be associated with particular types of mental function in living humans in these case the functions corresponding stone-tool making and language. (2) Can arguments be constructed about the brain architecture and function, and hence of the mental function of human ancestor and hominids; (3) is it possible to develop an argument about the evolution from the conditions identified in (2) (which are the least well defined) to the conditions identified in (1) (which are investigable) (Davidson, 2010, 218). What is being proposed is a statement of language as another tool dependable upon emulative learning and brain development concerned with such learning. As it is implicit from the methodology of archeology as a science this is dependable on the material culture recollected, in these case, stone tools. In that case, through the study of its process we can hypothesize necessary structures that might underline its changes and try to get proves for this in other set of material culture. The shift from objects to process should take
archeology away from question of firsts, towards looking at interaction
and unapparent relationship through which the past might show us the basic modes through which humans were in the past. Interaction between language and tool making are far from being totally defined, as the mediation of cultural learning makes both contingents until further investigation. Bibliography.
Davidson, Iain.(2010)."The Archeology of Cognitive Evolution."
Davidson, lain. (2011). Introduction Stone Tools and the Evolution
of Human Cognition, edited by April Nowell & Iain Davidson, 2010. Boulder (CO): University Press of Colorado. ISBN 978-16073-2030-2. Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 21(01), 143145. doi:10.1017/s0959774311000126
Stout, D. (2011). Possible Relations between Language and
Technology in Human Evolution. Stone Tools and the Evolution of Human Cognition, edited by April Nowell & Iain Davidson, 2010. Boulder (CO): University Press of Colorado. ISBN 978-1-60732030-2 Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 21(01), 143-145. doi:10.1017/s0959774311000126