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AND THE
CONSTITUTION
A Celebration
We pay ourselves a very great compliment when we celebrate and honor
Walter Berns. His life and work, defending and honoring the American
Republic and its great heroes, is a model and inspiration for all
who have been blessed to know and to learn from him.
Leon R. Kass
For more than fifty years, Walter Berns has analyzed the American constitutional order with insight and profundity. To celebrate his scholarly legacy,
AEIs Program on American Citizenship marked Constitution Day 2011
September 17, the day thirty-nine members of the Constitutional Convention
signed the draft constitutionwith a panel discussion dedicated to Berns and
his work on the Constitution.
WALTER BERNS
AND THE
CONSTITUTION
A Celebration
WITH REMARKS BY
CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH, LEON R. KASS,
AND JEREMY A. RABKIN
Walter Berns
and the Constitution
WITH REMARKS BY
CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH, LEON R. KASS,
AND JEREMY
A. RABKIN
Jeremy A. Rabkin
JEREMY A. RABKIN 5
a majorityand the runner-up could then be recognized as vice president. The rationale seems obvious once its explained. But you wont
find the explanation in Madisons Notes of the Debates at the Philadelphia Convention or in the pages of The Federalist. You wont find it in
any of the most recent full-length histories of the Founding, either.
To take another example, Bernss 1987 book, Taking the Constitution Seriously, points out that during the American Revolution, the
Continental Congress invited Quebec to join the other rebellious
coloniesdespite misgivings about joining hands with a Frenchspeaking and predominantly Catholic province. What they did not
do was invite any islands of the West Indies to join, even though
Jamaica alone had twice the population of Quebec and was Englishspeaking and Protestant and generated much more revenue for
Britain. But, as Berns points out, to embrace such places at the time
would have meant embracing more slave territories.5 Two generations later, that was an attractive prospect for political advocates in
southern states (who cast covetous eyes, for example, on Cuba). But
at the time of the American Revolution, there seems to have been a
clear understanding that more entanglement with slavery was more
trouble for the new republic.
As a trained social scientist, I gathered some data for this talk. I
checked the Lexis inventory of law review articles for citations to
Walter Berns. Among the most frequently cited Berns works, in fact,
are his articles on early debates about the First Amendment, demonstrating that even Jefferson and Madison seem to have conditioned
their defenses of freedom with one eye on what would avert challenges to slavery. He showed that the most avid defenses of freedom
in the Founding era were not simply about freedom.
Walter Berns was not a conventional conservative. His scholarship gave little attention to constitutional debates about property or
contract rights. He did not even devote much attention to federalismexcept to repudiate states-rights doctrines that might justify
the secession of southern states in 1860. He was not much interested in debates about the New Deal. He was not even much interested in defending tradition as such. In his first book, Freedom,
Virtue and the First Amendment, he spoke rather dismissively of the
JEREMY A. RABKIN 7
Berns was still more forthright in deprecating claims to a higher
justice in Constitutionalism and Multiculturalism: Every such
accusation [about Americas faults] presupposes a law . . . something
like a holy law against which political life is to be measured. One
might think that life in the United States could be heaven, or was
supposed to be heaven; but the Founders promised no such thing.
What they promised was liberty, including the liberty to tend to the
salvation of our own souls, and the country they established was the
first in all of history to make, and to keep, that promise. By keeping
it . . . they made corruption voluntary to an appreciable degree.
The contrast between these statements might suggest that Berns
changed his outlook over time, becoming ever more wary of appeals
to justice. But there is not such a sharp contrast between early and
late Berns. In 1979 Berns published a defense of the death penalty
with the forthright title For Capital Punishment. He agreed to have it
reprinted in 1991. It is among the most cited of his works, because
so few serious scholars have advanced this sort of moral defense of
capital punishment. The book does not merely argue that the
Framers of the Constitution (and those of the Fourteenth Amendment) plainly contemplated capital punishment for at least some
crimes, so judicial activists are wrong to read it out of the Constitution. Berns engages the deepest moral questions. He goes to some
trouble to show that the strongest argument against capital punishment was already advanced by the Marquis Beccaria in the eighteenth century. Reasoning from the Hobbesian premise of a state
founded in the self-interest of each citizen, Beccaria concluded that
no one would consent to a social contract arming the state with the
power to impose this ultimate penalty. Berns rejected the conclusion
by challenging the premise:
Criminals are properly the objects of anger and the perpetrators of terrible crimesfor example, Lee Harvey Oswald
and James Earl Rayare properly the objects of great anger.
They have done more than inflict an injury on an isolated
individual; they have violated the foundations of trust and
friendship, the necessary elements of a moral community,
the only community worth living in. A moral community,
So I dont think Berns changed his mind about freedom and justice. From his earliest to his latest works, he has always shown a
clear-eyed appreciation for the promise of the modern perspective
on politics without losing sight of its limitations. There is something
liberating in the outlook of John Locke or Thomas Jeffersonand
also something that threatens to diminish the human spirit. Berns
emphasized the fundamentally liberal premises of the Constitution
(in the classical, Enlightenment sense of liberal)without pretending that either classical liberalism or the Constitution itself
offers a neat, simple, or entirely satisfactory answer to every political challenge. An opinion column he published in the Wall Street
Journal in 1981 acknowledges, forthrightly, the danger of letting
ideology displace all thought: What characterizes a political problem is the absence of a solution, in the strict sense of the term, and
what characterizes the Soviet Union is its proclivity for solutions,
including simple if not yet final solutions. It is not an accident, as
Marxists would say, that we do things differently.
If it is conservative to doubt the reach of political solutions,
Berns was certainly a conservative throughout his career. But he was
never content to venerate the Constitution simply because it is old.
When he argued for letting established arrangements remainas he
did, for example, in defending the Electoral Collegehe insisted on
probing the constitutional argument, not merely praising the adequacy of the result.
JEREMY A. RABKIN 9
Now I hope I can tell a story in his presence. I recently had a conversation with a 2008 graduate of Cornell. Asked about his teachers, he said, Some were very capable instructors. You could learn
technical skills and technical subjects from them. But my classmates
could not take seriously the idea that our professors were purveyors
of wisdom. Students of Walter Berns took that idea for granted
that Berns was, in fact, a purveyor of wisdom. He showed us the
wisdom of the American Founders, while reminding us that not all
wisdom can be fitted within the limits of a modern constitution.
Leon R. Kass
I am both pleased and humbled to be able to offer words of tribute to Walter Berns at this commemoration of Constitution Day:
pleased, because I welcome a chance to express my enormous
regard for Walteras scholar, citizen, and gentlemanly human
being; humbled because, in this distinguished gathering that
includes so many of Walters students, there are people vastly
more qualified than I to speak knowledgably about his scholarship. Still, as a reader, admirer, and friend of nearly thirty years,
perhaps I can offer something of value for your consideration.
It is absolutely fitting and proper to honor Walter Berns in connection with Constitution Day. The United States Constitution, and
the underlying ideas and ideals of constitutionalism, have been the
central focus of Walters intellectual life. In his teaching and writings,
he has expounded their foundational and enduring significance for
the American polity, and he has defended their wisdom against the
depredations of famous law professors and Supreme Court justices.
Right from the start, Walter showed his capacity and courage for
swimming against the stream in the cause of the right and the good.
The guiding spirit of his career was heralded already in his first academic publication, in 1953, in which this untenured assistant professor, in the name of justice and due process of law, offered a
rigorous and spirited critique of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.s Supreme
Courts opinion in Buck v. Bell, upholding involuntary eugenic sterilization of the mentally retarded and celebrated in Holmess smug dictum, Three generations of imbeciles are enough.1
As his writings over a lifetime make plain, Walters devotion to
constitutionalism goes deeper than the written document and the
11
LEON R. KASS 13
Whether the passions are excited by, and the affections
drawn to, what is noble or what is base? Whether the relations between men and women are depicted in terms of an
eroticism wholly divorced from love and calculated to
destroy the capacity for love and the institutions, such as the
family, that depend on love? Whether a dramatist uses pleasure to attach men to what is beautiful or to what is ugly?3
Walter then proceeded to show that the political effect, if not also
the intended purpose, of the newly fashionable obscenity, licensed
by revisionist First Amendment jurisprudence, was to make us
shameless, oblivious to the distinction between public and private,
and therefore hostile both to the protection of the delicate sphere of
human love and to politically relevant self-command:
There is a connection between self-restraint and shame, and
therefore a connection between shame and self-government
or democracy. There is, therefore, a political danger in promoting shamelessness and the fullest self-expression or
indulgence. To live together requires rules and a governing
of the passions, and those who are without shame will be
unruly and unrulable; having lost the ability to restrain
themselves by observing the rules they collectively give
themselves, they will have to be ruled by others. Tyranny is
the natural and inevitable mode of government for the
shameless and self-indulgent who have carried liberty
beyond any restraint, natural and conventional.4
Not content to show that the liberty demanded by the arts is not
necessarily good for civil society, Walter then showed why the
unwillingness to distinguish between the obscene and the nonobscene also destroys our ability to distinguish between art and
trash and, finally, also between good and evil, the true and the false,
the noble and the base. Looking at the changes in American popular culture and American mores since this article was written in
1971, who would dare say that Walter was mistaken?
The virtues of civic life, beginning with self-command and reaching toward public-spiritedness, although especially important for
self-governing citizens, are not peculiarly American. Closer to what
LEON R. KASS 15
Walter carefully and subtly takes up these and other permanent
challenges to the cultivation of patriotic attachment in modern
America, and then turns to the area where our novel circumstances
give the greatest cause for concern: the education of the young or,
one should rather say, their miseducation.
Patriots are not born, they are made. Their formation is even
more a matter of the heart than of the head, and it takes place from
the earliest ages. Although the Constitution is silent on education
this was a matter left to the statesthe Founders were very concerned about the education of citizens for self-government. Jefferson
proposed a system of universal public education that would render
our children worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred
deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens. Walter
reviews the efforts associated with such names as Noah Webster and
William McGuffey, among others, to inculcate belief in God, moral
virtue, and love of country, along with the teaching of reading, writing, and arithmetic, efforts that lasted, successfully, well into the
early twentieth century. And then things began to unravel. Supreme
Court decisions in the 1940s, applying to the states for the first time
the First Amendments separation of church and the national state,
began the inexorable secularization of public education. How were
virtue and love of country to be promoted once religious teachings
were banished from the public education of the young? It was from
there but a short decline into the belief that public schools should
not be promoting patriotism at all, should not be arguing for the
superiority of one way of life above another, should instead be
teaching the young that preferential love of your own was indefensible and dangerous, that patriotism was in fact the last refuge of
scoundrels. To begin to remedy these educational diseases, Walter
suggests that we must pay renewed attention to the lives of those
Americans who have not only grappled with the nations gravest
troubles, but whose words have helped their fellow countrymen
understand and appreciate the gift that is American citizenship.
Walter gives us splendid and inspiring chapters on Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass, men whose words and deeds can still
be a beacon for buddingand agingpatriots.
LEON R. KASS 17
Notes
1. Buck v. Bell: Due Process of Law? Western Political Quarterly 6, no. 4
(December 1953): 76275.
2. Pornography vs. Democracy: The Case for Censorship, Public Interest, no. 22 (Winter 1971): 324.
3. Ibid., 10.
4. Ibid., 13.
5. Lincoln at Two Hundred, Bradley Lecture, February 9, 2009, available at http://www.aei.org/speech/100002.
Christopher DeMuth
In America today, the Constitution has come to mean constitutional law. Most Americans venerate their Constitution and realize that it is an important source of their liberties and of their
nations success. But when they talk about it, or hear political
leaders or the media talk about it, the subject is almost always
what courtsespecially the Supreme Courthave said in its
name. We pay attention to our Constitution when the Court holds
that one of its provisions forbids, or does not forbid, a particular
practicebanning violent video games, regulating corporate
political contributions, suing funeral hecklers, providing racial
preferences in college admissions. Moreover, as Justice Antonin
Scalia noted in his AEI Boyer Lecture in 1989, these holdings are
often treated as if they were policy decisions rather than constitutional decisionseven when they are not, in fact, policy decisions. If the Court holds that Congress does not have the
authority under the interstate commerce clause to forbid the possession of guns in school zones by means of a statute with suchand-such provisions, the media report gravely that the Court has
said people can take guns into schools.
It was not always this way. There was a time when the Constitution was understood to be a guide to political officials and even to
citizens and voters. Consider the president, whose oath of office,
prescribed by the Constitution, is pointedly sparehe will preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. As Walter Berns has
noted, in the nineteenth century all of our presidents invoked the
Constitution in their inaugural addresses following the taking of
that oath; moreover, constitutional arguments were central to many
18
CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH 19
live political controversies, especially in Lincolns speeches and
debates on slavery and the union. But in the twentieth century,
beginning with Theodore Roosevelt, constitutional appeals and references all but vanished from presidential inaugurals and also from
political debates (one exception being FDRs arguments for his
court-packing proposal). Modern presidents assuredly do not regard
the Constitution as a guide to their own actions. They would not
think of vetoing an act of Congress simply because they regarded it
as unconstitutional, even though the veto power was intended as a
safeguard against unconstitutional legislation. Instead, they sign the
act into law and say that, while they may have their own opinion, it
is of course up to the courts to decide the constitutional question;
and then their Justice Departments proceed to advocate the acts
constitutionality before those courts.
Congressional practice has become little different. Several decades
ago, in the early years of Walter Bernss career, it was still the case that
a few curmudgeonly senators would rise to ask what provision of the
Constitution authorized the undoubtedly worthy bill under consideration and then vote against it in the absence of a satisfactory answer.
No more. The Speaker of the House of the previous Congress articulated the modern approach. Asked for the constitutional authority for
a controversial piece of legislation, she said, Are you serious? (This
was not a question but an expression of contempt.) In the current session, the House leadership has reversed course and required that the
source of constitutional authority be specified at the beginning of
every billbut to little avail. General welfare, necessary and
properthese are good enough for congressional work. The Constitution as a guide to action is now just for judges in pronouncing on
the actions of others.
Walter Bernss fifty years of scholarship stands in opposition to
this shriveled conception of the Constitution. He is one of a line of
AEI constitutional scholars distinguished for not being lawyersa
line that also includes his great friend, the late Robert Goldwin, and
now his younger colleague, Michael Greve, and also departed members of the AEI extended family, such as Herbert Storing and Martin Diamond. I do not know that Walter, or any of them, would
CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH 21
drama, but it is the reasoning that lives onaffecting future behavior and the course of our constitutional order, often in unpredictable
ways. In a Berns essay, decisions are important mainly to illustrate
the strengths and (more often) weaknesses of the reasoning Walter
has been leading us throughas when this reasoning leads, in
about the same breath, to the banning of Memoirs of Hecate County
but not of a seamy crime magazine.2 And Walter recognizes the tug
of the immediate case upon reason and principle. A staunch opponent of extra-constitutional legislating by judges, he admits that he
would have done his damndest to invalidate Virginias compulsory
sterilization law at issue in Buck v. Bell, even though the Constitution
seems to say nothing on the matter.3 His capacity to place himself
in the shoes of his subjects extends even to his imagined self.
Second, Walters attention to words and reasoning is coupled with
a powerful opposition to excessive abstraction and formulae
especially to abstract rights that are supposed to override all other
considerations. Should the democratic principle of one man, one
vote lead us to abolish the Electoral College in favor of direct popular election of the president? No, says Berns, because that principle,
important as it is, is not the only important considerationwe also
want our presidents to attend to regional and other interests and
want our succession contests to be resolved with clear and unambiguous results. The Electoral College has done these things rather
well for more than two centuries, and almost certainly better than
direct election would have done. And, come to think of it, the Electoral College promotes some valued aspects of liberal democracy
that direct election would compromisesuch as the protection of
minorities, which are more influential at the state level than they
would be in a single national electorate.4 Should the libertarian
principle that individual freedom trumps all other considerations
decide cases under the First Amendment? No, because that principle, important as it is, is not the only important considerationfew
people are indifferent to the uses of freedom, and effective freedom
depends not only on the absence of restraint but on the nature of the
culture in which it is exercised. And, come to think of it, our freedoms surely rest more on our constitutional structure and traditions
CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH 23
does not have a specific reform platform at all, and he understands
the great difficulties of accomplishing what he has in mind. He
insists only that if we cease to know our Constitutionto understand its theories and practices and appreciate its strengths and
shortcomingsthen its great achievements will not endure.
I believe that Walters lifes work is itself an essential part of the
program he advocates. That our political leaders have taken their
leave of constitutional reflection and advocacy is a great lossin
part because it has left federal judges with a monopoly on the enterprise, and monopoly is not good for anyone. But their monopoly is
yet incomplete: constitutional reflection and advocacy is not only
for those in power, but also for citizens and especially for scholars
who specialize in it for the benefit of others. Walters great contribution is in seeing the Constitution wholeas much more than a
set of legal doctrines or parade of court decisionsand in showing
that it can illuminate the most vexing contemporary problems and
controversies. There is no better way to observe Constitution Day
than to read Walter Berns.
Walter Berns
Some three decades ago I came to AEI and found my old friend
Robert Goldwin in charge of the Constitution program here, and I
joined that program. As a part of that program, foreign scholars and
statesmen and stateswomen interested in the Constitution were
invited to come here to discuss the American Constitution, its institutions, and its underlying principles, and a number of uslargely
AEI scholars but not exclusively AEI scholarswent elsewhere and
talked about the American Constitution in countries abroad. We
visited France, Lisbon in Portugal, Cyprus, and, on a very important
occasion, South Africa.
We also went to countries in this hemispherefor instance, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil. Brazil was an especially interesting experience.
Mind you, in each of these cases I was talking to people who, essentially for the first time, were involved in writing or considering a new
constitution for their countries. Brazil in this case had just rid itself
of a military dictatorship, and they were considering how to advance
the cause of constitutional government there. I spoke in various
placesusually before a law school audienceand I think it was in
a law school at Recife where, after I finished my prepared remarks,
an individual, probably a law professorcertainly an angry Brazilianstood up and denounced not me, but the person whod invited
me to speak. He said, and one can understand why he said it,
Why did you invite an American here? Theyve had only one Constitution. Why didnt you invite someone from Bolivia? Theyve had
a hundred.
My principal experience in participating over the years in the
program directed by Robert Goldwin was a deep appreciation of the
25
Board of Trustees
William H. Walton
William L. Walton
Tully M. Friedman,
Vice Chairman
Gordon M. Binder
Managing Director
Coastview Capital, LLC
Arthur C. Brooks
President
American Enterprise Institute
The Honorable
Richard B. Cheney
Harlan Crow
Ravenel B. Curry
Daniel A. DAniello
John V. Faraci
Christopher B. Galvin
Chairman
Harrison Street Capital, LLC
Raymond V. Gilmartin
Harvard Business School
Managing Member
Rockpoint Group, LLC
Marilyn Ware
James Q. Wilson
Harvey Golub
Emeritus Trustees
Robert F. Greenhill
Richard B. Madden
Frank J. Hanna
Paul W. McCracken
Bruce Kovner
Chairman
Caxton Associates, LP
Marc S. Lipschultz
Partner
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.
J. Peter Ricketts
D. Gideon Searle
Managing Partner
The Serafin Group, LLC
Willard C. Butcher
Robert H. Malott
Paul F. Oreffice
Henry Wendt
Officers
Arthur C. Brooks
President
David Gerson
Jason Bertsch
Henry Olsen
Danielle Pletka
Council of Academic
Advisers
Chairman Emeritus
Cigna Corporation
Mel Sembler
Wilson H. Taylor
Alan J. Auerbach
Eliot A. Cohen
Eugene F. Fama
Martin Feldstein
Aaron L. Friedberg
Professor of Politics and
International Affairs
Princeton University
Robert P. George
Gertrude Himmelfarb
R. Glenn Hubbard
John L. Palmer
Sam Peltzman
George L. Priest
Jeremy A. Rabkin
Professor of Law
George Mason University
School of Law
Richard J. Zeckhauser
Mackenzie Eaglen
Stephen D. Oliner
Nicholas Eberstadt
Norman J. Ornstein
Resident Fellow
Jon Entine
Visiting Scholar
Mark J. Perry
Fellow
Tomas J. Philipson
Resident Fellow
Edward Pinto
Resident Scholar
Alex J. Pollock
Vincent R. Reinhart
Richard Rogerson
F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow
Michael Rubin
Resident Scholar
Gary J. Schmitt
Mark Schneider
Resident Fellow
David Schoenbrod
Visiting Scholar
Nick Schulz
Roger Scruton
NRI Fellow
Kent Smetters
Madden-Jewett Chair
Vincent Smith
Research Fellow
Rick Geddes
Research Staff
Kenneth P. Green
Joseph Antos
Leon Aron
Paul S. Atkins
Visiting Scholar
Michael Auslin
Resident Scholar
Claude Barfield
Resident Scholar
Michael Barone
Resident Fellow
Roger Bate
Walter Berns
Resident Scholar
Michael S. Greve
Kevin A. Hassett
Steven F. Hayward
Robert B. Helms
Arthur Herman
Frederick M. Hess
Ayaan Hirsi Ali
R. Glenn Hubbard
Frederick W. Kagan
Andrew G. Biggs
Karthik Kalyanaraman
Edward Blum
Dan Blumenthal
Andrew P. Kelly
John R. Bolton
J.D. Kleinke
Karlyn Bowman
Desmond Lachman
Resident Scholar
Visiting Fellow
Resident Fellow
Senior Fellow
Senior Fellow
Alex Brill
Research Fellow
Charles W. Calomiris
Visiting Scholar
Lynne V. Cheney
Senior Fellow
Steven J. Davis
Visiting Scholar
Visiting Scholar
Richard Perle
Jonah Goldberg
Resident Fellow
Resident Scholar
Pia Orrenius
Visiting Fellow
Ali Alfoneh
Resident Scholar
Resident Fellow
Scholar
Visiting Scholar
Resident Fellow
Resident Fellow
Visiting Scholar
Visiting Scholar
Resident Scholar
Resident Scholar
Resident Fellow
Phillip Swagel
Resident Fellow
Erin Syron
Visiting Scholar
Marc A. Thiessen
Visiting Scholar
Alan D. Viard
Resident Scholar
Peter J. Wallison
Adam Lerrick
Lawrence B. Lindsey
John H. Makin
Aparna Mathur
Resident Scholar
Visiting Scholar
NRI Fellow
Fellow
Resident Scholar
Lawrence M. Mead
David A. Weisbach
Visiting Fellow
Thomas P. Miller
Paul Wolfowitz
Resident Fellow
Charles Murray
John Yoo
Roger F. Noriega
Benjamin Zycher
Mauro De Lorenzo
Sadanand Dhume
Thomas Donnelly
Visiting Scholar
Resident Fellow
W. H. Brady Scholar
Fellow
Visiting Scholar
Scholar
Visiting Scholar
WALTER BERNS
AND THE
CONSTITUTION
A Celebration
We pay ourselves a very great compliment when we celebrate and honor
Walter Berns. His life and work, defending and honoring the American
Republic and its great heroes, is a model and inspiration for all
who have been blessed to know and to learn from him.
Leon R. Kass
For more than fifty years, Walter Berns has analyzed the American constitutional order with insight and profundity. To celebrate his scholarly legacy,
AEIs Program on American Citizenship marked Constitution Day 2011
September 17, the day thirty-nine members of the Constitutional Convention
signed the draft constitutionwith a panel discussion dedicated to Berns and
his work on the Constitution.
WALTER BERNS
AND THE
CONSTITUTION
A Celebration
WITH REMARKS BY
CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH, LEON R. KASS,
AND JEREMY A. RABKIN