Sebastiano Maffettone

Normative approaches to global justice1

Summary
In the last chapters we discussed the nature of justice and the complex passage from justice
within the nation-state to justice in RI. Global justice reproduces some patterns of statenational justice but always with substantial differences. It represents the disjunction between
justice in distribution and justice as recognition but in a different way. In In this chapetr, by
global justice I only treat global distributive justice, although acknowledging that there are
other cases of global justice, for instance commutative justice - which depends on the
fairness of international economic trade - or retributive justice - which may result from an
attempt to redress previous injustices, as in the case of colonialism. Of course, global justice
concerns also non-economic aspects not discussed here- such as cultural, environmental
and military. My interest is specifically in what political philosophers do when they discuss
global distributive justice, that is in normative theories.

Normative theories of global justice2 can be divided according two criteria: (i) relational or nonrelational; (ii) statist or cosmopolitan. Relational authors are either statist or cosmopolitan. Nonrelational authors normally are cosmopolitan albeit in a different way from relational
cosmopolitans. Limits of statists (Blake, Nagel, Julius, Sangiovanni 3) are showed starting with
1 This chapter has been written and discussed during some meetings of the GEM PhD group. The
atmosphere within the group was ideal and so was the critical discussion during the seminars.
Among the students and the teachers members of this group, I thank particularly the coordinator
MarioTel and my discussant Nicholas Lvrat for the very useful criticisms and suggestions. The
paper has been also read and criticized by Valentina Gentile, Pietro Maffettone, Domenico
Melidoro, Gianfranco Pellegrino. I thank them for their advice which was indeed precious.
2 In this chapter I discuss Western theories of global justice within a framework inspired by
analyitical political philosophy and liberalism. Of course in so doing I do not deny the relevance of
other options either outside the West or inspired by continental or post-modern political outlooks
anyway independent from liberalism.
3 M. Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, in Philosohy and Public Affairs,
Vol. 30/3, 2001, pp. 257296; T. Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, in Philosophy and Public
Affairs, Vol. 33/2, 2005, pp. 113-147; A.J. Julius, Nagels Atlas, in Philosophy and Public Affairs,
Vol. 34/2, 2006, pp. 176-192; A. Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, in

cosmopolitan objections to them. Cosmopolitans can be relational or non-relational, the difference

being that relational cosmopolitans (Beitz, Pogge, Cohen and Sabel 4) expand the basic structure
from domestic to global whereas non-relational cosmopolitans (Caney, Buchanan 5) use moral
arguments bypassing the institutional ones. Statist arguments are here adopted for criticizing
cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is criticized for two kinds of reasons: (i) institutional reasons;
(ii) moral reasons. The first kind of reasons mainly concern relational cosmopolitans and the second
ones non-relational cosmopolitans. In so doing, one plays the cosmopolitan with the statist and the
statist with the cosmopolitan. This is not because either cosmopolitans or statists are right. The
intention is rather to avoid the pitfalls of both statism and cosmopolitanism by presenting a fresh
start under the name of Liberal Internationalism. Then relational institutional support for Liberal
Internationalism is provided: normative regionalism. Finally, a moral support for Liberal
Internationalism is found: a non-relational humanitarian duty of justice. This duty of justice is not
egalitarian but sufficientarian, more focused on absolute deprivations than on relative deprivations.

Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35/1, 2007, pp. 2-39.

4 C. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton University Press, 1979; T.
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Polity Press, 2008 (2nd edition); J. Cohen e C. Sabel,
Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 34/2, 2006, pp. 147-175.
5 A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, And Self Determination: Moral Foundations for International
Law, Oxford University Press, 2004; S. Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, Oxford University Press,
2005.

Global Justice: the debate

Statism
Relational

Non Relational

Nagel
Sangiovanni
Blake
Julius

Cosmopolitanis
m
Beitz
Pogge
Cohen and Sabel
Caney
Buchanan

In this article, by global justice I only mean what is usually called distributive justice,
although acknowledging that there are other cases of global justice, for instance
commutative justice - which depends on the fairness of international economic trade - or
retributive justice - which may result from an attempt to redress previous injustices, as in the
case of colonialism. Of course, global justice concerns also non-economic aspects not
discussed here- such as cultural, environmental and military.

The nature of global justice

The world is characterized by a huge disparity in wealth. The progressive liberalization of

international trade and the economic globalization have contributed to an increasing gap between
the global rich and poor. Statistics seem to confirm this disquieting situation: we know that nearly
20% of the world population lives on less than a dollar a day, and 45% on less than two. Even
among states there are huge inequalities in income and wealth. Just as in the case of individuals,
there are rich and poor states. Quite a few of us, granting that there is excessive worldwide
inequality among peoples and states, would also uphold that such an inequality is unjust. To say that
an injustice of this type exists means that - at a global level - the most important goods fail to be
distributed among individuals and states in a morally acceptable manner. This injustice is even more
outrageous when extreme poverty leads many human beings to their death or makes it impossible
for them to lead a dignified life. Premises of this type give rise to a widespread demand for greater
justice at the global level.6
6

Consensus, however, tends to end here, and the roads branch out in separate directions. Different
normative approaches to global justice depart from this common point. This chapter is divided in
two parts. In the first part, it is presented a taxonomy of (some of) the most well known normative
approaches to global distributive justice. This is meant to be a critical presentation, in which one
ends by showing some reasons to be not satisfied with the most well known approaches to global
justice. These approaches are statism and cosmopolitanism. Statism usually is relational whereas
cosmopolitanism can be either relational or non-relational. In the second part, the author
formulates a more personal view which is a form of liberal internationalism. Liberal
internationalism can be seen as an intermediate position between relational and non-relational
approaches to global justice. Main reasons for criticising statism and cosmopolitanism are of
institutional and moral nature. Liberal internationalism includes a model for what is called here
normative regionalism which one can see like an institutional alternative to both statism and
cosmopolitanism. Finally, liberal internationalism will present a non-relational moral criterion for
pursuing a sufficentarian humanitarian duty of global justice.

1. Grounds of justice:
Relational vs Non
Relational

Relational : a
membership-based
approach
Relational approaches are
associative and stress the
meaning of the relation that
keep subjects of justice
united by common links
Non Relational:
In this perspective, justice is
understood as independent
from human interactions and
relations. Sources for these

Normative approaches to global justice can be divided according to two criteria, one
concerning the grounds of justice and the other the scope of justice. The first criterion divides
normative approaches to global justice in relational and non-relational. Relational approaches are
either associative or political and focus on of the relation that keep subjects of justice united by
common links. Relational approaches work on the premise that here is a de facto global basic
structure, a worldwide scheme of cooperation that includes norms regulating private property, the
law of the sea, financial and economic regimes and the relations among states under public
interntional law.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
We can say that they are membership-based. These approaches, in other words, hold that the
practice-mediated relations in which individuals live determine the justification of principles
of justice. Relational accounts can vary depending on the practices they are connected with.
Usa politcal aassocaitionist distinction For example, a relational approach can opt for a very strict
membership like it is to be members of the same family but also for a larger membership like it is to
be a member of an ethnic group, of a nation-state and of a world-wide UN association.
Non-relational approaches can be defined e contrario compared with the relational ones. In this
case, the approach is not neither politcal nor associative and the grounds of justice precede or
anyway are at least partially independent from the practice-mediated relations in which
individuals live. Non-relational approaches do not restrict admission to the group of
considered persons, but usually limit the nature of the intervention in their favour. Natural
prerogatives, needs, humanity and sufferance are all possible candidates for a non-relational
approach.
The distinction between relational and non-relational however does not specify its ambit of
application. This is why we need a second criterion based on scope. The classical distinction
concerning the scope of global justice is the one between statism and cosmopolitanism.
Statism and cosmopolitanism are here defined in terms of the dichotomy relational-non
relational. Statism is always relational and the relational structure is based on state
membership or co-citizenship. Cosmopolitanism however can be relational or not relational.
For relational cosmopolitanism the relational structure must be expanded up to include
membership in supranational entities. For non-relational cosmopolitanism instead
membership is not relevant if not from the point of view of being member of the human
species.
The Kantian origin of this distinction
Relational approaches -given the indeterminacy of their basic membership- cover a large set of
positions within the panorama of normative global justice. The most well known normative
approaches within the relational domain -if we have in mind the scope- are statism and
cosmopolitanism. Non-relational approaches instead usually are cosmopolitan and not statist. As
said before, both statism and cosmopolitanism show evident limits.
In connection with kantian stuff
Beitz distinction: moral-political cosm

Relational approaches to global justice

Cosmopolitans and statists can both be advocates of a relational view, albeit in quite different ways.
According to relational cosmopolitans, inequality should be handled, and hopefully reduced, from
the point of view of the individuals. In this view, injustice relates to the relations among the
individual persons who inhabit the globe. 7 quotation Kant Instead, according to relational statists, to
think of global politics in terms of relations among individuals is misleading. In this second view 8,
the presence of states is dominant and may not be neglected if we are to talk of justice for the world
in which we actually live.9 To counter what they believe to be an unlikely or undesirable
cosmopolitan utopia, the statists propose a minimalist view of global justice. This view envisions
not a world of persons who are more directly equal, but a world of
states and peoples that all behave in a reasonably fair manner in order
to attain a more egalitarian society.10
The advocates of cosmopolitanism usually believe in the potential for a
global distributive justice theory and in the full attainment of socio-

2. Scope of justice:
Statism vs
Cosmopolitanism

Statism:
For
statism,
the
structure is based
membership

relational
on state

Cosmopolitanism:
course,
Cosmopolitanism
be
7 My definition of cosmopolitanism is tailored for the sake of the argument. Of
I take for can
relational or not relational. For
granted that there can be different forms of cosmopolitanism: see C. Lu, The Onerelational
and Many
Faces
cosmopolitanism the
of Cosmopolitanism, in The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 8/2, pp. 244267,relational
2000. Here,
I ammust be
structure
expanded
up
interested in cosmopolitanism about justice, see C. Beitz, C. Beitz, Cosmopolitanism and Global to include
membership
in supranational
Justice, in The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 9, 2005 and C. K. Tan, Justice Without Borders,
Cambridge
entities.
For
non-relational
University Press, 2004. Even if there are different forms of cosmopolitanism, I think
that it is
cosmopolitanism
instead
membership is not relevant if not
plausible to assume that all forms of liberal cosmopolitanism share the individualistic
presupposition according to which individuals are the ultimate unit of moral concern as said by
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, cit., p. 169.
8 It must be clearly understood that here statism is not the same as the classical statism of the
advocates of the so-called political realism, such as Morgenthau, Waltz and others. See H.
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948,
and M. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw Hill, 1979.
9 It goes without saying that the distinction between cosmopolitanism and statism is not only
interesting from the point of view of political philosophy and political science. Indeed, it has a
significant tradition within the context of international law and the interpretation of its main
sources. If, for instance, we take the UN Charter, we may see that it has a general statist approach,
starting from Article 2 that forcedly defends the territorial integrity of states from the interference of
others. On the other hand, the entire discipline on so-called humanitarian law and human rights is
largely inspired by cosmopolitanism. It is to be hoped that the theoretical debate might also
influence the interpretation of the texts of international law, even though in this article I am only
going to deal with distributive justice.
10 This conception is called by Beitz the morality of states, whose main theorem is that within the
international realm the morality of the individuals is transformed into the morality of the states
(Beitz, Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice, cit., p 15)

economic human rights.11 In contrast, the advocates of statism place little trust in global justice,
although they often accept the soundness of human rights and the existence of humanitarian
reasons to support the least advantaged in the world. Here the thesis is uphold that there is the
possibility of a third course -more realistic than the version endorsed by the cosmopolitans and
more utopian than the version espoused by the statists.
This thesis rests on a further and, usually, more neglected consideration. When we deal with these
themes, we mix up two types of arguments furthering greater distributive justice in the world. On
the one hand, there are global justice theories that directly extend the paradigms of domestic
distributive justice to the global case. These theories focus on relative inequality, according to
which the worst-off of the planet are affected by a pervasive and avoidable inequality that is
comparable with domestic inequality.12 On the other hand, there are sufficientarian approaches,
that focus on human rights and minimal thresholds. In other words, they try to take care of absolute
poverty rather that of relative inequality, and for this very reason do not compare global inequality
to domestic inequality.13
The third option here proposed recognizes that, at this time, a comprehensive ideal of global
distributive justice - founded on the domestic distributive justice model - is not yet theoretically
justifiable, although it does not deserve the skepticism expressed by many statists. However, a
broad and convincing interpretation of human rights may do a great deal to reduce social injustice in
todays globalized world. This position can be sufficientarian, starting with a reduction of extreme
poverty and, over time, aiming to enable peoples to decide their own fate. It may be affirmed that
this thesis, which moves our attention from relative inequality to radical deprivations, is based on a
more modest ideal than global equality, an ideal that may be called liberal international justice.
This intermediate option creates a kind of continuity between 0 global justice and 1 global justice.
Perhaps as statists say- beyond the state in a global setting there is no proper global justice, but
still there could be a kind of global justice based on human rights. Of course, speaking of justice
11 Within the cosmopolitan point of view, there can be stronger and weaker forms of
cosmopolitanism. See D. Miller, D. Miller, The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice, in D. R. Mapel
and T. Nardin (a cura di), International Society, Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 166.
12 I use relative inequality to differentiate it from the expression radical inequality by T. Nagel, Poverty and Food:
Why Charity is not Enough, in P. Brown and H. Shue (edited by) Food Policy: the Responsibility of the United States
in the Life and Death Choices, The Free Press, 1977. The reformulation of inequality as impervious, pervasive and
avoidable can be found in T. Pogge, Real World Justice, in G. Brok e D. Moellendorf (edited by), Current Debates in
Global Justice, Springer, 2005, p. 37.

13 The idea to distinguish domestic and global justice according their comparative nature
(principles of global justice are non-comparative, whereas principles of domestic justice are
comparative) is David Millers. See his The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice, cit., p 171.

one means that this intermediate option exceeds the standard of mere humanitarian worry.
In my opinion, this intermediate option meets another requirement of some significance, at least for
a political theorist with a liberal background. Non relational cosmopolitans have a propensity for a
radical moralization of international politics, whose institutions are considered at the service of their
favourite moral ideals. Statists, on the contrary, tend to cut to a minimum the space of morals in
international politics. For a liberal, both positions should prove scarcely convincing. This is the
reason why this third position here exposed is called based on a weak ideal of global justice
and being neither moralistic nor skeptical- liberal' internationalism.

3. (Relational) Statism
Modern statism, is the thesis according to which beyond the state there is not egalitarian justice.
This thesis maintains the special nature of the state among human associations and on such basis
considers state-membership as the only (or the largely predominant) significant relation. Statists
must show that states and only states possess this characteristic. To show this, a statist thesis can be
based on different grounds, such are coercion, reciprocity and framing. In the following the author
tries to argue that -whatever these grounds are- statism will provide an insufficient theory of global
justice.
Statism based on coercion has been introduced by Blake and re-proposed in a modified form by
Nagel. According to these authors state's special relational nature is qualified by the capacity to
coerce its members.
Michael Blake is interested in showing whether liberals may at the same time be consistent with
their egalitarian background and opt for a distributive account that discriminates between
compatriots and foreigners14. In so doing, he presents the state-membership as essentially
characterised by the existence and effectiveness of a coercive structure. Given that the state subjects
only its citizens to legal coercion it has special duties of justification toward them. These duties
explain why consistently with moral egalitarianism- distributive justice can be different within and
outside state borders. According to Blake, this argumentative structure is logically founded on the
state capacity to legitimately limit a general principle of individual autonomy. The presupposed
principle of autonomy says that all persons are normally entitled to live as "autonomous agents".
The special nature of the state-members relation is precisely dependent on the necessity for the state

14 M. Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion and Autonomy, Philosophy & Public Affairs,
vol.30, 2001, pp. 257-96

to justify the limits it imposes on the principle of autonomy. This justification is needed only to
citizens and not to others.
The statist position, based on the coercive nature of the state, has also been presented by Thomas
Nagel.15 The meaning of coercion within the state has for Nagel- special value because citizens are
the authors of the laws that may be coercively imposed on them. For this reason, global justice is
not possible outside what is traditionally meant by the state. 16 Nagel does not present a renewed
version of political realism.17 On the contrary he recognizes a normative level of international
relations, and humanitarian-type duties of solidarity among persons and groups that are not citizens
of the same state may not be ruled out. However, in his opinion, these duties do not depend on a
distributive justice theory extended from the domestic to the global case. For instance, it would be
inappropriate to try to apply to the world something like Rawls difference principle. 18 At the most,
global commitments will have a humanitarian character and will more closely resemble charity than
justice.19
Andrea Sangiovanni proposes a version of reciprocity-based statism20. According to this view, legal
coercion is not the peculiar normative element that makes the state different from and more
important than other institutions. For, him what counts is the financial and sociological basis
every state needs to be effective and functioning. This implies that citizens contribute to the life of
the state through a full range of different activities, such as trust, compliance, participation and
providing general resources. Without these contributions the authority of the state could not exist.
On this background, Sangiovanni claims that we can as liberals- keep the idea that individuals are
the basic units of moral concern and be loyal to our egalitarianism even if we favor a different
treatment of citizens and foreigners from the global justice point of view. This is so because the
differential treatment does not depend on a discrimination and an arbitrary moral assessment but
rather by the fact that citizens contribute via reciprocity to the creation of a set of indispensable
15 T. Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, cit.
16 J. Cohen e C. Sabel, Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?, cit.
17 See note 7
18 According to Rawls Difference Principle, a just society is one whose institutions are organized
in such a way that inequalities are allowed only in order to improve the condition of the worst-off.
However, there is no such obligation at a global level. As regards this subject, see S. Freeman, S.
Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract, Oxford University Press, 2009, Chapters 8-9.
19 If, in this article, Nagel is clear about his propensity for statism, as much cannot be said about his
view of humanitarian-type duties. See T. Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, cit., p. 118.
20 see A.Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, Philosophy& Public Affairs, vol. 35 /1, 2007, pp. 3-39

collective goods.
All these forms of statism have been criticised by relational cosmopolitans. If we consider relational
cosmopolitan critiques of the statists, such as the more recent ones by J. Cohen and Sabel and the
earlier ones by Beitz and Pogge, it may be noted that they actually deal mainly with the institutional
issue. According to them, given the increased weight of international relations and institutions, it is
not the case that at the global level we lack those forms of coercion or reciprocity that for statistsare necessary to create genuine obligations of distributive justice. The rules enacted by IMF, WTO
and ILO, for instance, create constraints on the policies a state may implement, and have effects
over different state territories. These rules are enacted in the name and on behalf of the citizens of
the states that must accept them. Even if there is the possibility that the citizens of that state find
those rules wrong or unjust, that does not seem to go against the idea that, even in this case, there is
a sort of co-authorship as the one predicated by Nagel, however sui generis it may be. Indeed,
Cohen and Sabel insist, the very fact that citizens are permitted to protest against these rules shows
that they feel to be fellow participants.
Allunga
In order to refute this partial co-authorship hypothesis, it may be objected by statists- that the
protests of those citizens, who suffer the consequences of rules laid down by international
organizations that they fail to share, are not made against an international authority. They are rather
made against their own state, which has ratified and incorporated those rules domestically. The fact
is that, in the final analysis, in case of disagreement - at least in democratic regimes - citizens have
to pronounce, through their vote, their desire to maintain these rules. Such a controversy is not at all
easy to solve. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the national state acts as an intermediary
between international organizations and citizens. On the other, it seems more likely that the rules
enacted by international organizations are being coercively imposed on the citizens of individual
states.

4 Relational cosmopolitanism and institutional argument

Following the line of argument of the last section, one can substitute statism with some form of
cosmopolitanism. As said cosmopolitanism can be either relational or non relational.
The relational cosmopolitan conception is based on an institutional thesis according to which the
relational structure must be expanded up to include membership in supranational entities.
For those who share this thesis, there is a network of global structures able to create obligations for
people that are not so different from the obligations whose nature we usually we associate with the

state. Relational cosmopolitans in other words claim that the global basic structure is comparable
with the domestic basic structure. 21This comparability makes all statist positions indifferently from
their grounds in coercion or reciprocity- untenable. The most well known authors within the
relational cosmopolitan domain can be considered Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge.
Beitz maintains that there is no problem to apply Rawls' principles of justice globally. This
conclusion presupposes that there are not too many differences between the domestic and the global
settings. Main reason for this is the international economic interdependence. In that light, Beitz
argument is substantially proposed in the negative, in the sense that he does not see the difference
between the two basic structures at stake. States -in this perspective- have no special rights to their
resource endowments. This fact renders states subject to principles of distributive justice rather that
prior to them. As consequence a renewed original position should be global, including citizenship
on what is covered by a veil of ignorance.
Pogge presents his institutional cosmopolitanism assuming that the international order is
responsible for global injustice. As a result both individual agents and collective bodies have a
strong negative duty not to impose others an unjust institutional scheme as it is the actual one. This
conclusion is formulated within the language of human rights. In an interdependent world, a human
rights standard must be imposed on the global order because this order has an enormous impact on
the life of persons. This standard should support a drastic institutional reform at the global level
with a consequent dispersion of sovereignty. The outcome of this reform would be the eradication
of severe poverty and the reduction of inequality.
However if we look to the statist criticism of this position we note that for statists- the difference
between domestic and global justice is not merely quantitative. In other words, it is not only a
question of the supposed existence at a global level of a series of practices, relations and
institutions that are not yet sufficient to warrant either coercion or cooperation likely to create the
bases for actual associative obligations22. It is rather a question of a qualitative difference. The
domestic basic structure corresponds to a genuine political society, while the global basic structure
21 As for this differentialist thesis, see D. Miller, D. Miller, Justice and Global Inequality, in A.
Hurrell and N. Woods (edited by), Inequality, Globalization and World Politics, Oxford University
Press, 1999.
22 This is a further reason that makes the so called empirical objection to the political conception
(its description of reality being supposed to be false) very difficult. For this objection, see C. Beitz,
Justice and International Relations, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.4/4, 1975, pp 360-389 .
More recently the same objection has been discussed by David Miller. In particular, he writes The
empirical claim is the most intractablefor political philosophers at least. See D. Miller,
Collective Responsibility and International Inequality in Law of Peoples, in R. Martin and D.A.
Reidy (edited by), Rawls Law f Peoples. A Realistic Utopia?, Backwell, 2006, p. 195.

does not correspond to a genuine political society.

This is evident if we take reciprocity based statism. This statist thesis maintains that in the global
case and in the domestic case we witness two entirely different types of cooperation. What is
missing in the global case is that type of reciprocity that ensures cooperation in the domestic case.
Hence, the adoption of principles of global distributive justice would somehow mean that the
central idea of cooperation as a source of distributive obligations is not taken seriously enough.23
Analogous kind of argument can be applied to Nagels version of the political conception. Here,
distributive justice is not an end in itself. Even Rawls difference principle is not a politically neutral
tool. Rather, it is a model for political institutions the application of which proves meaningless
where the political nature of an institution is nonexistent. Distributive justice itself - always in the
political conception serves a political purpose. It is believed that an excessive income or status
difference does not allow actual freedom and equality and, therefore, is likely to distort the original
political relations of equality and liberty among fellow citizens within their political community.
Obviously, the corollary of this reasoning is that, since there is nothing like a worldwide state - a
state that, for the time being cannot even be imagined - the same type of political argument does not
apply at a global level. This is why the maximum ideal of global justice within the political
conception is a world populated by states that are internally relatively just. This is quite different
from any cosmopolitan project of global justice. As previously pointed out, the chief difference
between the two levels would seem to be the relation between authority and citizens. Within a
political community, as Nagel says, citizens are the authors of the laws that may be coercively
imposed on them, while something similar does not currently exist at a global level.
There are two major objections -if we follow this line of argument- against cosmopolitanism. Both
concern the claim that norms enacted by international institutions may have a fully political
meaning: one based on the voluntariness of the agreements and one based on their arbitrariness.
According to the first one, the international agreements are similar to the commitments undertaken
by voluntary and occasional associations24. They do imply individual and collective obligations, but
only in specific occasions and for limited purposes. This is why, within the context of the political
conception, no obligations of justice may derive from them. The second objection is based on the
arbitrariness of this type of relations: the contingent nature of international relations does not allow
thinking about the existence of any continuing cooperation and reciprocity on which actual duties of
23 This thesis is accurately developed by S. Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract, cit.
24 Nagel explicitly states that justice cannot be applied to a voluntary association or contract
among independent parties concerned to advance their common interests (T. Nagel, The Problem
of Global Justice, cit., p. 140).

distributive justice would depend.

Relational cosmopolitans counter these objections by rejecting this way of conceiving international
relations. In their version, the discontinuity and occasional nature of international relations would
be more the exception than the rule. There are supposedly only two options in Nagel as re-read by
moderate cosmopolitans (such as Cohen and Sabel): either the full continuity of political relations in
the domestic case, or the dominion of voluntaristic arbitrariness in the global case. Relational
cosmopolitans invoke a third option, where the creation of ever more stable and lasting international
constraints generates a form of embryonic political community where cooperation and reciprocity
progressively gain ground.

6. Non-relational Cosmopolitanism & Moral Argument

Non-relational cosmopolitans like Caney and
Buchanan- reason in a different way. They insist on
the moral nature of our obligations at the global
level.

simplified

form

of

non-relational

cosmopolitanism -aiming to make personal and

institutional morality more continuous- has been
discussed for over thirty years, since the publication
of a Peter Singers famous article. 25 Singer
argument like in general utilitarian argumentsmakes the right straightforwardly dependent on the
good conceived in utilitarian terms, and applies this

Global Justice:
Grounds and Scope

Relational theories:
o Relational Cosmopolitanism:
For relational cosmopolitans there is
a global basic structure analogous to
the domestic basic structure
o Statism:
The advocates of statism do not
accept the analogy between global
and domestic basic structure
Non relational theories:
o Non-Relational
Cosmopolitanism:
They insist on the moral nature of
our obligations at the global level.

form of reasoning to global justice. It has to be

noted that, in a different manner, analogous kind of
thesis is supported by non-relational cosmopolitans.
Caney

presents

his

type

of

non-relational

cosmopolitanism starting with a criticism of statism

25 See P. Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, in Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 1/1, 1972,
pp. 229-243. According to this thesis, starting off from a utilitarian background and allowing the
existence of a certain decreasing marginal utility of basic commodities, greater equalitarism in the
world certainly amounts to greater justice. Such a thesis has a highly revisionist content: famine in
the world is a scandal and we need to make every possible direct effort and create in the shortest
possible time new institutions, if there are none today, in order to solve the huge moral problem it
engenders.

and other forms of relationalism26. For him, all rights we attribute to citizens are recognised because
of the membership relation within the state but rather because citizens are substantially human
beings. Common humanity trumps citizenship and membership, and only universal values can
dictate the deep agenda of political theory. Within this perspective, all civil and legal rights
presuppose something like human rights. And these rights and the duties that correspond to them
cannot be limited by state borders.

This is why non-relational humanism becomes

cosmopolitanism, and all persons must be included within principles of global justice.
Allen Buchanan non-relational cosmopolitanism is still bolder 27. In fact, he claims that the whole
international legal system should be modelled on a deep commitment to justice for all persons.
More generally the international legal system should be inspired to principles of morality. Moral
principles of justice in fact determine the most basic moral rights and obligations. This does not
mean that these principles must be the same at the domestic and the global level, but rather that they
are prior to any legitimation of authority. In particular,
the authority of the state itself depends on its capacity

Two Versions of Cosmopolitanism:

to protect the human rights of the citizens. As a

consequence the existing principle of international
legal order must be modified in the light of a
revisionary moral perspective.
A successful revision of statism from a non-relational
cosmopolitan point of view can take place only if we
are able to challenge a foundational premise of the
statist thesis, namely the moral argument. According

Non-relational Cosmopolitanism: the

moral argument.
According to this argument, moral
principles of justice determine the most
basic moral rights and obligations. This
approach refuses the freestanding nature
of political institutions, and introduces
directly comprehensive moral views into
the political realm. Non-relational
cosmopolitans do not appreciate the
liberal distinction between right and good

to the moral argument, the difference principle -and

any vision of distributive justice - is a political
principle, and therefore its application to the global
community is not fully justified by standard
cosmopolitan arguments of a moral nature.
To understand the nature of this moral argument, it is
useful to think about the relation between the institutional argument and the moral argument. 2829
Both the institutional and the moral argument still concern the practice dependency of
26 S.Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2002
27 A.Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral foundations for International
Law, , Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004

distributive justice looking at the relation between the individual and the institutions, but in a
different way. As formulated by Nagel, the institutional argument states that Rawls principles
of justice, given the difference between domestic and international institutions, do not apply
among members of different polities. Because, as Nagel firmly maintains: these are different
cases or types of relations, and the principles that govern them have to be arrived at separately. 30
Thats why principles of global justice cannot be reached simply by extending the principles that
govern domestic justice. For domestic institutions are different from global ones: they are defined
by different practices. This is the reason why statism philosophically rejects the institutional
consistency defended by cosmopolitans.
Within this perspective the moral argument has to do with the classical anti-perfectionism and antiutilitarianism that are typical of a Rawlsian pluralist reading of liberalism. 31 According to Liam
Murphy, Rawls entire political philosophy is characterized by an intense dualism. 32 The intent of
this dualism is to keep moral personal conduct separate from political institutional analysis,
supporting a neat division of labour between institutions on one side and individual conduct on the
other side. In other words, the moral argument is based on a principle according to which there may
28 Here Nagel has a similar claim to Michael Blake (Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and
Autonomy, in Philosohy and Public Affairs, Vol. 30/3, 2001, pp. 257296), according to which the
institutional side of the statist position depends on the mere fact of coercion and its justification.
This distinction is nicely clarified by K. C. Tan, The Boundary of Justice and the Justice of
Boundaries; Defending Global Egalitarianism, in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol.
XIX/2, 2006, pp 319-344..
29 This is also Ronald Dworkins thesis in Laws Empire, Harvard University Press, 1986.
According to Jurgen Habermas, this thesis could be bypassed given the actual context that makes
the correspondence between nation and constitution old fashioned. The correspondence between
nation and constitution always for Habermas- depended on the revolutionary nature of liberal
constitutions and from the idea that sovereignty must be indivisible. Now, since both of these
aspects are not so relevant anymore, we may hope for a global constitutionalization of international
law. See Habermas, A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society, in his Between
Naturalism and Religion, Polity Press, 2008.
30 L. Murphy, Institutions and Demands of Justice, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 27/4,
1998, pp. 251-291
31 Partially reviewed by Rawls in his essay Basic Structure as Subject (1978), now in Political Liberalism, Harvard
University Press, 1996 (second edition). Actually, this form of Rawlsian anti-monism has been noted and criticized by
Murphy in Institutions and Demands of Justice, cit..

32 Actually Murphy points to a certain dualism in Rawls, rather than anti-monism. His article
criticizes Rawls dualism in the name of a greater consistency between personal commitment and
just institutions. I accept here Nagels suggestion, according to which the term anti-monism works
better than the term dualism, since Rawls is supposedly an advocate of a pluralist rather than a
dualistic view.

be no straightforward continuity between conceptions of the good and political visions of justice. As
a result, it involves a proviso: public institutions should not be directly shaped by goals that
correspond to the values of individuals or groups, even if those values and goals are as noble as
greater equality in the world.
Non-relational comsmopolitanism tends to bypass this proviso. By so doing, it does not respect the
freestanding nature of political institutions, and introduces directly comprehensive moral views into
the political realm. Thats why non-relational cosmopolitanism according to a reading of the moral
argument- violates the dictates of pluralist liberalism, in a way that is not too different from
comprehensive doctrines inspired to perfectionism and utilitarianism.
On this basis, it is easier to understand Rawls criticism of cosmopolitan conceptions.33
Cosmopolitan conceptions deal with the relations of equality among persons that are members of
different basic structures, while for Rawls what matters more for the purpose of justice is
membership withn the same basic structure. From one point of view, it is the difference of
institutions that straightforwardly blocks any cosmopolitan vision. From another point of view,
however, it is the moral argument and the pluralist soul of Rawlsian liberalism that prevents a
conception of global justice from being taken in earnest. In fact, Rawls takes off from the
assumption that major institutions are somehow freestanding, that is to say independent from the
conceptions of the good. Any attempt to adapt them to a specific view of the world would mean to
betray their eminently public nature. But it is this that non relational-cosmopolitans try to do, if we
follow a Rawlsian perspective, when they pretend to normatively model global justice
independently form the actual situation of the world institutions. And, adopting this comprehensive
view, the ethical obscures the political. Thats why any freestanding political conception should
reject non-relational cosmopolitanism.

6. Toward normative regionalism

Relational cosmopolitans single out an element of weakness in statism. In a changing international
situation, there seems to be no reason why the state should be the only one to determine normative
constraints among its citizens. In particular, it is hard to see the need for all or nothing reasoning.
Perhaps these normative constraints grow side by side with international institutions and global
33 Rawls famously writes: The ultimate concern of a cosmopolitan view is the well being of
individuals and not the justice of societiesWhat is important to the Law of Peoples is the justice
and stability for the right reasons of liberal and decent societies (Harvard University Press, 1999,
pp. 119-120).

interdependence. Regionalism offers a particularly interesting mediation from this point of view: it
can be considered a state led process with supra-national intentions. In such way a still statist
project can avoid to be in conflict with and instead go toward a global social, economic and ethical
trend. It must be noted that the term "regionalism" is here used in a generic way. For more
information, you can see the chapters of Sberro and van Langenhove & Maes in this volume.
The example of the European Union regionalism is emblematic. As matter of fact, EU has joined, in
its history, two convergent features: (i) the progressive change of a regional inter-governmental
structure into a supranational one; (ii) a strong commitment to respect the human rights. These
features are a kind of privileged realization of the global normative claim before mentioned. The
EU experience can be re-interpreted and re-used elsewhere. Its the conjunction of regional
supranational power, common economic market and respect for the rule of law that makes us think
that the EU model is more generally meaningful. This conjunction embodies what here is called
normative regionalism. To simplify, we can suppose that the EU supranational element and the
common market give sense to regionalism, whereas respect for human rights to normative.
The proliferation of foreign trade between European countries, and its progressive liberalization,
have promoted over time the establishment of a partial political community. 34 The progressive
regionalization of a few areas of the world, beginning from Europe, seems to prop up the idea of a
continuity of the normative constraints, popular among the cosmopolitans, rather that the idea of a
discontinuity, popular among the statists. More generally, what is so truly sui generis in the
domestic basic structure that would be unconceivable at global level? Substantially, it is its social
institutional effectiveness over time and its ability to create a truly social dimension. However, it is
reasonable to affirm that such an effect is not entirely impossible in principle in the global
community.
This type of reasoning, however, meets with at least two obstacles. Firstly, taking the last example,
regionalization is not tantamount to globalization. Indeed, the different institutional regionalizations
(such as ASEAN, NAFTA, AU, APEC, OAS, ECOWAS) could give rise to a global system of
mutual competition among regional areas. After all, going back to the EU, the European nations
have a common history and a series of shared institutions, and this is something that, for instance,
does not apply between the latter and the African nations. Therefore, the regionalization case does
not solve the matter of global justice. Secondly, the fact that there is a tendency towards a greater
global institutionalization, leading to less voluntaristic and arbitrary constraints among peoples,
does not mean that, at present, there are already all the conditions warranting normative constraints
34 As regards this subject, see J. Rawls and P. Van Parijs, Three letters on The Law of Peoples and the European Union,
in Revue de philosophie economique, Vol. 7, 2003, pp. 7-20.

among citizens throughout the world. After all, an ideal goal to be aimed at is not tantamount to an
acquired right. For instance, one of the bases for cooperation within the domestic basic structure
from which, according to Rawlsian reasoning, duties of justice are supposed to derive - is
reciprocity. Indeed, it is quite hard to assume that the same type of reciprocity we have at the
domestic level can exist now also at a global level.
These conclusions cause to think that we face a dilemma. On the one hand, the political conception
(and the statist thesis) is not fully wrong when we consider a fair evaluation of institutional
arguments in its support. In other words, a full normative justification of global justice on an
institutional basis is hardly tenable, rebus sic stantibus. On the other hand, statism seems too static
and this is a not at all negligible fault. In other words, there could be a justification in embryo of a
global distributive justice, even if there is not yet a full normative justification for it.
If we reflect upon the way in which global society is ordered today, we can be driven to uphold the
idea that eventually continuity rather than discontinuity will describe the relationship between
domestic and global basic structures. The global space, after all, finds collective recognition within
a world-wide organization such as the UN. Of course, the UN is more a club of states than a world
government in progress, but its work to protect human rights and humanitarian law is cosmopolitan
rather then statist in nature. In particular, the UN project dedicated to the Millennium Goals
neatly defines conditions for global justice.35 Parallel targets are pursued by a complex constellation
of international organizations, often coordinated in a complex worldwide network.36
7. Humanitarian argument
In this Section it is argued that even if we were convinced of the wrongness of the cosmopolitan
thesis that upholds the presence of a global basic structure, this does not entail the mere acceptance
"strong" statism37. Our duties towards inequality and poverty in the world still depend on some
notion of justice, and this notion does not need to be purely institutional. There can be other
sources of moral obligations based on justice towards the poor of the globe. These sources are
connected with natural duties and are not-relational. In such way they do not depend on the
existence of a controversial global basic structure.
35 See www.un.org.millenniumgoals/index.shtml.
36 See A. M. Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton University Press, 2004..
37 Also between the forms of statism presented in this chapter there can be a difference between
stronger and weaker forms of statism.The thesis here defended is for example nearer to Sangiovanni
mild statism than to Nagel strong statism.

There is a twofold proviso the obligations conceived in such a manner should respect. First,
they should not violate the anti-perfectionist principles treasured by the liberal political
conception. Secondly, they should be less demanding than those that depend on the soundness
of a full theory of global distributive justice. They are not the outcome of choices that are,
all in all, super-erogatory, as statists view them. From this standpoint, they may be viewed as
falling within the standard way of conceiving socio-economic human rights.
These obligations dont need to have associative nature, as claimed by Nagel about the obligations
deriving from distributive justice and implicitly accepted by his relational cosmopolitan critics.
They can be based on an universal duty of justice.38
According to this universal duty of justice, we have a duty to protect human dignity in all its
forms, regardless of the presence of a global basic structure. 39 Besides, as a counterpart to our
duty to protect in such a manner everybodys human dignity, we must make sure that a few
fundamental basic rights are guaranteed. Quite naturally, these basic rights include some socioeconomic human rights, as those to subsistence, health, and a minimum education. It goes without
saying that the protection of these basic rights does require either the controversial presence of a
strong interdependence or the effectiveness of operational international institutions. Indeed, as
Primo Levi happened to write, when one is in the presence of a systematic demolition of a
man there is little reason to argue and to wait.
One of the advantages connected with this non relational type of foundation is that we must
help whoever is in extreme difficulty, with no need to take the trouble to ascertain whether,
somehow, we are personally or collectively responsible for his/her hopeless situation. Whats
more, given the complexity of the global network of socio-economic relations, it is reassuring to
be able to think that first, we have the obligation to save someone who is dying of hunger or illness
and, only later, do we need to establish the quality of our relations with him or her.
At this point it is legitimate to ask ourselves, what the theoretical base of this type of argument
is. This question may be answered in two different manners that, taken together, could
provide a sufficient solution to the problem it poses. On the one hand, one may try to elucidate
38 A similar thesis is upheld by Allen Buchanan, A. Buchanan, Justice as Reciprocity versus
Subject-Centered Justice, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 19/3, 1990, pp. 227-252. Buchanans
idea is to set the duties apart from the idea of reciprocity in order to link them with the idea of
subjectivity.
39 Within a contractarian framework a similar thesis is defended by D. Richards, International Distributive Justice, in
J.R.Pennocck and J.W.Chapman (a cura di) Ethics, Economics and the Law, NOMOS XXIV, New York University
Press, 1982.

the type of duty being considered, starting from the right that corresponds to it. On the other
hand, one may try to trace its origins in a broader historical-critical line of reasoning.
As for the first issue, one can start by stating that the humanitarian duty of justice - as proposed
here is based on the idea that, as members of the same species, we must endeavour to enable each
person to exercise his/her own essential functions as a human being. 40 As a rule, the basis of these
arguments is that there are human rights, including the main socio-economic rights, where the
failure to protect them makes it impossible for people to exercise the majority of their other rights
and, therefore, makes it impossible to live ones life in full. Something similar is reflected in the
main human rights that safeguard the life of individuals and guarantee its fundamental
functionalities.41 We may conceive of them, as Shue does, as a sort of meta-rights, namely rights
without which no other rights or opportunities may be enjoyed. In this case, they would be a
requirement to live ones life. In conclusion, the universal duty one has been talking about until
now is a duty to ensure to all the members of our kind a few conditions of livability and agency.
It is a sort of a sui generis natural duty. This is the reason why it is not subject to the scrutiny
of pluralism, it is not controversial and does not depend on a single specific conception of the
good, because it precedes the conceptions of the good or is supposed to be a part of all of them.
The very idea of a meta-right, that is to say a right to right, highlights this unifying capacity of
the universal duty. This general universal duty clings as already said to a farther-reaching
historical-critical reasoning. Something similar is expressed in the concept of ethical metacomprehension of the species proposed by Jrgen Habermas. 42 Habermas has used this concept in
the light of a critique of a few likely permanent changes in our genetic inheritance. However, this
concept may be also applied to the case of the universal right we are talking about.
I believe that without basic rights corresponding to the general universal duty, we cannot selfunderstand each other as human beings. In other words, our ethical self-comprehension
would fail. In fact, our ethical self-comprehension is embedded in the fact that we consider
ourselves, both as individuals and as humankind, persons responsible for our own
biographies. Indeed, should there be no basic rights to security and subsistence, something
similar would be missing. From this point of view, fundamental human rights ensure that each
life has a value and, therefore, is protected as such, through a guarantee of security and
40 In this respect, it is not too different from Amartya Sens approach based on capabilities and
functioning. See A. K. Sen, The Idea of Justice, Harvard University Press, 2009.
41 Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Princeton University Press, 1980, second edition revised in 1996.
42 J. Habermas, The future of Human Nature, Polity, 2003.

subsistence. At the same time, however, basic rights allow each person to choose their own life
course, thereby retaining the liberal pluralist goal of guaranteeing agency, but advancing a
particular notion of wellbeing.
The basic rights and the correspondent universal duty rest on the characteristic of human
vulnerability.43 They are imposed by the fact that our weakness as human beings requires a
necessary support that cannot be neglected. This is indeed this type of argument that offers a
valuable solution to liberals who are particularly affected by the moral argument. Indeed, this
pluralism makes the direct passage from a given view of the world to the institutional realization of
its fundamental principles impossible for a liberal Rawlsian. And, as always for a liberal Rawlsian,
all this is connected with the well-known distinction between what is good within a given view
of the world, and what is right. The thesis that founds a universal duty on the ethical selfcomprehension of the human species predicates an overlapping of the good and the right in a
specific ambit and in limited cases. When the very sense of the community of all human beings
is at risk, because the vulnerability of a few is not adequately protected, then the good of
assistance to ensure the basic right to subsistence to those who lack everything, turns also into
a duty of justice. This happens because the good and the right together presuppose that
general moral community.
As a rule, in a post-metaphysical world, as Habermas calls it, the metaphysical level of group
ethics may not be transferred - in the name of pluralism to the universal morals of justice.
However there are exceptions. The holocaust, as dealt with by Primo Levi, is perhaps the most
typical exception of this kind. In the presence of such an event, whether or not we are responsible
for it and whatever our opinions as human beings, we cannot wash our hands of it. However, the
genocide of millions of persons who lack the basic rights to security and subsistence a genocide
that we are all substantially aware of - is similar to the Holocaust. In the horizon of such a farreaching drama, it is reasonable to transform a good, the universal duty, into a right, that is a
valid and legally binding obligation. In different words, the exceptionality at stake here allows
us to overcome the moral argument against cosmopolitanism, since the bond of human morals
and of species is based on the protection of vulnerability. Without basic rights to subsistence,
we could no longer legitimately consider ourselves human beings.

8. Human Rights
43 The term is used in a consequentialist framework by Robert Goodin in Protecting the
Vulenarable; a Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities, Chicago University Press, 1985

The main source for obligations of global justice consists in our reconstruction- in a universal
duty to protect the security and the subsistence of all human beings. One does not need to see this
duty as a purely humanitarian duty, because, as said from the beginning of this article, the substance
matter of it corresponds to the content of the most important socio-economic human rights. This is
a significant element, because one of the attractions of the cosmopolitan project consists in the fact
that we often believe there are normative constraints that exceed mere humanitarianism at the global
level. Perhaps, global politics requires more demanding norms than those dictated by mere
humanitarianism, but less demanding norms then the ones recommended by a cosmopolitan
egalitarian approach.
The main socio-economic human rights include moral principles, but they are also binding
since their validity is not only moral but also legal. They have been recognized as legitimate
rights by the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (1993). What is most important,
however, is that they have been fully acknowledged in the most important ethical-political and
legal document in the matter, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the
United Nations (1948). In its Preamble, it deals with social progress and its universal
promotion, while several articles of the Declaration deal with such socio-economic rights as
work, rest and education. More clearly than any other, article 25 upholds: Everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and the well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. The Commission on Human
Rights of the United Nations worked for a number of years with a view to specifying the
nature of socio-economic rights, until it got to the famous covenants of 1966, one on economic
and social rights and the other on civil and political rights.
When dealing with socio-economic rights, it is important to pose the problem of the limit. Up
to what point are rights such as the right to work and the right to health supposed to be
implemented? What is the cut-off point? It is not at all easy to answer such a question and,
perhaps, we need to consider one case at a time. However, the impression is that the
cosmopolitan solution, based on the adoption of a theory of global distributive justice, tends to
place the cut-off point too high and, in so doing, to be too demanding. In other words, it asks too
much from rich countries and, in general, requires what many see as super-erogatory conduct on the
part of their inhabitants. The solution based on human rights seems, instead, to require a less
demanding commitment, as it concentrates on guaranteeing security and subsistence to the
individuals who lack them and a general right of assistance to what Rawls called burdened

societies44 Both the rights to subsistence and the duty of assistance should not consist in the
assignment of a share of ones wealth based on an obligation to reciprocity, rather they should entail
a socio-economic contribution to the political autonomy of the individuals in burdened societies. If
the attainment of political justice is impossible without a minimum level of wellbeing, the rights to
subsistence and the right of assistance consist in contributing to the construction of this minimum
level*. In other words, these rights correspond to an ethical-political threshold that all should
succeed in reaching*. This allows for a clear cut-off point, which corresponds to the possibility
of action in the contemporary global political environment.
Once this threshold - this welfare minimum to be politically autonomous - is reached, the
citizens of the individual least advantaged states will be able to decide on their own and in a
democratic manner on the policies to be adopted.45 For example, they will be in a position to
choose which investment policies or expense policies to adopt. Their future will depend on this
since should they make the wrong choices they will not be entitled later on to lay justified
claims on the income and wealth of other countries that, in the past, have made better decision than
they have.46 As it is customary for a liberal to think, fundamental rights enable people to have a
starting position of relative equality, while the subsequent voluntary choices determine different
outcomes, which may be better or worse depending on individual cases. This principle is what
counts, while the methods to attain its goals count up to a certain point. Ultimately, human rights
and the duty of assistance to burdened societies which Rawls presents as two different aspects
of the foreign policy of a liberal state 47- may also be conceived as being actually two faces of the
same coin that may coincide in an extended version of socio-economic human rights that enables
everyone to make political choices. This would also allow for the attainment of one of the major
purposes of Rawlsian liberalism: to conceive distributive justice and equality in general as
instruments to achieve a liberal-democratic political equilibrium rather than as independent moral
purposes.

44 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, cit., p. 90.

45 Of course, it must be proved that citizens are able to decide upon their own state policies, and
sometimes such an option is surely unavailable.
46 The example that Rawls uses in The Law of Peoples (pp. 113-120) to rule out the possibility of
global justice actually relates to the different conduct of two states after having reached the
threshold of autonomy based on the socio-economic minimum. Rawls argues that if one state
behaves like a cicada and the other like an ant, the more responsible has not to compensate the
other.
47 J. Rawls The Law of Peoples, cit.

Final Questions

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GROUND AND SCOPE OF GLOBAL

JUSTICE?
HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE STAITSM?
AND COSMOPOLITANISM?
WHAT DOES IT MEAN RELATIONAL?
AND NON-RELATIONAL?
HOW WOULD YOU EXPLAIN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RELATIONAL AND NON
RELATIONAL COSMOPOLITANISM?