EN BANC

G.R. No. 180906

October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they
are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky
that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition
for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and
Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 2 filed
before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners
(therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII,
Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the
arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life,
liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 4 of the 1987 Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition
as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They
prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of
the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within
the period provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim
reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by
the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18 7 of the Amparo Rule;
and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under
the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the
CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ.
We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and
decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein
respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby
REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this
decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection
with their case, except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to
the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who
attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from
notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP
Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent
on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several
uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of
their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of
the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At
past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and
roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not
Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then
handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip,
ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him,
but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la
Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU
and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house
two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men. 13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded,
he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The
one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age
or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin,
curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and
about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside
Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his
brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw
several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt
of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his
(Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New
People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where
his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time
he answered none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would
salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high
officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the
uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and
thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much
about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents'
abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the
soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time,
Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food. 17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up.
They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice
with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he
could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to
the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back
the next day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise
with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he
managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and
firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a
forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing
the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay. 19 He
reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and
caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay.
He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a
so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed.
The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained. 20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the
wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk. 21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars.
He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating,
removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people 22 had been detained in
that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a
small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the
firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes
detained in what he only knew as the "DTU." 24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine
samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time
urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white
arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and
mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink
plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were
sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in
the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered
him to monitor and take care of them. 25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed
men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were
detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there,
Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo.
They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When
they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball
court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was
about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which
Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then
asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he
would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man. 27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin
n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa
hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat
sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa
gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00
in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to
their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still
could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen.
Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents
that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents
were then brought back to Sapang. 29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four
"masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. 30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he
called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to
gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the
medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove
that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance. 31 During his
testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. 32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine,
named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and
instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The
"Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up. 33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed
Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya,
Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his
house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians. 34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24 th Infantry Battalion.
He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then
blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the
barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then
he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were
training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn
Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was
abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She
was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she
was made to do the laundry.36

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name
they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24 th Infantry
Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were
threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at
night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed. 37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be
thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6
or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their
parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that
camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name
"Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24 th Infantry
Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit. 38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of
the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until
May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond
knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also
suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock. 39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him
and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayanbayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed
because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. 40 Another
time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed
only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse
near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the
house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from
May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007. 42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were
tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced
in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos
ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o
marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na
dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa
6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila
ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo,
piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya
ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit
sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay
mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong
mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na
dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni
Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga
sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni
Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas.
Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni
Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel,
dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at
ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena. 43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry
for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care
of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their
produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and
Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna. 44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped
farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When

they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he
wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it
first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their
guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards.
Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio.
In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m.,
Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and
Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They
boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to
matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14,
2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers
he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort
Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because
Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he
could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated
from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario,
in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military
trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was
brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying.
He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these
trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to
remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and
Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson." 46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr.
Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization
handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by
an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about
their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by
respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was
conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into
writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in
conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October
25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying
any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted,
detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled
issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as
head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7 th Infantry
Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU),
namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the
Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S.
Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort
Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to
establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June
27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing
his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that
the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to
release the latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of
National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the
Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations,
neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way
micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense
is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies)
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I
have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d)
of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum

Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of
Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is
issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the
person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as
well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. 49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ,
attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that
acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused
to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of
the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher
headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the
concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A
Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose
favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the
Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and
Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the
surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible,
including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission
of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent
evidence that may be gathered in the process. 50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed
in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which
averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion detachment
as detention area, I immediately went to the 24 th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no
untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo
and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine
National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that
none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged
beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was
used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo
and Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S.
Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners
could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted. 52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost
Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The
territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a
portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division, Maj.
Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the
respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz,
aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning;
and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative

liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a
complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction
of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial
jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and
conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006. 59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at
10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn
statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the
Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated 61 as according to Jimenez, the
directive to him was only to investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. 63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez
as it was in fact his first time to meet them. 64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate
of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons. 65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was
interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their
statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006. 66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over
to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006
and finished it on June 1, 2006. 67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel. 68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report
is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were
forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on
14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the
said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein
suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B")
states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the
concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat.
He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan
about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he
was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and
that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and
CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said
victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C")
states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a
CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and
he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in
their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing
him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working
at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came
only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by
Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the
incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states
that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU
based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the
background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA
in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo.
Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San
Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived
home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the
fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him
in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of
said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he
is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since
childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence
in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident
lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by
alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him

was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of
summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA
leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was
living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction
of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he
is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a
former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters
of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of
the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the
alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached
him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his
relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that
he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy.
Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims
that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having
been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or
sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was
helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the
incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad
in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly
innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything
fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a
CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking
them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that
transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is
unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful,
hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of
the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not
suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it
was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first
place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of
CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist
group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction
committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence,
it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore
concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and
two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed. 69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence
and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND
GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED,
CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING
RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S)
AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE
INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE
ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF
OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS;
AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS,

RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED

AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST
OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM
FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us
hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted
from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances
sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based
perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances," 71 hence "representatives from
all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system" 72 participated
in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing
and enforced disappearances." 73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987
Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. 74 As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are
"killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." 75 On the
other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of
the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. 78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio
Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, 79 which granted judges the power to
protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the
national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of
those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against
attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting
themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration
concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation. 80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. 81 If, after hearing, the
judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the
official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the
full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the
U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It
enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them
from using this power to make law for the entire nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in
response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal
Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that
institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived." 84 What began as a
protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for
several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas
corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo
casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect
against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these
countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socioeconomic rights.86Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the
protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights. 87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the
above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights
extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is
comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause
is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison.89

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these
remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through
summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under
the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American
and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it
is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably
yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative
roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to
liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also
sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and
Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution
and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007,
they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to
the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to
the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving
affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo. 94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action,
to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence,
the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction,
detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear
and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing
experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A
few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si
Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko
ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel." 97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay.
Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas." 98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato
para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell
phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar." 100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit
and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners
(herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the
six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their
attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents
of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also

CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the
six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and
George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their
assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7 th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their
CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners
were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for
Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely
superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry Division focused on the onesided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that
the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the
Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he
perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was
aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact,
he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen.
Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and
their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction
might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their
long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable
command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians
without due process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon,
chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no
clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the
abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after
Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were
boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas
proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the
petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested
that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which
was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a
detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a
house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them
to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound
of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was
there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought
the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond
was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies.
On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they
join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also
among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen.
Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the
medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners
saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of
the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata,
Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction.
We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming. 101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by
other independent and credible pieces of evidence. 102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by
the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic
specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, 103 also
corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and
confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," 104 firms up respondents' story that they were
detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was
abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and
tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and
credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. 106 These statements were
supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military

installation where she was detained. 107 She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed
that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account
of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention. 108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims
themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written
and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left
by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where
powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes
as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the
enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have
escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are
physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word" 109 as their "movements continue
to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the
case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly
connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights
to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being
once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to
security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated
with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and
unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987
Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and
solitary detention places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ
of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of
person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a
liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v.
Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State
on the exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that
amounted to a deprivation of liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance." 116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty,
and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as
respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article
III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a
person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of
the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy
against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76
Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness
and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The
constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and
seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of
his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be
for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which
the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of
security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's
existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the
right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those

things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires
of the individual."123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom
of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an
aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. 124 It is the "right to security of
person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." 125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to
life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus,
a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as
people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from
threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. 127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. 128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases,
the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons
because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. 129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free
will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion
of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will.
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological
invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense).
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving
invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom
from threat" as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation
should all the more be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant,
who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby
violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied)
Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found
baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when
they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and
to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural
obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations. 131 (emphasis
supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the
protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and
fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions
is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty
and security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In
the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security,
the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134 viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the
State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the
truth by the government.135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been
interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee 136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the
ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the
Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In
other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be
invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary
school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the
Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of
paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest
and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did
indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to
security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the
Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is
to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of
the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time,
States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot
be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons
under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained.
States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to
protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats
to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally
ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of
conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release
from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v.
Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in
that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter
of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and
the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v.
Zambia,144involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as
prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford
protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of
the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v.
Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since.
The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant
suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive
and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article
5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual
it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5
must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against
the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable
claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis
supplied)

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether
there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and
security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them,
would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first
time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before
he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It
should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful
order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal,
sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors
even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo
attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas.
Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their
escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated
specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons
known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private
citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are
forced to limit their movements or activities. 149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the
perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as faceto-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of
respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute
threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of
military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention,
and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez,
Provost Marshall of the 7thInfantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied
on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the
investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the
sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or
their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for
the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated
October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt
rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP,
which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of
relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons
involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent
court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above
directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused
to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by
petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the
results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent
threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken
in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts,
and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo

brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from
February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by
respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the
application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the
probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other
than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified
declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by
name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced
must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has
not been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused
with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a
protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section
1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is
pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in his possession, custody or control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27,
issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of
Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it
violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that
the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same
has been furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of
medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a
writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions
and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury
or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and
detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction.
Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court
processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical
personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make
appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from
victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to
preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 182498
December 3, 2009
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent
RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior
Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER);
and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,

vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-inFact, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis
(respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an
"enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules.
The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him;
(2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent
GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK
FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police AntiCrime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend
the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of
their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of
respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding
General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet,
Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct organization from the police and
the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or threats of
violation against the rights to life, liberty and security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police
agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case,
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance;
rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability,
on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the
victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that call for
the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations,
may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and
proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The
Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve
through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor
for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with
Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31,
2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked
Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned
from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.5 The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at
around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. 6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even
sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts and
activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.7
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and
Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. 8 On
November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances
surrounding Tagitis disappearance.9
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla. 10 The petition was directed against Lt.
Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine
National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG);

Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional
Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as
petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis personal circumstances and the facts outlined above, the petition went on to
state:
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but
while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him
and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin
Kunnong;
8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was
surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also around and
his room was closed and locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the room
of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell phones,
documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and
other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the
matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of
the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was
then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos
branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who
could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information from
persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men;
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in
an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as
suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondents] request and pleadings
failed to produce any positive results;
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband,
subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a
clear indication of the [petitioners] refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing
husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis to his
family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subjects whereabouts, and/or allow
[the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights and serious
anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in Davao
City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been visited by
the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby
resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying
[sic] to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive
results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the
[respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured her not
to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondents] request for help and
failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2)
months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and custody of
[respondents] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence operatives
and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of
a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing
on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from
service of the writ.11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in
or knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete
and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely
based on hearsay evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have any
personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been designated by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE USIG, to address
concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated with
the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these cases;
and gave the following summary:13
xxxx
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report
on the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim
checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then
roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the
said victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu
PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing
person, but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will lead to the
immediate findings of the whereabouts of the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The
said report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar
set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a
Prof. Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 oclock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly
arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House.
At about 6:15 oclock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast
craft ticket bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on
or about 10:00 oclock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as
stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to
purchase the ticket arrived at the pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not
return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case build up and
information gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find
Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence
Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that no
such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions
available under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This
immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand
alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them before the
bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached to
the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following: 14
xxxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to
conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October 28,
2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30,
2007, at around six oclock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by his student identified as
Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the participants of the said seminar.
He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic]
unidentified companion. At around six oclock in the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his student
to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the
pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to be found
anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the police. The
CIDG is not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced
disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis,
who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October
30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is being detained in
CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged
enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue

investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible
therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER 15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espinas affidavit
which alleged that:16
xxxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction or
illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere in
the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER nor was there any
indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by our men
and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally detained
ENGR. TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in
my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or eradicating kidnap-forransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society is a respondent in kidnapping
or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and charge them in court and to abduct
or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao
Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify and
apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of ENGR.
MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible, to identify
witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the disappearance and to determine the cause,
manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about
the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to
submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with Police
Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial Office
(PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the instruction not to leave any
stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are brought to the bar
of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his
affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis disappearance, viz: 17
xxxx
3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;
xxxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced disappearances
and when they are being alluded to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through Radio
Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain
Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief of
Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator of
Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the
Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan
Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction or arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was
requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the student
returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he immediately
inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in the counter
informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 oclock p.m. and never
returned back to his room;
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial
Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to determine the
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission, to
recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify witnesses and obtain
statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his
disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the disappearance so that they
shall be brought before a competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I have
caused the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu
PPO to conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;

b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu
PPO to expedite compliance to my previous directive;
c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of
directives for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the
owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative
statements regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;
d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize
efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof.
Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit
for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that they may
somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting
assistance to investigate the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it
is within their area of operational jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007
addressed to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the
case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation [sic] on
the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his disappearance
and submitted the following:
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-102007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring
the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;
c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station,
Sulu PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts
of the disappearance and the action being taken by our office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation
and Detection Management, NHQ PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office is
continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the immediate
solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far taken
on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command of the area of disappearance
to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE
TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting
"extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis. 20 As planned, (1) the first hearing would be to
mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf
and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of
Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives. 21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report from
PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis
disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of
Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines
and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told the Provincial
Governor of Sulu that:23
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and
carried away more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his [personal]
bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which [was] intended for the
IDB Scholarship Fund.
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he personally
went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation, particularly of their
detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the
disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction. 25 He further
testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given specific instructions to their supporting
units to perform their respective tasks; that they even talked to, but failed to get any lead from the respondent
in Jolo.26 In his submitted investigation report dated January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded: 27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the
documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no
participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis last
October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic Development Bank

Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB
central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic] be done by resentment or sour
grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly
conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the
disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and
wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic student scholars
should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among them.
xxxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed
considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their efforts
and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and investigation for the
early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination with other law-enforcement
agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this
case.
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be
exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis disappearance on the following grounds: 28
(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should
have been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda
was for the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for
dissemination to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months
since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged
abduction of Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than
one (1) month since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three
(3) weeks when battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It
was only on January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent
photographs of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis claim that
they already had an "all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr.
Morced Tagitis. How could the police look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph
had been disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM
was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirims replacement in the latters official designated post. Yet,
P/Supt KASIMs subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to
understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioners unofficial source of the military
intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par.
15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK
FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this courts
subpoena and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad
elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went to Jolo
and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a high
position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information that allowed her to "specify" her
allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition." 29 This friend also told her that her husband "[was] in
good hands."30 The respondent also testified that she sought the assistance of her former boss in Davao City,
Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP CIDG is holding [her husband],
Engineer Morced Tagitis."31 The respondent recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where
she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her and her friends (who were
then with her) a "highly confidential report" that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and
informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is under custodial investigation" for being a liaison
for "J.I. or Jemaah Islamiah." 32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis second wife, and they
have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. 33 She last communicated with her
husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging; Tagitis was then on his way to
Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City.34
The respondent narrated that she learned of her husbands disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her
stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since the time
they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007. 35 The respondent explained that it took her a few days
(or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husbands disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not communicate with her because his cellular
phones battery did not have enough power, and that he would call her when he had fully-charged his cellular
phones battery.36
The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in
paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal,
Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with three other people, namely, Mrs. Marydel
Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to them the contents of

the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent further narrated that the report
indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group and that he was under custodial
investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic taking maintenance medication, and
asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to give him his medication. 38
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports, 39 signed by the respondent,
detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine Army
and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with Col. Ancanan, the respondent
recounted, viz:40
On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight from Davao
City is 9:00 oclock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 oclock. We [were]
fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West Mindanao Command
(WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got information
about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed to us
the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very
important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to
answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said
meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the mall to
purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were
discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and hes last looked [sic]
in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my husband, because
I contacted some of my friends who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col.
Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and who held him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not give me
any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon alam mo na
kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by the
office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo told
me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr.
Tagitis) within nine days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet
failed to do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows: 41
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy
Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in Jolo, Sulu on
October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu where the
abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao
City looking for high-ranking official who can help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of
subject Engineer Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to
Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short
conversation. And he assured me that hell do the best he can to help me find my husband.
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp Katitipan
to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that Col.
Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different terrorist
[groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier. These are
the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP Letterhead. It was
not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please dont quote my Name! Because this is a raw report." He assured me that
my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to please take
care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate her
testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the information she received
from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when she went to Zamboanga to see
Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. 42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a report
and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis cellular phone, which showed that Tagitis and
his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007. 43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together with two
other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col. Kasim. 44 The
respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis
was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis

was under custodial investigation because he was being charged with terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under
surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and
a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could
not give a copy of the report because it was a "raw report." 45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell
them exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din
yan."50 Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated, 51 he never told
PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money entrusted to him. 52 Prof. Matli
confirmed, however, that that he had received an e-mail report 53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim
Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars
deposited in Tagitis personal account.54
On cross-examination by the respondents counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit was
already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it. 55 Prof Matli clarified that although he read the
affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of [its] contents." 56
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the respondents
testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the military or
the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent in her narrative report,
specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the injured terrorists; (2) that
Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the respondent that "your husband is in
good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his armed abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial
investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the "informal
letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. 59 He
also stressed that the information he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report" sourced from
"barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its veracity. 60
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to him by
his informant, who was a "civilian asset," through a letter which he considered as "unofficial." 61 Col. Kasim
stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for reading by others. 62 He testified
further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the respondent and her companions because "it was
not important to him" and also because the information it contained had no importance in relation with the
abduction of Tagitis.63He explained that he did not keep the letter because it did not contain any information
regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for his abduction. 64
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent Jose
Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondents allegation that Tagitis was in
the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the "investigative arm" of the
PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the Revised Penal Code
particularly those considered as heinous crimes." 66 Col. Pante further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU
personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they did not conduct any
operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis reported disappearance. 67 Col. Pante added that the four (4)
personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation," since they were only
assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation. 68 He denied that his office conducted
any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latters disappearance. 69 Col. Pante further testified that his
investigation of Tagitis disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on the
whereabouts of Tagitis.70
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP
(CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. The
conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondents testimony, corroborated by her
companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was
involved in Tagitis abduction came from no less than the military an independent agency of government. The
CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasims asset, pointing to the CIDGs involvement in
Tagitis abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence
world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the
military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories
painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or
any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB
scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also
found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on
the basis of the respondents testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the
Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the
second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary
as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was
no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of ransom the usual modus operandi of
these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and
directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen.

Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly
reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it
was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution of April 9, 2008.73
THE PETITION
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CAs March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the
sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal
remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and
security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was
abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the
ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial
evidence.74
THE COURTS RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondents Amparo petition, the petitioners
contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners
allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis rights to life, liberty
and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his
disappearance, and the respondents source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners instructions or with their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her
husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in
the investigation of Tagitis disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her
husband.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the
portions the petitioners cite):75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses
of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course
state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. 76 In an Amparo
petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim
exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is
detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in
reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and
security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in
terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance,
the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are
present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis
suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found
despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and
16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also
clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and
boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then
taken "into custody by the respondents police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by

the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and
connect [him] with different terrorist groups."77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to
release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his
right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by
Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate
the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the
annotation that these can be used as the affiants direct testimony.78 This requirement, however, should not be
read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as
in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition
sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is
essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the
respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and
February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the
petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have been
made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish at
the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with the reported
disappearance.79
We reject the petitioners argument that the respondents petition did not comply with the Section 5(d)
requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his
companions immediately reported Tagitis disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they
were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the "ready answer"
that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups. The
respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with the PNP
Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by the police that her husband
was having "a good time with another woman." The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to
no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondents personal inquiries that yielded the
factual bases for her petition.80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities, and
that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the
investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure
to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection
on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and conduct of the
investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondents frustrations in securing an
investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the
allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing
the petition forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition that otherwise is not supported by
sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action as a means to "fish" for evidence. 81 The
petitioners contend that the respondents petition did not specify what "legally available efforts were taken by
the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead of cooperating
with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Courts intervention.
We do not see the respondents petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege "the
actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of
the person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The following allegations of the respondents petition
duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her to file her
petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but
while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him
and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin
Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and
other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter
to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB

Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then
preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos
branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who
could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in
an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as
suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondents] request and pleadings
failed to produce any positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters
again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police headquarters in
Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been
visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places
thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try
complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no
positive results up to the present time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release
of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the
like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT
OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondents petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in
form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of the
case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an
enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an enforced
disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced disappearances would be
very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers
Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. 82 The Third Reichs Night and Fog
Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German security"; they
were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the
desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate
of these targeted persons.83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world
when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have "disappeared" during the
military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue became an
international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State security forces in that
continent under Operation Condor84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the
practice saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments counterinsurgency campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin
American media standardized the term "disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced
disappearances were called the "desaparecidos," 86 which literally means the "disappeared ones." 87 In general,
there are three different kinds of "disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting
agents and are never found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the
military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention
center or another; and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later
discovered.88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, 89 and 855 cases were
recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132
surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were
reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing,
108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during former
President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former
President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization,
reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced

disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human
Rights records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this
number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined
status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance 91 reports 619
outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to
November 30, 2008.92
Enforced Disappearances
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof."93 We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this
concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on
the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an
elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: 94
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific definition
[for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to formulate
the rules, definite rules concerning the same.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and disappearances will
define the jurisdiction of the courts. So well have to agree among ourselves about the nature of killings and
disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an element
incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the
concept includes acts and omissions not only of state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more
specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings, the
disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist organizations and others. So,
again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be
covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives 96 and in the
Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual
definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns
within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition
may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.98
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. 99 The simple reason
is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the
corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature
has the power to enact under the countrys constitutional scheme and power structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to
promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts,"100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and
purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and
security. Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its
procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on
actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a
difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may
have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of
criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal
action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether
an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance,
and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to
discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all
efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when
governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these
senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and
the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her
liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
Enforced Disappearance
Under International Law
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant
violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it

affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances of the
disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be "a double form of torture,"
with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family
members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and suffer as well the
serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance of the household
breadwinner.102
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December 1978 under
Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assemblys deep concern arising from "reports from
various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances," and requested the "UN
Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making
appropriate recommendations." 103
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global
phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third preambular
clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the
sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty
by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting
on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a
refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). 105 The Convention
was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007. 106 Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced
disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to
enforced disappearance107 and that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one shall be subjected to
enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any other
public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with
appropriate penalties under their criminal law.109 It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared
persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and
on the progress and results of the investigation. 110 Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing
offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are
established.111
Binding Effect of UN
Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet committed
to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however,
is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced
disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is
mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo
cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various
conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN
Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion." 112 Although no
universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the "human rights and fundamental freedoms"
guaranteed to all by the Charter,113 it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced disappearance,
and this Declaration states:114
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the
Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international
instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the
ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to
"generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land." 115
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 116 we held
that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The

incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary
international law that are binding on all states. We held further: 117
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law."118 The material sources of custom include State practice, State legislation,
international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of
treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the
UN General Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of international law,120 these sources identify
the substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio
juris" requirements of international law.121 We note the following in these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS)
General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June
1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or tolerate the forced
disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees." 123 One of the
key provisions includes the States obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their respective
national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was committed within their
jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and "when the alleged criminal is within its territory and
it does not proceed to extradite him," which can be interpreted as establishing universal jurisdiction among the
parties to the Inter-American Convention.124 At present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela
have enacted separate laws in accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have defined activities
involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.1251avvphi1
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the
protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has
applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by enforced
disappearance through the Conventions Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of torture;
Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on
the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection afforded by the European
Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,126 where the ECHR found a violation of the right to liberty and security of the
disappeared person when the applicants son disappeared after being taken into custody by Turkish forces in
the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared persons mother)
to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate
character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the
State as a violation of Article 13.127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary
international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third, 128 which
provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices, encourages, or
condones (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals." 129 We significantly note that in a
related matter that finds close identification with enforced disappearance the matter of torture the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 130 that the prohibition on
torture had attained the status of customary international law. The court further elaborated on the significance
of UN declarations, as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member
nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know what
human rights they promised in the Charter to promote." Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to one
authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great
and lasting importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of binding treaty against non-binding pronouncement,' but
is rather an authoritative statement of the international community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation
of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by
custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States." Indeed, several commentators
have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international
law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN Human
Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that the act of
enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also
amount to a crime against humanity.131

Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) also
covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity, 132 i.e., crimes
"committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute, 133 the Philippines is still merely a
signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the
statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special Panels
for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 134 In addition,
the implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of
national criminal provisions also covering enforced disappearance. 135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or
by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific
crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the
international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which
we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed
under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of a
disappearance:136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting
in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis
supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective remedy
under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations promptly,
thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States Parties
must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights The
Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and administrative
mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law Administrative mechanisms are
particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly,
thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate
allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an
ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to
investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself give
rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights, States
Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate, failure to bring
to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the
Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under either
domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (article 7),
summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7 and 9 and, frequently,
6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may
well be an important contributing element in the recurrence of the violations. When committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes against
humanity (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a
guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full
respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person
is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are
under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not
as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their
offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. [Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only as a
prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive duty to
afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural
rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the
individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is incumbent on the authorities to
account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take
effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective
investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.
[Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court made
effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through substantive
law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced disappearance," the materials cited
above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the medium of the Amparo
Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that
underlie every enforced disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed
by the Unique Nature of an
Enforced Disappearance
Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the allegations of
the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall discuss briefly
the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of
the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose involvement is alleged investigates
enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are
generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. 141 Experts note that
abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of governmental
authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are generally specialized,
highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally directed through a separate,
clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to avoid or prevent any interference
by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to secret detention centers where they subject
them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other controls. 142
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to
speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives. 143 We have had occasion to
note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo 144 when we acknowledged that "where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise."
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central
piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance i.e., the corpus delicti or the victims body is usually
concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have
begun.145 The problem for the victims family is the States virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez
Rodriguez146 that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the States power
to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the State to
commit the perfect crime.147
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring
the victims human rights.149 Experience shows that government officials typically respond to requests for
information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing
people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented. 150

These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or another, in
our consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in
Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree and
burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or
judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining
stipulations and admissions from the parties.
xxxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed or evade responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of
proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court
proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an
administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of
diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence point, too,
to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent
handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form
requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their
defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an
enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately
respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 151 provided the Court its first opportunity to
define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly
quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of
matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so
far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Courts first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we recognized
that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly requires do not need
to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full
and exhaustive proceedings. [Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties
presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must
frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary
difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without
transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR faced with a lack of direct evidence that the
government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez disappearance adopted a relaxed and
informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility for a
disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general practice of enforced
disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice. 154 The IACHR took note of the realistic
fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by
logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or
documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision.

Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions
consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances, because
this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the
whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velsquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who acted
under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the hearsay testimony of
Zenaida Velsquez, the victims sister, who described Manfredos kidnapping on the basis of conversations
she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad daylight. She also
told the Court that a former Honduran military official had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a
special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces. 155 The IACHR likewise
considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who asserted that he had been told by a Honduran
military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had spoken in prison to a
man who identified himself as Manfredo.156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and
appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective
counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another
wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the
way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are administrative in
nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the
substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to
the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the
Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness 157 is
expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay
testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The
admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and objective
considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness. 158 These requisites for admission
find their counterpart in the present case under the above-described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in
the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance
cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning of this
term under the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law."159 Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are
essentially fourfold:160
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only
shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and
was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned the petitioner,
Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious
circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and
testimony, as we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested
Tagitis. If at all, only the respondents allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on
record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her allegation
that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The
first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occupied a high position in
the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as
both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any

information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the
respondent but denied giving her any information about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together with
her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the
respondents testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband particularly
those in charge of any records or investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband is
being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly "parang liason ng
J.I.", sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jemaah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?
A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a
military report, maam.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, maam.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
A: There were three of us, maam.
Q: Who were your companions?
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, maam. 162
xxxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do?
A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista na
mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my
husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na
bigyan siya ng gamot, maam."163
xxxx
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in
Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because I
know that they would deny it, maam.164
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband
was abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with you
when you went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q: Only the two of you?
A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The four of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the location
of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is with the
military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He was charged of
terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he was abducted. He told
us that he was under custodial investigation. As Ive said earlier, he was seen under surveillance from January.
He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a Balik Islam and charged with

terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines. Then we asked him how long will he be in custodial
investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also told us that he cannot give us that report
because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it in the
computer or what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I dont know if it was computerized but Im certain
that it was typewritten. Im not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165
xxxx
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
A: We just left and as Ive mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to us
[sic] after the custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied] 166
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them
information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal
letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He
also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from "barangay
intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity. 167
To be sure, the respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners pointed out.
The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her that "her husband is
being abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly parang liason ng J.I."
The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbins testimony imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that
Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since
Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would certainly know that the PNP is not part of the
military."
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners
never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her
witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details
that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material
points.168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are
concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies
such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication 169and only tend to strengthen their probative
value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but
generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and
prefabricated story.170
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we hold
it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informants letter,
that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007, was "in
good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar
Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The respondents and Mrs.
Talbins testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasims plain denial and his claim that he had
destroyed his informants letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties conflicting
claims. Col. Kasims admitted destruction of this letter effectively, a suppression of this evidence raises the
presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed. 171 For brevity, we shall
call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the "Kasim evidence."
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence,
as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government participation, knowledge or
consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim was never
quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only
implies government intervention through the use of the term "custodial investigation," and does not at all point
to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence i.e., evidence whose probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim
himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the informant). 172
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to
acknowledge as the petitioners effectively suggest that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should
simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a
statement that the Amparo Rule despite its terms is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special
evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to
make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely
remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.1avvphi1

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at
least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence
even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the
surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility
requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is
relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the
case.
The evidence about Tagitis personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was reputedly a
consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in
Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong for the
purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates the
purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police
that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof Matli later on stated that he never
accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust, although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking
assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis personal account. Other than these pieces of
evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition
recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," no evidence
whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was
last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 the day he arrived in Jolo and was never seen again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of
the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the
evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the
element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the
disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the
attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by
the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered on whether there was
active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The respondents
own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with another woman somewhere.
Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As already related
above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary
purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasims story,
however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without
identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasims story is
that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a
"Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu.
None of the police agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force
Tagitis to which this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of
the case.
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP Chief
Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the Regional
Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial report of the
disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results. These, to the PNP
Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for
his part, also reported negative results after searching "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a
person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and thorough research, records show that no
such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better
in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search for
Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted Task Force Tagitis,
with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were again
replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned "retraction" that
Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for students, PS Supt. Ajirim
reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction and
said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had anything to do with the
disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the
money in his custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any investigation about
the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the background and activities
of this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody in Talipapao,
Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust,
or to tap any of the "assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this nature. These omissions and
negative results were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three
months after the disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim
could not attend the trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as
Ajirims replacement in the latters last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No investigation

even an internal one appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasims "asset" and
what he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the governments denial of any
complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent
at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis
was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these
developments is the governments dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response
by the Jolo police to Kunnongs initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent
when she herself reported and inquired about her husbands disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis
itself.
As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities
were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the
CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis
in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a "black"
operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the
CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none
of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation
made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate
can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the
activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to
come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded
denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government
and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already
knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under the circumstances of the
disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence,
already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of
the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, 173 the evidence at hand and the developments in this case
confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent
and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed
Tagitis outside the protection of the law a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international enforced
disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to those
of Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that case acted on the basis of the
photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and
later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a
claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention, including the right to life (Article 2)
and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article 5). The applicant contended that on August 14, 1993,
gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the
Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the apprehension.
According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to another detainment
facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent detainment, the
applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of events, including a photocopy of a post-operation
report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a description of
Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused of
being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahaps
enforced disappearance.
Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo remedy
this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case we believe and so
hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of
these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance
of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the
"PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent
crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." The
PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the "investigative arm" of
the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes." 176 Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNPCIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates
against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).177 No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by
assigning the investigation of Tagitis disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their
duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we

refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNPCIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem
appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the
CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its investigation to the
CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and
the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as further CA
hearings may indicate; the petitioners submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and submit to
this Court a quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and
the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.
The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit
its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this
Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari for lack of
merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly
responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices
regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper
investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results
acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable
with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and
action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and
the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of
this Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the
Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and shall
be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and
efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their
varying attendant circumstances, these directives particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA
are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 182498 : February 16, 2010

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent
RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior
Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER);
and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, v. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS,
herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Resolution the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners -- Gen. Avelino I. Razon,
former Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP); 1cralaw Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, former Chief of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), PNP;2cralaw Police Senior Superintendent Leonardo A.
Espina, former Chief of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER), PNP; 3cralaw and Gen. Joel
Goltiao, former Regional Director of the PNP-Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 4cralaw ( petitioners ) -addressing our Decision of December 3, 2009. This Decision affirmed the Court of Appeals (CA) decision of
March 7, 2008 confirming the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granting the
Writ of Amparo.
Our December 3, 2009 Decision was based, among other considerations, on the finding that Col. Julasirim
Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim) informed the respondent Mary Jean Tagitis ( respondent ) and her friends that her
husband had been under surveillance since January 2007 because an informant notified the authorities,
through a letter, that Tagitis was a liaison for the JI;5cralaw that he was " in good hands " and under custodial
investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of
Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism (Kasim evidence).
We considered Col. Kasim's information, together with the consistent denials by government authorities of any
complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the
disappearance, as well as the haphazard investigations conducted that did not translate into any meaningful
results, to be indicative of government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis (for purposes of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo).
We explained that although the Kasim evidence was patently hearsay (and was thus incompetent and
inadmissible under our rules of evidence), the unique evidentiary difficulties posed by enforced disappearance
cases compel us to adopt standards that were appropriate and responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced.
We noted that while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must also observe flexibility in
considering the evidence that we shall take into account. Thus, we introduced a new evidentiary standard for
Writ of Amparo cases in this wise:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the
relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all the other pieces of adduced
evidence, Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test. [Emphasis in the
original]
We held further that the Kasim evidence was crucial to the resolution of the present case for two reasons: first,
it supplied the gaps that were never looked into or clarified by police investigation; and second, it qualified a
simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case by injecting the element of participation by
agents of the State and thus brought into question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
Based on these considerations, we held that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG,
and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully accountable 6cralaw for
the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, we held Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose
under oath information relating to the enforced disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability, we
ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to this case. Similarly, we also held the PNP accountable for
the suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the same obligation of
disclosure that Col. Kasim carries.
The Motion for Reconsideration
The petitioners cited two grounds in support of their Motion for Reconsideration.
First, the petitioners argue that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasim's disclosure
unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the
petitioners contend that this Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to Col. Kasim by a
personal intelligence " asset " without any other evidence to support it. The petitioners also point out that the
Court misapplied its cited cases (Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, 7cralaw Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras,8cralaw and Timurtas v. Turkey9cralaw ) to support its December 3, 2009 decision; in those cases,
more than one circumstance pointed to the complicity of the government and its agents. The petitioners
emphasize that in the present case, the respondent only presented a " token piece of evidence " that points to
Col. Kasim as the source of information that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for having been
suspected as a " terrorist supporter ." This, according to the petitioners, cannot be equated to the substantial
evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.10cralaw
Second, the petitioners contend that Col. Kasim's death renders impossible compliance with the Court's
directive in its December 3, 2009 decision that Col. Kasim be impleaded in the present case and held
accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his " assets " on the enforced

disappearance of Tagitis. The petitioners alleged that Col. Kasim was killed in an encounter with the Abu
Sayaff Group on May 7, 2009. To prove Col. Kasim's death, the petitioners attached to their motion a copy of
an article entitled " Abus kill Sulu police director " published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer on May 8,
2009.11cralaw This article alleged that " Senior Supt. Julasirim Kasim, his brother Rosalin, a police trainee, and
two other police officers were killed in a fire fight with Abu Sayyaf bandits that started at about 1 p.m. on
Thursday, May 7, 2009 at the boundaries of Barangays Kulasi and Bulabog in Maimbung town, Sulu ." The
petitioners also attached an official copy of General Order No. 1089 dated May 15, 2009 issued by the PNP
National Headquarters, indicating that "PS SUPT [Police Senior Superintendent] Julasirim Ahadin Kasim 005530, PRO ARMM, is posthumously retired from PNP service effective May 8, 2009." 12cralaw Additionally, the
petitioners point out that the intelligence " assets " who supplied the information that Tagitis was under
custodial investigation were personal to Col. Kasim; hence, the movants can no longer comply with this
Court's order to disclose any information known to Col. Kasim and his " assets. "
The Court's Ruling
We hold that our directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case has been rendered moot and
academic by his death. Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
Paragraph (e) of the dispositive portion of our December 3, 2009 decision directs:
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the
obligation to disclose information known to him and to his " assets " in relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
Undisputably, this directive can no longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Col.
Kasim's demise. His intervening death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col.
Kasim may have left behind, particularly the network of " assets " he utilized while he was in the service.
Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of
informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the military. It is not farfetched
that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo requires,13cralaw can still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his
" asset " or network of assets during his lifetime.
The extinction of Col. Kasim's personal accountability and obligation to disclose material information, known to
him and his assets, does not also erase the burden of disclosure and investigation that rests with the PNP and
the CIDG. Lest this Court be misunderstood, we reiterate that our holding in our December 3, 2009 Decision
that the PNP -- through the incumbent PNP Chief; and the PNP-CIDG, through its incumbent Chief -- are
directly responsible14cralaw for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices
regarding the disappearance of Tagitis; and that the conduct of proper investigation using extraordinary
diligence still subsists. These are continuing obligations that will not truly be terminated until the enforced
disappearance of the victim, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, is fully addressed by the responsible or accountable
parties, as we directed in our Decision.
We now turn to the petitioners substantial challenge to the merits of our December 3, 2009 decision.
We see no merit in the petitioners submitted position that no sufficient evidence exists to support the
conclusion that the Kasim evidence unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance.
Contrary to the petitioners claim that our conclusions only relied on Col. Kasim's report, our Decision plainly
and pointedly considered other evidence supporting our conclusion, particularly the consistent denials by
government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis; the dismissive approach of the police
authorities to the report of the disappearance; and the conduct of haphazard investigations that did not
translate into any meaningful results. We painstakingly ruled:
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at
least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence
even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the
surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility
requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is
relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the
case.
xxx
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of
the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the
evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the
element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the
disappearance.
xxx

We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the government's denial of any
complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent
at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis
was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these
developments is the government's dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response
by the Jolo police to Kunnong's initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent
when she herself reported and inquired about her husband's disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis
itself.
As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities
were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the
CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis
in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a " black "
operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the
CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none
of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation
made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate
can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the
activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to
come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. [Emphasis in the original]
Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners claim that the Kasim evidence does not amount to substantial
evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is not a new issue; we extensively and thoroughly
considered and resolved it in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this point, we need not go into another full
discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to
say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires,
with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay
evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the
circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we
merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence , maintaining all the time the standards of
reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the
obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case.
We also cannot agree with the petitioners contention that we misapplied Secretary of Defense v.
Manalo,15cralaw Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,16cralaw and Timurtas v. Turkey17cralaw to support our
December 3, 2009 decision. The petitioners make this claim with the view that in these cases, more than one
circumstance pointed to the government or its agents as the parties responsible for the disappearance, while
we can only point to the Kasim evidence. A close reading of our December 3, 2009 Decision shows that it
rests on more than one basis.
At the risk of repetition, we stress that other pieces of evidence point the way towards our conclusion,
particularly the unfounded and consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the
disappearance; the dismissive approach of the police to the report of the disappearance; and the haphazard
handling of the investigation that did not produce any meaningful results. In cruder but more understandable
language, the run-around given to the respondent and the government responses to the request for
meaningful investigation, considered in the light of the Kasim evidence, pointed to the conclusion that the
Tagitis affair carried a " foul smell " indicative of government complicity or, at the very least, an attempt at
cover-up and concealment. This is the situation that the Writ of Amparo specifically seeks to address.
Manalo, Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas, read in proper perspective, fully support our findings and
conclusions in this case.
Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer a
problem in that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively
ended when they escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains
missing more than two years after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo,
however, because of the continuing threat to the brothers right to security; the brothers claimed that since the
persons responsible for their enforced disappearance were still at large and had not been held accountable,
the former were still under the threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which threat
constituted a direct violation of their right to security of person. In ruling that substantial evidence existed to
support the conclusion that the respondents right to security had been violated, the Court not only considered
the respondents affidavit and testimony which positively identified the perpetrators, but also noted other
evidence showing the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. The Court significantly
found that:

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military
elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and
torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost
Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied
on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the
investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the
sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or
their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for
the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated
October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt
rules of action in the event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP,
which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of
relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons
involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.
Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be
issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by
petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the
results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo .
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government. [Emphasis supplied] 18cralaw
Similarly in Velasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) acknowledged that
when the Honduran Government carried out or tolerated enforced disappearances, the police customarily
used a distinctive form of kidnapping. Consequently, the IACHR presumed that Velasquez disappeared at the
" hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials within the framework of that practice ." Moreover, the
IACHR found that negative inferences may be drawn from the fact that the government failed to investigate or
to inquire into his disappearance, and thwarted the attempts by the victim's family to do so; these according to
the Court strongly suggested the government's involvement in the disappearance, even if there was no direct
evidence indicating that the government kidnapped Velasquez. 19cralaw The Court thus held:20cralaw
iii. In the case of Manfredo Velsquez, there were the same type of denials by his captors and the Armed
Forces, the same omissions of the latter and of the Government in investigating and revealing his
whereabouts, and the same ineffectiveness of the courts where three writs of HABEAS corpus and two
criminal complaints were brought ( testimony of Miguel Angel Pavn Salazar, Ramn Custodio Lpez, Zenaida
Velsquez, press clippings and documentary evidence ).
h. There is no evidence in the record that Manfredo Velsquez had disappeared in order to join subversive
groups, other than a letter from the Mayor of Langue, which contained rumors to that effect. The letter itself
shows that the Government associated him with activities it considered a threat to national security. However,
the Government did not corroborate the view expressed in the letter with any other evidence. Nor is there any
evidence that he was kidnapped by common criminals or other persons unrelated to the practice of
disappearances existing at that time."
148. Based upon the above, the Court finds that the following facts have been proven in this proceeding: (1) a
practice of disappearances carried out or tolerated by Honduran officials existed between 1981 and 1984; ( 2)
Manfredo Velsquez disappeared at the hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials within the
framework of that practice; and (3) the Government of Honduras failed to guarantee the human rights affected
by that practice.
Finally, in Timurtas, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) altered the prevailing jurisprudence by
permitting a lesser evidentiary burden in cases of enforced disappearances. The ECHR dismissed the need
for direct evidence previously held necessary in the leading case of Kurt v. Turkey,21cralaw and instead
permitted the use of circumstantial evidence to establish a violation of the right to life. It stated that "whether
the failure on the part of authorities to provide a plausible explanation as to a detainee's fate, in the absence of
a body, might raise issues under Article 2 of the Convention (right to life), will depend on the circumstances of
the case and, in particular, on the existence of sufficient circumstantial evidence based on concrete elements,

from which it may be concluded to the requisite standard of proof that the detainee must be presumed to have
died in custody."22cralaw The ECHR found that:23cralaw
Noting that more than six and a half years has gone by since Abdulvahap Timurtas apprehension and having
regard to all the other circumstances of the case, the Court found that the disappearance of Abdulvahap
Timurtas after he had been taken into detention led, in the circumstances of this case, to a presumption that
he had died. No explanation having been provided by the Government as to what had happened to him during
his detention, the Government was liable for his death and there was a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.
[Emphasis supplied]
Significantly (in the context of the present case), the ECHR also noted that the inadequacy of the investigation
into the disappearance of Timurtas also constituted a violation of his right to life under Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are applicable to the present case.
There is the evidence of ineffective investigation in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez , while in all three was
the recognition that the burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use of circumstantial or
indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement for direct evidence to establish that an
enforced disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners effectively suggest -- would render it extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear. In these lights, we emphasized in
our December 3, 2009 Decision that while the need for substantial evidence remains the rule, flexibility must
be observed where appropriate (as the Courts in Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas did) for the protection of
the precious rights to life, liberty and security. This flexibility, we noted, requires that " we should take a close
look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence even of those usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the surrounding
circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement ." From
these perspectives, we see no error that we should rectify or reconsider.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to GRANT the motion to declare the inclusion of PS/Supt.
Julasirim Ahadin Kasim moot and academic, but, otherwise, DENY the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Let this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings as directed in our Decision of
December 3, 2009.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 183871
February 18, 2010
LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO
CARBONEL, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ.
DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA,
a certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo2 (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail
and seek to set aside the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No.
00003, a petition commenced under the Amparo Rule.
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court. After issuing
the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition to
the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its attachments contained, in substance,
the following allegations:
1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron
(AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes),
then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and brought to, and
detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted
alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment,

Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmarias,
Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military
asset.
After Lourdes release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at least two
occasions at different places, i.e., Dasmarias, Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycleriding men in bonnets, continued;
2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez), then substation commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, kept sending text messages to
Lourdes daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her
questions about Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations. He, however, failed to make
an investigation even after Lourdes disappearance had been made known to him;
3. A week after Lourdes release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to
leave their house because of the presence of men watching them;
4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and
arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct
against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and
a certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with
address at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Paraaque City, but nothing has happened;
and the threats and harassment incidents have been reported to the Dasmarias municipal and
Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations.
Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes abduction went into hiding after being visited by government
agents in civilian clothes; and
5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that
men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the
Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the
abduction of Lourdes; that unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a "mission order"
which was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing
any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to
immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the
offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of
them on the case of Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police
Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB (answering respondents,
collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically
denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the allegations against the
following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations truth. And by way of general
affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be
sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by
Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.4
Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following, among other public officials, containing their
respective affirmative defenses and/or statements of what they had undertaken or committed to undertake
regarding the claimed disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made to bear on her and her
daughters:
1. Gen. Esperon attested that, pursuant to a directive of then Secretary of National Defense
(SND) Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., he ordered the Commanding General of the PAF, with information
to all concerned units, to conduct an investigation to establish the circumstances behind the
disappearance and the reappearance of Lourdes insofar as the involvement of alleged
personnel/unit is concerned. The Provost Marshall General and the Office of the Judge Advocate
General (JAGO), AFP, also undertook a parallel action.
Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material results of the investigation; to
continue with the probe on the alleged abduction of Lourdes and to bring those responsible,
including military personnel, to the bar of justice when warranted by the findings and the
competent evidence that may be gathered in the investigation process by those mandated to look
into the matter;5
2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon - stated that an investigation he immediately ordered upon receiving a copy
of the petition is on-going vis--vis Lourdes abduction, and that a background verification with the

PNP Personnel Accounting and Information System disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro,
Cuaresma and one Jonathan do not appear in the police personnel records, although the PNP files
carry the name of Darwin Reyes Y. Muga.
Per the initial investigation report of the Dasmarias municipal police station, P/Dir. Gen. Razon
disclosed, Lourdes was abducted by six armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged
aboard a Toyota Revo with plate number XRR 428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi van to
AK Cottage Industry with address at 9 Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Paraaque City. The person
residing in the apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @ Darius Reyes allegedly
working, per the latters house helper, in Camp Aguinaldo.
P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the fact that Mrs. Rubrico never contacted nor coordinated
with the local police or other investigating units of the PNP after her release, although she is in the
best position to establish the identity of her abductors and/or provide positive description through
composite sketching. Nonetheless, he manifested that the PNP is ready to assist and protect the
petitioners and the key witnesses from threats, harassments and intimidation from whatever
source and, at the same time, to assist the Court in the implementation of its orders. 61avvphi1
3. P/Supt. Roquero stated conducting, upon receipt of Lourdes complaint, an investigation and
submitting the corresponding report to the PNP Calabarzon, observing that neither Lourdes nor
her relatives provided the police with relevant information;
4. P/Insp. Gomez alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses refused to cooperate with the
investigating Cavite PNP; and
5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that cases for violation of Articles 267
and 124, or kidnapping and arbitrary detention, respectively, have been filed with, and are under
preliminary investigation by the OMB against those believed to be involved in Lourdes kidnapping;
that upon receipt of the petition for a writ of amparo, proper coordination was made with the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) where the
subject criminal and administrative complaints were filed.
Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no more than a general denial of
averments in the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of court, they also
asked to serve notice of the petition through publication, owing to their failure to secure the current address of
the latter five and thus submit, as the CA required, proof of service of the petition on them.
The hearing started on November 13, 2007.7 In that setting, petitioners counsel prayed for the issuance of a
temporary protection order (TPO) against the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the
petition. At the hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be
served by the courts process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan.
The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President Arroyo from the petition,
petitioners motions for service by publication, and the issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence in this
recital. The bottom line is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the
case; denied the motion for a TPO for the courts want of authority to issue it in the tenor sought by petitioners;
and effectively denied the motion for notice by publication owing to petitioners failure to submit the affidavit
required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. 8
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review,
disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition
with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero,
P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Nevertheless, in order that petitioners complaint will not end up as another unsolved case, the heads of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the
investigations already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update
petitioners and this Court on the status of their investigation.
SO ORDERED.
In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following wise:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The
1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his comembers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be
sued during his or her tenure.9 The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. MacapagalArroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys
immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.10 x x x
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or
omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights.
This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir.
Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB.
None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has been implicated as being
connected to, let alone as being behind, the alleged abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their
names were not even mentioned in Lourdes Sinumpaang Salaysay11 of April 2007. The same goes for the
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jean12 and Mary Joy.13
As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that
they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates
against petitioners. To the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen.
Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing
that those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were,
in fact, members of the military or the police force." The two generals, the CAs holding broadly hinted, would
have been accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or
PNP.
As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because they allegedly had not
exerted the required extraordinary diligence in investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes
disappearance or bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there
were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting threats against Mary Joy.
While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir.
Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed
decision vis--vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to
the fact that command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law,
has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." 14 In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility,15 foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators16 (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute 17 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to
which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military
commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally
bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend
concurrence in its ratification.18
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,19 there is still no Philippine law that provides
for criminal liability under that doctrine. 20
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders
liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction

on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or
customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. 21 Still, it would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have
done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be
any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue
of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been
committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), 22 the writ of amparo
was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of
the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings." 23 Of the same tenor, and by
way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats
thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].
xxxx
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is
that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters
of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact. 24 x x x
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.
Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government
involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual
perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed part of either the
military or the police chain of command. A preliminary police investigation report, however, would tend to show
a link, however hazy, between the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction of
Lourdes and the address of Darwin Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be working in Camp Aguinaldo. 25 Then, too,
there were affidavits and testimonies on events that transpired which, if taken together, logically point to
military involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes, such as, but not limited to, her abduction in
broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a vehicle blindfolded and then being brought to a place where the
sounds of planes taking off and landing could be heard. Mention may also be made of the fact that Lourdes
was asked about her membership in the Communist Party and of being released when she agreed to become
an "asset."
Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro,
Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established.
Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul Ciano 26 and Technical Sergeant John N.
Romano,27officer-in-charge and a staff of the 301st AISS, respectively, none of the alleged abductors of
Lourdes belonged to the 301st AISS based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any unit
of the Philippine Air Force, per the certification28 of Col. Raul Dimatactac, Air Force Adjutant. And as stated in
the challenged CA decision, a verification with the Personnel Accounting and Information System of the PNP
yielded the information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga, the other alleged abductors, i.e.,
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members of the PNP. Petitioners, when given the
opportunity to identify Police Officer 1 Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no effort to confirm if he was the same
Maj. Darwin Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they were implicating in Lourdes abduction.
Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering respondents documentary evidence,
adduced to debunk the formers allegations directly linking Lourdes abductors and tormentors to the military or
the police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when queried on cross-examination, expressed the
belief that Sy/Reyes was an NBI agent. 29 The Court is, of course, aware of what was referred to in Razon 30 as
the "evidentiary difficulties" presented by the nature of, and encountered by petitioners in, enforced
disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this reason that the Court should take care too that no wrong

message is sent, lest one conclude that any kind or degree of evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to
secure amparo remedies and protection.
Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum evidentiary
substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of action under the Rule, thus:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.The parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence.
xxxx
Sec. 18. Judgment.x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall
grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall
be denied. (Emphasis added.)
Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of
liability against the person charged;31 it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally
reasonable minds might opine otherwise. 32 Per the CAs evaluation of their evidence, consisting of the
testimonies and affidavits of the three Rubrico women and five other individuals, petitioners have not
satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of and assigned to them under the Amparo Rule. In a very
real sense, the burden of evidence never even shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds no
compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts determination of the answering respondents role in the
alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her familys security.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court notes that both Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, per
their separate affidavits, lost no time, upon their receipt of the order to make a return on the writ, in issuing
directives to the concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough probe of the case and in
providing the investigators the necessary support. As of this date, however, the investigations have yet to be
concluded with some definite findings and recommendation.
As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or
indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As
police officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that
would include looking into the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and
obtaining statements from them; and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate
number XRR 428, and securing and preserving evidence related to the abduction and the threats that may aid
in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As we said in Manalo,33 the right to security, as a guarantee of
protection by the government, is breached by the superficial and one-sidedhence, ineffectiveinvestigation
by the military or the police of reported cases under their jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police
stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a preliminary fact-finding on
petitioners complaint. They could not, however, make any headway, owing to what was perceived to be the
refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A.
Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses attitude, "[They] do not trust
the government agencies to protect them." 34 The difficulty arising from a situation where the party whose
complicity in extra-judicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same
party who investigates it is understandable, though.
The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a
hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To
repeat what the Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones
right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings,
enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are
captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case,35 in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced:
[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not
a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer
of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. (Emphasis added.)
This brings us to Mary Joys charge of having been harassed by respondent P/Insp. Gomez. With the view we
take of this incident, there is nothing concrete to support the charge, save for Mary Joys bare allegations of
harassment. We cite with approval the following self-explanatory excerpt from the appealed CA decision:
In fact, during her cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat P/Sr. Gomez (ret) committed
against her or her mother and sister, Mary Joy replied "None " 36
Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners allegations about the OMB failing to act on their
complaint against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners
contention, the OMB has taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As culled from the
affidavit37 of the Deputy Overall Ombudsman and the joint affidavits 38 of the designated investigators, all dated
November 7, 2007, the OMB had, on the basis of said complaint, commenced criminal 39 and

administrative40 proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-07-0602-E and OMB-P-A 07-567-E, respectively, against

Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The requisite orders for the submission of counteraffidavits and verified position papers had been sent out.
The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act
or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual.
At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with the correct addresses of
respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the
petition for a writ of amparo individually addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened. And
petitioners motion interposed before the appellate court for notice or service via publication has not been
accompanied by supporting affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial
judgmentdisposing of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo without (1) pronouncement as to the
accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2) outright dismissal of the same petition
as to themhews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving and reviving
cases.41 Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the
afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate facts as would link the OMB in any
manner to the violation or threat of violation of the petitioners rights to life, liberty, or personal security.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty,
and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. 42 It is an extraordinary
writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances.43 Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the
ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.
In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the Court order the impleaded
respondents "to immediately desist from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of
the Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices where they are
working under pain of contempt of [this] Court." Petitioners, however, failed to adduce the threshold
substantive evidence to establish the predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the adverted
harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against responding respondents, as responsible for
the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is not to say, however, that petitioners allegation on
the fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily contrived. The reality on the ground, however,
is that the military or police connection has not been adequately proved either by identifying the malefactors as
components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by showing that they acted with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the
authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the harassment and
threats on her daughters to individual respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the case against them is
correct and must, accordingly, be sustained.
Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the appealed decision veritably
extended the privilege of the writ of amparo to petitioners when it granted what to us are amparo reliefs.
Consider: the appellate court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take specific measures
for the protection of petitioners right or threatened right to liberty or security. The protection came in the form
of directives specifically to Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure that the
investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP units, respectively, under them on the complaints of
Lourdes and her daughters are being pursued with urgency to bring to justice the perpetrators of the acts
complained of; and (2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners, a regular report on the progress
and status of the investigations. The directives obviously go to Gen. Esperon in his capacity as head of the
AFP and, in a sense, chief guarantor of order and security in the country. On the other hand, P/Dir. Gen.
Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining to the PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory, and arresting
institution.
As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set in its decision for the
completion of the investigation and the reportorial requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and
P/Dir. Gen. Razons imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police services, respectively.
Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter redefined and amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies,
are hereby given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the commanding general of the
AFP and the PNP.
At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper disposition of this case.

First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and
incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as
OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five
(5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in
motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing 44 of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the
Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 2245 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have,
in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, 46 on the other hand, provides that when the
criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal
action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the
terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the
outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay
of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6 47 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ
of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22;
and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the actual
abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the
kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the
criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to
obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive
and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a
degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining
under the premises. 48 Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe
and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB;
and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats
to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body
in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given
easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as
complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint
if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision:
(1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of
amparo;
(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir.
Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach
accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the
alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed
against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also affirmed for failure
of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and
(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent DirectorGeneral of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by
their respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments
and threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence
as required by Sec. 1749 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials, in
particular, to do the following:
(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of
respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro,
Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of this
determination to the OMB with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court;
(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy
and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and
(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches
of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma,
and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and locating them.
The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of this Decision; and within
thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of
the PNP shall submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and
petitioners.

This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the
actions of the AFP and the PNP.
Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31, 2008 of the CA.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 184461-62
May 31, 2011
LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE
SAMSON, Petitioners,
vs.
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 184495
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO,
(RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, ET
AL., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 187109
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.)
GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL.
FELIPE ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS, A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN, ARNEL ENRIQUEZ AND LT. FRANCIS
MIRABELLE SAMSON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and
Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto a jeep
bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.
Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective families scoured nearby
police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing.
On July 17, 2006, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition for habeas
corpus1 before the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 173228, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and
Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis
Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of July 19, 2006, 2 the Court issued a writ of
habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
The habeas corpus petition was docketed at the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 95303.
By Return of the Writ dated July 21, 2006, 3 the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached affidavits from the
respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that they
had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and disappearance of the three but their
inquiry yielded nothing; and that the military does not own nor possess a stainless steel jeep with plate number
RTF 597. Also appended to the Return was a certification from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) that plate
number RTF 597 had not yet been manufactured as of July 26, 2006.
Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court.
Witness Wilfredo Ramos, owner of the house where the three were abducted, recounted that on June 26,
2006, while he was inside his house in Hagonoy, he witnessed armed men wearing bonnets abduct Sherlyn
and Karen from his house and also abduct Merino on their way out; and that tied and blindfolded, the three
were boarded on a jeep and taken towards Iba in Hagonoy.4
Witness Alberto Ramirez (Ramirez) recalled that on June 28, 2006, while he was sleeping in his house, he
was awakened by Merino who, in the company of a group of unidentified armed men, repaired to his house;
that onboard a stainless jeep bearing plate number RTF 597, he (Ramirez) was taken to a place in Mercado,

Hagonoy and was asked by one Enriquez if he knew "Sierra," "Tanya," "Vincent" and "Lisa"; and that Enriquez
described the appearance of two ladies which matched those of Sherlyn and Karen, whom he was familiar
with as the two had previously slept in his house. 5
Another witness, Oscar Leuterio, who was himself previously abducted by armed men and detained for five
months, testified that when he was detained in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, he saw two women fitting the
descriptions of Sherlyn and Karen, and also saw Merino, his kumpare. 6
Lt. Col. Boac, the then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations team tasked to neutralize the
intelligence network of communists and other armed groups, declared that he conducted an inquiry on the
abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino but his subordinates denied knowledge thereof. 7
While he denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate the disappearance of Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the missing persons was sought by the mayor of Hagonoy.
Major Dominador Dingle, the then division adjutant of the Philippine Armys 7th Infantry Division in Fort
Magsaysay, denied that a certain Arnel Enriquez is a member of his infantry as in fact his name did not appear
in the roster of troops.8
Roberto Se, a supervisor of the Equipment, Plate Number and Supply Units of the LTO, denied that his office
manufactured and issued a plate number bearing number RTF 597. 9
On rebuttal, Lt. Mirabelle, Lt. Col. Boac and Gen. Palparan took the witness stand as hostile witnesses.
Lt. Mirabelle testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino nor
any order to investigate the matter. And she denied knowing anything about the abduction of Ramirez nor who
were Ka Tanya or Ka Lisa.10
Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the names of Ka Lisa and
Ka Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities; and that he ordered Lt. Col. Boac to conduct an
investigation on the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. 11 When pressed to elaborate, he stated: "I
said that I got the report that it stated that it was Ka Tanya and Ka Lisa that, I mean, that incident happened in
Hagonoy, Bulacan was the abduction of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya, Your Honor, and another one. That was the
report coming from the people in the area." 12
By Decision of March 29, 2007,13 the Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition in this wise:
As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the present petition for habeas
corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main office or function of the habeas corpus is to inquire into
the legality of ones detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of the persons subject
of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have limited powers, means and resources to conduct an
investigation. x x x.
It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but criminal proceedings by
initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime punishable by law. In the case of Martinez v.
Mendoza, supra, the Supreme Court restated the doctrine that habeas corpus may not be used as a means of
obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically
abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being no strong evidence that the
missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.
The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate investigations and appropriate
actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the
outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision. They also
moved to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion Paulino, Sherlyns
mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who allegedly met Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a military camp.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303, Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo 14 With Prayers for Inspection of Place
and Production of Documents dated October 24, 2007, docketed as G.R. No. 179994. The petition impleaded
the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil. National
Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald
Caigas.
Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in office.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179994 also prayed that they be allowed to inspect the detention areas of the following
places:

1. 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija

2. 24th Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan
3. Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
4. Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan
5. The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24th Infantry Batallion at Barangay
Banog, Bolinao, Pangasinan
6. 56th Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan
7. Army Detachment at Barangay Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan
8. Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a retired military personnel as a
caretaker;
By Resolution of October 25, 2007, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ of amparo returnable to the
Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition
with the pending habeas corpus petition.
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 002, respondents in the amparo case, through the Solicitor General, filed their
Return of the Writ on November 6, 2007.15 In the Return, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac and Lt. Mirabelle
reiterated their earlier narrations in the habeas corpus case.
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. stated in the Return that he immediately caused to investigate and verify the
identities of the missing persons and was aware of the earlier decision of the appellate court ordering the
police, the Commission on Human Rights and the National Bureau of Investigation to take further action on the
matter.16
Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion based in Balanga City,
Bataan, denied any involvement in the abduction. While the 24th Infantry Battalion detachment was reported
to be a detention site of the missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed that he found no untoward incident
when he visited said detachment. He also claimed that there was no report of the death of Merino per his
inquiry with the local police.17
Police Director General Avelino Razon narrated that he ordered the compilation of pertinent records, papers
and other documents of the PNP on the abduction of the three, and that the police exhausted all possible
actions available under the circumstances.18
In addition to the witnesses already presented in the habeas corpus case, petitioners called on Adoracion
Paulino and Raymond Manalo to testify during the trial.
Adoracion Paulino recalled that her daughter-in-law Sherlyn showed up at home on April 11, 2007,
accompanied by two men and three women whom she believed were soldiers. She averred that she did not
report the incident to the police nor inform Sherlyns mother about the visit. 19
Raymond Manalo (Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted persons when he was illegally detained by
military men in Camp Tecson in San Miguel, Bulacan. His group was later taken to a camp in Limay, Bataan.
He recalled that Lt. Col. Anotado was the one who interrogated him while in detention. 20
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,21 Manalo recounted:
xxxx
59. Saan ka dinala mula sa Sapang?
Pagkalipas ng humigit kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp Tecson sa ilalim ng 24th IB.
xxxx
Sa loob ng barracks ko nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP.
Ipinapalinis din sa akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng barracks, may nakita akong babae
na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan akong makipag-usap sa kanya. Sa ikatlo o ikaapat na araw,
nakausap ko yung babaeng nagngangalang Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng pagkain. Sinabi niya sa akin na
dinukot si[ya] sa Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na dinaranas niya. Sabi niya gusto niyang umuwi at
makasama ang kanyang magulang. Umiiyak siya. Sabi niya sa akin ang buong pangalan niya ay Sherlyn
Cadapan, mula sa Laguna. Sa araw tinatanggal ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si Sherlyn na maglaba.
x x x x.
61. Sino ang mga nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson?
Dito sa Camp Tecson naming nakilala si Allan Alvin (maya-maya nalaman naming na siya pala si Donald
Caigas), ng 24th IB, na tinatawag na master o commander ng kanyang mga tauhan.
Pagkalipas ng 2 araw matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating sina Karen Empeo at Manuel
Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at Manuel sa kwarto ni Allan[.] Kami naman ni Reynaldo ay nasa
katabing kwarto, kasama si Sherlyn.
xxxx
62. x x x x
Kaming mga lalake (ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang sina Sherlyn at Karen ay
ginawang labandera.
Si Sherlyn ang pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa akin na siyay ginahasa.
xxxx
63. x x x x

xxxx
Kaming lima (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa Limay. Sinakay ako, si
Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na jeep. Si Karen ay isinakay sa itim na sasakyan ni
Donald Caigas. x x x x
xxxx
66. Saan pa kayo dinala mula sa Limay, Bataan?
Mula sa Limay, kaming 5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel) ay dinala sa isang safehouse sa
Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring supplied; italics and emphasis in the original)
On rebuttal, Lt. Col. Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were called to the witness stand.
Lt. Col. Anotado denied seeing or meeting Manalo. He posited that Manalo recognized him because he was
very active in conducting lectures in Bataan and even appeared on television regarding an incident involving
the 24th Infantry Batallion. He contended that it was impossible for Manalo, Sherlyn, Karen and Merino to be
detained in the Limay detachment which had no detention area.
Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan, the then chief of staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment in Camp Tecson,
testified that the camp is not a detention facility, nor does it conduct military operations as it only serves as a
training facility for scout rangers. He averred that his regiment does not have any command relation with either
the 7th Infantry Division or the 24th Infantry Battalion. 22
By Decision of September 17, 2008,23 the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R.
SP No. 95303 (the habeas corpus case) and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00002 (the amparo case). Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, in both CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00002 (Amparo
case), the respondents are thereby ordered to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention
the persons of Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino.
Respondent Director General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume [the] PNPs unfinished investigation
so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate charges filed against those truly responsible.
SO ORDERED.
In reconsidering its earlier Decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied heavily on the
testimony of Manalo in this wise:
With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been able to convincingly prove the
fact of their detention by some elements in the military. His testimony is a first hand account that military and
civilian personnel under the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino. He also confirmed the claim of Oscar Leuterio that the latter was detained
in Fort Magsaysay. It was there where he (Leuterio) saw Manuel Merino.
His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be hearsay but not with respect to his
meeting with, and talking to, the three desaparecidos. His testimony on those points was no hearsay.
Raymond Manalo saw the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and tortured together. In fact,
he claimed to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In the absence of confirmatory proof, however,
the Court will presume that he is still alive.
The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed aside. His narration and those of
the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more than substantial evidence warranting an order that the
three be released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause. They may be moved from place
to place but still they are considered under detention and custody of the respondents.
His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x.
xxxx
The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were of no help either.
Again, their averments were the same negative ones which cannot prevail over those of Raymond Manalo.
Indeed, Camp Tecson has been utilized as a training camp for army scout rangers. Even Raymond Manalo
noticed it but the camps use for purposes other than training cannot be discounted.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing persons, [Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino], are being detained in military camps and bases under the 7th Infantry Division. Being not
held for a lawful cause, they should be immediately released from detention. (italic in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection order or
production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found that the
three detainees right to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately release
them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the PNP to proceed further with its
investigation since there were enough leads as indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the
appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the three.

Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the September 17, 2008
Decision of the appellate court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 184461-62, the first above-captioned casesubject of the present Decision.
Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also
challenging the same September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court only insofar as the amparo aspect is
concerned. Their petition, docketed as G.R. No. 179994, was redocketed as G.R. No. 184495, the second
above-captioned case.
By Resolution of June 15, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 184495 with G.R. Nos.
1844461-62.24
Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before the appellate court a Motion to Cite
Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases to
comply with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three missing persons. By
Resolution of March 5, 2009,25 the appellate court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:
While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents "to immediately RELEASE, or cause the
release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino," the decision is
not ipso facto executory. The use of the term "immediately" does not mean that that it is automatically
executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which states that a decision rendered is
immediately executory. x x x.
Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the
Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x.
Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for execution pending appeal under
Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion, the Court could not have issued, and did not issue, a writ of
execution. x x x. (underscoring supplied)
Via a petition for certiorari filed on March 30, 2009 before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion
Empeo challenged the appellate courts March 5, 2009 Resolution denying their motion to cite respondents in
contempt. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 187109, the last above-captioned case subject of the
present Decision.
Only Lt. Col. Anotado and Lt. Mirabelle remained of the original respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus
cases as the other respondents had retired from government service. 26 The AFP has denied that Arnel
Enriquez was a member of the Philippine Army.27 The whereabouts of Donald Caigas remain unknown.28
In G.R. Nos. 184461-62, petitioners posit as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY
OF RAYMOND MANALO.
II
THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEO AND MANUEL MERINO
ARE IN THEIR CUSTODY.
III
PETITIONERS DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEM
BECAUSE THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION;
MOREOVER, THE SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ON POINTS
IRRELEVANT TO THE PETITION.
IV
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND INCONGRUENT
WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE FATAL PROCEDURAL
INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO.29
In G.R. No. 184495, petitioners posit as follows:
5. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Inspection of Places;
6. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Production of Documents;
7. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police Director Gen. Avelino Razon did not
make extraordinary diligence in investigating the enforced disappearance of the aggrieved
parties
8. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command coming from the
highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine Army and the
Seventh Infantry Division of the Philippine Army to enforcibly disappear [sic] the aggrieved
parties

9. The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent
in this case;
10. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had
command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three
aggrieved parties
11. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then
Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having command responsibility in the
enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties 30
In G.R. No. 187109, petitioners raise the following issues:
[1] Whether the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final and executory[.]
[2] Whetherthere is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or in an
Amparo decision[.]
[3] Whetheran appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus [case] [or] an Amparo case[.] 31
Essentially, the consolidated petitions present three primary issues, viz: a) whether the testimony of Raymond
Manalo is credible; b) whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as
the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and detention of Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino; and c) whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the
aggrieved parties.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62
Petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. contend that the appellate court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of
Manalo who could not even accurately describe the structures of Camp Tecson where he claimed to have
been detained along with Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. They underscore that Camp Tecson is not under the
jurisdiction of the 24th Infantry Batallion and that Manalos testimony is incredible and full of inconsistencies. 32
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 33 an original petition for Prohibition, Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order which was treated as a petition under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having taken effect during
the pendency of the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the personal account of
Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino while on detention. Thus it held:
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit
and testimony, viz:
x x x x.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not corroborated by
other independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by
the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic
specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also
corroborate respondents accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and
confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," firms up respondents story that they were
detained for some time in said military facility. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On Manalos having allegedly encountered Sherlyn, Karen and Merino while on detention, the Court in the
immediately cited case synthesized his tale as follows:
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then
he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were
training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn
Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was
abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She
was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she
was made to do the laundry.
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name
they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry
Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were
threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at
night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be
thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6
or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their
parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that
camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name
"Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry
Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of
the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until
May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond
knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also
suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him
and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayanbayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed
because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. Another
time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed
only his son right before Raymonds eyes.
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse
near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the
house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from
May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were
tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced
in the camp, viz:
x x x x.34 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just cited Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo 35 which
assessed the account of Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother Reynaldos
abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of Manalos brother
Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalos graphic description of the detention area. There is thus
no compelling reason for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalos testimony. The
outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.
Petitioners go on to point out that the assailed Decision of the appellate court is "vague and incongruent with
[its] findings" for, so they contend, while the appellate court referred to the perpetrators as "misguided and selfrighteous civilian and military elements of the 7th Infantry Division," it failed to identify who these perpetrators
are. Moreover, petitioners assert that Donald Caigas and Arnel Enriquez are not members of the AFP. They
furthermore point out that their co-petitioners Generals Esperon, Tolentino and Palparan have already retired
from the service and thus have no more control of any military camp or base in the country. 36
There is nothing vague and/or incongruent about the categorical order of the appellate court for petitioners to
release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. In its discourse, the appellate court merely referred to "a few misguided
self-righteous people who resort to the extrajudicial process of neutralizing those who disagree with the
countrys democratic system of government." Nowhere did it specifically refer to the members of the 7th
Infantry Division as the "misguided self-righteous" ones.
Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite standing to file the
amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of
Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" as basis for filing the
petition on his behalf.37
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 38 provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the
aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of
the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of the immediate
family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision
must be followed. The order of priority is not without reason"to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless
filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party."39
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus on Merinos
behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ
on behalf of the aggrieved party.40
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from
filing the application on Merinos behalf as they are not authorized parties under the Rule.
G.R. No. 184495

Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate courts dismissal of the petitions against then President Arroyo welltaken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions were filed. 41
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. x x x 42
Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or
performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.
On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in an amparo
proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of command responsibility and its application insofar as amparo
cases already decided by the Court is in order.
Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo43 expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)44
It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity,45 and thus a
substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or
entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. 46 Rather, it is a remedial measure
designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to
life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals. 47
Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis 48 enlightens:
[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearancefor purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance
49
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes "responsibility" and "accountability," viz:
x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of
addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
restored.50 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal
liability.51 The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases
to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate
any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to

criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative

issuances, if there be any.52 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court
would issue.53 In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint
the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of
criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851 54 (RA 9851) to include command responsibility
as a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other
crimes.55 RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who,
despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or
repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competent authorities for investigation
and prosecution.
The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it found to
be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records,
it appears that the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan,
Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the September
17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit as there is
no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the abduction and continued
detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
G.R. No. 187109.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or
habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings
should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since
any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.
The Solicitor Generals argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is
misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules
strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory
motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state
that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an
amparo proceeding.
In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino
was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings 56 in
amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to
further appeals that may be taken therefrom.57
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the Court renders the following judgment:
1. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is AFFIRMED with modification in that
respondents in G.R. No. 184495, namely Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson,
Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas are ordered to
immediately release Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from detention.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino are DISMISSED.
2. The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named respondents are directed to forthwith
comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. Owing to the retirement
and/or reassignment to other places of assignment of some of the respondents herein and in G.R.
No. 184495, the incumbent commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division and the incumbent
battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion, both of the Philippine Army, are enjoined to
fully ensure the release of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from
detention.1awphi1
Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col.
Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas shall remain personally impleaded in the
petitions to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during
their incumbencies.
Let copies of this Decision and the records of these cases be furnished the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for further investigation to
determine the respective criminal and administrative liabilities of respondents.
All the present petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, directed at monitoring
of the DOJ, PNP and AFP investigations and the validation of their results.

SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 191805
November 15, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W.
SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE
PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT
CALLAGAN, Respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN.
REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1st LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ,
ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated 20
April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No.
193160).1Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.
Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa, PCSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S.
Matutina, or their replacements in their official posts if they have already vacated the same, are ORDERED to
furnish this Court within five (5) days from notice of this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to
petitioner covering but not limited to intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal reports prior
to, during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 made by the 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, its
branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.
The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports in any transaction or
operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents are ORDERED to expunge from the
records of the military all documents having any reference to petitioner.
Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General Jesus Ame Versoza,
Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTED to ensure that no further violation of
petitioners rights to life, liberty and security is committed against the latter or any member of his family.
The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account of her presidential
immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to respondents Calog and George
Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.
Petitioners prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is DENIED.
Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a
member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director General (PDG.) Jesus
A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio
M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina,
Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents
in G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the events relevant to the present Petitions
occurred, former President Arroyo was the President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig.
Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.

Antecedent Facts
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,
making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 2
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle
driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside
the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently,
three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the
others rode on the tricycle.3
The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started punching
him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area until about
2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There were
soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word "Bravo" written on it. Rodriguez later on
learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.4
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his
membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on
the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep. 5
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him
board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill
him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold,
and forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit
him on the head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach
to a papag,and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he refused to eat anything.
He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist. 6
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and Mission.
While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed
to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he remained
silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00 p.m., where
he was again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged NPA
comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer.7
At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide on their
way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to the soldiers,
was an NPA member who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a
member of the NPA. He also heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was
acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to Tabbak,
Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who
appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as "sir." 8
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him that
Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to disclose
the location of the NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were threatened with death.
When the soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the NPA camp if
they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The soldiers and Rodriguez
spent the next three nights in the mountains.9
On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the NPA
camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the military
camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to the same room where he had first been detained, and two
soldiers mauled him again. They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and
gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The soldiers,
however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper, they ordered him to write down his request
for rice from the people. When he refused, the soldiers maltreated him once more. 10
On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered in
an encounter in Cumao, and
that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the
document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature
to show that he was merely coerced.11
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men appearing
therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers instructed him
to write down the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote something on
the paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the document. The
soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers forced him down, held his

hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive another beating, but was also electrocuted. The torture
lasted for about an hour.12
At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the mountains,
where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there. 13
In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they stopped,
the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all
returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to
him. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined
him.14 When the doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained
them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramils medical certificate indicated that he
suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum. 15
Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him while he
was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took his photograph.
Later, they told him that he would finally see his mother. 16
Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that
he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper
and was warned not to report anything to the media. 17
Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave him a
pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him repeatedly reminded
him not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had surrendered to the
military.18
At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several men.
His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma
that he had surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel),
informed him that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan.
Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took
photographs of his bruises.19
A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to supposedly
prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and
asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila.
Again, the soldiers reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter
will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home. 20
Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office,
where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and
desperate to return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his
abductors because they had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR
Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed them. 21
The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a mall in
Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange
Toyota Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya,
1st Lt. Matutina alighted and called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed
him a cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back home. 22
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two
soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained that
the photos and videos would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive
home safely. Despite Rodriguezs efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only
left thirty minutes later.23
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on
Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had
been a victim of torture.24
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that several
suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a jeepney. 25
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the
Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents
and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. 26 The petition was filed against former President Arroyo,
Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino,
P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguezs
right to life, liberty and security.

b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching Rodriguez,
his family and his witnesses.
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry
Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on
Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division, the
Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and
subsequent to 6 September 2009.1wphi1
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of
respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used. 27
On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that
Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army.28 We likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before 22
December 2009 and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010. 29 Finally, we directed the Court
of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10 days after its submission
for decision.30
During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit affidavits and
other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010. 31
On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their Return
of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition. 32 In their Return, respondents
therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under
surveillance and identified as "Ka Pepito" by former rebels. 33 According to his military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.)
Rodel
B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan
Valley.34 Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military
in exchange for his protection.35
Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an Agents
Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military asset. 36 Since then, he
acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information. 37 However, he feared that his NPA
comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator.38 Thus, with his knowledge and consent, the
soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double agent. 39 Hence,
the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted. 40
Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January
2010,41alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe
turnover to his family and securing their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on
16 September 2009, after Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz
made phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location. 42 Cruz was able to
speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.43 This information was
transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan
to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division. 44
When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion at Masin, Alcala,
Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez
had become one of their assets, as evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the
latters Contract as Agent.45 The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the soldiers. 46 In
any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment. Cruz and
Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his family, and they were
made to sign a certification to this effect. During the signing of the document, herein CHR officers did not
witness any threat, intimidation or force employed against Rodriguez or his family. 47
During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much at ease
with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina. 48 Neither was there any force or intimidation when the
soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilmas consent. 49
During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position papers and
to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings. 50
On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision. 51 Subsequently, on 28 April 2010,
respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration. 52 Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this
Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No.
191805), raising the following assignment of errors:
a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order.
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of amparo, which
has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioners right to life,

liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the
absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching petitioner."
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had
command responsibility.53
On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:
a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a partyrespondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial
evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening
to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not
entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim
reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under the
rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data. 54
On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010
Decision of the Court of Appeals.55 They alleged that Rodriguez
Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence, to establish his
claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with violation his rights to life, liberty and
security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data and their corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary
protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. 56
In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision and
Resolution, the following issues must be resolved:
I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and
habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the
presidential immunity from suit.
III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases.
IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by
respondents in G.R. No. 191805.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure
the protection of the peoples rights to life, liberty and security.57 The rules on these writs were issued in light of
the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 58 The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007, 59 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008. 60
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.61 It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. 62 Rather, it
serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.63 It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading
to subsequent investigation and action.64
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means
in order to achieve unlawful ends.65 As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy
especially the right to informational privacy66 the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are
proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b)
enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous data or
information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification. 67
First issue: Grant of interim reliefs
In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must
be underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo clearly provides:
Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may
grant any of the following reliefs:
Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government

agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the
petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection
may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to
the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines
which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(a) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any
person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the
court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party
alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time,
place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for
justifiable reasons.
(b) Production Order. The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any
person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in
which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
(c) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the
witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited
persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at
a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final
adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo,
once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the
privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the
former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the
writ.
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and
habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis: 69
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file
the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on
the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the
victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.70 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision 71 found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 with
the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguezs right to life,
liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. 72 The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential
immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in this case to enable
the courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified
that the Court of Appeals rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her
presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency.
In Estrada v. Desierto,73 we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from
suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should
look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or
impairs the vindication of a right, to wit:
We reject [Estradas] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in
the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate
passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be
the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear
that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper
criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:
"x x x
xxx
xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would
render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may
continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents are immune from
suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. xxx
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases
filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption.
By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.
It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The
rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the
1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce
certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of
President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel
during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator.
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not
subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be
made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that
"when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US
Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts."
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones
where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is
inapplicable to unofficial conduct.74 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto, 75 we reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit exists
only in concurrence with the presidents incumbency:

Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His arguments
are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we
exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the
present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public
office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his
alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed arguments including their thinly
disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on
leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality
that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his
term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for
the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second
sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But
would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the president shall
be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he
might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations
almost daily?
Fr. Bernas:
The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure
he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez:
So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas:
There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that
explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez:
On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only
with his tenure and not his term.76 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the
presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of
command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, 77 command responsibility
pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." 78 Although originally
used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in
civil cases for human rights abuses.79 In the United States, for example, command responsibility was used
in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia civil actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture
Victim Protection Act.80 This development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that
the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our
view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ
of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders
liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction
on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or
customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,

however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.81 (Emphasis supplied.)
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable
the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from
applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative
liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the application of the
doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases.
Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its contemporary
signification as a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. It further stated that protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice.
Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in principle, of the doctrine of
command responsibility:
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their
duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule
requires. We hold these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision,
shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo
Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command responsibility doctrine to
Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian
Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity." Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior
responsibility as a ground for criminal responsibility for the crimes
covered.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_183871_2010.html - fnt20cm Such limited
treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statutes purpose and not intended to rule out the application
of the doctrine of command responsibility to other appropriate cases.
Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and police officers from
the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The explicit adoption of the doctrine of
command responsibility in the present case will only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their logical conclusion.
In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to be if it truly wants to
make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. While there is a genuine dearth of evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon
and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon accountable under the command responsibility doctrine, the ponencias
hesitant application of the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent to the rationale behind the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo.82 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan, 83 likewise penned by
Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal
liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases
to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate
any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court
would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint
the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of
criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those
(i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there
is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may
nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
a. Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must
now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed;
and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts
or punish the perpetrators thereof.84
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, 85 necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. 86
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard
of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial
evidence.87 In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility in all Government Offices, particularly at all
Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O.
226).88 Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of
command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or
has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its
commission.89 Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the
acts are widespread within the government officials area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or
regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel
are involved.90
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-inchief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the
military.91
b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo
The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that
former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.
Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the
"Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should
have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the
NPA.92 Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo
Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy
allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute
responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance. 93 Aside from
Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or
accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known
about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent
it.
Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805
The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Courts ruling in Razon, 94 to wit:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the

admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to
the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test. 95 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the same
being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals that the
totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of some
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.
a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or accountability of respondents
for the violation of or threat to Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security.
After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly
found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
Rodriguezs Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward account of
his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account
of his suspected membership in the NPA. 96 His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive description of
his physical surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise positively
identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and
torture,97 and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR representatives who appeared during his
release.98
More particularly, the fact of Rodriguezs abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated 16 September 2009,99 wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victims
capture.
As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the
physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division. According to the Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil, 100 she examined
Rodriguez in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and arrived at the
following findings:
FACE
- 10cm healed scar face right side
- 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)
- 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)
- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side
- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side
- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm
- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)
- both leg arm
- hip area/lumbar area101
Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the results of
which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Dr. Pamugas thus issued
a Medical Report dated 23 September 2009,102 explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured during his
detention by the military, to wit:
X. Interpretation of Findings
The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the torture and illtreatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots found on both legs and arms were due
to the insect bites that he sustained when he was forced to join twice in the military operations. The abrasions
could also be due to the conditions related during military operations. The multiple pin-point blood spots found
on his left ear is a result of an unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of tenderness he felt during
the physical examination were due to the overwhelming punching and kicking on his body. The occasional
difficulty of sleeping is a symptom experience (sic) by the subject as a result of the psychological trauma he
encountered during his detention.
XI. Conclusions and Recommendations
The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to the torture and illtreatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The physical injuries sustained by the subject, of
which the age is compatible with the alleged date of infliction (sic). 103 (Emphasis supplied.)
In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the medical finding that
the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers of
the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he

sustained showed that he could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus making respondents claim
highly implausible.
Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of
Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their
argument that he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a double agent, whose
relationship with the military was at all times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is far
removed from ordinary human experience.
If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should have
unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously
pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility. In fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December
2009104 Wilma executed, she made the following averments:
18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil sa mukha
syang pagod at malaki ang kanyang ipinayat.
19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko syang iiwan
sa lugar na iyon;
xxx
xxx
xxx
23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng dalawang linggo
sa kampo ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng kampo;
24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;
xxx
xxx
xxx
33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa kaligtasan ng
105
aming buong pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx
Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3
December 2009:106
24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki ang
ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga mata;
25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko syang
masigla at masayahin;
26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin nila ako."
27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo ang aking
kapatid sa kanila para raw ma-train sya.
28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx 107
Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory, contention
of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion from his activities
as a member of the CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to become
a double-agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his military handler, Cpl.
Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that he
wanted to become an ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the
same Return, respondents state that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted
to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from the source. If
petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that
he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the mountains or the
wilderness he dreads to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades. 108 (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and torture of
Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the formers right to security
when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:
In the videos taken by the soldiers one of whom was respondent Matutina in the house of petitioner on
September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of petitioners relatives hung
on the wall of the house, as well as videos of the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt.
Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and
his family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by
showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free from the watchful eyes of the
military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly innocuous cellhpone video camera. The
Court cannot and will not condone such act, as it intrudes into the very core of petitioners right to security
guaranteed by the fundamental law.109 (Emphasis supplied.)
Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory defenses
presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted,
detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no
substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguezs right to life, liberty

and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the CHR officers responsibility or accountability, this
Court nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of
abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and investigate violations
thereof,110 should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and address human rights
violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed their insufficient competence in facilitating and
ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal.
b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguezs rights
to life, liberty and security.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and
security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official. 111 Moreover, in the context of
amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in
enforced disappearance.112 Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.113
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo 114 that the right to security
of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to
investigate, viz:
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense
is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11
of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional
guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not
as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their
offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as
prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford
protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the
European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey. In
this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's
requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested
that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the
authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a
prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and
has not been seen since.115 (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable for
the violation of Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a fair
and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory
investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirezs account of the events into consideration. Rather, these
respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military. The ruling of the appellate court must be
emphasized:
In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are accountable, for
while they were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the investigation they conducted and/or
relied on is superficial and one-sided. The records disclose that the military, in investigating the incident

complained of, depended on the Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt.
Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army.
Such report, however, is merely based on the narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit
petitioners version of the subject incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged abduction
of petitioner.
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975,
otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to
investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in
their prosecution." In this case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation
to unmask the mystery surrounding petitioners abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG Verzosa
disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action against him. Palpable,
however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to effectively and aggressively investigate the
violations of petitioners right to life, liberty and security by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 17th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army.116 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his right to
security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility or accountability on
the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt.
Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt.
Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six months
before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against
respondents Calog and Palacpac.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence that
respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguezs rights to life,
liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September
2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of
the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to
issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to
amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He
likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj.
Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan
and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take
the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal
competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action
within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in this
Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant
positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

EN BANC

G.R. No. 191805

April 16, 2013
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W.
SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE
PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT
CALLAGAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN.
REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1ST LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ,
ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 15 November 2011, the Court promulgated its Decision in the present case, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan
and Vincent Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take
the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal
competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor lbrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action
within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in this
Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant
positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court was convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly found
sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military
abducted petitioner Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
Pursuant to the Decision ordering the Office of the Ombudsman to take further action, Ombudsman Conchita
Carpio Morales sent this Court a letter dated 23 May 2012, requesting an additional two-month period, or until
24 July 2012, within which to submit a report. The Ombudsman stated that Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and
his family refused to cooperate with the investigation for security reasons.
On 6 January 2012, respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration, 1 arguing that the soldiers belonging to
the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military cannot be held accountable for authoring the
abduction and torture of petitioner. Their arguments revolve solely on the claim that respondents were never
specifically mentioned by name as having performed, permitted, condoned, authorized, or allowed the
commission of any act or incurrence omission which would violate or threaten with violation the rights to life,
liberty, and security of petitioner-respondent and his family.2
On 18 January 2013, the Ombudsman submitted the Investigation Report, as compliance with the Courts
directive to take appropriate action with respect to possible liabilities respondents may have incurred. The
exhaustive report detailed the steps taken by the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, concluding that no criminal, civil, or administrative liabilities may be imputed to the respondents.
It was reflected therein that the lawyers for the Rodriguezes had manifested to the FIO that the latter are
hesitant to appear before them for security reasons, viz:
Karapatan (a non-governmental organization that provides legal assistance to victims of human rights
violations and their families) could not locate Noriel and Rodel. As of this writing, the Rodriguezes refused to
participate in the present fact-finding investigation for security reasons. Atty. Yambot disclosed (through a

Manifestation dated March 30, 2012 that despite efforts to convince Noriel to participate in the present
proceedings, the latter remains unconvinced and unwilling to this date.
Recent information, however, revealed that Noriel and his family are no longer interested in participating in the
present case.
Instead of appearing before this Office for a conference under oath, SPO1 Robert B. Molina submitted an
Affidavit dated June 13, 2012 stating that on September 15, 2009, at around 11:00 oclock in the morning,
Wilma H. Rodriguez appeared before the Gonzaga Police Station and requested to enter into the blotter that
her son, Noriel, was allegedly missing in Sitio Comunal, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Thereupon, he gathered
information relative to Wilmas report "but the community residence failed to reveal anything". 3
The other accounts specifically that of respondent Antonino C. Cruz, Special Investigator II of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), as well as the claims of respondents Mina and De Vera that they had
disclosed to the CHR that Noriel had become an agent ("asset") of the 17th Infantry Battalion have been
thoroughly evaluated and ruled upon in our Decision. The OMB further laments, "If only he (Noriel) could be
asked to verify the circumstances under which he executed these subsequent affidavits, his inconsistent
claims will finally be settled," and that "(I)f there is one person who can attest on whether detention and torture
were indeed committed by any of the Subjects herein, it is Noriel Rodriguez himself, the supposed victim." 4
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner to appear or participate at this stage of the proceedings due to
security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any
case, the issue of the existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability which may be imputed to the
respondents is not the province of amparo proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both preventive and curative
roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates
the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action. 5 In
this case then, the thrust of ensuring that investigations are conducted and the rights to life, liberty, and
security of the petitioner, remains.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or even administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of
evidence as a standard for the grant of the writ was correctly applied by this Court, as first laid down in Razon
v. Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to
the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test. 6 (Emphasis
supplied.)
No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of the privilege of the writ by the CA, and the present motion
for reconsideration raises no new issues that would convince us otherwise.
Respondents claim that they were not competently identified as the soldiers who abducted and detained the
petitioner, or that there was no mention of their names in the documentary evidence, is baseless. The CA
rightly considered Rodriguezs Sinumpaang Salaysay 7 as a meticulous and straightforward account of his
horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account of
his suspected membership in the NPA.8
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9 September 2009, he noticed a soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who
appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as "sir." 9 He saw Matutina again at 11:00
p.m. on 15 September 2009, when his abductors took him to a military operation in the mountains. His
narration of his suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical surroundings, personal
circumstances, and perceived observations. He likewise positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and
Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and torture. 10 These facts were further corroborated
by Hermie Antonio Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 September 2009, 11 wherein he recounted in
detail the circumstances surrounding the victims capture.
Respondents main contention in their Return of the Writ was correctly deemed illogical and contradictory by
the CA. They claim that Rodriguez had complained of physical ailments due to activities in the CPP-NPA, yet
nevertheless signified his desire to become a double-agent for the military. The CA stated:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his military handler, Cpl.
Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that he
wanted to become an ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the
same Return, respondents state that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted

to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from the source. If
petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that
he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the mountains or the
wilderness he dreads to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents conveniently neglect to address the findings of both the CA and this Court that aside from the
abduction of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the formers
right to security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives. The CA
found that the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of petitioners relatives hung on the wall
of the house, and the innermost portions of the house. 13 There is no reasonable justification for this violation of
the right to privacy and security of petitioners abode, which strikes at the very heart and rationale of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo. More importantly, respondents also neglect to address our ruling that the failure to
conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly amounted to a violation of, or threat to Rodriguezs rights to
life, liberty, and security.14
The writs curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty, and security may be
caused not only by a public officials act, but also by his omission. Accountability may attach to respondents
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. 15 The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner
and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. 16
The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG Verzosa, LT. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera,
and Lt. Col. Mina conducted a perfunctory investigation which relied solely on the accounts of the military.
Thus, the CA correctly held that the investigation was superficial, one-sided, and depended entirely on the
report prepared by 1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioners version of the
incident, and no witnesses were questioned regarding it. 17 The CA also took into account the palpable lack of
effort from respondent Versoza, as the chief of the Philippine National Police.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. Let
a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for whatever appropriate action she may still take
under circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 186050
December 13, 2011
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR and BEVERLY
LONGID, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO,
NORBERTO GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen. JESUS VERZOSA, Brig. Gen. REYNALDO
MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir. EDGARDO DOROMAL, Maj. Gen. ISAGANI CACHUELA, Commanding Officer of the
AFP-ISU based in Baguio City, PSS EUGENE MARTIN and several JOHN DOES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 186059
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY
GILBERTO TEODORO, SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN.
ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN. JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ. GEN.
ISAGANI CACHUELA ANDPOL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE MARTIN, Petitioners,
vs.
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR and BEVERLY
LONGID, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are consolidated appeals under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparofrom the January 19,
2009 Judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in Special Proceeding
No. 08-AMP-0001, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo in favor of James

Balao, Arthur Balao, et al. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al." The RTC granted the petition for the writ of
amparo but denied the prayer for issuance of inspection, production and witness protection orders.
The Antecedents
On October 8, 2008, Arthur Balao, Winston Balao, Nonette Balao and Jonilyn Balao-Strugar, siblings of James
Balao, and Beverly Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Amparo2 in favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men on September 17,
2008 in Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. Named respondents in the petition were then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Defense Secretary Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr.,Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto B.
Gonzales, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander B. Yano, Philippine National
Police (PNP) Police Director General Jesus A. Verzosa, Philippine Army (PA) Chief Brig. Gen. Reynaldo B.
Mapagu, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Chief Lt. P/Dir. Edgardo Doromal,
Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) Commander Maj. Gen. Isagani C. Cachuela, PNP-Cordillera
Administrative Region Regional Director Police Senior Supt. Eugene Gabriel Martin, the Commanding Officer
of the AFP Intelligence Service Unit (AFP-ISU) based in Baguio City and several John Does.
James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the University of the Philippines-Baguio (UPBaguio). In 1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region. As
head of CPAs education and research committee, James actively helped in the training and organization of
farmers. He was also the President of Oclupan Clan Association which undertakes the registration and
documentation of clan properties to protect their rights over ancestral lands. In 1988, while working for the
CPA, he was arrested on the charge of violation of the Anti-Subversion Law but the case was eventually
dismissed for lack of evidence.
The testimonies and statements of eyewitnesses established the following circumstances surrounding
Jamess disappearance:
On September 17, 2008, at around 8:30 in the morning, a man clad in black jacket, black shirt, black visor and
gray pants was standing infront of Saymors3 Store at Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. He had a belt bag and a
travelling bag which was placed on a bench. Vicky Bonel was at the time attending to the said store owned by
her brother-in-law while Aniceto G. Dawing, Jr. and his co-employee were delivering bakery products thereat.
A white van then arrived and stopped infront of the store. Five men in civilian clothes who were carrying
firearms alighted from the van and immediately approached the man poking their guns on him. They grabbed
and handcuffed him. The man was asking why he was being apprehended. One of the armed men addressed
the people witnessing the incident, saying they were policemen. Another warned that no one should interfere
because the man was being arrested for illegal drugs. Thereafter, they pushed the man inside the van. One of
the armed men went back to the store to get the mans travelling bag. Before leaving the place, one of the
armed men was also heard telling the driver of the van that they are going to proceed to Camp Dangwa (PNP
Provincial Headquarters in La Trinidad, Benguet). The van headed towards the direction of La Trinidad town
proper. The witnesses later identified the man as James Balao after seeing his photograph which appeared in
posters announcing him as missing.
The petition alleged that in May 2008, James reported surveillances on his person to his family, particularly to
his sister Nonette Balao (Nonette), and to CPA Chairperson Beverly Longid (Beverly). James supposedly
observed certain vehicles tailing him and suspiciously parked outside his residence, one of which was a van
with plate number USC 922. He also claimed to have received calls and messages through his mobile phone
informing him that he was under surveillance by the PNP Regional Office and the AFP-ISU. To prove the
surveillance, the informer gave the exact dates he visited his family, clothes he wore, and dates and times he
goes home or visits friends and relatives. Attached to the petition were the affidavits 4 of Nonette and Beverly
attesting to Jamess reports of surveillance to his family and to the CPA.
It was further alleged that on September 17, 2008, around 7:00 in the morning, James sent a text message to
Nonette informing her that he was about to leave his rented house in Fairview Central, Baguio City and that he
was going to their ancestral residence in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet to do his laundry. The travel time from
Fairview, Baguio City to Pico usually takes only 20 to 45 minutes. Around 8:00 a.m., Nonette, after discovering
that James never reached their parents house at Pico, started contacting their friends and relatives to ask
about Jamess whereabouts. No one, however, had any idea where he was.
Thus, the Balao family, with the assistance of the CPA and other NGOs, tried to locate James. Teams were
formed to follow Jamess route from Fairview, Baguio City to Pico, La Trinidad and people along the way were
asked if they happened to see him. These searches, however, yielded negative results. One of the teams also
went to the office of the AFP-ISU (PA-ISU) in Navy Base and the office of the Military Intelligence Group in
Camp Allen, both in Baguio City, but the personnel in said offices denied any knowledge on Jamess
whereabouts. The family likewise went to Baguio Police Station 7 to report Jamess disappearance. The report

was duly entered on the blotter but there have been no developments as of the filing of the petition. They also
sought the help of the media to announce Jamess disappearance and wrote several government agencies to
inform them of his disappearance and enlist their help in locating him.
Petitioners, moreover, enumerated in their petition several incidents of harassments and human rights
violations against CPA officers, staff and members.
Contending that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy for them to protect Jamess life, liberty and
security, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo ordering the respondents to disclose where
James is detained or confined, to release James, and to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his
person. They likewise prayed for (1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police
facilities which have been previously reported as detention centers for activists abducted by military and police
operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition, particularly
the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on James; and (3) a witness protection
order.
Petitioners simultaneously filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion 5 for the immediate issuance of a writ of amparo
pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
On October 9, 2008, the Writ of Amparo6 was issued directing respondents to file their verified return together
with their supporting affidavit within five days from receipt of the writ.
Respondents in their Joint Return7 stated: (1) that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is immune from suit and
should thus be dropped as party-respondent; (2) that only Arthur Balao should be named petitioner and the
rest of the other petitioners dropped; (3) that there is no allegation of specific wrongdoing against respondents
that would show their knowledge, involvement or participation in the abduction of James; (4) that Exec. Sec.
Ermita, Sec. Teodoro, Sec. Puno, Sec. Gonzales, Gen. Yano, Gen. Cachuela, Gen. Mapagu and Gen.
Verzosa in their respective affidavits denied having such participation or knowledge of Jamess abduction, set
forth their actions taken in investigating the matter and undertaking to continue exerting extraordinary diligence
in securing the liberty of James and bring all those responsible for his disappearance to the bar of justice,
including military or police personnel when warranted by the findings of the investigations; (5) that Supt. Martin
already ordered an investigation, came up with interviews of several witnesses, and held a dialogue with the
Commander of the Military Intelligence Group I (MIG1) and the Commanding Officer of the Internal Service
Unit-Internal Security Group, Philippine Army;and (6) that petitioners themselves did not cooperate with police
authorities in the investigation and neither did they ask the National Bureau of Investigation to locate James.
Respondents contended that the petition failed to meet the requirement in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo that
claims must be established by substantial evidence considering that: (1) petitioners allegations do not mention
in anyway the manner, whether directly or indirectly, the alleged participation of respondents in the purported
abduction of James; (2) Nonette and Beverly do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the abduction of James, hence, their statements are hearsay with no probative value; and (3) the
allegations in the petition do not show the materiality and relevance of the places sought to be
searched/inspected and documents to be produced, specifically the requirement that the prayer for an
inspection order shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the
whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
Respondents further argued that it is the PNP as the law enforcement agency, and not the respondent military
and executive officials, which has the duty to investigate cases of missing persons. At most, the AFP may
inquire on the matters being alluded to them as may be ordered by the proper superior, which is primarily done
for possible court martial proceedings. Hence, their common denials of having any knowledge, participation or
authorization for the alleged disappearance of James Balao. Nonetheless, respondents executed their
affidavits to show the actions they have taken and reports submitted to them by the proper authorities, as
follows:
Executive Secretary Ermitastated that upon receipt of copy of the petition for a writ of amparo, he caused the
issuance of a letter addressed to the PNP Chief and AFP Chief of Staff for the purpose of inquiring and
establishing the circumstances surrounding the alleged disappearance of James Balao, and which letters also
called for the submission of pertinent reports on the results of the investigation conducted, if any. 8
Secretary Teodoro declared that soon after the promulgation by this Court of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
he issued "Policy Directive on the Actions and Defenses Under the Amparo Rule" which instructed members of
the AFP to undertake specific measures even without waiting for the filing of an amparo petition in court
whenever any member of the AFP or any of its commands or units have been reported or published as being
involved in the alleged violation of an individuals right to life, liberty and security or threat thereof, as a
preparatory step in the filing of a verified return as required by A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. The AFP was therein also
directed to immediately coordinate with the PNP, NBI, DOJ and other government agencies in the attainment
of the desired actions in the event a petition is filed. Said policy directive was contained in his Memorandum

dated October 31, 2007 to the Chief of Staff, AFP, and there is no reason for him to doubt that the AFP will
comply with it insofar as the present petition for writ of amparo is concerned. 9
Secretary Puno confirmed receipt of a copy of the petition and said he will write to the PNP Chief to call for
pertinent reports relative to the circumstances of the alleged "taking" of the person in whose favor the writ
of amparo was sought. He undertook to make available any report he will receive from the PNP on the
matter.10
NSA Gonzales asserted that as a public officer, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance
with law, which presumption remains undisturbed amid gratuitous assumptions and conclusions in the petition
devoid of factual and legal basis. Upon receipt of a copy of the petition, he caused to be issued
letters/communications to the Director General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, the PNP
Chief and the AFP Chief of Staff for the purpose of making active inquiries and establishing the circumstances
of the alleged disappearance insofar as the possible involvement of military/police personnel is concerned. He
undertook to provide the material results of investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned
agencies.11
General Yano narrated that prior to the receipt of a copy of the petition, he received a memorandum from the
Department of National Defense transmitting the letter of Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro A. Casio
inquiring about the alleged abduction of James Balao. On the basis of said memo, he directed by radio
message the NOLCOM Commander to conduct a thorough investigation on the matter and to submit the result
thereof to the AFP General Headquarters. This was also done in compliance with the Policy Directive issued
by Defense Secretary Teodoro. He reiterated his October 6, 2008 directive to the PA Commanding General in
another radio message dated October 16, 2008. He undertook to provide the court with material results of the
investigations conducted by the concerned units as soon as the same are received by Higher Headquarters. 12
Lt. Gen. Cachuela said that even prior to the receipt of a copy of the petition, he was already directed by
Higher Headquarters to conduct a thorough investigation on the alleged abduction of James Balao. Acting on
said directive, he in turn directed the 5th Infantry Division, PA to investigate the matter since the place of the
commission of the abduction is within its area of responsibility. He undertook to furnish the court with a copy of
the result of the investigation conducted or to be conducted, as soon as NOLCOM receives the same. 13
BGen. Mapagu on his part declared that there is nothing in the allegations of the petition that would show the
involvement of the PA in the reported disappearance of James Balao. He claimed that he immediately called
the attention of the "concerned staff" to give some information regarding the case and directed them to submit
a report if they are able to obtain information. 14
Pol. Dir. General Verzosa set forth the actions and steps taken by the PNP, particularly the PNP Regional
Office-Cordillera (PRO-COR) headed by PCSupt. Eugene Martin, being the lead PNP unit investigating the
case of James Balao.15
Pol. Chief Supt. Martin recounted that in the afternoon of September 17, 2008, CPA Chairperson Beverly
Longid called up and informed him of the disappearance of James. On September 20, 2008, he was informed
that James was allegedly missing and immediately ordered the Office of the Regional Intelligence Division
(RID) to send flash alarm to all lower units to look for and locate James Balao. This was followed by a
Memorandum with his picture and description. Upon his orders, Police Station 1 of the Baguio City Police
Office (BCPO) immediately conducted inquiries at the boarding house of James at Barangay Fairview, Baguio
City. Likewise, he ordered the creation of Task Force Balao to fast track the investigation of the case. He
further instructed the RID to exert all efforts and supervise all lower units to intensify their investigation and
ascertain the whereabouts and other circumstances surrounding the disappearance of James. Results of the
investigations conducted were set forth in his affidavit. He had constant coordination with the CPA leaders and
Balao family who divulged the plate numbers of vehicles allegedly observed by James prior to his
disappearance as conducting surveillance on his person. Upon verification with the Land Transportation
Office, the said vehicles were found to be registered under the following persons: TNH 787 Narciso Magno
of #20 Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas; and USC 922 G & S Transport Corp. On October 6, 2008, he received
information regarding an abduction incident in Tomay, La Trinidad whereupon he ordered the Provincial
Director of Benguet to conduct an in-depth investigation; said investigation disclosed that the person abducted
was indeed James. On October 8, 2008, Task Force Balao with the help of the CPA and Balao family were
able to convince two witnesses in the abduction incident in Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet to shed light on the
incident; as a result, cartographic sketches of the suspects were made. In the morning of October 9, 2008, he
presided over a dialogue which was attended by the Group Commander, MIG1 and Commanding Officer of
ISU, ISG and PA, for the coordinated efforts to locate James. In the afternoon of the same day, he met with the
family and relatives of James to inform them of initial efforts and investigation of the case. The Task Force
Balao was also able to secure the affidavits of witnesses Aniceto Dawing and Vicky Bonel, and invited some
members of the CPA who retrieved Jamess personal belongings in Fairview, Baguio City and his companions
prior to his disappearance on September 17, 2008 to appear before the Task Force Balao for some

clarifications but none of them appeared. The case is still under follow-up and continuing investigation to know
what really happened, identify the abductors, determine the real motive for the abduction and file the
necessary charges in court against those responsible.16
Also attached to the Return are the more detailed reports (with attached affidavits of other witnesses) dated
October 14, 2008 and October 6, 2008 submitted by Task Force Balao Commander P/S Supt. Fortunato B.
Albas to the PNP Cordillera Regional Director. Pertinent portions of the two reports read:
xxxx
2. Inquiries conducted from Mr. Zusimo Unarosa, a resident of Nr 126, Purok 3, Central Fairview,
Baguio City, claimed that on the 1st week of September 2008, he frequently observed two (2)
unidentified male persons aged 50-70 years old and about 51" to 55" in height, bringing boxes
from the house, the contents of which could not be determined. However, averred that these two
(2) male personalities are not familiar in the barangay. He further stated that he had never seen a
van conducting surveillance on the house and have not heard of any incident of kidnapping or
abduction in the community.
3. Mr[.] Anselmo Alukim, a neighbor, residing adjacent to the house of the subject, when
interviewed, averred that he observed some unidentified male and female persons visiting the said
house.
4. Interview conducted on Mr[.] Danny Griba, a resident of said barangay averred that James
Balao is not a resident or occupant of the said house and claimed that he only saw the subject last
summer and stated there are five (5) unidentified persons occupying the said house. He further
stated that three (3) male persons aged 40 to 50 years old and a female aged between 20-30
years old goes out during day time with several boxes and returns at about 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM on
board a taxi cab again with some boxes of undetermined contents.
5. Mrs[.] Corazon Addun, resident of Nr 114, Purok 3, Central Fairview, Baguio City averred that
the subject is not residing in the said place and saw him only once, sometime on April 2008. She
further narrated that a certain Uncle John aged 40 to 50 years old and a male person aged 20 to
30 are among the occupants of said house. Accordingly, on September 21, 2008, Uncle John went
to the house of Mrs. Addun and over a cup of coffee told her that he will be going to Sagada,
Mountain Province purposely to locate a missing colleague who was sent there. Accordingly[,] he
received a phone call that his missing colleague (James Balao) did not reach the municipality and
reported missing. After that short talk, she never saw Uncle John again. Additionally, she did not
notice any vehicle conducting surveillance therein and any unusual incidents that transpired in said
place.
xxxx
7. This office has likewise coordinated with MIG-1 and ISU, ISG, PA but both offices denied any
knowledge on the alleged abduction of James Balao.
8. It was found out that it was SPO4 Genero Rosal, residing within the vicinity, who followed-up the
incident because it was reported to him by his neighbors. That after he learned about [James
abduction], he contacted PDEA, La Trinidad PS, RID ad Intel BPPO to verify if they had an
operation in Tomay, La Trinidad but all of them answered negative.
x x x x17
xxxx
3. A photocopy of the photograph of James Balao was presented to the witnesses wherein they
confirmed that the picture is the same person who was arrested and handcuffed. Another witness
divulged that prior to the arrest of the person in the picture/photograph, a red motorcycle with two
(2) male riders allegedly conducted surveillance along the highway about ten (10) meters away
from the place where the victim was picked-up. Minutes later, a white Mitsubishi Adventure arrived
and took the victim inside the car. The motorcycle riding in tandem followed the Mitsubushi
Adventure en route to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet. Another witness overheard one of the
abductors instructing the driver to quote "pare sa Camp Dangwa tayo."
4. Follow[-]up investigation resulted in the identification of a certain "KULOT" who also witnessed
the alleged abduction. However, he was hesitant to talk and instead pointed to the driver of the
delivery van of Helens Bread. At about 8:30 AM of October 9, 2008, Aniceto Dawing Jr[.] y Gano,
the driver of the delivery van of Helens Bread, surfaced and gave his statements on what he
witnessed on the alleged abduction.
5. On October 12, 2008, one Vicky Bonel y Felipe, 19 years old, single, native of Atok, Benguet,
resident of Tomay, LTB and store keeper of Saymor[s] Store appeared before the office of Benguet
PPO and gave her sworn statement on the alleged abduction. A cartographic sketch was made on
the person who identified himself as policeman. She further stated that it was when while she was
tending her brother-in-laws store, gun-wielding men, of about six or more, handcuffed and shove

the victim inside their vehicle. She recalled that she can recognize the abductors if she can see
them again.
6. Another witness stated that she was preparing her merchandise in the waiting shed of Lower
Tomay when she noticed a parked motorcycle beside the elementary school at about 7:00 AM of
September 17, 2008. The rider of the bike was suspiciously scouring the area and kept on calling
someone from his cellular phone before the abduction was made.
7. Baguio City Police Office conducted follow-up investigation and were able to secure affidavit of
Florence Luken y Mayames, 47 years old, married, and a resident of 135 Central Fairview averred
that James Balao together with a certain Uncle John about 65-75 years old, about 54" in height
and a certain Rene about 30-35 years old and stands 55", were her neighbors for almost one year.
She further stated that James Balao and company do not mingle with their neighbors and only one
person is usually left behind while James and Rene goes out at 6:00 or 7:00 AM and goes back at
around 6:00 or 7:00 PM.
She further averred that she did not notice any van or any kind of vehicle parked along the
roadside infront of any residence not his neighbors nor any person or persons observing the
occupants of the said house. Accordingly, at around 1:00 PM of September 26, 2008, a closed van
(Ca[n]ter) with unknown plate number was seen parked infront of the said house and more or less
(10) unidentified male person[s] aging from 20-23 and an unidentified female entered the alleged
rented house of James Balao and took some table, chairs and cabinets then left immediately to
unknown destination.
8. Mrs[.] Mina Cabati Serdan the owner of the house being rented by James Balao averred that
sometime May of 2007, a certain Mr[.] June, a realtor agent, recommended to her that a certain
James Balao will rent the house for one (1) year term with an agreed monthly rent of fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00). She stated that James Balao had extended his stay for almost 4
months. On the last week of August 2008, Mrs[.] Serdan called up James Balao through phone to
inform him that she will terminate his stay at the rented house on September 30, 2008. Mrs[.]
Serdan further stated that [she]visited the rented house only twice and that was the only time she
saw James Balao with an unidentified companions.
That she only discovered that James Balao was missing when a certain Carol informed her that he was
missing. [Sh]e further stated that she visited her house and found out that the said occupants have already left
on September 26, 2008 and discovered that all personal belongings of the occupants have already been taken
out by the relatives.
xxxx
VI. ACTIONS TAKEN:
1. That a composite team "TASK FORCE BALAO" from this office and the Regional Headquarters
headed by [P/S SUPT] FORTUNATO BASCO ALBAS was formed.
2. That the composite team of investigators conducted ocular inspection on the area.
3. On October 8, 2008, two (2) witnesses namely: Marjore Domingo Hipolito and Jenny Lynn
Malondon Valdez gave their sworn statements and cartographic sketch of one of the abductors.
4. On the morning of October 9, 2008, a dialogue was presided by RD, PRO-COR and attended by
the Group Commander, MIG1 and Commanding Officer of ISU, SG, PA. Both commanders denied
the accusations against them.
5. In the afternoon of the same day, a meeting with the family and relatives of James Balao was
again presided by RD, PRO-COR wherein the results of the initial efforts and investigation were
given to the family. He also reported the surfacing of another two (2) witnesses who described the
suspect who handcuffed James Balao.
6. PRO-Cordillera wrote a letter to the Cordillera Peoples Alliance requesting them to present
Uncle John, Rene and his other companions who are then residing in the same boarding house
including all his companions on September 17, 2008 and prior to his disappearance.
REMARKS:
Case is still under follow-up investigation to identify the alleged abductors to determine the real motive of the
abduction and to file necessary charges against them in court. 18
During the hearing, the affidavits and testimonies of the following witnesses were presented by petitioners:
Aniceto Dawing19 testified that on September 17, 2008, around 8:00 in the morning, while he was delivering
bread at Saymors Store in Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet, a white van stopped infront of them and five armed
men alighted. The armed men, who introduced themselves as policemen in Filipino, held and pointed a gun at
one male person. The armed men told the male person that he was being apprehended for illegal drugs. They
then let the male person board the vehicle and informed him that they will proceed to Camp Dangwa. Dawing
admitted that he did not know that it was James whom he saw that time and came to know only of his identity
when he saw a poster bearing Jamess photograph. On cross-examination, he stated that the white van did

not have any markings that it was a police vehicle and that the armed men were in civilian clothes and did not
wear any police badges or identification cards. He just assumed that they were policemen because of their
posture and haircut and because they introduced themselves as such.
Anvil Lumbag stated in his affidavit 20 that he was also at Saymors Store in the morning of September 17, 2008
to buy chicken. He said that a ToyotaRevo stopped infront of the store from where four men alighted. The men
handcuffed a man who was standing infront of the store and uttered "Walang makikialam, drugs kaso nito"
while pointing a gun at the said man. Then, they forced the man to board the Revo. Before the Revo fled,
Lumbag heard one of the men say that they will be going to Camp Dangwa. Lumbags affidavit, however, did
not mention if it was James who was forcibly taken by the armed men.
Beverly Longid21 testified that she got to know James when she was a member of the CPA youth organization
in her student days. Every time James will have an activity that is CPA-related, he would coordinate with
Beverly, she being the CPA chair. She also testified that prior to his disappearance, the last time she talked
with James was in July or August of 2008 when he reported surveillances on his person by the PNP and the
AFP. In her affidavit, she alleged that James reported to her several vehicles tailing him, one of which was a
green van with plate number USC 922, the same plate number she had seen at the Intelligence Security Unit
in Navy Base, Baguio City, and which was attached to a silver grey van.
Beverly admitted that at the time of the alleged abduction, she was in Baguio City, at the Office of the
Cordillera Peoples Legal Center and that she only came to know that James was missing in the afternoon of
September 18, 2008. She also confirmed that they met with Pol. Supt. Martin to seek assistance regarding
Jamess disappearance.
Nonette Balao22 testified that she was at her bakeshop located in Km. 4, La Trinidad, Benguet in the morning
of September 17, 2008. At around 6:30 a.m., she received a text message from James saying that he will be
going home to their ancestral home to do some laundry. Thirty minutes later, she received another text
message from James saying that he was already leaving his place in Fairview, Baguio City. When around 8:00
a.m. James had not yet arrived at their ancestral home, she got worried. She texted him but failed to get a
reply, so she tried to call him. His phone, however, had already been turned off. She then called the CPA office
to check if James was there. She was told that he was not there so she went to Jamess house in Fairview at
around 9:00 a.m. Jamess housemates, however, told her that he left at 7:00 a.m.
Nonette also testified that they only reported Jamess disappearance to the police on September 20, 2008
because they thought that it was necessary that a person be missing for at least 48 hours before the
disappearance could be reported. They went to Sub-Station Police Precinct No. 1 in Baguio and to the police
precinct in La Trinidad to report the matter. They also went to Camp Dangwa to see if James was there.
Nonette claimed that she became worried because James never switched off his mobile phone and since he
already texted her that he was coming home, he could have texted again if there was a change of plans. Also,
James had told them since April 2008 that he had been under surveillance. She does not know why James
went to Tomay, La Trinidad.
Samuel Anongos stated in his affidavit 23 that he is a member of the Education Commission of the CPA. He
claimed that when they conducted trainings and educational discussions on mining education in Abra,
members of the AFP harassed the community and committed various human rights violations. The AFP also
allegedly held community meetings where they said that the CPA is part of the New Peoples Army. Attached to
Anongoss affidavit is a copy of a paper that the AFP was allegedly distributing. It shows the organizational
structure of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA) wherein CPA was
identified as one of the organizations under the National Democratic Front (NDF). 24
RTC Ruling
On January 19, 2009, the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James Balao is detained or confined,
(b) to release James Balao considering his unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist
from further inflicting harm upon his person; and
DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER
for failure of herein Petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and
substantiate the same.25
In denying respondents prayer that President Arroyo be dropped as party-respondent, the RTC held that a
petition for a writ of amparo is not "by any stretch of imagination a niggling[,] vexing or annoying court
case"26from which she should be shielded. The RTC ruled that said petition is nothing more than a tool to aid
the president to guarantee that laws on human rights are devotedly and staunchly carried out. It added that
those who complain against naming the president as party-respondent are only those who "either do not
understand what the Writ of Amparo is all about or who do not want to aid Her Excellency in her duty to
supervise and control the machinery of government." 27

In upholding the standing of Jamess siblings and Beverly to file the petition, the RTC held that what Section 2
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparorules out is the right to file similar petitions, meaning there could be no
successive petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo for the same party.
The RTC further held that "more likely than not," the motive for Jamess disappearance is his activist/political
leanings and that Jamess case is one of an enforced disappearance as defined under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. In so ruling, the RTC considered (1) the several incidents of harassment mentioned in Beverlys
testimony and enumerated in the petition; and (2) the references in the petition to the CPA as a front for the
CPP-NPA.
The RTC likewise ruled that the government unmistakably violated Jamess right to security of person. It found
the investigation conducted by respondents as very limited, superficial and one-sided. The police and military
thus miserably failed to conduct an effective investigation of Jamess abduction as revealed by the
investigation report of respondents own witnesses, Supt. Martin and P/S Supt. Fortunato Basco Albas, the
Commander of Task Force Balao. It further noted that respondents did not investigate the military officials
believed to be behind the abduction as said military officials were merely invited to a dialogue and there was
no investigation made in Camp Dangwa where the abductors were believed to have taken James as narrated
by the witnesses. Moreover, the RTC observed that despite the undertaking of respondents to investigate the
abduction and provide results thereof, four months have passed but petitioners have not been furnished
reports regarding the investigation.
As to the denial of the interim reliefs, the RTC stated that the stringent provisions of the rules were not
complied with and granting said reliefs might violate respondents constitutional rights and jeopardize State
security.
Both parties appealed to this Court.
The Consolidated Petitions
Petitioners, in G.R. No. 186050, question the RTCs denial of the interim reliefs.
Respondents, on the other hand, assail in their petition in G.R. No. 186059, the issuance of the writ of amparo.
They raise the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT ORDERING RESPONDENT-PETITIONERS TO: (A)
DISCLOSE WHERE JAMES BALAO IS DETAINED AND CONFINED; (B) TO RELEASE JAMES
BALAO CONSIDERING HIS UNLAWFUL DETENTION SINCE HIS "ABDUCTION" AND (C) TO
CEASE AND DESIST FROM FURTHER INFLICTING HARM UPON HIS PERSON IS BASED
PURELY ON CONJECTURES, SURMISES AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE; HENCE, IT MUST BE
SET ASIDE.
II
RESPONDENT-PETITIONERS HAD PROVEN THAT THEY OBSERVED EXTRAORDINARY
DILIGENCE AS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.
III
THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE MANALO CASE
ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CASE AT BAR; HENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GROSSLY
ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING THEREIN TO THE CASE AT BAR.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PETITIONER-RESPONDENTS PRAYER FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF AN INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER AND A WITNESS
PROTECTION ORDER.28
Our Ruling
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances." It was formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded rulemaking power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution,
albeit limited to these two situations. "Extralegal killings" refer to killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. 29 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government
official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal
to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection of law. 30
Section 18 of the Amparo Rule provides:
SEC. 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant
the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be
denied. (Emphasis supplied.)

The threshold issue in this case is whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by the
Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
In granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, the trial court ratiocinated:
On record is evidence pointing to the more likely than not motive for James Balaos disappearance his
activist/political leanings. This is shown by the several incidents relating to harassments of activists as
mentioned in the unrebutted testimony of Beverly Longid and the enumeration made in par. 48 (a) to (cc) of
the petition. There were also references in the petitions pars. 52 et. seq. to the CPA (of which James Balao
was an active staff) as a front organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army.
More likely than not he was not taken to parts unknown for reasons other than his involvement in the CPA, that
is, politically-motivated. The Court considers these facts enough circumstances to establish substantial
evidence of an enforced disappearance as defined under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. For after all,
substantial evidence requires nothing greater than "more likely than not" degree of proof. 31 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of briefing papers supposedly
obtained from the AFP (Oplan Bantay-Laya implemented since 2001) indicating that the anti-insurgency
campaign of the military under the administration of President Arroyo included targeting of identified legal
organizations under the NDF, which included the CPA, and their members, as "enemies of the state." The
petition cited other documents confirming such "all-out war" policy which resulted in the prevalence of
extrajudicial killings: namely, the published reports of the Melo Commission and the UNHRCs Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Mr. Philip Alston. The petition also enumerated
previously documented cases of extralegal killings of activists belonging to militant groups, including CPA
leaders and workers, almost all of which have been preceded by surveillance by military or police agents and
acts of harassment. Consequently, petitioners postulated that the surveillance on James and his subsequent
abduction are interconnected with the harassments, surveillance, threats and political assassination of other
members and officers of CPA which is his organization.
We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys counter-insurgency program by
itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced
disappearance.
In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo,32 the Court noted that the similarity between the circumstances
attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such
abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction
of James from past similar incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and other leftleaning groups.
The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of James on the very positions held by
the respondents, stating that -The abduction of James Balao can only be attributed to the Respondents who have command responsibility of
all the actions of their subordinates and who are the primary persons in the implementation of the
governments all out war policy.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo34 had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command
responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior
is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators
(as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which
the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for
crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms
and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its
ratification.
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides
for criminal liability under that doctrine.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders
liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction

on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or
customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have
done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be
any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue
of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been
committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was
conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the
basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings." Of the same tenor, and by way of
expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or
extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance [or extrajudicial killings].
xxxx
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is
that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters
of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact. x x x 35
Subsequently, we have clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that
the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders
may therefore be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of
their responsibility, or at least accountability.36
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,37 the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these terms are applied to
amparo proceedings, as follows:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. x x x38(Emphasis supplied.)
Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military and police
authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have
not been established, much less their link to any military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence
indicating that James is being held or detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents.
Consequently, the trial court erred in granting amparo reliefs by ordering the respondent officials (1) to
disclose where James Balao is detained or confined, (2) to release him from such detention or confinement,
and (3) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person. Such pronouncement of responsibility
on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. 39 However, we agree
with the trial court in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are "very limited, superficial and onesided." Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the respondents are borne by the
evidence on record, thus:
x x x the violation of the right to security as protection by the government is unmistakable. The police and the
military miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of James Balaos abduction as revealed by the
investigation report of respondents own witnesses Honorable Chief Superintendent Eugene Martin and
Honorable Senior Superintendent Fortunato Albas. The investigation was to use the words in The Secretary
of National Defense, et. al., v. Manalo et. al. "verylimited, superficial and one-sided."
The actions taken were simply these: (a) organization of the "Task Force Balao"; (b) conduct of ocular
inspection at the place of abduction; (c) taking of sworn statements of civilian witnesses, whose testimonies
did not prove much as shown by the continued disappearance of James Balao; (d) dialogue with implicated
military officials as well as family members and friends of James Balao; and (e) writing of letter to the CPA.
The Court does not want to second-guess police protocols in investigation but surely some things are amiss

where the investigation DID NOT INVESTIGATE the military officials believed to be behind the abduction as
they were merely invited to a dialogue and where the investigation DID NOT LEAD to Camp Dangwa where
the abductors were supposed to have proceeded as narrated by the witnesses. To the mind of this Court,
there is a seeming prejudice in the process of investigation to pin suspects who are not connected with the
military establishments. By any measure, this cannot be a thorough and good faith investigation but one that
falls short of that required by the Writ of Amparo.40
Respondents reiterate that they did their job the best they could and fault the petitioners instead for their noncooperation which caused delay in the investigation. They particularly blamed Beverly who failed to attend the
October 15, 2008 invitation to appear before the investigators and shed light on Jamess disappearance.
We are not persuaded.
First, the Task Force Balao had acknowledged the fact that Pol. Chief Supt. Martin was already in constant
coordination with the Balao family and CPA, and hence the investigators could have readily obtained whatever
information they needed from Beverly. Pol. Chief Supt. Martin even mentioned in his affidavit that Task Force
Balao was able to secure the testimonies of two eyewitnesses with the help of Beverly and the Balao family,
and that as a result cartographic sketches were made of some suspects. 41 Moreover, Beverly had explained
during the cross-examination conducted by Associate Solicitor Paderanga that she was at the time
coordinating with national and local agencies even as the police investigation was ongoing. 42 There is nothing
wrong with petitioners simultaneous recourse to other legal avenues to gain public attention for a possible
enforced disappearance case involving their very own colleague. Respondents should even commend such
initiative that will encourage those who may have any information on the identities and whereabouts of
Jamess abductors to help the PNP in its investigation.
Assuming there was reluctance on the part of the Balao family and CPA to submit Jamess relatives or
colleagues for questioning by agents of the PNP and AFP, they cannot be faulted for such stance owing to the
militarys perception of their organization as a communist front: ergo, enemies of the State who may be
targeted for liquidation. But more important, such non-cooperation provides no excuse for respondents
incomplete and one-sided investigations. As we held in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo 43 :
As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or
indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As
police officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that
would include looking into the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and
obtaining statements from them; and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate
number XRR 428, and securing and preserving evidence related to the abduction and the threats that may aid
in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As we said in Manalo, the right to security, as a guarantee of
protection by the government, is breached by the superficial and one-sidedhence, ineffectiveinvestigation
by the military or the police of reported cases under their jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police
stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a preliminary fact-finding on
petitioners complaint. They could not, however, make any headway, owing to what was perceived to be the
refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A.
Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses attitude, "[They] do not trust
the government agencies to protect them.The difficulty arising from a situation where the party whose
complicity in extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same
party who investigates it is understandable, though.
The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a
hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To
repeat what the Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones
right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings,
enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are
captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced:
"[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not
a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer
of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government." 44 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
Indeed, why zero in on Jamess own kin and colleagues when independent eyewitnesses already provided
firsthand accounts of the incident, as well as descriptions of the abductors? With the cartographic sketches
having been made from interviews and statements of witnesses, the police investigators could have taken
proper steps to establish the personal identities of said suspects and yet this was not done, the police
investigators not even lifting a finger to ascertain whether the cartographic sketches would match with any
enlisted personnel of AFP and PNP, or their civilian agents/assets. As to the vehicles, the plate numbers of
which have earlier been disclosed by James to his family and the CPA as used in conducting surveillance on

him prior to his abduction, the military merely denied having a vehicle with such plate number on their property
list despite the fact that the same plate number (USC 922) was sighted attached to a car which was parked at
the PA-ISU compound in Navy Base, Baguio City. As to the other plate number given by James (TNH 787),
while the police investigators were able to verify the name and address of the registered owner of the vehicle,
there is no showing that said owner had been investigated or that efforts had been made to locate the said
vehicle. Respondents insistence that the CPA produce the alleged companions of James in his rented
residence for investigation by the PNP team, while keeping silent as to why the police investigators had not
actively pursued those evidentiary leads provided by eyewitnessesand the Balao family, only reinforce the trial
courts observation that the investigators are seemingly intent on building up a case against other persons so
as to deflect any suspicion of military or police involvement in James Balaos disappearance.
In view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents clearly failed to discharge their burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of Jamess abduction. Such ineffective investigation extant in the records of this
case prevents us from completely exonerating the respondents from allegations of accountability for James
disappearance. The reports submitted by the PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio City Police
Station do not contain meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. In
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court observed that such reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and
units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal
detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for the victim. 45 In the same case we
stressed that the standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe
extraordinary diligence called for extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights
and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
As to the matter of dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent, though not raised in the petitions, we hold
that the trial court clearly erred in holding that presidential immunity cannot be properly invoked in an amparo
proceeding. As president, then President Arroyo was enjoying immunity from suit when the petition for a writ of
amparo was filed. Moreover, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or
omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. 46
In order to effectively address thru the amparo remedy the violations of the constitutional rights to liberty and
security of James who remains missing to date, the Court deems it appropriate to refer this case back to the
trial court for further investigation by the PNP and CIDG and monitoring of their investigative activities that
complies with the standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975,
otherwise known as the "PNP Law"47 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate to
"[i]nvestigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in
their prosecution." The trial court should further validate the results of such investigations and actions through
hearings it may deem necessary to conduct.
Lastly, on the denial of the prayer for interim reliefs under the Amparo Rule.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an
amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. 48 A basic requirement before an amparo
court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the order.49 In this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied
since the petitioners specified several military and police establishments based merely on the allegation that
the testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of similar abductions involving activists
disclosed that those premises were used as detention centers. In the same vein, the prayer for issuance of a
production order was predicated on petitioners bare allegation that it obtained confidential information from an
unidentified military source, that the name of James was included in the so-called Order of Battle. Indeed, the
trial court could not have sanctioned any "fishing expedition" by precipitate issuance of inspection and
production orders on the basis of insufficient claims of one party.
Nonetheless, the trial court is not precluded, as further evidence warrants, to grant the above interim reliefs to
aid it in making a decision upon evaluation of the actions taken by the respondents under the norm of
extraordinary diligence.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 186050 and 186059 are PARTLY GRANTED. The Judgment dated
January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in Special Proceeding No.
08-AMP-0001 is MODIFIED as follows:
1) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo;
2) AFFIRMING the denial of the prayer for inspection and production orders, without prejudice to
the subsequent grant thereof, in the course of hearing and other developments in the
investigations by the Philippine National Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group and the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
3) ORDERING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his
successor, and the incumbent Director General of the Philippine National Police, or his successor,

to CONTINUE the investigations and actions already commenced by the Philippine National Police
Regional OfficeCordillera, Baguio City Police, Northern Luzon Command, Philippine National
Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Philippine ArmyIntelligence Service Unit and other concerned units, and specifically take and continue to take the
necessary steps:
(a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by Task
Force Balao;
(b) to locate and search the vehicles bearing the plate numbers submitted by the
petitioners and which James Balao had reported to be conducting surveillance on his
person prior to his abduction on September 17, 2008, and investigate the registered
owners or whoever the previous and present possessors/transferees thereof; and to
pursue any other leads relevant to the abduction of James Balao;
The incumbent Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, Philippine National Police Director
General, or their successors, shall ensure that the investigations and actions of their respective
units on the abduction of James Balao are pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by
Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule.
For purposes of these investigations, the Philippine National Police/Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group shall periodically report the detailed results of its
investigation to the trial court for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the trial court
shall pass upon the sufficiency of their investigative efforts. The Philippine National Police and the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group shall have six (6) months
from notice hereof to undertake their investigations. Within fifteen (15) days after completion of the
investigations, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the DirectorGeneral of
the Philippine National Police shall submit a full report of the results of the said investigations to
the trial court. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the trial court shall submit its full reportto this
Court.
These directives and those of the trial court made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and
shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Armed Forces of the
Philippines Chief of Staff, Director General of the Philippine National Police and Chief of the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group and other concerned units,
under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and
investigation constitute less than the EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE that the Amparo Rule and
the circumstances of the case demand; and1awphi1
4) DROPPING former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent in the petition for
writ of amparo;
This case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 for
continuation of proceedings in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-0001 for the purposes of monitoring
compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in the light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
responsible, or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the trial court shall submit its own
report and recommendation to this Court for final action. The trial court will continue to have jurisdiction over
this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision;
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any
responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 184467
June 19, 2012
EDGARDO NAVIA,1 RUBEN DIO,2 and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown by the required quantum of proof
that their disappearance was carried out by, "or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the
government] or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information on
the fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons." 3
This petition for review on certiorari4 filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC 5 challenges the July
24, 2008 Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City which granted the Petition for
Writ of Amparo7 filed by herein respondent against the petitioners.
Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation 8 (Asian Land) arrived
at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay
Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur
Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two
uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find
her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with
them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric
wires and lamps in the subdivision.9
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also
located in Grand Royale Subdivision.10 The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia
(Navia), also arrived thereat.
As to what transpired next, the parties respective versions diverge.
Version of the Petitioners
Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a report from a certain
Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a
post in said subdivision.11 The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to petitioners
Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as security guards at the Asian Land security
department. Following their departments standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising entered the report in
their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there where Dio and Buising were able to
confirm who the suspects were. They thus repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to
invite the two suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them.
At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects admitted that they took the
lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita. 12 Soon, Navia
arrived and Buising informed him that the complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation. Since
there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement to the
effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. 13 His mother Lolita also signed
the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house.
Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.
Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved in the reported loss of
electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave.
Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was
released unharmed and without any injury.14
Upon Navias instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the logbook as
witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Lolita asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the
logbook where she was being asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on her reading
glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her signature therein. After which, the guards
left.
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation 15 from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to
appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing
husband Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police
Station. However, since Virginia was not present despite having received the same invitation, the meeting was
reset to April 22, 2008.16
On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her that they released Ben and that
they have no information as to his present whereabouts. 17 They assured Virginia though that they will
cooperate and help in the investigation of her missing husband. 18
Version of the Respondent
According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested, shoved into
the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security
office, Navia lividly grumbled "Ikaw na naman?" 19 and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for
mercy, but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on different parts of his

body.20 Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig,
papatayin ko na si Ben." 21
Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area where their house is
located is very dark and his father had long been asking the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to
install a lamp to illumine their area. But since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from
one of the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However, the lamp Bong got was
no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post from which he took it and no longer pursued his plan. 22
Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guards logbook where she undertook not to allow Ben to
stay in her house anymore.23 Thereafter, Navia again asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolitas inquiry as
to why she had to sign again, Navia explained that they needed proof that they released her son Bong
unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latters case will be forwarded to the barangay. Since she has poor
eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and then left with Bong. 24 At that juncture, Ben
grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone. However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong left
the security office at once leaving Ben behind. 25
Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the logbook
again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again when she already twice signed the logbook at the
headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was about to sign only pertains to Bongs release. Since it
was dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buisings word and signed the logbook without, again, reading
what was written in it. 26
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to be
told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben,
asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the
matter to the police.
In the course of the investigation on Bens disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that petitioners took
advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the logbook as a witness that they already
released Ben when in truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben was
when she left him in petitioners custody at the security office. 27
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparo28before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo
court issued an Order29 dated June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the
production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:
WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution [in] A.M. No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also
known as "The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo", let a writ of amparo be issued, as follows:
(1) ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising of the Asian Land
Security Agency to produce before the Court the body of aggrieved party Benhur Pardico, on
Monday, June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;
(2) ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the aforementioned date and
time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to personally appear thereat;
(3) COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising to file, within a
non-extendible period of seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ, a verified written return
with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:
a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or threaten with
violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or
omission;
b) The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or
omission; and
c) All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners] pertaining to the threat,
act or omission against the aggrieved party.
(4) GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting the [petitioners], or any
persons acting for and in their behalf, under pain of contempt, from threatening, harassing or
inflicting any harm to [respondent], his immediate family and any [member] of his household.
The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at their address indicated in
the petition, copies of the writ as well as this order, together with copies of the petition and its annexes. 30
A Writ of Amparo31 was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on June 27, 2008. 32 On June 30,
2008, petitioners filed their Compliance33 praying for the denial of the petition for lack of merit.
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the testimony of Buising, while Virginia
submitted the sworn statements34 of Lolita and Enrique which the two affirmed on the witness stand.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision 35 granting the petition. It disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it proper and
appropriate, as follows:
(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately conduct a deep and
thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in
connection with the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in
the process, as part of the investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;
(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the witnesses who
testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure their safety and security; and
(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate the
circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by the [petitioners] in this
case, utilizing in the process, as part of said investigation, the pertinent documents and admissions
forming part of the record of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.
Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director Nestor Mantaring, and to
the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.36
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 37 which was denied by the trial court in an Order 38 dated August
29, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:
4.1. WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.
4.1.1. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS HAVE
COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF HER HUSBANDS RIGHT TO
LIFE, LIBERTY, OR SECURITY.
4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT OF THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.
4.1.3. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ALLEGED
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS.39
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is
available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the
aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia
miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with some
degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat
to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced
that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries
in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on
March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in
holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.
Our Ruling
Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the
reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective
relief "to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." 40
Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute his identity as the
same person summoned and questioned at petitioners security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such
uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Bens inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and
security. Article 641 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 42 recognizes every human beings
inherent right to life, while Article 943 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The
right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on
grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty
and security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law. 44
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as alleged in Virginias petition and
proved during the summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does not, however, define extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the
Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence
and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress. 45 Then, the budding jurisprudence on
amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis46 when this Court defined enforced disappearances. The Court in
that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced
disappearances, as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." 47
Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after Congress
enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 985148 on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or
involuntary disappearances as follows:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo49 where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his Separate Opinion that
with the enactment of RA No. 9851, "the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not
only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as
well of what an enforced or involuntary disappearance is." 50 Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to
enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons
contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts
should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that
constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate
or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a menacing attitude towards Ben and
that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of
Navia at that time, his threatening statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben,"
cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In addition, there is nothing
on record which would support petitioners assertion that they released Ben on the night of March 31, 2008
unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained how she was prodded into affixing her signatures in
the logbook without reading the entries therein. And so far, the information petitioners volunteered are sketchy
at best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified or presented in court and whose
complaint was never reduced in writing.1wphi1
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise
essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support
or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this
case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented
tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as
responsible or accountable persons. 51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its
agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in

investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition
is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City
and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has
been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance
must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 182795
June 5, 2008
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners,
vs.
NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN., I XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the following
premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied
in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public
Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only solution to
this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules the "RULE ON THE
WRIT OF AMPARO."1
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City.
Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be
demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles, to
wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these
so-called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting
syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must be
the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political protges. If unabated would
certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this Country.
It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to
answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in
the hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable
Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the possession of the
Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448,
180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the
second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore,
Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be
treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance
of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court
in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous

decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of
merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo.3
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was
affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the
enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is
made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory
judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal
basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at
all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the
four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed
factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its
face, the court ought to issue said writ.

Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall
issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge
may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be
later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the
petition will be dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the
highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not
spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will
also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales *, Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. **, Nachura***, Leonardo-de-Castro, Brion, JJ., concur.