BENJAMIN P.

GOMEZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as Postmaster General, HON. BRIGIDO R.
VALENCIA, in his capacity as Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and
DOMINGO GOPEZ, in his capacity as Acting Postmaster of San Fernando,
Pampanga, respondent-appellants.
Facts: On September l5, 1963 the petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez mailed a letter at the
post office in San Fernando, Pampanga. Because this letter, addressed to a certain
Agustin Aquino, did not bear the special anti-TB stamp required by the statute, it was
returned to the petitioner.
In view of this development, the petitioner brough suit for declaratory relief in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, to test the constitutionality of the statute, as well as
the implementing administrative orders issued, contending that it violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as well as the rule of uniformity and equality of
taxation
Issues/ Ruling:
1. Equal Protection Clause/ Rule of uniformity
- The five centavo charge levied by Republic Act 1635, as amended, is in the nature of an
excise tax, laid upon the exercise of a privilege, namely, the privilege of using the mails.
As such the objections levelled against it must be viewed in the light of applicable
principles of taxation.
To begin with, it is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select the
subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions. 4 This power has aptly been described as "of
wide range and flexibility." 5 Indeed, it is said that in the field of taxation, more than in
other areas, the legislature possesses the greatest freedom in classification. 6 The reason
for this is that traditionally, classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local
needs and usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden.
In the case of the anti-TB stamps, undoubtedly, the single most important and influential
consideration that led the legislature to select mail users as subjects of the tax is the
relative ease and convenienceof collecting the tax through the post offices. The small
amount of five centavos does not justify the great expense and inconvenience of
collecting through the regular means of collection. On the other hand, by placing the duty
of collection on postal authorities the tax was made almost self-enforcing, with as little
cost and as little inconvenience as possible.
2. The petitioner further argues that the tax in question is invalid, first, because it
is not levied for a public purpose as no special benefits accrue to mail users as
taxpayers, and second, because it violates the rule of uniformity in taxation.
- The eradication of a dreaded disease is a public purpose, but if by public purpose
the petitioner means benefit to a taxpayer as a return for what he pays, then it is
sufficient answer to say that the only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally
entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized
society, established and safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to public purposes.
3. Finally, the claim is made that the statute is so broadly drawn that to execute it
the respondents had to issue administrative orders far beyond their powers.
- It is true that the law does not expressly authorize the collection of five centavos
except through the sale of anti-TB stamps, but such authority may be implied in so far as

it may be necessary to prevent a failure of the undertaking. The authority given to the
Postmaster General to raise funds through the mails must be liberally construed,
consistent with the principle that where the end is required the appropriate means are
given.

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased

Antonio Jayme Ledesma,plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as the Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee.
Facts:
Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the
sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop
years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void,
being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's
opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutioally levied.
Issues/Ruling:
The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided
for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the taxing power.
Analysis of the Act, and particularly of section 6 (heretofore quoted in full), will
show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is
primarily an exercise of the police power. it was competent for the legislature to find that
the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in turn; and in
the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution of
benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added
strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain
Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar
industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within
reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion.
Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness

WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of

Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET
AL., respondents-appellees
Facts:
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal,
instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that
Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works",
approved on June 20, 1953,
that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder
roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet
constructed, . . . within the Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at . . . Pasig,
Rizal" which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any

important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio

Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder roads were to be construed)
were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the
passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines
that on May, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council
of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of
Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject
to the condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to
change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the
municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent
Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of
Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the
construction of the projected feeder roads in question

Issues/Ruling:
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 be declared
null and void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be
"declared unconstitutional and, therefor, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be issued
enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Director of the Bureau
of Public Works and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the
continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads project, and from making and securing
any new and further releases on the aforementioned item of Republic Act No. 920, and
the disbursing officers of the Department of Public Works and Highways from making any
further payments out of said funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that pending
final hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the
aforementioned parties respondent from making and securing any new and further
releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No. 920 and from making any further
payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.
- It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct
object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the
magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of
the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of
private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their
aid by the use public money.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its
passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently
thereto, unless the latter consists of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with
retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to
the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality
thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill,
which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill
was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or
on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the
result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and void. 4
The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of
said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of
legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic
defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the
declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO,
JR., Respondent.
Facts:
petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May
27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties,
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a
10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
Issues/Ruling:
Procedural: Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
Substantive: 1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106,
107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article VI, Section 28(2)
2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the
NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate
the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article III, Section 1