1

A DECADE AFTER THE

ACEH PEACE PROCESS: ANALYSIS
OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
LTCOL DANILO O CARINO PHIL
ABSTRACT

This research project examines why the Aceh conflict came to an end almost
abruptly in 2005 considering its three decades of undertaking and previous
displayed resilience from the separatist groups which the conflict seemed
unresolvable. Not only has it claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, but also
displayed very strong resilience on the Government of Indonesia (GoI) effort to
curl the separatist movement. How and why did this happen? This triggered the
study to examine the factors leading to the nature of changes in Acehs conflict
resolution. Sequel to this, the study aims to achieve the objectives of exploring
how did these factors, accompanying perspectives and inherent biases changed
during the various rounds of peace negotiations, how did these changes
contributed to resolving the conflict in Aceh and recommend important lessons
learnt drawn from Aceh peace process that might be relevant for other conflicts in
the region and beyond. It used qualitative research for its primary data and
adopted the theory of conflict resolution as the theoretical framework. The
research also draws attention to the fact that before the successful Helsinki peace
process, there had been two previous failed attempts at finding a peaceful
resolution to the conflict in Aceh. These past mistake and failure draws lessons
learnt to create a more effective mechanism and innovative approaches from
Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) that
pave the way towards its peaceful resolutions. The study concludes that the peace
negotiations between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM) transformed towards peaceful resolution because of the strong political
will among important stakeholders, the role played by the Finnish CMI as arbiter
and the effect of 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. These factors also changed the
dynamics of conflict from elements of securitization to elements of
desecuritization during the various rounds of peace process that led to the return
of a sense of normalcy in Aceh. This study posits that the success factors in the
Acehs conflict resolution experiences can be adapted to other inter-state conflict
in the region.

INTRODUCTION

The paper focuses on a classic intra-state conflict case: Aceh in Indonesia. The Aceh conflict
lasted for more than three decades, with sporadic attempts on reconciliation and bloody
exchanges between the government military and members of the separatist movement. After the
devastating Indian Ocean tsunami that claimed thousands of lives in this coastal Indonesian
province, another attempt to reach a negotiation in early 2005 was pursued. This time, it was
mediated by the Finnish organization, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), the two sides came to
an historic agreement and finally on 15 August 2005, they signed the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOU) that set out a comprehensive plan for peace1.

The history of the Aceh conflict began in the sixteenth century when the sultanate of
Aceh contested the Portuguese domination over the international pepper trade 2 . The same
happened when Dutch colonialists began subjugating much of the Indonesian archipelago. The
natives of Java fought together with the Acehnese to resist Dutch occupation. The conflict
continued then with the Acehnese against the Indonesian central government, and lasted almost
three decades. After WWII, the first rebellion in Aceh took place in 1953 when Daud Beureuh
and his followers declared the Aceh region a part of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Indonesia
Islamic State of Indonesia)3. Several years after the archipelagos independence, the Province of
Aceh was granted special autonomous status in 1962.

However, the discovery of significant natural gas deposits near the Acehnese territory
contributed to a larger conflict between the central government and a growing separatist
movement in Aceh. The separatist movement dubbed as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM; Free
Aceh Movement) led by Teuku Hasan M. di Tiro was officially launched in December 1976,
declared independence for Aceh 4 . In the height of the violent conflict, there were several
attempts to reach peaceful solution through the Humanitarian Pause (HP) in early 2000 and
1

Edward Aspinall, 2005, Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict
Transformation, Berghof Foundation for Peace Support.
2
Joko P. Putranto, 2009, Aceh Conflict Resolution: Lessons Learned and the Future of Aceh. p17.
3
M. Isa Sulaiman, From Autonomy to Periphery: A Critical Evaluation of the Acehnese Nationalist
Movement, in Verandah of Violence, ed. by Anthony Reid, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), 130.
4
Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling, 2003, Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia, Routledge
Curzon, Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, p.149.

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in 2003 meant to reduce the escalation of violence
but both failed and the Indonesian government responded a military emergency in Aceh. In 2004,
another attempt at a peace deal was reached this time through the arbitration of the Finnish
organization, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). With commitment to meaningful dialogue,
the negotiations continued under the Yudhoyono administration and subsequently achieved an
agreement in August 2005. It is important to note that while tragic, the 2005 Indian Ocean
tsunami that swept much of Aceh provided opportunity to resolve the conflict.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PERVASIVENESS OF

INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS
To fully appreciate how past events and circumstances influence the peace process, it is
important also to have a basic understanding on the Southeast Asia and the pervasiveness of
intra-state conflicts, and historical account of the Acehnese conflict. This is to contextualize the
case before delving into deep research and examination how the nature of changes among the
perspectives of the concerned stakeholders and the gradual manifestation of the desecuritization
process in Acehs conflict resolution.

It is worth noting that all forms of conflict are inherently different from one another,
hence the seemingly impossibility of developing a general approach or theory explaining
conflicts and its potential course of transformation. Parallels and several similarities may be
drawn and utilized as possible models to adopt the current situation. If only to emphasize, the
existing literature on international conflicts have been recently gaining traction among scholars.
There are then broadening sources for understanding the complexities and complications of
conflict and pathways to its resolution.

For most scholars, two assumptions are seen as ready explanations for the existence of
conflicts: (1) there are traditional forms of warfare, often battles for territory, and (2) the
breakdown of normal and peaceful relations between states creates disputes. The same schools of
thought dominated research on internal or intra-state conflict5 .
Jackson, R. Violent Internal Conflict and the African State, Journal of Contemporary African Studies,
20: 1 (2002, pp. 2952).
5

Today, majority of international conflicts are intra-state in nature. In the same manner,
these internal conflicts are mostly located in the developing world. One study indicates that the
Southeast Asia has the highest incidence of ethnic conflictthe same study relates this to the
fact that the region has the highest number of independent ethno-political groups involved in
armed struggles across the globe6. The continuing account of Moro struggle for independence in
Southern Philippines, the Malay-Muslim insurgencies in Thailands Deep South, and the many
ethnic conflicts that seriously cripple Burma today (e.g. Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State,
Christian minority struggle in Kachin state), are just examples of the myriad forms of conflict
that persist in the region.

A quick glance at these conflicts would permit the observer to assume that they are
rooted in ethnic divides and/or identity politics-when a powerful group or institution suppresses
ethnic group calls for autonomy or independence, or denies their demands for equal opportunities
on certain matters7 (Snow 1996 as cited in Jackson 2002). The existence of more than a hundred
ethno-linguistic groups in the Southeast Asia provides opportune support for such perception.
And while Reilly sees ethnic disputes as real forms of conflicts, they are also used as
convenient cover for mobilizing support around political and economic issues8. Examples of
which include: control over resources, changing social relations, increasing group inequalities,
and the tensions created when traditional lifestyles and power bases are confronted by the
inexorable forces of modernization, urbanization and change9.
Indonesia was considered as the worlds largest Muslim population with the biggest
economy in the region. The country also has a significantly diverse ethnic population, with
more than 300 local languages 10 . Mietzner and Aspinall described Indonesia as one of the
worlds multi-ethnic societies with a total population of around 230 million; at the last census
6
Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Against States: Ethno-political Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994
Presidential Address, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 347-377
7
Ibid.
8
Benjamin Reilly,Ethnic conflict in Papua New Guinea, Centre for Democratic Institutions, Australian
National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia.
9
Ibid. p.45.
10
Mietzner and Aspinall, 2010, Understanding the Success of Multiethnic Parties in Indonesia, University
Press, Oxford.

more than 1000 separate ethnic categories were listed. They described that the largest single
group is the Javanese, at about 41 per cent of the population, next is the Sundanese (West Java)
with about 15 per cent, but after that there is a multiplicity of much smaller groups 11. These only
mean that many regions of the country lack a dominant core but are instead complex mixtures of
large numbers of groups.

The writing of Kingsbury argues that such diversity creates several socio-economic and
ethno-political cleavages that may or may not develop into intra-state conflicts. Following such,
there is value in understanding the concepts of nations and states. Nations are often defined
as support for the creation, continuation or strengthening of an idea of a common bonded
identity, an assertion of independent unity and, usually, self-determination 12 . States, on the
other hand, are more specific entities with a given number of people and a delineated territory in
which a government exercises political and judicial authority, and claims a monopoly over the
legitimate use of force (potential or actual violence)13.

In the case of Indonesia, the apparent dominance of the Javanese ethnic group did not
bode well for other seemingly minor ethnic groups. Following the above-mentioned conceptual
definitions, the conflict in Aceh may be characterized as such - cases wherein there are selfconceptualizing and largely exclusive political communities (nations) within the state 14 which
in turn cause tensions that arise between the interests of such political communities and the
interests that are asserted on behalf of the state.

FACTORS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE INITIAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Mechanisms towards desecuritization were manifested through points of agreement such as

peace dialogues, ceasefire agreements, demobilization of rebel troops, withdrawal of military
forces, victim repatriation and political settlements. One of the fundamental factors of engaging
in desecuritization is the lack of common understanding and interpretation on the agreement
11

Ibid. p. 23.
Kingsbury, Damien 2007, Peace processes in Aceh and Sri Lanka: a comparative assessment, Security
challenges, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 93-112..
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid. p.95.
12

provisions. This was very much evident in the case of Indonesia wherein the government denied
autonomy and independence, as well as prevented escalating the issue in the international
platform. GAM, on the other hand, intends to bring in more international partners into the scene
and pave their path towards greater independence. Such misunderstanding further denied areas
for negotiations and created means to continue the fighting between the military and the armed
rebel troops.

Corollary to the first factor, Sukma disclosed that the Indonesian government tried to give
peace one last chance when it agreed to come to Tokyo in May 2003, to negotiate with GAMs
Sweden-based leadership. This last effort to save the peace process, however, ended in failure15.
As predicted, GAM representatives rejected Jakartas three demands that GAM must recognize
the unitary Republic of Indonesia, accept the special autonomy arrangement for Aceh, and agree
to immediate disarmament. As the meeting in Tokyo faced a dead-end, it was a time for the
police to exit and the military to come in. The government, through Presidential Decree No.
28/2003, decided to impose martial law across Aceh and initiated a military operation called
Operasi Terpadu (Integrated Operation) in the province16. The peace dialogues failed because
there remains distrust between conflicting parties. The government failed to establish working
committees, postponed important meetings, arrested and detained GAMs negotiators,
maintained security operation in the province, and incurred various human rights atrocities.
Hard-line elements within the government, both civilians and military officers, also expressed
their unsympathetic opinion on peace dialogues in public and threatened to use force against the
rebel group. On the other hand, GAM accused Indonesian government with lack of sincerity in
implementing some earlier agreed points.

This also led to mediators failing to bridge gaps between conflicting parties. HDC
mediated peace dialogues between the Indonesian government and GAM since 1999 until
shutting down in 2003. They initiated halting violence first and then intended to move towards
resolving more fundamental political issues. However, the approach was deemed too idealistic
and does not suit the situation wherein the involved parties mutually share severe distrust and
15

Rizal Sukma, 2004. Security Operation in Aceh: Goal, Consequences, and Lessons (Washington D.C.:
East-West Center Washington), 6.
16
Ibid. p.70

animosity. Finally, rampant corruption within the elite and local government ranks has always
beleaguered conflict settlement. Their poor performance in delivering basic services as well the
remaining presence of military troops in Acehs vicinity did not help alleviate the prevailing
issues of distrust and insincerity.

DYNAMICS OF DESECURITIZATION AND NATURE OF CHANGES

Several factors contributed to the successful 2005 peace negotiation. Initially, the movement
towards peace was attributed to the strong leadership of President Yudyohono and Vice
President Kalla as they initiated contact with GAMs top figures since 2004 and called on the
assistance of CMI in facilitating the dialogues. Kalla sent some members from his inner circle as
main negotiators representing the government namely, Hamid Awaluddin, the then minister of
law and human rights and Farid Husain, the then deputy social minister. Publicly, Kalla was
active to push the idea that dialogue is the only solution for conflict settlement in Aceh. He
actively convinced public in general as well as national elites who shared a more hard-line view
to settle the conflict.
The second factor was GAMs internal development. Unlike in many internal conflicts
(e.g Kashmir, Mindanao) where insurgent forces are highly fragmented, in Aceh there is only
one insurgents organization. All the main GAM commanders profess loyalty to the Swedenbased government in exile, although they have considerable operational autonomy. Cohesion is
partly attributed to the highly ideological and hard line character of the movement, which until
early 2005 was solidified around an un-compromising demand for independence17. After years of
militarily engaging the central government, GAM finally exhausted its fighting capability. While
decreasing its military wing, GAM learned that the central government might freeze the
negotiation and turn back to military solution. Nonetheless, the demobilization contributed to
building trust between the conflicting parties. It also helped that GAM is preparing itself to
transform into a local political party and start competing in the more formal political struggle in
Aceh. The most possible option then is to demilitarize, and soften its stance on independence in
favor of relative autonomy.
17

Edward Aspinall, 2005, Op. Cit. p8.

The third factor was the innovative mediators approach. It took a different route from
HDCs approach of mediation to nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. While including
points during HDC-facilitated dialogues such as ceasefire, demobilization, and other, CMIs
framework also included a design of implementation as well as a wider political settlement. This
approach provided a better picture on how to solve political dispute between the two parties
before they can agree on it. As the result of the process, CMI succeeded in mediating the
conflicting parties to agree on a comprehensive and creative peace agreement, which reflects a
strong willingness from both sides to make compromises. The peace agreement is creative since
it provides a formula to deal with difficult issues in an indirect way, and avoid the emergence of
splinter groups. The MoU stipulates the establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)
to ensure that the MoU is properly implemented. The AMM was comprised of the European
Union and ASEAN contributing countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand). It enjoyed an adequate mandate to carry out its tasks, which included the monitoring
of the DDR process, human rights situation, and the process of legislation change. More
importantly, the AMM was also given full authority to rule on disputed cases and alleged
violation of the MoU.

The fourth factor was the local political elites in Aceh. Despite contributed to the conflict
system because they lack crucial credibility in the eyes of the population. This is especially due
to corruption and related governance problems, but also because their own political autonomy
has in recent times been greatly circumscribed by the conflict, military dominance and central
government control18. However in the past, some members of the Acehnese political elite have
demonstrated their commitment and capacity to contribute to a peaceful resolution. For instance,
certain Acehnese members of the national legislature (DPR) played a key role in drafting the
Special Autonomy law in 2000-2001, with some of them at the time hoping that the law would
include mechanisms to integrate GAM peacefully into the political system (these mechanisms
were later vetoed by the Ministry of Interior) 19 . This group had also played an important

18
19

Ibid. p11.
Ibid. p. 12.

intermediary role between the Acehnese population and the wider Indonesian political system
during the AMM dialogue.

The fifth factor is the tsunami disaster that touched the hearts and minds of all Acehnese
people, Indonesian people and many world organizations, and citizens to become compassionate.
These feelings of humanity overcame the feeling of hatred and vengeance on both parties and it
transcended the solidarity based on religion, ethnic groups and nationalism. The disaster attracted
the presence of foreign powers, particularly superpowers and neighboring countries that
supported Indonesia in keeping its territorial integrity. These factors made GAM become more
realistic and transformed its separatist strategy into self-government. It seems that both parties
experienced a traumatic event and some of them considered the tsunami as a warning or anger
from God20. The tsunami disaster made the Acehnese people more reflective, contemplative,
religious, and humanistic. Something similar could also have happened to some GAM members
who lost their comrades and relatives in the calamity. Some analyses from scholars and
especially in the international press, suggest that the December 2004 tsunami was the key factor
that drove both side back to the negotiating table. In fact, Aspinall observation asserts that the
tsunami is better understood as a circuit breaker that allowed them to resume talks 21, thus
consolidated the political will to leave old grievances behind and join forces in the reconstruction
process and the creation of sustainable future for the people of Aceh.

MOVING FORWARD THE 2005 PEACE PROCESS

A decade after the conflict resolution in Aceh, observers have now shifted their focus on
how their new found autonomy provided areas for socio-economic improvement, particularly on
the lives of the ordinary Acehnese. Recent reports have shown that much work has yet to be done
in ensuring the seeds of autonomy will bear fruits for a better future in Aceh. Specifically,
international organizations that continue to work in Aceh underscore the need to strengthen
political institutions to ensure that another civil war could not tear the community apart.

20

Rizal Sukma, 2012. Security sector Government and conflict management in Indonesia: The Aceh Case,
Asia Security Initiative Policy, Series Working Paper 21.
21
Edward Aspinall, 2005, Aceh Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for systemic Conflict
Transformation, Berghof Foundation for Peace Support.

10

Corruption at the local level remains a valid concern in Acehan issue that is rooted structurally
when the peace negotiations were re-forged and the organizations working in Aceh focused more
on reintegration. While this is important, the reports believe that parallel efforts in strengthening
political institutions should also have been employed to ensure that short-term aid would be
sustained in the long run. Because there werent enough interventions, the local government
became prey to patronage politics - a concern that is shared across the archipelago.
Corollary to the previous statements, the interviewees 22 believed that concrete efforts
towards better service delivery in Aceh should be in effect. As an autonomous local government,
the people are expecting better service especially now that there is closer proximity. The
reintegration efforts before may be utilized today to ensure that ex-combatants remain active
members of the local community. Coupled with continuous investments on local capacity
development and a better outcome are expected. The road towards peace does not end at the
signing table in front of flashing cameras and gleaming smiles. More than anything, the fruits of
these agreements will only be tangible when the lives of the ordinary citizens previously caught
in these civil wars are changed for the better.

CONCLUSION

The theory of conflict resolution published by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall particularly
the model of conflict dynamics and conflict resolution explains the Aceh conflict progression
from violent conflict to peaceful social change. These models also gave emphasis on the
intervention by skilled third parties working unofficially with the parties and entry on what
particular part of the cycle to resolve the issues in non-violent ways.

Before the peaceful resolution of the Aceh conflict in 2005, there were two attempts to
reach peaceful negotiation. The first attempt facilitated by a third party under the Swiss-based
22

Associate Professor Dr. Lukman Thaib of the Academy of Islamic Studies at the University of Malaya.
Interviewed on 26 October 2015 and Mr Rasyidin, lecturer from Aceh, Jl. Cut Nyak Dien Aceh. Interviewed on 28
October 2015.

11

non-government organization Henry Dunant Center in early 2002 through Humanitarian Pause
demonstrate a dynamic series from violent conflict to conflict formation and back to violent
conflict after its failure by the end of the year. Same dynamics happened during the 2nd attempt
through Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in 2003 when the negotiation failed, the
Indonesian government declared a military emergency in Aceh. However, in 2004, another
attempt to reach peace was struck this time through the arbitration of the Finnish organization,
Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). With the willingness and commitment by both parties to
meaningful dialogue, the negotiations continued and took its path from violent conflict-toconflict formation, conflict transformation and went through social change leading to conflict
resolution in August 2005. Therefore, the Aceh conflict implies that the deep-rooted source of
conflict are addressed and transformed. This also implies that the behavior is no longer violent,
attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of conflict has been changed.

In summary, the findings of the study are as follows:

1.

The factors that led to the nature of changes in Acehs conflict resolution are the

varying spheres of influence of the leaders, domestic political dynamics which includes both the
local government and GAM, the intervention of international mediating groups more importantly
CMI in Helsinki, and the effect of 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. These factors significantly
proved that the first assumption is true in which the peace negotiation had transformed towards
peaceful resolution.

2.

The study finds that the second assumption is also true. The desecuritization

process and intervening factors identified provided much compelling impact on transforming the
conflict into resolution; as such the referent object is no longer existentially threatened and the
securitization actor shifted the issue out of emergency mode or return of a sense of normalcy.
The elements of desecuritization move are manifested into points of agreement in terms of
meaningful dialogue, demobilization of rebels troops, withdrawal of military forces, repatriation
of victims, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), political settlement and
release of political prisoners. While some may argue that it is path-dependent, it is also important

12

to note that a strong leadership and political will can create the necessary difference to steer the
path towards peaceful resolution.

3.

These changes are important to understand as these consolidate a framework for

better approaching related intra-state conflicts, particularly those prevailing in Southeast Asia.
The inherent biases during the various round of peace process pointed to Habibies term
when he offered the East Timorese a choice between separations from or integration into the
Republic, whereas Aceh had not been offered the same opportunity. The Timorese ultimately
managed to gain total separation from Indonesia through a referendum in 1999. Habibies
decision increased secessionist activities in Aceh, and also brought a response from student
groups in Aceh that demanded a similar referendum. When East Timor eventually separated
from Indonesia, it created a massive demonstration across Aceh, and according to some
estimates, more than 500,000 Acehnese gathered in the capital city of Banda Aceh in 1999 to
support the referendum. The Indonesian government tried to put an end to the uprising by
utilizing various strategies such as apologizing for the atrocities committed by the military and
enacting law No. 22/1999 known as Regional Autonomy. The said law restores Acehs
autonomous region status and grants the province a wide range of autonomy including the
provincial implementation of the Islamic law for the Muslims and compensation of the past
abuses of the military. However, such undertakings did not resound well with the GAM and the
Acehnese community because most of these initiatives did not come into reality.

Finally, the main message of this paper is to show that there is no military solution for
any domestic unrest. The main issue is not laid in military matter but more in a political,
economic, and socio-cultural realm. The use of the military to solve this problem should be
regarded as a series of civilian institutional failures to acknowledge the problem, to manage it, to
prevent it from becoming escalated, and to solve it within normal political bargaining process.
As the last resort, military engagement could be considered as an option. However, it has to be
understood, that a military intervention should be temporary in nature, aimed to stop violent
conflict, in order to provide room for a peaceful conflict solution mechanism.

13

RECOMMENDATION

Indeed, as demonstrated in the case of Aceh peace process, new creative approaches to
conflict-resolution are made possible by learning from past experience. Without such creativity,
the outlook for peace in Aceh would have been bleak indeed. It is also suggested that the new
Law of Governing Aceh (LoGA) could be a valuable model for autonomy legislation. As a final
point, future study to expand the scope on various models and concept of monitoring mission in
managing crisis in order to come up with more responsive and relevant approaches in addressing
similar Inter-State conflict in the region.

14

REFERENCES:
Benjamin Reilly,Ethnic conflict in Papua New Guinea, Centre for Democratic Institutions,
Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia.
Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling, 2003, Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia,
Routledge Curzon, Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, p.149.
Edward Aspinall, 2005, Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict
Transformation, Berghof Foundation for Peace Support.
Joko P. Putranto, 2009, Aceh Conflict Resolution: Lessons Learned and the Future of Aceh. p17.
M. Isa Sulaiman, From Autonomy to Periphery: A Critical Evaluation of the Acehnese
Nationalist Movement, in Verandah of Violence, ed. by Anthony Reid, (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 2006), 130.
Jackson, R. Violent Internal Conflict and the African State, Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, 20: 1 (2002, pp. 2952).
Kingsbury, Damien 2007, Peace processes in Aceh and Sri Lanka: a comparative assessment,
Security challenges, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 93-112.
Mietzner and Aspinall, 2010, Understanding the Success of Multiethnic Parties in Indonesia,
University Press, Oxford.
Rizal Sukma, 2004. Security Operation in Aceh: Goal, Consequences, and Lessons (Washington
D.C.: East-West Center Washington), 6.
Rizal Sukma, 2012. Security sector Government and conflict management in Indonesia: The
Aceh Case, Asia Security Initiative Policy, Series Working Paper 21.
Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Against States: Ethno-political Conflict and the Changing World
System: 1994 Presidential Address, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep.,
1994), pp. 347-377