TOBIAS SELGA and CEFERINA GARANCHO SELGA, Petitioners,

vs.
SONY ENTIERRO BRAR, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MARINA T. ENTIERRO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175151
September 21, 2011
FACTS:
Francisco Entierro died intestate and left behind a parcel of land, identified as Lot 1138-A, located in Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental. Franciscos spouse, Basilia Tabile (Basilia), and legitimate children, Esteban, Herminia,
Elma, Percival, and Gilda, all surnamed Entierro (collectively referred to as Basilia, et al.), executed a Deed of Sale
with Declaration of Heirship. In said Deed, Basilia, et al., declared themselves to be Franciscos only heirs who
inherited the subject property; and at the same time, sold the subject property to petitioners, spouses Tobias Selga and
Ceferina Garancho Selga, for P120,000.00. By reason of said sale, TCT No. T-10273 in Franciscos name was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134408 in petitioners names.
Seven years later, respondent Sony Entierro Brar, represented by her sister-in-law and attorney-in-fact, Marina T.
Entierro, filed before Branch 55 of the RTC of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental (RTC-Branch 55) a Complaint
for Annulment of Sale with Damages against petitioners, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 276. Respondent
claimed that she was one of the legitimate children of Francisco and Basilia, and that she had been preterited and
illegally deprived of her rightful share and interests in the subject property as one of Franciscos legal heirs. Among
respondents allegations in her Complaint was:
10. That as one of the co-heirs of the undivided portion of the questioned lot 1138-A, [herein respondent] is legally
entitled to redeem the said property from the [herein petitioners] for the price the said [petitioners] have paid her coheirs as appearing in the Deed of Sale with Declaration of Heirship, Annex "B."4
RTC-Branch 55 rendered the judgment declaring the annulment of the Deed of Sale with Declaration of heirship
adjudicating ownership of Lot No. 1138-A in the name of [herein respondent] Sony Entierro Brar being one of the
legitimate heirs of spouses Francisco Entierro and Basilia Tabile one eleventh (1/11) share and ten eleventh (10/11)
share in the name of [herein petitioner] Tobias Selga married to Ceferina Garancho.
Unsatisfied, respondent filed an appeal of the aforequoted judgment of RTC-Branch 55 before the Court of Appeals,
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 9520A UDK. However, respondent subsequently moved to withdraw her
appeal. The Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch 55 eventually attained finality.
In a Letter dated August 11, 1997, respondent informed petitioners that she was exercising her right to redeem
petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property. In their Reply-Letter dated August 20, 1997, petitioners
counsel rejected respondents demand. This prompted respondent to institute on January 21, 1998 a Complaint for
Legal Redemption with Damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56.
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 576, petitioners invoked the defenses of res judicata and/or
forum shopping, arguing that the cause of action pleaded by respondent was among those that had already been
litigated in Civil Case No. 276 before RTC-Branch 55. In its Decision dated July 27, 2001, RTC-Branch 56 agreed
with petitioners and dismissed Civil Case No. 573.
Respondents appeal of the aforementioned judgment of RTC-Branch 56 was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 72987
before the Court of Appeals.On May 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
72987, which reversed and set aside the assailed July 27, 2001 Decision of RTC-Branch 56 in Civil Case No. 573. The
Court of Appeals held that respondent had validly exercised her right to redemption of the subject property.The
appellate court further ruled that Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56 was not barred by the final judgment in
Civil Case No. 276 of RTC-Branch 55.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court, insisting that respondents right to redemption of the
subject property from petitioners was among the causes of action already litigated in Civil Case No. 276 before RTCBranch 55; and the very same cause of action between the same parties involving the same subject matter was merely
duplicated in Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56. Thus, the prior final judgment rendered in Civil Case No.
276 already barred Civil Case No. 573.
Respondent counters that Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56 involving her legal right to redeem the subject
property from petitioners cannot be deemed barred by the final judgment in Civil Case No. 276 rendered by RTCBranch 55 because said issue was not explicitly ruled upon in the latter case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the present action is barred by res judicata in view of the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 276.
HELD:
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(b), and the second is
conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c). Res judicata under the first concept or as a bar against the
prosecution of a second action exists when there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in the first
and second actions. The judgment in the first action is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the
parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat

the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all
matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In contrast, res judicata under the second concept or estoppel by
judgment exists when there is identity of parties and subject matter but the causes of action are completely distinct.
The first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as
to matters merely involved herein.
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, viz:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.18
It is not disputed that the Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276 had become final and
executory. Petitioners no longer appealed the said decision, while respondent withdrew her appeal of the same before
the Court of Appeals.
There is also no question that RTC-Branch 55 had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case No.
276, and that its Decision dated May 8, 1996 was a judgment on the merits, i.e., one rendered after a consideration of
the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case.
Controversy herein arises from the fourth requirement: the identity of parties, subject matter and, particularly, the
causes of action between Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573.
There is identity of parties. Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573 were both instituted by respondent against
petitioners.
There is also identity of subject matter. Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573 both involved respondents rights
and interests over the subject property as Franciscos legitimate child and compulsory heir.
Finally, there is identity of causes of action.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as "the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another." The cause of action in Civil Case No. 273 and Civil Case No. 576 is the sale of the entire subject
property by Basilia, et al., to petitioners without respondents knowledge and consent, hence, depriving respondent of
her rights and interests over her pro-indiviso share in the subject property as a co-heir and co-owner. The annulment of
the sale of respondents share in the subject property, the legal redemption by respondent of her co-heirs share sold to
petitioners, and the claim for damages should not be mistaken to be the causes of action, but they were the remedies
and reliefs prayed for by the respondent to redress the wrong allegedly committed against her.
The allegations in respondents Complaint in Civil Case No. 573 initially give the impression that the cause of action
therein was petitioners refusal to heed respondents demand to redeem petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the
subject property. But a closer study of said Complaint, as well as the trial proceedings before RTC-Branch 56, reveal
that respondents right to redeem petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property also arose from the sale
of the said subject property to petitioners by respondents co-heirs and co-owners, alleged to be without respondents
knowledge or consent the very same cause of action at the crux of Civil Case No. 276.
Therefore, Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56 should be dismissed, being barred by res judicata, given the
final and executory Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276. We stress that res judicata,
in the concept of bar by prior judgment, renders the judgment or final order conclusive between the parties and their
privies, not just with respect to a matter directly adjudged, but also any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto.
Garcua-Quiazon vs. Belen
G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013
FACTS:
Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died
intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of
Las Pias City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought
her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City. In
addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to
be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond
The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC. It held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in
1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City.

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2.Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a
decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13
Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus
defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2.Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to
sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the
law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.Having a vested right in the distribution of
Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the
purview of the law.
Vangie Barrazona vs. RTC Br. 61 of Baguio and San Realty & Dev. Corp.
486 SCRA 555
7 April 2006

FACTS:
San Realty & Development Corp. owns a building located at Naguilian cor. Asin Road, Baguio City.
Vangie Barrazona is leasing Unit 203 A and B of said building for a period of 2 years, from 15 July 2001 to 30 June
2003. Php 400 per sqm. For Unit 203 A and Php 500 per sqm. For Unit 203 B.
Since August 2001, Barrazona defaulted in her monthly rentals and failed to pay the same despite repeated demands
by San Realty.
On 14 May 2002, San Realty filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages before RTC Branch 61
of Baguio.

On 3 June 2002, Barrazona filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. She contends that the allegations in the
complaint clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment (unlawful detainer) ---an action within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the MTC. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint alleges that Barrazona failed to pay her rentals
and San Realty previously demanded for its payment and for Barrazona to vacate the leased premises.
The RTC denied the motion.
Barrazona filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the jurisdiction of RTC Branch 61.

ISSUE:
Is the action instituted by San Realty one for ejectment?
HELD:
YES. Jurisdiction is based on the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing. The nature of the action pleaded
appearing from the allegations in the complaint, such as the averments and the character of the relief sought,
determines the courts jurisdiction. The caption or denomination of the complaint is not controlling.
In this case, the complaint, specifically paragraphs 4 and 5, clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment. Its
caption that it is one for collection of sum of money is immaterial. The allegations therein are to be consulted.
CONRADO MAGBANUA and ROSEMARIE MAGBANUA-TABORADA, the latter assisted by her husband
ARTEMIO TABORADA - versus - PILAR S. JUNSAY, asssisted by her husband VICENTE JUNSAY, IBARRA
LOPEZ, and JUANITO JACELA
February 12, 2007
FACTS
Petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in the residence of complainant and herein respondent
Pilar S. Junsay was charged as a co-accused with the crime of Robbery before the RTC, Branch XLI of Bacolod City
in Criminal Case No. 28.
The records show that only petitioner Rosemarie was tried in Criminal Case No. 28. Her co-accused, Ernesto
Fernandez and a certain Gudo, remain at large.
The case for the prosecution relied on an alleged confession made by petitioner Rosemarie, admitting her participation
in the crime of Robbery. The defense contested the admissibility of the confession, and averred that the same was
made under duress.
On 20 December 1985, the RTC, Branch XLI of Bacolod City, rendered a Decision,[4] acquitting petitioner
Rosemarie of the crime of Robbery. The RTC held:
The evidence for accused [herein petitioner Rosemarie] more particularly the Medical Certificate and the testimony of
the attending physician as well as the Decision of the NAPOLCOM finding the investigating officers guilty has clearly
establish (sic) the fact that accused was physically maltreated by the investigating officers in an attempt to force her to
confess her participation in the robbery. X X X X X X
The decretal portion of the 20 December 1985 RTC Decision pronounced:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING THEREFORE, this Court finds the evidence for the prosecution not only
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but even insufficient to establish a prima facie
case against her for having participated in the robbery subject of the above entitled case and therefore ACQUITS
accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The bailbond of the accused for her provisional liberty is hereby
ordered cancelled.[6]

On 9 March 1987, petitioner Rosemarie, assisted by Artemio Taborada, and together with co-petitioner Conrado
Magbanua (Rosemaries father) filed with the RTC, Branch 51, Bacolod City, a Complaint for Damages[7] against
respondent Pilar, assisted by her husband Vicente Junsay, Ibarra Lopez, and Juanito Jacela. Respondent Pilar was the
employer of petitioner Rosemarie, while respondents Ibarra and Juanito were members of the police force of Bacolod
City, and assigned at the Police Station in Taculing,Bacolod City.
The Complaint, alleged, inter alia, that by reason of respondents false, malicious, and illegal actuations in filing
Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie, the latter suffered untold pain, shame, humiliation,
worry, and mental anguish, which if assessed in monetary terms will not be less than P200,000.00.[8] It was further
alleged therein that Conrado, Rosemaries father, lost his job and his entire family suffered.[9] Petitioners maintained
that Rosemarie suffered physical pain and mental torture due to the filing of the false criminal charge against her.[10]
They sought moral and exemplary damages, including attorneys fees and litigation expenses, as well as loss of
earnings and expenses incurred in connection with Rosemaries defense in Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery.[11]
They similarly prayed for payment of the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the instant case.
Respondent Pilar filed a Motion to Dismiss,[13] on the ground that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of
Limitations, as crystallized in Article 1146[14] of the Civil Code. From the time the cause of action arose to the filing
of the Complaint, four years and eight months had already lapsed.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,[15] contending that their cause of action is not for damages
based on the physical injuries suffered by Rosemarie during the investigation of the criminal case nor the violation of
her rights for the indignities foisted upon her by the respondents from 18 July 1982, and several days thereafter.[16]
They posited that the damages sought are for the malicious prosecution of Rosemarie. They reasoned that the baseless
filing of the criminal case for Robbery against Rosemarie, despite her protestations of innocence and the lack of
evidence against her, caused her family to incur expenses and subjected her to untold shame and humiliation.
Petitioners postulated that as the Complaint for Damages is for malicious prosecution, the prescriptive period should
be counted from the date of Rosemaries acquittal in Criminal Case No. 28, or on 20 December 1985, and not from 18
July 1982, the date when respondents injured the rights of Rosemarie. From the time judgment in Criminal Case No.
28 was rendered to the filing of the Complaint in the instant case, not more than one year and three months had
passed.
On 24 March 1988, the RTC issued an Order[19] denying respondents Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. It found
that the cause of action of petitioners Complaint was based on malicious prosecution; hence, the prescriptive period
shall be counted from the date of petitioner Rosemaries acquittal. According to the RTC, the allegations about the
wanton violation of the rights of Rosemarie as a person were to show the pattern of respondents malice.
Respondent Pilar filed before the RTC an Answer,[20] dated 18 May 1988, disclaiming petitioners allegation that she
maltreated petitioner Rosemarie while the latter was being investigated by the police authorities.
Petitioners alleged that respondent Pilar cannot claim lack of knowledge of the maltreatment and indignities suffered
by petitioner Rosemarie because she herself participated in such maltreatment. Petitioners further contended, inter
alia, that they have a proper and valid cause of action against the respondents, including petitioner Conrado who
suffered and incurred expenses to defend his daughter, Rosemarie, who was then a minor against unjust accusation,
maltreatment and torture.
On 25 July 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint. The RTC applied the established rule that
for a malicious prosecution suit to succeed, two indispensable elements must be shown to exist, to wit: (a) malice and
(b) absence of probable cause. It found that the elements were not successfully shown by petitioners. It held that the
mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful for the law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.[29]
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on the 25 July 1995 Decision of the RTC. Thus, the records of the case were
subsequently forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in toto.
Hence, petitioners come to the succor of this Court via the instant Appeal by Certiorari to assail the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC, that there was no malicious prosecution.

For our resolution is the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to damages for malicious prosecution. However,
before we could resolve said issue, we should first determine whether the filing of a criminal case for Robbery against
petitioner Rosemarie constituted malicious prosecution.
It is petitioners submission that the prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie was founded upon baseless accusations.[34]
Petitioners posit that the charges were based on false affidavits and false police reports, without which the criminal
case against petitioner Rosemarie would not have been filed.[35] Petitioners further decry the maltreatment which
petitioner Rosemarie allegedly suffered from the hands of respondents.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners have a valid cause of action against respondents.

RULING
NO.
In this jurisdiction, the term malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable
cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.[38]While
generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits
instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.
This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution.
Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did
occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action
finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the
prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister motive.[41] The gravamen of malicious
prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an
action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.[42]
We shall proceed to determine whether in the prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of Robbery, all four
elements were in attendance.
It is not disputed that the first and second elements are present.
On the question of probable cause, this Court has ruled that for purposes of malicious prosecution, probable cause
means such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[43] It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.[44] Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.[45]
Anent the question of whether the prosecutor acted without probable cause in bringing the action against petitioner
Rosemarie, we find no reason to depart from the conclusions reached by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The filing
of Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery was not without probable cause.
Indeed, during the investigation petitioner Rosemarie admitted her participation in the commission of the incident
complained of.
The inadmissibility of the aforesaid admission on the ground that the same was extracted under duress was an
evidentiary matter, which does not detract from the fact that based on petitioner Rosemaries admission; there was
reason for the respondents to believe that the suit was not unfounded, and that the crime was committed.
Finally, in an action to recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution
was impelled by legal malice.
Applying the rule to the case at bar, we affirm the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that there was no
proof of a sinister design on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate petitioner Rosemarie by instituting the
criminal case against her and her co-accused. Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her valuable belongings can only

be expected to bring the matter to the authorities. There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to one, who, as
victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings. At the risk of redundancy, we stress that the proscription
against the imposition of penalty on the right to litigate must not be violated. Mere filing of a suit does not render a
person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate.[51] There was no other explanation or motive as to why respondents would institute
baseless prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie. No evidence was shown that there was bad blood between respondent
Pilar and petitioner Rosemarie prior to the supposed robbery.
We also do not find the actuations of respondents Ibarra and Juanito to be impelled by legal malice. Their
commencement of the action against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-accused was pursuant to their duties as police
officers. The same was made subsequent to the report of respondent Pilar of the commission of the crime, and the
investigation on the person of petitioner Rosemarie. Even then, mistakes committed by a public officer are not
actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith,
[52] which was not established in the case at bar.
Moreover, as was clear from the outset, the instant case is a suit seeking damages for malicious prosecution, and not
for the violations and maltreatment that respondents allegedly committed against petitioner Rosemarie in extracting
the admission from her. At any rate, the RTC had ruled that the instant case is not an action on the injuries allegedly
suffered by petitioner Rosemarie, but rather for malicious prosecution. Otherwise, an action seeking damages for her
injuries should have been deemed prescribed.
5. UMALE vs CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 167246; July 20, 2011
FACTS: On January 4, 2000, the parties entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the petitioner, George Leonard S.
Umale, agreed to lease, for a period of two (2) years, an eight hundred sixty (860)-square-meter prime lot located in
Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the respondent. The respondent acquired the subject lot from Ortigas & Co. Ltd.
Partnership through a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that no shopping arcades or retail stores, restaurants, etc. shall be allowed to be established on the property, except
with the prior written consent from Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership and
(2) that the respondent and/or its successors-in-interest shall become member/s of the Ortigas Center Association, Inc.
(Association), and shall abide by its rules and regulations.
Before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City Branch 68. Respondent's ground for ejectment in this 1st Civil Case (No. 8084)
was the petitioners violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. Under this contract,
the petitioner shall use the leased lot as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for a small drivers canteen, and
may not utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the respondents prior written consent. The petitioner,
however, constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial establishments on the lot, without first securing the
required written consent from the respondent, and the necessary permits. The petitioner also subleased the property.
The MTC Br. 68 favored the respondent as to the ejectment case which was affirmed in toto by RTC-Branch 155,
Pasig City. However, the case was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 267, Pasig City because the Presiding Judge of
inhibited himself from resolving the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The RTC-Branch 267 granted the
petitioners motion, thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC-Br 68 decision. Accordingly, the Civil Case was
dismissed for being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for review with the CA.
During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed a 2nd Civil Case (No. 9210) for unlawful detainer
against the petitioner before the MTC-Branch 71, Pasig City. This time, the respondent used as a ground for ejectment
the expiration of the parties lease contract.
MTC-Branch 71 rendered a decision in favor of the respondent ordering the petitioner to peacefully vacate the
premises, ordered to pay herein respondent damages for the use of the property after the expiration of the lease
contract, attorneys fees with cost of suit. With respect to the commercial units built by petitioner on the subject land,
he is hereby ordered to remove the same and to restore the subject land in the same condition as it was received by
petitioner.
On appeal, the RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed the 2nd Civil
Case on the ground of litis pendentia.
Respondent's Argument- it filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA and argued
that there exists no litis pendentia between the first and second Civil Cases because the two cases involved different
grounds for ejectment, i.e., the first case was filed because of violations of the lease contract, while the second case
was filed due to the expiration of the lease contract. The respondent emphasized that the second case was filed based
on an event or a cause not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the first case.

Petitioner's Argument - litis pendentia exists between the two ejectment cases filed against him because of their
identity with one another and that any judgment on the first case will amount to res judicata on the other. The
petitioner argues that the respondent reiterated the ground of violations of the lease contract, with the additional
ground of the expiration of the lease contract in the second ejectment case. Also, the petitioner alleges that all of the
elements of litis pendentia are present in this case, thus, he prays for the reversal and setting aside of the assailed CA
decision and resolution, and for the dismissal of the complaint in the 2nd Civil Case on the ground of litis pendentia
and/or forum shopping.
CA's ruling- nullified and set aside the assailed decision of the RTC-Branch 68, and ruled that there was no litis
pendentia because the two civil cases have different causes of action. The decision of the MTC- Branch 71 was
ordered reinstated. Hence, petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1) WON there is litis pendencia;
2) WON the two Civil Cases have the same cauases of action
HELD:
1. There was no litis pendentia
As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial
identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the identity between the two actions should
be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other.
2. Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the
others.
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether the
same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (also known as the same evidence
test), or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is
the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint.
Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the
second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint and to which we answer in the negative. The facts
clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioners violation of stipulations in the
lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the
respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in
effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal
agreed upon by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration of the
lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent
as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time
of filing of the first ejectment case.
Restatement does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if the respondent alleged violations of
the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the
second case was the expiration of the lease contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no
longer file a second complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within one year
after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the second case, was the expiration of the lease contract.
Similarly, we do not find the respondent guilty of forum shopping in filing the second civil case. To determine whether
a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present
or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Considering our pronouncement that
not all the requisites of litis pendentia are present in this case, the CA did not err in declaring that the respondent
committed no forum shopping.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT vs. SECRETARY
ANGELO REYES
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Action involved & parties 2 consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court concerning
Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) allowing the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources
within Taon Strait.

G.R. No. 180771 - original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction seeking to enjoin respondents from
implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain
international and municipal laws
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals involving toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species
inhabiting in Taon Strait, and seeking their protection are Gloria Estenzo Ramos & Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (the
Stewards)
G.R. No. 181527 - original Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus seeking to nullify the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of DENR Region 7 in
connection with SC-46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to
provide petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Taon Strait Oil Exploration Project
Petitioners - Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC) an organization established for the welfare of
the marginal fisherfolk in Region 7
Facts:
1. A Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) was entered into by the Government of the
Philippines through the Department of Energy (DOE) and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) on June
13, 2002. Such contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Taon Strait.
2. December 21, 2004 - DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development,
and production of petroleum resources in the Taon Strait.
3. JAPEX was to drill a well in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan where the Taon Strait was
declared a protected seascape.
4. Resolution No. 2007-001 was issued by the Protected Area Management Board of Taon Strait (PAMB-Taon
Strait) adopting the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX and favorably recommended
the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
5. The EMB of DENR Region 7 granted an environmental compliance certificate (ECC) to the DOE and JAPEX for
the offshore oil and gas exploration project, hence, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well near Pinamungajan town
in the western Cebu Province which lasted until February 8, 2008.
6. 2 separate original petitions were filed by petitioners with SC seeking respondents to be enjoined from
implementing SC-46 for violation of the 1987 Constitution.
7. Motion to Strike its name as a respondent was filed by Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged
Philippine agent of JAPEX claiming that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas
exploration activities.
8. Such motion was opposed by petitioners on the following grounds which was also adopted by FIDEC:
a. It was premature, it was pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory.
b. SOS admitted that "it is in law a privy to JAPEX" since it did the drilling and other exploration activities in Taon
Strait under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX.
c. It would be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX had not yet been joined in the case.
9. Petitioners asked the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a co-respondent or as a substitute for its parent
company, JAPEX. JAPEX during all this time, did not file any comment at all.
10. SC issued and personally served a Resolution directing the Court's process servicing unit to again serve the parties
with a copy of the September 23, 2008 Resolution requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
11. Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification filed by JAPEX by way of special appearance where it requested to
be clarified as to whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012 Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion
in the case, as it has not been impleaded. It also alleged that JAPEX PH had already stopped exploration activities way
back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
12. Motion for Extension of Time to file its Memorandum filed by JAPEX PH also by special appearance
13. SC issued Resolution (April 24, 2012) - granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification, and
stating that:
a) it considers JAPEX PH - a real party-in-interest in these cases
b) Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court - a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
c) JAPEX PH has no separate personality from its mother foreign corporation, JAPEX Company, Ltd. which was the
party impleaded in this case because it was established as a mere branch office, for the purpose of carrying out the
latter's business transactions here in the Philippines.
d) Section 128 of the Corporation Code the function of a resident agent is to receive summons or legal processes that
may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation.

Petitioners' Allegations:
1. Adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Taon Strait:
a. A study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent due to
the destruction of the "payao" or "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef"
2. The ECC obtained by JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders,
a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
3. Respondents DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued an ECC to public respondent DOE and
private respondent JAPEX without ensuring the strict compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements
under the Environmental Impact Assessment system, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations.
4. Petitioners, through the Stewards, claim that they have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.
a. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. they assert their right to sue and the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits
granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept
of stipulation pour autrui.
b. The Stewards have right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners
of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Taon Strait and as stewards of the environment
since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public
trust doctrine.
c. SC may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction
Respondents' Allegations:
1. petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition
2. SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions
3. the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations;
4. public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to
SC-46
5. petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief
6. the issues raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually
terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008
7. Resident Marine Mammals have no standing under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an
action to be either natural or juridical persons.
a. Non-applicability of Oposa case since the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still
unborn. Since the petition was not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.
b. The Stewards cannot claim of legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be
parties to an action. The Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be
benefited or injured by the decision in this case.
c. Invoking the alter ego principle in political law - respondents claim that absent any proof that former President
Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering into and implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her own.
Issues:
1. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771
2. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.
Ruling:
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
1. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows for a "citizen suit" and permit any Filipino citizen to file an
action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn,
may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court
shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring
all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected
barangays copies of said order.
2. Rationale for this rule - to further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing

environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran.
3. Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."
4. Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in
the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
5. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is
worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition.
On the main issue - Service Contract No. 46 is declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution,
Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.

THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ATTY. ELDRIGE MARVIN B. ACERON vs. SPOUSES
ALAN and EM ANG
G.R. No. 186993
August 22, 2012
FACTS: On Sept. 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount of US$300,000.00
from Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners). As security, the respondents issued a promissory note with an interest at
the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, payable upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents
defaulted. In 2006, the debt aggregated to a total of US$719,671.23, inclusive of the ten percent (10%) annual interest
that had accumulated over the years. Notwithstanding the receipt of the demand letter issued, the respondents still
failed to settle their loan obligation.
In the same year, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, executed an SPA in favor of
Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents.
On September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money
with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents. However, the respondents moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds of improper venue and prescription. Insisting that the venue of the petitioners action was
improperly laid, the respondents asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed in the court of the place
where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in
Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the complaint against them in the RTC of
Quezon City was improper.
PETITIONERS: Maintain that their complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents may be filed in
the RTC of Quezon City. Invoking Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they insist that Atty. Aceron, being their
attorney-in-fact, is deemed a real party in interest in the case below and can prosecute the same before the RTC of
Quezon City, where he resides.
RESPONDENTS: Assert that the petitioners are proscribed from filing their complaint in the RTC of Quezon City.
They assert that the residence of Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative, is immaterial to the determination of the
venue of the petitioners complaint.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the complaint in RTC Quezon City is proper
2 . Whether or not Atty. Aceron, being an attorney-in-fact is a real party in interest
HELD:

1. No. The case should have been filed with the RTC of Bacolod City. The petitioners complaint for collection of sum
of money against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules
give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or
any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the
defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of
the place where the defendant resides. Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California, USA while the
respondents reside in Bacolod City. Applying the foregoing principles, the petitioners complaint against the
respondents may only be filed in the RTC of Bacolod City the court of the place where the respondents reside. The
petitioners, being residents of Los Angeles, California, USA, are not given the choice as to the venue of the filing of
their complaint.
2. No. Contrary to the petitioners claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is not a real
party in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. A real party in
interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.
Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to file
the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners the real
parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case below belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty.
Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is
subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.
The petitioners reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support their conclusion that Atty. Aceron is
likewise a party in interest in the case below is misplaced. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to
be the real property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that the representative is likewise deemed as
the real party in interest. The said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by
a representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included in the title of
the case.
Indeed, to construe the express requirement of residence under the rules on venue as applicable to the attorney-in-fact
of the plaintiff would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest", as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Court vis--vis Section 3 of the same Rule. The petition is denied.
------rex----[G.R. No. 121171. December 29, 1998]
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioner, vs., COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS S. CABARRUS, SR., JESUS
S. CABARRUS, JR., JAIME T. CABARRUS, JOSE MIGUEL CABARRUS, ALEJANDRO S. PASTOR, JR.,
ANTONIO U. MIRANDA, and MIGUEL M. ANTONIO, as Minority Stock Holders of Marinduque Mining
and Industrial Corporation, respondents.
Facts:
The development, exploration and utilization of the mineral deposits in the Surigao Mineral Reservation have been
authorized by Republic Act No. 1828, by virtue of which law, a Memorandum of Agreement was drawn on July 3,
1968, whereby the Republic of the Philippines thru the Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, granted Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC) the exclusive right to explore, develop and exploit nickel, cobalt and other
minerals in the Surigao mineral reservation.
The Philippine Government undertook to support the financing of MMIC by purchase of MMIC debenture and
extension of guarantees. The government then issued debenture bonds in favor of MMIC which enabled the latter to
take out loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The
loans were mortgaged by MMICs assets.

By 1984, DBP and PNBs financial exposure both in loans and in equity in MMIC had reached tremendous
proportions, and MMIC was having a difficult time meeting its financial obligations. MMIC had an outstanding loan
with DBP in the amount of P13,792,607,565.92 as of August 31, 1984 and in the amount of P8,789,028,249.38 as of
July 15, 1984 or a total Government exposure of Twenty Two Billion Six Hundred Sixty-Eight Million Five Hundred
Thirty-Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy and 05/100 (P22,668,537,770.05), Philippine Currency.
In order to mitigate MMICs loan liability, a financial restructuring plan (FRP) was drafted in the presence of MMICs
representatives as well as representatives from DBP and PNB. The two banks however never formally approved the
said FRP. In August and September 1984, as the various loans and advances made by DBP and PNB to MMIC had
become overdue and since any restructuring program relative to the loans was no longer feasible, and in compliance
with the directive of Presidential Decree No. 385, DBP and PNB as mortgagees of MMIC assets, decided to exercise
their right to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgages in accordance with the Mortgage Trust Agreement.
The foreclosed assets were sold to PNB as the lone bidder and were assigned to three newly formed corporations,
namely, Nonoc Mining Corporation, Maricalum Mining and Industrial Corporation, and Island Cement Corporation.
In 1986, these assets were transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
On February 28, 1985, Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., together with the other stockholders of MMIC, filed a derivative suit
against DBP and PNB before the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, for Annulment of Foreclosures, Specific Performance
and Damages. The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 9900, prayed that the court: (1) annul the foreclosure, restore the
foreclosed assets to MMIC, and require the banks to account for their use and operation in the interim; (2) direct the
banks to honor and perform their commitments under the alleged FRP; and (3) pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs.
In the course of the trial, private respondents and petitioner APT, as successor of the DBP and PNBs interest in
MMIC, mutually agreed to submit the case to arbitration by entering into a Compromise and Arbitration Agreement to
determine (a) Whether PLAINTIFFS have the capacity or the personality to institute this derivative suit in behalf of
the MMIC or its directors; (b) Whether or not the actions leading to, and including, the PNB-DBP foreclosure of the
MMIC assets were proper, valid and in good faith.
After conducting several hearings, the Arbitration Committee rendered a majority decision in favour of MMIC.
Motions for reconsiderations were filed by both parties but the same were denied. In 1994, private respondents filed in
the same Civil Case No. 9900 an Application/Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award. Petitioner countered
with an opposition arguing that a dismissal of Civil Case No. 9900 was merely a qualified dismissal to pave the way
for the submission of the controversy to arbitration, and operated simply as a mere suspension of the proceedings.
In an Order dated November 28, 1994, the trial court confirmed the award of the Arbitration Committee.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award
Held:
Admittedly the correct procedure was for the parties to go back to the court where the case was pending to have the
award confirmed by said court. However, Branch 62 made the fatal mistake of issuing a final order dismissing the
case. While Branch 62 should have merely suspended the case and not dismissed it, neither of the parties questioned
said dismissal. Thus, both parties as well as said court are bound by such error.
It is erroneous then to argue, as private respondents do, that petitioner APT was charged with the knowledge that the
case was merely stayed until arbitration finished, as again, the order of Branch 62 in very clear terms stated that the
complaint was dismissed. By its own action, Branch 62 had lost jurisdiction over the vase. It could not have validly
reacquired jurisdiction over the said case on mere motion of one of the parties. The Rules of Court is specific on how a
new case may be initiated and such is not done by mere motion in a particular branch of the RTC. Consequently, as
there was no pending action to speak of, the petition to confirm the arbitral award should have been filed as a new
case and raffled accordingly to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court.
Estoppel
The Court of Appeals ruled that APT was already estopped to question the jurisdiction of the RTC to confirm the
arbitral award because it sought affirmative relief in said court by asking that the arbitral award be vacated.
The rule is that Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the
invocation of this defense may de done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor for the parties to violate or disregard
that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character.
Petitioners situation is different because from the outset, it has consistently held the position that the RTC, Branch 62
had no jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award; consequently, it cannot be said that it was estopped from questioning
the RTCs jurisdiction. Petitioners prayer for the setting aside of the arbitral award was not inconsistent with its
disavowal of the courts jurisdiction.
Nature and limits of the Arbitrators powers
As a rule, the award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the
facts.[29] Courts are without power to amend or overrule merely because of disagreement with matters of law or facts

determined by the arbitrators.[30] They will not review the findings of law and fact contained in an award, and will
not undertake to substitute their judgment for that of the arbitrators, since any other rule would make an award the
commencement, not the end, of litigation.[31] Errors of law and fact, or an erroneous decision of matters submitted to
the judgment of the arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and honestly made.[32] Judicial review of
an arbitration is, thus, more limited than judicial review of a trial.[33]
Nonetheless, the arbitrators awards is not absolute and without exceptions. The arbitrators cannot resolve issues
beyond the scope of the submission agreement.[34] The parties to such an agreement are bound by the arbitrators
award only to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the contract and only if the award is rendered in conformity
thereto.
Accordingly, Section 20 of R.A. 876 provides:
SEC. 20. Form and contents of award. The award must be made in writing and signed and acknowledged by a
majority of the arbitrators, if more than one; and by the sole arbitrator, if there is only one. Each party shall be
furnished with a copy of the award. The arbitrators in their award may grant any remedy or relief which they deem
just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, which shall include, but not be limited to, the
specific performance of a contract.
xxx
The arbitrators shall have the power to decide only those matters which have been submitted to them. The terms of the
award shall be confined to such disputes. (Underscoring ours).
PAMPLONA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC. vs. TINGHIL
G.R. No. 159121; February 3, 2005
FACTS: Sometime in 1993, [Petitioner] Pamplona Plantations Company, Inc. (company for brevity) was organized for
the purpose of taking over the operations of the coconut and sugar plantation of Hacienda Pamplona located in
Pamplona, Negros Oriental. It appears that Hacienda Pamplona was formerly owned by a certain Mr. Bower who had
in his employ several agricultural workers.
When the company took over the operation of Hacienda Pamplona in 1993, it did not absorb all the workers of
Hacienda Pamplona. Some, however, were hired by the company during harvest season as coconut hookers or
sakador, coconut filers, coconut haulers, coconut scoopers or lugiteros, and charcoal makers.
Sometime in 1995, Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation was established for the purpose of engaging in the
business of operating tourist resorts, hotels, and inns, with complementary facilities, such as restaurants, bars,
boutiques, service shops, entertainment, golf courses, tennis courts, and other land and aquatic sports and leisure
facilities.
On 15 December 1996, the Pamplona Plantation Labor Independent Union (PAPLIU) conducted an organizational
meeting wherein several [respondents] who are either union members or officers participated in said meeting.
Upon learning that some of the [respondents] attended the said meeting, [Petitioner] Jose Luis Bondoc, manager of the
company, did not allow [respondents] to work anymore in the plantation.
Thereafter, on various dates, [respondents] filed their respective complaints with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VII, Dumaguete City against [petitioners] for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment,
overtime pay, premium pay for rest day and holidays, service incentive leave pay, damages, attorneys fees and 13th
month pay.
On 09 October 1997, [respondent] Carlito Tinghil amended his complaint to implead Pamplona Plantation Leisure
Corporation x x x.
On 31 August 1998, Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez rendered a decision finding [respondents], except Rufino
Bacubac, Antonio Caolas and Felix Torres who were complainants in another case, to be entitled to separation pay.
[Petitioners] appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to [the] NLRC. In the assailed decision dated 19 July 2000, the
NLRCs Fourth Division reversed the Labor Arbiter, ruling that [respondents], except Carlito Tinghil, failed to implead
Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation, an indispensable party and that there exist no employer-employee relation
between the parties.
[Respondents] filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by [the] NLRC in a Resolution dated 06 December
2000.[8]

Respondents elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
CA held that respondents were employees of petitioner-company. Finding there was a power to hire, the appellate
court considered the admission of petitioners in their Comment that they had hired respondents as coconut filers,
coconut scoopers, charcoal makers, or as pieceworkers. The fact that respondents were paid by piecework did not
mean that they were not employees of the company. Further, the CA ruled that petitioners necessarily exercised
control over the work they performed, since the latter were working within the premises of the plantation. According
to the CA, the mere existence -- not necessarily the actual exercise -- of the right to control the manner of doing work
sufficed to meet the fourth element of an employer-employee relation.
The appellate court also held that respondents were regular employees, because the tasks they performed were
necessary and indispensable to the operation of the company. Since there was no compliance with the twin
requirements of a valid and/or authorized cause and of procedural due process, their dismissal was illegal.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for the non-joinder of the Pamplona Plantation Leisure
Corporation.

HELD: Granting for the sake of argument that the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation is an indispensable party
that should be impleaded, NLRCs outright dismissal of the Complaints was still erroneous.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the
tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court
may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the NLRC did not require respondents to implead the Pamplona Plantation
Leisure Corporation as respondent; instead, the Commission summarily dismissed the Complaints.
In any event, there is no need to implead the leisure corporation because, insofar as respondents are concerned, the
leisure corporation and petitioner-company are one and the same entity. Salvador v. Court of Appeals has held that this
Court has full powers, apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings,
proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest.
In Alonso v. Villamor, we had the occasion to state thus:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to
facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they
are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at
fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
The controlling principle in the interpretation of procedural rules is liberality, so that they may promote their object
and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. When
the rules are applied to labor cases, this liberal interpretation must be upheld with even greater vigor. Without in any
way depriving the employer of its legal rights, the thrust of statutes and rules governing labor cases has been to benefit
workers and avoid subjecting them to great delays and hardships. This intent holds especially in this case, in which the
plaintiffs are poor laborers.
----cos agon---12. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015

BERSAMIN, J.:
An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage is a personal action
because it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
FACTS:
On 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of land
located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, TCT
No. 261331 and TCT No. 261332, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract. The Manila RTC declared the five parcels of land
expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory and was entered in the book of entries of
judgment.
The petitioner then filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendants Request to
Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having been filed out of time. Hence, the petitioner decided to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents loan. After
holding the public auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at P10,000,000.00.
Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18,522.155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in
the Makati RTC. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds: that the suit was barred by res
judicata; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the plaintiffs claim had been waived, abandoned, or
extinguished.
The Makati RTC denied the respondents motion to dismiss, ruling that there was no res judicata; that the complaint
stated a sufficient cause of action to recover the deficiency; and that there was nothing to support the claim that the
obligation had been abandoned or extinguished apart from the respondents contention that the properties had been
subjected to expropriation by the City of Manila. The respondents moved for reconsideration, reiterating their grounds
earlier made in their motion to dismiss. The petitioner adopted its comment/opposition to the motion to dismiss.
The respondents then filed their reply, in which they raised for the first time their objection on the ground of improper
venue contending that the action for the recovery of the deficiency, being a supplementary action of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, was a real action that should have been brought in the Manila RTC because Manila was the
place where the properties were located.
The Makati RTC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit; and held that it is improper
to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint on the ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue is indeed improperly
laid, since the said ground was not raised in the defendants Motion to Dismiss.
Upon appeal, the CA granted the petition for certiorari of the respondents holding that a suit for recovery of the
deficiency after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is precisely to
enforce the mortgage contract; it is upon a written contract and upon an obligation of the mortgage-debtor to pay the
deficiency which is created by law. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of deficiency must necessarily be the
same venue as that of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage Thus, the suit for judgment on the deficiency filed by
respondent BPI against petitioners Yujuico, being an action emanating from the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
contract between them, must necessarily be filed also at the RTC of Manila, not at the RTC of Makati. The CA denied
the respondents Motion for Partial Reconsideration and the petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration on
December 7, 2006.
Issues:
Is the CA correct in ruling that the venue of an action for recovery of deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as
that of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage?
Ruling of the Court:
No.
It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants of whether
an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According

to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an
interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real
action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local
action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those
brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its
breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.
The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one. Based on the
distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein.
Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought Civil Case No. 03-450 in the Makati RTC because Makati was
the place where the main office of the petitioner was located.
Moreover, the Makati RTC observed, and the observation is correct in our view, that it would be improper to dismiss
Civil Case No. 03-450 on the ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue had been improperly laid,
considering that the respondents had not raised such ground in their Motion to Dismiss. As earlier indicated, they
came to raise the objection of improper venue for the first time only in their reply to the petitioners comment on their
Motion for Reconsideration. They did so belatedly.
We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if
not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus
expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to
restrict their access to the courts. In other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a
court despite its being the improper venue.
Petition is granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. RTC orders reinstated.
OCHOA VS CHINA BANKING
G.R. No. 192877
March 23, 2011
FACTS: Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is
binding only on petitioners complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque City, but not on respondent banks Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, which
was filed with the same court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action was filed in the right venue
RULING: The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed
to Real-Estate Mortgages." Sections 1 and 2 thereof clearly state:
Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate mortgage hereafter
made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the following
sections shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for
the same is made in the power.
Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is situated; and in case the
place within said province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said
place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated.

The case at bar involves petitioners mortgaged real property located in Paraaque City over which respondent bank
was granted a special power to foreclose extra-judicially. Thus, by express provision of Section 2, the sale can only be
made in Paraaque City.
The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties 6 and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the
provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.
Section 1, Rule 2 [of the Rules of Court] defines an action in this wise:
"Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."
It is clear that the determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into an "action or suit" is the filing of the
same with a "court of justice." Filed elsewhere, as with some other body or office not a court of justice, the claim may
not be categorized under either term. Unlike an action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated
by filing a petition not with any court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be
made. By no stretch of the imagination can the office of the sheriff come under the category of a court of justice.
Verily then, with respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it being a
special law dealing particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general
provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions.
Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only to actions arising from or related to the
mortgage, such as petitioners complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages.
-----duran----UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and KUBOTA AGRI-MACHINERY
PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 119657. February 7, 1997

FACTS:
On October 28, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a
"Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services" of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
The contract contained, among others:
1) a stipulation reading: "All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon
City," and
2) a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain (as it did in fact obtain) a credit line with Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch in the amount of P2,000,000.00 to answer for its obligations to KUBOTA.
Some 5 years later, or more, UNIMASTERS filed an action in the RTC of Tacloban City against KUBOTA, a certain
Reynaldo Go, and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company-Tacloban Branch for damages for breach of contract, and
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order. The action was docketed and assigned to Branch 6.
RTC right away issued a restraining order enjoining METROBANK from "authorizing or effecting payment of any
alleged obligation of UNIMASTERS to defendant KUBOTA arising out of or in connection with purchases made by
defendant Go against the credit line caused to be established by UNIMASTERS for and in the amount of P2 million
covered by defendant METROBANK or by way of charging UNIMASTERS for any amount paid and released to
defendant KUBOTA by the Head Office of METROBANK in Makati, Metro-Manila. The Court also set the
application for preliminary injunction for hearing on January 10, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
On January 4, 1994 KUBOTA thus prayed for dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue (said motion
being set for hearing on January 11, 1994); and for the transfer of the injunction hearing to January 11, 1994 because
its counsel was not available on January 10 due to a prior commitment before another court.

KUBOTA claims that notwithstanding that its motion to transfer hearing had been granted, the RTC went ahead with
the hearing on the injunction incident on January 10, 1994 during which it received the direct testimony of
UNIMASTERS' general manager, Wilford Chan; that KUBOTA's counsel was "shocked" when he learned of this on
the morning of the 11th, but was nonetheless instructed to proceed to cross-examine the witness; that when said
counsel remonstrated that this was unfair, the Court reset the hearing to the afternoon of that same day, at which time
Wilford Chan was recalled to the stand to repeat his direct testimony. It appears that cross-examination of Chan was
then undertaken by KUBOTA's lawyer with the "express reservation that KUBOTA was not thereby waiving and/or
abandoning its motion to dismiss;" and that in the course of the cross-examination, exhibits (numbered from 1 to 20)
were presented by said attorney who afterwards submitted a memorandum in lieu of testimonial evidence.
RTC: authorised the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a bond of P2,000,000 and denied
KUBOTA's motion to dismiss. It maintained that UNIMASTERS Conglomeration is holding its principal place of
business in the City of Tacloban while the defendant KUBOTA is holding its principal place of business in Quezon
City. The proper venue therefore pursuant to Rules of Court would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at the
election of the plaintiff. Quezon City and Manila (sic), as agreed upon by the parties in the Dealership Agreement, are
additional places other than the place stated in the Rules of Court. The filing, therefore, of this complaint in the
Regional Trial Court in Tacloban City is proper.
Both orders were challenged as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion by KUBOTA in a special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals. It contended, more particularly, that:
(1) the RTC had "no jurisdiction to take cognizance of UNIMASTERS action considering that venue was improperly
laid,"
(2) UNIMASTERS had in truth "failed to prove that it is entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction;" and
(3) the RTC gravely erred "in denying the motion to dismiss.
CA: agreed with KUBOTA that -- in line with the Rules of Court and this Court's relevant rulings The stipulation
respecting venue in its Dealership Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising
thereunder only and exclusively to "the proper courts of Quezon City. The participation of KUBOTA's counsel at the
hearing on the injunction incident did not in the premises operate as a waiver or abandonment of its objection to
venue; that assuming that KUBOTA's standard printed invoices provided that the venue of actions thereunder should
be laid at the Court of the City of Manila, this was inconsequential since such provision would govern "suits or legal
actions between petitioner and its buyers" but not actions under the Dealership Agreement between KUBOTA and
UNIMASTERS, the venue of which was controlled by paragraph No. 7 thereof; and that no impediment precludes
issuance of a TRO or injunctive writ by the Quezon City RTC against METROBANK-Tacloban since the same "may
be served on the principal office of METROBANK in Makati and would be binding on and enforceable against,
METROBANK branch in Tacloban. CA denied motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. WON the participation by the lawyer of KUBOTA at the injunction hearing operated as a waiver of its objection to
venue
2. What construction should be placed on the stipulation in the Dealership Agreement that "(a)ll suits arising out of
this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon City?
3. WON this stipulation had the effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an optional venue and limiting litigation
between UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.

HELD:
4. NO. The record shows that when KUBOTA's counsel appeared before the Trial Court in the morning of January 11,
1994 and was then informed that he should cross-examine UNIMASTERS' witness, who had testified the day before,
said counsel drew attention to the motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and insistently attempted to
argue the matter and have it ruled upon at the time; and when the Court made known its intention (a) "to (resolve first
the) issue (of) the injunction then rule on the motion to dismiss," and (b) consequently its desire to forthwith conclude
the examination of the witness on the injunction incident, and for that purpose reset the hearing in the afternoon of that
day, the 11th, so that the matter might be resolved before the lapse of the temporary restraining order on the 13th,
KUBOTA's lawyer told the Court: "Your Honor, we are not waiving our right to submit the Motion to Dismiss.It is
plain that under these circumstances, no waiver or abandonment can be imputed to KUBOTA.
5. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the venue of actions, whether real or
personal, or involving persons who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise. Agreements on venue

are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from
one province to another."Parties may by stipulation waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being
merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third persons. It is a general
principle that a person may renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation would be against public
policy.
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon,
or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed
by law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the
parties respecting the matter.
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the proposition that normally, venue
stipulations should be deemed permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the
parties' convenience. In other words, stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be
interpreted as designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their
agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the venues indicated in said Rule 4.
On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this general policy, the language of the parties
must be so clear and categorical as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places, or to fix places
other than those indicated in Rule 4, for their actions. This is easier said than done, however, as an examination of
precedents involving venue covenants will immediately disclose. In a line of cases, the Court construed the venue
stipulations involved as merely permissive (13). There are cases however, where stipulations on venue were held to be
restrictive, or mandatory.
Of the essence is the ascertainment of the parties' intention in their agreement governing the venue of actions between
them. That ascertainment must be done keeping in mind that convenience is the foundation of venue regulations, and
that that construction should be adopted which most conduces thereto. Hence, the invariable construction placed on
venue stipulations is that they do not negate but merely complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting
language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to
disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but
merely permissive, or complementary of said rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the
venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different from those specified by said rule, does not,
without more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying
language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at
the place named by them,regardless of the general precepts of Rule 4; and any doubt or uncertainty as to the parties'
intentions must be resolved against giving their agreement a restrictive or mandatory aspect. Any other rule would
permit of individual, subjective judicial interpretations without stable standards, which could well result in precedents
in hopeless inconsistency.
The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place of business in Tacloban City, and
KUBOTA, in Quezon City. Under Rule 4, the venue of any personal action between them is "where the defendant or
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff.
In other words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the option to sue KUBOTA for breach of contract in the Regional Trial
Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon City.
But the contract between them provides that "All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper
Courts of Quezon City," without mention of Tacloban City.
1. In light of all the cases above surveyed, and the general postulates distilled therefrom, the question should receive a
negative answer. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and
intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City -- or other
contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention -- the stipulation should be construed, not as
confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or
Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).

One last word, respecting KUBOTA's theory that the Regional Trial Court had "no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
UNIMASTERS action considering that venue was improperly laid." This is not an accurate statement of legal
principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions.
This is fundamental.The action at bar, for the recovery of damages in an amount considerably in excess of P20,000.00,
is assuredly within the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court.
Assuming that venue were improperly laid in the Court where the action was instituted, the Tacloban City RTC, that
would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment -- precluding ventilation of the case before that Court of wrong
venue notwithstanding that the subject matter is within its jurisdiction. However, if the objection to venue is waived
by the failure to set it up in a motion to dismiss, the RTC would proceed in perfectly regular fashion if it then tried and
decided the action.
This is true also of real actions. Thus, even if a case "affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property"were commenced in a province or city other than that
"where the property or any part thereof lies,"if no objection is seasonably made in a motion to dismiss, the objection is
deemed waived, and the Regional Trial Court would be acting entirely within its competence and authority in
proceeding to try and decide the suit.
Auction in Malinta, Inc. vs Warren Luyaben
515 SCRA 519
February 12, 2007
Facts:
Luyaben, resident of Kalinga, filed with the Kalinga RTC a complaint for damages against Auction in Malinta Inc.
(Malinta) on the ground that Malinta failed to deliver the wheel loader after Luyaben tendered payment being the
highest bidder in an auction conducted by Malinta. Malinta moved to dismiss the case on the ground of improper
venue. Malinta argued that the correct venue is the RTC of Valenzuela City pursuant to stipulation in the Bidders
Application and Registration Bidding Agreement which states that all court litigation procedures shall be conducted in
the appropriate courts of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of improper venue
because there was a clear intention of the parties to limit the venue. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the resolution of
RTC and reinstated the complaint. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the stipulation in the parties Bidders Application and Registration Bidding Agreement effectively
limited the venue exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City.
Held:
No, the stipulation in the parties agreement did not effectively limited the venue exclusively to the proper court of
Valenzuela. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, all other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendant resides or in the case of
a nonresident defendant, where he may be found at the election of the plaintiff. However, Section 2 Rule 4 of the
Rules of court does not apply where the parties before the filing of the action have validly agreed in writing on an
exclusive venue. In this case, the stipulation in the parties agreement evidently lacks the restrictive and qualifying
words that will limit venue exclusively to the RTC of Valenzuela City. Hence, the Valenzuela courts should only be
considered as an additional venue to those mentioned under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The venue in the
case was properly laid down with the RTC of Kalinga.