UP Law School Cases List:

1. People v. Santiago, 43 Phil 120 (1922)

2. Pesigan v. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)
3. U.S. v Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910
4. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957
5. Gan v. CA, G.R. No. L-44264, September 19, 1988
6. Liang v. People, 323 SCRA 692 (2000)
7. People v. Kottinger, G.R. No. L-20569, October 29, 1923
8. Lucas v. Dr. Tuano G.R. No. 178763. April 21, 2009
9. People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000
10. Newsweek v. IAC, G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986
11. Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
12. Genobiagon v. CA G.R. No. 40452. October 12, 1989
13. PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006
14. Picart v. Smith, G.R. No. L-12219. March 15, 1918
15. People v. Ballesteros, G.R. No. 120921, January 29, 1998

(1) People v. Santiago, 43 Phil 120 (1922)

G.R. No. 17584, People v. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 8, 1922
G.R. No. 17584
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking him with automobile that he was driving,
the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer
one year and one day of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging that the court below committed four errors, to
wit:
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the appellant was being prosecuted in conformity
with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the Act is unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this
case.
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the presentation of the evidence in the case, if not
before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional and the proceedings had in the case under the
provisions of the Act constitute a prosecution of appellant without due process of law.
3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused and over the subjectmatter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and in sentencing him to one year and one
day of prison correccional and to the payment of costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have examined the record and find that the conclusions
of the trial judge, as contained in his well-written decision, are sufficiently sustained by the evidence submitted.
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding
the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones on
the other side where the were two young boys, the appellant did not take the precaution required by the
circumstances by slowing his machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an
ordinary prudent man would take in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as
his automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the result of the accident.

These facts are so well established in the records that there cannot be a shade of doubt about them.
Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that they deal with the fundamental questions as to
whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and constitutional.
This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General Orders No. 58, the defense arguing
that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending
section 2 thereof because its provisions have the character of constitutional law. Said section 2 provides as follows:
All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States against the persons charged
with the offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the Philippine Island is made the plaintiff in this
information, contains the following provisions in section 1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteen hundred, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands against the
persons charged with the offense."
Let us examine the question.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is
left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the Subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all
the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. (M'Culloch vs.
Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316, 407; 4 L. ed., 579.)
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each State has the authority, under its
police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure.
The states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion in creating and defining criminal
offenses. . . .
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial of the equal protection of the laws if it prescribes a
different procedure in the case of persons in like situation. Subject to this limitation, however, the legislature has
large measure of discretion in prescribing the modes of criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins vs.
Johnston, 237 U.S., 502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218 U.S., 57; 30
S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs. Flancders, 141 Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to its territories such as the Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the territories and possessions of the United States
may be exercised by that body itself, or, as is much more often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency, such
as a legislature, the organization of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in the several States or in Congress,
which is often taken as a model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic Act; but within the scope of such act
is has complete authority to legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within the police power of the
territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)

The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from Congress. By act of Congress their power extends "to all
rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States;" and this
includes the power to define and punish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.)
And in the exercise of such powers the military government of the army of occupation, functioning as a territorial
legislature, thought it convenient to establish new rules of procedure in criminal matters, by the issuance of General
Orders No. 58, the preamble of which reads:
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil liberties of the inhabitants of these Islands, the criminal code of
procedure now in force therein is hereby amended in certain of its important provisions, as indicated in the
following enumerated sections. (Emphasis ours.)
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to its provisions the effect of
law in criminal matters. For that reason it provides in section 1 that:
The following provisions shall have the force and effect of law in criminal matters in the Philippine Islands from and
after the 15th day of May, 1900, but existing laws on the same subjects shall remain valid except in so far as
hereinafter modified or repealed expressly or by necessary implication.
From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of this General Order do not the nature of
constitutional law either by reason of its character or by reason of the authority that enacted it into law.
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order was made its own by the Congress of the
United States for, as a mater of fact, this body never adopted it as a law of its own creation either before the
promulgation of Act No. 2886, herein discussed, or, to our knowledge, to this date.
Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the power of the Legislature to amend
it is self-evident, even if the question is considered only on principle. Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act
No. 2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government as a legislative body.
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines the legislative branch of our government has
undergone transformations and has developed itself until it attained its present form. Firstly, it was the Military
Government of the army of occupation which, in accordance with international law and practice, was vested with
legislative functions and in fact did legislate; afterwards, complying with the instructions of President McKinley
which later were ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the Military
Government were transferred to the Philippine Commission; then, under the provisions of section 7 of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it functioned as a colegislative body with the
Philippine Commission. Finally, by virtue of the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, known as the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the Philippine
Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus was formed the present Legislature composed of two
Houses which has enacted the aforesaid Act No. 2886.
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General Orders No. 58. The Philippine
Commission, at various times, had amended it by the enactment of laws among which we may cite Act No. 194,
regarding preliminary investigation, Act No. 440 relating to counsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary
investigations by justices of the peace of provincial capitals. Later on, and before the enactment of Act No. 2886,
herein controverted, the Legislature had also amended this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677
regarding appeals to the Supreme Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace courts and by Act No. 2709
which deals with the exclusion of accused persons from the information in order to be utilized as state's witnesses.
These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well as by our present Legislature are
perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said legislative bodies as the successors of the Military Government
that promulgated General Orders No. 58.

No proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature had, and had, the power to enact and amend laws.
(U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil., 7.) That it has the power to legislate on criminal matters is very evident from the wording of
section 7 of the Jones Law which says:
That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by due
enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from
time to time see fit.
It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of sovereignty. This assertion is right; but it is
also true that by reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in the supression, of crimes, such power is
delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such as territories. As we have seen in the beginning, the
territorial legislatures have the power to define and punish crimes, a power also possessed by the Philippine
Legislature by virtue of the provisions of sections 7, already quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial governments
are local agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the territorial government of
the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it does so by virtue of the authority delegated to it by the
supreme power of the Nation.
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of the several States of the Union and incorporated
territories like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the case with the Philippines, which is an organized territory
though not incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, 181-205.)
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration. As a matter of fact, the crimes committed within
our territory, even before section 2 of General Orders No. 58 was amended, were prosecuted and punished in this
jurisdiction as is done at present; but then as now the repression of crimes was done, and is still done, under the
sovereign authority of the United States, whose name appears as the heading in all pleadings in criminal causes and
in other judicial papers and notarial acts.
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form 1 of section 784 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in
criminal causes the constant practice followed in this jurisdiction established its use; and in notarial matters its use is
provided by section 127 of Act No. 496. This long continued practice in criminal matters and the legal provision
relating to civil cases and notarial acts have not been amended by any law, much less by Act No. 2886, the subject of
the present inquiry.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing the name to be used as party
plaintiff in criminal cases.
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined and in a transitory stage, is, in our opinion,
responsible for the fact that there is no positive provision in our constitutional law regarding the use of the name of
the People of the Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, in criminal prosecutions, as is otherwise the case in the
respective constitutional charters of the States of the Union and incorporated territories a situation which must
not be understood as depriving the Government of the Philippines of its power, however delegated, to prosecute
public crimes. The fact is undeniable that the present government of the Philippines, created by the Congress of the
United States, is autonomous.
This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all judicial actions, the case at bar being one of them;
as an example of such autonomy, this Government, the same as that of Hawaii and Porto Rico (People of Porto Rico
vs. Rosaly y Castillo [1913], 227 U.S., 270; 57 L. ed., 507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be sued without its
consent. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311; L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p.
27, ante.) The doctrine, laid down in these cases, acknowledges the prerogative of personality in the Government of
the Philippines, which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any responsibility in court in its own name unless it
consents thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative in law, to give that government the right to prosecute
in court in its own name whomsoever violates within its territory the penal laws in force therein.

However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in criminal matters, it is within the
power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as long as the constitutional provision of the
accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation is not violated.
Under the Constitution of the United States and by like provisions in the constitutions of the various states, the
accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him . . .
It is within the power of the legislatures under such a constitutional provision to prescribe the form of the indictment
or information, and such form may omit averments regarded as necessary at common law. (22 Cyc., 285.)
All these considerations a priori are strengthened a posteriori by the important reason disclosed by the following
fact that the Congress has tacitly approved Act No. 2886. Both the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 86,
and the Jones Law, last paragraph of section 19, provide that all the laws enacted by the Government of the
Philippines or its Legislature shall be forwarded to the Congress of the United States, which body reserves the right
and power to annul them. And presuming, as legally we must, that the provisions of these laws have been complied
with, it is undisputed that the Congress of the United States did not annul any of those acts already adverted to
Nos. 194, 440, 490 (of the Philippine Commission), and 2677, 2709 and the one now in question No. 2886 (of the
present Legislature) all of which were amendatory of General Orders No. 58. The Act now under discussion (No.
2886) took effect on February 24, 1920, and the criminal complaint in this case was filed on May 10, 1920. The
silence of Congress regarding those laws amendatory of the said General Order must be considered as an act of
approval.
If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial legislation the reasonable inference is that it approves such
act. (26 R.C.L., 679; vide Clinton vs. Englebrcht, 13 Wall., 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S., 549; 33
S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57 [L. ed.], 960; Nixon vs. Reid, 8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A., 315.)
Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of the People of the Philippine Islands as plaintiff
in the title of the information constitutes a vice or defect, the same is not fatal when, as in the present case, it was not
objected to in the court below.
An indictment must, in many states under express statutory or constitutional provision, show by its title or by proper
recitals in the caption or elsewhere that the prosecution is in the name and by the authority of the state, the
commonwealth, or the people of the state, according to the practice in the particular jurisdictions; but omissions or
defects in this respect may be supplied or cured by other parts of the records, and the omissions of such a recital or
defects therein, even when required by the constitution or by statute, is a defect of form within a statute requiring
exceptions for defect of form to be made before trial. (23 Cyc., 237, 238.)
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of
the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any
constitutional provisions and that the court a quo did not commit any of the errors assigned.
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being furthermore sentenced to the accessory penalties
prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the
payment of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor

(2) Pesigan v. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIO, Daet
Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential
Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government
of carabaos transported from one province to another.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the
evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas,
as the destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the
Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to
transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection,
one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and
questionable animals; one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur
and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines
Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor
Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No.
626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG
3144).

Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons
municipal nursery (Annex 1).
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos
allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his
order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred
to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as
already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14,
1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe
penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the
Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas
por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20
and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the
circular was published in the Official Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or
sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by
means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills
vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal
regulation.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be
published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be
deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved
by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated". (See
Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)

In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the
Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans
could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in
order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages.
Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed
and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents,
to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or
Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
De Castro, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the value of each carabao which is not returned for any
reason. The Pesigans are also entitled to a reasonable rental for each carabao from the twenty six farmers who used
them. The farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the Pesigans.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the value of each carabao which is not returned for any
reason. The Pesigans are also entitled to a reasonable rental for each carabao from the twenty six farmers who used
them. The farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the Pesigans.

(3) U.S. v Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon
which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the
material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province,
and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters
No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied
solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small
room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or
lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were
in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the
room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window,
there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was
very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been
inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after
events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at
the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down
on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of
which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because
of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to
the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant
his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends,
Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the
mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room
at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano
heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in
the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately
went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy
in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way
into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being
attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from
the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum
penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of selfdefense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception
from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his
room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room,

with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly
justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without
waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That
there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and
resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the
property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who,
by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts
were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but
one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in
those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that
which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and
cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as
defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as
most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the
crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties
described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative
enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain
provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule,
such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not.
Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm
and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since,
therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that
the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does
greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded
from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say
that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to
do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words
"con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted
from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and
included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of
the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown
above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is
no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is
no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal
Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May
31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the
operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects
of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can
be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or
ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted
to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes
and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which
are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave
crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional
in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall
incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being
subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or
less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one
thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word
"willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while
the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood
to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent
without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or
"causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In
English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought"
are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is
not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be
committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes
generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be
found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act.
Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this
doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important,
not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It
is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is
the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does
not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done
by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence
differs from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the
result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame
ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In
times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in
act from his neighbors does not offend. And

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an
evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the
want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the
plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering
one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first
in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is
wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice
result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no
man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of
necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the
lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the
rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental
principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law,
and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300,
and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to
be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is
Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs.
Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg.
vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the
question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect
which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which
will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded,
if without fault or carelessness he does believe them he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he
mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and
with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If,
without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to
what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he
was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array
of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a
man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief,
and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the
attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger

at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew
the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide
or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of
malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law"
in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the
code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against
him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such
design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the
degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and
a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near
enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant
the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and
that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he
would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded a
doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that
the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set
out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of
his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was
attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or
two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took
from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown
lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of
cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained
pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief
over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in selfdefense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch
of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and
that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with
articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory
penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following
sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked,
struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal
intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation
and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his
wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and
in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense,

nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which
he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not
given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might
bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city,
upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces,
saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two
shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated
a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying
upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had
been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired
from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as
having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of
the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack,
and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting
justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone
thrown against his window at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and
is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" because of which,
and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy,
he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this
man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the
requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from
criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the
accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme
court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at
night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his
person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck
the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the
property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to
the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would
have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the
case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was
committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice
or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not
warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who
assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person
who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced
to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article
61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby
reversing the judgment appealed from.

(4) Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10126

October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR
and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE
BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner
defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to
Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the
driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe
Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just
called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia
Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was
running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the
bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the
driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get
out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans
from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus.
There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the
driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the
vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum.
These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all
but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating
the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who
answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified
that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five
minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary

damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded
P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by
Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim
in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. For
purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth
in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts
or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial
court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence
to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown
by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one
of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it
fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what
degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning

of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave
it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still
alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A
satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by
plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively,
'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical
injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or
if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still
contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present
case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its
back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver
and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the
rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver
and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside
from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance,
and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the
codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the deceased, as well as
the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000)
PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We
also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs'
attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs
prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of
merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of the
passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited
by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus

inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old, and
that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his
instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary
precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones,
as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not
have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently,
resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of
their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally
dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the
complaint, either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the several
witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said driver was
negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of
justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased from ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO
EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision
appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.

5. Gan v. CA, G.R. No. L-44264, September 19, 1988

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Pacis, Baluyot, Reyes & De Leon for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No. 10201
of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII presided by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum and two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and was made to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the sum of P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
On appeal, the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was convicted only of Homicide thru Simple
Imprudence. Still unsatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 petitioner has come to this Court for a
complete reversal of the judgment below.
The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:
In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota
car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay
Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one
following the other about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven by the accused
approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the
opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it
and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-on collision
with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front
bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from
south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused
the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian
was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and
front paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old
man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival. 2

An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the above incident.
She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial
fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972.
The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness to prosecute the case as
evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.
The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
of- offense charged.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide thru simple imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, she is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) months and eleven (11)
days of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00) without, however, any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3
Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of errors:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly
towards her, she should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the
right should have also stepped on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the death of a
pedestrian.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple
Imprudence.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the petitioner liable to indemnify the deceased in the sum
of P12,000.00. 4
We reverse.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is

attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so,
the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. 5
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself
in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." 6
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence
resulting in Homicide.
The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:
The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite
direction followed by another which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should not
only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but should have also tried to stop or lessen
her speed so that she would not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time but also the
jeepney which was then parked along the street. 7
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such
suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it
is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation
confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to
herself and to others.
Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the relative distances
of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner did
have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light without
stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's statement to
the police 8 stating::
And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa sasakyan na
aking kasalubong kung kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit siya naman biglang
pagtawid ng tao o victim at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng magawa . Iyan ho ang
buong pangyayari nang nasabing aksidente. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity to have been
admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking too
much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate
herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly
could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. 10 The danger confronting
petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but
only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.

Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We
therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently
absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under consideration.
We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of the claim due
them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru
Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the
heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

6. Liang v. People, 323 SCRA 692 (2000)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000]
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail at
P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day,
the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA.
When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via
a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered
by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which
has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two
criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that
due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity
petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to
be presented at the proper time.1[1] At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause
does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.2[2]
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides: Jksm
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."

1
2

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official
capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the
prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to
present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow
the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.3[3] The imputation of theft is ultra vires
and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4[4] It appears that even the governments chief legal counsel, the
Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such,
enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official
functions.5[5] As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.6[6] Being purely a
statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.7[7] The rule on
criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.8[8] Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.9[9]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.2/22/00 9:47 AM

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

7. People v. Kottinger, G.R. No. L-20569, October 29, 1923

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20569

October 29, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
J. J. KOTTINGER, defendant-appellant.
Fisher, Dewitt, Perkins and Brady for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The question to be here decided is whether or not pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress
and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are absence or indecent. Surprising as it may
seem, the question is one of first impression not alone in the Philippine Islands, but in the United States, Great
Britain, and elsewhere. This will explain why a case which otherwise would be heard and voted in Division has been
submitted to the court in banc for decision.
On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta,
Manila. He found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently were used as evidence against J. J. Kottinger,
the manager of the company.
Out of these facts arose the criminal prosecution of J. J. Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
information filed in court charged him with having kept for sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and
indecedent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277. To this information, the defendant interposed a
demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an offense and were not contrary to
law; but trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant duly excepted thereto. Following the presentation of
evidence by the Government and the defense, judgment was rendered finding the defendant guilty of the offense
charged and sentencing him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
The five errors assigned by defendant-appellant in this court divide themselves into two general issues. The first
point sustained by counsel for the appellant is in nature a technical objection, growing out of the defendant's
demurrer. The second point, in reality the decesive issue, is as suggested in the beginning of the decision. We will
take upon the assignments of errors as thus classified in order.
Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. But included therein is a section, No. 12, making obscene or indecent
publications misdemeanors. Said section 12 which, it is contended by the Government, has here been violated, and
which, appellant argues, does not apply to the information and the facts, reads as follow:

Any person who writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, or keeps for sale, distributes, or
exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, book, or other matter, or who designs, copies, draws,
engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares any obscene picture or print, or who moulds, cuts, casts, or
otherwise makes any obscene or indecent figure, or who writes, composes, or prints any notice or
advertisement of any such writing, paper, book, print, or figure shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or
both.
Counsel has gone to the trouble to make a careful analysis of section 12 of the Libel Law which is intended to bear
out his thesis, first, that section 12 does not prohibit the taking, selling, and publishing of alleged obscene and
indecent pictures and prints, and second, that the information in this case charges no offense prohibited by section
12. Recall, however, that the law provides punishment, among other things, for any person who keeps for sale or
exhibits any absence or indecent writing, paper, book, or other matter, and that the information charges the
defendant, among other things, with having wilfully and feloniously kept for sale, distribution, or exhibition,
obscene and indecent pictures.
The phrase in the law "or other matter", was apparently added as a sort of "catch-all." While limited to that which is
of the same kind as its antecedent, it is intended to cover kindred subjects. The rule of ejusdem generis invoked by
counsel is by no means a rule of universal application and should be made to carry out, not to defeat, the legislative
intent. Even if the phrase "or other matter" be cobstrued to mean "or other matter of like kind," pictures and
postcards are not so far unrelated to writings, papers, and books, as not to be covered by the general words
(Commonwealth vs. Dejardin [1878], 126 Mass., 46; 30 Am. Rep., 652; Brown vs. Corbin [1889], 40 Minn., 508).
The line of argumentation is more refined that practical. Once conceded that section 12 of Act No. 277 does not
cover the present case, there yet remain for application article 571, No. 2, of the penal code, and section 730 of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. The section of the Revised Ordinances cited is most specific when it
provides in part that no person shall "exhibit, circulate, distribute, sell, offer or expose for sale, or give or deliver to
another, or cause the same to be done, any lewd, indecent, or absence book, picture, pamphlet, card, print, paper,
writing, mould, cast, figure, or any other thing."
While admittedly the information is lacking in precision and while the content of section 12 of the Libel Law is not
as inclusive as it might be, we yet conclude that the information is not fatally defective, and that said section 12
covers the alleged facts.
We come now to decide the main issue. We repeat that our own researches have confirmed the statement of counsel
that no one parrallel case be found. We must perforce reason from the general to the specific and from universal
principle to actual fact.
The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being obscene and indecent, disclose six
different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Exhibit A carries the legend "Philippines, Bontoc
Woman." Exhibit A-1 is a picture of five young boys and carries the legend "Greetings from the Philippines."
Exhibit A-2 has the legend "Ifugao Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-3 has the legend
"Igorot Girl, Rice Field Costume." Exhibit A-4 has the legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines. Exhibit A-5 has the
legend "Moros Philippines."
The prosecution produced no evidence proving the postcards obscene and indecent because it thought the post-cards
themselves the best evidence of that fact. The fiscal admitted in open court "that those pictures represented the
natives (non-Christians) in their native dress." The defendant, on the other hand, attempted to show that the pictures

as true to life. Dr. H. Otley Beyer, Professor in the University of the Philippines, corroborated by other witnesses,
testified from his studies in various parts of the Islands, such as the Mountain Province, Abra, Palawan, and
Mindanao and Sulu, that none of the pictures represented poses which he had not observed on various occasions,
and that the costumes worn by the people in the pictures are the true costumes regularly worn by them. Are such
pictures obscene or indecent?
The word "obscene" ands the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastify, decency,
or delicacy. "Indeceny" is an act against behavior and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in
determining whether a particular publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of
obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency, (29 Cyc., 1315; 8 R. C. L.,
312.)
The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscene or indecent pictures, writings, papers, or books. But the
words "obscene or indecent" are themselves descriptive. They are words in common used and every person of
average intelligence understand their meaning. Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves,
there is but little scope for proof bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or
indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case. (People vs. Muller [1884], 96 N. Y., 408; 48 Am. Rep.,
635.)
Considerable light can be thrown on the subject by turning to the Federal Laws prohibiting the use of the mails for
obscene matter and prohibiting the importation into the Philippine Islands of articles, etc., of obscene or indecent
character. (U. S. Rev. Stat., art. 3893; 36 stat. at L., 135; 7 Fed. Stat. Ann., 1194, sec. 3[b].)
"Obscene," as used in the Federal Statutes making it a criminal offense to place in the mails any obscene, lewd, or
lascivious publication, according to the united States Supreme Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form of
immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and has the same meaning as is given at common law in
prosecutions for obscene libel. (Swearingen vs. U. S. [1896], 161 U. S., 446; U. S. vs. Males [1892], 51 Fed., 41; 6
Words and Phrases, 4888, 4889.)
The case of United States vs. Harmon ([189], 45 Fed., 414), grew out of an indictment for despositing an obscene
publication in a United States post-office in violator of the Postal Law. Judge Philips said:
The statute does not undertake to define the meaning of the terms "obscene," etc., further than may be implied by the
succeeding phrase, "or other publication of an indecent character." On the well-organized canon of construction
these words are presumed to have been employed by the law-maker in their ordinary acceptation and use.
As they cannot be said to have acquired any technical significance as applied to some particular matter,
calling, or profession, but are terms of popular use, the court might perhaps with propriety leave their
import to the presumed intelligence of the jury. A standard dictionary says that "obscene" mean "offensive
to chastity and decency; expressing or presenting to the mind or view something which delicacy, purity, and
decency forbid to be exposed." This mere dictionary definition may be extended or amplified by the courts
in actual practice, preserving, however, its essential though, and having always due regard to the popular
and proper sense in which the legislature employed the term. Chief Justice Cockburn, in Rex vs. Hicklin (L.
R. 3 Q. B., 360), said: "The test of obscenity is this: Where the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is
to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall;" and where "it who suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or

even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of the most impure and libidinous character." So, also, it
has been held that a book is obscene which is offensive to decency or chastity, which is immodest, which is
indelicate, impure, causing lewd thoughts of an immoral tendency." U. S. vs. Bennet, 16 Blatchf., 338.
Judge Thayer, in U. S. vs. Clarke, 38 Fed. Rep., 732, observed:
"The word "obscene" ordinarily means something which is offensive to chastity; something that is
foul or filthy, and for that reason is offensive to pure-minded persons. That is the meaning of the
word in the concrete; but when used, as in the statute, to describe the character of a book,
pamphlet, or paper, it means containing immodest and indecent matter, the reading whereof would
have a tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of those into whose hands the publication might
fall whose minds are open to such immoral influences."
Laws of this character are made for society in the aggregate, and not in particular. So, while there may be
individuals and societies of men and women of peculiar motions are idiosyncrasies, whose moral sense
would neither be depraved nor offended by the publication now under consideration, yet the exceptional
sensibility, or want of sensibility, of such cannot be allowed as a standard by which its obscenity or
indecency is to be tested. Rather is the test, what is the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
reached by it? What is its probable, reasonable effect on the sense of decency, purity, and chastity of
society, extending to the family, made up of men and women, young boys and girls, the family, which is
the common nursery of mankind, the foundation rock upon which the state reposes?
. . . To the pure all things are pure, is too poetical for the actualities of practical life. There is in the popular
conception and heart such a thing as modesty. It was born in the Garden of Eden. After Adam and Eve ate
of the fruit of the tree of knowledge they passed from the condition of perfectibility which some people
nowadays aspire to, and, their eyes being opened, they discerned that there was both good and evil; "and
they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." From
that day to this civilized man has carried with him the sense of shame, the feeling that there were some
things on which the eye the mind should not look; and where men and women become so depraved
by the use, or so insensate from perverted education, that they will not evil their eyes, nor hold their
tongues, the government should perform the office for them in protection of the social compact and the
body politic.
As above intimated, the Federal statue prohibits the importation or shipment into the Philippine Islands of the
following: "Articles, books, pamphlets, printed matter, manuscripts, typewritten matter, paintings, illustrations,
figures or objects of obscene or indecent character or subversive of public order." There are, however, in the record,
copies of reputable magazines which circulate freely thruout the United States and other countries, and which are
admitted into Philippines without question, containing illustrations identical in nature to those forming the basis of
the prosecution at bar. Publications of the Philippine Government have also been offered in evidence such as
Barton's "Ifugao Law," the "Philippine Journal of Science" for October, 1906, and the Reports of the Philippine
Commission for 1903, 1912, and 1913, in which are found illustrations either exactly the same or nearly akin to
those which are now impugned.
It appears therefore that a national standard has been set up by the Congress of the United States. Tested by that
standard, it would be extremely doubtful if the pictures here challenged would be held obscene or indecent by any
state of Federal court. It would be particularly unwise to sanction a different type of censorship in the Philippines
that in the United States, or for that matter in the rest of the world.

The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in
unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in
the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type. We are convicted that the post-card pictures in
this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy.
We readily understand the laudable motives which moved the Government to initiate this prosecution. We fully
appreciate the sentiments of colleagues who take a different view of the case. We would be the last to offend the
sensibilities of the Filipino people and the sanction anything which would hold them up to ridicule in the eyes of
mankind. But we emphasize that we are not deciding a question in political theory or in social ethics. We are dealing
with a legal question predicated on a legal fact, and on this question and fact, we reach the conclusion that there has
not been proved a violation of section 12 of the Libel Law. When other cases predicated on other states of facts are
brought to our attention, we will decide them as they arise.
We seem to recall the statement of counsel that the proprietor of the photographic concern whom he represents
would on his own initiative place suitable and explicit inscriptions on the pictures so that no one may be misled as to
them. Indeed, he might even go further and out of consideration for the natural sensibilities of his customers,
withdraw from sale certain pictures which can be pointed out to him.
We hold that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in
the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. Disagreeing
therefore with the appellant on his technical argument but agreeing with him on his main contention, it becomes our
duty to order the dismissal of the information. 1awph!l.net
Judgment is reversed, the information is dismissed, and the defendant-appellant is acquitted with all costs de oficio.
So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor and Johns, JJ., concur.
Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo was present at the time this case was voted and then voted with Mr. Justice
Romualdez. (Sgd.) E. FINLEY JOHNSON.

Separate Opinions

ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting:

I do not agree with the view taken by the majority as to the nature of the photographic pictures in question. While
said pictures cannot, strictly, be termed obscene, they must, however, be regarded as indecent, for they are so.

Such pictures offend modesty and refinement, and for this reason, they are indecent. This is shown by common
sense. No woman claiming to be decent would dare to stand before the public in Manila, where said pictures were
exhibited, in the same fashion as these pictures are.
It is alleged that these pictures were taken from nature in non-Christian regions. We agree that in said regions they
are not, perhaps, regarded as offensive to modesty, and, therefore, are accidentally not indecent there. But in the City
of Manila where they were exhibited, no doubt they are.
And the law prohibits the exhibition not only of obscene pictures, but of indecent as well. (Sec. 12, Act No. 277.)
I understand that the judgment appealed from should have been affirmed.
Araullo, C.J., concurs.

8. Lucas v. Dr. Tuano G.R. No. 178763. April 21, 2009

THIRD DIVISION

PETER PAUL PATRICK LUCAS, FATIMA

GLADYS LUCAS, ABBEYGAIL LUCAS AND
GILLIAN LUCAS,

G. R. No. 178763

Petitioners,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

DR. PROSPERO MA. C. TUAO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

April 21, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari10[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioners Peter
Paul Patrick Lucas, Fatima Gladys Lucas, Abbeygail Lucas and Gillian Lucas seek the reversal of the 27 September
2006 Decision11[2] and 3 July 2007 Resolution,12[3] both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666, entitled
Peter Paul Patrick Lucas, Fatima Gladys Lucas, Abbeygail Lucas and Gillian Lucas v. Prospero Ma. C. Tuao.
In the questioned decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 14 July 2000 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners in a civil case
entitled, Peter Paul Patrick Lucas, Fatima Gladys Lucas, Abbeygail Lucas and Gillian Lucas v. Prospero Ma. C.
Tuao, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2482.

From the record of the case, the established factual antecedents of the present petition are:

Sometime in August 1988, petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas (Peter) contracted sore eyes in his right
eye.

On 2 September 1988, complaining of a red right eye and swollen eyelid, Peter made use of his health care
insurance issued by Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. (Philamcare), for a possible consult. The Philamcare
Coordinator, Dr. Edwin Oca, M.D., referred Peter to respondent, Dr. Prospero Ma. C. Tuao, M.D. (Dr. Tuao), an
ophthalmologist at St. Lukes Medical Center, for an eye consult.

Upon consultation with Dr. Tuao, Peter narrated that it had been nine (9) days since the problem with his
right eye began; and that he was already taking Maxitrol to address the problem in his eye. According to Dr. Tuao,
he performed ocular routine examination on Peters eyes, wherein: (1) a gross examination of Peters eyes and
their surrounding area was made; (2) Peters visual acuity were taken; (3) Peters eyes were palpated to check the
intraocular pressure of each; (4) the motility of Peters eyes was observed; and (5) the ophthalmoscopy 13[4] on
Peters eyes was used. On that particular consultation, Dr. Tuao diagnosed that Peter was suffering from
conjunctivitis14[5] or sore eyes. Dr. Tuao then prescribed Spersacet-C15[6] eye drops for Peter and told the latter
to return for follow-up after one week.

10
11
12
13

As instructed, Peter went back to Dr. Tuao on 9 September 1988. Upon examination, Dr. Tuao told Peter
that the sore eyes in the latters right eye had already cleared up and he could discontinue the Spersacet-C.
However, the same eye developed Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC),16[7] a viral infection. To address the new
problem with Peters right eye, Dr. Tuao prescribed to the former a steroid-based eye drop called Maxitrol,17[8] a
dosage of six (6) drops per day.18[9] To recall, Peter had already been using Maxitrol prior to his consult with Dr.
Tuao.

On 21 September 1988, Peter saw Dr. Tuao for a follow-up consultation. After examining both of Peters
eyes, Dr. Tuao instructed the former to taper down 19[10] the dosage of Maxitrol, because the EKC in his right eye
had already resolved. Dr. Tuao specifically cautioned Peter that, being a steroid, Maxitrol had to be withdrawn
gradually; otherwise, the EKC might recur.20[11]

Complaining of feeling as if there was something in his eyes, Peter returned to Dr. Tuao for another
check-up on 6 October 1988. Dr. Tuao examined Peters eyes and found that the right eye had once more
developed EKC. So, Dr. Tuao instructed Peter to resume the use of Maxitrol at six (6) drops per day.

On his way home, Peter was unable to get a hold of Maxitrol, as it was out of stock. Consequently, Peter
was told by Dr. Tuano to take, instead, Blephamide21[12] another steroid-based medication, but with a lower
concentration, as substitute for the unavailable Maxitrol, to be used three (3) times a day for five (5) days; two (2)
times a day for five (5) days; and then just once a day.22[13]

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Several days later, on 18 October 1988, Peter went to see Dr. Tuao at his clinic, alleging severe eye pain,
feeling as if his eyes were about to pop-out, a headache and blurred vision. Dr. Tuao examined Peters eyes and
discovered that the EKC was again present in his right eye. As a result, Dr. Tuao told Peter to resume the maximum
dosage of Blephamide.

Dr. Tuao saw Peter once more at the formers clinic on 4 November 1988. Dr. Tuaos examination
showed that only the periphery of Peters right eye was positive for EKC; hence, Dr. Tuao prescribed a lower
dosage of Blephamide.

It was also about this time that Fatima Gladys Lucas (Fatima), Peters spouse, read the accompanying
literature of Maxitrol and found therein the following warning against the prolonged use of such steroids:
WARNING:

Prolonged use may result in glaucoma, with damage to the optic nerve, defects in visual
acuity and fields of vision, and posterior, subcapsular cataract formation. Prolonged use may
suppress the host response and thus increase the hazard of secondary ocular infractions, in those
diseases causing thinning of the cornea or sclera, perforations have been known to occur with the
use of topical steroids. In acute purulent conditions of the eye, steroids may mask infection or
enhance existing infection. If these products are used for 10 days or longer, intraocular pressure
should be routinely monitored even though it may be difficult in children and uncooperative
patients.

Employment of steroid medication in the treatment of herpes simplex requires great

caution.

xxxx

ADVERSE REACTIONS:

Adverse reactions have occurred with steroid/anti-infective combination drugs which can
be attributed to the steroid component, the anti-infective component, or the combination. Exact
incidence figures are not available since no denominator of treated patients is available.
Reactions occurring most often from the presence of the anti-infective ingredients are
allergic sensitizations. The reactions due to the steroid component in decreasing order to
frequency are elevation of intra-ocular pressure (IOP) with possible development of glaucoma,
infrequent optic nerve damage; posterior subcapsular cataract formation; and delayed wound
healing.

Secondary infection: The development of secondary has occurred after use of

combination containing steroids and antimicrobials. Fungal infections of the correa are
particularly prone to develop coincidentally with long-term applications of steroid. The possibility
of fungal invasion must be considered in any persistent corneal ulceration where steroid treatment
has been used.
Secondary bacterial ocular infection following suppression of host responses also
occurs.

On 26 November 1988, Peter returned to Dr. Tuaos clinic, complaining of feeling worse. 23[14] It
appeared that the EKC had spread to the whole of Peters right eye yet again. Thus, Dr. Tuao instructed Peter to
resume the use of Maxitrol. Petitioners averred that Peter already made mention to Dr. Tuao during said visit of the
above-quoted warning against the prolonged use of steroids, but Dr. Tuao supposedly brushed aside Peters concern
as mere paranoia, even assuring him that the former was taking care of him (Peter).

Petitioners further alleged that after Peters 26 November 1988 visit to Dr. Tuao, Peter continued to suffer
pain in his right eye, which seemed to progress, with the ache intensifying and becoming more frequent.

Upon waking in the morning of 13 December 1988, Peter had no vision in his right eye. Fatima observed
that Peters right eye appeared to be bloody and swollen.24[15] Thus, spouses Peter and Fatima rushed to the clinic of
Dr. Tuao. Peter reported to Dr. Tuao that he had been suffering from constant headache in the afternoon and
blurring of vision.

Upon examination, Dr. Tuao noted the hardness of Peters right eye. With the use of a tonometer25[16] to
verify the exact intraocular pressure26[17] (IOP) of Peters eyes, Dr. Tuao discovered that the tension in Peters
right eye was 39.0 Hg, while that of his left was 17.0 Hg. 27[18] Since the tension in Peters right eye was way over
the normal IOP, which merely ranged from 10.0 Hg to 21.0 Hg,28[19] Dr. Tuao ordered29[20] him to immediately
discontinue the use of Maxitrol and prescribed to the latter Diamox30[21] and Normoglaucon, instead.31[22] Dr.

23
24
25
26
27
28

Tuao also required Peter to go for daily check-up in order for the former to closely monitor the pressure of the
latters eyes.
On 15 December 1988, the tonometer reading of Peters right eye yielded a high normal level, i.e., 21.0
Hg. Hence, Dr. Tuao told Peter to continue using Diamox and Normoglaucon. But upon Peters complaint of
stomach pains and tingling sensation in his fingers,32[23] Dr. Tuao discontinued Peters use of Diamox.33[24]

Peter went to see another ophthalmologist, Dr. Ramon T. Batungbacal (Dr. Batungbacal), on 21 December
1988, who allegedly conducted a complete ophthalmological examination of Peters eyes. Dr. Batungbacals
diagnosis was Glaucoma34[25] O.D.35[26] He recommended Laser Trabeculoplasty36[27] for Peters right eye.

When Peter returned to Dr. Tuao on 23 December 1988,37[28] the tonometer measured the IOP of Peters
right eye to be 41.0 Hg,38[29] again, way above normal. Dr. Tuao addressed the problem by advising Peter to
resume taking Diamox along with Normoglaucon.

During the Christmas holidays, Peter supposedly stayed in bed most of the time and was not able to
celebrate the season with his family because of the debilitating effects of Diamox.39[30]

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

On 28 December 1988, during one of Peters regular follow-ups with Dr. Tuao, the doctor conducted
another ocular routine examination of Peters eyes. Dr. Tuao noted the recurrence of EKC in Peters right eye.
Considering, however, that the IOP of Peters right eye was still quite high at 41.0 Hg, Dr. Tuao was at a loss as to
how to balance the treatment of Peters EKC vis--vis the presence of glaucoma in the same eye. Dr. Tuao, thus,
referred Peter to Dr. Manuel B. Agulto, M.D. (Dr. Agulto), another ophthalmologist specializing in the treatment of
glaucoma.40[31] Dr. Tuaos letter of referral to Dr. Agulto stated that:

Referring to you Mr. Peter Lucas for evaluation & possible management. I initially saw
him Sept. 2, 1988 because of conjunctivitis. The latter resolved and he developed EKC for which I
gave Maxitrol. The EKC was recurrent after stopping steroid drops. Around 1 month of steroid
treatment, he noted blurring of vision & pain on the R. however, I continued the steroids for the
sake of the EKC. A month ago, I noted iris atrophy, so I took the IOP and it was definitely
elevated. I stopped the steroids immediately and has (sic) been treating him medically.

It seems that the IOP can be controlled only with oral Diamox, and at the moment, the
EKC has recurred and Im in a fix whether to resume the steroid or not considering that the IOP is
still uncontrolled.41[32]

On 29 December 1988, Peter went to see Dr. Agulto at the latters clinic. Several tests were conducted
thereat to evaluate the extent of Peters condition. Dr. Agulto wrote Dr. Tuao a letter containing the following
findings and recommendations:

Thanks for sending Peter Lucas. On examination conducted vision was 20/25 R and
20/20L. Tension curve 19 R and 15 L at 1210 H while on Normoglaucon BID OD & Diamox
tab every 6h po.

Slit lamp evaluation42[33] disclosed subepithelial corneal defect outer OD. There was
circumferential peripheral iris atrophy, OD. The lenses were clear.

39
40
41
42

Funduscopy43[34] showed vertical cup disc of 0.85 R and 0.6 L with temporal slope R>L.

Zeiss gonioscopy44[35] revealed basically open angles both eyes with occasional PAS, 45
[36] OD.

Rolly, I feel that Peter Lucas has really sustained significant glaucoma damage. I suggest
that we do a baseline visual fields and push medication to lowest possible levels. If I may suggest
further, I think we should prescribe Timolol46[37] BID47[38] OD in lieu of Normoglaucon. If the
IOP is still inadequate, we may try Depifrin 48[39] BID OD (despite low PAS). Im in favor of
retaining Diamox or similar CAI.49[40]

If fields show further loss in say 3 mos. then we should consider trabeculoplasty.

I trust that this approach will prove reasonable for you and Peter.50[41]

Peter went to see Dr. Tuao on 31 December 1988, bearing Dr. Agultos aforementioned letter. Though
Peters right and left eyes then had normal IOP of 21.0 Hg and 17.0 Hg, respectively, Dr. Tuao still gave him a
prescription for Timolol B.I.D. so Peter could immediately start using said medication. Regrettably, Timolol B.I.D.
was out of stock, so Dr. Tuao instructed Peter to just continue using Diamox and Normoglaucon in the meantime.

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Just two days later, on 2 January 1989, the IOP of Peters right eye remained elevated at 21.0 Hg,51[42] as
he had been without Diamox for the past three (3) days.

On 4 January 1989, Dr. Tuao conducted a visual field study52[43] of Peters eyes, which revealed that the
latter had tubular vision53[44] in his right eye, while that of his left eye remained normal. Dr. Tuao directed Peter to
religiously use the Diamox and Normoglaucon, as the tension of the latters right eye went up even further to 41.0
Hg in just a matter of two (2) days, in the meantime that Timolol B.I.D. and Depifrin were still not available in the
market. Again, Dr. Tuao advised Peter to come for regular check-up so his IOP could be monitored.

Obediently, Peter went to see Dr. Tuao on the 7 th, 13th, 16th and 20th of January 1989 for check-up and IOP
monitoring.

In the interregnum, however, Peter was prodded by his friends to seek a second medical opinion. On 13
January 1989, Peter consulted Dr. Jaime Lapuz, M.D. (Dr. Lapuz), an ophthalmologist, who, in turn, referred Peter
to Dr. Mario V. Aquino, M.D. (Dr. Aquino), another ophthalmologist who specializes in the treatment of glaucoma
and who could undertake the long term care of Peters eyes.

According to petitioners, after Dr. Aquino conducted an extensive evaluation of Peters eyes, the said
doctor informed Peter that his eyes were relatively normal, though the right one sometimes manifested maximum
borderline tension. Dr. Aquino also confirmed Dr. Tuaos diagnosis of tubular vision in Peters right eye.
Petitioners claimed that Dr. Aquino essentially told Peter that the latters condition would require lifetime
medication and follow-ups.

In May 1990 and June 1991, Peter underwent two (2) procedures of laser trabeculoplasty to attempt to
control the high IOP of his right eye.

Claiming to have steroid-induced glaucoma54[45] and blaming Dr. Tuao for the same, Peter, joined by: (1)
Fatima, his spouse55[46]; (2) Abbeygail, his natural child56[47]; and (3) Gillian, his legitimate child 57[48] with
Fatima, instituted on 1 September 1992, a civil complaint for damages against Dr. Tuao, before the RTC, Branch
150, Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2482.

51
52
53
54

In their Complaint, petitioners specifically averred that as the direct consequence of [Peters] prolonged
use of Maxitrol, [he] suffered from steroid induced glaucoma which caused the elevation of his intra-ocular pressure.
The elevation of the intra-ocular pressure of [Peters right eye] caused the impairment of his vision which
impairment is not curable and may even lead to total blindness.58[49]

Petitioners additionally alleged that the visual impairment of Peters right eye caused him and his family so
much grief. Because of his present condition, Peter now needed close medical supervision forever; he had already
undergone two (2) laser surgeries, with the possibility that more surgeries were still needed in the future; his career
in sports casting had suffered and was continuing to suffer; 59[50] his anticipated income had been greatly reduced as
a result of his limited capacity; he continually suffered from headaches, nausea, dizziness, heart palpitations,
rashes, chronic rhinitis, sinusitis,60[51] etc.; Peters relationships with his spouse and children continued to be
strained, as his condition made him highly irritable and sensitive; his mobility and social life had suffered; his
spouse, Fatima, became the breadwinner in the family; 61[52] and his two children had been deprived of the
opportunity for a better life and educational prospects. Collectively, petitioners lived in constant fear of Peter
becoming completely blind.62[53]

In the end, petitioners sought pecuniary award for their supposed pain and suffering, which were ultimately
brought about by Dr. Tuaos grossly negligent conduct in prescribing to Peter the medicine Maxitrol for a period of
three (3) months, without monitoring Peters IOP, as required in cases of prolonged use of said medicine, and
notwithstanding Peters constant complaint of intense eye pain while using the same. Petitioners particularly prayed
that Dr. Tuao be adjudged liable for the following amounts:

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

1.
The amount of P2,000,000.00 to plaintiff Peter Lucas as
way of compensation for his impaired vision.

2.
The amount of P300,000.00 to spouses Lucas as and by
way of actual damages plus such additional amounts that
proven during trial.

3.
damages.

The amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by way of moral

4.
damages.

The amount of P500,000.00 as and by way of exemplary

and

by

may be

5.
The amount of P200,000.00 as and by way of attorneys
fees plus costs of suit.63[54]

In rebutting petitioners complaint, Dr. Tuao asserted that the treatment made by [him] more than three
years ago has no causal connection to [Peters] present glaucoma or condition. 64[55] Dr. Tuao explained that
[d]rug-induced glaucoma is temporary and curable, steroids have the side effect of increasing intraocular pressure.
Steroids are prescribed to treat Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis or EKC which is an infiltration of the cornea as a
result of conjunctivitis or sore eyes. 65[56] Dr. Tuao also clarified that (1) [c]ontrary to [petitioners] fallacious
claim, [he] did NOT continually prescribe the drug Maxitrol which contained steroids for any prolonged
period66[57] and [t]he truth was the Maxitrol was discontinued x x x as soon as EKC disappeared and was
resumed only when EKC reappeared 67[58]; (2) the entire time he was treating Peter, he continually monitored the
intraocular pressure of [Peters eyes] by palpating the eyes and by putting pressure on the eyeballs, and no
hardening of the same could be detected, which meant that there was no increase in the tension or IOP, a possible
side reaction to the use of steroid medications; and (3) it was only on 13 December 1988 that Peter complained of a

63
64
65
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headache and blurred vision in his right eye, and upon measuring the IOP of said eye, it was determined for the first
time that the IOP of the right eye had an elevated value.

But granting for the sake of argument that the steroid treatment of [Peters] EKC caused the steroid
induced glaucoma,68[59] Dr. Tuao argued that:

[S]uch condition, i.e., elevated intraocular pressure, is temporary. As soon as the intake of steroids
is discontinued, the intraocular pressure automatically is reduced. Thus, [Peters] glaucoma can
only be due to other causes not attributable to steroids, certainly not attributable to [his] treatment
of more than three years ago x x x.

From a medical point of view, as revealed by more current examination of [Peter], the
latters glaucoma can only be long standing glaucoma, open angle glaucoma, because of the large
C:D ratio. The steroids provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier as [Peter] remained
asymptomatic prior to steroid application. Hence, the steroid treatment was in fact beneficial to
[Peter] as it revealed the incipient open angle glaucoma of [Peter] to allow earlier treatment of the
same.69[60]

In a Decision dated 14 July 2000, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 92-2482 for insufficiency of
evidence.70[61] The decretal part of said Decision reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant complaint is dismissed for insufficiency of

evidence. The counter claim (sic) is likewise dismissed in the absence of bad faith or malice on the
part of plaintiff in filing the suit.71[62]

The RTC opined that petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Dr. Tuao was negligent
in his treatment of Peters condition. In particular, the record of the case was bereft of any evidence to establish that
the steroid medication and its dosage, as prescribed by Dr. Tuao, caused Peters glaucoma. The trial court reasoned

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that the recognized standards of the medical community has not been established in this case, much less has
causation been established to render [Tuao] liable.72[63] According to the RTC:

[Petitioners] failed to establish the duty required of a medical practitioner against which
Peter Pauls treatment by defendant can be compared with. They did not present any medical
expert or even a medical doctor to convince and expertly explain to the court the established norm
or duty required of a physician treating a patient, or whether the non taking (sic) by Dr. Tuao of
Peter Pauls pressure a deviation from the norm or his non-discovery of the glaucoma in the course
of treatment constitutes negligence. It is important and indispensable to establish such a standard
because once it is established, a medical practitioner who departed thereof breaches his duty and
commits negligence rendering him liable. Without such testimony or enlightenment from an
expert, the court is at a loss as to what is then the established norm of duty of a physician against
which defendants conduct can be compared with to determine negligence.73[64]

The RTC added that in the absence of any medical evidence to the contrary, this court cannot accept [petitioners]
claim that the use of steroid is the proximate cause of the damage sustained by [Peters] eye. 74[65]

Correspondingly, the RTC accepted Dr. Tuaos medical opinion that Peter Paul must have been suffering
from normal tension glaucoma, meaning, optic nerve damage was happening but no elevation of the eye pressure is
manifested, that the steroid treatment actually unmasked the condition that resulted in the earlier treatment of the
glaucoma. There is nothing in the record to contradict such testimony. In fact, plaintiffs Exhibit S even tends to
support them.

Undaunted, petitioners appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. Their appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 68666.

On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666 denying
petitioners recourse and affirming the appealed RTC Decision. The fallo of the judgment of the appellate court
states:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.75[66]

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The Court of Appeals faulted petitioners because they

[D]id not present any medical expert to testify that Dr. Tuanos prescription of Maxitrol and
Blephamide for the treatment of EKC on Peters right eye was not proper and that his palpation of
Peters right eye was not enough to detect adverse reaction to steroid. Peter testified that Dr.
Manuel Agulto told him that he should not have used steroid for the treatment of EKC or that he
should have used it only for two (2) weeks, as EKC is only a viral infection which will cure by
itself. However, Dr. Agulto was not presented by [petitioners] as a witness to confirm what he
allegedly told Peter and, therefore, the latters testimony is hearsay. Under Rule 130, Section 36 of
the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal
knowledge, x x x. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as
evidence.76[67]

Like the RTC, the Court of Appeals gave great weight to Dr. Tuaos medical judgment, specifically the
latters explanation that:

[W]hen a doctor sees a patient, he cannot determine whether or not the latter would react
adversely to the use of steroids, that it was only on December 13, 1989, when Peter complained
for the first time of headache and blurred vision that he observed that the pressure of the eye of
Peter was elevated, and it was only then that he suspected that Peter belongs to the 5% of the
population who reacts adversely to steroids.77[68]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 3 July
2007.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court premised on the
following assignment of errors:

I.

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THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING

THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS COMPLAINT
FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE;

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING

THE PETITIONERS COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENT ON THE
GROUND THAT NO MEDICAL EXPERT WAS PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS TO
PROVE THEIR CLAIM FOR MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT; AND

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

THE RESPONDENT LIABLE TO THE PETITIONERS FOR ACTUAL, MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, ASIDE FROM ATTORNEYS FEES, COSTS OF SUIT, AS A
RESULT OF HIS GROSS NEGLIGENCE.78[69]

A reading of the afore-quoted reversible errors supposedly committed by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision and Resolution would reveal that petitioners are fundamentally assailing the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the evidence on record is insufficient to establish petitioners entitlement to any kind of damage.
Therefore, it could be said that the sole issue for our resolution in the Petition at bar is whether the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in affirming the judgment of the RTC that petitioners failed to prove, by preponderance
of evidence, their claim for damages against Dr. Tuao.

Evidently, said issue constitutes a question of fact, as we are asked to revisit anew the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals, as well as of the RTC. In effect, petitioners would have us sift through the evidence on record
and pass upon whether there is sufficient basis to establish Dr. Tuaos negligence in his treatment of Peters eye
condition. This question clearly involves a factual inquiry, the determination of which is not within the ambit of this
Courts power of review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules Civil Procedure, as amended. 79[70]

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Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts; only errors of law are generally reviewed in
petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the Court of Appeals. Questions of fact are not
entertained.80[71]

Nonetheless, the general rule that only questions of law may be raised on appeal in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court admits of certain exceptions, including the circumstance when the finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence, but is contradicted by the evidence on
record. Although petitioners may not explicitly invoke said exception, it may be gleaned from their allegations and
arguments in the instant Petition.

Petitioners contend, that [c]ontrary to the findings of the Honorable Court of Appeals, [they] were more
than able to establish that: Dr. Tuao ignored the standard medical procedure for ophthalmologists, administered
medication with recklessness, and exhibited an absence of competence and skills expected from him. 81[72]
Petitioners reject the necessity of presenting expert and/or medical testimony to establish (1) the standard of care
respecting the treatment of the disorder affecting Peters eye; and (2) whether or not negligence attended Dr. Tuaos
treatment of Peter, because, in their words

That Dr. Tuao was grossly negligent in the treatment of Peters simple eye ailment is a
simple case of cause and effect. With mere documentary evidence and based on the facts presented
by the petitioners, respondent can readily be held liable for damages even without any expert
testimony. In any case, however, and contrary to the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, there was a medical expert presented by the petitioner showing the recklessness
committed by [Dr. Tuao] Dr. Tuao himself. [Emphasis supplied.]

They insist that Dr. Tuao himself gave sufficient evidence to establish his gross negligence that ultimately
caused the impairment of the vision of Peters right eye, 82[73] i.e., that [d]espite [Dr. Tuaos] knowledge that 5%
of the population reacts adversely to Maxitrol, [he] had no qualms whatsoever in prescribing said steroid to Peter
without first determining whether or not the (sic) Peter belongs to the 5%.83[74]

We are not convinced. The judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the RTC are in accord with the
evidence on record, and we are accordingly bound by the findings of fact made therein.

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Petitioners position, in sum, is that Peters glaucoma is the direct result of Dr. Tuaos negligence in his
improper administration of the drug Maxitrol; thus, [the latter] should be liable for all the damages suffered and to
be suffered by [petitioners].84[75] Clearly, the present controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence
case against a physician based on the latters professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in
order to prevail, is required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree
of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of such
failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.

For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of the medical
profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which states that:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient
relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages, four essential (4)
elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation, 85[76] must be established by the
plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for
damages.

When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated. And in
accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the needed training and skill
possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training, care, and
skill in the treatment of the patient. 86[77] Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to [the former] to
exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same
general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. 87[78] Stated otherwise, the physician has the
duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the
condition under similar circumstances.

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This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony,
because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in
the field.88[79]

There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the
attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable
malpractice.89[80] Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon the testimony of an expert witness that the
treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the
same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.

Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient, for there must be a
causal connection between said breach and the resulting injury sustained by the patient. Put in another way, in order
that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct
and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes; 90[81] that is, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.91[82]

Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same, in order to establish the proximate cause [of the
injury] by a preponderance of the evidence in a medical malpractice action, [the patient] must similarly use expert
testimony, because the question of whether the alleged professional negligence caused [the patients] injury is
generally one for specialized expert knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson; using the specialized
knowledge and training of his field, the experts role is to present to the [court] a realistic assessment of the
likelihood that [the physicians] alleged negligence caused [the patients] injury.92[83]

From the foregoing, it is apparent that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert
witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant
physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians [or surgeons] stems from

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the formers realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable
of intelligently evaluating;93[84] hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.

In the case at bar, there is no question that a physician-patient relationship developed between Dr. Tuao
and Peter when Peter went to see the doctor on 2 September 1988, seeking a consult for the treatment of his sore
eyes. Admittedly, Dr. Tuao, an ophthalmologist, prescribed Maxitrol when Peter developed and had recurrent EKC.
Maxitrol or neomycin/polymyxin B sulfates/dexamethasone ophthalmic ointment is a multiple-dose anti-infective
steroid combination in sterile form for topical application. 94[85] It is the drug which petitioners claim to have caused
Peters glaucoma.

However, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, [t]he onus probandi was on the patient to
establish before the trial court that the physicians ignored standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered
medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of the competence and skills expected of general
practitioners similarly situated.95[86] Unfortunately, in this case, there was absolute failure on the part of
petitioners to present any expert testimony to establish: (1) the standard of care to be implemented by competent
physicians in treating the same condition as Peters under similar circumstances; (2) that, in his treatment of Peter,
Dr. Tuao failed in his duty to exercise said standard of care that any other competent physician would use in
treating the same condition as Peters under similar circumstances; and (3) that the injury or damage to Peters right
eye, i.e., his glaucoma, was the result of his use of Maxitrol, as prescribed by Dr. Tuao. Petitioners failure to prove
the first element alone is already fatal to their cause.

Petitioners maintain that Dr. Tuao failed to follow in Peters case the required procedure for the prolonged
use of Maxitrol. But what is actually the required procedure in situations such as in the case at bar? To be precise,
what is the standard operating procedure when ophthalmologists prescribe steroid medications which, admittedly,
carry some modicum of risk?

Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuao under the circumstances, we have no
means to determine whether he was able to comply with the same in his diagnosis and treatment of Peter. This
Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate or weigh the attendant facts of this case to be able to state with
confidence that the acts complained of, indeed, constituted negligence and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary
reparation.

Petitioners assert that prior to prescribing Maxitrol, Dr. Tuao should have determined first whether Peter
was a steroid responder.96[87] Yet again, petitioners did not present any convincing proof that such determination

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is actually part of the standard operating procedure which ophthalmologists should unerringly follow prior to
prescribing steroid medications.

In contrast, Dr. Tuao was able to clearly explain that what is only required of ophthalmologists, in cases
such as Peters, is the conduct of standard tests/procedures known as ocular routine examination, 97[88] composed
of five (5) tests/procedures specifically, gross examination of the eyes and the surrounding area; taking of the
visual acuity of the patient; checking the intraocular pressure of the patient; checking the motility of the eyes; and
using ophthalmoscopy on the patients eye and he did all those tests/procedures every time Peter went to see him
for follow-up consultation and/or check-up.

We cannot but agree with Dr. Tuaos assertion that when a doctor sees a patient, he cannot determine
immediately whether the latter would react adversely to the use of steroids; all the doctor can do is map out a course
of treatment recognized as correct by the standards of the medical profession. It must be remembered that a
physician is not an insurer of the good result of treatment. The mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a
bad result occurs does not in itself indicate failure to exercise due care. 98[89] The result is not determinative of the
performance [of the physician] and he is not required to be infallible. 99[90]

Moreover, that Dr. Tuao saw it fit to prescribe Maxitrol to Peter was justified by the fact that the latter was
already using the same medication when he first came to see Dr. Tuao on 2 September 1988 and had exhibited no
previous untoward reaction to that particular drug. 100[91]

Also, Dr. Tuao categorically denied petitioners claim that he never monitored the tension of Peters eyes
while the latter was on Maxitrol. Dr. Tuao testified that he palpated Peters eyes every time the latter came for a
check-up as part of the doctors ocular routine examination, a fact which petitioners failed to rebut. Dr. Tuaos
regular conduct of examinations and tests to ascertain the state of Peters eyes negate the very basis of petitioners
complaint for damages. As to whether Dr. Tuaos actuations conformed to the standard of care and diligence
required in like circumstances, it is presumed to have so conformed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

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Even if we are to assume that Dr. Tuao committed negligent acts in his treatment of Peters condition, the
causal connection between Dr. Tuaos supposed negligence and Peters injury still needed to be established. The
critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence
which the evidence established and the plaintiffs injuries. 101[92] The plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he
has been injured and defendant has been at fault, but also that the defendants fault caused the injury. A verdict in a
malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable
medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.102[93]

The causation between the physicians negligence and the patients injury may only be established by the
presentation of proof that Peters glaucoma would not have occurred but for Dr. Tuaos supposed negligent
conduct. Once more, petitioners failed in this regard.

Dr. Tuao does not deny that the use of Maxitrol involves the risk of increasing a patients IOP. In fact, this
was the reason why he made it a point to palpate Peters eyes every time the latter went to see him -- so he could
monitor the tension of Peters eyes. But to say that said medication conclusively caused Peters glaucoma is purely
speculative. Peter was diagnosed with open-angle glaucoma. This kind of glaucoma is characterized by an almost
complete absence of symptoms and a chronic, insidious course. 103[94] In open-angle glaucoma, halos around lights
and blurring of vision do not occur unless there has been a sudden increase in the intraocular vision. 104[95] Visual
acuity remains good until late in the course of the disease. 105[96] Hence, Dr. Tuao claims that Peters glaucoma
can only be long standing x x x because of the large C:D 106[97] ratio, and that [t]he steroids provoked the latest
glaucoma to be revealed earlier was a blessing in disguise as [Peter] remained asymptomatic prior to steroid
application.

Who between petitioners and Dr. Tuao is in a better position to determine and evaluate the necessity of
using Maxitrol to cure Peters EKC vis--vis the attendant risks of using the same?

That Dr. Tuao has the necessary training and skill to practice his chosen field is beyond cavil. Petitioners
do not dispute Dr. Tuaos qualifications that he has been a physician for close to a decade and a half at the time
Peter first came to see him; that he has had various medical training; that he has authored numerous papers in the

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field of ophthalmology, here and abroad; that he is a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Ophthalmology; that he
occupies various teaching posts (at the time of the filing of the present complaint, he was the Chair of the
Department of Ophthalmology and an Associate Professor at the University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital and St. Lukes Medical Center, respectively); and that he held an assortment of positions in numerous
medical organizations like the Philippine Medical Association, Philippine Academy of Ophthalmology, Philippine
Board of Ophthalmology, Philippine Society of Ophthalmic Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, Philippine Journal
of Ophthalmology, Association of Philippine Ophthalmology Professors, et al.

It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there
is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his
knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. 107[98] In making the
judgment call of treating Peters EKC with Maxitrol, Dr. Tuao took the necessary precaution by palpating Peters
eyes to monitor their IOP every time the latter went for a check-up, and he employed the best of his knowledge and
skill earned from years of training and practice.

In contrast, without supporting expert medical opinions, petitioners bare assertions of negligence on Dr.
Tuaos part, which resulted in Peters glaucoma, deserve scant credit.

Our disposition of the present controversy might have been vastly different had petitioners presented a
medical expert to establish their theory respecting Dr. Tuaos so-called negligence. In fact, the record of the case
reveals that petitioners counsel recognized the necessity of presenting such evidence. Petitioners even gave an
undertaking to the RTC judge that Dr. Agulto or Dr. Aquino would be presented. Alas, no follow-through on said
undertaking was made.

The plaintiff in a civil case has the burden of proof as he alleges the affirmative of the issue. However, in
the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor
of plaintiff.108[99] The party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. 109
[100] The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing
than that which is offered in opposition to it; 110[101] in the last analysis, it means probability of truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 111[102]

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Rule 133, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of
evidence, thus:

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the
case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number.

Herein, the burden of proof was clearly upon petitioners, as plaintiffs in the lower court, to establish their
case by a preponderance of evidence showing a reasonable connection between Dr. Tuaos alleged breach of duty
and the damage sustained by Peters right eye. This, they did not do. In reality, petitioners complaint for damages is
merely anchored on a statement in the literature of Maxitrol identifying the risks of its use, and the purported
comment of Dr. Agulto another doctor not presented as witness before the RTC concerning the prolonged use of
Maxitrol for the treatment of EKC.

It seems basic that what constitutes proper medical treatment is a medical question that should have been
presented to experts. If no standard is established through expert medical witnesses, then courts have no standard by
which to gauge the basic issue of breach thereof by the physician or surgeon. The RTC and Court of Appeals, and
even this Court, could not be expected to determine on its own what medical technique should have been utilized for
a certain disease or injury. Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in
speculations.

All told, we are hard pressed to find Dr. Tuao liable for any medical negligence or malpractice where there
is no evidence, in the nature of expert testimony, to establish that in treating Peter, Dr. Tuao failed to exercise
reasonable care, diligence and skill generally required in medical practice. Dr. Tuaos testimony, that his treatment
of Peter conformed in all respects to standard medical practice in this locality, stands unrefuted. Consequently, the
RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly held that they had no basis at all to rule that petitioners were deserving of
the various damages prayed for in their Complaint.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision dated 27 September 2006 and Resolution dated 3 July 2007, both of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R.
CV No. 68666, are hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.

9. People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO, accused.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita112[1] finally did away with frustrated rape113[2] and allowed only
attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the threshold of
another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering almost every attempt at sexual violation of a
woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to be adopted. The danger there is that that concept
may send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better intrude with
climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape
and punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then be considered a deadly fait accompli,
which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim
since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were already present and nothing more was left
for the offender to do, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We ruled then
that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight,
was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape. We distinguished
consummated rape from attempted rape where there was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of
execution were performed as the offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. 114
[3] The inference that may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for
rape to be consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to its consummated
stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or lips of the
female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a conviction for
consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ was considered synonymous with
mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora, etc.,115[4] the crucial doctrinal bottom line
is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile
penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the
penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because

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where entry into the labia or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts
merely to attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed either in its
attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between the two, despite the
fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells the difference between life and
death for the accused - a reclusive life that is not even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate
extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but
consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus limited only to
consummated rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be possible in light of the view
of those who disagree with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to
the extreme penalty of death,116[5] hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.117[6]
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 oclock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon
P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to
prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then
busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a
helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her
daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"118[7] prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan
inside her childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed
Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her
brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the accused. 119[8] Seconds later,
Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their
compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his
misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical
injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthels body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5
cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed the charge
as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand for
her.120[9] He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly
pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced
upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad but

116
117
118
119
120

restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers
to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente punched him and
threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of Conrado Plata but
Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was not
true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his hands
and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to
take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty of statutory
rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral
damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her
narration should not be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible statements and
improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him
to commit the rape considering that Crysthels younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just
downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that
the episode happened within the family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and responded
to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open
for anybody to see what could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon
could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have
possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence of
any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthels private parts more than bolsters his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with
his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly "already
removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina." The gravamen of the offense of statutory
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal
Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion
perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below
seven (7) years old. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration
of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of
the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge.121[10] But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into
the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
In People v. De la Pea122[11] we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attackers penis
merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of
an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid
penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was
consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis
into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her
vulva,123[12] or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina.124[13] Thus, touching when
applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a

121
122
123

scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.125[14] As the labias,
which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the
vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g.,
mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the
rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the
labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The
skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin
which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia
minora.126[15] Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated,127[16] and
not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ
or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing
of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can
be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female
organ,"128[17] but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of
the pudendum,"129[18] or "the bombardment of the drawbridge."130[19] But, to our mind, the case at bar merely
constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion."
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving that
Primos penis was able to penetrate Crysthels vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon
witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that she
saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she saw upon entering her childrens
room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining
her relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. It
should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling
position, which Corazon described thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?

124
125
126
127
128
129
130

A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is pinning down the
victim, while his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the legs of the
victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primos kneeling position rendered an unbridled
observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided
Corazon an unobstructed view of Primos penis supposedly reaching Crysthels external genitalia, i.e., labia majora,
labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden his movements from
Corazons sight, not to discount the fact that Primos right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it
from Corazons view. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen the sexual
contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she
saw what was done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The
prosecution failed in this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital
contact was at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run
roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her timely
appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with mans instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and persist in
satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already been discovered or witnessed
by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazons
presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught literally with his pants down. The interval,
although relatively short, provided more than enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to
conceal his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the question of the court Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir.131[20]
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in this case
was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primos penis penetrating her vagina, however slight. Crysthel
made a categorical statement denying penetration,132[21] obviously induced by a question propounded to her who
could not have been aware of the finer distinctions between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is improper
and unfair to attach to this reply of a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped as her sex
and whose language is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the penis of the accused
touched her organ there was sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's organ the
penis of the accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as the
prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate Crysthel. 133[22] Corazon did not say,

131
132

nay, not even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an erection.134[23] On the contrary, Corazon
even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection
to be able to penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primos penis having breached Crysthels vagina is belied by the child's own
assertion that she resisted Primos advances by putting her legs close together; 135[24] consequently, she did not feel
any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her.136[25] Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored its
conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal
finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness, or the
hymenal tags were no longer visible.137[26] None was shown in this case. Although a child's testimony must be
received with due consideration on account of her tender age, the Court endeavors at the same time to harness only
what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to
conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for
consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external signs of
physical injuries on complaining witness body to conclude from a medical perspective that penetration had taken
place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate
the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between
the accused and the victim.138[27]
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects complement
each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the
medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully
ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately
conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from consummated
rape will significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of
attempted rape - and only of attempted rape - are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished
only for it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged,
which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the range of

133
134
135
136
137
138

which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO
guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty
of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.

10. Newsweek v. IAC, G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986
NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE
AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO
MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH MARANON,
ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO, PEDRO
YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Offices for private respondents.

FERIA, J.:
Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this special action for
certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of First Instance of Bacolod City which denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed by private respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the
Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which denied its Motion for Reconsideration.
It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros
Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812 in
their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental,
against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The
complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the
article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The
article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or
sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also
brutalized and killed them with imprunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a
deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put
them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the
Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of
the public in general. They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages,
and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine, plus expenses of
litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of the article was attached to the complaint.

On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article sued upon is
not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much less support a cause
of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action. Private respondents filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a reply.
On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which the motion to
dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid cause of action; and the question
as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of evidence. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982.
On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court (CA-G. R. No. 14406) seeking the
annulment of the aforecited trial court's Orders for having been issued with such a grave abuse of discretion as
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
As earlier stated, respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders in a Decision dated December 17, 1982 and
ordered the case to be tried on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint contains allegations of fact which
called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be made to substitute for an appeal
where an appeal would lie at a proper time. Subsequently, on March 10, 1983, the respondent Court denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, hence this petition.
The proper remedy which petitioner should have taken from the decision of respondent Court is an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of said Rules. However, since the petition was filed on time within fifteen days from notice of the Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, we shall treat the same as a petition for review on certiorari. The two (2)
issues raised in the petition are: (1) whether or not the private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of
action; and (2) whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complaint
made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding sugarcane planters referred
specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only against individual reputation; and
that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel
can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
We agree with petitioner.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is
essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962), although it is not
necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared that" ... defamatory matter which
does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be
shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified the personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs.
Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).
This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of persons, as in the
case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it is for the
individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384).
In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen , 32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows:

Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not
actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping; and it
is very probable that even then no action would lie where the body is composed of so large a
number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that
there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course
and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part.
(supra p. 628).
It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is
essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or
class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane planters of Negros
Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be cured
by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters.
We find petitioner's contention meritorious.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class interest affected by the
judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil.
348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They
do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never singled
out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a
special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it
does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.
The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit were arrested. The Court takes
judicial notice of this fact. (People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.)
The second issue to be resolved here is whether or not the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is available
to petitioner whose motion to dismiss the complaint and subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until
final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to
file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The
same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and
no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash,
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The
reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of
the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious

exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are
a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus vs. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and
directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez vs. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the
offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in
the case.
In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case
except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds,
this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on
double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case
except to dismiss the same.
In People vs. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on
certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.
Respondent Court correctly stated the general rule and its exceptions. However, it ruled that none of the exceptions
is present in the case at bar and that the case appears complex and complicated, necessitating a full-blown trial to get
to the bottom of the controversy.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against it by
pointing out the non-libelous nature of the article sued upon. There is no need of a trial in view of the conclusion of
this Court that the article in question is not libelous. The specific allegation in the complaint, to the effect that the
article attributed to the sugarcane planters the deaths and brutalization of sugarcane workers, is not borne out by a
perusal of the actual text.
The complaint contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural workers in the sugar industry
and the various foundations and programs supported by planters' associations for the benefit of their workers.
Undoubtedly, the statements in the article in question are sweeping and exaggerated; but, paraphrasing the ruling in
the Uy Tioco case above quoted, it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn the majority of the sugarcane
planters, who have at heart the welfare of their workers, because of the actions of a part. Nonetheless, articles such
as the one in question may also serve to prick the consciences of those who have but are not doing anything or
enough for those who do not have.

On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that they should check
the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of the press, like all freedoms, should
be exercised with responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil Case No.
15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras,
JJ., concur.

11. Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON,
EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE
AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE
DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant
Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsProsecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates, 3 a total
of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the
any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules
of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures
were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the
courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed
with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-

Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies
thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents,
their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of
Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted
to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations,
to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate
to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights
of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by
one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had
not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its
violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501,
511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged
unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation
whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789,
Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or
not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things
may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is
sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the
aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely
the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded
by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described
as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches
and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible
in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that
the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common
law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon
the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and
such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that
is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches
and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy
as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20 After
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that

all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it
used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence
seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the
sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd,
Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally
necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as
an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year
the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard
it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy
embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against
rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit
that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as
other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to
the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their
conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been
committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners
allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in
said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the
corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts
of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned
records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or
amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962.
In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of
alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of
the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our
opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962,
are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and
other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the
writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places,
offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the
deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants
and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were
consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared,
abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void
the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal
standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than
the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly
declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and
seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph
(numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants
served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the
authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying
down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things
and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or
otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures
made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void,
and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of
the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the
petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and
effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional

provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and
effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of
documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive
of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the
sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person,"
gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against
the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate
defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other
search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and
were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives
them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of
seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of
corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in
an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books
seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683
(10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the
constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth
Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when he
places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts
some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could
not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have
come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the
protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the
Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S.
vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have
standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for
reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club;
Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices
(IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the
papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned
the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the
premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books,
papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the
searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly
technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that
it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in
evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been
shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See
Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report,
Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in
order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a
Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved
for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate
documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was
entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar,
the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the
suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the
necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S.
461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may
expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view
of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected

him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone
legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against
him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th
Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just
like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of
the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal
Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not
show ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade
premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police
officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim
ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that
the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano
considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his
files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically
in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected
the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers
as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural
device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United
States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C.
S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn,
was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at
his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and
records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records
were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even
though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of
all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53
F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively
against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first
search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search
warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was
the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters
not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl.
D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this
decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many
personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the
searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types
of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection
with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were
directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the
petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their
personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and
private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate
offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various
pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and
other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful
searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were
they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or
possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in
securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are
personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued
the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to
move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions,
the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of
their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

12. Genobiagon v. CA G.R. No. 40452. October 12, 1989

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989
GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Mario D. Ortiz for petitioner.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. No. 09949-CR, dated October 10, 1974,
affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are:
On December 31,1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by appellant bumped an
old woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at the right side of T. Padilla Market. The
appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross
when the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only
because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig
ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a consequence, fell at the middle
of the road. The appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who just
closed his store in market in order to celebrate the coming of the New Year, and who saw the
incident right before him, shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter
refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and
his answer was, 'it was the old woman that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place
where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was unconscious, and the food and
viands she was carrying were scattered on her body. The victim was then loaded in a jeep and
brought to the hospital where she died three hours later (Exh. C). The findings after an autopsy are
as follows:
Contusion with Hematoma Left, Frontal and Occipito-Parietal Regionas
Fracture Occipito-Parietal Bone Cerebral Hemorrhage.
The deceased was an eighty-one-year old woman named Rita B. Cabrera. (pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Crim. Case
No. V7855). The trial court found petitioner guilty of the felony charged and sentenced him to "suffer an

indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Rita Banzon Cabrera the sum of P6,000
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty and to pay the costs"
(p. 3, Appellant's Brief, p. 56, Rollo).
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 09949-CR)which,on October 10,1974,conviction of the
accused but increased his civil liability to P12,000. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from except in the amount of indemnity
to be paid to the heirs of the deceased, Rita B. Cabrera, which is the sum of P6,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which should be raised to P12,000.00 (People vs.
Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468) but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, the same should be, as it is hereby affirmed in all other
respects with costs. (P. 37, Rollo.)
After his motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision was denied, he filed a petition for review in
this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident
which led to her death;
2. in not acquitting the petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt; and
3. in unjustly increasing the civil liability of the petitioner from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00, although
the circumstances of the victim and the accused (petitioner) do not warrant such increase.
It is quite evident that all the issues raised in the petition for review are factual. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence
is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon us (Bernardo vs.
Bernardo, 101 SCRA 351; Vda. De Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705).
The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. "The defense of
contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot
allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321,
March 29,1947)." (People vs. Quinones, 44 O.G. 1520).
The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his civil liability to P12,000, is devoid of
merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death in homicide or murder is P30,000
(People vs. De la Fuente, [1983]126 SCRA 518; People vs. Centeno, 130 SCRA 198). Accordingly, the civil liability
of the petitioner is increased to P30,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is
hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., took no part.

13. PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169891

November 2, 2006

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, Petitioner,

vs.
ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47567
and its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed with partial
modification the ruling3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20, directing petitioner Philippine
National Railways (PNR) to indemnify respondents Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia for the death of
Rhonda Brunty, and to pay actual and moral damages, attorneys fees and cost of suit.
Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit
sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia,
traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan with plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L.
Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes,
was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila4 as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980.
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay
Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad
track up ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the
Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. 5 A certain James
Harrow6 brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead
after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the
same hospital. He was transferred to the Manila Doctors Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for
further treatment.7
On July 28, 1981, Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter8 to the PNR demanding payment of actual, compensatory, and
moral damages, as a result of her daughters death. When PNR did not respond, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a
complaint9 for damages against the PNR before the RTC of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 20 and was
docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18645. They alleged that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the
physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of
PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal, Municipality of Moncada,
Tarlac. They pointed out that there was no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the
railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was only equipped with a hand flashlight.10 Plaintiffs likewise
averred that PNR failed to supervise its employees in the performance of their respective tasks and duties, more
particularly the pilot and operator of the train.11 They prayed for the payment of the following damages:

1.) P200,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;

2.) P2,800,000.00 for compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty representing lost or unearned income
of Rhonda Brunty;
3.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the evidence adduced, to
plaintiff Ethel Brunty;
4.) At least P64,057.61 as actual damages representing medical expenses to plaintiff Juan Manuel M.
Garcia and at least P1,000,000.00 as unearned or lost income of said plaintiff;
5.) At least P72,760.00 as actual damages representing cost of the Mercedes Benz car to plaintiff Juan
Manuel M. Garcia;
6.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the evidence adduced, to
plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia; and
7.) Attorneys fees equivalent to at least 15% of the total award to plaintiffs herein.12
In its Answer,13 PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection but
also in the supervision of its employees.14 By way of special and affirmative defense, it stressed that it had the right
of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has no legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any
such crossing. It insisted that there were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides
of the road before the railroad crossing. It countered that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was
Mercelitas negligence, and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The driver disregarded the
warning signs, the whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by the guard. 15 As
counterclaim, it prayed that it be awarded actual and compensatory damages, and litigation expenses. 16
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint17 dated July 28, 1986 to include, as party plaintiff, Chemical Industries of the
Philippines, Inc. (Chemphil), Garcias employer, who claimed to have paid for the latters medical and
hospitalization expenses, the services rendered by the funeral parlor of the deceased, and the expenses in transferring
the remains of Rhonda Brunty to the United States.18
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision19 on May 21, 1990 in favor of plaintiffs. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia and
against the defendant Philippine National Railways directing the latter to pay the former the sum of:
1. Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) Philippine Currency, for the death of Rhonda Brunty formerly a
resident of 1595 Ashland Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois, U.S.A.;
2. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) Philippine Currency for moral and actual damages due the heirs of
Rhonda Brunty;
3. Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P72,760.00) Philippine Currency for damages
sustained by the Mercedes Benz;
4. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency as and for attorney's fees, and;
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.20

Aggrieved, the PNR appealed the case to the CA, raising the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF RHONDA BRUNTY AND THE CONSEQUENT AWARD OF DAMAGES DUE THE HEIRS
OF RHONDA BRUNTY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE
DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES MERCEDES BENZ IN THE AMOUNT OF
SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY PESOS (P72,760.00).
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PLAINTIFFSAPPELLEES.21
In its Brief, PNR insisted that the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence and recklessness of
Garcia and Mercelita.22 It insisted that it had provided adequate warning signals at the railroad crossing23 and had
exercised due care in the selection and supervision of its employees.24 The RTC erred in awarding damages to
Rhonda Brunty as she cannot be allowed to receive what she is not in a position to give, having been a non-resident
alien who did not own a property in the Philippines.25 It likewise questioned the award of damages on the Mercedes
Benz as well as the grant of attorneys fees.26 At the very least, Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence.27
For their part, appellees countered that appellant was grossly and recklessly negligent in not properly providing the
necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac;28 appellant was negligent in not exercising
due diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, particularly the train operator Alfonso
Reyes;29 the car was driven in a careful and diligent manner, and at a moderate speed, with due regard to all traffic
rules and regulations at that particular time;30 the doctrine of "last clear chance" is not applicable;31 Ethel Brunty is a
non-resident alien who can rightfully file the instant case;32 and they are entitled to recover damages from
appellant.33
The CA rendered the assailed Decision34 on August 15, 2005. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with PARTIAL
MODIFICATIONS, increasing the death indemnity award from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, and deleting the award
for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz.
SO ORDERED.35
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the RTC as to the negligence of the PNR. Considering the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, it ruled that the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the
railroad crossing were not merely inadequate they did not satisfy the well-settled safety standards in
transportation.36 However, the CA did not agree with the RTCs findings on the contributory negligence of Mercelita,
the driver of the Mercedes Benz. It held that Mercelita could not have foreseen the harm that would befall him and
the two other passengers under the prevailing circumstances, thus, could not be considered guilty of contributory
negligence.37
The PNR, now petitioner, comes before this Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari on the following
grounds:

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKING CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT
DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT
CONCLUSION SUCH AS:
THE RESPONDENTS DRIVER OVERTOOK ANOTHER VEHICLE BY ACCELERATING AT 70
KILOMETERS PER HOUR WITHIN JUST 50 YARDS AWAY FROM THE RAILROAD TRACKS.
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL
COURT REGARDING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS DRIVER.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN
THE INSTANT CASE.38
Petitioner insists that the proximate cause of the mishap was Mercelitas disregard of traffic rules and regulations.
Had the court considered the fact that Mercelita had overtaken another vehicle a few yards before the railroad track,
it would have reached a different conclusion.39 Moreover, petitioner asserts, considering that the decisions of the
RTC and the CA vary as to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, the findings of the RTC
should prevail. Thus, Mercelitas contributory negligence should not have been ignored. 40 Lastly, petitioner avers
that since there is freedom of control and greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it is obvious that in
railroad crossings, they have the last clear chance to prevent or avoid an unwanted accident from taking place. 41
In their Comment42 on the petition, respondents reiterate the findings of the RTC and the CA that the breach by
petitioner of its legal duty to provide adequate and necessary public safety device and equipment within the area or
scene of the accident was the proximate cause of the mishap.43 While it is true that as a general rule, the trial court is
in the best position to evaluate and observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses presented during the trial, the
CA, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has the vested right to modify, reject, or set aside the trial courts
evaluation and findings.44 As to the application of the doctrine of last clear chance, respondents claim that said issue
is being raised for the first time in this petition.45 Lastly, respondents cite foreign jurisprudence stating that if the
violation is one which gives rise to liability per se for any resulting injury, the defenses ordinarily available in
actions for diligence are barred and the contributory negligence of the person injured is no defense.46
The Court is thus tasked to answer the following factual questions: (1) As between petitioner and Mercelita, whose
negligence resulted in the unfortunate collision? (2) Is Mercelita (the driver of the Mercedes Benz) guilty of
contributory negligence? Finally, the application in this case of the doctrine of last clear chance is likewise in
question.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.47 In Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company,48 this Court held that negligence is want of
the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require.49 In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation,
jurisprudence50 has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the
person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.

The issue of who, between the parties, was negligent was thoroughly discussed by both the RTC and the CA. In
petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be put into issue, and
questions of fact as a general rule, cannot be entertained. The finding of negligence by the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon as it would entail going into factual matters on which the
finding of negligence was based.51 The established rule is that factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial
court are conclusive and binding on this Court.52
The records of the instant case show that both the RTC and the CA carefully examined the factual circumstances
surrounding the case, and we find no cogent reason to disturb the same. It is, however, worthy to emphasize that
petitioner was found negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of
motorists in crossing the railroad track. As such, it is liable for damages for violating the provisions of Article 2176
of the New Civil Code, viz:
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites
must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for
whose acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
damage.53 Applying the foregoing requisites, the CA correctly made the following conclusions:
It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents herein) sustained damage or injury as a result of the
collision. That there was negligence on the part of PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the circumstances
prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing
is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation. x x x
xxxx
x x x An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR
itself would yield the following: (1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed
warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the
site as claimed by PNR (petitioner), it would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks
ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since ones view would be blocked by
a cockpit arena. x x x54
Moreover, the CA held that a vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there is
an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on
the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area.55
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to
avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in
the maintenance of the crossings.56 Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and
construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at
such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with
large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the
necessity of looking out for trains.57
This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal
light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the
public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment
be installed.58

In view of the foregoing, we affirm the factual findings of the CA as well as its conclusion on petitioners
negligence.
As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, we agree with petitioner. Contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.59 To hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.60 To prove contributory negligence, it is
still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and
not simply a condition for its occurrence.61
The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the place was not properly
illuminated; ones view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was
also established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had
overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the way
he did. However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not negate petitioners liability.
Pursuant to Article 217962 of the New Civil Code, the only effect such contributory negligence could have is to
mitigate liability, which, however, is not applicable in this case, as will be discussed later.1wphi1
As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we rule in the negative. The doctrine of last clear
chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent
negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of
defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. 63 The
proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of petitioner, we hold that the above
doctrine finds no application in the instant case.
We note that the damages awarded by the appellate court consist of (1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Rhonda Brunty; (2) P1,000,000.00 as actual and moral damages due the heirs of Rhonda Brunty; and (3) P50,000.00
as and by way of attorneys fees. No damages, however, were awarded for the injuries suffered by Garcia, yet, the
latter never interposed an appeal before the CA nor even before this Court. The record is, likewise, bereft of any
allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier
finding of contributory negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has the effect of mitigation of liability,
does not apply.
As to the amount of damages awarded, a modification of the same is in order, specifically on the award of actual and
moral damages in the aggregate amount of P1,000,000.00.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered.
They arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they must be duly
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered, and on evidence of the
actual amount thereof.64 Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of
actual damages cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the
wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence.65 This is in lieu of actual damages as it would be unfair for the victims heirs to get
nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot produce receipts.66
The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not proscribed from recovering moral
damages in meritorious cases.67 We, therefore, sustain the award of moral damages in favor of the heirs of Rhonda
Brunty.

Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. 68 In the
instant case, the moral suffering of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty was sufficiently established by Ethel Brunty in her
deposition,69 viz:
Q: What have you felt as a result of the death of Rhonda?
A: I felt earnest anguish and mixed feelings of anger and extreme sorrow because she died so far away and alone,
and because her death could so easily be prevented if there had been adequate and appropriate warning signals at the
railroad crossing and it is just an unbearable and irreparable loss. In so many ways, she was my life. It seemed to me
that losing her was just like losing my own life, or worst, and even now, there is no end to our bereavement. I am
still on constant medication to be able to sleep and to be able to perform my duties effectively in my job but it does
not take away the pain of loss.70
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,71 and in Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,72 we awarded moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased. In Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Malecdan, 73
the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held in keeping with the purpose of the law, while in Macalinao v.
Ong,74 the amount of P50,000.00 was held sufficient.1wphi1
Considering the circumstances attendant in this case, we find that an award of P500,000.00 as moral damages to the
heirs of Rhonda Brunty is proper. In view of recent jurisprudence, indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of Rhonda
Brunty and attorneys fees amounting to P50,000.00 is likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 15, 2005 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. The award of actual damages is deleted, and in lieu thereof, temperate damages of
P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty. The award of moral damages is reduced to P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

14. Picart v. Smith, G.R. No. L-12219. March 15, 1918

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-12592. March 8, 1918. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIPE BUSTOS ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Kincaid & Perkins for Appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; HISTORY.
Freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. It
was among the reforms sine quibus non insisted upon by the Filipino People. The Malolos Constitution, the work of
the Revolutionary Congress, in its bill of rights, zealously guarded these basic rights. A reform so sacred to the
people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost should now be protected and carried forward.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee the right of
freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition. Beginning with the Presidents Instructions to
the Commission of April 7, 1900, these gruaranties were made effective in the Philippines. They are now part and
parcel of the Organic Law of the Constitution of the Philippines Islands.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. These paragraphs in the Philippine Bill of Rights carry with
them all the applicable English and American jurisprudence.
4. ID.; ID.; GENERAL PRINCIPLES. The interests of society and the maintenance of good government demand
a full discussion public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is necessary for free
speech. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a
free government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth v. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div. N. Y., 510.) Of course,
criticism does not authorize defamation.
5. ID.; ID.; ID. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
6. ID.; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; GENERAL PRINCIPLES. The right to assemble and petition is a
necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a
right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any
person or group of persons can apply without fear of penalty to the appropriate branch or office of the Government
for a redness of grievances.
7. ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; PRIVILEGE. The doctrine of
privileged communications rests upon public policy, "which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, through, as an incidental result, it may, in some instances, afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and
malignant slanderer." (Abboth v. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE. Qualified privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. "A
communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although

it contain criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable." (Harrison v. Rush, 5
E. & B. 344; 1 Jur. [N. S. ], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their
truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual. Personal injury is not necessary. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is
made in intemperate terms. Finally, if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake
as to the respective functions of various officials, such an unintentional error would not take the case out of the
privilege.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MALICE. In the usual libel case, malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroys that presumption. the onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny will defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communications.
12. ID.; ID.; ID. Previous decisions of this court concerning libel reviewed and distinguished.
13. ID.; ID.; ID. A petition, prepared and signed at an assembly of numerous citizens including affidavits by five
individuals, charging a justice of the peace with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal, was presented
through lawyers to the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance
of the district. The judge of first instance, after investigation, recommended to the Governor-General that the justice
of the peace filing a motion for new trial, the judge of first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and
acquitted the justice of the peace of the same. Criminal action was then begun against the petitioners, now become
the defendants, charging that portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were libelous. The trial
court found thirty-two of the defendants guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a nominal fine. On a review of the
evidence, we find that express malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the
petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the petition were transmitted through reputable
attorneys to the proper functionary. The defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an hones
endeavor to improve the public service, they should rather be commended for their good citizenship.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of
Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. The appeal also submits
the larger question of the attitude which the judiciary should take in interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law in
connection with the basic prerogatives of freedom of speech and press, and of assembly and petition. For a better
understanding, the facts in the present appeal are first narrated in the order of their occurrence, then certain
suggestive aspects relative to the rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition are
interpolated, then the facts are tested by these principles, and, finally, judgment is rendered.
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, the prepared
and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield & OBrien, and five individuals
signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield & OBrien submitted this petition and these affidavits
with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four
citizens apparently owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the formation as libelous.
Briefly stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace were.
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace,

who first told her that he would draw up the complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid;
also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on trial before the justice of the peace,
went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that if
he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days
later was informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to
appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50;
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four persons, on the day of the trial the
justice called him over to his house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon
shelved.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting
investigation, proper action and report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. The judge of
first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result, the judge, the
Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the GovernorGeneral that the respondent be removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case
be transmitted to the Executive Secretary."cralaw virtua1aw library
Later the justice of the peace filed a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and
reopened the hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and is
councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and that one
Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of
first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him of the same. Attorneys for
complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-General as requested the record does not disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of
the following information:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P.I., the said accused,
voluntarily, illegally, and criminality and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan
Serrano who was at said time and place justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote,
signed, and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice
of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which writing appear among other things the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this town of Macabebe, an account of the conduct
observed by him heretofore, a conduct highly improper of the office which he holds, is found to be a public
functionary who is absolutely unfit, eminently immoral and dangerous to the community, and consequently
unworthy of the office.
"That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and positive manner by facts so certain, so serious,
and so denigrating which appear in the affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no less serious, but which the
undersigned refrain from citing herein for the sake of brevity and in order not to bother too much the attention of
your Honor and due to lack of sufficient proof to substantiate them.
"That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of this town to continue in his office, the
protection of the rights and interest solemnly guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Right, and justice in this town will
not be administered in accordance with law.
"Than on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad conduct as such justice of the peace,
previous to this time, some respectable citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled to present an
administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan Serrano before the judge of first instance of Pampanga, in
which case there were made against him various charges which were true and certain and of different characters.

"That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the peace, far from changing his bad and
despicable conduct, which has roused the indignation of this town of Macabebe, subsequently performed the acts
above-mentioned, as stated in the affidavits herewith attached, as if intending to mock at the people and to show his
mistaken valor and heroism.
"All of this has been written and published by the accused with the deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor
and reputation of the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to public hatred,
contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library
It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition mentioning the investigation before the judge
of first instance, the affidavits upon which based and the concluding words, "To the Executive Secretary, through the
office of Crossfield & OBrien."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso,
Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and one thirty-second
part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the defense, coming
into the case, after the handing down of the decision, filed on December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the
principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by then counsel for the defendants to the admission
of Exhibit A consisting of the entire administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. All the
defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed making the following assignments of
error:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants for a new trial.
"2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection inadvertently interposed by their
counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.
"3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the introducing in evidence by the accused of the
affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
"4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement was unqualifiedly privileged.
"5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden was on the defendants to show that the alleged
libelous statements were true and free from malice.
"6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.
"7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. This is especially true
of all the defendants, except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes."cralaw virtua1aw library
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings, administrative and judicial, were properly before this
court. As a matter of fact counsel for defendants in the lower court made an improvident objection to the admission
of the administrative proceedings on the ground that the signatures were not identified and that the same was
immaterial, which objection was partially sustained by the trial court. Notwithstanding this curious situation by
reason of which the attorney for the defense attempted to destroy through his objection the very foundation for the
justification of his clients, we shall continue to consider all the proceedings as before us. Not indicating specifically
the reason for this action, let the following be stated: The administrative proceedings were the basis of the
accusation, the information, the evidence, and the judgment rendered. The prosecution cannot be understood without
knowledge of interior action. Nothing more unjust could be imagined than to pick out certain words which standing
by themselves and unexplained are libelous and then by shutting off all knowledge of facts which would justify
these words, to convict the accused. The records in question are attached to the rollo, and either on the ground that
the attorneys for the defense retired the objection to the introduction of the administrative proceedings by the
prosecution, or that a new trial should have been had because under section 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "a
case may be reopened on account of errors at law committed at the trial," or because of the right of this court to call
in such records as are sufficiently incorporated into the complaint and are essential to a determination of the case, or

finally, because of our conceded right to take judicial proceedings supplemental to the basis action, we examine the
record as because us, containing not alone the trial for libel, but the proceedings previous to that trial giving rise to
it. To this action, the Government can not complain for it was the prosecution which tried to incorporated Exhibit A
into the record.
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain principles which make up the law of libel and
slander, we feel warranted in seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and general discussion of freedom of
speech and press and assembly and petition in the Philippine Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to clear
up certain misapprehensions on the subject and to place these basic rights in their proper light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down the freedom of speech as cherished in
democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was consequently
ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos" (The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.)
describing "the reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos insist upon, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines free and
by instituting Filipino delegates."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad" and by other means invariably in exposing
the wants of the Filipino people demanded." (See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the
work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and
assembly and petition.
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition that a reform so sacred to the people of these
Islands and won at so dear as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.
Net comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The Constitution of the United States and the State
constitutions guarantee the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition. We are
therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instruction to the
Second Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
in the nature of organic acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not unfamiliar to
students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which the American people demanded before giving their approval to the Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the proposition never to be forgotten for an instant that the guaranties
mentioned are part and parcel of the Organic Law of the Constitution of the Philippines Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The language carries with it all
the applicable jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner v. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S.,
100; Serra v. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S., 470.) And what are these principles? Volumes would inadequately answer.
But included are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision
of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thinskinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual
be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State,
so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the
Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the agencies of Government public opinion
should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases of Wason v. Walter, 4 L.R. 4
Q. B., 73; Seymour v. Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372; The Queen v. Sir R. Garden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of
the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for
proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary
would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over
the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the
contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful
act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In
the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak
of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."
(Howarth v. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the
right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning
must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for
public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.
"The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evildisposed and malignant slanderer." (Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it
is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord
Campbell, C.J.
"A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although
it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable." (Harrison v. Bush,
5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.S. ], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice
in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest
or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their
truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive.
Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of
public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this
person in good faith believe he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not
defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of
privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional
error will not take the case out of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of
proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as
the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See
White v. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or

falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications.
The ultimate test is that of bona fides. (See white v. Nicholls [1845], How., 266; Bradley v. Heath [1831], 12 Pick.
[Mass. ], 163; Kent v. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. L., 72; Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309;
Newell, Slander and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc. pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the basic rights of freedom of speech and press
and of assembly and petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be construed with
reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to
test the facts of this case with these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered
libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government
official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity
or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a
simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to
the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further,
although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in
office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a
person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did
not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but
which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue
publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.
And finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the
Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by the
Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a judge of First
Instance, or on the Governor-Generals own motion, and that at the time this action took place the Executive Bureau
was the office through which the Governor-General acted in such matters. (See Administrative Code of 1917, secs.
203 and 229, in connection with the cases of U. S. v. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. &
B., 344, holding that where defendant was subject to removal by the sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of
State was privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those established in other cases in which private individuals
have been convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the
officer, have been the causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. v. Sedano [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. v.
Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. v. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the case of the United States v. Julio Bustos
([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos case,
with the exception that there has been more publicity in the present instance and that the person to whom the charge
was made had less jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case. Publicity is immaterial if
the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild
statements, with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to persons who could not furnish
protection." Malicious and untrue communications are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point to
which we invite special attention is United States v. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note also Yancey v.
Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing
out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve
the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are
acquitted with the costs de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur.
I think it proper to observe, however, that in my opinion the Attorney-General is entirely correct when he says that
this case is substantially identical with the former "Bustos case (The United States v. Bustos, 13 Phil. Rep., 690). I
believe that a careful reading of our decisions in these cases is sufficient to demonstrate that fact. The truth is that
the doctrine of the prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case has long since been abandoned by this court; and in
my opinion it would make for the more efficient administration of the Libel Law in these Islands to say so, in so
many words. (Cf. U. S. v. Sedano, [1909], 14 Phil. Rep., 338, 339; U. S. v. Contreras [1912], 23 Phi. Rep., 513; U.
S. v. Montalva [1915], 29 Phil. Rep., 595; and U. S. v. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil. Rep., 365.)

15. People v. Ballesteros, G.R. No. 120921, January 29, 1998

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120921. January 29, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and
ALVIN BULUSAN, accused-appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery,
as charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and applying Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and further sentencing them to pay jointly and solidarily 1.The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and
actual damages in the amount of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE
PESOS (P35,755.00), with interest;
2.

The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P20,000.00), and actual damages in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS (P61,785.00), with interest;

3.

Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of TWO THOUSAND AND THREE PESOS
AND FORTY CENTAVOS (P2,003.40), and moral damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00), with interest;

4.

Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) each, with interest.

5.

The costs.

The accused shall be credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they had undergone
preventive imprisonment, if they agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, otherwise, they shall be credited in the service thereof with only four-fifths of the time during
which they had undergone preventive imprisonment.i[1]
In the warm summer evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel
Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a
carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino at Ganayao, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte. They proceeded to the barangay hall at
Carusipan to attend a dance. The group did not tarry for long at the dance because they sensed some hostility from
Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks. In order to avoid trouble, especially during the

festivity, they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his
companions.
The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired upon from the
rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the eastern side of the topdown jeep and landed just beside it. He
scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but was
shot in the stomach and died.ii[2] Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries in the right
foot, back of the right thigh, and legs and thighs, respectively.iii[3] The stunned Eduardo Tolentino was not even able
to move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney.iv[4] He did not survive. The
precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people dead and four others injured.
Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan
were issued. Charged with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder, an information was filed as
follows:
That on or about (sic) May 28, 1991, in the Municipality of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, nighttime purposely sought, with evident
premeditation and treachery, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, with intent to kill,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot Eduardo Tolentino Sr., Jerry Agliam, Vidal Agliam, Carmelo
Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, with the use of firearms which caused the death of Eduardo Tolentino
Sr. and Jerry Agliam and thereby inflicting gunshot wounds to Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and
Ronnel Tolentino having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of Murder, but which did not
by reason of causes independent of the will of the defendant, namely the able and timely medical assistance given to
said Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino which prevented their death.
All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results. Bulusan was not
tested for nitrates.
In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions at the basketball court,
as alleged by the complainants. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands, Galo attempted to
exculpate himself from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had,
in fact, just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test. He further asserted that paraffin tests are not infallible,
and that his hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound, the source of which is urine. Lastly, he
said that he was not even present at the crime scene when the firing incident took place; hence, he could not have
been one of those who strafed the jeep.v[5]
For his part, Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, narrating to the court that, on May 28, 1991, at around 7:00
oclock in the evening, he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. He returned home within thirty
minutes and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 oclock. The next morning, he busied himself with some
chores, which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. He handled the fertilizers without gloves. To
counter the finding of traces of nitrates on his left hand, Ballesteros maintained that he uses his left hand in lighting
cigarettes, as it was very painful for him to use his right hand. He likewise informed the trial court that he had no
motive to kill the victims.vi[6]
Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros, stating that he saw only Galo on the evening of the
dance but did not talk to him. He denied joining the two later that night because after the dance, he went straight to
the house of Michael Viloria, where he spent the night until he went to work at 7:00 oclock in the morning of the
following day.vii[7]
The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused now come to the High Court on appeal, praying that the decision of the trial court be reversed and that a
new one be entered acquitting them of the charges.

The principal question to be resolved has to do with the merits of the decision of the lower court. Was it correct in
finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt? We answer in the affirmative.
Accused-appellants insist that the trial court erred in finding that Carmelo and Vidal Agliam recognized them as the
assailants. This claim is unmeritorious. In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to
be well illumined by the moon. The shooting took place on a small road in the mountainous terrains of Ilocos Norte,
where the air is free from darkening elements and turbidity. It being a summer evening, there could not have been
any fog to becloud the atmosphere and hamper the vision of the victims, which would have prevented them from
clearly seeing their assailants. They pinpointed the location of the malefactors to be approximately three meters
from where they stood.viii[8] Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them, the victims
could distinctly identify their assailants. It must be noted that Carmelo was acquainted with Galo and his brother, a
butcher, since he used to deal with them in his business of buying and selling cattle. ix[9] Bulusan was a classmate of
Vidal at Cadaratan School. Generally, people in rural communities know each other both by face and name. x[10]
Bulusan and Agliam were, not only townmates, but former classmates as well. The constant interaction between
them through the years would necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that, at the very least, one would
have been able to recognize the other easily.
That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. A distinction is herein timely made
between motive and intent. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent, on
the other hand, is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.xi[11] Motive alone is not proof of a
crime.xii[12] In order to tip the scales in its favor, intent and not motive must be established by the prosecution.
Motive is hardly ever an essential element of a crime. A man driven by extreme moral perversion may be led to
commit a crime, without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it.xiii[13] Along the same line, a man who
commits a crime with an apparent motive may produce different results, for which he is punished. As held in a line
of cases, the rule is well-settled that the prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter
has been positively identified as the author of the crime.xiv[14] Lack or absence of motive for committing the crime
does not preclude conviction thereof where there were reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the
accused as the perpetrator of the felony.xv[15]
Accused-appellants attempt to offer wild excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their hands
is futile. Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and urine may leave traces of nitrates, but these
are minimal and, unlike those found in gunpowder, may be washed off with tap water.
The hackneyed defense of alibi interposed by accused-appellants must likewise fail. As consistently enunciated by
this Court, the established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove, not only that
he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.xvi[16] This accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily
prove. On the night of May 28, 1991, Galo and Bulusan attended the dance at the barangay hall. After the dance,
they went their separate ways but remained within the barangay. Galo lingered in the premises. Bulusan slept over
at the house of Michael Viloria, which was within walking distance from the dance hall.
The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence, the reason being that it is easily
manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence. xvii[17] This is especially true in case of
positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses, xviii[18] which renders their alibis worthless.xix[19] Positive
identification prevails over denials and alibis.xx[20]
Accused-appellants are under the common misconception that proof beyond reasonable doubt requires total freedom
from any quantum of doubt. This is not so. Under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
(p)roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.

Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. The doubt to the benefit
of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on
imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence. xxi[21] Reasonable doubt is that
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt.xxii[22] A precise example would be the uncorroborated alibi of accused in the case at bar
where accused-appellants individually interposed the wavering defense of alibi. Galo failed to elucidate on his
whereabouts after the dance, whereas Bulusan claimed to have slept in the house of one Michael Viloria. Ballesteros
attested that he was not at the dance hall at all. None of them, however, attempted to corroborate their alibi through
the testimony of witnesses. In fact, they never attempted to present as witnesses those who could have testified to
having seen them elsewhere on the night in question. Had they done so, the presentation of corroborative testimony
would have reenforced their defense of alibi. As held in People vs. Ligotan,xxiii[23] an alibi must be supported by
credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and where such defense is not corroborated, it is fatal to the
accused.
The Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by treachery. Under Paragraph 16, Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code, (t)here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The requisites
of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. xxiv[24] As
regards the second requisite, the accused must make some preparation to kill his victim in such a manner as to insure
the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. xxv
[25] There must be evidence that such form of attack was purposely adopted by the accused.xxvi[26] Here, it is
obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan. The facts show that
the attack was well-planned and not merely a result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. Manifestations of their
evil designs were already apparent as early as the time of the dance. They were well-armed and approached the
homebound victims, totally unaware of their presence, from behind. There was no opportunity for the latter to
defend themselves, the attack being so sudden that Eduardo Tolentino was shot right where he sat.
The trial court was also correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims. Damages may be defined as the
pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the
pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. xxvii[27]
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained,xxviii[28] whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish,
serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the
proximate result of the offenders wrongful act or omission.xxix[29] In granting actual or compensatory damages, the
party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, xxx[30]
as corroborated by his testimony.xxxi[31] Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not
controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the
court.xxxii[32] Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper. However, the order granting compensatory damages
to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court,
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00) is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity, and not as
compensatory damages.xxxiii[33] As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury
caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable,xxxiv[34] may be determined by the trial court in its discretion.
Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

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