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MARIANO

G.R.
No.
128576:August
A.
VELEZ
vs.REV.
13,
2002
FRANCISCO
FACTS:
situated
in
Puntod,
Macasandig,
succession
to
their
four
children
of
Ramona
Estate
with
Damages
against
been
claimed
and
Instance
of
Cagayan
de
purchased
the
shares
of
sold
his
share
as
well
as
Mariano
CiriacaBacarroRadaza.
Velez,
Sr.
by
his
wife
plaintiffs,defendants
damages
and
P5,000.00
as
Court
of
Appeals,
which
partition
the
property
defendants-appellees.
denied
by
the
appellate
court.Hence,
ISSUE/s:
the
instant
petition
forofreview.
Velez.
Sr.
b)
RULING:
whether
respondents
are
guilty
laches. DEMETRIO
petitioners
to
delivered
the
land
to
for
help
in
plowing
the
1.
land
which
he
was
formerly
cultivating.Whil
Viajar (previous batch #9 DONE)
2.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant-appellant,
vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, ET AL., claimants.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, appellee.
FACTS: During the months of September, October and November every year, the
waters of Laguna de Bay cover a long strip of land along the eastern border of the two
parcels of land in question, the width of which strip varies from 50 to 70 meters.
The Government of the Philippine Islands contends that the said two parcels of land
belong to the public domain, and its evidence tends to prove that they have always
been known as the shores of Laguna de Bay, and they are situated alongside the
highway running parallel to said shore; that the water of the lake has receded a great
distance on that side; that said parcels of land had been under water formerly; that at
present, during the rainy season, the water of the lake reaches the highway, and that
when the water recedes the people of the place occupy and cultivate said lands during
the dry season.
The claimant Colegio de San Jose contends, and its evidence tends to prove, that the
above-named parcels of land are a part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan
belonging to said claimant, which has been in possession thereof since time
immemorial by means of its tenants or lessees and farmers.
Court of First Instance of Laguna decided inin favor of Colegio de San Jose. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the two aforesaid parcels of land in controversy belong to the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan and are owned by the claimant Colegio de San Jose,
or whether they belong to the public domain as a part of the bed of Laguna de Bay?
RULING: The land is Colegio de San Jose's.
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh
water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by
the Pasig River. Hence, it's a lake.
Inasmuch as, according to article 407 of the Civil Code, cites that lakes and their beds
belong to the public domain, and inasmuch as, according to article 74 of the Law of
Waters providesprovides that the bed of lake is the ground covered by its waters at their
highest ordinary depth; whereas the waters of Laguna de Bay at their highest depth
reach no farther than the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question,
said parcels are outside said bed and, consequently, do not belong to the public
domain.
Article 84 of the said Law of Waters further provides:

ART 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the
owners of such lands.
Even if, therefore, the two parcels of land in litigation were considered as accretions
gradually deposited by accessions or sediments from the waters of Laguna de Bay, they
would still, according to the legal provision just quoted, belong to the claimant Colegio
de San Jose as owner of the lands bordering on said Laguna de Bay.
We find: (1) That the natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its
waters at their highest ordinary depth during the dry season, that is, during the months
of December, January, February, March, April, May, June, July and August; (2) that the
highest depth reached by said waters during the rainy season, or during the months of
September, October and November, is extraordinary; (3) that the two parcels of land in
litigation form an integral part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging to the
claimant Colegio de San Jose; (4) that said two parcels of land, being accidentally
inundated by the waters of Laguna de Bay continue to be the property of the claimant
Colegio de San Jose (art. 77, Law of Waters of August 3, 1866); (5) that even supposing
that the said two parcels of land have been formed by accession or deposits of
sediment by the waters of said Laguna de Bay, they still belong to the said claimant
Colegio de San Jose, as owner of the land of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,
bordering on said Laguna de Bay (art. 84, Law of Waters of August 3, 18660; (6) that
the provisions of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of the waters of
the sea are not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes, which are governed by
special provisions.
3.
NICOLAS PANLILIO, EUTIQUIANO CUYUGAN, and SIXTO TIMBOL, (plaintiffs and
appellants) vs. ATILANO MERCADO, CIRIACO PIMPING, MANUEL REYES, and
TELESFORO MARTINEZ, (defendants and appellants)
Gr. No. 18771, March 26, 1923
44 Phil 695
FACTS:
Nicolas Panlilio, Eutiquiano Cuyugan, and Sixto Timbol (plaintiffs) are the owners
of various parcels of land in the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga. From 1911 until
August 1919, the parcels of land belonging to them were divided by a small river known
as the Estero Abacan. The defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping are the
owners of various parcels of land which, previously to the month of August 1919, were
situated to the east of the land of the plaintiffs and were not touched by the Abacan
River. During the said month, a heavy flood occurred in the Abacan River and when the
flood sudsided, the river no longer flowed in the channel through the lands of the

plaintiffs but had opened a new course of the river previous to the year 1911. It may be
noted in the years 1916 and 1917 a cadastral survey was made of the district where the
lands of both the plaintiffs and the defendants are situated and that upon the plans of
that survey then the course of the river is excluded from the cadaster and set apart as a
public stream. After the termination of rainy season and early in the year 1920, a
complaint was madeto the provincial board of Pampanga by various land owners,
including the defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping, setting form that the
new course of the river was destroying their land and rendering it useless and asking
that the river be returned to its former channel. The complaint was endorsed to the
district engineer, the defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping, accompanied by
the defendants district engineer, proceeded to the point where the river had first began
to change its course, and after locating this point upon the cadastral plan, proceeded
with laborers of the defendants Atilano Mercado and Ciriaco Pimping to excavate the
old bed of the river for the purpose of causing the river to return to this bed. Later, a
petition for a writ of injunction was filed by the plaintiffs to restrain the defendants from
entering the lands, and from disturbing the plaintiffs in their peaceful possession of the
same. They also pray for damages for trespass on the land. Defendant set up a
counterclaim for 40,000, alleging that the plaintiffs, by placing bamboo stakes in the
River Abacan, caused it to change its course and causing damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court absolved the defendants from the complaint and the
plaintiffs from the counterclaim without cost.
Whether or not action of river is the only and final determining factor in the
abandonment of a river bed.
HELD:
1. Action of river not the only and final determining factor in the abandonment of a
river bed. While the abandonment of the bed may be the consequence of the
riving changing its course it is not necessarily the action of the river itself which is
the only and final determining factor in such abandonment. Article 370 of the Civil
Code cannot be solely relied on to have the conclusion that the old bed of the
river Abacan became ipso facto absolutely abandoned upon the river varying its
course in 1919.
2. Estero Abacan is a public stream; Action for the government to return the river to
its old course. The river is a public stream; its bed is of public ownership and was
determined in the cadastral survey. In the case of public stream, the bed is of
public ownership and the public cannot be considered absolutely divested of this
ownership until there is some indication of an intention of the part of Government
to acquiesce to change in the course of the stream. It is not compelled to stand

idly by and let nature take its course clearly indicated by article 372 of the Civil
Code. This certainly does not indicate abandonment on the part of the
government.
3. Claim for damages; Evidence falls short.

1.
RAGASA V ROA
G.R. No. 141964, June 30, 2006 ]
Facts:
In 1989, plaintiffs entered into a contract with Oakland Development Resources
Corporation for the purchase in installments of a piece of
Property in Quezon City. Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs took possession of the said
property covered by TCT No. 27946 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and
resided thereat together with their relatives who continued to occupy the same
whenever the plaintiffs would leave for Italy where they both worked. From May of 1989
up to the present date, plaintiffs were in continuous and notorious possession of the
said property to the exclusion of others and in the concept of an owner;
In March 992, plaintiffs were able to fully pay for the agreed purchase price of the
property accordingly, a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 12, 1992 was executed by
and between Oakland Development Resources Corporation and the original owner's
copy of TCT was turned over to them.
Sometime March of 1999, upon learning that Oakland Development Resources
Corporation was no longer functional as a corporate entity, she decided to cause the
transfer of registration of TCT No. 27946 of Registry of Deeds for Quezon City herself
since the vendor thereof was apparently in no position to undertake the same; She was
thus surprised to learn from the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City that on April 14,
1995, the property in question was sold by defendant Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City
[a respondent here] to defendants Sps. Roa [respondents here] as the highest bidder
for the price and consideration of P511,000.00 as shown in the Sheriff's Final Deed of
Sale.
Aggrieved, plaintiff filed a case against defendants in the RTC. RTC dismissed the case
upon motion by the respondents to dismiss the case, characterizing the suit as an
action "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff" which, according to Article 1146 of the
Civil Code, and said action is already barred by prescription for having been filed more
than four years after the registration of the execution sale. Plaintiff elevated the case to
the SC through a petition for review on certiorari raising only a pure question of law.
Issue 1: Whether the action is based on Article 1146 or Article 476?
Held 1: The action is based on Article 476 based on the allegations in the complaint.

To make out an action to quiet title under the foregoing provision, the initiatory pleading
has only to set forth allegations showing that (1) the plaintiff has "title to real property or
any interest therein" and (2) the defendant claims an interest therein adverse to
theplaintiff"s arising from an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable."
Thus, the averments in petitioners' complaint that (1) they acquired ownership of a
piece of land by tradition or delivery as a consequence of sale and (2) private
respondents subsequently purchased the same piece of land at an allegedly void
execution sale were sufficient to make out an action to quiet title under Article
476. Also Art 476 should apply as the respondents was not able to dispute the
allegation of the plaintiffs that they had been in continuous and notorious possession of
the property to the exclusion of others and in the concept of an owner.
Issue 2: Whether the action to action to quite title has prescribed?
Held 2: No, the action has not prescribed. Art. 480 provide that actions to quiet title to
property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as
against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the
plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners
thereof.
The reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to anaction,
proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aidof a court
of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect onhis title, or
to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession isdisturbed or
his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
However the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action
to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complainant when he is in
possession.
One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems,
invoke his remedy within the statutory period.
3.
Tan vs Valdehueza
66 SCRA 61
Facts:

-defendant Arador, rediculo, Pacita, Concepcion and Rosario (Valdehueza) are brothers
and sisters.
- The first cause of action was the subject matter of the public auction sale wherein
Plaintiff is the highest bidder and such Certificate of sale was executed in favor of
LUCIA TAN (plaintiff).
-Due to the failure of defendant Arador Valdehueza to redeem the said land within the
period of 1yr , the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff executed an Absolute deed of sale in
favor of the plaintiff.
- Defendants Arador and rediculo executed two documents of deed of pacto de retro
sale in favor of the plaintiff of two portions of parcel of land which is described in the
second cause of action.
- that from the execution of the deed of sale right to repurchase mentioned in the
second cause of action, arador and rediculo remained in possession of the land where
the land taxes to the said land were paid by the same defendants.
- a complaint for injuction was filed by Tan against Valdehueza, to enjoin them from
entering the above describe parcel of land and gathering the nuts therein. This
complaint and the ounterclaim ere subsequently dismissed for failure of the parties to
seek trial, thus evincing lack of interest on their partto proceed.
- the first Deed of Pacto de Retro ( August 5, 1955) was not registered, while the second
(march 15, 1955) was registered.
-trial court rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiff
-The Valdehueza appealed arguing that the lower court erred in failing to adjudge on
the first cause of action that there exist Res judicata and erred in making a finding on
the second cause of action as a simple loan instead, it shoud be declared as equitable
mortgage.
Issue:
a) Whether there war Res Judicata in adjudging the first cause of action
b) Whether the transaction between parties were simple loan
Held:
a) There was no res judicata as a bar to the first cause of action in civil case 2574
because the two cases are not identical. Case 2002 was for injunction against
entry and gathering of nuts, while case 2574 seeks to remove any doubt or cloud

of the plaintiffs ownership with a prayer for declaration of ownership and


recovery of possession.
Applying the test of absence of inconsistency between two judgements, the court
holds that the failure of Tan, in case 2002, to secure injunction is not inconsistent
with her being adjudge in case 2574 as the owner of the land with the right ro
recover.

b) No. Under article 1875 pof the civil code of 1889, regsitrarion wa a necessary
requisite for the validity of a mortgage even as between the parties, but article
125 of the new civil code, this is no longer so.
The Valdehuesza having remained in possession of the land and the realty taxes
having been paid by them, the contracts which purported to be pacto de retro
transactions are presumed to be equitable mortgages, whether registered or not,
there being no third parties involved.
4.
Coronel vs Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 70191
Facts:
Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a
parcel of l a n d r e g i s t e r e d u n d e r h i s n a m e . T h e c o m p l a i n t w a s f i l e d
a g a i n s t t h e p r i v a t e respondents before the Court of First Instance of
Cavite. Coronel alleged in his complaint that at the time he purchased the parcel of
land, the private respondents were already occupying a portion of the land as tenants at
will and that despite demands to vacate the premises, the respondents failed and
refused to move out of the land. In their answer, the respondents denied that Coronel
was the owner of the whole parcel of land and alleged that the lots occupied by
them form part of an u n d i v i d e d s h a r e o f B r i g i d o M e r l a n a n d J o s e
M e r l a n , r e s p o n d e n t s , w h i c h t h e y inherited from their deceased father, one of
the three heirs of BernabelaLontoc, the original owner of lot; that the Merlan brothers
never sold their share to anybody; that Coronels claim of ownership of the whole parcel
of land is fraudulent, void, and without effect and that the other defendants were
legitimate tenants. In their Third Party Complaint, the defendants charged that the thirdparty defendants, owners of the remaining portion of the lot in question,
defrauded them when they sold the entire parcel. Third Party defendants Marcelo
Novelo, Paz Anuat, Daniel Anuatand Rosario Cailao, the defendants co-owners
of the remaining portion of lot in question d e n i e d t h a t t h e y h a d
something
to
do
with
the
fraudulent
acts
or
i l l e g a l machinations which deprived the defendants of their share in the subject
parcel of land, and that what they sold was only their 2/3 undivided shares in said parcel.

Lower court ruled in favor of the defendants and on appeal, the lower
courtsdecision was affirmed with modification by the then IAC.
Issue:
WON the claim of private respondents to the land in question is barred by
thestatute of limitation or by estoppel by laches.
WON the IAC erred in affirming the lower courts decision.
Ruling:
No. In dispute in the instant case is the 2/8 share of BernabelaLontoc of the Naic
estate. When Lontoc died in 1945, she survived the three sets of heirs.
BernandinoMerlan, Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat sold their 2/3 undivided portion of lot to
spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo and which later Ignacio sold his interest to
Mariano Manalo. Considering these facts, it is evident that the private respondents
never sold their 1/3 share over the lot in question. Moreover, private repondentsBrigido
and Jose Merlan were in open, peaceful and adverse possession of their share over the
lot and that when the first sale of lot took place, it was then they only knew about
Coronels claim over the whole lot.
The petitioner contends that the claim of the private respondents over their
undivided share 25 years after the registration of the deed of sale in favor of Ignacio
Manalo and more than five years after the registration of the deed of sale in favor of
Mariano Manalo is barred by prescription or laches. According to him, there was an
undue delay on the part of private respondents to claim their 1/3 share. Also, petitioner
insists that he is possessor in good faith, thus in the TCT in the name of his successor
in interest was very clear to the effect that there is no lien or encrumbrance therein.
The counterclaim of the private respondents which was in effect a reconveyance
to them to their share has not prescribed. As lawful possessor and owners of the lot in
question their cause of action falls within the settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet
title to property in ones possession is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession
over a period of more than 25 years gave them a continuing right to seek aid of a court
of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim against them. In the same
manner, there is no bar based on laches to assert their right on their share over the lot
in question. Also, the facts show, that they are in peaceful possession and exercised
ownership thereto for more than 25 years which was disrupted only when petitioner tried
to remove them by virtue of torrens title covering the entire lot. Hence, the undivided
share of the private respondents was mistakenly included in the TCT of Mariano
Manalo.
The SC finds no reversible error on the part of lower courts in recognizing the
ownership of the private respondents over their 1/3 share. The petitioner is bound to

recognize the lien in favor of the private respondents which was mistakenly excluded
and therefore not inscribed in the torrens title of the land of his predecessor in interest.
Petition is dismissed. The questioned decision is affirmed but with modification.

6.
AVILA vs. BARABAT
G.R. No. 141993, March 17, 2006
FACTS:
The subject of this controversy is a portion of a 433-square meter parcel of land
located in Cebu. Upon the death of the owner, ownership of the lot wastransferred to
her five children, petitioners Narcisa Avila, NatividadMacapaz, Francisca Adlawan, Leon
Nemeo and JoseBahena. These heirs built their respective houses on the lot.In 1964,
respondent Benjamin Barabat leased a portion of the house owned by Avila. His corespondent, JovitaBarabat, moved in with him when they got married.Avila
subsequently relocated to Cagayan de Oro City and offeredher house and shares in the
lotto respondents who agreed to buy it. Their agreement was evidenced by a
privatedocument dated July 17, 1979.
Respondents stopped paying rentals to Avila and took possession of the property as
owners. They also assumed the payment of realty taxes onit.
Sometime in early 1982, respondents were confronted by petitioner JanuarioAdlawan
who informed them that they had until March 1982 only to stay in Avilas place because
he was buying the property. Respondents replied that the property had already been
sold to them by Avila. Theyshowed Adlawan the July 17, 1979 document executed by
Avila.On January 6, 1983, respondents received a letter from Atty. JoselitoAlo informing
them that Avila had sold her house and share in lot no. 348to his clients, the spouses
Januario and Nanette Adlawan. Considering the sale to the spouses Adlawan as
prejudicial to their title and peacefulpossession of the property, they demanded that
Avila execute a public document evidencing the sale of the property to them but Avila
refused.Respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Toledo City. The complaint was subsequently amended to include annulment
of the deed of sale to the spouses Adlawan, specific performance, partitionand
damages as additional causes of action. Respondents anchored their claim over the
property to the July 17, 1979 private document denied having offered to sell her
property to respondents. She claimed that respondents gave her an P8,000 loan
conditioned on hersigning a document constituting her house and share in lot no. 348

as security for its payment. She alleged that she innocently affixed hersignature which
was prepared by respondents and which they now claim as a private deed of sale
transferring ownership tothem.
ISSUE
WON the court erred in denying the right to redeem the property and in ruling
that there was implied partition by the acts of the parties.
HELD
Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) the parties
entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and (2) their intention was to
secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. Here, both the trial and appellate courts
that it was a contract of sale. They also agreed that the circumstances of the case show
that Avila intended her agreement with respondents to be a sale. Both courts were
unanimous in finding that the subsequent acts of Avila revealed her intention to
absolutely convey the disputed property. It was only after the perfection of the contract,
when her siblings began protesting the sale that she wanted to change the agreement.
Petitioners rely on Article 1623 in relation to Article 1620 of the Civil Code to justify their
right of redemption. This is incorrect.
These provisions state:
Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or any of them are sold to a third person. If the price of
the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they
may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned
in common.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by theprospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unlessaccompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.The right of redemption of co-owners
excludes that of adjoining owners.Petitioners right to redeem would have existed only
had there been co-ownership among petitioners-siblings. But there was none. For
thisright to be exercised co-ownership must exist at the time the conveyance is made by
a co-owner and the redemption is demanded by the otherco-owner or co-owner(s).
However, by their own admission, petitioners were no longer co-owners when the
property was sold to respondentsin 1979. The co-ownership had already been

extinguished by partition.The regime of co-ownership exists when the ownership of an


undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.By the nature of co-ownership, a
co-owner cannot point to any specific portion of the property owned in common as his
own because his share in it remainsintangible and ideal.
The purpose of partition is to separate, divide and assign a thing held in common
among those to whom it belongs. By their own admission, petitioners already
segregated and took possession of their respective shares in the lot. Their respective
shares were thereforephysically determined, clearly identifiable and no longer ideal.
Thus, the co-ownership had been legally dissolved. With that, petitioners right to
redeem any part of the property from any of their former co-owners was already
extinguished. As legal redemption is intended tominimize co-ownership, once a property
is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community ceases to exist and
there isno more reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.

7.
Locator: G.R. No. 79899 (172 SCRA 660)
Title: D. Annie Tan vs. Court of Appeals, China Banking Corporation, George Laurel
Tan, et. al.
Date Promulgated: April 24, 1989

Statement of Facts

Spouses Tan Tiong Tick and Tan Ong Hun (parents of herein private respondents)
mortgaged a 178 sq. meter parcel of land with China Bank in order to secure various
obligations. In Dec. 22, 1969, Tan Tiong Tick died without paying his obligations.

China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the property at a public
auction. Later, Tan Ong Hun along with the respondents filed a complaint against China
Bank with CFI praying for the nullity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure
sale. They've also asked that the redemption period be suspended.

The 1-year redemption period expired without the respondents (at this point Tan
Ong Hun had already died) exercising the right to redeem the property. China Bank
consolidated its ownership over the property and land improvements.

In an amicable settlement, China Bank agreed with the respondents for them to
exercise their right to repurchase at a given period. Otherwise, China Bank will be free
to dispose of the property.

D. Annie Tan tendered a check to repurchase the property a day before the end of
the period. However, the deed of sale returning the property to the heirs was not in favor
of D. Annie Tan but of all six heirs, who would, therefore, share and share alike leading
to D. Annie Tan filing an action against herein respondents.

CFI ruled in favor of D. Annie Tan. CA affirmed with the CFI in toto. The case was
addressed to the SC after denial of motion for reconsideration.

Issue(s)

Was there an established co-ownership among the heirs of Sps. Tan?

Ruling

Yes. Since the lot and its improvements were mortgaged by the deceased parents,
a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the
foreclosed property. Redemption by one during this period would have inured to the
benefit of all.

However, co-ownership extinguished when the heirs allowed the 1-year period of
redemption to expire without redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title.

SC reversed the decision of the CA and ordered China Bank to execute deed of
sale over the disputed property to D. Annie Tan alone.

8.
Ceniza vs CA

Facts: The petitioner filed against the respondents an action for the recovery of their
titles of Lots situated in Mandaue Cebu which was originally part of Hacienda de
Mandaue of the Semenario de San Carlos Cebu. The property is covered by
reconstituted original Certificate of Title in the name of Vicente Dabon married to
Marcela Ceniza.
The records disclose that when Hacienda de Mandaue was subdivided for resale to the
occupants in 1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon, who were residing in the hacienda,
jointly purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and they agreed, for convenience, to
have the land registered in the name of Dabon. Since then, Jose Ceniza, Vicente
Dabon, and their heirs have possessed their respective portions of the land, declared
the same for taxation, paid real estate taxes on their respective shares, and made their
respective installment payments to the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu.
After Dabon dies in 1954, his 7 children succeeded to his portion of the land.
Lot 627 was divided into 3 parts (627 A, B and C) but the private respondents refused to
convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners. They claimed that their
predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627,
by purchase from the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. Petitioner filed a complaint for
reconveyance. Respondent alleged that petitioners right of action had already
prescribed.
Petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust for them, as co-owners,
hence, their action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.
RTC rendered judgment for the petitioners. (finding existence of co ownership among
parties)
CA reversed. (petitioners right of action has prescribed)

Issue: W/N the registration of the title of the land in the name of one of the co-owner,
constituted a repudiation of the co-ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
Ruling:No. The trial court correctly ruled that since a trust relation and co-ownership
were proven to exist between the predecessors- in-interest of both petitioners and
private respondents, prescription did not run in favor of Dabon's heirs except from the
time that they repudiated the co-ownership and made the repudiation known to the
other co-owners, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza.
Paragraph 5 of Article 494 of the Civil Code providesNo prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his coowners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership.
The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of
his co-owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs. Article 1452 of the Civil Code states:
If two or more persons agree to purchase property and common consent
the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a
trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the
interest of each.
This Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a general
rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a title by
prescription. Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following
circumstances:
a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to the ouster of thecestuique trust;
b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestuique trust; and
c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
The above elements are not present here for the petitioners/ co-owners have not been
ousted from the land. They continue to possess their respective shares of Lot 627 and
they have been paying the realty taxes thereon.

Decision of CA is reversed and set aside.

9.
MARIANO A. VELEZ vs.REV. FRANCISCO DEMETRIO
G.R. No. 128576:August 13, 2002
FACTS:
The spouses Abrogar were the owners of a ten-hectare agricultural land situated in
Puntod, Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. Upon their death, ownership of the land
passed by intestate succession to their four surviving children and five grand
children.On April 14, 1975, respondents, the surviving children of Ramona RadazaDemetrio and Jose Radaza, Sr., instituted a complaint for Partition of Real Estate with
Damages against petitioners, the heirs of the late Mariano Velez, Sr.They discovered
that the property had been claimed and fenced in by Mariano Velez, Sr.docketed as
Civil Case No. 4686 of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17.,
and that they were denied entry thereto. Mariano Velez, Sr. purchased the shares of
SeveroRadaza and JacobaRadaza in 1936; that on May 30, 1947, Filomeno sold his
share as well as Ramonas share to Mariano Velez, Sr.; that the share of Jose was
likewise sold to Mariano Velez, Sr. by his wife CiriacaBacarroRadaza.

RTC ruled in favor of the defendants and Orders the dismissal of the complaint filed by
the plaintiffs,defendants are the absolute owner,lawful owner with a counter claim
ofP20,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as attorneys fee; and orders the
plaintiffs to pay the costs.Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed and set aside the lower courts decision, to wit: new one entered directing the
partition of the property covered by OCT No. 7678 in the portion of 2/5 to the plaintiffsappellants and 3/5 to the defendants-appellees. Costs against the appellees.The motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the appellate court.Hence, the
instant petition for review.

ISSUE/s:
a) whether the shares of Ramona Radaza and Jose Radaza were sold to Mariano
Velez. Sr.

b) whether respondents are guilty of laches.

RULING:
a)

NO.there was no evidence presented in support thereof. The testimonies offered by


petitioners to establish the alleged transactions were pure hearsay.Tabian further
testified that he delivered the land to Ciriaca. Thereafter, SarioEchem, a tenant of
Mariano Velez, Sr., approached him asking for help in plowing the land which he was
formerly cultivating.While the Court of Appeals did not squarely rule on the weight of
Tabians testimony, the same was likewise hearsay and cannot serve as proof of the
alleged sale.

b)

No.The Court of Appeals held that laches could not have set in because the specific
act of repudiation of the co-ownership was made only on March 27, 1974, when
petitioners registered the affidavit of adverse claim executed by Mariano Velez and had
the same annotated on respondents title with respect to the 3/5 portion of the land. It
held that only then did the period of prescription start to run. However, since this case
was filed on April 14, 1975 and only for a 3/5 portion thereof, then no prescription can
be counted in favor of petitioners for the remaining2/5.The land involved was registered
under the Torrens system in the name of respondents and their predecessor-in-interest
in 1938. The evidence shows that only 3/5 of the land was sold to Mariano Velez, Sr.
and the 2/5 thereof remains in the name of respondents. The land being undivided, only
the rights of the co-owners were transferred, thereby making the buyer another coowner of the property.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 22, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30381 is AFFIRMED.

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