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BLTB vs NLRC
Facts:
This case arose when private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU (TLM-BLTBNAFLU), an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions. (NAFLU), filed a Notice of Strike against the
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA. Efforts at
amicable settlement having failed, Acting Labor Secretary C. Castro certified the dispute to the NLRC on August 29,
1988. A copy of the certification order was served upon the NAFLU on August 29, 1988, and on the TLM-BLTBCoNAFLU on August 30, 1988. However, it was noted in the notice of order that union secretary Jerry Soriano refused to
receive it. On August 31, 1988, the officers and members of TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike and maintained
picket lines blocking the premises of BLTBCo's terminals. NLRC issued an en banc resolution ordering the striking
employees to lift their picket and to remove all obstructions and barricades. All striking employees on payroll as of
May 23, 1988, were required to return to work. BLTBCo was directed to accept them back to work within 5 days
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went
on strike, only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were later re-admitted. Subsequently, about 614
employees, including those who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike, filed individual complaints
for illegal dismissal. Their common ground was that they were refused admission when they reported back for work.
BLTBCo contends that the 190 union members who participated in the illegal strike should not have been reinstated
because they defied the return-to-work order of September 6, 1988. It invokes against the NLRC its own words in its
resolution of July 19, 1991, where it said: A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of
an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph
of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended; Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their
employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.
Issue: WoN the 190 union members should be reinstated even the strike is illegal and they initially defied the return
to work order
Held: Yes
The mere fact that the majority of the strikers were able to return to work does not necessarily mean that the
rest deliberately defied the return-to-work order or that they had been sufficiently notified thereof. As the Solicitor
General correctly adds, some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time to return during the
period given by the petitioner, which was only five days. The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents
abandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot
by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of
employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. 4 This refusal
must be clearly established. As we stressed in a recent case, 5 mere absence is not sufficient; it must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. A
worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his employment. If his
purpose is to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike. We agree with the Solicitor General
that the mere filing of charges against an employee for alleged illegal acts during a strike does not by itself justify his
dismissal. The charges must be proved at an investigation duly called where the employee shall be given an
opportunity to defend himself. The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited to those "who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented to
substantiate the commission thereof and not merely an unsubstantiated allegation. He who asserts the commission of
illegal acts, must prove the same, and it is on the basis of substantiated evidence that this Commission declares the
loss of employment status of specific union members who have committed illegal acts.
The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an
instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are
able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat
to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working
class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the
workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in
the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the
legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industries affected with public
interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.
1) The strikers committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. They formed human barricades to block
the road, prevented the passage of the respondent companys truck, padlocked the companys gate, and
prevented co-workers from entering the company premises.[9]
2) And violated the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[10] enjoining the union and/or its members from
obstructing the company premises, and ordering the removal therefrom of all the barricades.
A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. [11] It is considered as the most
effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment.[12] But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means
for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits
for its exercise. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly
paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:
a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where
the means employed are illegal. For instance, the strike was considered illegal as the strikers formed a human cordon
along the side of the Sta. Ana wharf and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of
Petitioners.
It follows therefore that the dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid. Their dismissal
as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code,
pertinent portion of which provides: x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any x x
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status. x x. As observed by the Labor Arbiter, it was the appellant-workers who voluntarily stopped
working because of their strike. In fact, the appellant workers admitted that non-striking workers who wanted to return
to work were allowed to do so. Their being without work could not therefore be attributed to the employers refusal to
give them work but rather, to the voluntary withdrawal of their services in order to compel the company to recognize
their union. The next aspect of the case to consider is the fate of the four petitioners herein. Decisive on the matter is
the pertinent provision of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code that: x x any worker x x who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. x x It can be gleaned
unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee can not be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the
strike[17] and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified. But proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may
justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. (additional only)
LIMITATIONS
BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA VS NLRC
Facts:
The labor conflict between the parties broke out in the open when
the petitioner union 1 struck on April 6, 1992 protesting issues ranging from unfair labor practices and union busting
allegedly committed by the private respondent. 2 The union picketed the premises of the private respondent at
Bagumbayan and Longos in Quezon City; Angono and Antipolo in Rizal; San Fernando, Pampanga and San Pedro,
Laguna.
The strike hurt the private respondent. On April 8, 1992, it filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction 3 to stop the
strike which it denounced as illegal. It alleged that at around 7:00 p.m., respondents led by its officers and some
members staged a wild-cat strike, without a valid notice of strike, nor observing cooling-off period, and made even
during the pendency of a preventive mediation proceedings. And during the said wild-cat strike, respondents have
set-up makeshifts, tents, banners and streamers and other man-made obstructions at the main plant and offices of
petitioner which effectively impeding, as in fact still effectively impeding the ingress and egress of persons who have
lawful business with the petitioner.
The union, however, claimed that it was not furnished a copy of the petition. Allegedly, the company misrepresented
its address to be at Rm. 205-6 Herald Bldg., Muralla St., Intramuros, Manila. On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the
evidence of the company alone. The ex parte hearing started at 2:30 p.m. where testimonial and documentary
evidence were presented. 4 Some thirty (30) minutes later, an Ocular Inspection Report was submitted by an
unnamed NLRC representative stating that the business operation was completely paralized (sic) as no person was
noticed inside the company compound. No persons and/or vehicles were seen entering and leaving the
premises. Ingress to and engress from the company is presumed to be not free. Before the day was over, the
respondent NLRC (First Division) issued a temporary restraining order against the union No copy of this Order was
furnished the union. The union learned of the Order only when it was posted on April 15, 1992 at the premises of the
company. On April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction wherein
it alleged that the respondents are still committing illegal acts, by resorting to grave threats, intimidation against the
non-striking employees and persons with lawful transactions with the company since April 20, 1992, continuously up
to this time, either by actual threats and intimidation whenever these persons attempt to report to work or transact
business with the company, or by calling at their houses or places of residence, and then and there coerce not to
report for work on pain of bodily harm. The union got wind of the motion only on May 4, 1992. The next day, May 5,
1992, it opposed the motion, alleging They were never furnished by the petitioner with a copy of the original petition
for injunction filed on April 8, 1992 because as seen from the petition, petitioner addressed the respondents at Rm.
205-206 Herald Bldg., Muralla St., Manila as stated in paragraph 2 of the said petition and they came to know only of
the same when Commission issued a temporary restraining order dated April 15, 1992 which was served to them at
the picket line on April 15, 1992 and thus they opposed the same on April 20, 1992. The same day, however, the
respondent NLRC issued its disputed Order 7 granting the company's motion for preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON the NLRCs order valid
HELD:NO
Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of employees to
improve the terms and conditions of their employment. It may be that in highly developed countries, the significance
of strike as a coercive weapon has shrunk in view of the preference for more peaceful modes of settling labor
disputes. In underdeveloped countries, however, where the economic crunch continues to enfeeble the already
marginalized working class, the importance of the right to strike remains undiminished as indeed it has proved many
a time as the only coercive weapon that can correct abuses against labor. It remains as the great equalizer. In the
case at bar, the records will show that the respondent NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218
(e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code in issuing its Order of May 5, 1992. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides both
the procedural and substantive requirements which must strictly be complied with before a temporary or permanent
injunction can issue in a labor dispute
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave
or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code
shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of
the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding
of fact by the commission, to the effect:
(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless
restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or
unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the
prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;
Issue: WON dela Rosa was illegally dismissed because his actual participation in the illegal acts during the strike
Held: NO
The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions. 14 The Labor Code is
emphatic against the use of violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike and to this end prohibits the
obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's premises for lawful purposes. The sanction provided in par.
(a) of Art. 262 thereof is so severe that "any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status." 15
GREPALIFE submitted before the Labor Arbiter several affidavits of its employees which de la Rosa did not refute. Of
these documents, two (2) specifically described the incidents that transpired during the strike
Petitioner de la Rosa assails the inherent weakness of the sworn statements of these security guards. But while it is
true that affidavits may be regarded as infirm evidence 16 before the regular courts unless the affiants are presented
on the stand, such affidavits by themselves are acceptable in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Under Sec. 7,
Rule V, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, these proceedings, save for the constitutional requirements of
due process, are not to be strictly governed by the technicalities of law and procedural rules. Section 3, par. 2, of the
same Rule provides that verified position papers are to be accompanied by all supporting documents including the
affidavits of the parties' respective witnesses in lieu of direct testimony. It is therefore a clear mandate that the Labor
Arbiter may employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy before him.
Since de la Rosa did not present countervailing evidence, the NLRC correctly appreciated the affidavits of the two (2)
security guards as having adequately established the charges leveled against de la Rosa thus justifying his dismissal
from employment.
While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not every unfair act or decision constitutes unfair
labor practice (ULP) as defined and enumerated under Art. 248 Of the Labor Code. 18
There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts instituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers'
right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may be held liable under this provision if his conduct affects in whatever
manner the right of an employee to self-organize. The decision of respondent GREPALIFE to consider the top officers
of petitioner UNION as unfit for reinstatement is not essentially discriminatory and constitutive of an unlawful labor
practice of employers under the above-cited provision. Discriminating in the context of the Code involves either
encouraging membership in any labor organization or is made on account of the employee's having given or being
about to give testimony under the Labor Code. These have not been proved in the case at bar.
To elucidate further, there can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated. 19A
union officer has larger and heavier responsibilities than a union member. Union officers are duty bound to respect
the law and to exhort and guide their members to do the same; their position mandates them to lead by example. By
committing prohibited activities during the strike, de la Rosa as Vice President of petitioner UNION demonstrated a
high degree of imprudence and irresponsibility. Verily this justifies his dismissal from employment. Since the objective
of the Labor Code is to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace, the dismissal of undesirable labor
leaders should be upheld. 20
It bears emphasis that the employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment according to his own discretion and
judgment. This prerogative flaws from the established rule that labor laws do not authorize substitution of judgment of
the employer in the conduct of his business. Recall of workers clearly falls within the ambit of management
prerogative. 21 The employer can exercise this prerogative without fear of liability so long as it is done in good faith for
the advancement of his interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees
under special laws or valid agreements. It is valid as long as it is not performed in a malicious, harsh, oppressive,
vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite.
STRIKE
INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW, ENRICO GONZALES and MA. THERESA
MONTEJO , vs. INTERPHIL LABORATORIES, INC., AND HONORABLE LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING,
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
Facts:
Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Interphil Laboratories, Inc., a company engaged in the business of manufacturing and packaging
pharmaceutical products. They had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from 01 August 1990 to 31
July 1993. Prior to the expiration of the CBA Allesandro G. Salazar, Vice-President-Human Resources Department of
respondent company, was approached by Nestor Ocampo, the union president, and Hernando Clemente, a union
director. The two union officers inquired about the stand of the company regarding the duration of the CBA which was
set to expire in a few months. Salazar told the union officers that the matter could be best discussed during the formal
negotiations which would start soon. The two officers again approached Salazar and inquired once more about the
CBA but received the same reply. Ocampo requested for a meeting to discuss the duration and effectivity of the
CBA. Salazar acceded and a meeting was held where the union officers asked whether Salazar would be amenable
to make the new CBA effective for two (2) years, starting 01 August 1993. Salazar, however, declared that it would
still be premature to discuss the matter and that the company could not make a decision at the moment. The very
next day, all the rank-and-file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule of
from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. At 2:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., respectively, the employees
stopped working and left their workplace without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they
were working on. When Salazar inquired about the reason for their refusal to follow their normal work schedule, the
employees told him to "ask the union officers." To minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the
company, Salazar immediately asked for a meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union
director, told Salazar that the employees would only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree
to their demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union officers that the
matter could be better discussed during the formal renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was apparently
unsatisfied with the answer of the company, the overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to
engage in a work slowdown campaign during the time they were working, thus substantially delaying the production
of the company. Respondent company filed with the NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner unions overtime
boycott and work slowdown which amounted to illegal strike.
Issue: whether or not the respondents have engaged in "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" both amounting to
illegal strike
Held:
Yes. As undisputably testified to by Mr. Alessandro G. Salazar, the company's Vice-President-Human Resources
Department, sometime in February, 1993, he was approached by the union President NestorOcampo and Union
Director Hernando Clemente who asked him as to what was the stand of the company regarding the duration of the
CBA between the company and which was set to expire He answered that the matter could be best discussed during
the formal renegotiations which anyway was to start soon. This query was followed up sometime in March, 1993, and
his answer was the same. In early April, 1993, the union president requested for a meeting to discuss the duration
and effectivity of the CBA. Acceding to the request, a meeting was held on April 15, 1993 wherein the union officers
asked him if he would agree to make the new CBA effective on August 1, 1993 and the term thereof to be valid for
only two (2) years. When he answered that it was still premature to discuss the matter, the very next day, all the rank
and file employees of the company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule of 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M.
and 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M., when after the 8-hours work, they abruptly stopped working at 2:00 P.M. and 2:00 A.M.,
respectively, leaving their place of work without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were
working on.When he saw the workers leaving before the end of their shift, he asked them why and their reply was
"asked (sic) the union officers." Alarmed by the overtime boycott and the damage it was causing the company, he
requested for a meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, he asked them why the regular work schedule was
not being followed by the employees, and union Director Enrico Gonzales, with the support of the other union officers,
told him that if management would agree to a two-year duration for the new CBA and an effectivity date of August 1,
1993, all employees will return to the normal work schedule of two 12-hour shifts. When answered that the
management could not decide on the matter at the moment and to have it discussed and agreed upon during the
formal renegotiations, the overtime boycott continued and the employees at the same time employed a work
slowdown campaign during working hours, causing considerable delay in the production and complaints from the
clients/customers. Evidently, from all the foregoing, respondents' unjustified unilateral alteration of the 24-hour work
schedule thru their concerted activities of "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" from April 16, 1993 up to March 7,
1994, to force the petitioner company to accede to their unreasonable demands, can be classified as a strike on an
installment basis, as correctly called by petitioner company. It is thus undisputed that members of the union by their
own volition decided not to render overtime services in April 1993. More importantly, the overtime boycott or work
slowdown by the employees constituted a violation of their CBA, which prohibits the union or employee, during the
existence of the CBA, to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work. In Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa vs. NLRC,[23] this Court ruled: The Court also agrees that such a slowdown is generally condemned as
inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees continue to work and remain at their positions and
accept the wages paid to them, they at the same time select what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of
their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to the employers damage, to do other work; in other words, they work
on their own terms.
Held: yes
A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial
or labor dispute." 4 It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force
management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some
disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and
progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and
management together with the overarching public interest. Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike
are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra. They Provide for the
procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting
of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment.
In National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs. Overseas, et al. the court ruled that If only the filing of the strike
notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and
emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) far which the filing of the strike notice and strikevote report is required cannot be achieved. The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of
Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the
majority of the union members. The need for assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot
be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to
defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the
union and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to
wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers
and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not, however,
be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority
for while the majority is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote
assures the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and hence, with better
chance to succeed.
Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly
illegal as it was held within th seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor
Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from
verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy
consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work
stoppage conducted by the union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the
ruling of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.
NOTE: Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file
a notice of strike or the employer may file, notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before
the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the
absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any
legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws,
which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15daycooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in
the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that
purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of
the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on
substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry
may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret
balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the
voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period
herein provided.
Article 264 of the same Code reads:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or
lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without
first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or
lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall
not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been
hired by the employer during such lawful strike. (emphasis ours).
on strike, it cannot be said that they intend to cut off or terminate their relationship with their employer. On the
contrary, a strike may improve the employer-employee relationship bringing about better working conditions and more
efficient services. Hence, the petitioner's contention that Edilberto Tupas ceased to be an employee from 17
September 1957 to the middle of February 1958 when he was on strike, cannot be sustained. Section 18 of Republic
Act No. 1161 as amended by Republic Act No. 1792 provides that
Beginning as of the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the month when an employee's
compulsory coverage age takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment, there shall be
deducted and withheld from the monthly compensation of such covered employee a contribution equal to
two and a half per centum of his monthly compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
and Section 19 thereof provides that
Beginning as of the last day of the month immediately preceding the month when an employee's
compulsory coverage takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment, his employer shall
pay, with respect to such covered employee in his employ, a monthly contribution equal to three and a half
per centum of the monthly compensation of said covered employee... (Emphasis supplied.)
The above legal provisions do not require that the employer's 3-1/2% and employee's 2-1/2% contributions be based
on the latters monthly compensation actually earned or received by the employee covered by the Social Security
System. They only provide that after an employee is compulsorily covered by the System he and his employer will
contribute to pay the premium every month during his employment. In the case at bar, Edilberto Tupas was
compulsorily covered in September 1957 by the System. When he was on strike from 17 September 1957 to the
middle of February 1958, his employment did not cease or end.
Held: Yes
The NLRC had found that petitioners had failed to show that private respondents had committed illegal acts
during the May 1987 strikes which would have warranted termination of their employment. Mere participation in a
lawful strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of a union member. The Labor Code protects
ordinary, rank-and-file union members who participated in a strike from losing their jobs provided that they did not
commit illegal acts during the strike. The Labor Code does at the same time hold accountable union officers who
knowingly participated in an illegal strike. 6 In the case at bar, no proof was adduced by petitioners that the May 1987
strikes violated the provisions of Article 264 of the Labor Code which establish procedural criteria for determination of
the legality of a strike; thus, there was no proof that private respondents who are union officers knowingly or in bad
faith participated in an illegal strike.
With respect to private respondent Tiglao, petitioners submit that the management's act of dismissing him
was warranted by his continued refusal to obey its lawful and valid orders to report for work at the Pasig Nodal
Station and later, at the Caloocan Nodal Station. This act is punishable by dismissal under PT&T's rules and
regulations and, petitioners continue, constitutes serious misconduct and gross negligence which are just causes for
the dismissal of an employee. We, however, see no basis for overturning the NLRC's conclusion that respondent
Tiglao was dismissed on account of his union activities. It is well-settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
like respondent NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality when such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 8 In the case at bar, the NLRC found that the real basis for the transfer of
respondent Tiglao from PT&T's Antonino Branch was not an alleged vague and unspecified "exigency of the service"
but rather the fact that in its Antonino Branch where Tiglao was originally assigned, ALU had scored heavily in the
certification election. This finding is not without support in the evidence of record.