The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1994) Vol.

XXXII

The Project of Ethical Renewal and Critique:

Edmund Husserls Early Phenomenology
of Culture
Anthony J. Steinbock
University of New Hampshire
Renewal [Erneuerung]is the expression Edmund Husserl
used in a series of articles appearing in the early 1920s for the
process of social, political and ethical transformation of human culture (1922-1924). As an absolute ethical demand renewal consists in the struggle towards a better humanity
and a genuine human culture. A t the invitation of a J a p a nese periodical, The Kaizo (meaning renewal), Husserl
drafted five articles, only the first three of which were actually
published. A complete review of these essays and an appraisal
of their full thematic content is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, I would like t o entertain the concept of renewal and
its place in the generative becoming of a culture.
To do this I first want briefly to explain the broader phenomenological background in which Husserl approached the
enterprise of renewal (Section I). I would then like to describe
Husserls concept of renewal as an ethical task (Section 11). In
the third section, I will take up the process of renewal as accomplishing the best possible. In Section IV, I will discuss
the concept of critique that Husserl advances in the Kaizo articles. My concluding Section (V) will interpret Husserls emphases on the urgency of critique and continual renewal in
relation t o the generation of a culture.

I. OPTIMALITY AND GENESIS

AS PHENOMENOLOGICAL CLUES
TO THE KAIZO ARTICLES
The Kaizo articles were written in 1922-1924, right on the
heels of Husserls fervent occupation with the problems of nor-

Anthony J . Steinbock is Assistant Professor of Philosophy a t the

University of New Hampshire. He has published numerous articles o n
political, social, and phenomenological philosophy. He recently finished a book on Husserl and Generative Phenomenology and is currently translating Husserl$ Analysis of Passive Synthesis.

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Anthony Steinbock
mality and abnormality (1917-1921). I t was also a t this time
t h a t Husserl explicitly distinguished between static and genetic phenomenological methods. Let me first discuss the notion of normality, and then take up the notion of genesis.
(A) During t h e period of 1917-1921, b u t not exclusively,
Husserl devoted considerable energies to phenomenological investigations of normality and abnormality under the aegis of
reflections on primordial constitution [ Urkonstitutionl. Overall, one can find four distinctive modes of normality and abnormality in Husserls reflections: concordance a n d
discordance, optimality a n d non-optimality, typicality a n d
atypicality, and familiarity and non-familiarity. Let me emphasize t h a t these are phenomenological notions and not, for example, medicinal, therapeutic, o r psychological ones; t h a t is,
they concern the constitution of sense. More precisely, during
t h e time frame j u s t mentioned, Husserl sketched normality
and abnormality as the relation between particular sense organs (and the lived body as a whole), and the environing world
[Umweltl. It is not necessary to explicate the full range of normality and abnormality here.2 I t is sufficient t o focus on t h e
one modality that is relevant for Husserls discussion of ethical
renewal in the Kaizo articles, namely, normality a s optimality.
Briefly, optimality is defined in two ways: (1)The optimal
is the phenomenological in-itself o r objective sense t h a t functions a s the thing itself in practical contexts; here the optimal is understood a s t h e best i n a p a r t i c u l a r context of
action or i n t e r e ~ t (2)
. ~ Related t o this point, the optimal is understood a s t h a t which offers the greatest richness and differentiation in a unity.4 In this sense, too, the optimal is the best
possible given a certain context.
The institution of the optimal occurs through facts (e.g., the
actual perception of the color red), but a t the same time points
beyond itself a s a norm for further perceptions, guiding furt h e r action, and teleologically organizing other appearances
according t o it. Likewise, t h e abnormal is what is worse for
particular conditions of experience, less in richness and differentiation.
Thus, this particular red seen in daylight can function a s
the institution of the normal color red, which a s optimal organizes other appearances of red according to it. This accounts
for t h e fact t h a t t h e red color a t night is not some qualitatively different color, say, brown, but precisely a dimly perceived red.5 The appearing colors t h a t are not optimal serve a s
indexes for the normal by pointing back t o the optimal in this
context a s their norm.
Nevertheless, even though t h e optimal as norm functions
teleologically, it can be superseded by the institution of a new
appearance or event t h a t yields a new best. What was formerly normal is now abnormal in relation t o the new optimal.

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In comparison t o the old order the new optimal is indeed a n

anomaly; but insofar a s it is precisely optimal for experience, it is now the new normal, the new norm.6
Let this truncated explanation of the optimal function as a
rough sketch of what Husserl means by the optimal in his
analyses of primordial constitution. I will address this notion
in the context of the Kaizo articles where Husserl uses the
expression the best possible for the cultural equivalent t o
the perceptual optimal. One important difference, as will become clearer below, is t h a t Husserls description of the perceptual/epistemological optimal tends t o stress discovering
richness and diversity given in a perceptual object in varying
contexts. The cultural/ethical best possible, however, suggests
a richness and diversity that is to be g e n e r ~ t e d . ~ L me
e t not
pursue this distinction further, but turn to Husserls notion of
genesis.
(B) At the same time t h a t Husserl explored the phenomenological concepts of normality and abnormality, he also explicitly formulated the difference between static and genetic
phenomenological research perspectives.8 A static methodology essentially has two applications. First, it describes structures of experience, formal and material essences, etc. To this
extent static phenomenology can be characterized as an ontological enterprise; within an ontology, the eidetic structures
can remain taken for granted in their being and hence remain
mundane. Second, in a constitutive regard, static phenomenology treats the constitution of sense, but only within the
strictures of present givenness. It can articulate the accomplishment of sense through intention and fulfillment, but
does not broach the temporal development of sense.
In a genetic phenomenology, however, Husserl is primarily
concerned with the process of temporal development. It is not
so much geared on a mere formal time consciousness; properly speaking genesis concerns t h e process of t h e selftemporalization of the i n d i v i d u a l , ultimately individual
. ~ a t the time Husserl
facticity or monadic i n d i ~ i d u a l i t yBut
made his initial distinction between static and genetic methods, and at the time of the Kaizo articles, the contours of a
genetic method were not so well defined. Thus, Husserl used
the expression genesis t o cover any type of becoming t h a t
develops over time: in the Kaizo articles Husserl extends
temporalization to include the historical becoming of a community.
I have suggested in other works that there is a systematic,
methodologic, and thematic distinction t o be made between
genetic phenomenology and generative phenomenology.
Whereas the former bears on an order of meaning that is circumscribed by the birth and death of an individual, and most
properly concerns the unity and becoming of a life, the latter

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treats the phenomenon of generativity a s geo-historical-social
movement.lo I t concerns t h e unity of communities a n d their
traditions. The primary generative matters include t h e geohistorical-social concepts homeworld and alienworld, and
not, e.g., Ego and alter Ego.l While Husserl did investigate
the intercultural concepts of home and alien already prior
t o t h e Kaizo articles,12 he did not take them u p again rigorously until the time he began articulating distinctions between
genesis and generativity, i.e., t h e years following 1929 (or after the French Cartesian Meditations). My point is t h a t when
Husserl speaks of genesis in the Kaizo articles, he uses t h e
unrefined term t o cover both individual temporalization a n d
t h e process of socio-historical movement, a n d f u r t h e r t h a t
many of his descriptions of t h e generation of meaning in a n
ethical order already t u r n on a distinction between genesis
and g e n e r a t i ~ i t y . ~
Having clarified t h e s e two important phenomenological
concepts, optimality a n d genesis, a s background or understanding key concepts employed in Husserls Kaizo articles, we
a r e now in a position t o approach t h e problem of ethical renewal and critique.

11. RENEWAL AS AN ETHICAL TASK

The Kaizo articles were written against t h e backdrop of
what Husserl perceived a s a crisis haunting European culture
a f t e r t h e F i r s t World War. The crisis concerned a troubled
faith and skeptical pessimism: not on a mere cognitive or epistemological plane -usually a t the forefront of Husserls work;
rather, it concerned the entire sphere of culture, and specifically, European culture ( H 27, 4 f.).14
By culture, Husserl understands t h e ensemble of h u m a n
accomplishments t h a t come together in the continuing activities of communal life a n d t h a t have t h e i r existence i n t h e
abiding tradition of a community ( H 27, 21). But culture is not
merely a unity of pregiven norms, already established in advance, whether they be intellectual, artistic, political, or religious norms. Culture is most fundamentally for Husserl a n
ethical domain; it is a normal culture (normal in t h e full
sense of the word), brought about through human accomplishments. The process of bringing those norms into being can be
termed the process of normalization.
Husserl calls for renewal not because we are failing t o crea t e culture and cultural values; the creation of culture takes
place through normalization, through t h e appropriation of
norms and values by new generations, as well a s by repeating
them in ritual, work habits, story telling, etc. His challenge instead is t o create culture reasonably, i.e., critically. We read:
We are human beings, freely willing subjects who together ac-

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tively intervene in
[own] environing world, constantly
shaping it. We do so whether we want t o or not, whether for
better or worse. Can we not also do it reasonably; is reasonability and excellence of ability not within our power (H27, 4)?
Whether in the guise of an eidetic science (i.e., an ontology)
o r as a transcendental rigorous science, phenomenology is conceived in these essays primarily as a n ethical task.16 Husserl
portrays science not only as a trait in the development of humanity, but as influencing and guiding the self-development of
humanity of which it is conscious (H27, 56). The purpose, however, is not absolute knowledge, but the ethical becoming of humanity from within the development of human culture.
With at least the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology clearly i n hand, and emphasizing t h e dynamic
movement of science which functions guidingly but which also
remains embedded within the life of humanity, Husserl asserts
with a sense of urgency:

... we must recognize a t once that all this is not to be understood statically, but dynamically-genetically [sic].Rigorous science is not objective
being, but the becoming [das Werden] of a n ideal objectivity; and if it is
essentially only in becoming, then the idea of genuine humanity and its
method of self-formation is also only in becoming. (H27, 55)
The renewal of human culture must be understood in the
genesis of renewal a s the science of a humanity developing
reciprocally with the advent of an ethical humanity. What Husserl describes as a process of self-development is most rigorously a process of the self-realization of human culture (H27,
56). The ethical dimension belongs t o culture a s a highest
value.
Yet the life form of the ethical human being, contends Husserl, is not only relatively of the highest value, i.e., one culture
domain relative t o another, say to the artistic life, but singly
and absolutely. Again, Husserl is emphatic: The genuine artist, for example, is a s such not yet a genuine human being in
t h e highest sense. But t h e genuine human being can be a
genuine artist, and can only be so i f ethical self-regulation demands this from him (H27, 29).
I t follows from such a characterization of the ethical life
t h a t ethically one cannot become human and cultural in just
any way one likes, since becoming human is a n ethical prospect. On the other hand, i t would be inaccurate t o say t h a t a
particular mode of life is somehow grounded i n ethics.
Husserls position is more nuanced. His point is that normally
cultural life can be anything as an ethical life. As a result, the
artistic life is, of course, undertaken as an artistic life, but not
merely as an artistic life since normally for this person or this
community it is undertaken as a n ethical task. Thus, Husserl
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would say t h a t a n ethical human being is not simply a n artist

because she writes, dances, and paints, but rather t h a t she becomes a n artist insofar a s this style of life is required for the
co-realization of t h e moral tenor of t h e self a n d community.
And we could say the same of the teacher, the carpenter, t h e
politician, or the lawyer.
Here we find a striking spin on Platos notion of the Good
t h a t transcends Being. For later in this same article Husserl
concludes t h a t ethical justice becomes t h e ultimate form of
justice, and implies t h a t the good in itself is only good insofar a s it is morally good. We read:
Only ethical justice is ultimate justice. What is otherwise called simply
valuable o r good in itself only receives this name because it fulfills certain essential conditions which demand considering it in the framework
of an ethical life a priori as a positive factor of value in taking account
of value, rather than excluding it a limine. ( H 27, 42)

This does not mean, a s some would contend, t h a t moral reason replaces speculative reason, or t h a t moral philosophy
becomes now first philosophy. Instead, philosophy or reason,
as moral or speculative, receives its value in the context of a n
ethicaI life, according to t h e demands of a n ethicaI individual
and communal self-regulation.
The normative idea of reason as responsibility is a n ethical
reason t h a t imbues variegated areas of culture, from logic t o
aesthetics. I t is a n ethical conscience ( H 27, 2 9 ) . Culture
t h e n is axiological, not i n t h e s e n s e of being a doctrine of
value, but in the sense t h a t all of cultures domains are guided
ultimately by ethical norms t h a t come into being through human action, and more specifically through the ethical human
life ( H 27, 32, 42, 63).
The ethical h u m a n life is normal because i t is bound t o
norms and lives in them ( H 27, 59); a n ethical norm is neither
a n ahistorical principle t o which one must slavishly conform,
nor a mere historical fact, a being [ S e i n ] ;it is rather a binding
should-be [Seinsollenl t h a t itself arises out of the framework
of human communal normality.

111. THE BEST POSSIBLE

I n a work t h a t follows a description of normality in terms
of optimality, it is not surprising t o discover Husserl appealing
to the notion of optimality in order t o portray the bindingness
of norms generated from within a normal cultural framework.
B u t i n s t e a d of describing it on a p e r c e p t u a l l y constitutive
level, t h e normal is understood i n t h e K a i z o articles on a n
ethically constitutive level a s optimal, a s the best possible
[das Bestmoglichel.

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What type of normativity do we gain with such a characterization? Husserl admits that the expression, the best possible
is general and formal, and that its content is incompletely determined ( H 27, 33). The reason for this, I would argue, is that
the normal qua optimal is conceived generatiuely, and as a result is evolving in its content along with ethical action. Or
more precisely put, the vagueness of this formulation is due t o
the historicity and generativity of a homeworld itself and cannot be specified speculatively in advance. Its characterization
is necessarily incompletely determined because the norm is
tied t o the process by which it is achieved such that the content of the norm arises in the context of process.l8
Taking up and actively repeating the sense that stems from
a tradition, we accept a tradition a s valid in many respects.
But just as the norms of a normal individual life can become
more or less habitual, culturally, too, we can live a certain way
simply because it has always been done that way by our parents, our ancestors, etc.IgAlthough such appropriation of sense
may be the perpetuation of a tradition, it may also signal the
inertia and degeneracy of its generative force. For Husserl, in
order for a homeworld t o become a homeworld, a homeworld
demands a continual renewal of its generative force ( H 27, 4
f., 43). Put differently, while the habitual character of actions
does give a clue t o the bindingness of norms as internally developing from a homeworld, norms are not binding simply by
having been repeated, but as a practical, reasonable possibility
of renewing our life ( H 27, 33); in order to function as norms,
they have t o be made normal through renewal.
Husserl writes that the extent to which the practical possibility of renewing ones entire life is open, becoming ethically
the best possible is set in contrast not only to an organic passivity of repetition, but also t o the merely theoretical absolute
ideal of completeness imposed on an ethical life from the outside (H27, 34, 42, 44). Thus against the idea of absolute completeness out of absolute reason it belongs essentially to the
practical imperative to do that which is the best possible at
a given time [das zur Zeit Bestmoglichel and in this way to become better and better according t o the present [zeitiger] possibility ( H 27, 36). Such a contextual, relative best possible
life for the subject is demanded absolutely; that is, through
human ethical experience it becomes a kind of absolute imperative
I have mentioned above that the optimal or best possible is
realized in experience at the same time that it functions teleologically as a norm in order to become optimal and guide experience. The best possible peculiar to the ethical life functions
in t h e same way. On t h e one hand, the normal ethical life
must be an historical o r contextual life, realized and realizable
in particular human circumstances in order for this way of life
.lZo

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Anthony Steinbock

to be the best possible. On the other hand, this relative ideal

also functions teleologically and bears the stamp of infinity
( H 27, 34). This understanding has two consequences.
First, an action that is not the best possible for human culture necessarily refers back to the best possible in its execution: [the unethical life] refers back t o the pregnant concept
o f a n ethical life. The ethical life includes the unethical life
because the former is developing the continuity of a generative
density and is not simply contained in an instantaneous act.
Likewise, the ethical life according to Husserl is made up of
various levels of norm realization, among them the ideal optim a l f o r m of a consistent life according t o the best, namely,
the respective best possible knowledge and conscience for the
ethical subject in question ( H 27, 39 f.).
Second, because the best possible is a kind of concrete absolute, the present ethical optimum can be superseded, instituting a new ethical best possible despite its teleological reference
back t o the previous norm. In a specific ethical context, an act
or an ethical life can appear as an ethical anomaly; but this
anomaly may a t the same time point beyond the current ethical norms that define the culture and institute a new normality, a new best possible. Ethical norms t h a t develop
dynamically in the process of human life and culture make i t
impossible to specify the content of these optima in advance.
Applying Husserls exposition of the optimal from his genetic descriptions on a perceptually constitutive level t o this
discussion, it is possible, if not t o specify its content, then a t
least t o give sharper contours t o its formality. We can say that
living the best possible life in terms of the practical possibility
of renewal is the affirmation, realization and generation of the
highest differentiation and richness of generativity.
A new form of human being emerges in the self-regulation
of a life according t o the best possible, as the necessary form
of the true human: self-humanization is a constant genesis
of self-formation ( H 15 391). But asserts Husserl, this type of
ethical human being is not yet the best possible as such ( H
27, 45).
Why is ethical self-regulation not t h e best possible as
such? Why is it not fully ethical? Is Husserl resorting t o a n
abstract norm or to a n imperative t h a t one can never attain
due to human finitude? At first glance, i t would appear t h a t
Husserl has in mind an absolute best possible that human life
would be incapable of realizing in a n ethical life. Upon closer
inspection, however, he is not becoming more abstract, but
more concrete. Living according t o an ethical self-regulation is
not fully ethical because it is still based on the contemporary
i n d i v i d u a z , on a self; methodologically i t is still genetic
rather than generative. Ethically, I am responsible not only for
my own becoming but for the generation of an ethical context
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which I take up and in which I am inextricably involved. Accordingly, Husserl hedges his remarks on self-regulation because his own analyses remain up t o t h i s point merely
genetic. The dimension lacking is the generative dimension as
communal and historical (cf. H 27,45 f.).
Although Husserl had not yet distinguished between genetic and generative dimensions in this early work, he nonetheless points towards the generative dimension by evoking
the historico-cultural character of communal ethical life. Husserl explains that the inclusion of the human being in a human community, and the fact that this life is integrated into a
communal life has consequences that determine ethical comportment from the very start, giving to the categorical imperative a closer formal determination ( H 27, 45).Belonging
to my own being, will and realization is also the process of being, willing and realizing this best possible of the other; selfresponsibility is responsibility before the other (H27,46 f.; H
15 422). Moreover, realizing the optimal in the ethical life
means renewing the cultural community in its historical selftransformation, its institutions, organizations, and cultural
goods of every kind: in short, realizing the best possible of the
homeworld is the renewal of its generative force.
The social and ethical degeneracy of a culture is no more
intrinsic to the unfolding of a homeworld than is its possible
flourishing. What is certain is t h a t viewed generatively, the
homeworld undergoes constant historical transformation (H
15, 181). Given t h i s configuration, namely, t h a t t h e
homeworld is undergoing constant normative transformation
through active (but not necessarily reasonable repeating), and
the fact that homecomrades have a n ethical responsibility
for the historically generative force of the homeworld, the
ethical becoming of a homeworld requires a persistent attentiveness t o its normative generation, a continual renewal
which Husserl clarifies under the process of critique.

IV.THE CONCEPT OF CRITIQUE

Most of us are familiar with the notion of historical critique in Husserl primarily from his Krisis work. There Huss e r l describes continual critique as a n inquiry back
[Riiclzfrage] into our historical framework in a n effort t o discern our unique historical task-not from the outside, externally, but r a t h e r from within (H 6, 72). A critical
understanding of our history entails examining our surviving
values a n d goals t h a t have been handed down to u s a n d
sedimented, linking us as well to future generations. Such a n
historical inquiry b a c k is not portrayed as a private task of
an isolated philosopher in the present, but is described as an
intersubjective task, a generative task through the exchange

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of critique with those present and with the past tradition ( H

6, 73).
Significantly-and here we touch base with the project of
renewal- t h e Krisis understands historical critique a s a responsible critique t h a t is u n d e r t a k e n not merely a s a n a t tempt t o make explicit what is latent o r sedimented, a s if t o
free ourselves from prejudices a n d presuppositions simply;
r a t h e r i t i s a n effort to revitalize a n d to carry on t h e
sedimented system of values and goals as taken for grantedeven in t h e form of a radical transformation. This h a s the
sense of reawakening a generative community. Such a process
is what Husserl calls a genuine or most profound self-reflection [Selbstbesinnungl.
We realize from t h e publication of t h e Kaizo articles t h a t
t h e notion of historical critique was also prominent about a
decade earlier in the fifth and final draft of Husserls contribution t o The Kaizo.22 Critique here is a mode of historical inquiry t h a t indicates a transformation from passive to ethically
active comportment, from a n unfree historical naivete t o a
free position-taking ( H 27, 62). The extent to which Husserls
use of free and unfree is appropriate or ultimately misleading given t h e historical embeddedness of the individual in a
generative tradition is open t o question. In spite of this questionable usage I believe t h a t the central import of his invocation of critique can still be ascertained.
Husserl seems to distinguish between two senses of critique. The first sense is the faculty of critique [Vermogen der
Kritikl which he explains is endemic t o human life. We exercise it in everyday practical affairs, albeit incompletely, by
considering whether o r not our goals and means are actually
correct, and without simply throwing waste t o our convictions.
This faculty of critique, however, is not ultimate, for we can
transform it into a critical attitude by placing our pregiven
convictions, our appropriations, i n question, considering t o
what extent they deserve credit ( H 27, 63 f.).
Interestingly, Husserl uses the expression critical attitude
[kritische Einstellungl a s a way of describing t h e process of
freeing oneself from a potentially naive appropriation a n d
complacent repeating of a tradition. The fact t h a t Husserl uses
critical in this context is suggestive. It implies a way of taking a distance from t h e t r a d i t i o n within t h e t r a d i t i o n , a
slackening of t h e i n t e n t i o n a l t h r e a d s , a s Merleau-Ponty
would say, rather than completely severing them. It suggests a
generative transcendental attitude t h a t must explicate the essential normality present in the actual and possible movement
from one cultural complex t o a n o t h e r a s i t itself embodies
them.23
By the critique of tradition and the present world, Husserl
h a s in mind the function of preparing a new rational forma-

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tion, i.e., a new shape of responsible humanity. Moreover, such

a rational life Husserl considers t o be the philosophical life.
But this subject of reason, he clarifies, cannot be the isolated
single-ego, who as isolated cannot exist; rather he or she is the
communal
Because the ethical organization of society through rational willing is the reshaping of a new humanity, t h e philosopher can be said t o be t h e functionary of
humanity.
Certainly, Husserls posture of critique is a far cry from
what critical theory has called immanent critique. Nevertheless we can see certain affinities between the two. In particular, the critical attitude is fundamentally a critique of t h e
normative dimension of a homeworld from within a developing
homeworld in order to evaluate its own contradictions and inconsistencies; it neither presupposes that the normative content of a homeworld can be given in advance, nor t h a t i t is
imposed outside of its historical generation. Despite its vagueness, o r perhaps precisely because of it, at least the early inspiration of the critique of critical theory and the critical
attitude of a generative phenomenology have this much in
common. Seyla Benhabibs introduction t o the notion of critique can serve as a touchstone. She observes that
[the] unclarity [concerning the normative foundations of critical theory]
is not due to a lack of conceptual acuity or to analytical confusion. It is
endemic to the mode of inquiry known as critique that, despite its emphatic normative dimension, it considers itself to have transcended the
normative naivete of evaluative theories prescribing a n ideal ethics and
an ideal p o l i t i ~ s . ~ ~

For a generative phenomenology, evaluating a homeworlds

own inconsistencies or contradictions is a delicate point. To be
sure, Husserls emphasis remains on assessing the consistency
and deviations of a culture, specifically European culture, according to its primordial institution in ancient Greece. The difficulty is that he tends to expand an immanent ethical reform
of this homeworld t o an all encompassing world, one humanity, one normality and hence t o a ubiquitous homeworld.26
Let me turn to this prospect of the one world, considering it in
relation to the ethical generation of culture.

V. CONCLUSION
THE ETHICAL GENERATION OF CULTURE
In his later writings, Husserl entertains the prospect of the
one world [die eine Welt] in terms of a quest for scientific objectivity. He does so i n two ways. I n the first case t h e one
world is regarded statically as a substratum or a totality of
which the home and alien are just different interpretations or
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Anthony Steinbock

perspectival adumbration^.^^ Here t h e world is treated like a

thematic object upon which we focus our attention, functioning
like a n identical pole ( H 15, 210, 217, 437).
The second way he proposes t o grasp the one world is genetically. I n t h i s case t h e one world is said t o evolve practically through expansion a s t h e one homeworld of a higher
order, making t h e alien familiar.28Because t h e world t h a t
Husserl has in mind here is Europe and European culture expressed in the teleology of scientific reason primordially instituted by t h e Greeks, t h e practice involved is t h e cognitive
practice of scientific reason (cf. H 6, 318 ff.). As a result, t h e
one world is often conceived as a total rational synthesis of act u a l and possible homeworlds of lower order homeworlds ( H
15, 217, 225 ff.).
While achieving the one world seems to be Husserls goal, I
contend t h a t his generative descriptions of intersubjectivity
challenge it forcefully: such a synthesis of homeworld a n d
alienworld generatively examined is impossible. And it is precisely upon generative phenomena a n d not static o r genetic
ones t h a t t h e drive towards t h e one world stumbles. Let me
begin t o explicate this point by citing the questions Husserl
raises.
H u s s e r l suggests t h a t a n alien community of
homecomrades and their alien homeworld is normatively different for those of us in our homeworld: their validities are not
our own. Because the alienworld h a s its own generative density of a tradition, Husserl poses the question: to what extent
and how far [can I] understandingly appropriate their experiential validities, t h a t is, proceed in bringing into a synthesis
their homeworld with that of mine? ( H 15, 233 f.).
I n a n ethical register, Husserl poses similar questions i n
the Kuizo articles. From a n ontological perspective he tends t o
handle the problem of a universal ethic and religion in terms
of something like a concrete universal. Admitting t h a t human
worlds are given in the mode of homeworldliness and alien,
with their corresponding ethical lives and religions, Husserl
implies t h a t they are united by a n abstract universal generality t h a t is purely formal in such a way a s t o leave open how
ethics and religion will be determined or be concrete. Everything concrete is only concrete in its general type.29
From a genetic perspective, Husserl poses the problem differently. At the conclusion of the fourth Kuizo article he asks
(merely rhetorically it seems) whether a closed-off world
should open itself up towards the outside; is it not ethically
required to let a n ethical community grow out over the entire
world? He states further t h a t we come t o the ultimate idea of
a universal ethical humanity, t o a t r u e human world-people
over all particular peoples and t o a over-people encompassing
them, to a unitary culture, to a world state over all single sys-

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tems of states (H27, 58 f.). Is this possible? Desirable? And
given the notion of renewal and critique, does this over-arching perspective make sense?
If we take Husserls insights into the genesis and generation of the optimal seriously, then the ethical best possible
need not merely refer back to a primordial institution; ethical
critique and renewal would not have to be oriented on the one
world. In addition t o referring back, the institution of norms,
and thus the development of a culture, can also go beyond the
previous best possible, despite its teleology, precisely a s the
best possible; it can institute new normalities and new optima.
Hence, even within the homeworld itself there can be diverse,
conflicting and rivaling normalities. The renewal of a cultures
generative force may even require such diversity and such a
transcending.
Certainly we face attempts t o overcome alienness: one can
attempt to destroy an alien people by mass genocide, by displacing them from their earth-ground or home-land, by cultural domination. But for all that, one would never gain total
access t o the alien generativity. Were the homeworld to overcome alienness, t h e homeworld would no longer be a
homeworld since it would cease to be what it is as co-relative
to and co-generative with an alienworld. Instead, there would
be a destruction of the entire structure homeworld/alienworld.
Only by abstracting from generativity is the prospect of the
one world conceivable.
In what sense is homeworld/alienworld ethically irreducible? Is it an ethical imperative t o attain the one world? The
attempt to do this, I suggest, would be the attempt t o overcome generativity, the very generative force that ethical conscience was summoned to renew, not destroy. By making a
so-called ethical one world, we would not be renewing
generativity but negating it, actually making our world unethical. It would be t o objectify the alien, to make the alien accessible, reifying the generative force, and the alienworlds
generative becoming. For this reason, the attempt to establish
the one world is unethical. This does not mean that we cannot
become responsive to alien generativity by being responsible to
ours, but it does mean that we cannot ethically take over their
responsibility.
I would argue t h a t t h e diversity of normalities a n d the
transcending of t h e best possible is more t o t h e point of
Husserls continual renewal of a cultures generative force, a
renewal that is itself in generation. An emphatic urgency for
critique o r renewal would serve no real purpose were there
only a single possibility inherent in the generation of a culture, and not a diversity of possibilities and norms that give
shape t o the emergence of a homeworld. The ethical demand
for renewal would not be literally imperative were critique
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Anthony Steinbock

undertaken from a perspective outside of ethical development;

it is imperative because it is instead undertaken from within a
humanity i n t h e process of becoming. There is not a simple
choice between the alternatives of either generation or degeneracy; what is required is a critique within a field of competing optima, competing normalities t h a t a r e oriented towards
realizing the generation of a common world in relation to alien
ones.3oAll the more reason t h a t our convictions be placed constantly in question in a continual renewal! Critique, most profoundly, would not be free in the sense of autonomy or being
unconstrained, but in the sense of a freeing up of possibilities,
of emancipating present and future best possible ways for generating a homeworld, evaluating them as they are historically
emerging.
J u s t a s the homeworld is not simply given once and for all,
s o too a r e i t s ethical norms in constant transformation, demanding the critical attitude and normative renewal. Ethical
justice, for example, would have to interpret systems of norms,
values a n d virtue not simply on the basis of past deeds, but
from the perspective of a future t h a t is not given in advance;
it would have t o be evaluated in terms of a best possible t h a t
can only be determined i n the process of its historical emergence, i n t h e particular historical intersubjective situation
t h a t is in the process of becoming ethically optimal.
Ultimately, t h e self-responsibility for our culture and the
critical a t t i t u d e towards its generativity would not lead t o
wars of ethnic purity o r t o religious conversions, but would
simultaneously be a responsibility towards a n alien culture. If
renewal a s becoming ethically the best possible with respect t o
our homeworld is a self-responsibility towards the historical
generative force whose best possible realization remains of necessity ambiguous, t h e n ethical renewal and critique of t h e
generative framework would require openness on our part towards other possibilities t h a t realize this generativity. Being
responsible would not entail taking over the responsibility of
or f or another culture. Rather, i t would take the shape of being responsive towards the alien, in the face of a n alien culture. I n this way, self-responsibility becomes simultaneously
being responsive towards t h e alien, a n alienworld t h a t cogeneratively becomes w h a t it is i n t h e becoming of t h e
h~meworld.~~

NOTES
Of these three only the first article appeared in both German and
Japanese, the remaining two appeared only in Japanese translation.
The final two articles were withheld and left in draft form. See the editors (Thomas Nenons and Hans Sepps) introduction to the Husserliana
edition i n which these articles have been included: Aufsatze und
Vortruge (1922-1937) eds., Thomas Nenon and H a n s Rainer Sepp,

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Husserliana vol. 27 (Boston: Kluwer, 19891, xi f. Hereafter, I will cite
this volume as H 27.
See my The Phenomenological Concepts of Normality and Abnormality, hereafter, Normality and Abnormality.
See for example Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungsund Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926, ed., M. Fleischer, Husserliana
vol. 11 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 19661, 23-24.
Ms. D 13 XII, 11-12: Das Tageslicht, der helle Tag 1aRt die
Dingmerkmale am reichsten und differenziertesten hervortreten, in ihm
betatige ich mich daher mit Vorliebe ...
Ms. D 13 XII, 51: Aber zum Ding gehort es, daR diese normale
Farbe doch wieder sich wandelt, eben j e nach Auftreten von
belichtenden Korpern bei Tageslicht oder bei fehlendem Tageslight.. ..
Es scheidet sich also Farbe als Erscheinungsfarbe (im Vollschema) und
Farbe,an sich, ein a n sich aber, d a s eigentlich mit gesehener Farbe
keine Ahnlichkeit hatte, wenn nicht die optimale Farbe das Telos ware,
und eine wirkliche Farbe in dem urspriinlichen Sinn von erscheinender
Farbe. (Emphasis mine.)
Ms. D 13 XVII, 14: Dann ware eine feinere Sinnesorganisation,
mit gestigerten Sehleistungen etc., nicht anomal, sondern erst recht normal, gesteigert normal, und, was vorhin normal hieB, anomal. (Emphasis mine.) See my Normality and Abnormality, especially 93.
I would like to thank Tom Nenon for highlighting this important
distinction between perceptual and ethical optima implicit in Husserls
descriptions.
In fact, the only way he could describe the notions of normality
and abnormality is through a genetic perspective because they essentially entail the unfolding of sense over time: where concordance is concerned it is t h e i n t e r n a l coherence of sense, its developing
Einstimmigkeit;where optimality is concerned, it is the institution, solicitation, and potential overcoming of the best possible in experience.
See Zur Phanomenologie der Zntersubjektivitat (Zweiter Teil, 192119281, Husserliana vol. 14, ed., Is0 Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
19731, 34-48. This volume will be cited hereafter as H 14.
lo See my Home and Beyond: Explorations in Generative Phenomenology. See also Generative Phenomenology in Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, ed., Lester Embree (Boston: Kluwer, forthcoming).
I1 In short, a homeworld [Heimwelt] is a normal lifeworld in all four
senses of the term normal mentioned above. An alienworld [Fremdweltl
is a constitutionally abnormal lifeworld in the sense of a culture that
has norms that are not valid for us.
l2 Ms. A V 1O/I (c. 1920), entitled: Umwelt, Heimwelt.
The thematic distinction-if not terminological -between genesis
and generativity is present in the second appendix to the Kaizo articles
from 1922/23, H 27, 96.
l4 See Donn Weltons Husserl and the Japanese, in Review of Metaphysics 44 (March 19911, 577. Note also that the fifth article, provisionally entitled Formale Typen der Kultur in der Menschheitsentwicklung,
t r e a t s many themes t h a t were to become prevalent i n his famous
Vienna Lecture of 1935. I have in mind here the role of rational teleology, the central place of Europe, primordial institution of philosophical
science with ancient Greece, etc.
Id Reading unsere for ihre.
Cf. H 27, 12 ff. and 89.

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Anthony Steinbock
li
Self-regulation, according to Husserl, is the ability to evaluate the
sense of ones life in terms of its actualities and possibilities. In a
Kantian vein it entails prescribing general life goals and submitting
oneself to norms which one has freely generated. See H 27, 26 ff.
Welton, Husserl and the Japanese, 594 f.
I9 See Zur Phunomenologie der Zntersubjektiuitat (Dritter Teil, 192919351, Husserliana vol. 15, ed., Is0 Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
19731, 144. This volume will be cited hereafter as H 15.
2o Cf. H 27, 33: Ein solches jeweils bestmogliches Leben ist fur sein
Subjekt selbst charakterisiert als das absolut Gesollte. See also H 27,
29,37-39 as well as H 15, 144 f.
21 See especially Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die
transzendentale Phanomenologie. Eine E i n l e i t u n g i n die
phanomenologische Philosophie, Husserliana vol. 6 , ed., Walter Biemel
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 19541, $15. Hereafter, this work will be
cited as H 6.
22 See 62 ff., 77 ff. Here Husserl defines critique as the conscious differentiation between the heteronomous and autonomous motives of certainty and the position of the knowing subject against all motivations of
the heart [Gemiit]for a judgmental certainty, and against other motivations which have become standardized [normierten] without insight
through prejudices.
23 Here I have reformulated one of Weltons explanations of critique
for my purposes. See Welton, Husserl and the Japanese, 587.
24 See Appendix VII, Radical Kritik, H 27, 107.
25 Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, Utopia: A S t u d y o f the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 19861, 8.
26 See also H 15, 235.
27 H 15, 210, 214 f., 217, 437.
28 On one occasion Husserl explicitly imports this structure from the
Fifth Meditation and imposes it on the structure of homeworld and
alienworld. He writes of making the alienworld a homeworld by grasping it as if it were a homeworld ( H 15, 625).
29
See Ms. A VII 9, 11: Naturlich da der Mensch seiende Welt nur
h a t in Modis der Heimweltlichkeit und Fremde ..., s o ist es ohne
weiteres ersichtlich, dalj jede konkreten Menschen seines Volkes und
seiner Heimwelt betreffende Ethik oder Religion ... durchaus
umweltliche Bezogenheit h a t ... . Universale Ethik und Religion ist
offenbar nur reine Form, in ihrer universalen Allgemeinheit abstrakt,
offen unbestimmt lassend die Konkretionen von Mensch und Umwelt.
Eben damit aber die Norm der Echtheit, die stets mitverstanden sein
murj in der Weise, wie jedes Konkrete n u r konkret ist in seinem
allgemeinen und doch nicht herausabstrahierten Typus. Doch ware da
manches Besondere zu sagen.
so See Bernhard Waldenfels, Ordnung i m Zwielicht (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 19871, esp. sections A and B.
An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Husserl
Circle, Florida Atlantic University, May 27, 1994.
I would like to acknowledge the Husserl Archives at Leuven, and in
particular, Professor Samuel Ijsseling, for his kind permission to consult
and t o cite Husserls unpublished manuscripts. All translations of
Husserls works cited in this article are mine.

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