Bhu' M M M C C 2016: Team Code-Op

TEAM CODE-OP
BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016
BEFORE THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF RHODO
IN THE MATTER OF:

SLP NO. 8015/2015
REPUBLIC OF RHODO.....PETITIONER
V.
DASHANAN MOTORS LIMITEDDEFENDANT
SLP NO. 031/2016

MAYA MEHTA ...PETITIONER
V.
STATE OF NORTHERN PROVINCE ..DEFENDANT
Memorial for Petitioners
-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... V
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...................................................................................... VIII
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................... IX
ISSUES RAISED...................................................................................................................... XIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS............................................................................................. XIV
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED....................................................................................................... 1
I.
THAT THE SLPS ARE MAINATINABLE .................................................................... 1
II. THAT THE IMPUGNED GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE SHOULD NOT BE

ANULLED ................................................................................................................................. 3
A. THAT THE INTENT OF THE DIRECTIVE IS TO UPHOLD THE RIGHT TO LIFE
OF THE CITIZENS OF THE COUNTRY ............................................................................. 3
B. THAT THE DIRECTIVE ISSUED WAS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE
DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY .................................................................. 6
C. THAT THE IMPUGNED DIRECTIVE WAS IN KEEPING WITH THE MUNICIPAL
LAWS OF THE COUNTRY ................................................................................................... 8
D. THAT THE IMPUGNED DIRECTIVE WAS IN PURSUANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ..................................... 8
E. THAT THE IMPUGNED DIRECTIVE WAS NOT IN VIOLATION OF ANY
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.................................................................................................... 11
III.
THAT MORE COMPENSATION SHOULD BE AWARDED FOR THE
POLLUTION CAUSED BY DML......................................................................................... 14
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[Memorial for Petitioner]
IV.
THAT A WRIT OF MANDAMUS SHOULD BE ISSUED TO THE STATE
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD TO CLOSE THE PLANT OF DML ALONG

RIVER ASLI............................................................................................................................ 20
A. THAT THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE NATIVES HAS BEEN INFRINGED BY THE
STATE ................................................................................................................................... 20
B. THAT THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT WAS ERRONEOUS ..................... 24
PRAYER ................................................................................................................................... XVI
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION
EXPANSION
Section
Sections
Paragraph
Paragraphs
&
And
AIR
All India Reporter
Anr.
Another
Art.
Article
ED.
Edition
EPA
Environment Protection Act
Honble
Honorable
MoEF
Ministry of Environment and Forest
NGT
National Green Tribunal
UDHR
United Declaration of Human Rights
Ors.
Others
IUCN
International Union for Conservation of

Nature
WWF
World Wildlife Fund
PCB
Pollution Control Board
SBCB
State Pollution Control Board
MBCF
Mohana Biodiversity Conservation Forum
Rhodo
Republic of Rhodo
DML
Dashanan Motors Limited
HC
High Court of Shivpuri
PIL
Public Interest Litigation
SC
Supreme Court
SCC
SCC Supreme Court Cases

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UOI
Union of India
v.
Versus
Vol.
Volume
W.P.
Writ Petition
SLP
Special Leave Petition
DPSP
Directive Principle of State Policy
DPSPs
Directive Principles of State Policy
IV | P a g e
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu, AIR 1999 SC 812 ................................ 17,25
B.L. Waddehra(Dr.) v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2969. .......................................................... 4
Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 3268 ............................................................... 7
Basheshar Nath v. I.T. Commisioner AIR 1959 SC 149 (158). ................................................... 23
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 11 Ex 781 ........................................................... 15
Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore, AIR 1970 SC 2042 ........................ 6
Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932), AC 562, 618-19 ......................................................................... 15
Francis Coralite Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, Administrator, AIR 1981 SC 746 ............. 13
Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 1350 .................................. 7, 10, 24
J.C. Galstaun v. Dunia Lal, (1905) 9 CWN 617 ........................................................................... 17
Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, AIR 2005 SC 3180 ................................................................. 15
K.M. Chinnappa v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 724 ................................................................ 10
Keshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 ........................................................ 6
KR Shenoy v. Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, AIR 174 SC 2177 ............................... 10
Krishnan Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 128........................................................... 12
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 873 .............................................................. 7, 12
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388. ................................... 1, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13, 18, 19, 20
M.I. Builders(P) Ltd. V. Radhe Shyam Sahu, (1999) 6 SCC 532 ................................................ 10
Mehta M.C. v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 ...................................................................... 23
N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 867 ...................................................................... 5, 20
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664 .............................................. 11
Pathumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771 .......................................................................... 12
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Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel, AIR 1996 SC 2111 .................................................................. 15

Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. I.A.A.I., AIR 1979 SC 1628 ............................................................ 23
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 652. .............................. 5
Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, AIR 1990 SC 630............................................ 5
Sivarajan P.V. v. Union of India, AIR 1959 SC 556 .................................................................... 12
Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 1274 .......................................................................... 7
State of Kerala v. Thomas, N.M., AIR 1976 SC 490. .................................................................... 6
State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhartiya, AIR 1991 SC 286 .................................................................... 6
State of Maharashtra v. Rao Himmatbhai Narbheram, AIR 1970 SC 1157 ................................. 12
State of Orissa v. Radhey Shyam Meher, AIR 1995 SC 855 ....................................................... 12
State of Punjab v. Raja Ram, AIR 1981 SC 1694 ........................................................................ 23
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420 ..................................................... 4, 7, 23, 24
T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union Of India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 724 .................. 5, 11, 26
Tarun Bharat Sangh Alwar v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 514. .............................................. 25
Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 273. .............................................. 17
Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178. ............................................ 5
Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 990 ................................................. 5, 23
Zee Telefilms Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677 .......................................................... 23
BOOKS
A. DESAI, ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE (2ND ED. 2002).
DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (8TH ED. 2009).
DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (14TH ED. 2009).
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6TH ED. 2010).
P. LEELAKRISHNAN., ENVIRONMENTAL CASE LAW BOOK (2ND ED. 2006).
P. S. JASWAL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2006).

VI | P a g e
S. K. SARKAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (2ND ED.2006).
S. SHANTHAKUMAR, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2008).
SHANTHAKUMAR, S., INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2008).
SUMEET MALIK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2012).
V. N.SHUKLA , CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (11TH ED. 2008).

STATUTES AND ACTS
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.
WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1974

LEXICONS
BRIAM A. GARNER,BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (10TH ED. 2014).
P RAMANATHAAIYAR, THE MAJOR LAW LEXICON 3531 (4THED 2010).
SALLY WEHMEIER, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNERS DICTIONARY (7TH ED. 2005).
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioners humbly approach the Honble Supreme Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution of Republic of Rhodo.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
-THE BACKGROUNDDashanan Motors Limited (hereinafter referred as DML) was initially established as a public
sector enterprise after the independence of Republic of Rhodo (hereinafter referred to as Rhodo)
in the mid-twentieth century. Its flagship product was Pushpak, and buses named Garuda which
became the preferred means of mass transit. The sole and principal manufacturing unit of DML
is situated in the suburbs of the capital city of Northern Province, Shivpuri on the banks of the
River Asli and it remained profitably operational for the first few decades of its existence.
In the meantime, there was a growing concern in the international community regarding the
degradation of environment, which led to various international treaties and conferences on
environmental safety norms in which Rhodo was an active participant.
In 1991, Rhodo, faced with an impending foreign exchange and balances of payment crisis,
relaxed its import regime, which resulted in the entry of foreign automobile companies into
Rhodo and people started opting for their products over DMLs products. Thus, sales dipped for
DML and the government intervened by setting up ancillary units (tyre, lube & lubricant, paint &
coolant) to manufacture the spare parts onsite, and injected funds to create updated and efficient
components for the automobiles.
The condition of DML, however, did not improve and its disinvestment process started in 2005,
at the end of which DKS Enterprises held 30%, VS Motors held 21% and 49% was held by the
government. After the private acquisition of DML, there has been a consistent rise in the value of
the stock on the National Stock Exchange.
-THE CONTROVERSIESA. The factory of DML, ever since its inception, discharged all its trade effluents in the river Asli.
Fifty miles down the river from where the factory is situated, the river Asli created a delta the
Mohana which is an internationally recognised important biosphere reserve.
In 2015, certain drastic changes were observed in the flora and fauna, and the health of the
natives of this region
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i. The over-ground breathing roots of the deltaic mangroves were found plugged with
sludge resulting in withering and death of vast patches of mangrove forests.
ii.
Bloated bodies of dead riverine dolphins unique to the Mohana delta, which were
a special and endangered variety, floated up on the shores.

iii.
The natives started complaining of having developed black sores on various parts
of the body and shortness of breath.

The Mohana Biodiversity Conservation Forum (MBCF) conducted an exhaustive research to
elicit the reason for these detrimental changes, which revealed that the water of the river
contained various hazardous chemicals, some of the major pollutants being sulphur and heavy
metals which could have been the cause of death of the dolphins and the black-sore disease.
It averred that the major reason for presence of the hazardous chemicals beyond the tolerable
limits in the river was due to the emission of effluents by DML and opined that it was
responsible for such environmental deterioration. Their findings were independently confirmed
by ecological studies conducted by researchers of international eminence.
Maya Mehta, a prominent green crusader, took up the cause of the MBCF and demanded a
thorough inspection of the trade effluents and plant facilities of the DML or a complete closure
of the plant until such findings came out, but no action was taken.
B. The government of Republic of Rhodo had switched to the Euro IV norms in 2010, and had
declared to opt for Euro V norms by 2015 and Euro VI norms by 2020. At the end of 2014, the
government decided to skip directly to Euro VI norms by 2020.
By mid-2015, the air pollution levels in the country had risen dauntingly and the government,
after proper consideration and deliberation, and under the influence of various environmental
conservation pressure groups, opted to switch from Euro IV to Euro VI norms from 1 January
2016. It issued a directive to that effect in October 2015 strictly ordering all automobile
manufacturing companies to desist manufacture and sale of all vehicles which do not comply
with the new norms.
The DML manufactured only three vehicles namely Pushpak Hatchback and Pushpak Sedan
among cars and Garuda Premium bus which were non-compliant. The Board of Directors of
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DML held a meeting on 1 November 2015 at which it was found that necessary modifications of
the products would require at least eight months, and till then, they would have to lay off
workers and forced to stop both manufacturing and sale of their products, incurring huge losses.
-THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGSA. Ms. Mehta filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the HC on 16 November 2015. She cited
expert analyses on the effluent and emission figures and photographic and documentary evidence
of the morphological and physiological changes in the deltaic ecosystem. She alleged the reason
for the drastic shift in the ecological balance of the deltaic region to be the discharge of noxious
effluents by the DML plant. She sought to recover damages from the DML to the natives
suffering from black sores and a writ of mandamus to be issued to the State Pollution Control
Board (SPCB) to close the DML plant.
The HC directed the SPCB to conduct an examination of the trade effluents discharged by the
plant and report the same to the court within 3 weeks.
The HC, in its final judgment dated 21 December 2015, held that the report of the PCB revealed
that effluents discharged by the plant contained many chemicals beyond the prescribed limits.
After this examination, the Court ordered the company to pay damages worth Rs.10 crores to the
aggrieved natives. It also opined that if the plant was closed, it would render about 45000
employees unemployed, and that it would leave around 2 lac family members of these employees
in misery, hunger and squalor. Hence, it did not issue a directive to shut the plant.
Ms. Mehta and the aggrieved natives were dissatisfied with the damages awarded and in the
subsequent week, she filed a SLP before the SC seeking enhancement of the awarded damages
and closure of the plant, which was admitted under SLP 031/2016.
B. The directors of DML considered the government directive to be violative of their fundamental
rights and moved the High Court of Shivpuri (hereinafter referred to as HC) on 1 December 2015
seeking the issuance of writ of mandamus to get the impugned directive annulled. The writ
petition was admitted as WP(C) 9813R2015.
The petitioner alleged that the directive was unconstitutional as it violated their freedom to trade
and profession and the right to livelihood of their employees and the HC ruled in their favour.
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The aggrieved Central Government filed an SLP the Supreme Court of Rhodo (hereinafter
referred to as SC) on 22 December 2015 which was admitted as SLP 8015/2015.
C. After a couple of hearings, SC decided to club SLP 031/2016 and SLP 8015/2015 as they had the
same subject matter and the same parent company, and because Ms. Mehta was the council for
the central government in the latter.
The SC has set both of these cases to be decided before a division bench on 1st April 2016 for
final hearing.
XII | P a g e
ISSUES INVOLVED
I.
II.
WHETHER THE SLPS ARE MAINTAINABLE?
WHETHER THE IMPUGNED GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE SHOULD BE ANULLED?
III.
WHETHER MORE COMPENSATION SHOULD BE AWARDED FOR THE POLLUTION CAUSED BY DML?
IV.
WHETHER A WRIT OF MANDAMUS SHOULD BE ISSUED TO THE STATE POLLUTION CONTROL

BOARD TO CLOSE THE PLANT OF DML ALONG RIVER ASLI?
XIII | P a g e
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
THAT THE SLPS ARE MAINTAINABLE
It is humbly submitted the SLPs filed by the Government and Ms. Maya Mehta are maintainable
in the interests of the general public.
II.
THAT THE IMPUGNED GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE SHOULD NOT BE

ANNULLED
Firstly, the intent of the impugned Government directive was to uphold the right to life of the
citizens of the country.
Secondly, the impugned directive had been issued in reference with various international
environmental protocols.
Thirdly, the impugned directive is in consonance of the Directive Principles of State Policy
(DPSPs).
It is, therefore, humbly submitted that the impugned directive cannot be held to be arbitrary and
should not be annulled.
III.
DELETERIOUS EFFECTS RESULTING DUE TO THE POLLUTION CAUSED BY

THE DML PLANT
It is humbly submitted that compensation awarded by the Honble High Court for the deleterious
effects resulting due to the pollution caused by the DML plant is inadequate and the amount of
compensation awarded should be increased.
XIV | P a g e
IV.

RIVER ASLI
Firstly, the right to life of the natives of the Mohana region and the citizens of the country at
large is being infringed due to the violation of their right to a clean environment caused by the
failure of the SPCB to exercise its statutory functions and powers.
Secondly, the the decision of the Honble High Court should be reversed as it has erred in its
judgement.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I.
THAT THE SLPS ARE MAINATINABLE
1. It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the Special Leave Petition no.
SLP 8015/2015 is being filed by the Government of Republic of Rhodo as per the provisions
of Article 136 of the Constitution. It is respectfully submitted that the Special Leave to appeal
is sought against the judgement of the High Court in the writ petition no. WP(C) 98133/2015,
wherein the High Court has erred on substantial questions of law. It is also submitted that in
absence of any interference of this Honble Court, substantial and grave injustice will result
and the case has features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision of the
Honble High Court. Moreover, the exercise of Article 136 cannot be limited merely because
there is an alternative remedy available to the aggrieved party.
2. The Honble High Court annulled the Government directive, seeking to necessitate
compliance with regard to the switch to Euro VI norms. The directive of the government was
aimed at reducing pollution by issuing stricter emission norms. The rise in the pollution
levels to daunting extent necessitated this directive. Article 48A of the Constitution has
conferred, on the Government, the DPSP (DPSP) to protect and improve the environment.
The directive was also in consonance with the major environmental conventions and treaties,
of which Rhodo is an active participant and signatory.
3. The annulment of the directive, by the Honble High Court, was in utter disregard to the
environment and the laws. It was passed without taking into account the deteriorating
environmental conditions in the country. Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has the power to interfere in cases of serious miscarriage of justice. This is an
extraordinary circumstance in as much as the annulment of the Government directive can
have far-reaching and irreversible impact on the environment.
4. It is, moreover, humbly submitted that in the PIL filed by Ms. Maya Mehta, although the
Honble High Court held that DML was involved in polluting the river Asli, it refused to
close down the factory. It is submitted that the factory cannot be allowed to continue merely
on the grounds that it would lead to loss of employment of the employees1 and therefore, the
SLP 031/2016 has been filed by Ms. Mehta. DML has been involved in discharging trade
1
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1037.

1|Page
effluents in the river beyond permissible limits, since its inception, in an utter disregard for
law and the natives of the region. The pollution has led to many deleterious changes in the
health of the natives.
5. It is respectfully submitted that in order to further the ends of justice, the damages that have
been awarded to the aggrieved natives by the Honble High Court need to be increased not
merely to compensate them for the medical treatment but also to act as a deterrent for DML
from further discharging trade effluents beyond permissible limits.
6. Humbly contending the aforementioned arguments before the Honble Supreme Court in the
following contentions, it is submitted that both the SLPs filed before the Honble Court are
maintainable in the interests of the general public.
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II.
THAT THE IMPUGNED GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE SHOULD NOT BE

ANULLED
7.
It is respectfully submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the impugned directive
issued by the government should not be annulled. To contend this, a two-pronged argument is
humbly presented to the Honble Court as follows.
A. THAT THE INTENT OF THE DIRECTIVE IS TO UPHOLD THE RIGHT TO
LIFE OF THE CITIZENS OF THE COUNTRY
8. It is humbly submitted to the Honble Supreme Court that the intent of the directive issued by
the government should be primarily taken into consideration in the present case, which
becomes clear from the facts stated as follows
i. The government had switched to the Euro IV norms in 2010 and declared that they
would switch to the Euro V norms by 2015 and to the Euro VI norms by 2020.
ii. The government decided in 2014 that they would skip the Euro V norms and switch to
the Euro VI norms in 2020.
iii. There was a daunting rise in the air pollution levels of the country by mid 2015 and
the concerned government, after proper consideration and deliberation, and also
influenced by the various pressure groups working for environmental conservation,
declared that they would switch to the Euro VI norms by 1 January 2016.
iv. The government issued a directive to this effect in October 2015 and strictly ordered
all automobile companies to desist the manufacture and sale of those vehicles which
were non-compliant with the new norms.
9. It is contended on behalf of the government that the action of the government was imperative
in the circumstances that had arisen. The condition of air pollution in the country was so
grave that some of the countrys leading urban centres had found a place in the list of the
most polluted cities on earth by emission and particulate matter count. In such an emergent
situation, it is impossible for either the government or the various pressure groups working
for environmental conservation to not be concerned about the environmental health of the
nation and the quality of life of its citizens.
3|Page
10. It is, therefore, submitted that this directive was issued to preserve the essence of the right to
life under2 of the Constitution of India, which states
11. Article 21 talks about the right to life and personal liberty which cannot be restricted except
reasonably by procedure established by law. Here, the definition of life has been extended to
something more than the survival or animal existence and now includes all those aspects of a
mans life which make it worth living. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Maneka
Gandhi v Union of India3, had expanded the scope of Article 21 on the same lines. It would
include all those aspects of life which go to make a mans life meaningful complete and
worth living.
12. As a result of the liberal interpretation of the words life and liberty in the context of this
Article, the scope of Article 21 has been extended so much so that it has almost become a
residuary right.
13. The most remarkable feature of the expansion of Article 21 is that many of the nonjusticiable Directive Principles embodied in Part IV of the Constitution have now been
resurrected as enforceable fundamental rights through judicial activism. For instance, the
right to pollution-free water and air is now considered a fundamental right of the citizens of
the country. This was judged by the court in the case of Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar,4
Right to live is a fundamental right under Art 21 of the Constitution and it
includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment
of life.
14. Moreover, it has also been held in the judgement of B.L. Waddehra (Dr.) v Union of
India,5that the residents have the constitutional as well as statutory right to live in a clean
city. The government, in this case, has issued the directive to ensure this fundamental right of
the citizens, because there was already a daunting rise in the levels of air pollution, thereby
reducing the quality of life of the people.
15. A corollary of this development is that while the negative language of the Article and word
deprived was supposed to impose upon the State the negative duty not to interfere with the
2
Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
4
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420.
5
B.L. Waddehra(Dr.) v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2969.
3
4|Page
life or liberty of an individual without the sanction of law, activist judges have now imposed
a positive obligation6 upon the State to take steps for ensuring to the individual a better
enjoyment of his life and dignity through steps like the maintenance and improvement of
public health7 and the elimination of water and air pollution8. Here, the government directive
aims at improving the present deteriorating state of the environment, thereby fulfilling a
stated fundamental obligation of a state.
16. In the case of Shantistar Builders, it was held that right to life includes the right to decent
environment.9 Thus, the right to clean environment is now a fundamental right which was
futher asserted in the case of N.D. Jayal v. Union of India,10
In a catena of cases we have reiterated that right to clean environment is a
guaranteed fundamental right.
17. The right to have a living atmosphere congenial to human existence is a right to life. Thus,
the State is under a fundamental obligation to protect and improve the environment11,
especially the most vital necessities like the air, water and soil, which cannot be allowed to be
misused and polluted so as to reduce the quality of life enjoyed by others. It is the risk of
harm to the environment that the government had taken into consideration when it issued the
directive to prevent air pollution through more stringent rules.
18. The risk of harm to the environment or to human health is to be decided in public interest,
according to the reasonable persons test. Life, public health and ecology have priority over
unemployment and loss of revenue, but a balance has to be struck between development and
environmental protection12. In the present case, this balance has in no way been disturbed by
the government directive. In the directive, the government does not ask for the closure of all
the automobile companies manufacturing vehicles non-compliant with the new norms, but for
the prohibition of sale of such vehicles for the improvement of the environment. Thus, the
government has tried to balance the need for development along with its fundamental
obligation to provide a clean environment for the citizens, but has prioritised the environment
Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 990.

Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178.
8
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 652.
9
Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, AIR 1990 SC 630.
10
N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 867.
11 T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union Of India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 724.
12
7
5|Page
preservation over the loss of employment and revenue, which are indirect results of the
implementation of the directive.
19. Hence, it is submitted that the government directive cannot be considered arbitrary as the
sudden action that is taken is due to a emergent circumstances and it was the duty of the
government to place the rights of its citizens above anything else.
B. THAT THE DIRECTIVE ISSUED WAS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE
DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY
20. It is humbly submitted that the directive issued by the government is in consonance with the
DPSPs. It is further submitted that the government has issued this directive in compliance
with the Constitution13, which states that
21. Article 48A therefore, mandates that it is the duty of the State to apply these principles in
making laws and in understanding the scope and purport of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution, especially under the Articles 14 and 21, as well as the laws enacted by
the Parliament and the State Legislatures.
22. It is to be noted that there is no disharmony between the DPSPs and the Fundamental Rights,
because they supplement each other in aiming at the same goal of the establishment of a
welfare state, which is envisaged in the Preamble14. The Court in the judgement of Chandra
Bhawan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore15 held thatThe provisions of the Constitution are not erected as barriers' to progress. It is a
fallacy to think that in our Constitution there are only rights and no duties There
is no conflict between Part III and Part IV of
the Constitution which are
complementary and supplemental to each other.

23. Thus, they are not exclusionary but complementary to each other16. It is submitted that the
government directive issued also follows this principle because a DPSP was being used to
further the interests of the general public in accordance with a Fundamental Right, the Right
to Life.
13
Article 48A, Constitution of India, 1950.

Keshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
15
Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore, AIR 1970 SC 2042; State of Kerala v. Thomas,
N.M., AIR 1976 SC 490.
16
State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhartiya, AIR 1991 SC 286.
14
6|Page
24. It is submitted that whenever an action of the State is in consonance with the provisions laid
down in the DPSPs, the same is considered to be reasonable action, and also that even though
the implementation of a Directive Principle may cause hardship to a few individuals, it
should be upheld in the larger interests of the community17
The Act seems to implement one of the most important constitutional directives
contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India. If in this process a few individuals
suffer severe hardship that cannot be helped, for individual interests must yield to
the larger interests of the community or the country as indeed every noble cause
claims its martyr.
25. In the present case, the government has similarly issued the directive in the larger interests of
its citizens which gained priority over the rights of the employees of DML.
26. It is submitted that the provisions of Article 48A have to be construed as a part of the
principle of Article 21 of the Constitution18. Article 48A is to be read with Aritcle 51A and
these are fundamental in understanding the scope of Article 21.
27. DPSPs are generally not legally enforceable as is enumerated in Article 37 of the
Constitution19, which states
The provisions contained in this Part [Part IV] shall not be enforceable by any
court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the
governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these
principles in making laws.
28. Thus, reading Article 48A with the Article 2120, the Honble Supreme Court had concluded
that although the Article is not judicially enforceable by itself, it becomes enforceable
through the expansion of the interpretation of Article 21, which now guarantees right to clean
environment under the ambit of right to life.
17
Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 1274; Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 873.
Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 1350.
19
Id.
20
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420; Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 3268
18
7|Page
29. Hence, it is submitted that the directive issued by the government was in consonance with
Article 48A of the Constitution, which enumerates the Directive Principles for State Policy
and that inherently renders it to be a reasonable action on the part of the government.
C. THAT THE IMPUGNED DIRECTIVE WAS IN KEEPING WITH THE
MUNICIPAL LAWS OF THE COUNTRY
30. It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the impugned directive is in
keeping with the municipal laws of the country, namely, the Environmental Protection Act,
1986.
31. The Section 3 of the Environmental Protection Act, 1986 enumerates the power of the
Central Government to take measures to protect and improve the environment as follows
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Central Government shall have the
power to take all such measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the
purpose of protecting and improving the quality of the environment and
preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (1), such measures may include measures with respect to all or any of the
following matters, namely
(iv) laying down standards for emission or discharge of environmental pollutants
from various sources whatsoever:
32. This Section explicitly states that the Government can undertake any measure to protect and
improve the environment, including measures like laying down standards for emission, as has
been done in the impugned directive. It is thus submitted that this directive was issued under
the ambit of this Act.
D. THAT THE IMPUGNED DIRECTIVE WAS IN PURSUANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
33. It is respectfully submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the directive that was
issued by the government was in pursuance with the internationally established principles of
8|Page
environmental law, and should, therefore, be held to be in the best interests of the citizens as
well as the environment of the nation.
34. As has already been mentioned in the facts, Rhodo was an active participant21 in various
significant treaties, conferences and conventions such as Stockholm Conference, 1972, Kyoto
Protocol, 1992, Rio Summit, 1992, etc. but had subsequently passed various legislations to
that effect including an amendment to its Constitution.
35. It is thus contended that the government of Rhodo has always been active in pursuing
international principles for environmental law, and the impugned government directive was
also issued in pursuance of these principles.
i.
Adherence To The Precautionary Principle
36. It is submitted that the impugned directive was issued keeping the this principle in mind. The
Precautionary Principle was stated in Article 7 of the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on
Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, May 199022. It reads as followsEnvironmental measures must anticipate, prevent and stack the causes of
environment degradation. Where there are threats of serious and irreversible
damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as reason for postponing
measures to prevent environmental degradation.
37. The Precautionary Principle requires that, if there is a strong suspicion that a certain activity
may have environmentally harmful consequences, it is better to control that activity now
rather than to wait for incontrovertible scientific evidence. This principle is expressed in the
Rio Declaration, which stipulates that, where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
38. In the landmark case of M.C Mehta v. Kamal Nath23, the Honble Supreme Court held that
The "Precautionary Principle" - in the context of the municipal law - means:
21
Moot Proposition, 5.
Article 7, Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, May 1990.
23
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388.
22
9|Page
(i) Environment measures - by the State Government and the statutory

authorities - must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental
degradation.
(ii) Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
(iii) The "Onus of proof" is on the actor or the developer/industrialist to snow
that this action is environmentally benign.
39. Thus, the directive issued by the government was under the ambit of this principle as there
was an emergent threat to public health due to the daunting rise in the levels of air pollution
in the country, and a precautionary step was required to prevent the same from continuing.
ii.
Adherence To The Doctrine Of Public Trust
40. The Doctrine of Public Trust was first enunciated by the US Courts. The doctrine says that
natural resources meant for public use and enjoyment are held by the State as the trustee of
the public, and can only be disposed of in a manner that is consistent with the nature of such a
trust24. The State, as a trustee, is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources25. This
means development and environmental protection should go hand in hand, according to this
principle.
41. The doctrine is first mentioned in M.C. Mehta v Kamal Nath26 where the Supreme Court
applied it with regards to the protection and preservation of natural resources. In K. M.
Chinnappa v. Union of India27, the Supreme Court held that the pristine glory of the natural
resources cannot be allowed to be eroded or encroached unless the courts find it necessary in
good faith for public good and in the public interest.
24
Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 1350; M.I. Builders(P) Ltd. V. Radhe Shyam
Sahu, (1999) 6 SCC 532; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388.
25
KR Shenoy v. Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, AIR 174 SC 2177.
26
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388.
27
K.M. Chinnappa v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 724.
10 | P a g e
iii.
Adherence To The Principle Of Sustainable Development
42. It is submitted that the Principle of Sustainable Development was introduced by the World
Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 where it was defined as
Development that meets the needs of the present generation without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
43. The Supreme Court of India observed that the principle of sustainable development should be
followed and that there is a need to find a balance between the developmental needs and
environmental degradation28.
44. It is submitted that the adherence to this principle is now a constitutional requirement and it is
the duty of the State under the Constitution to devise and implement a coordinated
programme to meet its obligation of sustainable development based on inter-generational
equity29.
E. THAT THE IMPUGNED DIRECTIVE WAS NOT IN VIOLATION OF ANY
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
45. It is respectfully submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the impugned directive
was not in violation of any of the Fundamental Rights as mentioned under the Part III of the
Constitution of India. It is further submitted that the impugned directive imposes only
reasonable restrictions on the Fundamental Rights granted to the citizens of the country.
i.
That There Was No Violation Of Right To Trade
46. It is submitted that there was no violation of the Right to Trade guaranteed to the Directors of
DML under Article 19(1)(g)30 since the restriction imposed by the directive was reasonable.
47. It is further submitted that the restriction imposed by the impugned directive was that all
automobile companies were prohibited from the manufacture and sale of all vehicles which
did not comply with the newly introduced Euro VI norms. It is contended that it was imposed
in public interest due to the daunting rise in air pollution in 2015.
28
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664.

T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2008) 2 SCC 222.
30
Constitution of India.
29
11 | P a g e
48. It is also submitted that the directive is not in violation of Article 19 because it satisfies the
test of reasonableness. To find out if a restriction is reasonable, one has to take into
consideration
a. The DPSPs.
b. Prevailing social values as well as social needs which are intended to be
satisfied by the restrictions.
c. Restrictions must not be of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the
requirement of the interests of the general public.
d. There must be a direct and proximate nexus or reasonable connection between
the restrictions imposed and the object sought to be achieved.31
49. It is contended that in the present case, the directive is in consonance with the DPSPs and
such a restriction can be considered reasonable within the meaning of Clauses (2)-(6) of
Article 1932; that it is in keeping with the social need of reducing the quantum of air
pollution; that it is not in excess of the public interest since the Government is trying to
protect the citizens from the harmful health effects of the rising levels of air pollution by
introducing the Euro VI norms and a restriction which is commensurate with the need for
protection of the public cannot be said to be unreasonable33, even though it causes hardship in
individual cases34.
50. It is further contended that there is a direct and proximate link between the directive issued
and its object, that is, to control the rising quantum of air pollution in the country since the
implementation of the Euro VI norms will directly attack one of the causes of the rising levels
of air pollution and help in restricting the rise in the near future. It is, therefore, submitted that
the restriction has a rational connection with the object sought to be achieved by the law.
51. It is also contended that a restriction cannot be regarded as unreasonable merely because the
object could have been feasibly achieved by an alternative scheme35 or because, in a given
31
Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of India 1 257 (14th edition, 2015).
Pathumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771.
33
State of Maharashtra v. Rao Himmatbhai Narbheram, AIR 1970 SC 1157.
34
Sivarajan P.V. v. Union of India, AIR 1959 SC 556.
35
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 873.
32
12 | P a g e
case, it operates harshly on a person or some persons36, and in such a case, a Government
policy in public interest would override the business interest of an individual37.
52. It is submitted that in the present case too, the technicalities of the impugned directive or its
interference with the business interests of an individual or some individuals will not render it
unconstitutional.
ii.
That There Is No Violation Of Right To Life
53. It is submitted that there is no violation of the Right to Life of the employees of the DML
under Article 21 of the Constitution under the ambit of Right to Livelihood.
54. It is further submitted that Right to Livelihood is now an aspect under the extended
interpretation of this Article which defines life as something more than survival or animal
existence, thereby including the right to human dignity38. Since, to live with dignity, a person
should have a minimum income, hence, the Right to Livelihood is incorporated in the Right
to Life.
55. It is now contended that the restriction imposed on DML is not violative of Article 21 since
life, public health and ecology have priority over unemployment and loss of revenue as held
by the Honble Court in the case M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Kanpur Tanneries)39 .
56. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned directive is not in violation of Article 21 because
the interest of the public should always be placed above the interests of a few individuals.
36
Krishnan Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 128.

State of Orissa v. Radhey Shyam Meher, AIR 1995 SC 855.
38
Francis Coralite Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, Administrator, AIR 1981 SC 746.
39
37
13 | P a g e
III.

POLLUTION CAUSED BY DML
57. It is humbly submitted before this Honble Court that due to the discharge of effluents by the
DML plant in the river Asli, it has led to the degradation of flora and fauna and the health of
the natives in the surrounding regions. The enterprise, since its inception, has discharged all
its effluents in the river which has led to the changes being observed in the Mohana region.
The alteration has been seen in three fieldsi. Firstly, it has affected the flora, causing to the over ground breathing roots of the
mangroves to be plugged with sludge. This has led to the withering and death of the
mangroves.
ii. Secondly, it has affected the fauna of the region. The endangered riverine dolphins
which are unique to the Mohana region have been found dead and their bodies have
floated up on the shore.
iii. Thirdly, deleterious changes have also been observed in the health of the natives.
They have started complaining about shortness of breath and have even developed
black sore on various parts of the body.
58. Further, it is respectfully submitted before the court that the researches carried on by
observing scientists and activists of the MBCF found out the major pollutants of the river to
be sulphur and heavy metals and concluded that this was due to the effluent discharge by the
DML plant. It has further been concluded that this could have led to the death of the
endangered dolphins. The findings of MBCF were even confirmed by independent ecological
studies which had been conducted by eminent international researchers.
59. In the light of the above findings, it is further submitted that DML was also negligent in so
far as the discharge of trade effluents in the river Asli, beyond the permissible limits, is
concerned.
60. Negligence has been defined as the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
14 | P a g e
conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do40.
61. This definition of negligence was extended by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of
Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel41 and has been invariably cited in Indian cases42. In the
judgement, the court propounded three constituents of negligence viz., legal duty to take care,
breach of the said duty and consequential damages.
62. It is humbly submitted that the respondents, DML, owed a duty of care towards the natives of
the Mohana region. DML had set up ancillary units including a tyre, lube and lubricant
factory and a paint & coolant manufacturing unit. These units involve the use of toxic
materials.
63. In furtherance of the above submission, it is contended that it was reasonably foreseeable by
DML that the discharge of toxic effluents in the river Asli can be detrimental to the health of
the natives of the region. This principle of foreseeability was laid down by Lord Atkin in the
case of Donoghue v. Stevenson43. As Lord Atkin said, You may take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your
neighbour.44
64. It is humbly submitted that due to the noxious trade effluents discharged by DML, deleterious
effects became evident on the health of the natives of the region. The natives developed black
sores on various parts of the body and suffered from shortness of breath. These changes were
due to the presence of sulphur and other heavy metals which were way beyond the tolerable
limits in the river Asli. The findings of MBCF, which had been confirmed by international
researchers, have stated that DML was responsible for the presence of sulphur and heavy
metals in the water and, thus, for the adverse effects on the natives. It is also submitted that
the report of the PCB had also held that DML was responsible for the pollution of the river
and the Honble High Court held that that was the cause of the deleterious effects in the
Mohana region. From these facts, it is contended that there was a breach of duty on the part
of DML as it failed to exercise reasonable degree of care while dealing with toxic waste.
40
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 11 Ex 781.

Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel, AIR 1996 SC 2111.
42
Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, AIR 2005 SC 3180.
43
Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 AC 562.
44
Id.
41
15 | P a g e
65. It is contended that the breach on DMLs part was the direct cause of the adverse effects on
the health of the natives. There is a clear link between the two incidents as has been
established by the reports of the PCB, since there was no other incident in that time period
which could have contributed to the effects that have been observed in the Mohana region.
66. The failure to exercise reasonable degree of care that DML owed to the natives while dealing
with toxic effluents, and the consequential effect establishes a clear case of negligence on the
part of DML.
67. As already submitted, the report of the PCB submitted to the Honble High Court revealed
that the plant has been discharging effluents into the river that contain various chemicals way
beyond the prescribed limits and the Honble Court correctly concluded from the same that it
was due to this heavy discharge of pollutants in the river that the flora and fauna of the
Mohana region was badly affected and the natives had developed the black sore disease, and
held that it was necessary to grant compensation to such natives. Respectfully submitting to
the reasoning of the Honble Court, it is contended that the damages awarded by the court
were inadequate with reference to the facts of the present case.
68. It is humbly submitted before that court that the compensation granted by the Honble High
Court of Judicature of the Northern Province of Shivpuri, that is, Rs. 10 crore is insufficient
on the following grounds
a. The compensation awarded by the Honbe High Court was arbitrary because it did not
rely on any assessment of damages by any authoritative body, thereby not
appreciating various factors which require immediate attention and require
additional funds to be resolved. It is contended that such assessment be done before
any award of compensation.
b. It is respectfully submitted that the compensation is insufficient since it has been
granted to the natives only on the ground of their suffering from the black sore
disease and not from the shortness of breath which is also a result of the pollution
caused by the DML plant.
c. This compensation has only been granted to the aggrieved natives of the region, but
no compensation has been granted for the degradation of flora and fauna of the
Mohana region. Additional compensation needs to be paid for protection of the
16 | P a g e
mangroves as well as the endangered species of riverine dolphins present in the area.
In the landmark case of Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India45 the court
held that,
In some cases the reaction manifested contemporaneously and in others
the effect was to manifest itself much later.
So, in the present scenario, the Court should grant compensation for any possible
reactions of the pollutants on other people who are not yet affected but due to
exposure, their health may deteriorate.
d. There is a need to prevent similar behaviour in future on the part of defendant. Hence,
there is a need to award exemplary damages with an objective of punishing the
wrongdoer for his outrageous nature or conduct which is reflected in his persistence
recurrence of the wrongful activity46. This is evident from the fact that DML has
been discharging its trade effluents in river Asli since its inception, in an utter
disregard for law.
e. Another basis for demanding additional compensation is that the pollution caused by
the company has disturbed the ecological harmony of the region and the original
quality of life of the flora and fauna needs to be restored. The restoration process of
the habitat will require additional funds, for which the compensation paid by DML
should be increased.
f. Additional funds are needed to restore the purity of the river Asli, which has been
polluted by DML since its inception. So, to refurbish the water back to its original
state, the damages being awarded should be increased. This would lead to creation
of safe environment for the natives to survive. The most basic element needed for
survival is water and in the case of A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof.
M.V.Nayudu47, the same was held,
Thus, the right to access to drinking water is fundamental to life and there is a
duty on the State under Article 21 to provide clean drinking water to its citizens.
45
Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 273.

J.C. Galstaun v. Dunia Lal, (1905) 9 CWN 617.
47
A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu, AIR 1999 SC 812.
46
17 | P a g e
69. Further, it can even be said that the financial position of a company should not matter while
determining the quantum of compensation. The company responsible for discharging the
effluents should not be allowed to take the excuse that due to financial constraints the
damages cannot be paid and the exploitation of the environment continues. A similar idea had
been stressed in the case of M.C Mehta v. Union of India (Kanpur tanneries)48 where the
Apex Court held that
The financial capacity of the tanneries should be considered as irrelevant while
requiring them to establish primary treatment plants.
70. Finally, the aggrieved natives are dissatisfied with the present amount of compensation
because they feel that the gravity of the black sore disease is being undermined by the
Honble High Court. The black sore disease is a disease of serious gravity and a large amount
of funds would be required to treat all the natives affected. The Court should also consider
the pain and trauma that the natives have undergone without any mistake or negligence of
their own. DML has been allowed to run regardless of the fact that it has been dumping the
waste in the river Asli and polluting it since the inception, for the motive of profit. But while
achieving its motive for profit it has caused mammoth harm to not only flora and fauna but
even human lives. In M.C Mehta v. Union of India49 that is the Oleum Gas Leak Case, a
Constitution Bench held that any enterprise which is involved hazardous activity can be
allowed to function only on the condition that it indemnifies all those who suffer on account
of such hazardous activity.
71. It is, moreover, contended that DML should be held liable under the Polluter Pays Principle,
which basically means that the producer of goods or other items should be responsible for the
cost of preventing or dealing with any pollution that the process causes. This involves
environmental cost as well as direct cost to the people or property. It also covers costs
incurred in avoiding pollution and not just the immediately tangible. In the case M.C. Mehta
v. Kamal Nath and Ors50., it was stated that
The Court while awarding damages also enforces the "POLLUTER PAYS
PRINCIPLE" which is widely accepted as a means of paying for the cost of
48

50
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, AIR 2000 SC 1997.
49
18 | P a g e
pollution and control. To put in other words, the wrongdoer, the polluter, is under
an obligation to make good the damage caused to the environment.
72. It is therefore submitted that since DML has been polluting the river Asli for so many years,
it should be held liable under this principle and the Court should levy exemplary damages
like it did in the case of M.C. Mehta v Kamal Nath51 by increasing the compensation granted
by the Honble High Court so as to deter other such flouting of environmental rules in the
future.
51
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, AIR 2000 SC 1997.

19 | P a g e
IV.

RIVER ASLI
73. It is humbly submitted to the Honble Supreme Court that a writ in the nature of mandamus
issued to the SPCB to order the closure of the plant of the DML situated along the river Asli
and discharging effluents in it, thereby causing widespread pollution. This issue shall be
contended from three perspectives which are stated as follows
A. THAT THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE NATIVES HAS BEEN INFRINGED BY
THE STATE
74. It is respectfully submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the right to life of the
natives of the Mohana region under Article 21 of the Constitution has been infringed. Article
21 of the Constitution states that
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.
75. In Article 21, the definition of life has been extended to something more than the survival or
animal existence and now includes all those aspects of a mans life which make it worth
living52. As a result of the liberal interpretation of the words life and liberty in the
context of this Article, the scope of Article 21 has been extended so much so that it has
almost become a residuary right.
76. It is contended that this infringement has taken place in the ambit of the right to a clean
environment, which has been recognised as an important aspect of the right to life, and as a
fundamental right in itself 53.
77. As mentioned in the facts, Ms. Mehta had sent a number of representations to the to the
SPCB and the concerned government authorities with detailed evidence of massive air and
water pollution caused by the DML plant and its widespread deleterious consequences on
both humans and nature, and demanded a thorough inspection of the trade effluents and the
plant facilities and a complete closure of the plant until such were published. However,
52
53
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.

N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 867.
20 | P a g e
neither was a thorough and substantive inquiry ordered by the PCB nor was an order of
closure of the plant issued.
78. It is, therefore, contended that the SPCB did not perform its statutory functions of regularly
inspecting trade effluents54 being discharged by industries as imposed by the Section 17(1)(f)
of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.
79. This Section imposes a function on the SPCB to inspect the effluent discharge of the
industries in the territory of the State and this function has not been performed by the SPCB
in the instant case.
80. It is also submitted that the Section 32 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 1974 provides the SPCB with the emergency powers of even completely prohibiting a
person from discharging any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter into the stream or well
or on land55 when it is evident to it that any polluting matter is present in any stream.
81. This Section empowers the SPCB to act in case it feels that there is the presence of any
emergency situation with reference to the pollution of any stream, which, according to the
definition given in the Act, includes rivers56.
82. It is also submitted that the SPCB has been provided with the powers to issue directions to
close down an industry, operation or process as per the Section 33A of the Water (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) Act, 197457.
83. It is also contended that although the Section 33 of the Water (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1974 contains the provision that the SPCB, on becoming aware of any
pollution taking place, can approach the judiciary for the issuance of an order restraining the
same. The Section 33 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 reads as
(1) Where it is apprehended by a Board that the water in any stream or well is
likely to be polluted by reason of the disposal or likely disposal of any matter in
such stream or well or in any sewer or on any land,
54
17(1)(f), Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.

32, Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.
56
2, Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1986.
57
33A, Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.
55
21 | P a g e
or otherwise, the Board may make all application to a court, not inferior to that of
a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class, for restraining
the person who is likely to cause such pollution from so causing.
84. In the present case, although Ms. Mehta had sent proof of the pollution being caused by the
DML plant to the SPCB, no action was taken was taken by them under the Sections 32, 33 or
33A. Thus, it is contended that the SPCB had not performed its duty to protect the
environment from pollution, and this led to the deprivation of the natives of the Mohana
region of a clean environment, thereby infringing their right to life.
85. It is, moreover, submitted that the Article 12 of the Constitution states that
In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the
Government and Parliament of India and the Government and Legislature of each
of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under
the control of the Government of India.
86. Thus, according to Article 12, a body would answer the definition of State for this Part if it is
financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under all pervasive control of
the government. The Article gives us an extended meaning to the words the State, which
will not only include the Executive and Legislative organs of the Union and the States, but
also local bodies as well as other authorities58 which include the instrumentalities or
agencies or bodies or institutions which discharge public functions of the governmental
character59.
87. It is submitted that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to treat such
authority which has been created by law and which has certain powers to make laws, to make
rules and regulations, to be included in the term other authorities as found in this Article60.
In the present case, since the PCBs are created under the Environment Protection Act, 1986,
the SPCB falls under the ambit of the term other authorities in the Article 12. Thus, it can
be held in the present case that the State, as interpreted from Article 12, is liable for the
violation of the right to a clean environment of the natives.
58
Basheshar Nath v. I.T. Commisioner AIR 1959 SC 149 (158).

Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. I.A.A.I., AIR 1979 SC 1628; State of Punjab v. Raja Ram, AIR 1981 SC 1694.
60
Zee Telefilms Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677.
59
22 | P a g e
88. The expansion of the ambit of Article 21 is has also caused many of the non-justiciable
Directive Principles embodied in Part IV of the Constitution to have been resurrected as
enforceable fundamental rights through judicial activism. For instance, the right to pollutionfree water and air61 is now considered a fundamental right of the citizens of the country. It is
this newly enumerated aspect of right to life that Ms. Mehta is contending to have been
violated.
89. A corollary of this development is that a positive obligation62 is now imposed upon the State
to take steps for ensuring to the individual a better enjoyment of his life and dignity through
steps like the maintenance and improvement of public health63 and the elimination of water
and air pollution64. In the SLP 031R2016, it is contended that the State fulfil this obligation
through its instrumentality, the State Pollution Control Board which has refused to utilise its
powers to protect the natives of the Mohana region from the deleterious effects of the
pollution caused by the DML plant although the same has already been brought to their
notice by Ms. Mehta.
90. It is submitted that the State owes some fundamental duties to its citizens which are
mentioned as the DPSPs under the Part IV of the Constitution of India. Thus, it is the
fundamental duty of the State under Article 48A of the Constitution to protect and improve
the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country65. Article 48A
mandates the duty of the State to apply these Principles in making laws and in understanding
the scope and purport of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, especially
under the Articles 14 and 21, as well as the laws enacted by the Parliament and the State
Legislatures.
91. Since the SPCB falls under the ambit of State according to Article 36 of the Constitution
which states
In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State has the same
meaning as in Part III.
61

Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 990.
63
Id.
64
Mehta M.C. v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086.
65
Article 48A, Constitution of India.
62
23 | P a g e
it is contended that the State has failed in the fulfilment of the duty it owes to the citizens
under Article 48A.
92. It is further submitted that the provisions of Article 48A have to be construed as a part of the
essence of Article 21 of the Constitution66. DPSPs are generally not legally enforceable as is
enumerated in Article 37 of the Constitution, which states
The provisions contained in this Part [Part IV] shall not be enforceable by any
court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the
governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these
principles in making laws.
93. Reading Article 48A with the Article 2167, however, the Honble Supreme Court had
concluded that although the Article is not judicially enforceable by itself, it becomes
enforceable through a wider interpretation of Article 21, so that in case of a failure of the
foregoing duties, the Supreme Court or a High Court would entertain a petition under Article
32 or 226, as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) brought by an individual68 or institution in the
locality or any social action group69.
B. THAT THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT WAS ERRONEOUS
94. It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the decision of the Honble
High Court should be reversed on the grounds that the Honble High Court has erred on facts
and law.
95. As has already been contended, the right to a clean environment, which is now considered to
be a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. of the natives of the Mohana
region has been violated by the non-performance of statutory functions of the SPCB.
96. It is submitted that it had been contended before the Honble High Court that a writ in the
nature of mandamus be issued to the SPCB to close the DML plant situated along the river
Asli, but the Honble had not taken the required action on the grounds that around 45,000
66
Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State Of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 1350.

68
69
Tarun Bharat Sangh Alwar v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 514.
67
24 | P a g e
employees of the DML would be rendered unemployed and 2 lac more people dependent on
these employees would be faced with misery, hunger and squalor70.
97. It is also submitted that in keeping with Article 21, the Honble Supreme Court, while dealing
with environmental matters under Articles 32 and 136, and the Honble High Courts, under
Article 226, can refer the scientific and technical aspects for investigation and opinion to the
statutory expert bodies having a combination of judicial and technical expertise in such
matters71.
98. In the present case, the PCB is a statutory body which has expertise in the field of pollution
and it is submitted that the Honble High Court has rightly placed complete reliance upon its
report in the PIL filed by Ms. Mehta (case law).
99. It is further submitted that although it is acknowledged that the conclusions drawn by the
Honble High Court from the report submitted by the PCB are of complete authority, but the
petitioners wish to contend that the Honble High Court erred on the law and the facts of the
case, due to which it failed to appreciate the grave problems posed by the DML plant to the
natural environment and the health of the natives, as well as the citizens at large and failed to
take a bold step that would act as a deterrent to any corporation flouting environmental laws
in the future. It is thus submitted that the Honble Supreme Court realise the gravity of the
situation at hand and order the SPCB to close the DML plant.
100. In this context, it is also contended that the right to have a living atmosphere congenial to
human existence is now an aspect of the right to life. Thus, the State is under a fundamental
obligation to protect and improve the environment72, especially the most vital necessities like
the air, water and soil, which cannot be allowed to be misused and polluted so as to reduce
the quality of life enjoyed by others. The risk of harm to the environment or to human health
is to be decided in public interest and thus, life, public health and ecology have priority over
economic interests like unemployment and loss of revenue. It is, thus, contended that the
Honble High Court erred when it placed employment of the employees of the DML over the
collective good of the citizens of the country. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
Honble Supreme Court, in view of this interpretation of Article 21, prioritise the public
70
Moot proposition, 22.

A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof.M.V.Nayudu, AIR 1999 SC 812.
72
T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union Of India, AIR 2005 SC 4256.
71
25 | P a g e
interest over the interest of a few, that is, the employees of DML and should reverse the
erroneous decision of the Honble High Court.
26 | P a g e
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited it is most
humbly and respectfully requested that this Honble Court to adjudge and declare that:
1. Directive issued by the government should not be annulled.
2. Compensation should be increased.
3. The DML plant should be shut down.
In the alternative, pass any other relief which the court may deem fit and proper.
All of which is humbly submitted by

Counsels on behalf of the Petitioners
XVI | P a g e

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BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016

BEFORE THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF RHODO

IN THE MATTER OF:

DASHANAN MOTORS LIMITEDDEFENDANT

SLP NO. 031/2016

STATE OF NORTHERN PROVINCE ..DEFENDANT

Memorial for Petitioners

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

THAT THE SLPS ARE MAINATINABLE .................................................................... 1

II. THAT THE IMPUGNED GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE SHOULD NOT BE

THAT MORE COMPENSATION SHOULD BE AWARDED FOR THE

POLLUTION CAUSED BY DML......................................................................................... 14

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

THAT A WRIT OF MANDAMUS SHOULD BE ISSUED TO THE STATE

POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD TO CLOSE THE PLANT OF DML ALONG

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

All India Reporter

Environment Protection Act

Ministry of Environment and Forest

National Green Tribunal

United Declaration of Human Rights

International Union for Conservation of

World Wildlife Fund

Pollution Control Board

State Pollution Control Board

Mohana Biodiversity Conservation Forum

Dashanan Motors Limited

High Court of Shivpuri

Public Interest Litigation

SCC Supreme Court Cases

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

Special Leave Petition

Directive Principle of State Policy

Directive Principles of State Policy

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel, AIR 1996 SC 2111 .................................................................. 15

A. DESAI, ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE (2ND ED. 2002).

DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (14TH ED. 2009).

M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6TH ED. 2010).

P. LEELAKRISHNAN., ENVIRONMENTAL CASE LAW BOOK (2ND ED. 2006).

P. S. JASWAL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2006).

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

S. K. SARKAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (2ND ED.2006).

S. SHANTHAKUMAR, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2008).

SHANTHAKUMAR, S., INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2008).

SUMEET MALIK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2012).

V. N.SHUKLA , CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (11TH ED. 2008).

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.

WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1974

BRIAM A. GARNER,BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (10TH ED. 2014).

P RAMANATHAAIYAR, THE MAJOR LAW LEXICON 3531 (4THED 2010).

SALLY WEHMEIER, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNERS DICTIONARY (7TH ED. 2005).

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

a special and endangered variety, floated up on the shores.

of the body and shortness of breath.

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

WHETHER THE SLPS ARE MAINTAINABLE?