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12
17, 2010), a reform that makes Margaret Thatcher look like a leftist
radical (Editorial, Financial Times, September 17, 2010); and the end
of half a century of thundering revolutionary certitude about Cuban
socialism (Rory Carroll, The Guardian, September 9, 2010).
Al Jazeera wondered what Che Guevara, the legendary communist
revolutionary, would make of Cubas plan to lay off 500,000 state workers by 2011 as the island moves closer to a market economy (Chris
Arsenault, Al Jazeera, October 10). Actually, Che Guevara himself
argued that full employment should not be prioritized over improvements in productivity and efficiency, without which socialism and
communism would not be possible. In 1962, once the structural underemployment inherent in pre-revolutionary Cubas sugar economy had
been tackled, Guevara insisted (on January 20): We should think
about productivity without fear that it makes workers unemployed. Yes,
it is true that workers are made unemployed; but every excess worker
in a factory means social unemployment. . . . the worker stuck in a job
where he has to divide his work with another worker adds nothing
to society (Guevara, 1966, 153).1 Guevara believed that socialism
was a phenomenon of both technology/productivity and political
consciousness, and that these had to be augmented simultaneously
in the transition process. In the early 1960s, Guevaras solution was to
send surplus workers to study. In contemporary Cuba, with extremely
high educational levels nationwide, the solution to low productivity
has to be sought elsewhere.
Other recent reforms in Cuba, especially those introduced under
Ral Castro since 2008, have elicited similar responses from the international media and political commentators outside of Cuba. Those
measures have included the removal of wage caps for production over
the norm, the distribution of idle state land in usufruct (short-term,
rent-free loan) to families and individuals, increasing state payments
for private or cooperative farm produce, the opening up of access to
previously restricted durable goods, and experimentation with small
urban cooperatives in fields such as hair cutting. However, contemporary developments cannot be understood from a purely ideological
perspective as if they express a political decision to embrace capitalism.
1 Similarly, in 1986 Fidel Castro warned against speaking about the standard of living as if
it was divorced from productivity, from economic and social development, as if it was divorced from the development needs of a country in the Third World, even a socialist one
(November 30, 1982, cited in Granma, July 15, 2010, 1).
13
14
revolution, and he forced the question onto the agenda, initiating the
Great Debate in the early 1960s and developing a unique system of
economic management for the transition to socialism, the Budgetary
Finance System (BFS), between 1959 and 1965. The BFS was inspired
by the administrative, financial and technological methods used by
the U. S. corporations and their subsidiaries in Cuba, adapting the
centralization and efficiency inherent in monopoly capitalism to the
socialist planned economy. This was consistent with Marxs stages
theory of history, which predicted that communism would emerge
from a fully developed capitalist mode of production. Marx showed
how the tendency to the concentration of capital, that is, to monopoly,
is inherent in the system. Therefore, the monopoly form of capitalism
is more developed than perfect competition. Guevara believed that
a socialist economic management system emerging from monopoly
capitalism could be more advanced, efficient and productive than
the Soviet system of economic management, which was adapted from
predominantly underdeveloped, pre-monopoly Russian capitalism.
15
16
17
The BFS aimed to foster Cubas industrialization, increasing productivity and institutionalizing collective management. Fidel Castro
secured Guevara the institutional space and the authority he needed
to experiment:
Che had an exceptional opportunity during the first years of the Revolution to
go deeply into important aspects of socialist construction. . . . He confronted
the task of applying the principles of MarxismLeninism to the organization
of production, as he understood them, as he saw them. He worked at this
for years, he spoke a lot, he wrote a lot about all those themes and really
he developed a theory that was very elaborate and very profound about the
way in which, in his opinion, socialism should be constructed and progress
towards communist society. (F. Castro, 2003, 4023.)
18
analyzed. For example, eager to industrialize their way out of monocrop dependency, Cuban revolutionaries neglected the sugar harvest.
The resulting fall in export earnings, exacerbated by the blockade,
severely reduced Cubas capacity to import the raw materials and
spare parts required for industry. Labor shortages in the countryside
led to increased reliance on voluntary labor for agricultural work.
Inevitably, some Cuban economists and planners blamed Guevaras
economic management model, claiming that these problems resulted
from excessive centralization and the lack of financial incentives to
individuals and enterprises. They hoped that by adopting the tried
and tested Soviet system this trend could be reversed. This juncture
coincided with increasing integration into the socialist bloc via trade
and personnel exchange; Cuban students went to Eastern Europe
on scholarships while the socialist countries sent technicians and
economists to Cuba. These advisors advocated the USSRs AFS with
decentralization and financial autonomy for enterprises, rejecting
the BFS model of centralized control of administration and finance.
The AFS was adopted in INRA and the Ministry for Foreign Trade
(MINCEX). Under this system enterprises functioned as independent accounting units responsible for their own profits and losses. In
INRA its operation was similar to the khozraschet model of cooperative
farms in the USSR. On August 23, 1963, both the BFS and the AFS
were endorsed by law, although they had been implemented prior to
that. There were now two competing economic management systems,
operating under one Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN), one central bank and one treasury. This created the institutional conditions
for the Great Debate.
All ministries received a state budget allocated by JUCEPLAN,
but the economic management system they operated had practical
implications affecting their organizational structures, the financial
relations among state institutions, relations between producers and
consumers, and so on.3 However, because the proponents of the different systems sought corroboration in Marxist texts the discussion
between them assumed the character of a theoretical rather than a
practical debate. Inevitably, there were discrepancies between the
theory and the reality of implementation of both systems. The theory
3 JUCEPLAN worked according to the national development strategy which was formulated
by the governments Economic Commission on which sat Guevara (MININD), Carlos Rafael
Rodrguez (INRA) and Osvaldo Dortics (President of Cuba).
19
was the conceptual paradigm that guided the practical policies, while
daily experience also fed back into the theoretical constructs.
The Great Debate took place concurrently with a broader discussion within the socialist bloc as part of a rightward push to liberalize
the planned economy, advocating market socialism and increasing
reliance on capitalist mechanisms to solve problems of economic
stagnation and bureaucracy. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland
led this reformist drive in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1962 Evsei G.
Liberman, a Soviet professor in the University of Kharkov, Ukraine,
published an influential article in Pravda recommending that the
profit motive, not the production plan, become the main driver of
productive efficiency, pursued via material incentives. Libermans
proposals, like those of many others, were a response to low productivity and efficiency, particularly in comparison with economic growth
in the developed capitalist world. It was not yet historically evident
that market socialism was a step towards the restoration of capitalism. Indeed, the reformists asserted that the key premise of their
proposals was to strengthen the socialist economy in the transition
to communism.
The protagonists in Cuba were well-informed about the broader
debate on incentives and financial autonomy contemporaneously
underway in the eastern European socialist countries. In addition to
his study of Capital and other classic Marxist texts, Guevara immersed
himself in contemporary literature, from east to west, both in favor
of market socialism and against the use of capitalist mechanisms.
He concluded that the Soviets had created a hybrid system, lacking
the efficiency of the free market with its aggressive fight for profits,
because the state plan and legally defined relations of production
prevented exploitation and capitalist accumulation, while failing to
foster collective consciousness in workers.
On July 11, 1964, Guevara told colleagues that he had been reading analyses from the socialist bloc, including the resolutions of the
14th Congress of the Polish Communist Party: The solution that they
are proposing for these problems in Poland is the complete freedom
of the law of value; that is to say, a return to capitalism (Guevara, 1966,
505). For Guevara it became imperative to initiate a serious study of
the political economy of the transition to socialism. The more people
were involved in collective debate, the more comprehensive and solid
would be the theory that emerged. He appealed to MININD directors
20
21
are the product of concrete human labor, but their constant and
complex exchange gives the human labor expended a particular
abstract, social, character. This abstract quality is thus a historical
characteristic. Marx showed that under the law of value the quantity
of abstract human labor embodied within commodities is the basis for
their exchange. The commodity must be desired in exchange (it has
a use value) and the labor time it contains must be socially necessary
that is, consistent with the average conditions of production.
Marx began Capital by stating that the wealth of societies in which
the capitalist mode of production prevails presents itself as an immense
accumulation of commodities. Because the commodity form is most
developed under capitalism, its complete analysis was only possible
under that system. However, under capitalism, commodities are no
longer exchanged directly in relation to the labor time embodied in
them, so their price no longer expresses that value in a simple, straightforward fashion. This change arises because different capitalists use
different ratios of labor to means of production (machinery, plant,
raw materials), producing different quantities of surplus value from
a given capital investment. But capitalists are guided by a concept of
equal returns to capital, refusing to invest where the rate of return is
below the average. Marx showed that because the operation of the law
of value has to provide for an equalization of the rate of profit, the
historically earlier form of simple prices is modified. Prices adjust to
form a general rate of profit and are affected in this process by other
factors such as rent, interest, final demand and competitors supply,
to establish the eventual market price. The result seems to contradict
the law of value. Marx set himself the task of demonstrating how under
capitalism, profits, rent and interest are also regulated by the law of
value, and how market prices are ultimately determined by the same
law. His analysis included the discovery of the actual mediating function of prices of production (D. Yaffe, 1976, 3149).
The dispute about the law of value in transition economies is at
the heart of the question about the feasibility of constructing socialism
in a country without a fully developed capitalist mode of production,
where development has been stunted by imperialist exploitation. The
debate is integral to the problems of production, distribution, investment and social relations. The notion of an eventual communist stage
requires a highly productive society in which the political conditions
exist for social production to be directed towards the needs of the
22
23
24
25
Guevara believed that the task of a socialist country was not to use, or
even hold in check, the law of value, but to define very precisely the
laws sphere of operation and then make inroads into those spheres
to undermine it; to work towards its abolition, not limitation. In June
1963, Guevara questioned: How can one consciously use the law
of value to achieve a balance in the market on the one hand, and a
faithful reflection of real value on the other? This is one of the most
serious problems the socialist economy faces (Guevara, 1971c, 114).
By February 1964 he had concluded:
We deny the possibility of consciously using the law of value, basing our
argument on the absence of a free market that automatically expresses the
contradiction between producers and consumers. . . . The law of value and
planning are two terms linked by a contradiction and its resolution. We can
therefore state that centralized planning is characteristic of the socialist
society, its definition. (Guevara, 1971b, 143.)
26
27
28
29
30
31
Guevara argued that the use of capitalist mechanisms in the production process in socialist Cuba risked reproducing capitalist social relations and a capitalist consciousness, despite state planning and state
ownership of the means of production. Guevara believed that moral
incentives should be developed to undermine the law of value as early
as possible during the transition process. Socialism must develop an
economic management system that finds a harmony between two
goals; production and consciousness must be fostered in parallel: To
build communism, a new man must be created simultaneously with the
material base (Guevara, 1971e, 343). He recognized that the underdevelopment of the productive forces and the fact that the consciousness of the Cuban people had been conditioned by capitalism meant
that there was an objective need to offer them material incentives.
But he opposed their use as the primary instrument of motivation,
because they would become an economic category in their own right
and impose individualist, competitive logic on the social relations of
production: Pursuing the chimera of achieving socialism with the aid
of the blunted weapons left to us by capitalism (the commodity as the
economic cell, profitability, and individual material interest as levers,
etc.) it is possible to come to a blind alley. . . . Meanwhile, the adapted
economic base has undermined the development of consciousness
(Guevara, 1971e, 342).
Guevara concluded with his most succinct exposition on the
theme:
If material incentives are in contradiction to the development of consciousness, but on the other hand, are a great force for obtaining production
gains, should it be understood that preferential attention to the development
of consciousness retards production? In comparative terms, it is possible
within a given period, although no one has made the relevant calculations.
7 If communism neglects . . . Here Guevara is clearly referring to the so-called communist
countries; he is not contemplating the idea that communism could be reached without a
new consciousness developing, along with new social relations.
32
We maintain that the development of consciousness does more for the development of production in a relatively short time than material incentives
do. We take this stance because our societys development is generally projected to lead
to communism. This presupposes that work will cease to be a painful necessity and become an agreeable imperative. Such a statement is loaded with
subjectivism and requires sanction in the experience we are gaining. If in
the course of experience it proves to seriously block the development of the
productive forces, then the decision must be made to act quickly in order to
get back on familiar paths. (Guevara, 1971b, 1345.)
The familiar path was the AFS with its use of capitalist categories. The
italicized sentence above is vital because it expressly states the qualitative objective of constructing a new society, a goal that cannot be
reached by increasing production alone. This defines the paradigm
within which Guevaras conceptions of consciousness and incentives
should be discussed.8
The question of incentives to workers remains central to the contemporary debate in Cuba, which is focused on increasing productivity
and efficiency.9 In different periods, Cuban socialism has had greater
or lesser dependence on material incentives to production; however,
moral incentives have continued to be valued and applied. Orlando
Borrego, Guevaras deputy in Cuba from 1959 to 1964, asserted that
without the development of consciousness in our country we would
not have been able to survive until now. In no country in the world
do material incentives lead people to a revolutionary consciousness,
much less a humanist consciousness with ideas about cooperation
and good relations within and outside the country (Borrego, 2008).
33
34
35
arrive there without a radical change in the strategy of the first most
important socialist power (H. Yaffe, 2009a, 2401).
Guevara hoped that his theoretical critique of the AFS, backed up
by the practical experiences of implementing the BFS in Cuba, would
convince the socialist countries to correct their mistakes. His critique
of the Soviet Manual was intended to consolidate these efforts, but
he was unable to complete this work. Following his departure for the
Congo in the mid-1960s, there was a misguided attempt in Cuba to
implement a new Registry System of economic management, believed
to be consistent with the operational principles of Guevaras BFS. In
reality it abandoned key premises of the BFS: economic analysis and
cost controls. Alfredo Gonzalez said that to associate the Registry
System with Guevara is a great historical injustice, because if there
was someone in this country who was concerned for costs and for
efficiency it was Che (Gonzlez, 2006). This concern for efficiency
within socialism frames the connection between Guevaras critique of
Soviet political economy and contemporary developments in Cuba.
36
the Great Debate in Cuba from the early 1960s and the measures of
the present period is the question: to what extent can the Revolution
replace capitalist mechanisms (profit motive, material incentives,
market-exchanges, competition) with administrative controls (the
plan, the budget, supervision and audits, workers democracy) to
advance towards socialist construction: increasing productivity and
efficiency along with consciousness? Different responses to this challenge in different periods explain fluctuations in Cuban policy: in
periods of economic crisis the Revolution has been forced to enact a
tactical retreat, allowing more operational space for expressions of the
law of value. Conversely, in periods of recovery the government has
closed down those spaces and reinforced the primacy of the centralized
plan, budgetary finances and the socialized economy (Yaffe, 2009b).
Two examples will be sufficient here to demonstrate this point. In
1990 with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Cuba lost around 85% of its
trade and GDP plummeted by 35%, leading to the Special Period
of severe economic crisis. During the 1990s Cuban enterprises were
granted greater financial autonomy than the AFS enterprises in Cuba
which Guevara had opposed in the 1960s. They controlled their own
finances and those with hard currency purchased imports directly, ending the states monopoly on imports. However, in 2005, the year when
Cuban GNP finally recovered its preSpecial Period levels, financial
autonomy was removed from Cuban enterprises, including the Cuban
dividend from Cubanforeign joint ventures. Financial reserves were
transferred to the central bank, which became responsible for allocating finances and approving all future transactions. The result was
a degree of financial recentralization not seen since Guevaras BFS.
The policy of establishing joint ventures between the Cuban state
and foreign companies provides the second example. Contracts were
relatively short-term, enabling the Cuban government to terminate or
take over these businesses as those agreements ended and as conditions permitted. The number of mixed enterprises decreased by 41%,
from 403 in 2002 to 236 in 2006, when joint ventures accounted for
just one per cent of employment. Meanwhile, large investments have
increased in major infrastructural and development projects in strategic sectors like mining, energy, transport and telecommunications.
Largely carried out by joint ventures with fraternal state companies
from Venezuela and China, the result has been to limit the sphere
of operation of capitalist mechanisms introduced via foreign capital,
37
38
aim is to restore macroeconomic equilibrium through fiscal adjustments, but the challenge remains to do this while limiting the reliance
on capitalist mechanisms.
Socialism is a dialectical process in which there are many complex
issues to resolve: the balance of responsibility for provision between
the individual and the state; how such class antagonisms as remain
under socialism are mediated; ensuring discipline with resources and
at work; how the wealth of socialist society should be distributed; and
how much control and centralization is appropriate. These questions
are being addressed in Cuba in the face of a brutal blockade and terrorist attacks.
It is neither right nor practicable that a significant number of
individuals in Cuba benefit from socialist state provision without contributing to it. This was recognized by Fidel Castro, who in November
2005, while still President of the Council of State, lambasted Cubas
new rich; a small percentage of the population with access to hard
currency, who benefited from free universal welfare and education
provision while refusing to contribute anything to society. There are
several dozens of thousands of parasites who produce nothing, he
said. Fidel highlighted the problem of widespread pilfering of state
resources, generated by low salaries and scarce material goods: The
Special Period aggravated it, because in this period we saw the growth
of much inequality and certain people were able to accumulate a lot
of money (F. Castro, 2005).
Highlighting the value of state subsidies for fuel, Fidel asserted:
No one knows the cost of electricity, no one knows the cost of gasoline, no one knows its market value. Introducing efficiency saving
and anti-corruption measures, he set Cuba on the path to achieving
what he called the dream of everyone being able to live on their salary or on their adequate pension.11 The long-term plan he revealed
was to eliminate the ration book, undermining the parasitic layer in
Cuban society, those who can work but wont. The state would reduce
its subsidy on energy consumption, inducing awareness of consumption levels and saving. Subsidies and free services will be considered
only in essentials. Medical services will be free, so will education and
the like (F. Castro, 2005).
11 Also echoing Marx: Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society after
deductions have been made exactly what he gives to it (Marx, 1977).
39
New debates are underway in Cuba, but the core issues are those
raised but not resolved in the 1960s. The current changes to the
employment structure intend to provide the infrastructure in which
all Cubans can contribute towards socialist development. This type
of major adjustment could not be risked in a period of vulnerability.
No one will be abandoned, and the measure does not represent an
ideological preference for liberalization, neither is it a rupture with
the socialist revolution, or with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. The
recent measures reflect a valiant determination to preserve the gains
of the Revolution, while dealing with the problematic of development with equity. We are witnessing a further chapter in Cubas Great
Debate about socialist transition.
Department of History
University College London
Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom
h.yaffe@ucl.ac.uk
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