Compare two cases of European security intervention by

any or all of NATO, the EU or the OSCE.

April 1992 saw the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina republic declare
independence from Yugoslavia ultimately leading to a genocide campaign
killing 100,000 Bosnian Muslims and Croation civilians by Serbians; NATO
finally intervened in 1995. The 1999 Kosovo campaign was to prevent the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and ethnic Albanians being ethnically
cleansed by the Serbs. By comparison, the response was swift and decisive.
In Bosnia the European Community (EC) response was apathetic, the UK
advocated non-intervention and against lifting an arms embargo as it is not
a British interest[1]. The USA viewed it as Europes problem urging the UK to
do more and lift an arms embargo; accordingly, there was no leadership from
President Clinton, despite the contrary in previous conflicts, including the
1991 Gulf War. Sep 1991 saw the EC pushing for a UNSCR authorising ground
troops as part of the Western European Union (WEU), this was vetoed by the
USA, it had no appetite to deploy troops after Mogadishu in 1993.
1995 saw several events change the entire conflict. First were the massacres
at Srebrenica and Sarajevo in UN Safe Zones. President Clintons re-election
campaign; Bosnia was an election issue. Post-election, the Senate and the
House were under Republican control, lifting the arms embargo. Finally,
Clinton was concerned about his international credibility due to nonintervention in Rwanda.
Clinton took the lead with Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, a bombing
campaign, in Aug 1995. 15 nations, including the UK followed; thereby sidestepping the EC, WEU and UN thus becoming a NATO response. Tactically, the
campaign targeted the Bosnian Serb Army, stopping ethnic cleansing. The
strategic effect of forced them to the negotiating table, the Dayton
Agreement and the Implementation Force (IFOR) taking on the enforcement
role from NATO on 20 Dec 1995.
The Kosovo campaign was US led, quickly followed by the UK and numerous
other countries. Prime Minister Blair was convinced that the moral imperative
was more important than national interest[2], accordingly the UK acted
without a UNSCR. Blair continued that European Security was firmly linked to
NATO security, as such, NATO had to be a credible force. Tactically the
operation forced Milosevic to the negotiating table, preventing thousands of
deaths. More profound were the strategic implications, The UK and USA
became convinced that humanitarian intervention was the right thing to do
internationally; however, the haste to act without a UNSCR questioned the
UNs authority. The success of ALLIED FORCE allowed the NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR) to enforce the peace plan.
Both campaigns motives were similar; the strategy incoherent. Bosnia was a
new paradigm in the post-Communist world which NATO didnt have an
apparent role; nearly 100,000 people died awaiting the Wests intervention.
The USA didnt the lead role and the UK was vehemently against military
action. The Kosovo campaign had a lasting strategic effect on the West in

that humanitarian intervention developed into legitimate foreign policy. It

established, and was alluded to by the UN Secretary General, that force
without a UNSCR can be legitimate, if not strictly legal.

[1] Douglas Hurd speech to parliament, Hansard, 29 April 1993, Vol. 223, Col. 1176
[2] Blair, T. (2010) A Journey, New York: Knopf