Relationship between body and mind

The relationship between the mind and the body and what makes the self
have been debated for millennia and are as complex as ever. The seemingly
obvious nature of which one is becomes very unsure under close inspection,
and we tend to ignore the problems of personal identity and the mind-body
relationship even though the answers obviously involve profound
consequences. Many great philosophers including Plato, Aristotle, and
Descartes have written explicitly about this subject, and others like the preSocratics have written about philosophies that could easily apply to them.

Interactionism
Interactionism is the view that mind and bodyor mental events and
physical eventscausally influence each other. That this is so is one of our
common-sense beliefs, because it appears to be a feature of everyday
experience. The physical world influences my experience through my senses,
and I often react behaviorally to those experiences. My thinking, too,
influences my speech and my actions. There is, therefore, a massive natural
prejudice in favor of interactionism. It has been claimed, however, that it
faces serious problems (some of which were anticipated in section 1).
The simplest objection to interaction is that, in so far as mental properties,
states or substances are of radically different kinds from each other, they
lack that communality necessary for interaction. It is generally agreed that,
in its most naive form, this objection to interactionism rests on a billiard ball
picture of causation: if all causation is by impact, how can the material and
the immaterial impact upon each other? But if causation is either by a more
ethereal force or energy or only a matter of constant conjunction, there
would appear to be no problem in principle with the idea of interaction of
mind and body.
Even if there is no objection in principle, there appears to be a conflict
between interactionism and some basic principles of physical science. For
example, if causal power was flowing in and out of the physical system,
energy would not be conserved, and the conservation of energy is a
fundamental scientific law. Various responses have been made to this. One
suggestion is that it might be possible for mind to influence the distribution
of energy, without altering its quantity. (See Averill and Keating 1981).
Another response is to challenge the relevance of the conservation principle
in this context. The conservation principle states that in a causally isolated
system the total amount of energy will remain constant. Whereas [t]he
interactionist deniesthat the human body is an isolated system, so the

Relationship between body and mind

principle is irrelevant (Larmer (1986), 282: this article presents a good brief
survey of the options).
Robins Collins (2011) has claimed that the appeal to conservation by
opponents of interactionism is something of a red herring because
conservation principles are not ubiquitous in physics. He argues that energy
is not conserved in general relativity, in quantum theory, or in the universe
taken as a whole. Why then, should we insist on it in mind-brain interaction?
Most discussion of interactionism takes place in the context of the
assumption that it is incompatible with the world's being closed under
physics. This is a very natural assumption, but it is not justified if causal
over determination of behavior is possible. There could then be a complete
physical cause of behavior, and a mental one. The strongest intuitive
objection against over determination is clearly stated by Mills (1996: 112),
who is himself a defender of over determination.
For X to be a cause of Y, X must contribute something to Y. The only way a
purely mental event could contribute to a purely physical one would be to
contribute some feature not already determined by a purely physical event.
But if physical closure is true, there is no feature of the purely physical effect
that is not contributed by the purely physical cause. Hence interactionism
violates physical closure after all.
Mills says that this argument is invalid, because a physical event can have
features not explained by the event which is its sufficient cause. For
example, the rock's hitting the window is causally sufficient for the window's
breaking, and the window's breaking has the feature of being the third
window-breaking in the house this year; but the facts about prior windowbreakings, rather than the rock's hitting the window, are what cause this
window-breaking to have this feature.
The opponent of over determination could perhaps reply that his principle
applies, not to every feature of events, but to a subgroupsay, intrinsic
features, not merely relational or comparative ones. It is this kind of feature
that the mental event would have to cause, but physical closure leaves no
room for this. These matters are still controversial.
The problem with closure of physics may be radically altered if physical laws
are in deterministic, as quantum theory seems to assert. If physical laws are
deterministic, then any interference from outside would lead to a breach of
those laws. But if they are in deterministic, might not interference produce a
result that has a probability greater than zero, and so be consistent with the
laws? This way, one might have interaction yet preserve a kind of
nomological closure, in the sense that no laws are infringed. Because it
involves assessing the significance and consequences of quantum theory,

Relationship between body and mind

this is a difficult matter for the non-physicist to assess. Some argue that
indeterminacy manifests itself only on the subatomic level, being cancelled
out by the time one reaches even very tiny macroscopic objects: and human
behavior is a macroscopic phenomenon. Others argue that the structure of
the brain is so finely tuned that minute variations could have macroscopic
effects, rather in the way that, according to chaos theory, the flapping of a
butterfly's wings in China might affect the weather in New York. (For
discussion of this, see Eccles (1980), (1987), and Popper and Eccles (1977).)
Still others argue that quantum indeterminacy manifests itself directly at a
high level, when acts of observation collapse the wave function, suggesting
that the mind may play a direct role in affecting the state of the world
(Hodgson 1988; Stapp 1993).

Epiphenomenalism
If the reality of property dualism is not to be denied, but the problem of how
the immaterial is to affect the material is to be avoided, then
epiphenomenalism may seem to be the answer. According to this theory,
mental events are caused by physical events, but have no causal influence
on the physical. I have introduced this theory as if its point were to avoid the
problem of how two different categories of thing might interact. In fact, it is,
at best, an incomplete solution to this problem. If it is mysterious how the
non-physical can have it in its nature to influence the physical, it ought to be
equally mysterious how the physical can have it in its nature to produce
something non-physical. But that this latter is what occurs is an essential
claim of epiphenomenalism. (For development of this point, see Green
(2003), 14951). In fact, epiphenomenalism is more effective as a way of
saving the autonomy of the physical (the world as closed under physics')
than as a contribution to avoiding the need for the physical and non-physical
to have causal commerce.
There are at least three serious problems for epiphenomenalism. First, as I
indicated in section 1, it is profoundly counterintuitive. What could be more
apparent than that it is the pain that I feel that makes me cry, or the visual
experience of the boulder rolling towards me that makes me run away? At
least one can say that epiphenomenalism is a fall-back position: it tends to
be adopted because other options are held to be unacceptable.
The second problem is that, if mental states do nothing, there is no reason
why they should have evolved. This objection ties in with the first: the
intuition there was that conscious states clearly modify our behavior in
certain ways, such as avoiding danger, and it is plain that they are very
useful from an evolutionary perspective.

Relationship between body and mind

Frank Jackson (1982) replies to this objection by saying that it is the brain
state associated with pain that evolves for this reason: the sensation is a byproduct. Evolution is full of useless or even harmful by-products. For
example, polar bears have evolved thick coats to keep them warm, even
though this has the damaging side effect that they are heavy to carry.
Jackson's point is true in general, but does not seem to apply very happily to
the case of mind. The heaviness of the polar bear's coat follows directly from
those properties and laws which make it warm: one could not, in any simple
way, have one without the other. But with mental states, dualistically
conceived, the situation is quite the opposite. The laws of physical nature
which, the mechanist says make brain states cause behavior, in no way
explain why brain states should give rise to conscious ones. The laws linking
mind and brain are what Feigl (1958) calls nomological danglers, that is,
brute facts added onto the body of integrated physical law. Why there should
have been by-products of that kind seems to have no evolutionary
explanation.
The third problem concerns the rationality of belief in epiphenomenalism, via
its effect on the problem of other minds. It is natural to say that I know that I
have mental states because I experience them directly. But how can I justify
my belief that others have them? The simple version of the argument from
analogy says that I can extrapolate from my own case. I know that certain of
my mental states are correlated with certain pieces of behavior, and so I
infer that similar behavior in others is also accompanied by similar mental
states. Many hold that this is a weak argument because it is induction from
one instance, namely, my own. The argument is stronger if it is not a simple
induction but an argument to the best explanation. I seem to know from my
own case that mental events can be the explanation of behavior, and I know
of no other candidate explanation for typical human behavior, so I postulate
the same explanation for the behavior of others. But if epiphenomenalism is
true, my mental states do not explain my behavior and there is a physical
explanation for the behavior of others. It is explanatorily redundant to
postulate such states for others. I know, by introspection, that I have them,
but is it not just as likely that I alone am subject to this quirk of nature,
rather than that everyone is?
For more detailed treatment and further reading on this topic, see the entry
epiphenomenalism.

Parallelism
A central philosophical issue of the seventeenth century concerned the
apparent causal relations which hold between the mind and the body. In

Relationship between body and mind

most seventeenth-century settings this issue was discussed within the

context of substance dualism, the view that mind and body are different
kinds of substance. For Leibniz, this is a particularly interesting issue in that
he remained fundamentally opposed to dualism. But although Leibniz held
that there is only one type of substance in the world, and thus that mind and
body are ultimately composed of the same kind of substance (a version of
monism), he also held that mind and body are metaphysically distinct. There
are a variety of interpretations of what this metaphysical distinctness
consists in for Leibniz, but on any plausible interpretation it is safe to assume
(as Leibniz seems to have done) that for any person P, Ps mind is a distinct
substance (a soul) from Ps body. With this assumption in hand, we may
formulate the central issue in the form of a question: how is it that certain
mental states and events are coordinated with certain bodily states and
events, and vice-versa? There were various attempts to answer this question
in Leibnizs time period. For Descartes, the answer was mind-body
interactionism: the mind can causally influence the body, and (most
commentators have held) vice-versa. For Malebranche, the answer was that
neither created minds nor bodies can enter into causal relations because
God is the only causally efficient being in the universe. God causes certain
bodily states and events on the occasion of certain mental states and events,
and
vice-versa.
Leibniz
found
Descartes
answer
unintelligible
(cf. Theodicy, sec. 60), and Malebranches excessive because miraculous (cf.
Letter to Arnauld, 14 July 1686).
Leibnizs account of mind-body causation was in terms of his famous doctrine
of the pre-established harmony. According to the latter, (1) no state of a
created substance has as a real cause some state of another created
substance (i.e. a denial of inter-substantial causality); (2) every non-initial,
non-miraculous, state of a created substance has as a real cause some
previous state of that very substance (i.e. an affirmation of intra-substantial
causality); and (3) each created substance is programmed at creation such
that all its natural states and actions are carried out in conformity with all the
natural states and actions of every other created substance.
Formulating (1) through (3) in the language of minds and bodies, Leibniz held
that no mental state has as a real cause some state of another created mind
or body, and no bodily state has as a real cause some state of another
created mind or body. Further, every non-initial, non-miraculous, mental
state of a substance has as a real cause some previous state of that mind,
and every non-initial, non-miraculous, bodily state has as a real cause some

Relationship between body and mind

previous state of that body. Finally, created minds and bodies are
programmed at creation such that all their natural states and actions are
carried out in mutual coordination.
According to Leibniz, what appear to be real causal relations between mind
and body are, in metaphysical reality, the mutual conformity or coordination
of mind and bodyin accordance with (3)with no interaction or divine
intervention involved. For example, suppose that Smith is pricked with a pin
(call this bodily state Sb) and pain ensues (call this mental state Sm), a case
of apparent body to mind causation. Leibniz would say that in such a case
some state of Smiths mind (soul) prior to Sm was the real cause
of Sm, and Sb was not a causal factor in the obtaining of Sm. Suppose now
that Smith has a desire to raise his arm (call this mental state Sm), and the
raising of his arm ensues (call this bodily state Sb), a case of apparent mind
to body causation. Leibniz would say that in such a case some state of
Smiths body prior to Sb was the real cause of Sb and Sm was not a causal
factor in the obtaining of Sb. So although substances do not causally
interact, their states accommodate one another as if there were causal
interaction among substances.
It should be noted, however, that Leibniz did think that there was a sense in
which one could say that mental events influence bodily events, and viceversa. He wrote to Antoine Arnauld that although one particular substance
has no physical influence on another nevertheless, one is quite right to
say that my will is the cause of this movement of my arm ; for the one
expresses distinctly what the other expresses more confusedly, and one
must ascribe the action to the substance whose expression is more distinct
(28 November 1686 (draft)). In this passage, Leibniz sets forth what he takes
the metaphysical reality of apparent inter-substantial causation to amount to.
We begin with the thesis that every created substance perceives the entire
universe, though only a portion of it is perceived distinctly, most of it being
perceived unconsciously, and, hence, confusedly. Now consider two created
substances, x and y (x not identical to y), where some state of x is said to be
the cause of some state of y. Leibnizs analysis is this: when the causal state
of affairs occurred, the relevant perceptions of substance x became more
distinct, while the relevant perceptions of substance y became more
confused. Insofar as the relevant perceptions of x become increasingly
distinct, it is causally active; insofar as the relevant perceptions of
substance y become increasingly confused, it is passive. In general,
causation is to be understood as an increase in distinctness on the part of

Relationship between body and mind

the causally active substance, and an increase in confusedness on the part

of the passively effected substance. Again, each substance is programmed at
creation to be active/passive at the relevant moment, with no occurrence of
real substantial interaction.
It is difficult to say exactly why Leibniz denied inter-substantial causation.
Some of the things he tells us, in both private and public writings, seem
unsatisfactory for one reason or another. For example, in Primary
Truths (1686?), we are given this:
Strictly speaking, one can say that no created substance exerts a
metaphysical action or influx on any other thing. For, not to mention the fact
that one cannot explain how something can pass from one thing into the
substance of another, we have already shown that from the notion of each
and every thing follows all of its future states. What we call causes are only
concurrent requisites, in metaphysical rigor. Here Leibniz gives a reason tied
to his complete concept theory of substance, according to which the nature
of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so
complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all
the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed (Discourse on
Metaphysics, sec. 8). But there are, it seems, at least two problems with this
explanation. First, Leibniz moves rather quickly from a conceptual
explanation of substance in terms of the complete concept theory, to the
conclusion that this consideration is sufficient to explain the activity of
concrete substances. Second, even if conceptual considerations about
substances were sufficient to explain their apparent causal activity, it does
not seem to follow that substances do not interactunless one is assuming
that causal over determination is not a genuine possibility. Leibniz seems to
be assuming just that, but without argument.
Sometimes
Leibniz
gives
a
more
At Monadology sec.7, we read this:

familiar

line

of

reasoning.

There is no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed

internally by some other creature, since one cannot transpose anything in it,
nor can one conceive of any internal motion that can be excited, directed,
augmented, or diminished within it, as can be done in composites, where
there can be change among the parts. The monads have no windows through
which something can enter or leave. Accidents cannot be detached, nor can
they go about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the

Relationship between body and mind

Scholastics once did. Thus, neither substance nor accident can enter a
monad from without. He seems to think that causal interaction between two
beings requires the transmission or transposition of the parts of those
beings. But substances are simple unextended entities which contain no
parts. Thus, there is no way to explain how one substance could influence
another. Unfortunately, however, this line of reasoning would seem to also
rule out one case of inter-substantial causation which Leibniz allows, viz., and
Gods causal action on finite simple substances.

Occasionalism
Version of Cartesian metaphysics that flourished in the last half of the 17th
century, in which all interaction between mind and body is mediated by God.
It is posited that unextended mind and extended body do not interact
directly. The appearance of direct interaction is maintained by God, who
moves the body on the occasion of the minds willing and who puts ideas in
the mind on the occasion of the bodys encountering other material objects.
For example, when a person actualizes his desire to pick up an apple, his
mind does not act on his body directly, but his willing of the action is the
occasion for God to make his arm reach out; and when his hand grasps the
apple, the apple does not act on his mind directly, but the contact is the
occasion for God to give him ideas of the apples coolness and softness.
Enveloped primarily by Arnold Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche, 17thcentury Dutch and 17th18th-century French philosophers, respectively, to
solve a specific problem in Cartesian metaphysics. For Ren Descartes, mind
is active, unextended thinking, whereas body is passive, unthinking
extension. But these two created substances, the bases of Cartesian dualism,
are combined as a third, compound substancethe living human. The
problem is that the essential unlikeness of mind and body in the Cartesian
view makes it difficult to conceive how they can interacti.e., how
unextended mental ideas can push the body around and how bodily bumping
can yield ideas. Descartes opinion that direct interaction takes place in
the pineal gland deep within the brain does not answer the question of how.
The orthodox view of the French Cartesians Pierre-Sylvain Rgis and Jacques
Rohault was simply that God has made mind and body so that they interact
directly even if scientists do not know how. The occasionalists answer to the

Relationship between body and mind

question is to show how interaction appears to be direct when in fact it is

mediated by the fourth, uncreated Cartesian substance, God.

Physicalism
Physicalism (also known as Materialistic Monism - see the sections on
Materialism and Monism) is the philosophical position that everything which
exists is no more extensive than its physical properties, and that the only
existing substance is physical. Therefore, it argues, the mind is a purely
physical construct, and will eventually be explained entirely by physical
theory, as it continues to evolve. With the huge strides in science in the 20th
Century (especially in atomic theory, evolution, neuroscience and computer
technology), Physicalism of various types (see below) has become the
dominant doctrine in the Mind/Body argument (see the section on Philosophy
of Mind).
The term "physicalism" was first coined by the Austrian philosopher Otto
Neurath (1882 - 1945) in the early 20th Century. In some ways, the term
"physicalism" is a preferable one to the closely related concept of
Materialism because it has evolved with the physical sciences to incorporate
far more sophisticated notions of physicality than just matter, for example
wave/particle relationships and non-material forces produced by particles.
Physicalism can also be considered a variety of Naturalism (the belief that
nature is all exists, and that all things supernatural therefore do not exist).
An important concept within Physicalism is that of supereminence, which is
the idea that higher levels of existence are dependent on lower levels, such
that there can only be a change in the higher level if there is also a change in
the lower level (the higher level is said to supervene on the lower level).
Objections to Physicalism point out the apparent contradiction of the
existence of qualia (properties of sensory experiences, or "the way things
seem to us") in an entirely physical world (also known as the knowledge
argument). Hempel's Dilemma (propounded by the German philosopher Carl
Hempel) attacks how Physicalism is defined: if, for instance, one defines
Physicalism as the belief that the universe is composed of everything known
by physics, one can point out that physics cannot describe how the mind
functions; if Physicalism is defined as anything which may be described by
physics in the future, then one is really saying nothing. Against this, it can be
argued that many examples of previously dualistic concepts are being
eroded by continuous scientific progress, and that the physical basis of the
mind will almost certainly be known sometime in the future.

Relationship between body and mind

Types of Physicalism
There are two main categories of Physicalism, Reductive and Non-Reductive:
Reductive Physicalism, which asserts that all mental states and
properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of
physiological processes and states, has been the most popular form
during
the
20th
Century.
There are three main types:
Behaviorism, which holds that mental states are just descriptions
of observable behavior and those behaviors, can be described
scientifically without recourse either to internal physiological
events or to hypothetical constructs such as the mind.
Type Identity Theory (also known as Identity Theory or Type
Physicalism), which holds that specific mental states are identical
to specific physical internal states of the brain.
Functionalism, which holds that mental states (beliefs, desires,
being in pain, etc.) are constituted solely by their functional role
(the causal relations of mental states to other mental states,
sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs), and can be
characterized in terms of non-mental functional properties. It
further asserts that mental states are multiply realizable,
meaning that they can be sufficiently explained without taking
into account the underlying physical medium (e.g. the brain,
neurons, etc.) so that they can be realized in multiple ways,
including, theoretically at least, within non-biological systems
such as computers.
Non-Reductive Physicalism, which argues that, although the brain is all
there is to the mind, the predicates and vocabulary used in mental
descriptions and explanations cannot be reduced to the language and
lower-level explanations of physical science. Thus, mental states
supervene (depend) on physical states, and there can be no change in
the mental without some change in the physical, but they are not
reducible
to
them.
There are three main types:
Anomalous Monism, which states that mental events are
identical with physical events, but that the mental is anomalous
i.e. these mental events are perfectly real, and identical with
(some) physical matter, but not regulated by strict physical laws.
Therefore, all mental things are physical, but not all physical

10

Relationship between body and mind

things are necessarily mental. This doctrine was first proposed by

Donald Davidson in the 1970s.
Emergentism, which involves a layered view of nature, with the
layers arranged in terms of increasing complexity, each
corresponding to its own special science.
Eliminativism (or Eliminative Materialism), which holds that
people's common-sense understanding of the mind ("folk
psychology") is hopelessly flawed, and will eventually be
replaced (eliminated) by an alternative, usually taken to be
neuroscience.

Pre-established harmony
Gottfried Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony (French: harmonie
prtablie) is a philosophical theory about causation under which every
"substance" affects only itself, but all the substances (both bodies and
minds) in the world nevertheless seem to causally interact with each other
because they have been programmed by God in advance to "harmonize"
with each other. Leibniz's term for these substances was "monads" which he
described in a popular work (Monadology 7) as "windowless".
An example:
An apple falls on Alice's head, apparently causing the experience of pain in
her mind. In fact, the apple does not cause the painthe pain is caused by
some previous state of Alice's mind. If Alice then seems to shake her hand in
anger, it is not actually her mind that causes this, but some previous state of
her hand.
In literature:
There is really no avoiding the pre-established harmony.
"Theodicy" by G. W.
Leibniz
This is the famous theory of pre-established harmony.
o "Nature Mysticism" by J.
Edward Mercer
Is this a pre-established harmony, or a chain of coincidences?
o "A Budget of Paradoxes, Volume I (of II)" by
Augustus De Morgan

11

Relationship between body and mind

This theory of the relations between body and soul is known to

philosophy as the system of pre-established harmony.
"History of Modern Philosophy" by Alfred
William Benn
The same conception of impossibility led the ingenious and subtle mind
of Leibnitz to his celebrated doctrine of a pre-established harmony.
"A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive" by
John Stuart Mill
THERE is a pre-established harmony between the voice of the
Shepherd and the heart of the sheep.
o "The Little Gleaner, Vol. X."
by Various
Must we not here fall back on something like a pre-established
harmony?
o "Studies in Logical Theory"
by John Dewey
It assumes a pre-established harmony between natural impulse and
natural objects.
"Human Nature and Conduct" by
John Dewey
THE RELATION OF SOUL AND BODY is clearly explained on the
standpoint of the pre-established harmony.
o "A History of Philosophy in Epitome" by Albert
Schwegler
Leibniz's theory is best known as a solution to the mind-body problem of how
mind can interact with the body. However, Leibniz also rejected the idea of
physical bodies affecting each other, and explained all physical causation in
this way.
Under pre-established harmony, the preprogramming of each mind must be
extremely complex, since only it itself causes its own thoughts or
movements, for as long as it exists. In order to appear to interact, each
substance's "program" must contain a description of either the entire
universe, or of how the object is to behave at all times, during all
"interactions" which will appear to occur.
It can also be noted that if a mind behaves as a windowless monad, there is
no need for any other object to exist in order to create that mind's sense
perceptions, leading to a solipsistic universe consisting only of that mind.
Leibniz seems to admit this in his Discourse on Metaphysics section 14.
However, he claims that his Principle of Harmony, according to which God
creates the best and most harmonious world possible, dictates that the
perceptions (internal states) of each monad "expresses" the world in its
entirety, and the world expressed by the monad actually exists. Although

12

Relationship between body and mind

Leibniz says that each monad is "windowless," he also claims that it

functions as a "mirror" of the entire created universe.
On occasion, Leibniz styled himself as "the author of the system of
preestablished harmony".

Conclusion
We have discussed the mind-body problem in detail and found that it is
continued to be an unsettled issue. Dualism and physicalism tend to pull us
in two opposite directions. For dualists it is mind acting upon matter. For a
physicalist, consciousness can be reduced to matter. The neurosciences have
challenged some aspects of dualism and Physicalism and showed the greater
need to go beyond them. In this context emergence become an alternative
to dualism and Physicalism.

Bibliography
Bricke, J., 1975, Interaction and physiology, Mind, 84: 2559.
Descartes, R., 1641: Meditation VI, in Meditations on the First
Philosophy, J. Cottingham (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
Broad, C. D., 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University
Press.
Foster, J., 1968, Psycho-physical causal relations, American
Philosophical Quarterly, 5: 6470.
Larmer, R., 1986, Mind-body interactionism and the conservation of
energy, International Philosophical Quarterly, 26: 27785.
Jackson, F., 1982, Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly, 32:
127136.
Daly, C. 1997, What are Physical Properties?, Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly, 79(3): 196217.
Dowell, J.L., 2006a, Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism,
Philosophical Studies, 131(1): 123.

13

Relationship between body and mind

Hyslop, A., 1999, Methodological Epiphenomenalism, Australasian

Journal of Philosophy, 78(1): 6170.
Jackson, F., 1982, Epiphenomenal Qualia, Philosophical Quarterly, 32:
12736.
Nemerow, L., 1988, Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of
Acquaintance, in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition, Oxford:
Blackwell.
Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind from the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Steven Nadler, 'The Occasionalism of Louis de la Forge', in Nadler (ed.),
Causation in Early Modern Philosophy (University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 5773; Nadler, 'Descartes
and Occasional Causation', British Journal for the History of Philosophy,
2 (1994) 3554.
Leibniz Philosophischen Schriften hrsg. C. Gerhardt, Bd VI 539, 546;
Jose R Silva de Choudens, "Preestablished harmony and corporeal
substance in Leibniz" (January 1, 1992).
Heil, John (2004). Philosophy of mind: a contemporary introduction.

14