Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs.

Mayfair Theater
G.R. No. 106063
November 21 1996

FACTS:
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. used to own a parcel of land with two 2-storey buildings constructed thereon,
located at Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, which it leased to Mayfair Theater Inc. for a period of 20 years.
The Contract of Lease contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject
properties. However, on July 30, 1978 within the 20-year-lease term the subject properties were sold
by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. for the total sum of P11,300,000, without first offering
to Mayfair.
Mayfair filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for (a) the annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, (b) specific performance, and (c) damages. The lower court
rendered a Decision in favor of Carmelo and Equatorial but the Court of Appeals reversed such decision
rescinding the sale and ordered to allow Mayfair Theater, Inc. to buy the aforesaid lots for P11,300,000.00.
Mayfair bought the property. However, Equatorial filed an action for the collection of a sum of money
against Mayfair, claiming payment of rentals or reasonable compensation for Mayfairs use of the subject
premises after its lease contracts had expired. Equatorial alleged that representing itself as the owner of
the subject premises by reason of the Contract of Sale; it claimed rentals arising from Mayfairs occupation
thereof. The trial court dismissed the Complaint holding that the rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale did
not confer on Equatorial any vested or residual proprietary rights.
ISSUES:
The issue raised in question in this case is whether or not the sale of the property to Equatorial is valid.
DECISION:
In the case, there was no right of ownership transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial in view of a patent
failure to deliver the property to the buyer. From the peculiar facts of this case, it is clear that petitioner
never took actual control and possession of the property sold, in view of respondents timely objection to
the sale and the continued actual possession of the property. While the execution of a public instrument of
sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic
delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold. In the case, Mayfairs opposition to the transfer of the property by way of sale
to Equatorial was a legally sufficient impediment that effectively prevented the passing of the property into
the latters hands. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of
accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale
to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property during that
period. Not having been the owner, Equatorial cannot be entitled to the civil fruits of ownership like rentals
of the thing sold. The Supreme Court denied the petition for the review of the decision made by the Court
of Appeals. It also deemed rescinded the sale between Equatorial and Carmelo, therefore ordering
Carmello to allow Mayfair to purchase the property for P11,300,000.
LAW:
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon the delivery to him in any of
the ways specified by law or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee. While the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized
by law as equivalent to delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely
presumptive, is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.

SULO NG NAYON, INC. VS. NAYONG PILIPINO

FACTS:
In 1975, respondent leased a portion of the Nayong Pilipino Complex, to petitioner Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. for
the construction and operation of a hotel building, to be known as the Philippine Village Hotel. The lease
was for an initial period of 21 years, or until May 1996. It is renewable for a period of 25 years under the
same terms and conditions upon due notice in writing to respondent of the intention to renew.

In 1995, petitioners sent respondent a letter notifying the latter of their intention to renew the contract for
another. July of the same year, parties agreed to the renewal of the contract for another 25 years, or until
2021. Under the new agreement, petitioner PVHI was bound to pay the monthly rentals
Beginning January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their monthly rental. Respondent
repeatedly demanded petitioners to pay the arrears and vacate the premises.
MeTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent
RTC which modified the ruling of the MeTC.
CA which held that the RTC erroneously applied the rules on accession, as found in Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code
ISSUE:
WON Sulo sa Nayon as builders have acted in good faith in order for Art. 448 in relation to Art. 546 of the
Civil Code may apply with respect to their rights over improvements.
HELD:
Article 448 is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds, plants, or sows on land in
which he believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands where the only interest of the builder,
planter or sower is that of a holder, such as a tenant.
In the case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. In fact, as lessees, they recognize
that the respondent is the owner of the land. What petitioners insist is that because of the improvements,
which are of substantial value, that they have introduced on the leased premises with the permission of
respondent, they should be considered builders in good faith who have the right to retain possession of the
property until reimbursement by respondent.
We affirm the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not
give the petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good
faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee to easily "improve" the lessor out of its property.
We reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call for
the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. His rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil
Code.

PNB VS. DE JESUS

FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine National Bank disputes the decision handed down by the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 23 March 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56001, entitled Generoso De Jesus, represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, Christian De Jesus, versus Philippine National Bank. The assailed decision has affirmed the
judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, declaring
respondent Generoso de Jesus as being the true and lawful owner of the 124-square-meter portion of the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17197 and ordering petitioner bank to vacate the
premises, to deliver possession thereof to respondent, and to remove the improvement thereon.
It would appear that on 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over the
questioned property. In his complaint, respondent stated that he had acquired a parcel of land situated in
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 1,144 square meters covered by TCT No. T-17197, and that
on 26 March 1993, he had caused a verification survey of the property and discovered that the northern
portion of the lot was being encroached upon by a building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square
meters. Despite two letters of demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the
area.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building sometime in 1981 from
then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in existence and to remedy the situation,
Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at
P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter claimed to have accepted. The sale, however, did not
materialize when, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot
to the Development Bank of the Philippines.

The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the rightful owner of the
disputed 124-square-meter portion of the lot and ordering petitioner to surrender possession of the
property to respondent and to cause, at its expense, the removal of any improvement thereon.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, sustained the trial court but it ordered to be deleted the award to
respondent of attorneys fees, as well as moral and exemplary damages, and litigation expenses.
Petitioner went to this Court, via a petition for review, after the appellate court had denied the banks
motion for reconsideration, here now contending that 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN ADJUDGING PNB A BUILDER IN BAD FAITH OVER THE
ENCROACHED PROPERTY IN QUESTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN NOT APPLYING IN FAVOR OF PNB THE PROVISION OF
ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND THE RULING IN TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORP. VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 7.[1]
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals have both rejected the idea that petitioner can be
considered a builder in good faith. In the context that such term is used in particular reference to Article
448, et seq., of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on
that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of any defect in his title or mode of acquisition.
The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to the subject, read:
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land
if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall
fix the terms thereof.
Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted
or sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things
in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing provisions, compel the landowner to make a choice
between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price
of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession,
i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.[2] Even as the option lies with
the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He much choose one. He cannot, for instance,
compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land.[3] In order, however, that the builder
can invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice be made by
the landowner, he should be able to prove good faith on his part.
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the
absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individuals personal good faith
is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations
alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put
the holder upon inquiry.[4] The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.[5] Applied to possession, one
is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.[6]
Given the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, it should be evident enough that
petitioner would fall much too short from its claim of good faith. Evidently, petitioner was quite aware, and
indeed advised, prior to its acquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a part of the building sold
to it stood on the land not covered by the land conveyed to it.
Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land by Ignacio, has in actuality been
part of the property transferred to petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose
ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works (or sown or planted

something) and not to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later
loses ownership of the land by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the
builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. [7]
In fine, petitioner is not in a valid position to invoke the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The
Court commiserates with petitioner in its present predicament; upon the other hand, respondent, too, is
entitled to his rights under the law, particularly after having long been deprived of the enjoyment of his
property. Nevertheless, the Court expresses hope that the parties will still be able to come up with an
arrangement that can be mutually suitable and acceptable to them.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56001 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MACASAET VS. MACASAET
Facts:
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-degree
relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents and Teresita is his wife.
On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTC of Lipa an ejectment suit against the children.
Respondents alleged that they were the owners of 2 parcels of land, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City;
that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in Mar. 1992 and used
them as their residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite repeated demands,
petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500.
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that respondents
had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in order that they could all
live near one another, employ marivic, the sister of Ismael, and help in resolving the problems of the
family.
They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant of
inheritance in favor of their children.
The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. It opined that
Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of
Vicente and Rosario.
As their stay was merely tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate the
lots upon demand.
On appeal, the regional trial court updheld the findings fo the MTCC. However, the RTC allowed the
respondents to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by petitioners, after payment
of the indemnity provided for by Art. 448 in relation to Art. 546 and 548 of the NCC.
The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying the
subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. Citing Calubayan v. pascual, the CA further ruled
that petitioners status was analogous to that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease had expired, but
whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
Consequently , in ascertaining the right of the petitioners to be reimbursed for the improvements they had
introduced on respondents properties, the appellate court applied the Civil Codes provisions on lease.
Issue:
W.O.N. the courts should fix the duration of possession.
Held:
That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear, the issue is the duration of
possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this point, Art. 1197 of the civil Code allows the courts to fix
the duration or the period.
Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.

Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period. Such qualification
cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case.
The mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify or authorize the courts
to do so
It can be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually
benefited from the arrangement.
Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an agreement.
Their possession which was originally lawful became unlawful when the reason therefore love and
solidarity ceased to exist between them.

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 79688

253 SCRA 10

FEBRUARY 1, 1996

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.
Doctrine: Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that he land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any
defect or flaw in his title. The burden of proving bad faith belongs to the one asserting it.
Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation, herein petitioner a parcel of land at
Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. The property was designated as Lot 9, Phase II. In 1975, herein respondent
Eldred Jardinico bought the said subject lot from the former purchaser. Eldred later discovered that the property he
purchased had improvements introduced therein by respondent Wilson Kee.
Kee on the other hand bought on installments Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.
(CTTEI) which is the exclusive real estate agent of the petitioner. Under the contract Kee was allowed to take possession
of the property even before full payment of the price. CTTEI through an employee, Zenaida Octaviano accompanied Kees
wife Donabelle to inspect Lot No. 8. Octaviano however mistakenly pointed towards Lot 9. Hence spouses Kee had their
residence, an auto repair shop, a store and other improvements constructed on the wrong lot.
Upon discovery of the blunder both Kee and Jardinico tried to reach an amicable settlement but they failed.
Jardinico demanded that the improvements be removed but as Kee refused, Jardinico filed a complaint for ejectment with
damages against Kee at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City. Kee filed a third-party complaint
against herein petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC found that the error was attributable to CTTEI also since at present the contract with Kee has
rescinded for Kees failure to pay installments. Kee no longer had any right over the subject property and must pay rentals
for its use. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not
negligent. It argued that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Even if assuming that he was in good faith, he was no longer so
and must pay rentals from the time that he was given notice to vacate the lot. The Court of Appeals ruled that Kee was a
builder in good faith as he was unaware of the mix-up when he constructed the improvements. It was in fact due to the
negligence and wrongful delivery of CTTEI which included its principal the herein petitioner. It further ruled that the award
of rental was without basis.
Pending the resolution of the case at the Court of Appeals Jardinico and Kee entered into a deed of sale, wherein
Lot 9 was sold to Kee. In the said deed a provision stating that regardless of the outcome of the decision, such shall not
be pursued by the parties and shall be considered dismissed and without effect. The appellate court was not informed of
this deal.
Issue: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the
owners agent, a builder in good faith?

Held: Yes. Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that petitioner has the burden of proving that Kee was a
builder in bad faith. Kee may be made liable for the violation of the contract with CTTEI but this may not be used as a
basis of bad faith and as a sufficient ground to negate the presumption of good faith. Jardinico is presently only allowed to
file a complaint for unlawful detainer. Good faith is based on the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his
and his ignorance of any flaw or defect in is title. Since at the time when Kee constructed his improvements on Lot 8, he
was not aware that it was actually Lot 9 that was delivered to him. Petitioner further contends that Kee was negligent as a
provision in the Contract of Sale on Installment stated that the vendee must have personally examined the property and
shall bear on his own the consequential expenses in the changes that may happen thereon. The court held that such
provision cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the vendees right to recover damages resulting from petitioners
negligence. Such interpretation of the waiver is contrary to law and public policy and cannot be allowed. Petitioner cannot
claim and excuse itself from liability by claiming that it was not directly involved in the delivery of the property. The
principal must be responsible for the acts of the agent done within the scope of his authority. CTTEI was the sole real
estate representative of the petitioner when the delivery was made. Wilson Kee is therefore declared a builder in good
faith. Petitioner and respondent CTTEI are declared solidarily liable for damages due to negligence. The award of rentals
to Jardinico is dispensed with.

REYNANTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: More than 50 years ago, Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos, over a
fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan with an area of 188.711 sq. m. (TCT 25618, Land
Registry of Bulacan). During the tenancy, Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his family lived
and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering an area of 5,096 sq. m.
and 6,011 sq. m. respectively. These lots are located between the fishpond covered by TCT 25618 and the
Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Reynante harvested and sold said nipa palms without interference
and prohibition from anybody. Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa
palms near the fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them as his own.
After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs entered into a written agreement denominated as
Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagsasauli ng Karapatan dated 29 November 1984 with Reynante whereby the
latter for and in consideration of the sum of P200,000 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the
heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or "bantay kasama at
tagapamahala. Pursuant to the said written agreement, Reynante surrendered the fishpond and the 2
huts located therein to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos. The heirs of Leoncio and Dolores Carlos, and the
heirs of Gorgonio and Concepcion Carlos thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz.
Reynante continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa
palms he had planted therein.
On 17 February 1988, the heirs formally demanded that Reynante vacate said portion since the latter had
already been indemnified for the surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, Reynante
refused and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.
On 22 April 1988, the heirs filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction
against Reynante with the MTC Meycauayan Bulacan (Branch 1, 3rd Judicial Region, Civil Case 1526)
alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over the physical, actual and material
possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting
off and/or disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto.
On 10 January 1989, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and finding that
Reynante had been in prior possession of lots 1 and 2. The heirs appealed to the RTC Malolos Bulacan
(Branch 8, 3rd Judicial Region) and on 8 August 1989 it rendered its decision in favor of the heirs, and
reversed the decision of the lower court. The Court ordered Reynante to restore possession of the piece of
land, together with the sasa or nipa palms planted theron; without pronouncement as to attorney's fees,
and each party bearing their respective costs of the suit. From said decision, Reynante filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for review.
On 28 February 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision (CA-GR 19171), affirming the decision of
the lower court in toto, and thus denied the petition seeking to issue a restraining order. On 5 November
1990, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Reynante. Hence, the petition for

review on certiorari. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
28 February 1990 and reinstated the decision of the MTC Meycauayan, Bulacan (Branch I).
1. Action for forcible entry. An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title of
the property is never determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his
favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria (German
Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495,
498, 499). On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of action
for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil.
469 [1942]). In the present case, the Court of Appeals could not legally restore the heirs' possession over
lots 1 and 2 simply because Reynante has clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2.
2. Reynante in prior possession Reynante was in possession of the questioned lots for more than 50
years. He was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years
and that he constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms therein. This fact is
bolstered by the "Sinumpaang Salaysay " executed by Epifanio Lucero, Apolonio D. Morte, and Carling
Dumalay, all of whom are disinterested parties with no motive to falsify that can be attributed to them,
except their desire to tell the truth. Moreover, an occular inspection was conducted by the trial court dated
2 December 1988 which was attended by the parties and their respective counsels. The court observed
that the controversial premises is beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs but situated along the Liputan,
Meycauayan River it being a part of the public domain. On the other hand, the heirs based their claim of
possession over lots 1 and 2 simply on the written agreement signed by petitioner whereby the latter
surrendered his rights over the fishpond. There is nothing, however, on the document that the tenant was
giving other matters not mentioned in the document. Neither was there any mention of the hut and nipa
palms for such to be included in the subsequent least to de la Cruz, a a circumstance that gives the
impression that said hut and palms do not belong to the heirs.
3. Disputed lands not included in TCT 25618 The disputed lots involved in the present case are not
included in TCT 25618 as per verification made by the Forest Management Bureau, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. That tract of land situated at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
containing an area of 1.1107 hectares as described in the plan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic
Engineer Restituto Buan for Reynante falls within Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond
development) under Project 15 per B.F.L.C. Map 3122 dated 8 May 1987.
4. Requisites of accretion Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the
water; and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61647, October 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 514, cited in Agustin v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218).
5. Accretion does not automatically become registered land Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2
were created by alluvial formation and while it is true that accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owner of the banks (Article
457), such accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another
person through prescription. In Ignacio Grande, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. (GR L-17652, 30 June
1962, 115 Phil. 521) it was held that "an accretion does not automatically become registered land just
because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is
one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral
Act does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and, thereafter, protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this
protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided."
In the present case, assuming that the heirs had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by
accretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a period of 50 years subjected said accretion to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.

AGUSTIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts:

The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province
of Cagayan. In 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, OCT
5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by Eulogio Agustin.
As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank.
The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968. In 1950, all lands west of the river were
included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were Pablo
Binayug and Maria Melad. Binayug was in possession since 1947 of Lots 3349, 7875 to 7879, 7881 to
7885, 7891 and 7892. It is has an area of 8 hectares planted to tobacco and corn and another 12 hectares
overgrown with talahib. Binayug's Homestead Application W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959
and his possession recognized in the decision in Civil Case 101.
On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case 343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of Maria
Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued OCT P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on 1 June 1956. Through the
years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was
Agustin's Lot 8457, depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Binayug on the western
bank. However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed,
and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug
and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To
cultivate those lots they had to cross the river. In April 1969, while the Melads, Binayug, Urbina and their
tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, Agustin, the
Heirs of Baldomero Langcay, Juan Langcay, and Arturo Balisi, accompanied by the mayor and some
policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the Melads, Binayug and
Urbina from the premises.
On 21 April 1970, Maria and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case 343-T) to recover Lot 3351 with an
area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On 24 April 1970, Pablo Binayug filed a separate
complaint (Civil Case 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions. On 16 June 1975, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case 343-T, ordering Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and
Octavio Bancud, their representatives or agents to vacate Lot 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its
accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and to restore
ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.
The trial court likewise ordered, in Civil Case 344-T, Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente
Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad,
Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan
Langoay, their representatives or agents to vacate Lots 3349, 7875 to 7879, 7881 to 7885, 7891 and 7892,
together with its accretion and to restore possession to Pablo Binayug and Geronimo Urbina. Without
pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to costs. Eulogio Agustin appealed the
decision in Civil Case 343-T, while Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo
Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed the decision in Civil Case 344-T. But upon motion of the Melads, Binayug
and Urbina, the trial court ordered on 15 August 1975 the execution pending appeal of the judgment in
Civil Case 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as
they had not presented evidence at the trial. On 29 November 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court
rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the Agustin,
Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay. Hence, the petition for review. The Supreme Court denied the petition for
lack of merit, and affirmed the decision of the IAC, now CA; with costs against Agustin, et.al
1. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeal conclusive with the Supreme Court The finding of the
Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the Melads, Binauyg and Urbina who did not
lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden
change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported
by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)"
2. Conditions for accretion to benefit a riparian owner Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the
following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from
the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514). In the present case, the accretion on the western bank of
the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and
imperceptible. Only when Lot 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that
was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares
had been added to it. Lot 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June 1950 to Pablo Binayug,
grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan
River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the
alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806).

3. Reason for the principle of accretion benefiting a riparian owner The reason for the principle is
because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive
force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of
easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some
way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
4. Ownership of accretion not lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the river The' ownership of
the accretion to the lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the river
(Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed), and separated or transferred said
accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply
to this situation. Article 459 provides that whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates
from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land
to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same
within two years." Article 463 provides that whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches,
leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains
it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL v. JESSE CACHOPERO

Petitioner Rachel Celestial is the sister of defendant Jesse Cachopero. They had a dispute over a
piece of land which was a dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying to obtain a Miscellaneous
Sales Application (MSA) to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) alleging that he
had been the owner of that land whereon he built a house and other improvements. However, Celestial
protests that she has preferential right over the land because it is adjacent to and is the only outlet from
her house. According to the Bureau of Land, the land in dispute was a creek and is therefore outside the
commerce of man. The first MSA was denied by the Municipal Trial Court(MTC) prompting Cachopero to
obtain another MSA which was granted by the DENR. Due to conflicting interests of the parties, the land in
dispute must be sold in a publicauction.
Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the DENR with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC.
Celestial contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Cachoperos petition for certiorari as it is in
the nature of an appeal falling within the jurisdiction of the CA and that the Cachopero has not exhausted
all administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
(b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one of the parties when it is classified as outside the
commerce of man
HELD:
RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and SC over original petitions for certiorari,
prohinition and mandamus.
Celestial has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e. through a petition
for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) and a special civil
action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).
Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative
writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit and
not a commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a courts jurisdiction to issue the writ of
certiorari requires the commencement of a new and original action therefore, independent of the
proceedings which gave rise to the questioned decision or order. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Courtof Appeals and the Supreme Court over original
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Section 21 of B.P. 129.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals conclusion that the instant case falls under the
recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, which provides that such is
inapplicable if (1) it shouldappear that an irreparable injury or damage will be suffered by a party if he
should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative officialconcerned on the

matter as a result of a patently illegal order or (2) where appeal would not prove to be speedy and
adequate remedy.
This requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being instances
when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among which
are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when
the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the
claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto
proceedings.
A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not susceptible to acquisitive prescription
As for Celestials claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan
Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest,
Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the
latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes
of an imperfect title.
MORANDARTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The BOL approved the free patent application of Beder Morandarte. More than 10 yrs.after, the Rep. Of
Phil., represented by Dir. Of lands filed a complaint for Annulment of Tiltle & Revision against Sps.
Morandarte.
Rep.alleged that BOL found that the subject land includes a portion of the Miputak River w/c cannot be
validly awarded as it is outside the commerce of man and beyond the authority of the BOL to dispose of.
On the otherhand, Sps. Morandarte contended that the Miputak River change its course due to the closure
of the river bed through the construction of dikes for the fishponds of the Sps. Lacaya. Sps. Lacaya are the
holders of fishpond lease agreement by the BOF covering a part of the land included in the title issued to
Morandarte. In line with this, sps. Morandarte claim that only a portion of the property covered be nullified
and
not
the
entire
title.
Issue:
WON the questioned property belongs to the public domain & is beyond the commerce of man?
Ruling: the court held YES... Applying Art.420 (1) a river is one of the properties of public dominion. It is
well recognized that property of the public domain is incapable of registration & its inclusion in a title
nullifies
that
title.
In the present case, a portion of land belonging to the pub.domain was merely erroneously included, and
absence of clear evidence of fraud on the part of Morandarte will not invalidate the entire title, only on the
portion
traversed
bu
the
Miputak
river
be
reconveyed
back
to
the
state.
Lastly, even sps. Morandarte have been occupying the property for more or less 10 yrs., the river and their
natural beds cannot be acquired by prescription.

JAGUALING VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Facts:
A certain parcel of land is located in Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental with an area of 16,452 sq. m., forming
part of an island in a non-navigable river, bounded by the Tagoloan River on the north, south, and east and by the portion
belonging to Vicente Neri on the west. Janita Eduave claims that she inherited the land from her father, Felomino Factura,

together with his co-heirs, Reneiro Factura and Aldenora Factura, and acquired sole ownership of the property by virtue of
a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with sale. The land is declared for tax purposes under Tax Declaration 26137 with an
area of 16,452 sq. m. Since the death of her father on 5 May 1949, Eduave had been in possession of the property
although the tax declaration remains in the name of the deceased father. The entire land had an area of 16,452 sq. m.
appearing in the deed of extrajudicial partition, while in tax declaration the area is only 4,937 sq. m., and she reasoned out
that she included the land that was under water. The land was eroded sometime in November 1964 due to typhoon Ineng,
destroying the bigger portion and the improvements leaving only a coconut tree. In 1966 due to the movement of the river
deposits on the land that was not eroded increased the area to almost half a hectare and in 1970 Eduave started to plant
banana trees. In 1973, Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that
they prevent squatters to come to the area. Eduave engaged the services of a surveyor who conducted a survey and
placed concrete monuments over the land. Eduave also paid taxes on the land in litigation, and mortgaged the land to the
Luzon Surety and Co., for a consideration of P6,000.00. The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita
Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio Factura, which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable
settlement of the parties. The heirs of Antonio Factura had ceded a portion of the land with an area of 1,289 sq. m., to
Janita Eduave in a notarial document of conveyance, pursuant to the decision of the CFI, after a subdivision of the lot 62
Pls-799, and containing 1,289 sq. m. was designated as Lot 62-A, and the subdivision plan was approved. Eduave also
applied for concession with the Bureau of Mines to extract 200 m3 of grave, and after an ocular inspection the permit was
granted. Eduave, after permit was granted, entered into an agreement with Tagoloan Aggregates to extract sand and
gravel, which agreement was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds. Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing assert that
they are the real owners of the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 sq. m. During the typhoon Ineng in 1964 the
river control was washed away causing the formation of an island. Jagualing started occupying the land in 1969, paid land
taxes as evidenced by tax declaration 26380 and tax receipts, and tax clearances. Actual occupation of the land by
Jagualing included improvements and the house.
Rudygondo and Janita Eduave filed with the RTC Misamis Oriental an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud
over the property in question against Jagualing. On 17 July 1987 the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of
Eduave to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over the land in litigation. The court found that
the island is a delta forming part of the river bed which the government may use to reroute, redirect or control the course
of the Tagoloan River. Accordingly, it held that it was outside the commerce of man and part of the public domain, citing
Article 420 of the Civil Code. As such it cannot be registered under the land registration law or be acquired by prescription.
The trial court, however, recognized the validity of Jagualings possession and gave them preferential rights to use and
enjoy the property. The trial court added that should the State allow the island to be the subject of private ownership, the
Jagualings have rights better than that of Eduave.
On appeal to the CA, the court found that the island was formed by the branching off of the Tagoloan River and
subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code, the
CA reversed the decision of the trial court, declared Eduave as the lawful and true owners of the land subject of the case
and ordered Jagualing to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to Eduave.

Issue:
Who between the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a non-navigable and non-floatable
river and the owner of the land along the margin nearest the island, has the better right thereto?

Held:
The parcel of land is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-floatable river; from a small mass of
eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of
alluvial deposits. The CA did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than
the property of Eduave, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of
their property along the margin of the river.
Lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under Article 465, also granted
the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the best position to
cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over the accretion is required. If,
however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession of third parties,
as indeed even accretion to land titled under the Torrens system must itself still be registered.

There is no need to make a final determination regarding the origins of the island, i.e., whether the island was
initially formed by the branching off or division of the river and covered by Article 463 of the Civil Code, in which case there
is strictly no accession because the original owner retains ownership, or whether it was due to the action of the river under
Article 465, or whether it was caused by the abrupt segregation and washing away of the stockpile of the river control,
which makes it a case of avulsion under Article 459, as the case is not between parties as opposing riparian owners
contesting ownership over an accession but rather between a riparian owner and the one in possession of the island.

OFFICE OF THE CITY OF PARANAQUE VS. EBIO

FACTS:
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Paraaque City covered by
Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.
Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez,
which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively
occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and
occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in
October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Paraaque municipal office for the
construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land in
favor of Ebio.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08,
series of 1990 seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access
road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the
main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately
opposed and the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and
the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.
On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate
the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent
a reply, asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The
request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paraaque City on April 21, 2005 and
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.

HELD:
No.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have
gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership
over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in
relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by
accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek
do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may
be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the
possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of
public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the
gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public
domain by clear provision of law.

LUCASAN VS. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANC CORPORATION

The Case:
On appeal is the March 23, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81518, affirming
the July 24, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 43, granting respondents
motion to dismiss, as well as its subsequent Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
Petitioner Inocencio Y. Lucasan (Lucasan) and his wife Julianita Sorbito (now deceased) were the owners of
Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E situated in Bacolod City, respectively, subject of a mortgage loan and for failure
to pay, the lots were sold at public auction and were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder.
Lucasan, as well as the mortgagee banks, PNB and RPB, did not redeem the properties within the
redemption period. Nevertheless, PBC did not file a petition for consolidation of ownership.
In January 1997, Lucasan, through counsel, wrote a letter to the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC), PBCs receiver and liquidator seeking the cancellation of the certificate of sale and offering to pay
PBCs claim against Lucasan.
Not long thereafter, Lucasan paid his loans with the PNB and RPB. Consequently, the mortgagee banks
executed their respective releases of mortgage, resulting in the cancellation of the prior encumbrances in
favor of PNB and RPB.
On August 13, 2001, PDIC denied Lucasans request for the cancellation of the certificate of sale advising
the latter that said properties be disposed of in a public bidding in accordance with its policy.
Lucasan then filed a petition denominated as declaratory relief with the RTC of Bacolod City
On July 24, 2003, the RTC granted PDICs motion to dismiss, finding the claim of any cloud over the titles of
Lucasan to be bereft of basis in fact and in law.
Lucasan filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on October 20, 2003.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. It declared that Lucasan already lost his right to redeem
the properties when he failed to exercise it within the prescribed period. The effect of such failure was to
vest in PBC absolute ownership over the subject properties.
Issue:
WON the RTC correctly dismissed Lucasans complaint for quieting of title.
Held:
Unfortunately for Lucasans complaint, the foregoing requisites to avail of the remedy of quieting of title
are wanting.
To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and

the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy Stated
differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in
dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by virtue of a writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 12188. On May 13, 1981, a public auction of the subject parcels of land was held and the lots were
awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale in favor of PBC was issued on the same day, and
was registered and annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 112552 on June 5, 1981.
Under the 1964 Rules of Court, which were in effect at that time, the judgment debtor or redemptioner had
the right to redeem the property from PBC within twelve (12) months from the registration of the
certificate of sale. With the expiration of the twelve-month period of redemption and no redemption having
been made, as in this case, the judgment debtor or the redemptioner lost whatever right he had over the
land in question.
Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties within the redemption period, on account of his
then limited financial situation.23 It was only in January 1997 or fifteen (15) years later that he manifested
his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right he had over Lot Nos. 1500-A
and 229-E.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan to PNB and RPB in 1997 cannot, in any way, operate to restore
whatever rights he had over the subject properties. Such payment only extinguished his loan obligations to
the mortgagee banks and the liens which Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration
of the notice of embargo and certificate of sale.

LASQUITE VS. VICTORY HILLS, INC.

This appeal seeks to annul the Decision[1] dated November 8, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 77599. The Court of Appeals had set aside the Decision[2] dated July 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 in Civil Case No. 548 which upheld Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) Nos. NP-197[3] and NP-198,[4] in the names of petitioners Andrade and Lasquite, respectively.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 4, 1971, Jose Manahan[5] executed a Deed of Quitclaim/Assignment of Rights[6] over a parcel of
land designated as Lot No. 3050 at Barrio Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal in favor of Conrado O.
Lasquite. Lasquite applied for a free patent over the lot, and pending approval of the application, sold half
of the land to Juanito L. Andrade on January 11, 1981.[7] Upon the grant of the patent application, OCT
Nos. NP-197 and NP-198 were issued in the names of Andrade and Lasquite, respectively, on June 18,
1981.
Thereafter, on August 22, 1983[8] and October 22, 1983,[9] Simeona, Armentina, Herminia, Zenaida,
Gloria, Yolanda and Rodolfo, all surnamed Prescilla, filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands to question the
grant of free patent in favor of petitioners. They claimed to have been in possession in concepto de
dueno of Lot No. 3050, planting and cultivating crops thereon since 1940. On March 8, 1989, the Prescillas
also instituted a case for reconveyance and damages against petitioners before the RTC of San Mateo,
Rizal, Branch 77 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 548-SM. They alleged that Lasquite forged the
signature of Jose M. Manahan in the Deed of Quitclaim/Assignment of Rights since the latter has died
on April 11, 1968.[10]
It also appears that a second complaint,[11] for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages, was filed
by Roberto and Raquel Manahan, Maria Gracia M. Natividad, the heirs of Leocadio Manahan, and the heirs
of Joaquin Manahan against petitioners on June 1, 1990. The Manahans asserted title over Lot No. 3050 as
successors of Jose S. Manahan whom they claimed to have died on October 12, 1947.[12] The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 680-90-SM and raffled to Branch 76 of the San Mateo, Rizal RTC. Upon learning
of Civil Case No. 548-SM initiated by the Prescillas against petitioners, the Manahans filed a Complaint
in Intervention[13] on June 23, 1993, and Civil Case No. 680-90-SM was consolidated with Civil Case No.
548-SM.
It also appears that on January 11, 1994, respondent Victory Hills, Inc. (Victory Hills) also intervened in Civil
Case No. 548-SM. Victory Hills likewise claimed to be the owner of the subject lot. Victory Hills traced its
title to Lot No. 3050 to OCT No. 380[14] which was allegedly registered on January 4, 1937 to
Jose H. Manahan by virtue of Homestead Patent No. H-19562[15] datedDecember 14, 1936. According to
Victory Hills, Jose H. Manahan sold Lot No. 3050 to Rufino Hieras on May 17, 1944 to whom Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 46219[16] was issued.Hieras then conveyed the lot to spouses Serafin and
Veronica Angeles, and Catalina Cayetano who obtained TCT No. 85082[17] in their names. Later, the lot
was transferred to Victory Hills onSeptember 6, 1961 under TCT No. 90816.[18]
On November 27, 1991, Victory Hills filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Relocation Survey[19] with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Upon grant of the motion, the DENR released a
Narration Report of the Relocation Survey[20] on December 9, 1993. The report noted that:
xxxx
1. H-19562 and H-19887 had been accepted by Cad. 375-D, San Mateo Cadastre and identical to Lot [No.]
3050 and Lot [No.] 258 respectively[;]
2. H-19562 had been issued a free patent and Original Certificate of Title No. 380 in favor [of] Jose
Manahan on June 4, 1937. That said title was transferred to Rufin[o] Hieras on May 17, 1944 with TCT [No.]
46219, cancelling O[CT] [No.] 3[8]0. Again TCT [No.] 46219-T-237 was cancelled and TCT [No.] [8]5082 was
issued to [Spouses] Serafin Angeles and [Veronica] D. Angeles and Catalina Cayetano [on]March 17, 1961;
3. A consolidate[d] subdivision survey of H-19562 and H-19887 had been approved by the LRC designated
as plan (LRC) Pcs [-] [1586] surveyed June 1-15, 1961; which was not projected in Cad. 375-D, San Mateo
Cadastre;
4. Lot [No.] 3050 which is identical to H-19562 was subdivided and designated as plan Cad-04-002023-D,
into two lots. (Emphasis supplied.)[21]
xxxx
Notwithstanding the said report, Branch 77 of the Rizal RTC, on July 2, 2002, promulgated a Decision which
upheld the title of petitioners to Lot No. 3050. It decreed:
Accordingly, the title of defendants, Conrado Lasquite and Jose Andrade, involving the subject parcel of
land under OCT No. NP-198 and OCT No. NP-197 registered on June 18, 1981, are sustained. Likewise, the
title issued to plaintiffs Prescilla, under OCT No. ON-333 involving Lot 3052 is sustained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing these cases.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.[22]
The trial court disregarded OCT No. 380 and ruled that it was spurious as it lacked the signature of then
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Eulogio Rodriguez. The RTC also ruled that the complaints for
reconveyance of the Precillas, the Manahans and Victory Hills, which were all founded on extrinsic fraud,
had prescribed since more than four (4) years have elapsed since the land was registered before they filed
cases in court.
The Prescillas, the Manahans and Victory Hills interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On November
8, 2006, the appellate court set aside the ruling of the RTC and declared Victory Hills the absolute owner of
Lot No. 3050. The appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 2, 2002 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 77 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DECLARING VICTORY HILLS, INC. the
absolute owner of the parcel of land designated as Lot 3050 subject of the instant case and ORDERING the
Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel OCT No. NP-198 and OCT No. NP-197 in the names of defendantsappellees Conrado Lasquite and Juanito Andrade.

SO ORDERED.[23]
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to us. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
I.

HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS OCT NO. 380 AND HOMESTEAD PATENT NO. H-19562 ARE VALIDLY ISSUED;
II.
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT VICTORY HILLS, INC. HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF TITLE AND OWNERSHIP OVER
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY VIS-A-VIS PETITIONERS CONRADO O. LASQUITE AND TEODORA I. ANDRADE;
III.
GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO RESPONDENTS HOMESTEAD PATENT NO. H-19562 DESPITE THE FACT
THAT A COPY OF SAID HOMESTEAD PATENT WAS NEVER PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL NOR IN THE
APPEAL;
IV.
HOLDING THAT OCT NO. 380 IS AN EN TOTO TRANSCRIPTION OF HOMESTEAD PATENT NO. H-19562
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT NO EVIDENCE RELATIVE THERETO WAS ADDUCED IN THE LOWER
COURT;
V.
NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE THAT RESPONDENTS CLAIM HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.[24]
Condensed, the twin issues for our determination are: (1) whether respondent Victory Hills, Inc. is entitled
to reconveyance of Lot No. 3050; and (2) whether respondents claim had prescribed.
Petitioners assail the validity of OCT No. 380 as the source of respondents derivative title. They fault the
appellate court for according weight to the certificate of title even if it does not bear the signature of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. They stress that the Bureau of Lands has no record of Patent No.
H-19562 which respondent cited as the basis for the issuance of its title to Lot No. 3050 and yet the
appellate court still concluded that the transcription of Patent No. H-19562 in OCT No. 380 was conclusive
proof of its due execution. Petitioners likewise call for a review of the facts in this case owing to the
conflicting findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, respondent relies on OCT No. 380 as evidence of the earlier registration of Lot No. 3050
in the name of its predecessor, Jose H. Manahan. Such recording, respondent asserts, has rendered OCT
No. 380 indefeasible one year following its issuance on January 4, 1937 and has effectively segregated Lot
No. 3050 from the domain of public lands. Respondent further justifies that the notation sgd in OCT No.
380 was sufficient indication that the original copy of Homestead Patent No. H-19562 had been signed by
then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Eulogio Rodriguez. In any case, respondent invokes the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the Register of Deeds in issuing OCT No. 380. It
finally argues against the issue of prescription since petitioners raised the same only for the first time on
appeal.
Often cited but rarely heeded is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its
power of review, the Court does not normally undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, there are several recognized exceptions[25] in which
factual issues may be resolved by this Court. Two of these exceptions find application in the present case,
to wit: (1) when the findings of fact of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court; [26] and
(2) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals upheld OCT No. 380 as the origin of TCT No. 90816 in the
name of respondent Victory Hills. The appellate court ruled that the homestead patent which was awarded
to respondents predecessor, Jose H. Manahan, in 1936 cannot simply be defeated by the subsequent grant
of free patent to petitioners 45 years later. It accepted the transcript of Homestead Patent No. H-19562 in
OCT No. 380 as a faithful reproduction of the original. Also, the Court of Appeals recognized the notation
sgd in OCT No. 380 as customary to signify that the original copy of the patent had been signed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
After carefully poring over all the evidence submitted in this case, we find the petition to be impressed with
merit.
The relocation survey conducted by the DENR on October 25, 1993 positively confirmed that the mother
title of respondents TCT and the OCTs of petitioners cover the same land. We are confronted, therefore,
with a case of successive registration, in the event of which we have been constantly guided that:

In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.[27]
However, we find that the circumstances attendant in this case militate against a forthright application of
this rule.
Section 105 of Act No. 2874,[28] the governing law when Homestead Patent No. H-19562 was purportedly
issued, speaks of who must sign the patents and certificates granted pursuant to the Act:
SEC. 105. All patents or certificates for lands granted under this Act shall be prepared in the Bureau of
Lands and shall issue in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands under the signature of the
Governor-General, countersigned by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, but such patents
or certificates shall be effective only for the purposes defined in section one hundred and twenty-two of
the Land Registration Act; and the actual conveyance of the land shall be effected only as provided in said
section. (Emphasis supplied.)
Noteworthy, Section 47[29] of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act[30] provides that a certified true
copy of an original certificate of title shall be admissible as evidence in our courts and shall be conclusive
as to all matters contained therein except as otherwise provided by the Act. This is complementary to the
rule on the admissibility of public documents as evidence under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. -Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter.
Thus, the evidentiary value of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.[31]
In the case at bar, the appellate court gave credence to the certified true copy of OCT No. 380 as proof of
ownership of respondents predecessor. Yet, it is readily apparent from a cursory reading of said copy that
OCT No. 380 was supposedly signed,[32] not by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as
mandated by law, but by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Hence, it is plain to see that to give
OCT No. 380 probative value in court would be to allow variance or an evasion or circumvention of the
requirement laid down in Section 105 of Act No. 2874. We are thus warned that any title sourced from the
flawed OCT No. 380 could be void. On this basis, we are justified to consider with great care any claims
derived therefrom.
What taints OCT No. 380 even more is the fact that the records of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) are devoid of evidence to prove that Homestead Patent No. H-19562,[33] much
less a patent application[34] for Lot No. 3050 with the Bureau of Lands ever existed. The
certification[35] from the Bureau of Lands that Lot No. 3050 was surveyed in the name of Jose Manahan
suggests, at best, that he was a survey claimant. Neither do we find the derivative titles of OCT No. 380
free from any taint of irregularity. While TCT No. 46219 in the name of Hieras indicated January 4, 1937 as
the original registration date of Lot No. 3050, the TCTs of subsequent transferees designated a different
date May 17, 1944.
True, a duly-registered certificate of title is considered a public document and the entries found in it are
presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce evidence establishing
otherwise.[36] Even then, records of public officers which are admissible in evidence are limited to those
matters which the public officer has authority to record.[37] Indisputably, it was beyond the power of the
Register of Deeds to register a public land based on an invalid, much worse, a non-existent patent. To
sanction an otherwise invalid document in the guise of upholding the stability of our land registration
system would run counter to the judicial devotion towards purging the system of illicit titles, in accordance
with our base task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy.[38]
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it
should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the
land sought to be reconveyed is his.[39] It is rather obvious from the foregoing disquisition that respondent
failed to dispense such burden. Indeed, the records are replete with proof that respondent declared the lots
comprising Lot No. 3050 for taxation purposes only after it had instituted the present case in court. This is
not to say of course that tax receipts are evidence of ownership, since they are not, albeit they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one would ordinarily be paying taxes for a property
not in his actual or at least constructive possession.[40]

Other than paying taxes from 1994-1997, however, respondent has not shown that it exercised dominion
over Lot No. 3050. In contrast, petitioner Lasquite has been continuously paying taxes on the land since
1972,[41] and has utilized the land as a farm, planted fruit trees and raised goats thereon. Petitioners have
likewise built structures and managed to entrust the property to the care of certain individuals without any
objection from respondent.
Respondent avers that petitioner Lasquite forged the Deed of Quitclaim/Assignment of Rights to make it
appear that Jose Manahan conveyed Lot No. 3050 to him. It must be stressed, however, that whoever
alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be
substantiated with clear and convincing evidence.[42]
Regrettably, Victory Hills was unable to establish that the Jose H. Manahan from whom it derived its title is
the same Jose Manahan from whom petitioner Lasquite bought Lot No. 3050.During the trial of this case,
several death certificates had been proferred by the parties, albeit, inconclusive to establish the identity of
Jose Manahan as the common origin of all their titles.Respondent Victory Hills obtained its title from
Jose H. Manahan. Meanwhile, the records disclose that the Jose S. Manahan from whom the Manahans
derived title was 54 years old and married when he died of infectious hepatitis on October 12, 1947.
[43] For their part, the Prescillas traced their title from Jose M. Manahan, who was supposedly 68 years old
and single when he succumbed to acute myocardial infarction on April 11, 1968.[44] This was however
belied by the List of Register of Deaths in the Municipality of San Mateo Rizal for the year 1968.[45]
Relevant to the issue of prescription, we have ruled that to determine when the prescriptive period
commenced in an action for reconveyance, the plaintiffs possession of the disputed property is
material. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point
of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The
prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is
not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not
run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of
a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.[46]
The records reveal that it was only on January 11, 1994 or nearly 13 years after OCT Nos. NP-197 and NP198 were issued that respondent filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Complaint in Intervention[47] and
Complaint in Intervention[48] before the RTC of Rizal. Nevertheless, respondent claimed to be in actual
possession in concepto de dueno of a sizeable portion of Lot No. 3050.Thus, the action assumed the nature
of a suit to quiet title; hence, imprescriptible.
However, in our view, respondent Victory Hills has failed to show its entitlement to a reconveyance of the
land subject of the action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 8, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 77599 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated July 2, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TANDOG VS. MACAPAGAL
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Decision1 dated July 31, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57812.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are:
The subject of the controversy is a land consisting of 147,991 square meters situated at Sitio Inarawan,
Barangay Inuman, San Isidro, Antipolo City.
The above-named petitioners claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since time immemorial. They trace their rights
to Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried, who died in 1945. He was survived by his nephews and nieces, now
deceased, except Maria Bautista Catanyag. She and Casimiros grand nieces and grand nephews (herein
petitioners) have continued possessing and cultivating the land.
When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they found that portions of
the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina Calderon and Renato Macapagal,
respondents. According to petitioners, spouses Calderon used falsified documents to justify their
possession of 20,116 square meters of the land which they sold to the government. For his part, Renato
Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent No. 045802-1165 which led to the issuance to him of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-665 over an area of 18,787 square meters. Because of these

incidents, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bracnh 73, Antipolo City a complaint for quieting of
title, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2418.
Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners allegations in their complaint.
She alleged that she and her husband bought their property in 1958 and, since then, have been in
possession of the same. They planted trees and crops thereon. Also, they have been paying the
corresponding realty taxes. She does not know petitioners who are all strangers in the place.
Before the hearing of the case, or on July 20, 1993, petitioners and Macapagal entered into a Compromise
Agreement.2 Petitioners acknowledged therein his ownership of the portions of the land consisting of
18,787 square meters covered by OCT No. P-665. This agreement was approved by the trial court.
After petitioners had presented their evidence, spouses Calderon filed a demurrer to evidence. In an Order
dated March 20, 1995, the trial court granted their motion and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated July 31, 2000 affirming the Order
of the trial court dismissing their complaint. The appellate court held:
Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the
owners title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title
must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding." Under the maxim "expresio
unius est exclusio alterius," these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of
these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action. (Titong v. CA, G.R. No. 111141, March 6,
1998)
The appellants had nothing to show for this. The most that they did was to mark a DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY & OR RIGHTS OR INTERESTS THEREIN as Exh. "D" and a SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY as Exh. "E", which allegedly are the falsified documents used by the appellees as basis for their
claim over the subject lot. x x x
xxx
Under Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, it is clear that for the evidence to be considered, the
same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
(Vda de Oate v. CA, G.R. 116149, Nov. 23, 1995) Any evidence which a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected. x x x
It does not help either that the testimonies presented are on the whole hearsay and unreliable as to the
existence and right of the amorphous Casimero Policarpio and the hereditary link between him and the
appellants.
Hence, this present petition.
Petitioners contend that the allegations of spouses Calderon that they purchased their property and
Macapagals claim that he applied for a Free Patent are judicial admissions which they (petitioners)
consider as cloud upon their interest in the disputed property.
The petition must fail.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by mere verbal or
parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This rule is subject to qualification, where there is
a written or factual basis for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or
adverse possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.3
While petitioners alleged that respondents claim of adverse possession is a cloud on their (petitioners)
interest in the land, however, such allegation has not been proved. The alleged falsified documents relied
upon by respondents to justify their possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally

offered in evidence by petitioners. We have consistently ruled that documents which may have been
marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not formally offered in evidence, cannot be
considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.4
It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action.5 Petitioners failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not
present any evidence to prove that Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-ininterest. Their testimonies can not be considered declarations about pedigree. In order that pedigree may
be proved by acts or declarations of relatives under Section 39 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, it is
necessary that (a) the actor or declarant is dead or unable to testify; (b) the act or declaration is made by
a person related to the subject by birth or marriage; (c) the relationship between the declarant or the actor
and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration; and (d) the act or declaration was
made ante litem motam, or prior to the controversy.6
Records show that petitioners failed to establish by evidence any or all the above requisites.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 57812. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
RUMARATE VS. HERNANDEZ
FACTS: Sps. Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of real property and/ quieting of title against the
heirs of sps. Hernandez. Rumarate averred that Santiago Guerrero orally bequeathed his rights over lot
379 to him in 1929. Thereafterm their family cleared the land, built a house, and planted on it. A quitclaim
was also executed by Santiago in their favor in 1960.

In 1970, Rumarate discovered that sps. Hernandez were able to obtain title over lot 379 but he did not file
a case immediately.
Respondent heirs of sps. Hernandez claimed that Santaigo sold the lot to them in 1964 but they were not
able to possess the land.
ISSUE:
To whom should lot 379 be awarded?
RULLING:
To Rumarates. Rumarates open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of lot 379 for
more than 30 years vested them title over the lot.
Action for quieting of title is aimed to determine the respective rights of the parties and to prevent future
disturbances thereon; it is merely a confirmation proceeding and; is imprescriptible.
The requisites for an action for quieting of title are:
a. Plaintiff has legal or equitable title to or interest in the subject property.
b. The deed, claim, incumberance, or proceeding casts cloud on his title even if it appears to be valid
or legally efficient but was really invalid.

METROBANK VS. ALEJO

A cloud on a title is defined as a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded. Where a title was previously held null and void already, an action to quiet title is not the
proper remedy because the TCT (as basis of the right) is not, on its face or otherwise, valid in the first
place.
FACTS:
Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the
amounts of 5k and 2k. As security for the payment, Spouses Acampados executed in favor of the bank a
Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land registered in their names. Subsequently a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of the TCT of the spouses was filed by Sy Tan Se in the RTC of Valenzuela.

Despite being the mortgagee of the real property, the bank was not made a party to the said civil
case(complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT.) They werent notified as well.

The spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were
initiated. The bank submitted the highest and winning bid. A certificate of sale was issued in their favor.
When they were about to get their TCT from the Register of Deeds, petitioner was informed of the
existence of the decision in the aforementioned civil case (complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT)
declaring the Spouses Acampadoss TCT null and void.
The bank filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the RTC Decision. The CA dismissed their petition
and ruled that the bank should have filed a petition for relief from judgment or an action for quieting of
title.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a petition for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy available to the bank
2. Whether or not the judgment of the trial court (declaring the Spouses Acampados TCT null and void)
should be declared null and void
HELD Both Yes
1. Petition for annulment of judgment was the proper remedy available to the bank. It precisely alleged
that Sy Tan Se purposely concealed the case by excluding petitioner as a defendant to the civil case even if
he was an indispensable party. This deprived the bank of its duly registered property right without due
process of the law. The allegation of extrinsic fraud may be the basis for annulling a judgment.
Petition for relief (what the CA recommended) was not available to the bank since it was never a party to
the civil case.
An action for quieting of the title was also not available to the bank. An action for quieting of title is filed
only when there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. A cloud on a title is defined as a
semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The subject judgment
cannot be considered as a cloud on petitioners title or interest over the real property covered by TCT,
which does not even have a semblance of being a title.

It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would warrant the filing of an
action to quiet title because to do so would require the court hearing the action to modife or interfere with
the judgment of another co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that our court
has no power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the administration of
justice. Clearly, an action for quieting of title is not an appropriate remedy in this case.

Bank cant also intervene to a case that he has no knowledge of.

2. The judgment of the trial court should also be declared null and void because the bank, which is an
indispensable party, was not impleaded in the civil case.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
SALIGUMBA VS. PALANOG
GR. No. 143365. DEC 4 2008
FACTS: Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title
with Damages against defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. before the RTC.In
the complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous
possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land located in Solido, Nabas, Aklan. The
spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises and had
destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment
declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and ordering spouses Saligumbas, to
vacate the premises. A motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the
trial court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, and ruled that since more than five years had elapsed after the
date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion. Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica
Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision dated 7
August 1987 which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded
petitioners Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants.
It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February

1985. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor did an order issue for the substitution of
the deceased spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr.,
despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria
Saligumba. The record is bereft of any evidence proving the death of the spouses, except the mere
notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial courts orders which were returned unserved.
ISSUE: WON the death of the party would affect the validity of the decision.
HELD: Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
Under Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order
the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true
that the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed
to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of the deceased. There was no court order for
deceaseds legal representative or heir to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in
court to be substituted for the deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such
legal representative, nor did the heirs ever ask to be substituted.

CLADO-REYES VS. LIMPE

FACTS:
Subject of the present controversy is a 2,445-square meter portion of a certain lot in Guiguinto, Bulacan
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-32498 (T-199627), having a total lot area of 20,431
square meters, more or less.
On February 1, 1995, petitioners filed an action to quiet title, reconveyance and damages against
respondents and alleged that they have been occupying the disputed lot since 1945 through their
predecessor-in-interest, Mamerto B. Reyes. They claimed that during his lifetime, Mamerto had accepted a
verbal promise of the former lot owner, Felipe Garcia, to give the disputed lot to him in exchange for the
surrender of his tenancy rights as a tiller thereof.
To prove that Mamerto was a former tenant of Felipe; that during his lifetime he had worked on the lot; and
that he owned and possessed the same, petitioners presented two documents, namely: (1) Certification
dated October 12, 1979 and (2) Pagpapatunay dated November 17, 1982 allegedly executed by Simeon
I. Garcia, the eldest son of Felipe, attesting to such facts. Petitioners also alleged that whenever
respondents visited the lot, respondent Julius Limpe would promise to deliver the certificate of title to
them. However, sometime in October 1994, petitioners received a letter from respondents asserting
ownership over the disputed lot.
In their answer, respondents contended that they are the legal owners of the lot by virtue of a Deed of
Exchange of Real Estate and Deed of Absolute Sale executed on July 5, 1974 and February 28, 1974,
respectively, between them and Farm-Tech Industries, Incorporated. To further assert ownership over the
lot, they presented TCT No. T-199627, Tax Declaration Nos. 15172 and 9529 and realty tax receipts of the
lot, which were all registered and declared in their names.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. Accordingly, the trial court ordered petitioners to reconvey the
disputed lot to respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling and upheld respondents
title over the disputed lot. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONERS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION TO QUIET TITLE, RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES
AGAINST RESPONDENTS.
HELD: The petition lacks merit. PETITION DENIED.
To begin with, an action for quieting of title originated in equity jurisprudence to secure an adjudication
that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the

complainant and those claiming under him may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim. Thus, our
courts are tasked to determine the respective rights of the contending parties, not only to put things in
their proper places, but also to benefit both parties, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of
doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he
may desire, to use and even to abuse the property as he may deem best.

Under Articles 476 and 477 the New Civil Code, there are two indispensable requisites in order that an
action to quiet title could prosper: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
To prove their case, petitioners merely cited Section 4 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and stated that their title was founded upon those provisions.
They hardly argued on the matter. Neither was there positive evidence (1) that their predecessor had legal
title, i.e., a certificate of land transfer; (2) that the lot was an agricultural lot and not a commercial one as
contended by respondents; and (3) that they are qualified beneficiaries under the Agrarian Reform Law.
Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of
proving the allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence.
Next, the documentary evidence petitioners presented, namely, the Certification and Pagpapatunay,
did not confirm their title over the disputed lot. First, original copies of those documents were not
presented in court. Second, as the appellate court pointed out, Simeon I. Garcia, the declarant in those
documents, was not presented in court to prove the veracity of their contents. Third, even a cursory
examination of those documents would not show any transfer or intent to transfer title or ownership of the
disputed lot from the alleged owner, Felipe Garcia, to petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest, Mamerto
B. Reyes. Fourth, petitioners did not bother to adduce evidence that Simeon I. Garcia, as the eldest son of
the late Felipe Garcia, inherited the entire lot as to effectively convey title or ownership over the disputed
lot, i.e. thru extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Felipe Garcia. Accordingly, we agree that the
documents allegedly executed by Simeon I. Garcia are purely hearsay and have no probative value.
In contrast, respondents presented evidence which clearly preponderates in their favor. First, the transfer
certificate of title, tax declarations and realty tax receipts were all in their names. Second, pursuant to the
Torrens System, TCT No. RT-32498 (T-199627) enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity and is the best
proof of ownership of the lot. Third, although tax declarations or realty tax receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. As we previously held, such realty tax payments constitute proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property.
Worth stressing, in civil cases, the plaintiff must establish his cause of action by preponderance of
evidence; otherwise, his suit will not prosper. After carefully considering the arguments of the parties, as
well as their respective evidence, we unanimously agree that the petitioners were not able to prove that
they have any legal or equitable title over the disputed lot.

TANENGLIAN VS. LORENZO NO COPY!

SPS. SANTOS VS. HEIRS OF LUSTRE
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 1330, Cecilia Macaspac and Tarcisio Maniquiz, both heirs of Dominga Lustre, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of
Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against Froilan M. Santos, son of the appellant
spouses.
Civil Case No. 2115 was instituted while Civil Case no. 1330 was pending, It was filed by Lustres other
heirs against the parties of this case. They averred that the sale of the property to Natividad Santos was
simulated, spurious or fake, and that they discovered that spouses Santos transferred the property to
Froilan Santos when the latter filed an ejectment suit against them. Thereafter, Froilan Santos, through
fraud and deceit, succeeded in transferring the property.
The RTC denied the respondents petition to dismiss. The petitioners claimed that the second action must
be dismissed based on it being barred by litis pendetia and prescription and laches.

ISSUES:
Whether the second action is barred by litis pendentia.
Whether the action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a
fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.

RULING:
No, the second action is not barred by litis pendentia because there is no identity of parties. In the case,
respondents are not guilty of forum shopping because the element of identity of parties is not present. The
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1330 does not, in fact, share a common interest with the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 2115.
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. Among its elements are identity of the parties, identity of the
subject matter and identity of the causes of action in the two cases.
Plaintiff Cecilia Macaspac in Civil Case No. 1330 filed the complaint seeking the reconveyance of the
property to her, and not to Dominga Lustre or her heirs. This is a clear act of repudiation of the coownership which would negate a conclusion that she acted in privity with the other heirs or that she filed
the complaint in behalf of the co-ownership. In contrast, respondents were evidently acting for the benefit
of the co-ownership when they filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2115.
Yes. The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a
fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not
prescribe.Moreover, a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an
actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. Otherwise, if
plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against him. Thus, when
an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an
action that is imprescriptible
It follows then that the respondents present action should not be barred by laches. Laches is a doctrine in
equity, which may be used only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Obviously, it cannot be
set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA VS. LUMOCSO NO COPY!
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. PONFERRADA
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Accion Reinvindicatoria before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City against the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC)
Heirs of Santos alleged therein that, during his lifetime, Enrique Santos was the owner of a 936-squaremeter parcel of land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
57272.He had been in possession of the owners duplicate of said title and had been in continuous, open,
adverse and peaceful possession of the property. He died on February 9, 1970 and was survived by his
wife, Alicia Santos, and other plaintiffs, who were their children. Thereafter, plaintiffs took peaceful and
adverse possession of the property, and of the owners duplicate of said title.
Sometime in February 1996, heirs of santos learned that iglesia ni cristo was claiming ownership over the
property. They alleged that Enrique Santos, during his lifetime, and his heirs, after his death, never
encumbered or disposed the property. In 1996, Santos had the property fenced but Iglesia ni Cristo
deprived them of the final use and enjoyment of their property. Thus, Santos filed for the quieting the title
of plaintiffs over and/or recover possession of their said property in the name of deceased Enrique Santos.
Petitioner argues that the action (either Quieting of Title or Accion Reinvindicatoria) had prescribed, the
same having been filed only on October 24, 2001 beyond the statutory ten-year period therefor

Trial court and CA later ruled in favor of Private Respondents. CA stated that as to the issue of prescription,
the appellate court held that the prescriptive period should be reckoned from 1996, when petitioner
claimed ownership and barred respondents from fencing the property.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge gravely erred and abused her discretion when she held that the action
for quieting of title and/or accion reinvindicatoria (civil case no. Q-01-45415) has not yet prescribed
Petitioners argument:
That the action of respondents, whether it be one for quieting of title or an accion reinvindicatoria, had
prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 24, 2001. Petitioner asserts that this is because when
respondents filed their complaint, they were not in actual or physical possession of the property, as it
(petitioner) has been in actual possession of the property since 1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued to it
by the Register of Deeds
Ruling:
As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, the action of respondents was one for quieting of title
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 476 of the New Civil Code. The latter provision
reads:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, or a cloud of an interest in land
appearing in some legal form but which is, in fact, unfounded, or which it would be inequitable to
enforce.38 An action for quieting of title is imprescriptible until the claimant is ousted of his possession.
Petitioners claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property since 1984 when TCT
No. 321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations in the complaint that respondents had been
in actual and material possession of the property since 1961 up to the time they filed their complaint on
October 24, 2001.
Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against petitioner. It bears
stressing that an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of ownership and includes jus
possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.41 Thus, the owner of real property in actual and
material possession thereof may file an accion reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a
parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof.
Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they filed their complaint
against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory action had not even
commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984.
Thus, petition is denied. CAs decision is affirmed