Diamonds Are a Philosopher's Best Friends: The Knowability Paradox and Modal Epistemic

Relevance Logic
Author(s): Heinrich Wansing
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 31, No. 6 (Dec., 2002), pp. 591-612
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30226775 .
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HEINRICH
WANSING

BESTFRIENDS
DIAMONDSAREA PHILOSOPHER'S
The KnowabilityParadoxand Modal EpistemicRelevanceLogic
Receivedin revisedversion16July2002
ABSTRACT.Theknowability
reasoningpattern
paradoxis an instanceof a remarkable
a
of
such
in the courseof whichan occurrenceof the possibility
(actually, pair
patterns),
thediamond,disappears.
Inthepresentpaper,it is pointedouthowtheunwanted
operator,
of the diamondmaybe escaped.Theemphasisis not laidon a discussion
disappearance
of thecontentious
premiseof theknowability
paradox,namelythatall truthsarepossibly
the conclusionis derivedthatall truthsare,in
known,buton how fromthis assumption
the solutionofferedis in thespiritof theconstructivist
attitude
fact,known.Nevertheless,
maintained
defenders
of
the
anti-realist
In
order
to
avoid
the
by
usually
premise.
paradoxical reasoning,a paraconsistent
relevantmodalepistemiclogic with strong
constructive
andshownto be complete.
Thesystemis axiomatized
negationis definedsemantically.
KEYWORDS:constructive
negation,epistemiclogic,knowability
paradox,modallogic,
relevance
paraconsistent
logic,
logic.

1. A DIAMONDLOST

Verificationists
holdthata sentenceA is trueif andonly if it is possible
to verify(prove)A. Fromthis anti-realist
pointof view,it seemsplausible thatif A is true,then A is knowable:if it is possibleto proveA, it
is possibleto knowthatA. Since its firstpublishedpresentation
in [11]
andits rediscoveryas an "unjustlyneglectedlogicalgem"by Hart[16],
the paradoxof knowability1has receivedconsiderableattention,see,
for example,[5,8,20,22,23,27-29,36,38,39,47-52].
The startingpointof
the construction
is the anti-realist
thesisthateverytruesentenceis knowclaimthateverytruesentenceis, in
able, andit leadsto the problematic
oversentencesis suppressed,one
fact, known.2If explicitquantification
obtainsthe followingreadingof the anti-realistthesis in propositional
modalepistemiclogicbasedon classicallogic:
(1)

AD OKA.

Intheliterature,
therearetwoversionsof theknowability
paradox.The
additionalassumptions
of VersionI are
(2)
ki
W1

K(A A B) : (KA A KB)

Journalof Philosophical Logic 31: 591-612, 2002.

i0 2002 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin the Netherlands.

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592

HEINRICH
WANSING

of knowledgeoverconjunction),
(distribution
(3)

KA

(knowledgeimpliestruth),and

(4)

--O(KAA KA).

Usually,the knowledgeoperatorK involvedis takento be a normal

necessityoperator,but for the purposeof the argumentit is enoughto
assumethatthe K operatoris a necessityoperatorin themonotonicmodal
(or minimal)models,this
logic EMT,see [4]. In termsof neighbourhood
meansthattheneighbourhood
functionN is supplemented
(X n Y e N(w)
implies X e N(w), Y E N(w), or, equivalently,X e N(w), X C Y,

impliesY E N(w)) andthe followingcondition(t) holds:if X E N(w),

then w e X. (Supplementationcorrespondswith K(A A B) D (KAA KB)
rule
andcondition(t)withKA D A.)Likeassumption
(2),thereplacement
of the smallestclassicalmodallogic E
A - B/KA - KB characteristic
introducesa certainamountof 'logicalomniscience'.Themodaloperators
0 andO maybe assumedto be S5-typemodalities.3
Assumption(3) is part
of theclassicaldefinitionof knowledgeasjustifiedtruebelief,a definition
in Plato'sMenon(96d-98c)and
thatis oftentracedbackto considerations
thathasbeencriticizedas beinginsufficientby Gettier[14]. The assumptions (2) and (3) areusuallytakento be logicallyvalid.Assumption(4)
rule
is provablein anymodalepistemiclogic comprisingthenecessitation
in theformF--A/f- -"OAandthelaw of noncontradiction
(-"(AA -nA)).
It thusseemsthat(1) is theonly 'substantial'
premise.4
Thetwoversionsof theargument
normallypresupposeclassicalpropositionallogic as the non-modal,non-epistemicbase logic. However,up
to a certaincommonpoint,bothversionsemployonly intuitionistically
rule
acceptablemeans.In the case of VersionI, the negationintroduction
is used.Bothversionsyield
(5)

-(AA -- KA).

An applicationof an intuitionistically
unacceptableDeMorganlaw
eventuallygives
(provableby classicalreductioad absurdum)
(6)

A D KA.

of (5) is hardlyacceptable,it is usuallyemphaAlthoughthe derivability

sized that the classicallyequivalent(6) is unwanted.The formulaKA
is takento meanthatthereis a doxasticsubjectand a momentof time
at which the subjectknowsthat A. But some truthsmight remainundiscovered,at leastby non-omniscient
subjects,andhencethe anti-realist
is in trouble.

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KNOWABILITY
PARADOX

593

Version(I) (see [16]):

1. A A

-,KA

assumption,
temporary

2. OK(AA-KA)
1,(1),
3. O(KAA K-KA) 2, (2),
4. O(KA
3, (3),
K--,KA)
5.
6.

-"O(KA A -'KA)
-n(A A --K A)

(4),
1, 4, 5 and negationintroduction.

Version(II) of the paradoxicalreasoninguses the negationintroduction

and
ruleandmodustollens(orinsteadof modustollensthecontraposition
the
elimination
it
fact
that
rules).Moreover, employs
implication
(7)

--OK(A A - KA)

is syntacticallyprovableusing (2), (3), and negationintroduction:

1. K(A A --K A)
2. KA A
K--KA
3. KA
4. K--'KA
5. --KA
6. --,K(A A --KA)
7. -nOK(A A
--KA)

temporaryassumption,
1, (2),
2,
2,
4, (3),
1, 3, 5, negationintroduction,
6, necessitation.

Since (7) enjoys some intuitiveplausibility,it may be arguedthat even if

(7) is notalreadyprovablein a givenmodalepistemiclogic, (7) shouldbe

postulated.Again it seems that(1) is the only 'substantial'premise.

Version(II)(see,forexample,[11,52]):
1. (A A --,KA) D OK(A A --KA)
2. -'OK(A A -'KA)
3.
A -KA)
-,(A

instantiationin (1),
(7),
1, 2 and modus tollens.

Also if oneis notcommittedto theanti-realist

thesisthateverytruthis
thatthis claimallows one to infer
knowable,it wouldseem paradoxical
that everytruthis known.It is the type of reasoningleadingfrom (1)

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594

WANSING
HEINRICH

to (6) andfrom(1) to (5) thatis problematic.

As Fitch[11]pointedout,the
of a diamondoccursnotonlywithrespectto the
surprisingdisappearance
but
knowabilityoperator withrespectto anyunaryconnectivesatisfying
analogousto thoseof theknowability
assumptions
paradox.5

2. REACTIONS TO THE KNOWABILITY PARADOX

Quitedifferent(kindsof) reactionsto theknowability

paradoxarepossible
andcanbe foundin theliterature:
1. Theanti-realist
thesismaybe rejected.Thisis, e.g., Williamson'sattitude.
thesismaybe replacedby anotherstatementthatdoes
2. Theanti-realist
not give rise to the unwantedinferences.The modifiedanti-realist
thesis may be formulatedeitherin the languageof modalepistemic
logic or in another,richerlanguage,claimedto be moreappropriate.
Melia [23] holdsthatthe anti-realistneednot acceptthe anti-realist
wouldnotbe threatened
thesis(1), whenceanti-realism
by theknowability paradox.Accordingto Riickert[36], the modifiedanti-realist
thesisimplicitlyproposedin Melia'spapercanbe renderedas 0(K A
K--A). Otherauthorssuggestedusinga richerrepresentation
language
marker,see [8,20,36].
containinganactualityoperatorora subjunctive
3. The anti-realistthesis may be syntacticallyrestricted.Dummett[5]
thesisoughtto be restrictedto "barecentlyarguedthattheanti-realist
then
becomes
thedefiningpropertyin the
sic statements".
Knowability
basecaseof aninductivedefinitionof thetruthpredicate.Tennant[39]
objectsthatDummett'srestrictionresultsin a knowabilityprinciple
too weakto distinguish(somekindof) intuitionistic
logic as the corin Tennant's
view is therestriction
rectlogic. A constraintsustainable
of the anti-realistthesis to whathe calls Cartesianstatements,i.e.,
statementsA suchthatKA is consistent.
4. It maybe suggestedto replaceclassicallogic as the non-modalnonepistemicbaselogic by a suitablenon-classicallogic.
In thepresentpaper,the latterapproachis pursued.A logicalsolutionhas
the advantageof avoiding any commitmentto versions of realism or antirealism. Moreover,the inferences presented by Fitch and Hart certainly
remaindisputableirrespectiveof the meritsof richerlanguages or restrictions of the anti-realistthesis, and this even more so, since these reasoning
patternsapply not only to the notion of knowability.

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KNOWABILITYPARADOX

595

it will not
It is well-knownthatforblockingtheunwantedderivations,
sufficeto replaceclassicallogic by intuitionistic
logic. The intuitionisticbe
inclined
to
avoid
theparadoxof knowaanti-realist
ally-minded
might
bilityby rejectingtheDeMorganlaw (orclassicalreductio)usedto derive
the problematic
(6). Accordingto Williamson[48] this may even be the
for
a
to escapefrom the knowabilityparadox.
verificationist
only way
However,the derivationof (5) uses only meansthatareintuitionistically
acceptable,andthe intuitionist,althoughrejectingthe derivationof (6),
wouldhaveto be willingto acceptthederivation
from(5)
of (5). Moreover,
the followingformulais intuitionistically
(understoodintuitionistically)
derivable:

(8)

--KAD --A.

In Tennant's[38] terminology,accepting(8) still requiresa "moderately

hardanti-realism",
andaccordingto Williamson[52],(8) is a deeplyproblematicconsequenceof (5), althoughfrom(8) one cannotintuitionistically inferthe unwantedformulaA D KA. Since (8) can be inferred
from(1), Williamson[52] drawsthe conclusionthatintuitionisticnegation"doesnotcorrectlyformalizethenegationthatwe applyto empirical
sentences".
Whatis neededis a non-classicallogic in whichthe negationintroductionruleusedto derive(5) fails. If (7) is postulatedandnot derived
also modustollensshouldfail. Negationinusingnegationintroduction,
troductionandmodustollensfail in DavidNelson'sconstructivelogics
N3 and N4 with strongnegation --,. In these systems not only implication
but also - is interpretedconstructively.6In the relational semantics for

Nelson'slogics, verificationand falsificationare takenas primitiveand

areregardedas equallyimportantconcepts.Whereasin the three-valued
logic N3, atomicformulascannotbe bothverifiedandfalsified,this restrictionis given up in the paraconsistent
four-valuedsystem N4. The
verificationandfalsificationclausesare suchthatin effect for all kinds
of compoundnegations,theirverificationandfalsificationconditionsare
laid downseparately.
In particular,
is not accepted.
negationintroduction
If anassumption
A allowsoneto derivea formulaB andits strongnegation
this
no
gives informationto the effect that ~-A.As a resultof the
~-B,
constructive
treatment
of negation,alsoin thenon-paraconsistent
logicN3,
the law of noncontradiction
A
fails
to
a
be
theorem.
Instead,
A))
('-(A
A D (^-AD B) is a theoremof N3.Sincethe aboveproofsof (5) employ
the knowabilityparadoxcanbe blockedsimplyby
negationintroduction,
N4
N3
or
as
an
baselogic.
using
underlyingnon-modalandnon-epistemic

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596

HEINRICH
WANSING

Thisobservation
seemsnotto havebeenmadein theliterature.7
Still,there
remainsa problem.If theconstructive
analogue
K (AA , K A)

(9)

of (7) is postulatedas a plausibleprinciple,thentheformula

A -KA))
(A A r-,KA) D (OK(A rA KA) A ~KOK(A

(10)

canbe derived:
1. (AA ~
instantiationin (1),
,KA) D OK(AA iKA)
2. 0OK(AA--KA)
(9),
3. (A A -KA) D '-OK(AA KA) 2, empty implicationintroduction,

introduction.
1, 3, conjunction

4. (10)

The derivabilityof (10) is problematic,becauseif somethingis true

but unknown,intuitivelythis need not implythata certainformulaand
its negationis verified.8Using the paraconsistent
logic N4 as the base
in
from
because
N4,
(OK(AA ~-KA) A
logic mitigatesthis problem,
formulas,but it may be
--OK(AA ,KA)) one cannotderivearbitrary
the
of
that
this
way blocking knowabilityparadoxremainsunobjected
is not enough.Thederivationof (10) canbe
satisfactory.
Paraconsistency
avoidedif the constructive
implicationof Nelson'slogics is replacedby
relevantimplication(becauserelevantimplicationdoes not permitempty
In summary,
we maysay thatwe wouldliketo
implicationintroductions).
relevantmodalepistemiclogic enjoyingthe following
havea constructive
properties:
* negationis treatedconstructively
and
suchthatnegationintroduction
modustollensfail to hold,
* (9) andtheanalogueof (4):
(11)

~,,O(KAA ~~KA)

of modelssuchthatthese
withpurelystructural
properties
correspond
formulasmayor maynotbe postulatedas axioms,
butalsorelevant.
implicationis notonly constructive

3. A PARACONSISTENT CONSTRUCTIVE RELEVANCE LOGIC

In this section,we shallsemanticallydefinethe logic RN4,a modalepistemicextensionof a relevantversionof Nelson'sparaconsistent

logic N4.
Thesemanticsof RN4combines:

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PARADOX
KNOWABILITY

597

theneighbourhood
semanticsof classicalmodallogicsto interpret
the
knowledgeoperatorK, see [4],
* Routley'sandMeyer'sternaryrelationalsemanticsto interpretrelevantimplication,see [6,33-35],
* a binaryaccessibilityrelationto interpret
themodaloperators0 and ],
* thedistinctionbetweenverification
andfalsificationclausesto interprettheconstructive,
strongnegation.
Forthe relevanceandmodallogic partof the semantics,we shallfollow
thepresentation
in [6] andthepresentation
in [12,13].Note,however,that
all modalrelevancelogicsconsideredin [12,13]areaxiomatizedusingthe
rule.Whatis novelin thepresentsemanticsis thetreatment
contraposition
of strongnegationinsteadof the *-negationof relevancelogic andan inof the knowledgeoperatorthatallowscapturingformulas(9)
terpretation
and(11).
DEFINITION
1. A modalepistemicNelsonframe(orjust a frame)is
a structurea = (I, R, S+, S-, N+, N-, 0), where:

(1) I is a non-emptyset;
(2) 0 is a non-emptysubsetof I;
(3) R IxlxI x I;
(4) S+ andS- arebinaryrelationson I;
(5) N+ and N- are mappingsfrom I into YP(GP(I)).

thecomponentsof a framecanbe understood

as follows:
Intuitively,
(1) I is a non-emptyset of information
states,
0
a
is
(2)
states,
non-emptyset of initialinformation
of theinformation
statess andt is contained
(3) Rstu iff thecombination
in stateu,
froms,
(4) S+st iff t is accessibleforverification
S-st iff t is accessibleforfalsification
froms,
(5) X E N+(s) iff the propositionX is believed at s,

X e N- (s) iff thepropositionX is disbelievedat s.

Weshallreferto S+ in theverification
clauseforformulasOB anduse Sin theverification
clausefor formulas0B. TherelationsS+ andS- could
their
intuitive
exchange
readings,sinceit does not reallymatterwhether
we thinkof theverification
of OB as thefalsification
of D~ B or we think
of theverification
of OB as thefalsification
of 0~ B, see Definition4.
The componentsof a framemustsatisfya numberof conditions,all
of which are plausible(or at least not implausible)given the intuitive
of thecomponents.
Wedefine
understanding

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598
*

HEINRICH
WANSING

s < t iffdef (3u O0)Rust (t is a possible expansionof s),

R2stuw iffdef 3x (Rstx and Rxuw),
R2s(tu)w iffdf 3x (Rsxw and Rtux).

Theconditionsare:
(identity)

s,
_
(Rstu and s'

< s) implies Rs'tu,

R2stuw
(associativity)
impliesR2s(tu)w,
(permutation) R2stuwimpliesR2sutw,

(monotony)

(idempotence) Rttt,
(persistence 1) {(u, s) : 3w(u < w & S+ws} c S+,
(persistence2) {(u, s) : 3w(w < u & S-ws} c S-,
(persistence3) s 5 t implies N+(s) C N+(t),
(persistence4) s < t implies N-(s) g N- (t).
=
DEFINITION2. If a = (I, R, S+, S-, N+, N-, 0) is a frame,then M92
(M,v+, v-) is a modalepistemicNelsonmodel(orjusta model)iff

(1) v+ and v- are valuationfunctionsassigningto everypropositional

variablea subsetof I,
variablep:
(2) foreverypropositional
t
and
if
s
s E v+(p), then t E v+(p);
<
(persistence+)
(persistenceo)if s < t and s E v-(p), then t E v-(p).
1 = (I, R, S+, S-, N+, N-, 0, v+, v-) is called reand
S- are reflexiverelationson I. 9A1is Euclideanif it
flexive if S+
satisfiesthefollowingconditions:
DEFINITION3.

Euclidicity- (Vs, t, u e I) ((S-st & S+su) =

Euclidicity+ (Vs, t, u e I) ((S-st & S+su) =

S-ut),
S+tu).

9M2
is called knowledgeconsistentif for every u, w E I and every X C I,
S+uw implies X e N+(w) or X e N-(w);

9Ris saidto be niceif foreveryu, w E I andeveryX C I,

S+uw implies X n {v : X e N-(v)} e N-(w);
9m is called positively supplementedif N+ (w) is closed under supersets;
and f2 is said to satisfy condition (t+) if X e N+(w) implies w e X.
= (I, R, S+, S-, N+, N-, 0, v+, v-) be a modDEFINITION4. Let 91M
el, t e I and A be a formula.The notions f92,t + A (A is verifiedon the

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KNOWABILITY
PARADOX
basis of informationstate t) and 032,t )-

599

A (A is falsified on the basis of

statet) aredefinedby thefollowingsimultaneous

induction:
information
9)1,t j+ p
K9),t - p
9I, t k+-~ B
9)1,t j-=N B
9, t
O9,t

BAC
+B
- BAC

91, t + BvC

iff t E v+(p), p atomic,

iff t E v-(p), p atomic,
iff Ml,t =- B,
iff 9R, t 1+ B,
B and9A, t H+ C,
iff 9t, t+
iff 9, t -B or , t - C,
iff 9X),t+

B or9, t ~+ C,
- B and9N,t - C,

9A,t

- BvC

9, t

+ B D C iff (Vu, s E I) (if Rtus and

9T, u H+ B,

iff 9, t

then9A,s P+ C),

, t H- B D C
9, t H+ OLB
T9,t H- OB
)1, t H+ OB

iff 9J, t H+ B and 9), t =- C,

iff (Vu E I) if S+tu then 92, u -+ B,
iff (3u E I) S-tu and91, u 1- B,
iff

(3u E I) S-tu and9,

u H+ B,

9), t =- OB

iff (Vue I) if S+tu then9J, u =- B,

9, t 1+ KB
9)1,t H- KB

iff IBIM E N+(t),

iff IBIT~ N-(t),

whereIBIB"(theverification
set of B) = {w : w e I and9A,w H+ B}.
Verification
andfalsificationhereareto be understood
in a sensethatallowsforinconsistent
states:a possibleworldt takenas aninformation
state
verifiesformulaB if t supportsthe truthof B (in the sense of providing
theinformation
thatB is definitelytrue),andt falsifiesB if t supportsthe
B
of
the
thatB is definitely
(in senseof providingtheinformation
falsity
No
is
and
false). probabilistic
understandinginvolved, nothingspecificis
assumedaboutthe verificationandfalsificationconditionsof atomicformulas.Theseconditionsmaydependon thesubjectmatterorthediscipline
considered.
An information
stateneedneithersupportthetruthnorsupport
the falsityof a givenformulaB, andit mayalso happenthata stateboth
verifiesandfalsifiessomeB.
If thevalidityof KA D A doesnotemergefromtheverification
clauses
already(butis guaranteed
by condition(t+)),it makessense to postulate
thatKB is verifiedatstatet iff theverification
set of B is amongthesetsof
statesjustifiablybelievedat t (9m,t 1+ KB iff IBl" e N+(t)). Similarly
set of B is amongthe
then,t supportsthefalsityof KB iff theverification

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600

HEINRICH
WANSING

sets of statesjustifiablydisbelieved at t: 9A,t

E N-(t).
- KB iff IBIM"

andfalsificationclausesforformulasKB
Notethatwiththeseverification
a distinctionis drawnbetweenjustifiablybelievingthat ~-Bandjustifiably
disbelievingthatB. Thisis certainlywanted.Otherwise,9)1,t 1+ K-B
iff 92, t V+ ~KB. Butit is conceivable,for example,thatthereis a state
at whicheverybodyalwaysjustifiablydisbelievesthatpersona is happy,
butnobodyeverjustifiablybelievesthata is unhappy.The only available
to the effect thata is not happy,without
evidencemightbe information
to
effect
evidence
the
thata is unhappy.Perhapsthispoor
therebeingany
beingis alwaysneitherhappynorunhappy.9
5. Let 9)X = (I, R, S+, S-, N+, N-, 0, v+, v-) be a
DEFINITION
model.A formulaA is validin 9A1
(in symbols92 i= A) iff foreveryt E 0,
A.
A
entails
B
in
91
for every t E 1, 9)1,t j+ A implies
t
iff
9~2, +
B.
A
valid
with
is
9~2,t j+
respectto a class t of modelsiff A is valid
in every9)3QE . The theoryof a class of models(t is the set of formulas
validwithrespectto t.
6. The logic RN4is the theory(in the languageconsidDEFINITION
of
the
class
ered)
21of all reflexive,Euclidean,knowledgeconsistent,nice,
modalepistemicNelson models satisfying
and positivelysupplemented
condition (t+).

AND COMPLETENESSOF RN4

4. AXIOMATIZATION

Let A - B abbreviate(A D B) A (B D A).

7. TheaxiomaticcalculusHRN4consistsof theadjunction
DEFINITION
rule (A, B/A A B), modusponens, the inferencerules A - B / K A

andA - B/ KA

KB

-K B, theinferencerules

D A
(Al A.--A
An)
RKto (OI
-A. A OAn) D OA

A A.
D(A1 v...

RKoAOA 3 (OAl v

v A,)
-v QAn)

(n > 0);
(n > O);

where if n = 0, RKo is A/OA and RKO is ~,A/~1OA,and the following

axiomschemata:
(AO) A D A,
(Al) (A D B) D ((C D A) D (C D B)),

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KNOWABILITY
PARADOX
(A2)
(A3)
(A4)
(A5)
(A6)
(A7)
(A8)
(A9)
(A10)
(All)
(A12)
(A13)
(A14)
(A15)
(A16)
(A17)
(A18)
(A19)

601

(A D (A D B)) D (A D B),
(A D (B D C))D (B D (A D C)),
((A D B) A (A D C)) D (AD (BA C)),
(A A B) D A,
(A A B) D B,
A D (A v B),
B D (A v B),
(A D C) D ((B D C) D ((A v B) D C)),
(A A(B v C)) D ((AA B) v (AA C)),
~-(AD B) - (A A - B),
~-(AA B) - ('-A v -B),
~
-~(A v B) A
(~-A -B),
~-'A - A,
~-OA- 0~A,
-OA
A -El-~A,
-O(KA A ~KA),
A
r-KA),
~.OK(A
DA D A,

(A20)A D OA,
(A21)
(A22)
(A23)
(A24)

OA D OOA,
OOA D OIA,
KA D A,
K(A A B) D (KA A KB).

A formulaA is provablein HRN4(in symbols F-A) iff A is an instantiation

of one of the above axiom schemataor A can be derivedfrom instances
of (AO)-(A24) by repeatedapplicationsof the inference rules of HRN4.
It can easily be shown that OA - -O-A and F- OA - ~0KA. If
A, F are sets of formulas,we write A F- F iff there are A1,..., A, E A
and B, ..., Bm
, E r such that F AIA
An, D B v ... v Bm.We shall
A
use Cl(A) to denote {B : A F-{B }}.
To prove soundness,two lemmataare applied.
LEMMA 1 (Persistence). For everyformula A:
(persistence+)if s < t and 9A1,s -+ A, then 9A2,t -- A;
(persistence-) if s < t and 9A, s )- A, then9)2,t -- A.
Proof. By simultaneousinduction on A. We consider three cases not
familiarfrom the positive relevancelogic R+.

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602

HEINRICH
WANSING

Case 1. Suppose91, 5s

+
~,B

ands < t. Then932,s V- B, andby the

inductionhypothesisfor (persistence-),9At,t j-- B, i.e., 91, u i=+ r-B.

Case 2. Suppose 91, s =- OB and s < t. Then (Vu e I) S+su =

9), u j- B. By (persistence 1), (Yu e I) S+tu = S+su. Therefore,
OB.
(Vu e I) S+tu = 9tA,t =- B, in otherwords,9T, t
Case 3. Suppose 9A, s =- OB and s < t. Then (3u e I) S-su &

9), u 1- B and,by (persistence2), S-tu. Therefore,(3u e I) S-tu &

O
91, u =- B, in otherwords,92, t =- ]B.
LEMMA2 (Verification). (V9Ae 21)A entails B in 912iff 9A = A D B.
Proof Let 9)1be a model. SupposeA entails B in 92 and t E 0.

w
9), t [+ A D B iff forall u, w, if u < w and9A,u 1=+A, then9, w=+
B. If 9)M,
u k+ A andu < w, thenby (persistence),
9), w + A. Since
A entailsB, 9A,w 1-+ B. Conversely,supposet E 0, 9)1,t + A D B,
and9), s k+ A. Thenfor all u, w, if u < w and 91, u )+ A, then
O
T1,w -=+B. Sinces < s, we have9A,s j+ B.
THEOREM1 (Soundness).I- A implies1=2 A.
Proof.By inductionon the lengthn of proofs.We considerhere,by
way of example,onlytwo subcasesof n = 1.
(A17):
~KA)
9)1,t 1 +
i(KAA
iff 93, t =- O(KAAr ,KA)
02, 1u - (KAA -KA)
iff (Vu E I) S+tu
iff (Vu E I) S+tu = (09, u k- KA or9N, u =- ~KA)
iff (Vu E I) S+tu 4 (9X, u =-KA or 9A, u + KA)
iff (Vu E I) S+tu = (JA19"N-(u) or IAl9x e N+(u)).

Thelatteris thecasebecause9) is knowledgeconsistent.

(A18):
91, t

~
~OK(AA ^KA)

iff 9A,t k- OK(AA~KA)

iff
iff
iff
iff

(Vu e
(Vu e
(Vu e
(Vu E

I) S+tu
I) S+tu
I) S+tu
I) S+tu

=9 t, u - K(AAriKA)
A
e N-(u)
= I(A --KA)j~
A
e
= IIAIn I--KAIT' N-(u)
e N-(u).
n
=A j1Aj~ {v: IA:9"E N-(v)}

The latteris the case because9) is nice. Note thatwe have shownthat
of (A17) and(A18) (alias(11) and(9)) are verifiedat any
instantiations
stateof anyknowledgeconsistent,respectivelynicemodel.
o
Also thecompletenessprooffollowsfamiliarlines.

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603

KNOWABILITY
PARADOX

DEFINITION
8. A set of formulasA is calleda theoryiff
(1) if A E A andB E A, thenA A B E A (closureunderadjunction),
(2) if A E A and F- A D B, then B E A (closureunderprovable
implication).
A theoryA is saidto be primeiff
A, thenA E or Be A.
(3) if AvB
A theoryA is saidto be saturated
if it is primeandregular:
(4) F-AimpliesA E A.
The soundnessof HRN4guarantees(usingclassicalreasoning)the existenceof sets of formulasA, F suchthatA rF. Theexistenceof prime
theoriesis guaranteed
by thePrimeExtensionLemma.
LEMMA3 (PrimeExtension). If A is a theory and A YLF, then there
is a prime theory A' such that A c A' and A' Yr F (and therefore

A'n r = o).

Let A1, A2,... be a list of all

Proof By a Lindenbaum-construction.
formulasandset
A0

= A,

J An U {An+l}
A+
/},

A'

if

A,, {A,,+I}
otherwise,

r,

ULA.
i<ao

It follows that there exist saturatedsets 6 such that A E

8 if YA.
=
A
A
:
the
Extension
there
exists a
Lemma,
(Suppose
{B H B). By
o
primeextensionA' D A suchthatA A'.)
DEFINITION9.

The model '9* = (I*, R*, S+*, S-*, N+*, N-*, 0*,

v+*,v-*), thecanonicalmodel,is definedas follows:

*
*
*
*
*

I* = the set of all prime theories;

R*stu iff for all (VA, B) ((A D B E s and A E t) implies B E u;
Ae
u;
S+*tu iff{A
:-: A t} c
S-*tu iff {OA
E u} t;
N+*(u) = {sat(A) : KA E u} U non-sat,where sat(A) is the set of all
prime theories containing A, and non-sat = {F _ I* : there is no A

suchthatF is theset of all primetheoriescontainingA};

* N-*(u) = {sat(A) : ~KA e u} U non-sat;

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604

HEINRICH
WANSING

* 0* = the set of all saturated

sets0 suchthatA 0e iffVA;
* uE v+*(p) iff pE u;
* u E v-*(p) iff --p E u.
LEMMA4 (Vt, u E I*) (1) OA E t = A e u iff OA E t = "A e u;
(2) A u =: OA e t iff A e u =iU-~O[AE t.

Proof Theproofusesclosureof t andu underprovableimplicationand

axiomschemata(A14)-(A16).
o
It has to be verifiedthatthe structure9m*is in fact a modalepistemic
Nelsonmodel.Forthatpurpose,thefollowinglemmais used:
LEMMA5 (Squeeze Lemma). Let I' be the set of all theories, and let R*'
be the extension of R* to domain I' x I' x I'. For all s', t' E I' and all
U E I*, if R*'s't'u, then there exists s E I* such that s' C s and R*'st'u,
and there exists t E I* such that t' c t and R*'s'tu.

Proof See, forinstance,[6,12,13].

Anotherlemmathatis usedis:
LEMMA 6 (Inclusion) (Vt, u E I*) t < u (i.e., (3s E 0*) R*stu) if
t C u.

Proof Since F- A D A, the directionfromleft to rightis obvious.

Suppose t c u. Let w = {A : F- A}. Then R*'wtu. By the Squeeze
Lemma,thereis a primetheorys such that R*stu. Since w C s, s is
saturated.
o
LEMMA7. 9)* is infact a model.

Proof.We observedalreadythatI* and0* arenon-empty.The proof

and
thatR*satisfies(identity),(monotony),(associativity),
(permutation),
(idempotence)is known from relevancelogic, see [6]. (persistence+)
and (persistence-) follow immediatelyfrom the Inclusion Lemma.
(persistence1) and(persistence2) followfromthe InclusionLemmaand
the definitionof S+* andS-*. Consider(persistence2). Supposew < u
and S-*ws. Then (i) w C u and (ii) for every A, OA 0 w =4 A s. Supposeforreductiothatthereis a formulaB suchthatB E s andCB u. By

To verify(persistence3),
(i), OB w, andby (ii) B V s, a contradiction.

suppose that s < t and X E N+(s). Thens c t and there exists a

formula A such that (i) X = sat(A) and KA e s or (ii) X E non-sat.
If (i), then KA e t andhence X e N+(t). If (ii), then trivially X E N+(t).

Thecaseof (persistence
4) is analogous.Clearly,S+*andS-* arerelations
on I*, butit hasto be shownthatN+* andN-* arewell-definedfunctions.

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KNOWABILITY
PARADOX

605

This follows easily from the observationthat IAI*'9 C IBl0'* implies

F- A D B (Lemma10.5 in [12]) using the rules A - B/KA - KB
and A - B /~lKA -_

KB.E

Completenessfollows almostimmediatelyfrom the 'CrucialLemma', stating that for every formulaA and every w E I*, 9*, w -+ A iff A E w,
and 9R*,w --- A iff -A e w. To provethe CrucialLemma,another

lemmais used,namely:
LEMMA8. (1) Let s I* and t' = {B : OB e s}. Then(i) t' is a theory
and (ii) thereexists t D t' such that t E I* and A t if A i t'.
(2) Let s E I* and OB E s. Thenthere exists t E I* such that B e t and
for all A, A E t implies OA E s.

Proof (1) is Lemma7.5 in [12];(2) is Lemma21 in [3].

(1) (i) SupposeC, DE t'. ThenOC, OD e s, andby closureunder
provableimplication,(OC A OD) e s. RuleRKo andI- C A D C A D
give (OC A DD) D O(C A D). ThereforeD(C A D) E s and hence
(C A D) e t'. The set t' is thus closed underadjunction.To show closure
underprovableimplication,assume CE t'. Then OC e s. If H-C D D,

then,by RK, I- OC D OD. Since s is a theory,OD E s and hence

D E t'. (ii) This follows from the PrimeExtensionLemma.

A
(2) Let T := {A : BE A, A
OA e s, Cl(A) C A}.
T is non-empty,becauseCl({B}) e T. To see this,the only non-trivial

observation
is thatforeveryA, AE Cl({B})implies0A e s. If F-B D A,
by RKOwe haveF OB D OA, andsinceOB E s ands is closedunder
provableimplication,OA e s. Since T is non-emptyand closed under
unionsof non-emptychains,by Zorn'sLemma,T has a C-maximalelementt. Clearly,t is closed underadjunctionandprovableimplication.
For primeness suppose D v C E t. Then O(D v C) e s. OD e s or
OC e s, because F-O(D v C) D (OD v OC) and s is closed underprovableimplicationandprime.Suppose0D e s. ButthenCl(t U {D}) e T, a
contradiction
withthe C-maximality
of t in T.
O
LEMMA9 (CrucialLemma). For everyformula A and every w E I*,
(1) 9)*, w
(2) 91*, w

+ A iffA e w, and
A iff -~AEw.

inductionon A. Thebasecaseis obvious.The

Proof By simultaneous
case A = KB followsimmediatelyfromthe definitionof N+* andN-*.
Subcase A = (B D C) (1) is familiarfromrelevancelogic; A = (B D C)

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606

HEINRICH
WANSING

(2) followsusingtheinductionhypotheses.Wehereconsideronlythecase
A = OB.
(1) (=)
iff
iff

iff
only if

92*, w + OB
(3u E I*) S-*wu & 9R1*,u V+ B
(3u E I*) S-*wu & B E u
(3u E I*) {B :B E U} w &B E u
OB w.

(1) (=) SupposeOB e w. By Lemma8 (2), thereexistst E I* such

that B E t and for all A, A E t implies0A e w. In otherwords,29*,
w kC+ 0B.

(2) (e=) Suppose~OB e w and9)1*,w

iff
iff
iff

=-

OB.Then

(3u E I*) S+*wu & 92*, u - B

(3u E I*) S+*wu & ^BB u
(3u E I*){B: OB w)}E u&-CBu u
~
(3u E I*) {--,B : rOB e w} u & B 0u by Lemma.

Since - OB e w, we obtaina contradiction.

w. Then
(2) (=4) Suppose 91*, w =- OB and -OB
ft'= {C:
B.
Define
w
and
(ii) (Vu E I*) S+*wu =j 9)r*,u
(i) OEl-B0
OC E w}. Then ~-B0 t'. By Lemma8 (1), (3t E I*) t' t and ~-B0 t,
i.e., 91*, t V- B. Since for all OA e w, A E t' and hence A E t, we
have S+*wt. Therefore,(3t E I*) S+*wt & 9m*t
RB, a contradiction

with(ii).

It remainsto be shownthatthecanonicalmodelbelongsto 9.
is reflexiveand Euclidean.
LEMMA 10. 9RJ*

ToshowEuclidof reflexivityis straightforward.

Proof.Theverification
In
other
words:
icity,assumethatS-*st andS+*su.
(i)

Aet =40A es

and (ii)

E=s
LOA

A Eu.

For Euclidicity- it must be shown that (iii) A E t 4=:OA E u, and for

Euclidicity+it mustbe shownthat(iv) IA E t i= A E u. Wehave

(iii) OAE t 4

D OAE s
s (A~)
OA E

A E u,

LEMMA 11. Thecanonical model 9)1*is knowledgeconsistent,nice, positivelysupplemented,and satisfies condition (t+).

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KNOWABILITY
PARADOX

607

Proof We considerhere only knowledgeconsistencyand niceness.

RecallthatAxiom(17) (Axiom(18))is verifiedatanystateof anyknowledgeconsistent(nice)model.
Suppose9i1* fails to be knowledgeconsistent.Then (3u, we I*)
(3X C I*) S+*uw, X 0 N+(w) and X 0 N-(w). By definition of
w.
N+* and N-*, there is a formulaA such that KA w and ~KA

By Lemma9 andDefinition4, JAI"*0 N+(w) and IAIM** N-(w).

Thereforenot for every w e I*, if S+*uw then IAIT*'e N+(w) or
u V-+ ~O(KA A ,-KA), a contradiction.
IAl"' E N-(w). Hence M91*,
Supposenow that92* in not nice. Then (3u, w e I*) (3X C W*)
S+*uw and X n {v : X e N-*(v)} 0 N-*(w). By definitionof N-*, there
is a formulaA such that,KA 0 w and IAIO*= X n {v X e N-*(v)}.
ThereforeX is a verificationset. Otherwise,for all D, (3t X) t J+ D

andthereforeforall D, (3t 0 Xnf{v: X E N-*(v)}) t J+ D. ButthenXn

set, a contradiction.
Thus,there
{v : X e N-*(v)} failsto be a verification
is a B suchthatX = IBI *, andtherefore : X e N-*(v)=}=
{v
I-~KBIM*.
Hence -,-K(BA ~KB) 0 w, and hence, by Lemma 9, 9)*,u =+
LNK(B A rKB). However, (Vt e I*) 9)1*,t J+ h~K(B A ^-KB), a

contradiction.

THEOREM2.

2 A = H-A.
Assume
thatY'A. Thenthereis a saturated
set A notcontaining
Proof
A and9T*,A K+ A. Sincef9* E 2(,we have
A.
o
=t

A three-valued
constructivemodalepistemicrelevancelogic RN3is obtained,if it is requiredthatin everymodelfor everyatomp, v-(p) n

v+(p) - 0.

5. A DIAMONDPRESERVED

We can, finally,returnto the knowabilityparadox.If one follows Version (I) of the paradox,in RN4the reasoningcomesto an end afterfive
steps:
1. A A -KA
temporary
assumption,
2.
3.
4.
5.

OK(AA
~i-KA)
O(KA A KrKA)
O(KAA
r -KA)
0 (KA -KA)

1, (1),
2, (2),
3, (3),
(11).

Thederivation
cannotbe continuedusingnegationintroduction.

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608

HEINRICH
WANSING

in RN4,it breaksdown
If Version(II) of the argumentis represented
afterthreesteps:
1.

A A OKA

(1),

2. -,OK(AA~KA)
(9),
3. (A r KA) D OK(AA ~KA) instantiation
in 1.
Modustollens and contraposition,
both as a rule and as an axiom,fail
to hold in RN4 (and N4 and N3), and therefore--OK(A A^ ,KA) D

-(A A KA) cannot be deduced from (AA ^ KA) D OK(A A ~-KA)

to detachtheunwanted
(12)

~,(A A ~~KA).

So thisrouteto (12) is interrupted.

The followingis a specificationof a reflexive,Euclidean,knowledge
counter-model
consistent,nice,andpositivelysupplemented
satisfyingcondition (t+), showing thatthe inference p D OKp/~(p A -Kp) is invalid
in RN4:
I ==0 = {t), R = (t, t, t), S+ = S- = (t, t); N+(t) = {{t}},
N-(t) = {0}, v+(q) = v-(q) = 0, for every atom q.
As can easily be verified, 9)1 = (I, R, S+, S-, N+, N-, 0, v+, v-) is in

fact a model. The premisep D OKp is verifiedat t becausep fails

of (2), (3), (11), and (9) are valid
to be verifiedat t. All instantiations
satisfiescondition(t+), is knowledge
in 9A1because t)1is supplemented,
consistent,andalso nice.Moreover,the conclusion~-(p A -,Kp)fails to
be verifiedat t becausep failsto be falsifiedandfailsto be knownat t:
=
t
pjma0 N+(t)
p and 0
iff t V- p and t iL+ Kp

iff t V- p andt V=-,Kp

iff t V- (pA ,-Kp)

iff t K++ ~(p A ~Kp).

Intuitionistic
negation
logic hasbeencriticizedforits non-constructive
construcwith
Nelson's
for
reasons
and
working
by manyauthors, many
see
tive logics with strongnegationhavebeenassembledin theliterature;
therein.
and
references
Perhapsthe
[1,2,7,15,18,19,24-26,30-32,37,40-46]
most appealingrouteto constructivelogic with strongnegationfor the
of the
[21] supplementation
previousverificationistis L6pez-Escobar's
and
intuitionistic
of
conjunction,disjunction, impliproof-interpretation
A canonicalproofof the constructive
cationby a disproof-interpretation.

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KNOWABILITY
PARADOX

609

of A andnota proofshowing
negation-A of A is adisproof(orrefutation)
that A impliesabsurdity.A canonicaldisproofof ~-Ais a proofof A.
This gives a naturalinterplaybetweenthe notionsof proofanddisproof.
Moreover,the ideathata proofof the negationof A is a proofrevealing
thatA impliesabsurdityis problematic,
becauseabsurdityhas no proof,
and a proofthat A impliesabsurditywouldrequirea constructionthat
convertsanyproofof A into a non-existingproofof absurdity.
Nelson's
four-valuedlogic is soundwithrespectto the proof-and-disproof
semanand
Nelson's
three-valued
is
sound
under
the
further
tics,
logic
assumption
thatno formulaA is bothprovableanddisprovable.
It is thenclearthat
modustollensmustfail. SupposethatA D B and ~-Bare valid:there
is a construction
convertinganyproofof A into a proofof B andthere
is a disproofof B. This does not guaranteethe existenceof a refutation
of A. Also contraposition
mustfail. Considercontraposition
as an axiom.
Thereis no guaranteethatthereexists a constructionthatconvertsany
construction
anyproofof A into a proofof B into a contransforming
structiontransforming
any disproofof B into a disproofof A. For the
thatconverts
rule,assumethatthereexists a construction
contraposition
of
A
into
a
of
B.
Then
there
is
no
any proof
proof
guaranteethatthere
also existsa construction
thatconvertsanydisproofof B intoa disproofof
A. Thefarewellto negationintroduction,
modustollensandcontraposition
with
the
use
of
relevant
is a farewellto theparadoxical
together
implication
of thediamond.
disappearance
like
mathematical
theoriesin
Curiously, Nelson,alsoFitchinvestigated
whichtrueandfalsestatements
aredefinedsimultaneously
by constructive
means,see [9,10].In fact, Fitch[9] consideredpropositional
logics that
amountto the systemsinvestigatedby Nelsonmerelyuponthe addition
of the conditionsforfalsifyingimplicationsat the stateof evaluation,see
also [32].
6. CONCLUSION

It has been emphasizedthatthe reasoningpatternsexemplifiedby the

fail to be validandthatthe strangedisappearance
paradoxof knowability
of a diamondis avoided,if the relevantmodalepistemiclogic RN4 is
used containinga constructive
negationthatsatisfiesneitherthe negation
introduction
rulenormodustollens.A logicwithsucha treatment
of negation recommendsitself anywayto a constructivist
who is readyto treat
constructivetruthon a parwithconstructivefalsity.Moreover,the logic
RN4has beenaxiomatizedandshownto be completewithrespectto its
relationalsemantics.

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610

WANSING
HEINRICH
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I amgratefulto StenLindstr6m,
HelgeRiickert,YaroslavShramkoandan
anonymousrefereeforcriticalcommentson earlierversionsof thispaper.
Moreover,a previousversionof thepaperwaspresentedattheuniversities
andUtrecht.I wouldlike to acknowledgeusefulquestions
of Amsterdam
Dick de Jongh,and
and remarksby GiovannaCorsi,Paul Harrenstein,
Maartende Rijke.Thanksalso to Neil Tennantfor makingavailablethe
[39].Thecolleaguesmentionedare,of course,notresponsible
unpublished
fortheviews advocatedin thepresentpaper.

NOTES
1 The knowabilityparadoxis also often called the Fitch paradox.Since Fitch [11], however, attributesthe paradoxto an anonymousreferee, the term 'knowabilityparadox' is,
perhaps,more appropriate.
2 In some presentationsof the knowability paradoxit is assumed that necessarily all
truths are knowable. We shall neglect this complication, since it is not essential for the
derivationsto be scrutinized.
3 For the sake of the argument,assumingthat0 and0 are K-typemodal operatorswould
be enough. However,logical necessity and possibility are usually representedby necessity
and possibility in S5 (= KT5).
4 If the reader is convinced that (1) is also valid, note that (1) corresponds with the
following semantical condition: w E X implies 3t Swt and X e N(t), where S is the
accessibility relationused to interpretthe diamond.
5 The discussion of (1) or its naturallanguage counterpartis really a different matter.
If K is understoodas provabilityin arithmetic,for example, G6del's first incompleteness
theoremshows that for the languageof arithmetic,(1) in untenable.
6 The logic N3 can be seen as a conservativeextension of intuitionisticlogic by strong
negation. However, intuitionisticnegation need not be taken as primitive,because the intuitionisticnegation --A of A can be definedin N3 as AD -~A. Negation introductionand
modus tollens fail with respect to strongnegation.
7 In [51], Williamson considers N3. Williamson discusses a formalization of "Goldbach's Conjecture will never be decided". Its formalization in intuitionistic logic as
-n(KA v K -A) leads to a contradiction,if VersionII of the knowabilityparadoxis accepted
as a proof of -'KA D -"A. Williamsonthen considers '-(KA v K~-A) as a formalization
of "Goldbach'sConjecturewill neverbe decided"in N3. Note thatWilliamson'streatment
of strong negation differs from the development in the present paper also insofar as in
Williamson'ssystem, formulasKA arenot falsifiedat the stateof evaluation.Instead-K A
is taken to mean --A.
8 Also Johansson's minimal logic [17] does not help. If (7) is assumed, modus tollens
must fail, but it holds in minimallogic.
9 Theremay well be otherfalsificationclauses for formulasK B worthyof investigation.
The presentclause keeps belief and disbelief separate,enables capturing(9) by the frame
condition of niceness, and avoids 911,t *+K B iff 9)J,t *+ K B.

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PARADOX
KNOWABILITY

611

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Dresden Universityof Technology

Instituteof Philosophy
01062 Dresden, Germany
e-mail: Heinrich.Wansing@mailbox.tu-dresden.de

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