HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY
EVIDENCE LAW PROJECT ON:
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF CONFESSION UNDER
SECTION-30 OF INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
SUBMITTED BY:
SUBMITTED TO:
PRAKASH VAIBHAV
APURVA VERMA

MS.

SEMESTER VII
SUBMITTED ON:
ROLL NO. 116
AUGUST, 2016

16 TH

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I express my deepest regard and gratitude to my teacher, Ms. Apurva Verma for guiding me
through the subject. Her consistent supervision, constant inspiration and invaluable guidance
have also been of immense help in understanding and carrying out this project report.
I would also like to thank my family and friends without whose support and encouragement,
this project would not have been a reality.
I take this opportunity to also thank the University for providing extensive database resources
in the Library and through Internet.
Name: Prakash Vaibhav
Semester- VII
Section- B
Roll number- 116

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgementsi
Introduction...1
Objectives & Research Methodology3
Scope of Section 30...4
Principle behind Section 30...6
Section must be strictly construed.7
Joint Trial...9
Value of Section 30..10
Conclusion....13
Bibliography.iii

INTRODUCTION

Under our law a confession affecting the maker thereof and a co-accused
in a joint trial for the same offence, may be considered both against the
maker and a co-accused. This provision is contained in Section 30 of the
Evidence Act. It is as follows: Section 30, Evidence Act, When more
persons than one are being tried, jointly for the same offence, and a
confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other
of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such
confession as against such other person as well as against the person who
makes such confession.
The confession of a co-accused is no doubt admissible in evidence. The
co-accused un-corroborative by any other evidence is not sufficient to
sustain to conviction. The court cannot straightway start with the
confession of co-accused. If there is substantial evidence against the
accused and there remains some doubt lingering them the confession of
the co-accused may be taken into consideration to set that doubt at rest.1
The S.C. held2 that is the provisions of Section 30 of Evidence Act, the
confession of co-accused has to be regarded as amounting to evidence is
general way because whatever considered by the court is evidence. In
that sense the circumstances as well as probabilities considered by the
court as amount to evidence. But these are not defined as evidence u/S 3
of the Evidence Act.
Prior to passing of Evidence Act 1872, the statement of an accused person
was not evidence against a tell as prisoner or one who was jointly tried by
with person making it. In English law a prisoner is not liable to be affected
by confession of his accomplices.
The general rule is that the confession of an accused person is not
evidence against anyone but himself only. A confession implicated the
names of the other person. It was held that it should be proved in its
1 C.B. Xavier Cochin v. Food Inspector Mattemcherey AIR 1968 Kerala 66.
2 Haricharan Kurni v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184.
4

integrity. But it was the duty of judge not to consider the evidence against
anyone but the confess nor itself. It two persons were charged with joint
commission of an offence, one of them on his examination before a
magistrate, stated in the hearing of the other that they both that they
both committed the offence the other did not deny it. It was held that this
statement of one was not evidence against the other. 3 It is necessary that
the person confessing and other person against whom his confession is to
be taken into consideration should be tried jointly.
The High Courts in India have a view that the confession of the co-accused
can be used only in the support of other evidence. Clearly there must be
another evidence. It cannot be made the foundation of conviction is
correct.4
A confession of a person jointly tried with the prisoner can be taken into
consideration against him, it must appeal that the confession implicates
the confessing person substantially to the same extent as it implicates the
confessing person against whom it is to be used. A person admits guilt to
the fullest extent and exposes himself to the pains penalties provided for
his guilt. Then there is guarantee for truth of his confession. The
legislature provides that the statement may be considered against his
fellow prisoners charged with same crime.
A statement made by an accused person before it can be taken into
consideration against a fellow prisoner. According to section 30 of the Act,
must amount to a confession, on the part of the maker with respect to the
offence which all one charged.5 His confession may be taken into
consideration against such other as well as against himself because the
admission of his guilt operates as a sort of sanction which is to some
extent affords some guarantee of the truth of the whole statement.
3 R. v. Applely 3 Start 33.
4 Bhubani Sahu v. The King 1949 PC 257.
5 Bhadresurar Sardar v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Calcutta 416.
5

Section 30, is a very exceptional indeed, an ordinarily provision by which

something which is not evidence may be used against the person at his
trial. So such provision must be used with greatest caution and care.

OBJECTIVES

1. To understand the meaning of confession.

2. To understand the scope of Section 30.
3. To analyse the evidentiary value of confessions.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The secondary data available regarding the various types of law have
been discussed and analysed. The study has been carried out using the
descriptive analytical method. A doctrinal method for research has been
adopted. Both primary and secondary sources of data have been used.
The research consisted books, articles, and websites.

SCOPE

OF

SECTION 30

The section enacts that when more than one person being tried jointly for
the same offence, a confession made by one person from them affecting
himself and such other persons is proved the court may take into
consideration such confession as against such other persons as well as
against the confessor. The word may, in this section make it clear that it is
the discretion of the court to consider it or not, against such other person.
It is not bound in law to use such confessional against such other persons.
It has also emphasized that such confessional statements being not given
on oath, not in the presence of co-accused. It veracity cannot be tested by
cross-examination. So it should be used against the maker and not against
the others. This section has introduced first time in Indian Evidence Act, in
1872 and makes a departure from the common law of English. It is an
innovation of a very serious character, which is liable to cause injustice if
it is not properly understood and applied. It can be used against the coaccused only to support the other evidence. It cannot be made foundation
of conviction against him. This section applies to confessing not to
statements which do not admit the guilt of the conferring party. It is
opposed to the principle of jurisprudence to use the statement against a
person without giving him the opportunity of cross-examination, the
person making the statement.
The Privy Council in Bhubani v. King,6 discussed the exact scope of section
30:
Section 50 applies to confession not to the statements. This section seems
to be based on the view that an admission by an accused person of his
own guilt affords some sort of sanction in support of the truth of his own
confession against, other as well as co-accused. It is a weak type of
confession, section 307 does not define the co-accused evidence. It is not
6 1944 SC 257.
7 Evidence Act, 1872.
8

based on the oath, not in the presence of the co-accused, nor can it be
cross-examined. It is a supporting evidence not amounting to proof.
The Supreme Court approved these observations of Privy Council in the
case of Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P.8
Where the other evidence against the accused is less satisfactory and the
prosecution seeks to rely on the confession of the co-accused. Then the
presumption of innocence, which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence,
assists the accused person and compels the court to render the verdict
that the charge is not proved against him and so the accused is entitled to
benefit of the doubt.9 It is obvious that the confession of an accused
cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence against co-accused. 10
The principle is that where there is evidence against the co-accused is
sufficient if the court believes to support his conviction then this kind of
confession described u/S 30 may thrown into scale as an additional reason
for believing that evidence.11
The court must insist on independent evidence which implicates the coaccused. The fact and circumstances must raise not a mere suspicion is
not, but proved beyond doubt the co-accused person complicity in the
crime. Mere suspicion is not proof. The extra judicial confession of an coaccused involving the other co-accused can not be utilized against them
in the absence of the other independent evidence.12
In case of Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P.13 The accused committed the
crime. He confessed the crime and implicating himself and Kashmira
8 AIR 1952 SC 159.
9 State of Rajasthan v. Chetan Lal, 1970 Cr. L.J. 1206.
10 Public Prosecutor v. Shalik Ibrahim, AIR 1964 A.P. 548.
11 Devanchand v. State, AIR 1965 Orissa 66.
12 Buder Ganda v. State, AIR 1965 Orissa 170 .
9

Singh. The court convicted the accused and Kashmira Singh appealed to
the S.C. The court acquitted the appellant and held that a man should not
be deprived his life and liberty only on the basis of uncorroborated
confession of his co-accused.

13 AIR 1952 SC 159.

10

PRINCIPLE BEHIND SECTION 30

Normally a confession is useful as evidence against the accused person
who makes it. But by Section 30 of Evidence Act, it is laid down that it
may be taken into consideration against the co-accused also, provided it
affects the confessor as well as the co-accused. This is an important
qualification because a person would not incriminate himself for the sake
of incriminating the other co-accused, unless it is true. In other words the
self-incrimination of an accused person vouchsafes the truth of the
accusation of the other. West J. in Empress v. Daji Narsu14, very
emphatically said that Where a person admits guilt to the fullest extent
and exposes himself to the pains and penalties provided for his guilt, there
is a guarantee for the truth of the statement of the accused and the
legislature provides that the statement may be considered against his coprisoners charged with the same crime, Straight, J., in Queen Empress v.
Fagrup15 expressed this principle as follows: What was intended was that
where a prisoner, to use a popular phrase makes a clean breast of it and
unreservedly confesses his own guilt and at the same time implicates
another who is jointly tried for the same offence, his confession can be
taken into consideration against such other as well as against himself,
because the admission of his own guilt operates as a sort of a sanction,
which to some extent takes the place of the sanction of an oath, and
affords some guarantee that the whole statement is a true one. In
another case the same learned Judge pithily said that the confessing
prisoner must tar himself and the person or persons he implicates with
one and the same brush. The object sought by the rule of law, said
West J., in Queen Empress v. Nur Mahomed16 is a safeguard for sincerity
and for information.
14 (1882) I.L.R. 6 Bom. 288
15 ILR (1885) 7 All 646
16 ILR 1884 (8) Bom 223
11

12

SECTION MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED

It has been held over and over again in a catena of decisions that this
section has to be construed very strictly. Thus it has been said Section 30
of Act I of 1872, introduces, as it does, an entirely new, and I am inclined
to think, rather dangerous element into the conduct of criminal trials, and
ought to be constructed with great strictness. It was remarked in In reMarimuthu17, that this section should be construed with the greatest
caution and with care to make sure that we do not stretch it one line
beyond its necessary intention.
The same anxiety which characterized he interpretation of this section so
as not to make it comprehensive in import, is to be seen in the judicial
interpretation according to which for invoking the rule of this section, the
confession prisoner must implicate himself to the same extent as his coprisoner whom he incriminates. There is authority even in older cases for
saving That the statement of one prisoner cannot be taken as evidence
against another prisoner under Section 30 unless the parties are
admittedly in parti delicto i.e. when the confession prisoner implicates
himself to the full, as much as his co-prisoner whom he is criminating.
(Emperor v. Baijoo)18 to the effect, West J., in Emperor v. Daji Narsu,19 it
was observed, and it is as follows; When a person admits guilt to the
fullest extent and exposes himself to the pains and penalties provided for
this guilt, there is guarantee for his truth and the Legislature provides that
his statement may be considered against his fellow prisoners charged in
the same crime, Straight, J. in Emperor v. Jagrup,20 summed up this
position in the following excellent manner : What was intended with
17 73 Ind Cas 961
18 25 WR 430 Cr.
19 6 Bom. 288.
20 7 All 646.
13

regard to Section 30 of the Evidence act, was that, where a prisoner, to

use a population phrase, makes a clean breast of it, and unreservedly
confesses his own guilt, and at the same time implicates another person
who is jointly tried with him for the same offence, his confession may be
taken into consideration against such other person as well as against
himself, because his own guilt operates a sort of sanction which to some
extent, takes the place of an oath, and so affords some guarantee that the
whole statement is a true one. But where there is no full and complete
admission of guilt, no such sanction or guarantee exists and for this
reason, the confession in Section 30, cannot be construed as including a
mere inculpatory admission which falls short of being an admission of
guilt. The same learned Judge in R. v. Ganiraj21, expressed the
implications of Section 30 as follows The test, Section 30 intended to be
applied to a statement of one prisoner proposed to be used in-evidence as
against another, is, to see whether it is sufficient by itself to justify the
conviction of the person making it of the offence for which he is being
jointly tried with the other person or persons against whom it is tendered.
In fact to use a popular and well understood phrase, the confessing
prisoner must far himself and the person or persons he implicated with
one and the same brush.
The principle in Ganirajs case has been followed in R. v. Mulu,22 and
Bhadraswar v. R23. But the rule laid down in R. v. Ganiraj was explained in
later decisions to mean that all that is required to make the confession
admissible against a co-accused is that it should substantially implicated
its maker in regard to the offence for which he and his co-accused are
charged. Admission of actual guilt is not necessary. It is sufficient if the
admission constructively established his guilt as well as that of a coaccused.
21 2 All 444.
22 2 All 646 .
23 AIR 1928 Calcutta 418, 109 Indian Cases 351.
14

15

JOINT TRIAL
Section 30 only relates the confession made by accused person who being
jointly tried for the same offence at the same time with the accused
against whom the confession is used. Two persons are charged with
murder and one of them made a statement to a Magistrate, it was held
that the statement of an accused could only be taken into consideration
as against the other person U/S 30. If two accused were being tried jointly
the same offence.
The tried jointly means legally tried jointly and not imply tried jointly as a
matter of fact. The confession of person who is dead and was never
brought to trial is not admissible U/S 30 as the confession of co-accused. 24
When a person makes a confessional statement implicating himself and
the another accused, but did before the commencement or completion of
a enquiry his statement is not admissible U/S 30 of Evidence Act.
But where during the joint trial of two accused persons one died but
before his death, his confession has been put on the record, it was held
that the confession could be used against the other accused.25
The confession of an approver can be used u/S 30 only when he is being
tried jointly with the prisoners and not after he has become approver and
removed from the dark.
An approved cannot be deemed as being jointly tried with the accused, his
confession is not therefore admissible u/S 30 against the accused. A
confession of an absconding co-conspirator who is not tried jointly with
other conspirators cannot be used against the latter.
Where a jointly trial start but could not last as one of the accused
absconded and the case of that accused was separated u/S 512 26 Section

24 Achhaylal Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1947 P.C. 90.

25 Ram Sarup v. Emperor, 1937 Calcutta 39.
16

30 of the Act would not attracted and the statement of the other accused,

17

was not useable against the absconding accused.27

18

VALUE OF SECTION 30
Affecting Himself and some other
A statement entirely exculpates himself and inculpates his other fellow
prisoners is not comes under the scope of this section. It does not amount
to confession of the makers own individual guilt for which he and others

19

are tried jointly. This type of statement can afford no guarantee of its

20

truth.28
The section applies to the case where confession of the accused indirectly
covers. In a case it was held that the confession of the accused implicates

21

him substantially to the same extent as it used implicates the person

22

against whom it is to be used for the offence jointly tried.29

23

The Allahabad High Court held that a confession in which the confessor
assigns to himself a minor or subordinate part of offence and major part to

24

his fellow prisoners jointly tried cannot be used against the later.30

25

The Supreme Court has laid down in Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab.31 That
a confessional statement of one accused can be taken into consideration
against the other accused it. The conditions laid down U/S 30 are fulfilled.
One of the condition is that confession must implicate the substantially to
the same extent as the other accused person. If he throws main blame of
the other accused and makes out that he was an unwilling spectator of the
crime committed by the other accused, it can be stated that he confession

26

cannot be used at all against the other accused.32

In conclusion it is submitted that the confession made by accused must be
affected himself and other accused equally that is, it must effect both of
them and no more.
Made
This section applied only to confessions made before magistrate to prove
the trial. The confession may have made at any time before the trial or at
the time of trial. The section requires that the confession whatever made
must be proved before the court, is taken into consideration against the
accused.
Proved

27

Section 30 requires that a confession made by an accused which is to be

28

used against the other fellow prisoners must be proved in the court. 33
Where a prisoner makes a confession in the absence of another prisoners
and the other prisoner have had no opportunity of denying or even of
knowing about that confession, cannot be said to have been proved. It is
only after the proper proof is given that it may be taken into considered. It
means proved before the prosecution case come to an end.
Where the accomplice made a confession that ornaments looted in
dacoity were kept in a particular place in house of the co-accused in
consultation with him. He had promised to pay their price after melting
them. The ornaments were recovered from the place stated by the

29

accused. There was ample corroboration of the confession and same could

30

be used against the co-accused.34

May take into Consideration
Section 30 does not say that a confession made by accused will be
evidence against the co-accused. It says that the court may take into such
evidence consideration. The confession of the co-accused is not an
evidence u/S 3 of the evidence Act. No conviction can be based upon it
solely. It can only be used to corroborate other evidence of the record. It
might assist the court in coming to the conclusion that other evidence is

31

true. The confession can only be used to satisfy the court that the

32

evidence is true.35
It is the discretion of the court to take into consideration. The confession
of one of the accused against the other accused tried jointly. In order that
it may be used against co-accused. The confession should implicate that
the confessing persons substantially to the same extent as it implicates
the persons against whom it is to used. In the absence of sufficient
evidence against the other accused to sustain there conviction, the
confession of the co-accused can not even to be take into consideration.
The word may does not show that the every confession is of very small
value against co-accused. The judge is given a discretion but the
discretion must be exercised in judicial manner.
It is necessary that being other evidence on record to which this
statement can lay assurance.
The word may take into consideration show that such confession is not
more than an element in the consideration of all the fact of the case and
they do not have the effect of doing away with the necessity of other
evidence.
Confession of accused against co-accused can be considered if there is
other circumstantial evidence. In a warrant case, eleven accused were put
up for trial. Ten accused pleaded guilty and on acceptance of their pleas of
guilty, they were convicted and sentenced. Thereafter some evidence was
recorded and as the case was triable as a warrant case, a change was
levied against the eleventh accused after few months. It was held that
against the eleventh accused in trial, provisions of Section 30 could not be
considered into service for the purpose of relying on the confessions of the
co-accused. Confessional statement of co-accused in no evidence and it

33

can be used only to support the prosecution case. It cannot be a basis for

34

framing of charge against co-accused.36

35

CONCLUSION
Confession is the strongest evidence against the maker of it. Once
admitted in evidence, it leads to conviction of the accused even without
any other evidence in some cases. The court should always be cautious
enough before convicting an accused based only on his confession. The
Courts have formulated some rules of prudence and rules of caution so
that an accused is not convicted only on the basis of his statement to
ensure that no innocent be punished. These rules have, by practice over
the years, become as much enforceable as rules of law. The trial court has
to decide depending on the facts and circumstances of each case before
it. For more clarity and uniformity of decisions the accepted rules of
prudence may be recognised by statutes. Besides section 24 of the
Evidence Act may be amended to include the terms torture, coercion,
cruelty, inhuman treatment along with threat, inducement, promise
to reject all involuntary confessions. Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872
may be amended to include all law enforcing and security agencies with
police or alternatively the term police and voluntary may be defined for
more clarity. Provisions should be made regulating admissibility and
evidentiary value of confession by gesture. Section 30 of the Evidence Act,
1972 may be amended to clearly state, like section 34 of the said act
which states that entries in books of account are relevant but shall not
alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability, that
confession of a co-accused shall not sufficient evidence to convict a nonconfessing accused. Similar provision may be made on conviction on the
basis of an extrajudicial oral confession.

36

37

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DR. V NAGESWARA RAO, THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1ST EDITION, LEXIS NEXIS

BUTTERWORTHS
M.C. SARKAR, S.C. SARKAR, PRABHAS C. SARKAR, SUDIPTO SARKAR, SARKAR'S
LAW

OF

EVIDENCE, 18TH EDITION, LexisNexis Butterworths

26 Cr. P.C. 1898.

27 Assistant Collector of Customs New Delhi v. Harbans Lal Saraf Cr. L.J. 618.
28 Krishna Narayan v. State of U.P. 1976 Cr. L.J. 503.
29 Kunhaman v. State of Kerala, 1974 Cr. L.J. 328.
30 Shambu v. Emperor, 1932 ALJ 162.
31 AIR 1957 SC 216.
32 Charan Dass v. State, 1971 Orissa 100.
33 Section 3 Indian Evidence Act, A fact is proved if after considering the matter before the
court, it believes to exist.
34 Bibhuti v. State, 1979 Cr. L.J. (NOC) (2) Allahabad.
35 Chandra Dass v. State, AIR 1952 Calcutta 618 1977(3) SCC 342.
36 1980 Cr. L.J. (Gujrat) 234.