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This case arose when private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU (TLM-BLTBNAFLU), an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions. (NAFLU), filed a Notice of Strike against the
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA. Efforts at
amicable settlement having failed, Acting Labor Secretary C. Castro certified the dispute to the NLRC on August 29,
1988. A copy of the certification order was served upon the NAFLU on August 29, 1988, and on the TLM-BLTBCoNAFLU on August 30, 1988. However, it was noted in the notice of order that union secretary Jerry Soriano refused to
receive it. On August 31, 1988, the officers and members of TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike and maintained
picket lines blocking the premises of BLTBCo's terminals. NLRC issued an en banc resolution ordering the striking
employees to lift their picket and to remove all obstructions and barricades. All striking employees on payroll as of
May 23, 1988, were required to return to work. BLTBCo was directed to accept them back to work within 5 days
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went
on strike, only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were later re-admitted. Subsequently, about 614
employees, including those who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike, filed individual complaints
for illegal dismissal. Their common ground was that they were refused admission when they reported back for work.
BLTBCo contends that the 190 union members who participated in the illegal strike should not have been reinstated
because they defied the return-to-work order of September 6, 1988. It invokes against the NLRC its own words in its
resolution of July 19, 1991, where it said: A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of
an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph
of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended; Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their
employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.
Issue: WoN the 190 union members should be reinstated even the strike is illegal and they initially defied the return
to work order
Held: Yes
The mere fact that the majority of the strikers were able to return to work does not necessarily mean that the
rest deliberately defied the return-to-work order or that they had been sufficiently notified thereof. As the Solicitor
General correctly adds, some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time to return during the
period given by the petitioner, which was only five days. The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents
abandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot
by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of
employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. 4 This refusal
must be clearly established. As we stressed in a recent case, 5 mere absence is not sufficient; it must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. A
worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his employment. If his
purpose is to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike. We agree with the Solicitor General
that the mere filing of charges against an employee for alleged illegal acts during a strike does not by itself justify his
dismissal. The charges must be proved at an investigation duly called where the employee shall be given an
opportunity to defend himself. The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited to those "who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented to
substantiate the commission thereof and not merely an unsubstantiated allegation. He who asserts the commission of
illegal acts, must prove the same, and it is on the basis of substantiated evidence that this Commission declares the
loss of employment status of specific union members who have committed illegal acts.
The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an
instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are
able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat
to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working

class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the
workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in
the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the
legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industries affected with public
interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.


Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, the petitioner herein, were
casual employees of respondent CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation. In the said company, the collective bargaining
representative of all rank and file employees was CENAPRO Employees Association (CCEA), with which respondent
company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Their CBA excluded casual employees from membership in
the incumbent union. The casual employees who have rendered at least one to six years of service sought
regularization of their employment. When their demand was denied, they formed themselves into an organization and
affiliated with the Association of Independent unions in the Philippines (AIUP). Thereafter, AIUP filed a petition for
certification election, which petition was opposed by the respondent company. The CCEA anchored its opposition on
the contract bar rule. On May 4, and July 3, 1990, the union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote, and the
needed documentation, with the Department of Labor and Employment. The notice of strike cited as grounds therefor
the acts of respondent company constituting unfair labor practice, more specifically coercion of employees and
systematic union busting.
On July 23, 1992, the union proceeded to stage a strike, in the course of which, the union perpetrated illegal
acts. The strikers padlocked the gate of the company. The areas fronting the gate of the company were barricaded
and blocked by union strikers. The strikers also prevented and coerced other non-striking employees from reporting
for work.
Subsequently, the respondent company filed a complaint for illegal strike. The day before, July 24, 1990,
petitioners filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal lockout against the respondent company. In a
consolidated Decision, he Labor Arbiter declared as illegal the strike staged by the petitioners, and dismissed the
charge of illegal lockout and unfair labor practice and five (5) union officers were declared to have lost their
employment status, fifteen (15) union members were not reinstated because they executed quit claims in favor of the
respondent company, and six (6) workers, Rosalito Bantulan, Edward Regner, Joel Densing Henedino Mirafuentes,
Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, were ordered to be reinstated. On October 8, 1993, the Labor Arbiter
issued an Order excluding Rosalito Bantulan and Edward Regner from the list of those to be reinstated and to be paid
backwages. The remaining four (4) workers, Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres
Tejana, are the petitioners here.
Issue: WON there is union busting on the part of the company as basis of the strike
Held: NO.
The NLRC correctly ruled that the strike staged by petitioners was in the nature of a union-recognitionstrike. A union-recognition-strike, as its legal designation implies, is calculated to compel the employer to recognize
ones union and not other contending group, as the employees bargaining representative to work out a collective
bargaining agreement despite the striking unions doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of
formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit. It is undisputed that at the time the petition
for certification election was filed by AIUP, the petitioner union, there was an existing CBA between the respondent
company and CCEA, the incumbent bargaining representative of all rank and file employees. The petition should
have not been entertained because of the contract bar rule. When a collective bargaining agreement has been duly
registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code, a petition for certification election or motion for
intervention may be entertained only within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of the said agreement. [8] Outside
the said period, as in the present case, the petition for certification election or motion for intervention cannot be
allowed. Hence, the conclusion that the respondent company did not commit the alleged union busting.
From the gamut of evidence on hand, it can be gathered that the strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal
for the reasons, that:

1) The strikers committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. They formed human barricades to block
the road, prevented the passage of the respondent companys truck, padlocked the companys gate, and
prevented co-workers from entering the company premises.[9]
2) And violated the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[10] enjoining the union and/or its members from
obstructing the company premises, and ordering the removal therefrom of all the barricades.
A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. [11] It is considered as the most
effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment.[12] But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means
for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits
for its exercise. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly
paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:
a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where
the means employed are illegal. For instance, the strike was considered illegal as the strikers formed a human cordon
along the side of the Sta. Ana wharf and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of
It follows therefore that the dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid. Their dismissal
as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code,
pertinent portion of which provides: x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any x x
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status. x x. As observed by the Labor Arbiter, it was the appellant-workers who voluntarily stopped
working because of their strike. In fact, the appellant workers admitted that non-striking workers who wanted to return
to work were allowed to do so. Their being without work could not therefore be attributed to the employers refusal to
give them work but rather, to the voluntary withdrawal of their services in order to compel the company to recognize
their union. The next aspect of the case to consider is the fate of the four petitioners herein. Decisive on the matter is
the pertinent provision of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code that: x x any worker x x who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. x x It can be gleaned
unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee can not be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the
strike[17] and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified. But proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may
justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. (additional only)

The labor conflict between the parties broke out in the open when
the petitioner union 1 struck on April 6, 1992 protesting issues ranging from unfair labor practices and union busting
allegedly committed by the private respondent. 2 The union picketed the premises of the private respondent at
Bagumbayan and Longos in Quezon City; Angono and Antipolo in Rizal; San Fernando, Pampanga and San Pedro,
The strike hurt the private respondent. On April 8, 1992, it filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction 3 to stop the
strike which it denounced as illegal. It alleged that at around 7:00 p.m., respondents led by its officers and some
members staged a wild-cat strike, without a valid notice of strike, nor observing cooling-off period, and made even

during the pendency of a preventive mediation proceedings. And during the said wild-cat strike, respondents have
set-up makeshifts, tents, banners and streamers and other man-made obstructions at the main plant and offices of
petitioner which effectively impeding, as in fact still effectively impeding the ingress and egress of persons who have
lawful business with the petitioner.
The union, however, claimed that it was not furnished a copy of the petition. Allegedly, the company misrepresented
its address to be at Rm. 205-6 Herald Bldg., Muralla St., Intramuros, Manila. On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the
evidence of the company alone. The ex parte hearing started at 2:30 p.m. where testimonial and documentary
evidence were presented. 4 Some thirty (30) minutes later, an Ocular Inspection Report was submitted by an
unnamed NLRC representative stating that the business operation was completely paralized (sic) as no person was
noticed inside the company compound. No persons and/or vehicles were seen entering and leaving the
premises. Ingress to and engress from the company is presumed to be not free. Before the day was over, the
respondent NLRC (First Division) issued a temporary restraining order against the union No copy of this Order was
furnished the union. The union learned of the Order only when it was posted on April 15, 1992 at the premises of the
company. On April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction wherein
it alleged that the respondents are still committing illegal acts, by resorting to grave threats, intimidation against the
non-striking employees and persons with lawful transactions with the company since April 20, 1992, continuously up
to this time, either by actual threats and intimidation whenever these persons attempt to report to work or transact
business with the company, or by calling at their houses or places of residence, and then and there coerce not to
report for work on pain of bodily harm. The union got wind of the motion only on May 4, 1992. The next day, May 5,
1992, it opposed the motion, alleging They were never furnished by the petitioner with a copy of the original petition
for injunction filed on April 8, 1992 because as seen from the petition, petitioner addressed the respondents at Rm.
205-206 Herald Bldg., Muralla St., Manila as stated in paragraph 2 of the said petition and they came to know only of
the same when Commission issued a temporary restraining order dated April 15, 1992 which was served to them at
the picket line on April 15, 1992 and thus they opposed the same on April 20, 1992. The same day, however, the
respondent NLRC issued its disputed Order 7 granting the company's motion for preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON the NLRCs order valid
Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of employees to
improve the terms and conditions of their employment. It may be that in highly developed countries, the significance
of strike as a coercive weapon has shrunk in view of the preference for more peaceful modes of settling labor
disputes. In underdeveloped countries, however, where the economic crunch continues to enfeeble the already
marginalized working class, the importance of the right to strike remains undiminished as indeed it has proved many
a time as the only coercive weapon that can correct abuses against labor. It remains as the great equalizer. In the
case at bar, the records will show that the respondent NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218
(e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code in issuing its Order of May 5, 1992. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides both
the procedural and substantive requirements which must strictly be complied with before a temporary or permanent
injunction can issue in a labor dispute
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave
or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code
shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of
the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding
of fact by the commission, to the effect:
(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless
restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or
unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the
prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;

(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants property are unable or unwilling to furnish
adequate protection.
oreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair strategies to secure ex parte temporary restraining orders
against striking employees. Petitioner union did not receive any copy of private respondent's petition for injunction in
Case No. 000249-92 filed on April 8, 1992. Its address as alleged by the private respondent turned out to be
"erroneous". 15 Consequently, the petitioner was denied the right to attend the hearing held on April 13, 1992 while the
private respondent enjoyed a field day presenting its evidence ex parte. On the basis of uncontested evidence, the
public respondent, on the same day April 13, 1992, temporarily enjoined the petitioner from committing certain
alleged illegal acts. Again, a copy of the Order was sent to the wrong address of the petitioner. Knowledge of the
Order came to the petitioner only when its striking members read it after it was posted at the struck areas of the
private respondent.
To be sure, the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order in a labor dispute is not per
se prohibited. Its issuance, however, should be characterized by care and caution for the law requires that it
be clearly justified by considerations of extreme necessity, i.e., when the commission of unlawful acts is
causing substantial and irreparable injury to company properties and the company is, for the moment, bereft
of an adequate remedy at law. This is as it ought to be, for imprudently issued temporary restraining orders can
break the back of employees engaged in a legal strike.


About a month and a half before the expiration of the CBA, the parties submitted their respective proposals
and counter-proposals to serve as bases for their discussions on its projected renewal. The ensuing series of
negotiations however resulted in a deadlock prompting petitioner Great Pacific Life Employees Union (UNION
hereon) to file a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of
Labor. Despite several conciliatory conferences before the Board, the impasse could not be resolved. Thus, on 3
November 1993 petitioner UNION led by its President Isidro Alan B. Domingo and Vice President Rodel P. de la Rosa
went on strike. Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (GREPALIFE hereon) required all striking employees to
explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action, including possible dismissal from
employment, should be taken against them for committing illegal acts against the company in the course of the strike.
They were warned that failure to submit their explanations within the prescribed period would be construed as waiver
of their right to be heard. The company directive was apparently triggered by some violent incidents that took place
while the strike was in progress. Strikers reportedly blocked all points of ingress and egress of the company premises
in Makati City thus preventing GREPALIFE employees reporting for work from entering their respective offices. These
employees and third persons doing business with the company, including lessees of the GREPALIFE building, were
allegedly forced by the strikers to submit their cars/vehicles, bags and other belongings to illegal search. Complying
with the order, UNION President Alan B. Domingo and some strikers explained that they did not violate any law as
they were merely exercising their constitutional right to strike. Petitioner Rodel P. de la Rosa and the rest of the
strikers however ignored the management directive. NION officers were notified of the termination of their services,
effective immediately, as Senior Benefits Clerk and Senior Data Analyst, respectively. 2 All other strikers whose
explanations were found unacceptable or who failed to submit written explanations were likewise
dismissed. 3Notwithstanding their dismissal from employment, Domingo and de la Rosa continued to lead the
members of the striking union in their concerted action against management. On 15 February 1994 Domingo and de
la Rosa filed a joint letter of resignation with respondent company but emphasized therein that "(their) resignation is
submitted only because the same is demanded by the Company, and it should not be understood as a waiver as
none is expressingly or impliedly made of whatever rights (they) may have under existing contracts and labor and
social legislation." 7 The MOA was subsequently incorporated in a new CBA which was signed on 4 March 1994 but
made effective on 1 July 1993 until 30 June 1996.
On 2 June 1994 Domingo and de la Rosa sue GREPALIFE for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages.

Issue: WON dela Rosa was illegally dismissed because his actual participation in the illegal acts during the strike
Held: NO
The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions. 14 The Labor Code is
emphatic against the use of violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike and to this end prohibits the
obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's premises for lawful purposes. The sanction provided in par.
(a) of Art. 262 thereof is so severe that "any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status." 15
GREPALIFE submitted before the Labor Arbiter several affidavits of its employees which de la Rosa did not refute. Of
these documents, two (2) specifically described the incidents that transpired during the strike
Petitioner de la Rosa assails the inherent weakness of the sworn statements of these security guards. But while it is
true that affidavits may be regarded as infirm evidence 16 before the regular courts unless the affiants are presented
on the stand, such affidavits by themselves are acceptable in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Under Sec. 7,
Rule V, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, these proceedings, save for the constitutional requirements of
due process, are not to be strictly governed by the technicalities of law and procedural rules. Section 3, par. 2, of the
same Rule provides that verified position papers are to be accompanied by all supporting documents including the
affidavits of the parties' respective witnesses in lieu of direct testimony. It is therefore a clear mandate that the Labor
Arbiter may employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy before him.
Since de la Rosa did not present countervailing evidence, the NLRC correctly appreciated the affidavits of the two (2)
security guards as having adequately established the charges leveled against de la Rosa thus justifying his dismissal
from employment.
While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not every unfair act or decision constitutes unfair
labor practice (ULP) as defined and enumerated under Art. 248 Of the Labor Code. 18
There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts instituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers'
right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may be held liable under this provision if his conduct affects in whatever
manner the right of an employee to self-organize. The decision of respondent GREPALIFE to consider the top officers
of petitioner UNION as unfit for reinstatement is not essentially discriminatory and constitutive of an unlawful labor
practice of employers under the above-cited provision. Discriminating in the context of the Code involves either
encouraging membership in any labor organization or is made on account of the employee's having given or being
about to give testimony under the Labor Code. These have not been proved in the case at bar.
To elucidate further, there can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated. 19A
union officer has larger and heavier responsibilities than a union member. Union officers are duty bound to respect
the law and to exhort and guide their members to do the same; their position mandates them to lead by example. By
committing prohibited activities during the strike, de la Rosa as Vice President of petitioner UNION demonstrated a
high degree of imprudence and irresponsibility. Verily this justifies his dismissal from employment. Since the objective
of the Labor Code is to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace, the dismissal of undesirable labor
leaders should be upheld. 20
It bears emphasis that the employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment according to his own discretion and
judgment. This prerogative flaws from the established rule that labor laws do not authorize substitution of judgment of
the employer in the conduct of his business. Recall of workers clearly falls within the ambit of management
prerogative. 21 The employer can exercise this prerogative without fear of liability so long as it is done in good faith for
the advancement of his interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees
under special laws or valid agreements. It is valid as long as it is not performed in a malicious, harsh, oppressive,
vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite.

Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Interphil Laboratories, Inc., a company engaged in the business of manufacturing and packaging
pharmaceutical products. They had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from 01 August 1990 to 31
July 1993. Prior to the expiration of the CBA Allesandro G. Salazar, Vice-President-Human Resources Department of
respondent company, was approached by Nestor Ocampo, the union president, and Hernando Clemente, a union
director. The two union officers inquired about the stand of the company regarding the duration of the CBA which was
set to expire in a few months. Salazar told the union officers that the matter could be best discussed during the formal
negotiations which would start soon. The two officers again approached Salazar and inquired once more about the
CBA but received the same reply. Ocampo requested for a meeting to discuss the duration and effectivity of the
CBA. Salazar acceded and a meeting was held where the union officers asked whether Salazar would be amenable
to make the new CBA effective for two (2) years, starting 01 August 1993. Salazar, however, declared that it would
still be premature to discuss the matter and that the company could not make a decision at the moment. The very
next day, all the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule of
from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. At 2:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., respectively, the employees
stopped working and left their workplace without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they
were working on. When Salazar inquired about the reason for their refusal to follow their normal work schedule, the
employees told him to "ask the union officers." To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the
company, Salazar immediately asked for a meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union
director, told Salazar that the employees would only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree
to their demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union officers that the
matter could be better discussed during the formal renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was apparently
unsatisfied with the answer of the company, the overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to
engage in a work slowdown campaign during the time they were working, thus substantially delaying the production
of the company. Respondent company filed with the NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner unions overtime
boycott and work slowdown which amounted to illegal strike.
Issue: whether or not the respondents have engaged in "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" both amounting to
illegal strike
Yes. As undisputably testified to by Mr. Alessandro G. Salazar, the company's Vice-President-Human Resources
Department, sometime in February, 1993, he was approached by the union President NestorOcampo and Union
Director Hernando Clemente who asked him as to what was the stand of the company regarding the duration of the
CBA between the company and which was set to expire He answered that the matter could be best discussed during
the formal renegotiations which anyway was to start soon. This query was followed up sometime in March, 1993, and
his answer was the same. In early April, 1993, the union president requested for a meeting to discuss the duration
and effectivity of the CBA. Acceding to the request, a meeting was held on April 15, 1993 wherein the union officers
asked him if he would agree to make the new CBA effective on August 1, 1993 and the term thereof to be valid for
only two (2) years. When he answered that it was still premature to discuss the matter, the very next day, all the rank
and file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule of 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M.
and 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M., when after the 8-hours work, they abruptly stopped working at 2:00 P.M. and 2:00 A.M.,
respectively, leaving their place of work without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were
working on.When he saw the workers leaving before the end of their shift, he asked them why and their reply was
"asked (sic) the union officers." Alarmed by the overtime boycott and the damage it was causing the company, he
requested for a meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, he asked them why the regular work schedule was
not being followed by the employees, and union Director Enrico Gonzales, with the support of the other union officers,

told him that if management would agree to a two-year duration for the new CBA and an effectivity date of August 1,
1993, all employees will return to the normal work schedule of two 12-hour shifts. When answered that the
management could not decide on the matter at the moment and to have it discussed and agreed upon during the
formal renegotiations, the overtime boycott continued and the employees at the same time employed a work
slowdown campaign during working hours, causing considerable delay in the production and complaints from the
clients/customers. Evidently, from all the foregoing, respondents' unjustified unilateral alteration of the 24-hour work
schedule thru their concerted activities of "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" from April 16, 1993 up to March 7,
1994, to force the petitioner company to accede to their unreasonable demands, can be classified as a strike on an
installment basis, as correctly called by petitioner company. It is thus undisputed that members of the union by their
own volition decided not to render overtime services in April 1993. More importantly, the overtime boycott or work
slowdown by the employees constituted a violation of their CBA, which prohibits the union or employee, during the
existence of the CBA, to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work. In Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa vs. NLRC,[23] this Court ruled: The Court also agrees that such a slowdown is generally condemned as
inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees continue to work and remain at their positions and
accept the wages paid to them, they at the same time select what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of
their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to the employers damage, to do other work; in other words, they work
on their own terms.


Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their agricultural establishments
are located in Davao City. On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondents. private respondents contracted Philippine
Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide security services for their business premises located in
Lapanday, Bandug, Callawa, Davao City, and Guising, Davao Del Sur. Their contract also called for the protection of
the lives and limbs of private respondents' officers, employees and guests within company premises. The Union
branded the security guards posted within the company premises as private respondents' "goons" and "special
forces." It also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members.
An unfortunate event brake the peace of the parties. On September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez, a member of
the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his wife and children. The
gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of private respondents.
The day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report for work. They returned to work the
following day but they did not comply with the "quota system" adopted by the management to bolster production
output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent (30%). Private
respondents charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown. Private respondents filed separate
charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for
injunction. On September 17, 1988, petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez who
was laid to rest. Again, on September 23, 1988, petitioners did not report for work. Instead, they proceeded to private
respondents' office at Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for the removal of the security guards, the
ouster of certain management officials, and the approval of their mass leave application. Their mass action did not
succeed. On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was canducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of
the strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB
on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on October 12, 1988, the Union struck.
Issue: WON the strike staged by petitioners on October 2, 1988 illegal

Held: yes
A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial
or labor dispute." 4 It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force
management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some
disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and
progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and
management together with the overarching public interest. Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike
are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra. They Provide for the
procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting
of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment.
In National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs. Overseas, et al. the court ruled that If only the filing of the strike
notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and
emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) far which the filing of the strike notice and strikevote report is required cannot be achieved. The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of
Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the
majority of the union members. The need for assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot
be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to
defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the
union and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to
wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers
and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not, however,
be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority
for while the majority is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote
assures the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and hence, with better
chance to succeed.
Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly
illegal as it was held within th seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor
Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from
verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy
consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work
stoppage conducted by the union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the
ruling of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.
NOTE: Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file
a notice of strike or the employer may file, notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before
the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the
absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any
legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws,
which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15daycooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in
the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that
purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of
the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on
substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry
may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret

balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the
voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period
herein provided.
Article 264 of the same Code reads:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or
lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without
first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or
lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall
not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been
hired by the employer during such lawful strike. (emphasis ours).


The laborers of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. went on strike. Edilberto Tupas, a laborer, was one of the
strikers. From October 1957 to January 1958, the period of time the strike lasted, the rope factory did not pay to the
Social Security Commission any premium for Edilberto Tupas. In February 1958 it resumed and continued to pay the
premium until 6 May 1958 when Edilberto Tupas died. Later, Social Security Commission sent bill No. 138 to the
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. in the amount of P10.27 representing its contribution to the unpaid premium for Edilberto
Tupas. The rope factory averred "that the amount of P9.45, representing employer's 3-1/2% premium contribution for
October, November, December, 1957 should be for the account of the late Edilberto Tupas for the reason that he was
then on strike and consequently, unemployed by the company. Mr. Tupas, during these months, received no wages.
The Company, however, was willing to pay the amount of P0.82 only, as underpaid premium for the month of May,
1958." On 4 November 1958 the Social Security Commission wrote to the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc., declaring the
strike "not unlawful" and reiterating its demand upon the latter to pay the amount of P10.27. The petitioner Elizalde
Rope Factory, Inc. contends that it is not required to pay the 3-1/2% contribution corresponding to a period of strike,
because during such period a striker ceases to be an employee whom the law1 describes as -Any person who
performs services for an employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives
compensation for such services. 1wph1.t
According to the petitioner, since the requisites of rendering or performing service and receiving compensation
therefor are wanting while Edilberto Tupas was on strike, he during the strike was not an employee for whom
premium should be paid.
Issue: should social security premium corresponding to a period when a covered worker is on strike be paid by the
Held: Yes
Although during a strike the worker renders no work or service and receives no compensation, yet his
relationship as an employee with his employer is not severed or dissolved. Strike is the workers' means of expressing
their grievances to employers and enforcing compliance with their demands made upon them. And when laborers go

on strike, it cannot be said that they intend to cut off or terminate their relationship with their employer. On the
contrary, a strike may improve the employer-employee relationship bringing about better working conditions and more
efficient services. Hence, the petitioner's contention that Edilberto Tupas ceased to be an employee from 17
September 1957 to the middle of February 1958 when he was on strike, cannot be sustained. Section 18 of Republic
Act No. 1161 as amended by Republic Act No. 1792 provides that
Beginning as of the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the month when an employee's
compulsory coverage age takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment, there shall be
deducted and withheld from the monthly compensation of such covered employee a contribution equal to
two and a half per centum of his monthly compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
and Section 19 thereof provides that
Beginning as of the last day of the month immediately preceding the month when an employee's
compulsory coverage takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment, his employer shall
pay, with respect to such covered employee in his employ, a monthly contribution equal to three and a half
per centum of the monthly compensation of said covered employee... (Emphasis supplied.)
The above legal provisions do not require that the employer's 3-1/2% and employee's 2-1/2% contributions be based
on the latters monthly compensation actually earned or received by the employee covered by the Social Security
System. They only provide that after an employee is compulsorily covered by the System he and his employer will
contribute to pay the premium every month during his employment. In the case at bar, Edilberto Tupas was
compulsorily covered in September 1957 by the System. When he was on strike from 17 September 1957 to the
middle of February 1958, his employment did not cease or end.

PT & T Corp vs NLRC

a run-off election was conducted on 15 November 1986 between private respondent Associated Labor
Union ("ALU") and Pambansang Samahang Anak-Pawis ("PASAP") with the latter garnering the highest number of
votes. ALU's best showing among the branches of PT&T nationwide was in the Antonino Branch of PT&T. Principally
responsible for ALU's strong showing during the run-off elections in the Antonino Branch was ALU's Vice-President,
private respondent Osialito Tiglao, Jr. Subsequent to the run-off elections, two (2) directives were issued by the
management transferring Tiglao from the Antonino Branch Radio Room to the Pasig Nodal Station and later, to the
Caloocan Nodal Station. ALU protested Tiglao's transfer. Such protest remained unacted upon by the management.
Hence, ALU filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations ("BLR") on the ground that PT&T had
committed an unfair labor practice in dismissing its officers and members and/or in discriminating and coercing its
members. The dispute was certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. On 30 March 1987, private respondent
Tiglao was dismissed by PT&T for refusing to comply with the two (2) transfer directives. He thereafter filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against PT&T with the NLRC.
On 13 May 1987, the employees of PT&T and United Management Corporation (a sister corporation of PT&T and
organized by ALU) staged a strike. For the next two days, ALU members who were PT&T employees staged further
strikes at the PT&T offices in the cities of Manila, Davao, Legaspi and Cebu. As a consequence of these incidents,
the other named respondents in this case, all officers and members of ALU-TUCP, were eventually separated from
the service, allegedly for committing illegal acts during what PT&T considered was a series of illegal strikes. These
other private respondents also filed complaints against petitioners for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Meanwhile, on
6 June 1987, petitioner PT&T filed a complaint for illegal strike against private respondents before the NLRC,
Arbitration Branch Manila, docketed as Case No. 00-06-02046-87. On 22 June 1987, PT&T filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw and/or Consolidate praying that the illegal strike case be withdrawn from the NLRC Arbitration Branch and
instead forwarded to NLRC Commissioner Daniel Lucas for arbitration. Acting on PT&T's Motion to Withdraw and/or
Consolidate, Labor Arbiter Pacita del Rosario issued on the same day an Order dismissing with prejudice PT&T's
complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue: WON dismissal of the respondent employees was without just cause

Held: Yes
The NLRC had found that petitioners had failed to show that private respondents had committed illegal acts
during the May 1987 strikes which would have warranted termination of their employment. Mere participation in a
lawful strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of a union member. The Labor Code protects
ordinary, rank-and-file union members who participated in a strike from losing their jobs provided that they did not
commit illegal acts during the strike. The Labor Code does at the same time hold accountable union officers who
knowingly participated in an illegal strike. 6 In the case at bar, no proof was adduced by petitioners that the May 1987
strikes violated the provisions of Article 264 of the Labor Code which establish procedural criteria for determination of
the legality of a strike; thus, there was no proof that private respondents who are union officers knowingly or in bad
faith participated in an illegal strike.
With respect to private respondent Tiglao, petitioners submit that the management's act of dismissing him
was warranted by his continued refusal to obey its lawful and valid orders to report for work at the Pasig Nodal
Station and later, at the Caloocan Nodal Station. This act is punishable by dismissal under PT&T's rules and
regulations and, petitioners continue, constitutes serious misconduct and gross negligence which are just causes for
the dismissal of an employee. We, however, see no basis for overturning the NLRC's conclusion that respondent
Tiglao was dismissed on account of his union activities. It is well-settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
like respondent NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality when such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 8 In the case at bar, the NLRC found that the real basis for the transfer of
respondent Tiglao from PT&T's Antonino Branch was not an alleged vague and unspecified "exigency of the service"
but rather the fact that in its Antonino Branch where Tiglao was originally assigned, ALU had scored heavily in the
certification election. This finding is not without support in the evidence of record.