CARPIO MORALES v CA (6th Division)

Doctrine:
The jurisprudential doctrine of condonation which permitted an elective
official's re-election as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby
cutting the right to remove him therefor has been abandoned by the Court
for lack of legal bases.

FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Atty. Bondal and Nicolas Enciso VI before
the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, accusing
them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building..
Binay, Jr. was alleged to be involved in anomalous activities
attending the procurement and construction phases of the Makati
Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present
terms as City Mayor of Makati.
The Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order, placing
Binay Jr., et al., under preventive suspension for not more than six
(6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order.
The CA granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pea,
Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor. Citing Governor Garcia,
Jr. v. CA, it found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO
in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of
the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the
acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation
doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be
administratively charged.

Binay Jr. contended that phases I and II were undertaken before he

was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010 and that phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City
Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic.
In view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence
to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office
would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the
person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
The Ombudsman, on the other hand contended that the
condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive
suspension orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine
HELD:
No. The writ of preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman's
preventive suspension order was correctly issued.
The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the
condonation doctrine. By merely following settled precedents on
the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained
"good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave
abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above.
Under the Condonation Doctrine, the penalty of removal may not
be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was
elected for each term is separate and distinct. An elective official's
re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct,
thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor. The courts may
not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life
and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers.
This doctrine originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. In which case, as there was no
legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court resorted to

American authorities and found that the weight of authorities

seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one
from office because of misconduct during a prior term.
The Court found that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft
of legal bases. The concept of public office, under the 1987
Constitution, AS A PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary requirement of
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is PLAINLY
INCONSISTENT with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior
term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second
term of office, or even another elective post.

Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and

there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction
to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is
fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense
done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President.
The Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application. It should be, as a general rule,
recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently,
the people's reliance thereupon should be respected.