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Bernstein's "The Unanswered Question" and the Problem of Musical Competence

Author(s): Allan Keiler


Source: The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 195-222
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/741445
Accessed: 14-11-2015 10:06 UTC
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BERNSTEIN'S THE UNANSWERED


QUESTION AND THE PROBLEM OF
MUSICAL COMPETENCE
By ALLAN KEILER

delivered the Charles Eliot Norton


BERNSTEIN
Lectures at Harvard University in 1973. The original lectures
were accompanied by visual aids and extended orchestral performances projected on a screen. Each lecture was then redelivered the
following evening in a television studio and committed to phonograph records which were issued by Columbia Records on eighteen
discs. In 1976 Harvard University Press issued the original six lectures essentially as they were firstpresented, together with three
seven-inch long-playing records that contain essential examples
played by Bernstein at the piano. The places at which the complete
orchestral performanceswere introduced in the lectures are indicated in the text.
No other series of Norton Lectures has received as much attention or as wide a public as that of Bernstein. This must be attributed
in large part, of course, to his popularity and appeal to a diverse
musical audience. But one must hope that, in addition, it has something to do with the intrinsicinterestand value of his subject. The
aim of Bernstein's The Unanswered Question is one that often
occupied him in his earlier writings,the question of "whither music,"
or the problem of the development of musical stylesin the twentieth
century.The path of music in the twentiethcenturyhas always been
a problem for Bernstein,and the central issue of this problem is the
gradual dissolution and abandonment of tonality and its consequences for our century.Bernstein's position is well known; the very
title of his fifthlecture, "The Twentieth Century Crisis," indicates
his view: "On the one hand tonality and syntactic clarity; on the

LEONARD

195

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other, atonality and syntactic confusion."' The complete story of


this crisis is presented by Bernstein in the last three lectures, which
he calls "The Delights and Dangers of Ambiguity," "The Twentieth
Century Crisis," and "The Poetry of Earth." In chapter 4 Bernstein
discusses late nineteenth-centurychromatic styles,which he takes to
be the immediate impetus for the final breakdown of tonality in the
twentiethcentury.Chapter 5 is concerned primarilywith the establishment of strict twelve-tone composition by Schoenberg, which
music. Chaprepresentsfor Bernstein the crisis in twentieth-century
ter 6 outlines the eventual resolution of the crisis when "tonal music
is no longer dormant; it has been admitted into the avant-garde
world sneakilyat first,and then with radical new approaches through
which composers have found a way again to share in the fruits of
earth."2
Bernstein has told us this story before, and it is difficultnot to
see this combat of good and evil as a thinly disguised apologia. Except forsome verybrief and superficialexcursions into the technical
jargon of linguistics, the second half of Bernstein's lectures is no
differentin content from,for example, an early telecast that he gave
in 1957, "Introduction to Modern Music," later reprinted in his
The Joy of Music.3 Schoenberg is here once again made out to be
the diabolus in musica, and Stravinskyits savior. Again, in his The
Infinite Variety of Music, he argues that "All forms that we have
ever known - plainchant, motet, fugue or sonata - have always
been conceived in tonality. . . . We are stuck with this, and always
will be. And the moment a composer tries to 'abstract' musical tones
by denying them their tonal implications, he has left the world of
communication.'"
By the time that we arrive at the Norton Lectures, this issue is
not merely an aesthetic one for Bernstein, forhe goes on to ask: "Is
this kind of music [serialism] denying a basic law of nature when it
denies tonality?"; "Is the human ear equipped to take it all in?";
"If the human ear can take it in, will the heart be moved?"5 Bernstein has thus raised the issue from the level of aesthetic value to
one that involves the perceptual and cognitive capacities of human
1 Leonard Bernstein,The UnansweredQuestion,Six Talks at Harvard (Cambridge,
Mass., 1976),p. 269.
2 Ibid., p. 421.
3 (New York, 1959),pp. 180-224.
4 (New York, 1966),p. 12.
5 The Joyof Music, p. 205.

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Bernstein's The Unanswered Question

197

beings. But the invention of serialism by Schoenberg has from its


very inception produced only the latest and most hysterical outcry
of antinature sentiment: "Schoenberg's critics were to accuse him
of violating the natural laws of music, of substitutinga purely artificial systemforone that had been handed down to be used along with
the laws of physics."6 Thus the most strong-mindedproponents of
tonal music have argued that the public's failure to accept serial
music is the result of the innate disposition of the organism to respond only to music that is organized according to some principle of
tonal center. Indeed, twelve-tone composers themselves, partly
through discomfortat the outrage accorded their work, have suggested that the increased complexity of serial music may well be a
perceptual problem forthe listener,and have pointed out systematic
differencesbetween tonal and serial music that suggest to them differentcognitive responsesappropriate foreach.7
If, in The Unanswered Question, Bernstein has once again merely
raised the old issue of serialism versus tonality, he does so armed
with new argumentswhich derive, for the most part, fromthe intellectual frameworkof contemporarylinguistic theory,and especially
generative or transformationalgrammar:
... the notion of a worldwide,inbornmusicalgrammarhas haunted me; but I
would never have dreamed of basing a lectureserieson a notion so ill-defined,
and apparentlynon-verifiable,
if it were not for the extraordinary
materialsthat
have appeared in recentyearson the similaridea of a universalgrammarunder-

lyinghumanspeech.8

But Bernstein's belief that "the best way to know a thing is in the
context of another discipline" is, especially in the wrong hands, an
invitation to confusion, if not disaster. The question of transferring
concepts and methodologies from one discipline to another is particularly problematic when contemporary linguistics becomes the
source. Its rationalist foundation and the technical nature of much
of the work have led to misinterpretationand misuse, especially for
many scholars in ancillary disciplines, who view themselvesas more
empirical, data-oriented researchers.Nevertheless, I am not as hesitant, at least with respect to music theory, as Chomsky, who has
issued a rather stringent but necessary warning: "In general, the
6 Charles Rosen, Arnold Schoenberg (New York,
1975), p. 7.

7 See, e.g., Leonard B. Meyer,Music, the Arts and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions
in Twentieth-Century
Culture, Pt. III, (Chicago, 1967),esp. pp. 235-44,287-93.
8 P. 7.

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problem of extending concepts of linguistic structureto other cognitive systemsseems to me, for the moment, in not too promising
a state, although it is no doubt too early for pessimism."' It is unfortunate,however,that,forall of the enthusiasmand often valuable
musical insights of Bernstein, his Norton Lectures cannot be considered a well-conceived or rigorous contribution to this kind of
interdisciplinarystudy. It would be tedious to hold up for scrutiny
the inconsistency,faultyargument,and emptyterminological morass
that characterizes large parts of Bernstein's lectures. But certainly
the attention they have received and the misconceptions they are
likely to create if taken too seriouslyor followed too closely warrant
discussion. Moreover, it would be a disservice to Bernstein's aim not
to give some indication of the insights that are possible in music
theoryand analysis froma cautious application of certain theoretical
and formalaspects of linguistics.1'
II
Much of the work in contemporarylinguisticsis based on certain
fundamental theoretical premises, and some discussion of these is
necessaryboth foran understandingof the limits of Bernstein's work
and as a starting point for further inquiry into the usefulness of
linguistic procedures for problems of music theory." The most basic
distinction that underlies linguistic research is that of competence
and performance,the distinction between what is known and how
it is used. Linguistic competence refersto that internalized systemof
rules that can be thought of as a characterization of the linguistic
9 Noam Chomsky,Language. and Mind, enl. ed. (New York, 1972),p. 75.
10The linguisticinterlude that follows is necessarilybrief,and must be concerned
only with those concepts and issues that will come up again during the course of
this essay. For readers who wish to consult some works in linguisticsI suggest: Ronald
W. Langacker, Language and Its Structure (New York, 1968); Emmon Bach, Syntactic
Theory (New York, 1974); and Noam Chomsky,op. cit.
11It is unfortunatethat Bernstein leaves the reader with no idea of the extent
of the research in the area of language and music. A useful summary of some of
this research can be found in Jean-Jacques Nattiez, "S6miologie musicale: l'etat de
la question," Acta Musicologica, XLVI (1974), 153-71. To this should be added my
"Syntax of Prolongation," Pt. I, In Theory Only, III/5 (1978), and Pt. II (forth"Toward a Formal Theory of Tonal
coming); and Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff,
Music," Journalof Music Theory (forthcoming).

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knowledge shared by the members of a speech community. Actual


linguistic performance,on the other hand, or the directly observed
use of language, is only an indirect reflectionof linguistic knowledge.
Performance is constrained not only by what one knows, but by
limitations of memory,systemsof belief other than those related to
language, and even such transient phenomena as lack of attention
and excitability. Thus the hesitations,false starts,and unintentional
errors of normal language use cannot be taken to reflectproperties
of linguistic knowledge, or the grammar of some language, but only
particular manifestationsof it. Competence, in other words, is only
one of many factorsthat interact to determine performance.
Another important distinction, one that relates directly to the
properties of linguistic competence, is that of deep structure and
surfacestructure.Consider the pair of sentences
(1) John is eager to please.
(2) John is easy to please.
If one assumes, forthe moment, that sentence structureis exhaustively describable by some kind of sentence parsing,or constituentanalysis, then there is no way to make explicit certain fundamental differences of structurebetween (1) and (2). A breakdown or division into
components,or constituents,would be the same forboth sentences:
John-is
John
-is

eager to please
teasy
eager

John -is-

easy

John-is-

-to please
eas
eager

John-is-

eas

to please

-to-please

This breakdown of constituents is associated with a labeling that


indicates the basic categories of sentence construction, and all of
this information is normally represented in the form of a tree diagram:

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200

Sentence

(3)

Noun Phrase(NP)

VerbPhrase(VP)

Noun

Verb

John

is

Adjectivephrase
Adj.

Infinitive
phrase

easyeager
Seager~

to

please

However, (3) is a much closer approximationto the appropriate


structureof (1) than of (2). For one thing,thereis an object-verb
relationshipbetweenJohnand please in (2) thatis not true of (1).
A reflection
ofthisrelationshipis seen in
(4) Johnis easyforMaryto please
where an underlying proposition Mary -

please -

John must be

understoodin a deeper sense than John as the subject of is easy.


Notice that the different
noun or pronoun that occurs as subject
on thesurfacein (2) and (4), as well as in
(5) It is easy (forMary)to pleaseJohn,
is partof thepossiblesurfacevariationof a morebasicor deep structurewhichunderliesall threeof thesesentencesand whichis representedbytheconstituent
analysisofthefollowingtreediagram:
Sentence

(6)
NP

VP
v

Sentence
NP
N

Mary

is

VP

V
please

adjective

easy

NP
I
N
John

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The deep structureof (2), as well as of.(4) and (5), is represented in


(6). The NP of the entire sentence is explained as an embedded sentence, that is by the insertion of a complete syntacticstructure. In
this way, the verb-object relationship between please and John is
made explicit. Sentence structure is thus the pairing of deep and
surface structures.The deep structureof a sentence is mapped onto
the surface form by means of transformationalrules that can, for
example, delete constituentsand change their order and hierarchial
position.
The kind of knowledge of sentence structurerepresentedin (6) is
part of the linguistic competence of native speakers, and is reflected,
for example, in judgments of grammaticalityof pairs of sentences
like
*(7) John is easy.
(8) John is eager.
*An asteriskindicates that the sentenceis ungrammatical.

The unacceptability of (7) can be explained in terms of deep structures like (6), where sentences with the verb to be plus adjective
that contain one of a small class of adjectives like easy require an
entire proposition or complete sentence structure as the NP. Sentences like (7) do not occur, in other words, because the deep structure object of the embedded sentence (John) cannot occur without
the verb phrase of that embedded sentence. The transformational
rules that map structureslike (6) onto structureslike (3) would include the optional deletion of the deep structureembedded sentence
subject, the promotion of the deep structureobject to the principle
NP position, and the reassignment of the embedded VP as a constituent of the adjective. The result of these transformationsis to
create a surface formfor (2) that is ambiguous with that of (1).
The distinction between deep and surface structurethat underlies syntacticanalysis is also related to important differencesin the
other components that make up linguistic competence, the semantic
and phonological components. The semantic component is a system
of rules that convertsthe deep structureof a sentence into a semantic
interpretation that expresses the intrinsic meaning of a sentence.
Semantic interpretationrequires the explicit syntacticrepresentation
of the deep structure as a basis for representing meaning. Such a

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notion as "sentence subject," for example, which is essential to the


semantic interpretationof a sentence, requires the informationof
the deep structureand not of the surface form. In (5), for instance,
the it does not contribute to semantic interpretation,but acts only
as the surface filler of the subject position of the sentence if the
entire embedded sentence is reassigned from its original position.
Thus the traditional distinction of grammatical subject, which for
(2) and (5) would be John and it, and logical subject, which in both
cases is X -please - John, results from a failure to characterize
"subject-of" in termsof the more explicit syntacticinformationassociated with the deep structure. In other words, relational concepts
like "subject-of" are definable in a general and consistent way only
in terms of the syntacticfacts represented in the deep structureof
sentences.
The phonological component is also interpretive,and converts
the stringof grammatical and lexical formativesthat constitutesthe
surface form of a sentence into a phonetic representation. The
process of phonological derivation is similar in an importantrespect
to that of syntacticdescription: a phonological deep structureis converted into a phonetic surface form by means of phonological rules
that increase the phonetic specificationof an utterance until a more
or less direct connection can be made between the phonetic representation and the empirical factsof pronunciation.
This specificationof the propertiesof the components of a grammar must be understood to represent a highly restrictivehypothesis
about the structureof human language or of linguistic universals.
Constraints on grammarsare of two kinds, formal and substantive,
and it seems clear that,although surface structuresare highly diverse
fromone language to another, deep structurescan be defined in ways
that vary only to a small degree among languages. The substantive
universals of phonological structure,for example, include a set of
some fortyphonetic features that are cross-classifiedin a binary way
in termsof ten or twelve features(e.g. nasality,voicing, frontnessof
articulation, etc.). Formal universals refer, rather, to the abstract
propertiesof rule formationand application. There is, furthermore,
no a priori reasons why this set of universals should be true rather
than some other, so that the verificationof some such set from one
language to another is of considerable importance, especially in the
relationship of research in linguistics to problems of mind. Linguis-

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Bernstein's The Unanswered Question

203

tics, in other words, can be thought of as providing a hypothesis


about the nature of human intellectual capacities.
At the level of particulargrammar,[the linguist]is attemptingto characterize
knowledgeof a language,a certaincognitivesystemthat has been developed of course- by the normalspeaker-hearer.
At thelevel of universal
unconsciously,
he
is
grammar,
tryingto establishcertaingeneralpropertiesof human intelligence.
is simplythe subfieldof psychologythat deals with
Linguistics,so characterized,
theseaspectsof mind.12

III
Now you can see why I became so excited when I began reading the new
linguistics,which postulatedthe notion of innate grammaticalcompetence.Because suddenlymy old undergraduatenotion of a universal musical grammar
was reanimated.It had lain dormant for years,paralyzed,I suppose, by that
deadly cliche: Music is the UniversalLanguage of Mankind. .... But then,when
I began reading the new linguistics,I thought:here is a freshway to pursue
my intuitiveidea, whichhad grownstale and had deterioratedinto a platitude.
In otherwords,by buildinganalogies betweenmusicaland linguisticprocedures,
couldn't thatclicheabout the UniversalLanguage be debunkedor confirmed,
or
at leastclarified?13

Bernstein's initial intuition is certainlycorrect; language and music


are among the most characteristicand universal aspects of human behavior, and this alone suggeststhat it might very well be profitable
to approach the studyof music within the same intellectual paradigm
as that of language. The distinction between competence and performance seems to me again an essential startingpoint for such an
endeavor. Theories of musical competence are concerned with formalizing the internalized knowledge that listeners bring to music
which allows them to organize musical sounds into coherent patterns. This internalized musical knowledge underlies the most
diverse musical activities. It is reflected,for example, in the ability
of a listener to identifyexamples as belonging to a certain style,to
make judgments about appropriateness,and, in general, to superimpose a structureon the input stimulus that corresponds in some way
to his understandingof how a given musical systemworks. Surely all
analytic techniques presuppose, whetheror not theyare made explicit,
Chomsky,op. cit.,p. 28.
13Bernstein,The UnansweredQuestion, p. 10.

12

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204

a given systemof parameters and relationships which constrains the


ways in which perceptual judgments are made about pieces of music.
Ultimately,of course, one would hope that theories of musical competence would extend beyond theories of specific musical styles or
traditions to include the study of all musical cultures. It is, in fact,
only in termsof an understandingof musical universals that we will
be able to explain the way in which human beings are able to learn
any musical style whatever. Research in ethnomusicologyhas given
evidence that the most foreign musical styles can be acquired, and
that listeners from one musical tradition can develop the intuitions
of another, quite distinct musical culture. Indeed, the broadening
of our knowledge about the diversityof musical stylesamong all of
the peoples of the world has led one eminent ethnomusicologistto
speculate: "There is so much music in the world that it is reasonable
to suppose that music, like language and possibly religion, is a
species-specifictrait of man. Essential physiological and cognitive
processes that generate musical composition and performance may
even be genetically inherited,and thereforepresent in every human
being."14
There is very little of a substantivenature that is known at present about general musical competence. But it is already possible to
see a need, in the areas of music theory and in certain traditional
problems of musicology, for a distinction between competence and
performance.Even in those cultures where the cultivation of musical
art formsand written tradition encourage a high degree of distinctiveness between one musical work and another, a distinction between competence and performanceis crucial. For example, it is fundamental to an understandingof the relation between musical works
and musical performance. Consider first the question, Where is
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony? (BFS). Now it is clear that there is
no straightforwardanswer. The question What is BFS? will get us
further.By BFS we do not mean, even in the ordinary use of language, either a particular score or a particular performanceof that
work. For one thing, a multiplicity of either does not entail any
more than a single BFS. Moreover, mistakes in a performance of
BFS that are caused by, say, the memory lapse of some conductor
do not change the notion of BFS. Scores and performancesof BFS
are locatable in time and place, but the work itself is not a spatial14 John Blacking,How

Musical is Man? (Seattle, 1973),p. 7.

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205

temporal thing but a more abstract concept; hence the oddness of


the question, Where is Beethoven's Fifth Symphony?Knowledge of
particular works, of course, entails a whole hierarchy of musical
understanding. This general musical competence would include an
understanding of those grammatical constraints that define tonal
music as a coherent musical language, as well as propertiesthat reflect
more specificstylisticdistinctions.The consequence of the distinction
of musical competence and performancein analysis should therefore
be reflectedin the ability of any theoryof tonal music to specifyfor
any possible piece in that domain what is universal about the choices
that make up its tonal language and what is idiosyncratic.Most analytic statementsare, in any explicit sense, concerned for the most
part only with the latter. The need to constructa theoryof a (tonal)
musical structurethat provides a clear way of making such a distinction, whatever the content of such a theorymay prove to be, seems
to me imperative in music theoryand analysis, and lies at the foundation of any meaningful theory of musical style or, what is at the
moment even more intractable,theoriesof musical value.
In cultures where musical practice has a more utilitarian function, and where musical forms are - but not necessarily- transmitted as part of an oral tradition, the need to distinguish musical
competence from performance is even more imperative. Here the
issue usually centers on the fact that musical uniformityis encouraged either because of the prescribed functional context of a style
or genre, or because of the cognitive demands of memory or the
need foraccurate repetitionand transmission.This constrainttoward
uniformityhas made the problem of classificationin particular genres
of chant, for instance, especially troublesome. The more uniform a
whole repertory of examples, the less mutually exclusive are the
members of any one subclass grouped according to type with those
of any other class.15Hence, classificationswhich depend exclusively
on the segmentation of surface forms will almost inevitably appear
arbitraryor not veryrevealing. Current research in the area of chant
has, I think,already shown that any understanding of what is prototypical and what is divergent is not likely to emerge from the selection of certain surface formsas prototypicalor formulaic,and others
15For a discussion of this problem, see Kendall L. Walton, "The Presentation
and Portrayal of Sound Patterns," In Theory Only, II/11-12 (1977), 3-16. For an
entirelydifferentand, I think,objectionable approach, see Nelson Goodman Languages
of Art (Indianapolis, Indiana, 1968).

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as either permissible variants of them,or as representationsof different prototypes or formulas. The need for and choice of formulas
belong to the area of musical performance,and are imposed by the
demands of transmission,suitabilityof text,short-termmemory,and
many other factors.Similarityand divergence must be related, rather,
to a more abstract concept of musical competence in which constraintson permissible surface formsare defined by a grammar with
properties of rule specificationand application. The latter, in turn,
is only one of the featuresthat affectsthe choice of either an oftenused formula, or permissible novelty in any given context.16 A note
of warning is necessaryhere as well. The problem of definingmusical
competence reflected in dead musical repertories entails many of
the same difficultiesthat affectthe description of extinct languages.
What is absent in both cases is, of course, native intuitions about
whether proposed grammars make the right generalizations about
given examples. Since in both cases the corpus of available examples
is in many instances only a highly selective and constrained one, and
often for the most accidental of reasons, a choice between alternatively proposed abstract accounts of the data may not even be possible. Imagine, for example, the difficultiesin tryingto arrive at the
grammar of English sentence structureif only imperative sentences
existed as the available corpus. In a similar way, the musical competence reflected,say, in chant repertories may give a very imperfect
and skewed indication of a much richerbut no longer reconstructible
grammar.
Bernstein, in the firstthree lectures of the Norton series, has
sketched out a theoryof musical competence, or at least an approach
to one. He bases these chapters on the componential division of
generative grammar,hence the succession (1) musical phonology, (2)
musical syntax,and (3) musical semantics. His point of departure is
thus analogical: "Why not a study of musico-linguistics,just as there
already exists a psycho-linguisticsand a socio-linguistics?"17But the
very equations established here betray a false start.Psycholinguistics
16 The distinction of competence and performance,although not discussed in
these terms,is already implied in Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales (New York,
1965), in relation to the transmissionof oral epic poetry.In the area of chant classification, see especially Leo Treitler, "Homer and Gregory: the Transmission of Epic
Poetry and Plainchant," The Musical Quarterly,LX (1974), 333-72; and " 'Centonate'
Chant: Uebles Flickwerkor E pluribus unus?", Journal of the American Musicological
Society,XXVIII (1975), 1-23.
17 The UnansweredQuestion, p. 9.

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and sociolinguistics are behavioral disciplines and are thus concerned with language performance; that is, they take as a point of
departure some theory of language competence and attempt to define factorswhich, in conjunction with the internalized knowledge
of some language system,contribute to language behavior, whether
in termsof the neurological and cognitive mechanisms of the human
organism or in terms of sociological factors. Musicolinguistics is
based on a false equation; any theory of musical competence will
itselfneed to be implemented in behavioral terms from psychological, sociological, and many other behavioral perspectives. It is a
dangerous and usually trivial business to attempt to find analogues
of theoretical properties intrinsicto one discipline for another. The
motivations which have led linguists to establish phonology, syntax,
and semantics as components of a theory of language competence,
and the precise formal and substantive interrelations among these
components, are the result of analytic problems and solutions that
relate specifically to the study of language. Any meaningful crossdisciplinaryreferencethat this conceptual frameworkmay have with
music can come only after considerable independent research into
the problems defined intrinsically as musical. To begin with the
assumption that they are true for music as well, and then to search
for their equivalents, will inevitably make a mysteryof issues that
ought to be properly musical. The evidence for cross-disciplinary
relationships of this kind has to be established independently, so
that such generalizations have the proper theoretical and evidential
support within the discipline fromwhich theyarise.
Bernstein's search for musical analogies with linguistics, especially in the form of universals, is for the most part unrewarding.
Let us consider firstthe lecture on musical phonology. The one
point that emerges from it is that tonalitymust be somehow related
- and thereby vindicated - to the innate
capacity of the human
Bernstein
does
understand
that
in
organism.
linguistics innate cais
a
of
pacity explained by theory language competence or linguistic
universals. It is therefore not very surprising that he adduces the
appeal to nature, in the formof the overtone series, dressed up with
pseudolinguistic arguments. He makes two proposals for (musical)
phonological universals. The firstis that the notes which make up
the various musical scales used throughout the world are derived
fromthe natural overtone series. This, of course, has to be supported
by the broadest sleight-of-handsince, as we have all finallycome to

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understand,the intervalliccontent of even our simple diatonic scale


requires, on the one hand, gross adjustment and, on the other, harmonic partials that exist only in the farthestlimits of the overtone
series. Bernstein's procedure is that of a desperate man who tenaciously clings to the overtone series at all cost: arrange in the necessaryorder any required partial, in whateveraltered formis necessary.
In the case of non-Western music, the distortion is even greater.
Take as an example the so-called pentatonic or slendro scale of
Indonesian music which Bernstein discusses. There is absolutely no
relationship of intervallic content between this scale and the overtone series. The sequence of intervalsthatmakes up this scale, in fact,
varies from less than our half step to greater than our whole step.
Indeed, the intervallicstructureof the slkndroscale varies even from
one gamelan to another. It is perfectlynormal for the firstinterval
of the slkndroscale to be tuned to nearly twice that of another. Moreover, pitch relationships in gamelan music function in termsof contour only, so that any number of differentinterval patterns will be
heard in the same way as long as the contour remains the same.'8
If, then, examples like the scales of Indonesian music are explained as instances of conformance with the overtone series, then
Bernstein's claim about the relationship of scalar patterns to the
overtone series as a universal one is without content. The claim
amounts to arguing that everythingis equally possible, hence there
are no constraintsin terms of which musical systemsoperate - no
counterexample is imaginable, given the way our universe is described. But as I have tried to show in Part II of this essay, the significance of a set of universals is derived from the fact that they
forman arbitrarysystemselected frommany conceivable ones. There
is, for example, no reason of economy or other factor that explains
why transformationsare formallyconstrained to apply to deep structures in the way that they do. The universal properties that make
up a theoryof competence are thereforeempirically testable in such
a way that each new example (language or musical system) must
conformto that set of universals postulated by the theory.
Bernstein's suggestion that "this competence would be our inbuilt capacity to construe those naturally serialized overtones, and
18See Alton and JudithBecker,"A Grammarof the Musical Genre Srepegan,"
of Michigan),for an illuminatingdiscussionof this exmimeographed(University
ample.

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209

to construe them in differentways"19deserves some comment. As a


counterpartto his original proposal about musical universals,it does
recognize that musical systems behave according to some logic of
their own, and are not related in a simple isomorphic way to physical
facts.This arbitraryinternal logic according to which linguistic and
presumably musical systems operate is the subject of a theory of
competence. Bernstein has here shiftedthe attention once again from
the concept of competence to that of performance in his discussion
of universals. The confusion happens repeatedly in the literature.
Leonard Meyer, for example, has argued that ". . . a dispassionate
analysis of the difficultiesinvolved in the perception and comprehension of ... music seeks to enhance our understandingof the nature of
musical structures and musical experience regardless of style or
method."20 I would argue, rather, that exactly the opposite is true.
Theories of musical competence make explicit the "nature of musical
structures"; the formal and substantive universals which define any
theory of competence are thus a definition of the measure of complexity of the object. Every theory about language structure, or
musical structure,is thus at the same time a hypothesisabout performance to the degree that it rules out theories of perceptual or
cognitive strategies that fail to take into account the formal complexity of the object decoded. Schenker's theories of musical structure, for instance,would leave one with an entirelydifferentview of
the nature of musical understanding from that of the harmonic
theories of Rameau. I would not conclude, however, as Forte does,
that Schenker's theories give us a new way of hearing music, but
rather a new analytic vocabulary that becomes the basis for talking
about musical hearing.21In the same way, generative grammar has
made possible the fairlyrecent work in psycholinguisticsby defining
in explicit terms the nature and range of complexity that underlie
all human language.
Bernstein's chapter on musical syntax has many of the false starts
of his discussion of musical phonology. A recurrent problem is his
emphasis on substantive rather than formal universals. Substantive
universals are the most intrinsicaspect of language competence. They
are concerned, in phonology, with the alphabet of phonetic feature
19 The UnansweredQuestion, pp. 30-31.

20 Op. cit.,p. 238.

21Allen Forte, "Schenker's Conception of Musical Structure,"Journal of Music


Theory,III (1959), 1-30.

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The Musical Quarterly

oppositions from which all languages make a selection, and which


form the basis for the most appropriate application of phonological
rules in a derivation. There is nothing of importance about this set
of phonetic features outside of the study of language; this is particularly clear when one remembers that they are not derivable in
any direct and automatic way from physical facts- either fromthe
physiological apparatus of human beings or from the properties of
sound waves. They reflecta logic that is established by problems of
phonological description from one language to another. It is not
surprising, then, that Bernstein's reliance on the overtone series,
rather than on the functional status of interval patternsand oppositions in musical systems,is devoid of real significance.
Much of the chapter on musical syntaxis taken up with this same
kind of tinkering with linguistics. Again the emphasis is on the
substantive categories of syntax. Take the equation word (in language) = phrase (in music), which Bernstein proposes and then rejects. The example he gives as an illustration is taken from the beginning of the second theme of Mozart's G minor Symphony:
For instance,take the second themeof thissame G minor Symphony[8]. Those
firstthree notes sound like a word [9]; that's a fairly convincing isolated unit. So

is the next unit [10]. A fine word. But here again the analogy breaks down,

because the last note of the firstword; as played by the strings [I 1], also functions
as the firstnote of the second word, as played by the woodwinds [12], which is
linguistically impossible. It's as though one said the words "dead duck" with the

final"d" of "dead" servingas theinitial"d" of "duck": deaduck.Impossible.22

Bernstein'sexamples are reproduced in Example 1.


Ex. 1

ll

[91[10
ffr1
I ft1

I|l I |

[12)
kfI

The interestof this example lies in the problem of musical overlap,


that is, those situations where some segment of the musical continuum is shared by two musical phrases or motives. This problem
22 The UnansweredQuestion, p. 59.

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211

would profitfrom a thorough study; the issues at stake concern the


difficultiesand limitations in segmentingand classifyingthe musical
surface, and the relationship of surface phenomena to musical deep
structures.Indeed, there are comparable processes in language that
reflectthe inability to segment, in every case, a surface form so that
the resulting material can be uniquely assigned to a given unit or
class. The proportion between English 'walked' (w o kt, in phonetic
notation) and 'ate' (et) illustrates the point. Both words must be
analyzed as a sequence of lexical item ('walk' and 'eat') and a tense
marker ('past'). In the case of 'walked', both lexical item and tense
marker can be assigned part of the phonetic sequence (wa k + t =
'walk' + 'past'); in the case of 'ate' this is not possible. In the latter,
both constituents('eat' and 'past') are realized as one unsegmentable
phonetic form.But Bernstein is sidetracked frompursuing the musical aspect of this problem by his search for an appropriate linguistic
analogy. The irony of his conclusion is that preciselywhat he claims
to be impossible about dead duck is, in fact, the case: the d serves
for both dead and duck in normal pronunciation - "dead duck"
is deaduck.
Or take another equation that Bernstein proposes: verb
rhythm,noun = melody, adjective - harmony. With this analogy
Bernstein concocts the musical equivalent of the sentence Cruel
Fate Waltzes by startingwith a melodic motive from the Ring (see
Ex. 2a), adding a harmonic modifierin the form of an adjective (see
Ex. 2b), and then activating it with the rhythmicfunction of a verb
(see Ex. 2c).23Many of Bernstein's analogies are merelyharmless. But
this one entails a serious distortion. The grammatical relationships
among parts of speech are syntagmatic,that is they occur in some
fixed linear order. The uniqueness of the musical parameters of
the analogy from the point of view of language is that they occur
only simultaneously. But consider this tripartite equation for a
moment longer. Bernstein argues later that "... our basic assumption here would have to be the simple equation note = word, even
though we know it to be scientificallyshaky. On this basis, let us
construct a musical equation that goes: Jack loves Jill [29]. Not
exactly breathtakingmusic, nor is it a musical sentence, but it serves
our purpose by presentingthese notes as deep-structureunits linked
togetherto forma triadic surface[30], which makes syntacticsense."24
23 The examples are discussedin Bernstein,ibid.,
pp. 62-63.
24Ibid., p. 72.

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The Musical Quarterly

The examples are reproduced in Example 2.


Ex.2

(a)

(b)

CruelFate

(c)

Waltztempo

Jack
loves
Jill
Jack loves Jill

In [29] Bernstein has reduced his concept of a musical "sentence"


to a mere noun (the sentence gloss Jack loves Jill still contains both
noun and verb), and has then derived an adjective from it, all of
which thoroughlyconfuses the status of his analogy with parts of
speech in language. But more important, notice how counterintuitive is his proposed derivation of a surface form from the deep
structure. Hardly anyone, Schenkerian or not, would derive a triad
fromits arpeggiation. Nor, in other circumstances,do I believe that
Bernstein would do so either. In other words, it is just those musical
examples that are forced into the straitjacket of linguistic analogy
that are the hardest to penetrate and the least convincing. The last
three lectures, where only an occasional reminder of an earlier linguistic facade interferes,reveal much the same combination of musical insight,enthusiasm,and directnessthat one findsin all of Bernstein's pedagogical activities. The novelty of the enterprise of the
Norton Lectures mystifiesmore oftenthan it clarifies.

IV
I must leave the reader with some understandingof what can be
gained from linguistics in the study of music. Reference has been
made to many possible fruitfulpoints of contact between the two
disciplines. In this section I want to outline more systematicallythe
kind of insight that one might achieve in the study of musical com-

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Bernstein's The Unanswered Question

213

petence from theoretical work in linguistics. The study of competence, musical or linguistic, can only begin with the attempt to find
solutions to analytic problems. Indeed, the verynature of an analytic
problem may be clarified only when developed in terms of some
explicit formallanguage of description.
Within the language of tonal music, one kind of structural description that must find a place in a theory of musical competence
is concerned with the functional relationships of harmony, or the
syntax of harmonic prolongation. The starting point in this problem is the realization that the concept of harmonic function has
still not been given formal clarity. It is usually set in contrast
with that of chord grammar,or traditional Roman-numeral analysis.
Chord grammar is concerned with the isolation and labeling of
vertical pitch collections according to scale degree, inversion, etc.,
but independently of context. Chord function is concerned with the
relative hierarchical status of chords. As Salzer has put it, "Two
grammatically identical chords appearing in the same phrase can
fulfilltotallydifferentfunctions.Thus it follows that labeling chords
according to their grammatical status never explains their functions
or how they combine to create a unified whole."25 In Example 3,
the firstdominant chord (V6) has only passing status, apparent in
the melodic motion of both soprano and bass, while the second dominant chord has a more structurallyimportant function as the goal
of harmonic motion.
Ex.3

V6 I

V I

But there is a third parameter that is related to this distinction,that


of voice-leading: the same set of harmonic relationships can be
realized with differentpatterns of voice-leading. In Example 4 the
same harmonic pattern is realized, in the case of (a) and (b), with
the same soprano, but differentbass motion, and in the case of (b)
and (c), with the same bass, but differentsoprano.
The invariant feature of all three is the set of harmonic relationships, not the outer-voice motion or the sequence of Roman numer25 Felix Salzer, Structural Hearing, Tonal Coherence in Music, 2 vols., 2nd ed.
(New York, 1962),I, 10.

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The Musical Quarterly

Ex.4

(a)

(b)

II

(c)

V6 I

116 V

116

als. In general terms,given a set of harmonic relationships,a specific


number of voice-leading patternsare inherent in its pitch content.
These observations suggest that the chord functions of a piece
form part of a hierarchical structure of constituents that can be
analyzed and described in a formal way.26This constituentstructure
would express a hierarchy of abstract structural relationships that
can be defined with a logic that is independent of the particular
voice-leading realizations. The surface labeling of chords could then
be equated with the surface constituentsof a tree diagram. At least
some of the importantstructuralpropertiesof the harmonic context
that are essential for distinguishing the relative functional importance of chords can be made explicit in terms of constituent structure. If we take (a) and (b) of Example 5 to be differentvoice-leading
realizations of a syntacticallyminimal example of harmonic structure, then (c) would be the labeled constituent analysis of both (a)
and (b).
Tonic (T)

(c)

Ex. 5

(a)(b).Tonic
A
V

(TTonic

(TP)

AProlongation
o

Tonic (T)

IV

IV

Completion(TC)

Dominant
Prolongation

vv

Dominant(D)

Tonic (T)

Let us call the principal divisions Tonic Prolongation (TP) and


Tonic Completion (TC). TC would then be subdivided furtherinto
Dominant Prolongation (DP) and Tonic (T), so that the V and I
can be characterized as immediate constituents of each other. In
these examples the harmonic categories TP, TC, and DP are replaced directly by triads. Consider next Example 6, where the DP
is expanded furtherto include the surface constituent relationship
II(6-V.
26 See my articles on the syntaxof prolongationin In Theory Only (n. 11 above)
for a fullertreatmentof these ideas.

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Bernstein's The Unanswered Question


Ex.6
(a)

215

(b)(c)
TC
.Tp%
I

1V

II

I
V
V

II

l(6

In these examples, the II6'-V relationship is the same on a lower


constituentlevel as the V-I relationship on the next higher hierarchical level. In example 6, (c) makes explicit the fact that II'6) has an
immediate functional relationship with V, and a more long-range
and indirect one with the following I, as well as the fact that the DP
is a more complex constructionin one example than in the other.
The syntacticclasses and hierarchical constituent relationships
that underlie harmonic expansion are clearly limited; there are, however, syntactic processes of harmonic prolongation that greatly increase harmonic complexity.Consider next Example 7a, in which the
constituentrelationships that underlie the initial I-V-I harmonies on
one hierarchical level also underlie that sequence and the cadential
V-I on a higher,and thereforemore structurallyimportantlevel.
Ex.7
(a)

(b)

1I

L-

V6 1
L
I

V I

T
"

-TPT
T

VI
DP

TCTC
T

DP

This example suggests that the principle of syntacticembedding is


a device of harmonic .expansion just as it is a process of sentence
expansion. The TP of this example is, in other words, a complete
syntacticstructure. The harmonic constituent structure of the example is described in Example 7b. The TP of the whole example is
again subdivided into its own TP and TC; a complete syntactic
structure(I-V-I) is embedded as an expansion of the TP. Notice that
the tree diagram distinguishesproperlybetween the more local status
of the firstdominant chord and the more structurallyprominent
cadential dominant chord. That is, the tree diagram assigns immediate cadential but more hierarchically dominating (tonic) prolongational status to the firstdominant chord; the second has only
cadential status,and on a higher level than the first.This process of

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The Musical Quarterly

216

embedding is recursive: it may apply as an expansion of any TP on


any hierarchicallevel.
The next example, the opening section of a Handel courante
(mm. 1-12),is given in Example 8, togetherwith a constituentanalysis
of the harmonic structure.
The TP of the whole section lasts until measures 11-12, where the
strongest cadential emphasis occurs. Measures 1-11 constitute the
TP of the whole example; its immediate constituentTC is realized
as the cadence in measures 11-12. On the next lower subdivision,
there is again a TP that lasts until measure 5, where the circle of
fifthsbegins. The TC on this level is expanded to include a DP that
is realized by the entire circle of fifths.The process of embedding
has thus expanded the highest level TP with a complete syntactic
structure:
T
TP
TP1

TC
TC1

The TP on this level of derivation (TP1) is realized not as a triad,


but is expanded once again by embedding:
T
TP
TC1

TP1
TP2

TC

TC2

The last level of expansion of the TP that dominates the whole


embedding processis realized as the sequence of chord typesindicated
in Example 8.
Very often,so-called examples of irregular voice-leading may be
related to a more prototypical harmonic constituent structure. In
Example 9, a phrase froma Bach chorale, the V6 of measure 1 does

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"I'IF

II

dl

III

IIA
U

I3
UIJV~
I

I.

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The Musical Quarterly

218

not resolve properly; the leading tone moves downward chromatically rather than to the root of a following tonic triad.
Ex.9

It would be accurate to argue, in terms of harmonic structure,that


the voice-leading of the upper voices indicates the harmonic relationship of dominant-to-tonic,but that the chromatic voice-leading of
the bass does not. The surface sequence of chords would have the
constituentanalysis of Example 10.
Ex. 10
TP

TC

DPTP
T

TC
DP (T)

v6

v2/lv Ir6 v

Here, the V6 of measure 1 is analyzed as part of an embedded TC and


hence is less hierarchicallyprominent than the V of measure 2. The
tonic chord which is expected as the resolution of the V6, and which
occurs only simultaneouslywith the passing Eb of the bass (=V2/IV),
is implied but not realized as a distinct constituent. The example
would be more harmonically explicit and less irregular in its voiceleading if it were considered an elided version of Example 11, where
the leading tone firstresolves properly to F, and then moves downward to the seventh of the secondarydominant.
Ex. 11

The correctclaim about these two versions,I think,is that both are
manifestations of the same syntactic harmonic relationships: the
firstversion is, in other words, a transformationof a set of syntactic
properties more directly or isomorphically realized in the second

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Bernstein's The Unanswered Question

219

version. We might make this explicit by allowing two immediately


adjacent constituents, under certain contextual conditions, to be
realized as the same pitch collection, as in Example 12.
Ex. 12

-- --TP-----,Tc
T

TP

TC

DP

D
\VI

V
/V

IV
T

Some of these conditions have to do with syntacticboundaries. The


realization of two syntacticconstituentsas the same pitch collection
is, in examples such as these, one way of avoiding the explicit closure
that would otherwise occur between a TP and its TC. In this example, uninterrupted harmonic motion until the V-I of measure 2
is effected-bythe avoidance of isomorphic representationof the final
tonic of the lower-level TC and the immediately following subdominant.
The hierarchical nature of harmonic constituentstructureis very
often implied in pitch reduction graphs that play so central a role in
tonal music theory.A particularly revealing example is the part of
the firstmovement of the Mozart Pfano Sonata, K.331, that is given
in Example 13.
The recurrent four-measurephrase that is part of the conformant
structureof the theme has been analyzed many timesin the literature.
Two proposed pitch reductions of that phrase have been included
in Example 13, together with a constituent analysis that translates
the hierarchical implications of each reduction as closely as possible
into the syntacticframeworkproposed in the preceding examples.27

27The firstreduction is taken from Lerdahl and


see n. 11 above; the
Jackendoff,
second is from Heinrich Schenker,Das Meisterwerkin der Musik, Jahrbuch I (1925),
trans. Sylvan Kalib, "Thirteen Essays from the Three Yearbooks Das Meisterwerkin
der Musik by Heinrich Schenker: An Annotated Translation" (Ph.D. diss., NorthwesternUniversity,1973; UM 73-30,626), II, 135.

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The MusicalQuarterly

220
Ex. 13

T (mm.5-8)

TP
TP
T

TC
DP

~TC

DP

AI .4v

i
-I----

A.9

r
----

mm.1-4)
TP
T

TP

DP-

TC

DP
D

D T

TC

maj.:IV

A maj.:1V

T (mm.5-8)

TP

TC

TP
V

VI

II

Fi
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Bernstein's The Unanswered Question

221

The similarities of the two reductions extend only as far as the


principal subdivision into TP and TC. The embedded and hence
in each reduction. The troublelower-levelTC is analyzed differently
some feature is clearly the VI. In the firstreduction, it is analyzed
as part of a prolonged dominant, in which the VI acts as a lower
neighbor much as the dominant (V-VI-V) acts as a lower neighbor
to a prolonged tonic on a higher level. In the second reduction, the
VI is taken as part of a prolonged tonic that ends the embedded TC.
In other words, VI-V are analyzed either as immediate constituents
of a preceding V, or as immediate constituentsof a following I. In
both cases, the choice seems to be dictated by some surface linear
pitch pattern,either the neighbor figurein the bass in the firstreduction, or the successive Terzziige of the bass in the second. I do not
think either is correct to the degree that each is an implied analysis
of harmonic constituency. The relevant details would take us too
far from the present context, but several observations are possible.
The surface details of a piece often obscure the more general and
limited extent to which any given piece conformsto the syntactical
properties of the general language (in this case tonal harmony). In
this example the problem resides in the complex nature of the VI
constituent,which, I think,has both tonic and subdominant properties. The constituent analysis given immediately above the actual
surface of the music includes an additional level of embedding, so
that a final tonic of a particular group and an initial subdominant
constituentof a following group finda natural place in the constituent structure.This would then be another instance of the simultaneous realization of two harmonic constituents: VI defines only the
pitch content of the merger.There is, then,some truthto both reductions given in Example 13, but the more abstract harmonic relationships fromwhich the network of surface detail in part derives have
not been separated out from the more idiosyncratic design of the
piece. In general terms,surfacedetail must be considered only as evidence for musical deep structures.The important question to ask is
how idiosyncraticsurface structuresare derived or fashioned out of
more constrained abstractdeep structures.
V
I have tried to suggest that the paradigm of research that characterizes contemporarylinguisticsprovides an important perspective

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222

The Musical Quarterly

fromwhich many importantquestions in the study of music can be


formulated and pursued. The direction of future work does not lie
in any attemptto find parallels or analogies with linguistic concepts,
especially in the area of substantive universals. At the moment, the
most convincing effortsappear to be those that are limited to clearly
defined analytic problems, in which the formal clarity and explicitness of linguistic theorycan prove most effective.It is certainly too
premature to expect, in the near future,any singleminded theoryof
musical competence to emerge. Perhaps the eclecticism of much of
the work in music theoryand analysis of the last several decades, in
the field of ethnomusicology as well as our own musical tradition,
is all to the good. The challenge that is sounded in Bernstein's
Norton Lectures is an important one in the study of music. Surely
he is right in believing that linguisticswill play a crucial role in the
process of discoverythat many areas in the studyof music are already
undergoing.

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