Immanuel Kant distinguishes judgements of the beautiful from judgements of the

agreeable and judgements of the good. Describe these three forms of judgement, and
explain the differences between them.

This essay will discuss how Immanuel Kant distinguishes judgements of the beautiful from
judgements of the agreeable and judgements of the good. Each of these judgements possess
different properties, which will be illustrated through examining each separately and then
through how each kind of delight manifests. By revealing how the judgements relate to
desire, then which cognitive faculties they involve, then finally whether they claim
objectivity or subjectivity, provides a full comparison of the qualities each one of Kants
judgements embodies. However, as Stephen Davies expresses the interpretation and
application of Kants ideas is fraught with controversy.1 Kant demonstrates why there are
arguments of this nature. Yet there are many ambiguities and questions left unresolved with
no real possibility of solving these aesthetic problems.

Firstly, Kant describes how judgements of the agreeable involve what the senses find
pleasing in sensation.2 The agreeable rests entirely on feeling and requires no
conceptualizing. Rather, it is an automatic physiological response, in which the end goal is
gratification -rendering it questionable whether this is a true judgement. As Kant points out,
we are pathologically conditioned by stimuli3 to find pleasure in the agreeable. Unlike
judgements of the good and the beautiful, the subjectivity in personal preference is
acknowledged when making these judgements of sense.

1 Stephen Davies, Artworks and Functional Beauty, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol.56,
no.223, April 2006, p.225.
2 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. Meredith, (Oxford University Press,
1991), p.44.
3 Ibid, p.48.

Judgements of the good, on the other hand, relate to what serves a functional purpose. This
involves cognition of the actual object, and Kant explains that is good which by means of
reason commends itself by its mere concept.4 Due to the logical component of this
judgement, any reasonable being can be compelled to regard an object as good without
physically encountering it. However, knowledge of the intended use is required in order to
experience this practical delight. Judgements of the good also relate to moral virtue: there is
that which is good for something5 and that which is good in itself.6 Judgements of the
good can rightly claim objective universal validity.

Finally, judgements of the beautiful, or aesthetic judgements of taste, are more nuanced than
judgements of the good and agreeable. Aesthetic judgements are contemplative, pertain to
empirical objects (involving primary sensory experience). Crucially, beauty does not exist in
the qualities of the object, but as a property of the human mind: the resulting
pleasure/displeasure is in actuality a judgement of our experience. By this reasoning,
anything can be a source of aesthetic pleasure, yet as Berel Lang claims, there are
inconsistencies present. Kant describes how in certain situations it is impossible to make a
judgement of taste, as the disgust evoked in their real presence inhibits the response to their
aesthetic appearance.7 The cause of this failure is located in specific properties of the object,
which is contrary to Kants arguments that beauty is in us and not the object. Therefore,
there are ambiguities. As opposed to judgements of the agreeable and good, a judgement of
taste is the only one we are free to make.

4 Ibid, p.46.
5 Ibid, p.46.
6 Ibid, p.46.
7 Berel Lang, Kant and the Subjective Objects of Taste, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, vol.25, no.3, Spring 1967, p.248.

In order to distinguish judgements of the beautiful from judgements of the agreeable and the
good, Kant illustrates the differences in how each relates to the faculty of desire (whether it is
interested or disinterested.). When describing judgements of the agreeable and the good,
Kant expresses how a shared characteristic is the represented bond of connexion between the
subject and the real existence of the object. It is not merely the object, but also its real
existence, that pleases.8 Therefore, delight in the agreeable and the good is interested; it is
influenced by the desire to possess the object or prolong feelings of pleasure. Conversely,
delight in the beautiful is disinterested, and involves no moral, cognitive or sensuous interest
in the empirical object.9 This is as we only decide how we stand in relation to a subjective
mental experience and are indifferent to the objects actual existence. Jane Kneller describes
how our disinterested pleasure thus has the property of being both effect and (perpetuating)
cause of the judgement.10 This feeling is the only effect of aesthetic contemplation of which
we are fully conscious and as opposed to judgements of the agreeable and the good, is a key
criterion for aesthetic experience. The question of disinterestedness also raises potential
problems when we reflect on functional objects. As Stephen Davies highlights, art
appreciation has shifted from a narrow focus on the inner psychology and attitudes of its
percipient towards a wider recognition of the crucial relevance played by the works social
and historical context.11 Does knowledge of the practical use of an object serve to negate a
judgement of taste? Does this make it interested if the object has a purpose, and therefore a
judgement of the good? Can a judgement of the beautiful and a judgement of the good occur
simultaneously? Kant leaves these questions unresolved when distinguishing between the
judgements.

8 Ibid, p.48.
9 Jane Kneller, Kants Concept of Beauty, History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol.3, no.3, July
1986, p.318.
10 Ibid, p.319.
11 Davies, p.227.

Another key aspect to understanding how Kant differentiates between judgements of the
beautiful and judgements of the agreeable and the good is by examining the cognitive
faculties they employ. Kant assesses whether we are free to make these judgements. The
agreeable, as a mere bodily response, is decided without any cognition involved, only sense.
Therefore, it is not free. Similarly, judgements of the good are not free, yet are completely
logical, requiring determinate concepts. This results in a capacity to be compelled into
making a judgement of reason. Aesthetic judgements on the other hand, contain more
complexity. As Kant illustrates, when judging an object of beauty, it is compared to the entire
faculty of experiences the mind is capable of. The imagination and understanding revolve in a
state of cognitive harmony. The aesthetic pleasure arises from the feeling of the free play of
the powers of representation in a continuing experience which is indeterminate: the mind
does not settle on a concept which adequately covers the object. This judgement of taste,
Kant states, brings together the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the
concept uniting representations.12 It is the only judgement we are truly free to make, and
unlike the good, is not logical, but aesthetic. When an object is judged as beautiful, it is a
reference to its representation and our feeling of free delight. While Kant puts forward
comprehensive and seemingly resolved explanations, there are difficulties that remain. Ted
Cohen asks according to Kant, both cognitive faculties are at work in the execution of a
judgement of taste. The question is, what does the understanding do?13 All we know of
understanding is that it regulates the imagination. When its not doing that, what is it doing? I
would also ask how can Kants theories regarding this interplay of imagination and
understanding ever be objectively proven, if all we are aware of is a feeling of aesthetic
pleasure? Again, these are issues left open in the interpretation of Kants ideas.

12 Kant, p.58.
13 Ted Cohen, Three Problems in Kants Aesthetics, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol.42,
no.1, January 2002, p.1.

Finally, Kant distinguishes judgements of the beautiful from judgements of the agreeable and
good by comparing them in terms of objectivity and subjectivity: whether they claim
universal validity or not. The agreeable, as opposed to other judgements, is purely subjective
-a reality that is recognized without expecting others to concur. Kant also describes how
judgements of the good are objectively valid; these judgements hold for every reasonable
being, due to their logical component. Whereas with judgements of the beautiful, there is
again an added level of intricacy. We all share common mental functioning, and are each
capable of experiencing harmonious free play of the imagination and understanding. Because
of this, there is a tendency to project the subjective feeling of cognitive harmony onto the
object of beauty, which we naturally presuppose is a source of universal delight. This forms a
paradox which Kant names the Antinomy of Taste: aesthetic judgements are true only on an
individual basis, as beauty comes with no set properties, yet our judgement lays claim to
necessary validity for everyone.14 David Stern reveals another complication, stating this
claim to necessity is a sure sign that concepts play a role in the judgement. But this is
immediately counterbalanced by the claim that the concepts in question cannot be
determined.15 This essentially means that aesthetic disagreements can never be resolved, due
to the very nature of judgements of taste; there is no means of verifying beauty. Although
there is no solid proof of Kants concepts, by demonstrating the varying objectivity and
subjectivity, Kant further differentiates judgements of the beautiful from judgements of the
agreeable and the good.

Immanuel Kant distinguishes judgements of the beautiful from judgements of the agreeable
and judgements of the good by clearly expressing the differences in each and how they
compare. An analysis of each judgements properties, such as whether they are interested or
14 David Stern, Are Disagreements about Taste Possible? A Discussion of Kants Antinomy
of Taste, The Iowa Review, vol.21, no.2, Spring 1991, p. 69.
15 Ibid, p.69.

disinterested, the cognitive faculties at play, and the universal validity or subjectivity, allows
for a full grasp of how they differentiate. Kant also illustrates the inner workings of aesthetic
pleasure, as the mind revolves in a state of cognitive harmony how beauty is in us and not
the object. Although Kants theories disclose the importance of why there are arguments
surrounding the question of beauty, there are many open ends that cause ambiguities, which
due to the nature of aesthetics, are difficult to resolve.

Bibliography

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no.1, January 2002, pp.1-12.

Davies, Stephen. Aesthetic Judgements, Artworks and Functional Beauty, The

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Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgment, 1-10 (trans. Meredith), Oxford University
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Kneller, Jane. Kants Concept of Beauty, History of Philosophy Quarterly, University of

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