Property Final Output PDF

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PROPERTY IN GENERAL
(Article 414-426)
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 184869
September 21, 2010
TOPIC: CONVERSION OF PUBLIC LANDS FROM ALIENABLE TO INALIENABLE
LAND
The lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment
President Garcia dedicated them for Central Mindanao Universitys use in scientific and
technological research in the field of agriculture---- they ceased to be alienable public
lands.
MODESTO vs. URBINA
G.R. No. 189859
October 18, 2010
TOPIC: LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually
alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public
domain, and its occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.
REPUBLIC vs. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 186961
February 20, 2012
TOPIC: PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
All other properties of the State, which is not of the character mentioned in Article
420 is patrimonial property, hence, susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
In other words, for one to invoke and set up acquisitive prescription against the
State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established.
Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as
patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive
period.
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JEAN TAN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 193443
April 16, 2012
TOPIC: PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act governs
the classification and disposition of lands forming part of the public domain. Section 11
thereof provides that one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes is by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Section 48 thereof
enumerates those who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title
over an alienable and disposable public land. Thus, for ones possession and occupation
of an alienable and disposable public land to give rise to an imperfect title, the same
should have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. On the other, for one to claim that
his possession and occupation of private property has ripened to imperfect title, the
same should have been for the prescriptive period provided under the Civil Code.
Without need for an extensive extrapolation, the private property contemplated in
Section 14(2) is patrimonial property as defined in Article 421 in relation to Articles 420
and 422 of the Civil Code.
REPUBLIC vs. METRO INDEX REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 198585
July 02, 2012
TOPIC: PROPERTIES OF PUBLIC DOMINION AND PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
That properties of the public dominion are not susceptible to prescription and that
only properties of the State that are no longer earmarked for public use, otherwise
known as patrimonial, may be acquired by prescription are fundamental, even
elementary, principles in this jurisdiction.
REPUBLIC vs. CITY OF PARAAQUE
G.R. No. 191109
July 18, 2012
TOPIC: FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED AREAS ARE OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
The Court held that foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the
public domain and were inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open
to disposition and further declared no longer needed for public service. The fact that
alienable lands of the public domain were transferred to the PEA (now Philippine
Reclamation Authority or PRA) and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEAs
name did not automatically make such lands private. This Court also held therein that
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reclaimed lands retained their inherent potential as areas for public use or public
service.
REPUBLIC vs. ESPINOSA
G.R. No. 171514
July 18, 2012
TOPIC: CONVERSION OF PUBLIC DOMINION TO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may
be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After
all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of
the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth."
REPUBLIC vs. SANTOS et., al.
G.R. No. 180027
July 18 2012
TOPIC: PROOF OF CONVERSION TO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
As jurisprudence tells us, a mere certification or report classifying the subject
land as alienable and disposable is not sufficient. In this case, the respondents were not
able to present any express declaration from the State, attesting to the patrimonial
character of Lot 3. To put it bluntly, the respondents were not able to prove that
acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that they have
acquired title to Lot 3 by virtue thereof.
REPUBLIC vs. SANTOS III
G .R. No. 160453
November 12, 2012
TOPIC: PROOF OF CONVERSION TO PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government,
such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, and
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investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute.

Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC vs. VERTEX SALES AND TRADING,
INC.
G.R. No. 202079
June 10, 2013
TOPIC: SHARES OF STOCK ARE PERSONAL PROPERTY
Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by
delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or
other person legally authorized to make the transfer.
DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC vs. BASES
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 192896
July 24, 2013
TOPIC: PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become
patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable,
together with an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013
TOPIC: PRESUMPTION OF PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons.
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HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013
TOPIC: IDENTIFICATION OF LANDS BY EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done
exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.
REPUBLIC vs. ABOITIZ
G.R. No. 174626
October 23, 2013
A declaration that the property is alienable and disposable is not sufficient to
make it susceptible to acquisitive prescription. An express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer intended for public use, for public
service or for the development for the national wealth pursuant to Article 422 of the New
Civil Code must also be shown.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEGASPI
G.R. No. 182913
November 20, 2013
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, vs. RAMOS
G.R. No. 179181
November 18, 2013
TOPIC: REGALIAN DOCTRINE
In this jurisdiction, all lands belong to the State regardless of their classification.
This rule, more commonly known as the Regalian doctrine, applies with equal force
even to private unregistered lands, unless the contrary is satisfactorily shown.
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REPUBLIC vs. CORTES

G.R. No. 186639
February 5, 2014
TOPIC: PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113,
which states that all things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription, and that property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription. Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil
Code states that property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is this
provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear
that those property which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth are
public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion
if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin
to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. THE CITY ASSESSOR AND CITY TREASURER
OF LUCENA CITY
G.R. No. 166102
August 5, 2015
TOPIC: MACHINERY SUBJECT TO REAL PROPERTY TAX
While the Local Government Code still does not provide for a specific definition of
"real property," Sections 199(o) and 232 of the said Code, respectively, gives an
extensive definition of what constitutes "machinery" and unequivocally subjects such
machinery to real property tax. The Court reiterates that the machinery subject to real
property tax under the Local Government Code "may or may not be attached,
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permanently or temporarily to the real property;" and the physical facilities for
production, installations, and appurtenant service facilities, those which are mobile, selfpowered or self-propelled, or are not permanently attached must (a) be actually,
directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular industry, business, or
activity; and (2) by their very nature and purpose, be designed for, or necessary for
manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes.
For determining whether machinery is real property subject to real property tax,
the definition and requirements under the Local Government Code are controlling.
CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC., vs. THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS

G.R. No. 180110
May 30, 2016
TOPIC: MACHINERY SUBJECT TO REAL PROPERTY TAX
Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission
lines which this Court has recently declared in Manila Electric Company v. City
Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as "no longer exempted from real property
tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local
Government Code. To the extent that the equipment's location is determinable to be
within the taxing authority's jurisdiction, the Court sees no reason to distinguish between
submarine cables used for communications and aerial or underground wires or lines
used for electric transmission, so that both pieces of property do not merit a different
treatment in the aspect of real property taxation. Both electric lines and communications
cables, in the strictest sense, are not directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts,
relays or landing stations, but both may be classified under the term "machinery" as real
property under Article 415(5) of the Civil Code for the simple reason that such pieces of
equipment serve the owner's business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or
works that are on real estate. Even objects in or on a body of water may be classified as
such, as "waters" is classified as an immovable under Article 415(8)39 of the Code. A
classic example is a boathouse which, by its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a
personal property but, if it is tied to the shore and used as a residence, and since it
floats on waters which is immovable, is considered real property. Besides, the Court has
already held that "it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for
purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property.
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OWNERSHIP
(Article 427-439)
REPUBLIC vs. CATARROJA
G.R. No. 171774
February 12, 2010
TOPIC: PROOF OF OWNERSHIP
The Court ruled that the documents must come from official sources which
recognize the ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest. None of the
documents presented in this case fit such description.
FLORES vs. BAGAOISAN
G.R. No. 173365
April 15, 2010
TOPIC: QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IN AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
In order that an action for reconveyance based on fraud may prosper, it is
essential for the party seeking the reconveyance to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, his title to the property and the fact of fraud.
ORDUA vs. FUENTEBELLA
G.R. No. 176841
June 29, 2010
TOPIC: IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY OF ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE BASED ON
FRAUD
An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible
where the suitor is in possession of the property subject of the acts, the action partaking
as it does of a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
DE LEON vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 181970
August 3, 2010
TOPIC: DECREE OF JUDGMENT AS TO OWNERSHIP INCLUDES POSSESSION
THEREOF
Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the
delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it
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appearing that the defeated partys claim to the possession thereof is based on his
claim of ownership.
REPUBLIC vs. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 185091
August 8, 2010
Court has allowed tax declarations to stand proof of ownership only in the
absence of a certificate of title.
CAEZO vs. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 170189
September 1, 2010
TOPIC: ACCION REIVINDICATORIA
Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks of its full possession.
IMANI vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 187023
November 17, 2010
TOPIC: ACQUISITION OF TITLE AND REGISTRATION OF LAND
The fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani
married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses
covertures; Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. GOLDEN HAVEN MEMORIAL
PARK, INC.
G.R. No. 187824 & 188265
November 17, 2010
TOPIC: ANNOTATION OF AN ADVERSE CLAIM
The annotation of an adverse claim is intended to protect the claimants interest
in the property; The notice is a warning to third parties dealing with the property that
someone claims an interest in it or asserts a better right than the registered owner;
Such notice constitutes, by operation of law, notice to the whole world.
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MODESTO vs. URBINA

G.R. No. 189859
October 18, 2010
Mere declaration of land for taxation purposes does not constitute possession
thereof nor is it proof of ownership in the absence of the claimants actual possession.
CASTRO vs. MONSOD
G.R. No. 183719
February 2, 2011
TOPIC: SURFACE RIGHTS OF AN OWNER
The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under
it, and he can construct thereon any works, or make any plantations and excavations
which may deem proper.
An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but
his right is subject to limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
GAITERO vs. ALMERICA
G.R. No. 181812
June 8, 2011
TOPIC: OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
Whoever owns the property has the right to possess it.
LEOVERAS VS. VALDEZ
G.R. No. 169985
June 15, 2011
TOPIC: ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
landwoner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of
another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.
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CASILANG, SR. vs. CASILANG-DIZON

G.R. No. 180269
February 20, 2013
TOPIC: CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP
It is settled that tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership, but when
coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they can be the basis of claim
of ownership through prescription.62 In the absence of actual, public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
REPUBLIC vs. NG
G.R. No. 182449
March 6, 2013
While tax declarations and realty tax payments on property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they are nevertheless good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner, for no one in the right frame of mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in ones actual or at least constructive possession.
HEIRS OF ALEJANDRA DELFIN, vs. RABADON et. al.
G.R. No. 165014
July 31, 2013
Tax declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for
ownership when they are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property.
HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO vs. SPOUSES DE JESUS
G.R. No. 176020
September 29, 2014
TOPIC: ACTION TO RECOVER
Article 434 of the Civil Code states that "in an action to recover, the property
must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claim." The plaintiff, therefore, is duty-bound to clearly
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identify the land sought to be recovered, in accordance with the title on which he
anchors his right of ownership.
BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT vs. BALCOM-TAMBUYAT
G.R. No. 202805
March 23, 2015
TOPIC: DISTINCTION BETWEEN OWNERSHIP, TITLE AND CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership
which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with
title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean
that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a
certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.
Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons
not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
party may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To
repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.
Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
DELA CRUZ vs. HERMANO
G.R. No. 160914
March 25, 2015
TOPIC: OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the possession
contemplated is not exactly the same as that which is in issue in a forcible entry case.
Possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or actual or
material possession, and not one flowing out of ownership.
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SUPAPO vs. SPOUSES DE JESUS

G.R. No. 198356
April 20, 2015
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS INVOLVING TITLE OR POSSESSION OF
REAL PROPERTY
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions
involving title to or possession of real property is plenary.
RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and
granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value
of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
The complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the
complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action. This is required because the nature of the action and the court with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the
action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein.
SUPAPO vs. SPOUSES DE JESUS
G.R. No. 198356
April 20, 2015
TOPIC: CONSEQUENCE OF OWNERSHIP
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a
land is also entitled to the possession thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land
is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to this rule is the right
of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property.
Again, this right is imprescriptible.
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VITUG vs. ABUDA

G.R. No. 201264
January 11, 2016
TOPIC: ATTRIBUTES OF OWNERSHIP
Petitioner's undisputed title to and ownership of the property is sufficient to give him free
disposal of it. As owner of the property, he has the right to enjoy all attributes of
ownership including jus disponendi or the right to encumber, alienate, or dispose his
property "without other limitations than those established by law.
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RIGHT OF ACCESSION
(Article 440-475)
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE CITY vs. EBIO
G.R. No. 178411
June 23, 2010
TOPIC: OWNERSHIP OF ALLUVIAL DEPOSIT
Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain
as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may
have been added.
FERNANDO, JR. vs. ACUNA
G.R. No. 161030
September 14, 2011
TOPIC: PRINCIPLE OF ACCRETION; PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION
The principle of accretion is embodied in Article 457 of the Civil Code which
states that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion; In the absence of
any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in some other person, it
must continue to belong to the State.
TORBELA vs. SPS. ROSARIO
G.R. No. 140528
December 7, 2011
TOPIC: RIGHT OF ACCESSION DEFINED
The right of accession is recognized under Article 440 of the Civil Code.
Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and the improvements
or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land; It is the owner of the land who
is allowed to exercise the option to acquire improvements because his right is older and
because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.
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It is only if the owner chooses to sell hid land, and the builder or planter fails to
purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the
owner may remove the improvements from the land.
Following the rules of accession, civil fruits such as rents, belong to the owner of
the building.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. 160453
November 12, 2012
TOPIC: RIPARIAN OWNER; DEFINITION OF ACCRETION
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of
soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of
possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces
the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the
current of the water becomes manifest.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SPS. MARANON

G.R. No. 189316
June 1, 2013
TOPIC: CIVIL FRUITS
Rent is a civil fruit that belong to the owner of the property producing it by right of
accession.
VILLASI vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. 190106
January 15, 2014
TOPIC: RIGHT OF ACCESSION
While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the
ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produces
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, such
rule is not without exception.
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When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and
the lot which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately.
CO-OWNERSHIP
(Article 484-500)
BALUS vs. BALUS
G.R. No. 168970
January 15, 2010
The purpose of partition is to end co-ownership.
MIGUEL J. OSORIO PENSION FOUNDATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 162175
June 28, 2010
The law expressly allows a co-owner (first co-owner) of a parcel of land to
register his proportionate share in the name of his co-owner (second co- owner) in
whose name the entire land is registered- the second co-owner serves as a legal
trustee of the first co-owner insofar as the proportionate share of the first co-owner is
concerned.
A resulting trust is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration
and not legal title determines the equitable interests and presumed to have been
contemplated by the parties.
HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA vs. MAGDUA

G.R. No. 176858
September 15, 2010
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the
co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. Since possession
of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that co-owners possession may be
deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites
must concur:
1. That he has performed unequivocal acts or repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the other co-owners.
2. That positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust
or other co-owners .
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3. That the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

In order that the title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be
clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were
appraised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the
prescriptive period begins to run.
CO GIUK LUN vs. JOSE CO

G.R. No. 184454
August 3, 2011
TOPIC: DIVISION OF PROPERTY
A division of property cannot be ordered by the court unless the existence of coownership is first established. In Ocampo v. Ocampo, the court held that an action for
partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the property. Basic is the
rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a
preponderance of evidence.
Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of co-ownership over the Gubat and
Barcelona properties. The action for partition cannot be acted upon since petitioners
failed to establish any rightful interest in the properties. Petitioners also failed to prove
that co-ownership existed between the parties predecessors-in-interest. Thus,
respondents, as legal heirs of Fieng, are entitled to the exclusive ownership of
the Gubat and Barcelona properties.
BASBAS vs. SAYSON

G. R. No. 172660.
August 24, 2011
TOPIC: ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF THE CO-OWNED PROPERTY BY THE
CO-OWNER
A co- owner may, by himself alone, bring an action for the recovery of the coowned property pursuant to the well- settled principal that In a co- ownership, coowners may bring actions for the recovery of the co-owned property without the
necessity of joining all the other co- owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners.
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RICARDO RIZAL et.al. vs. LEONCIA NAREDA et.al.

G.R. No. 151898
March 14, 2012
TOPIC: CO-OWNERSHIP OVER A PARCEL OF LAND
Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever
the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Thus, on the
one hand, a co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over
the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a
portion which is truly abstract. On the other hand, there is no co-ownership when the
different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and
separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the
co-ownership, and his proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court, which he may bring at anytime in so far as his share is concerned.
HEIRS of ALBINA G. AMPIL vs. TERESA and MARIO MANAHAN

G.R. No. 175990
October 11, 2012
TOPIC: SUIT IS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN FILED FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL
CO-OWNERS
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that anyone of the co-owners may bring an
action for ejectment without joining the others. The action is not limited to ejectment
cases but includes all kinds of suits for recovery of possession because the suit is
presumed to have been instituted for the benefit of all.
CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, et al. vs. EMILIA FIGURACIONGERILLA

G.R. No. 151334
February 13, 2013
As co-owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right to alienate the lot but only in
so far as the extent of her portion was affected. In a contract of sale of co-owned
property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the
vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as
co-owner.
19 | P a g e
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the

other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership. The act of
repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to
wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive;
and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.
Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or in this
case, possession, do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other coowners. Hence, prescription among co-owners cannot take place when acts of
ownership exercised are vague.
REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA v. MARIO and MARGIE LAURON

G.R. No. 179011
April 15, 2013
All co-owners are real parties in interest in suits to recover properties, anyone of
them may bring an action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Only the co-owner
who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property becomes an indispensable
party thereto; the other co-owners are neither indispensable nor necessary parties.
VILMA QUINTOS vs. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS

G.R. No. 210252
June 16, 2013
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar
as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a
certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be
extended by a new agreement. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period
which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common.
Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever
the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Thus, on the
one hand, a co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over
the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a
portion which is truly abstract. On the other hand, there is no co-ownership when the
20 | P a g e
different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and
separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the
co-ownership, and his proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court, which he may bring at anytime in so far as his share is concerned.
REMAN RECIO vs. HEIRS OF THE SPOUSES DO AND ALTAMIRANO

G.R. No. 182349
July 24, 2013
Special power of Attorney or written authority must be secured first by the agent
or a co-owner before he could sell an immovable but under the regime of co-ownership,
a co-owner could sell his undivided interest or pro diviso share in the property owned
in common.
MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN vs. SPOUSES RODRIGO C. MARCELO AND CARMEN

T. MARCELO
G.R. No. 197725
July 31, 2013
It is not necessary that all compulsory heirs must be made parties to the
ejectment case. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. Only the
co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property becomes an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are neither indispensable nor
necessary parties.
INING vs. VEGA

GR No. 174727
August 12, 2013
Possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other coowners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of
an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or coheirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver the
same to his co- owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent any clear repudiation of the co- ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in
favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur:
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(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an

ouster
of
the
other
co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other coowners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
HILARIA BAGAYAS vs. ROGELIO BAGAYAS

G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517
September 18, 2013
In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a coowner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. An
action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. The
determination, therefore, as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the
resolution of an action for partition.
EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR. vs. SPOUSES ABUDA

G.R. No. 202932
October 23, 2013
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges,
shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the
contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
ARAMBULO vs. NOLASCO

(720 SCRA 95, March 26, 2014)
There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing, belongs to
different persons. The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the
Supreme Court, agree that co-owners have over their part, the right of full and absolute
ownership; that part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be
disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of their co-owners.
QUINTOS vs. NICOLAS

(726 SCRA 482, June 16, 2014)
The law generally does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property
relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners specific shares so as to
prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo.
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CLIDORO vs. JALMANZAR

(729 SCRA 350, July 19, 2014)
In Basbas vs. Sayson, 656 SCRA 151, the Supreme Court pointed out that even
just one of the co-owners, by himself alone, can bring an action for the recovery of the
co-owned property, even through an action for revival of judgment, because the
enforcement of the judgment would result in such recovery of property.
LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

(730 SCRA 376, July 23, 2014)
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab
initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Art. 144 of the
Civil Code.
HEIRS OF REYNALDO DELA ROSA vs. BATONGBACAL

(731 SCRA 263m July 30, 2014)
A co-owner has the right to alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned
property even without the consent of his co-owners.
FERNANDEZ vs. VILLEGAS

(733 SCRA 548, August 20, 2014)
Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may
bring an action for ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
QUIJANO vs. AMANTE

(737 SCRA 552, October 8, 2014)
In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with
each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising her rights over the whole
property.
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EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. SAMSON-BICO

738 SCRA 147
October 13, 2014
Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the absolute right of a co-owner to freely
dispose of his pro indiviso share as well as the fruits and other benefits arising from that
share, independently of the other co-owners.
CABRERA vs. YSAAC

740 SCRA 612
November 19, 2014
Sale of a portion of the property is considered an alteration of the thing owned in
common. Under the Civil Code, such disposition requires the unanimous consent of the
other co-owners. Prior to the partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property
requires the consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition tha land with
respect to the co-owner selling his or her share. A co-owner could enter into a contract
to sell a definite portion of the property.
TORRES, JR. vs. LAPINID

742 SCRA 646
November 26, 2014
A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro indiviso share in
the co-owned property. The Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can
claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of the co-owned property.
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
TAMBUYAT vs. TAMBUYAT

G.R. No. 202805
March 23, 2015
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another,
24 | P a g e
his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
DOMINGO vs. SINGSON

G.R. No. 200969
August 03, 2015
True it is that under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action
for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive
ownership of a common property.
SPOUSES BUTONG v. PLAZO

G.R. No. 187524
August 05, 2015
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is
proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement
of all the parties interested in the property.
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition directed by the court.
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-existence
of co-ownership between the parties. Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is
definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of an estate.
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POSSESSION
(Article 523-561)
PALILI vs AWISAN
G.R. No. 158385
February 12, 2010
The absence of actual, public and averse possession, the declaration of the land
for tax purposes does not prove ownership. The respondents tax declaration, therefore,
cannot serve as basis to oust petitioners who has been in possession (by himself and
his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war.
NUNEZ vs. SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC.

G.R. No. 180542
April 12, 2010
One need not have actual or physical occupation every square inch of the
property at all times to be considered in possession. The one year period is counted
from the time the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the dispossession when the same had
been affected by means of stealth.
FUENTES vs. ROCA

G.R. No. 178902
April 21, 2010
He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is
not aware that there exist in his title or mode of acquisition any flow which invalidates it.
SO vs. FOOD FEST LAND, INC.

G.R No. 183628
April 7, 2010
Two elements are paramount in possession, there must be occupancy,

apprehension or taking, there must be intent to possess.
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CARBONILLA vs. ABIERA

G.R No. 177637
July 26, 2010
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and
once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary
for such action to prosper.
In ejectment cases forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary of
proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession on the
right to possession of the property involved. Unlawful detainer involves the persons
withholdings from another of the possession of the real property which the latter is
entitled after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession under
the contract either expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that
possession must have be originally lawful and such possession must have turned
unlawfully only upon the expiration of the right to possess; The basis of such lawful
possession must have be established.
A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice.
BENEDICTO vs. VILLAFLORES

G.R. No. 185020
October 6, 2010
The question of whether a possessor is in good faith or bad faith is a factual
matter. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of law in an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court- the Supreme Court is not duly bound to analyze
and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.
Under Article 448 of the Civil Code, landowner is given the option to either
appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of
indemnity, or sell the land to the possessor in good faith- relatedly, Article 546 provides
that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and
useful expenses incurred, it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is
made.
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MODESTO vs. URBINA

G.R. No. 189859
October 18, 2010
An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil procedure to determine the better right
of possession of reality independently of the title; the objective of a plaintiff in accion
puliciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
Mere declaration of land for taxation purposes does not constitute possession
thereof nor is it proof .of ownership in the absence of claimants actual possession.
ASIA UNITED BANK vs. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC.

G.R. No. 191388
March 9, 2011
After the consolidation of titles in the buyers name, for failure of the mortgagor to
redeem, entitlement to a writ of possession becomes a matter of right.
MUOZ vs YABOT JR.

G.R. No. 142676
June 6, 2011
Topic: EFFECT OF PROOF OF PRIOR POSSESSION DE FACTO
Any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of
any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto
and undue deprivation thereof.
GAITERO vs. ALMERIA

G.R No. 181812
June 8, 2011
Whoever owns the property has the right to possess it. Possession is an
essential attribute of ownership. Necessarily, whoever owns the property has the right to
possess it. Here, between Almeriss registered title of ownership and Gaiteros verbal
claim to the same, the formers title is far superior.
A registered title cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law.
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BARRIENTOS vs. RAPAL

G.R. No. 169594
July 20, 2011
TOPIC: DE FACTO POSSESSION.
It should be stressed that unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits, under Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a
piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof,
without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession
in appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public
order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their
claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de
facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional
in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be
clothed with finality.
ABALOS vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO

G.R. No. 175444
December 14, 2011
TOPIC: ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just
title for ten (10) years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only
be extra-ordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty
(30) years.
Act of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the
owner are inadequate for the purposes of acquisitive prescription. The evidence relative
to the possession upon which the alleged prescription is based must be clear, complete
and conclusive in order to establish the prescription.
ROGELIO J. JAKOSALEM vs. ROBERTO S. BARANGAN

G.R. No. 175025
February 15, 2012
TOPIC: REQUISITES FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that in an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
29 | P a g e
defendants claim. In other words, in order to recover possession, a person must prove (1) the
identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 186961
February 20, 2012
TOPIC: POSSESSION BY PRESCRIPTION, AND EVIDENCE OF POSESSION
Article 1118 of the Civil Code provides that, possession for purposes of
prescription must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
A person who seeks the registration of title of a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear
and convincing evidence, i.e. he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence
or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors.
GEORGE S. TOLENTINO, et.al vs. PACIFICO S. LAUREL, et.al.

G.R. No. 181368
February 22, 2012
TOPIC: ACCION PUBLICIANA FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
An accion publiciana is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary
civil proceeding in order to determine the better and legal right to possess,
independently of title. The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property.
REPUBLIC vs. METRO INDEX REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 198585
July 2, 2012
TOPIC: CASUAL CULTIVATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE POSSESSION
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
Rather than proof of constructive possession, the presence of a meager number
of plantings on the subject properties shows that the respondent and its predecessors30 | P a g e
in-interest engaged in mere casual cultivation, which does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership.
HEIRS OF ROGELIO ISIP, SR. vs. QUINTOS

G.R. No. 172008
August 1, 2012
TOPIC: EXERCISE OF POSSESSION
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it
of such a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own property. It is
not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as
someone in his name may perform the act.
REPUBLIC vs. MARTIN NG

G.R. No. 182449
March 6, 2013
Possession is acquired in any of the following ways: (1) by the material
occupation of the thing; (2) by the exercise of a right; (3) by the fact that the property is
subject to the action of our will; and (4) by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring the right.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over
the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is
so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.
Tax declarations and realty tax payments on property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they are nevertheless good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner, for no one in the right frame of mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in ones actual or at least constructive possession.
ESTANISLAO vs. SPS. GUDITO

G.R No.173166
March 13,2013
Respondents have overwhelmingly established their right of possession by virtue
of the Deed of Donation made in their favor. They have complied with the provisions of
the law in order for them to legally eject the petitioners.
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VEVENCIA PABALAN vs HEIRS OF MAAMO

GR 174844
March 20, 2013
The Civil Code provides that possession must be en concepto de dueo or
adverse in order to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right. If not, such
possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.
SPS. SILVERIO vs. SPS. MARCELO

G.R. No. 184079
April 17, 2013
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one
who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for
resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by
any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has
the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.
HEIRS OF MELENCIO YU vs. CA

G.R. No. 182371
September 4, 2013
A judgment pertaining to ownership and/or possession of real property is binding
upon the defendants and all persons claiming right of possession or ownership from the
said defendant and the prevailing party need not file a separate action for ejectment to
evict the said privies from the premises.
MIRALLOSA v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC.

G.R. No. 194538
November 27, 2013
Being a builder in good faith, he believes that he is entitled to the reimbursement
of his useful expenses and that he has a right to retain possession of the premises,
pending reimbursement of the value of his improvements to be proven during trial, in
accordance with Article 545 of the Civil Code.
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SUAREZ vs. EMBOY, JR.

718 SCRA 677
March 12, 2014
The registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.
PASCUAL vs. DAQUIOAG

720 SCRA 230
March 26, 2014
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Whoever owns the property
has the right to possess it.
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION vs. TORMIL REALTY AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
729 SCRA 206
July 7, 2014
In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession
of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or
expiration of his right to possess.
MANGASER vs. UGAY

744 SCRA 13
December 3, 2014
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet
on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
REPUBLIC vs. ROASA

G.R. No. 176022
February 2, 2015
Therefore, what is important in computing the period of possession is that the
land has already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application
for registration. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the computation of the period may
include the period of adverse possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable
and disposable. (Emphasis supplied)
Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of
an owner is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a
persons belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is
33 | P a g e
occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. A

possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an
owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable
agricultural land.
HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO vs. SPS. ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS

G.R. No. 198356
April 20, 2015
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an
action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in
short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
BASCARA vs. JAVIER

G.R. No. 188069
June 17, 2015
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner
of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the
registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and
can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the
issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.
Upon the expiration of the period to redeem and no redemption was made, the
purchaser, as confirmed owner, has the absolute right to possess the land and the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court upon proper
application and proof of title.
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USUFRUCT
(Article 562-612)
COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN INC. vs. SPS. ARSENIO
G.R. No. 176791
November 14, 2012
TOPIC: BUILDERS, SOWERS, PLANTERS AS MERE USUFRUCTUARY
There were already instances where this Court applied Article 448 even if the
builders do not have a claim of title over the property. Thus the Court has ruled that this
provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. It does
not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the
land is owned; or that by some title one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.
However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good
faith beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia, this provision was
applied to one whose house despite having been built at the time he was still coowner overlapped with the land of another. This article was also applied to cases
wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner. The
Court ruled that the law deemed the builder to be in good faith. In Sarmiento v. Agana,
the builders were found to be in good faith despite their reliance on the consent of
another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner of the land.6
SPS. CACAYORIN vs. ARMED FORCES AND POLICE MUTUAL BENEFIT
ASSOC., INC.
G.R. No. 171298
April 15, 2013
TOPIC: DEATH OF THE USUFRUCTUARY EXTINGUISHES THE USUFRUCT
The right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since
death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This development
deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possession of
the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution.
35 | P a g e
EVANGELINE RIVERA-CALINGASAN AND E. RICAL ENTERPRISES vs.

WILFREDO RIVERA
G.R. No.171555
April 17, 2013
Generally, recovery of possession of real property is a real action that is not
extinguished by the death of a party. The judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action.
However, holding the property as usufructuary is an exception to this rule. The
right to the usufruct is rendered moot by the death of the usufractuary since death
extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This development
deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possession of
the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution. Thus, what actually
survives under the circumstances is the award of damages.
SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. vs. JESUS B. MENDOZA

G.R. No. 202247
June 19, 2013
When the owner of the share assigns and gives legal title of the said share to
another, the assignees title is only limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of
the facilities and privileges while employed with the company. The assignee does not
become the owner of the share and holds the share in trust. The assignee can therefore
be prevented from using the facilities and privileges of the club share by the owner.
SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ vs. SPOUSES

CARLITO ALINDOG AND CARMEN ALINDOG
G.R. No. 184045
January 22, 2014
It is an established rule that a writ of possession duly applied for by said
purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial
duty on the part of the court.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged
property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third
party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. The phrase a third party
who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor contemplates a
36 | P a g e
situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of
a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary
possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.
37 | P a g e
NUISANCE
(Article 694-707)
EMILIO GANCAYCO vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY
AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011
METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. JUSTICE EMILIO
A. GANCAYCO (Retired)
G.R. No. 177933, October 11, 2011
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from
constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not
nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the
safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure
illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or
endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free
passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs
the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is
that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be
abated under the undefined law of necessity. IaEScC
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the
city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion,
to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned
the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.
JAIME S. PEREZ, MARIKINA DEMOLITION OFFICE vs. SPOUSES

FORTUNITO L. MADRONA and YOLANDA B. PANTE
G.R. No. 184478
March 21, 2012
Respondents' fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to
the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to secure the property of
respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by
respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents' fence
indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its
summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.
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SMART COMMUNICATIONS INC. vs ARSENIO ALDECOA,

JOSE B. TORRE et. Al
GR No. 166330
September 11, 2013
TOPIC: NUISANCE
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence.
We have held that while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of our resources, the judiciary
will stand clear. A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that the court will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.
In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the
prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate
conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the
administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the
matter, it will decide the same correctly.
Given the equally important interests of the parties in this case, i.e., on one hand,
respondents' health, safety, and property, and on the other, petitioner's business
interest and the public's need for accessible and better cellular mobile telephone
services, the wise and prudent course to take is to remand the case to the RTC for trial
and give the parties the opportunity to prove their respective factual claims.
LINDA RANA vs TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN
ANG ONG
G.R. No. 192861
June 30, 2014
TOPIC: NUISANCE
With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that
the same is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or
comfort of the community. It was built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of
Sps. Rana from their house which was admittedly located on a higher elevation than the
subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties. Since the subject portion
is not a nuisance per se(but actually a nuisance per accidens as will be later discussed)
it cannot be summarily abated. As such, Wong, et al.s demolition of Sps. Ranas
subject portion, which was not sanctioned under the RTCs November 27, 1997 Order,
39 | P a g e
remains unwarranted. Resultantly, damages ought to be awarded in favor of Sps. Rana

particularly that of (a) nominal damages59 for the vindication and recognition of Sps.
Ranas right to be heard before the court prior to Wong, et al.s abatement of the subject
portion (erroneously perceived as a nuisance per se) and (b) temperate damages60
for the pecuniary loss owing to the demolition of the subject portion, which had been
established albeit uncertain as to the actual amount of loss.
RISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN
G.R. No. 211356
September 29, 2014
TOPIC: NUISANCE
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se
since this type of nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure,
which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or
surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotels particular incidentits locationand not its
inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been
constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary
permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per
se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.
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EASEMENTS/SERVITUDES
(Article 613-693)
SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON vs. SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA
TAN
GR No. 185240
January 20, 2010
TOPIC: EXTINGUISHMENT BY OPERATION OF LAW
The existence of dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the
idea that both estates belong to the same person.
MARGARITA F. CASTRO VS NAPOLEAON A MONSOD

GR NO. 183719
February 2, 2011
TOPIC: EASEMENT IN GENERAL
An easement is established either by law or by will of the owners an easement
or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner. There are two kinds of easements according
to source. An easement is established either by law or by will of the owners. The courts
cannot impose or constitute any servitude where none existed. They can only declare
its existence if in reality it exists by law or by the will of the owners. There are therefore
no judicial easements.
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LIWANAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

675 SCRA 744., 2012
TOPIC: EASEMENT IN GENERAL
Easements or servitudes are encumbrances imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner, for the benefit of a
community, or for the benefit of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate
does not belong.
The law expressly provides that open spaces in subdivision are reserved for public
use and are beyond the commerce of man.
CABAHUG VS NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

G.R. No. 186069
January 30, 2013
TOPIC: COMPENSATION FOR EASEMENT

The owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land if the
easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary
rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment
and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent
with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or
objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of of injury, death upon
or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary.
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. DUMADAG

G.R. No. 194336
March 11, 2013
TOPIC: RIGHT OF THE OWNER OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE
An easement or servitude is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and
immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing
42 | P a g e
somebody else to do or something to be done at his or her property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from the estate to which it
actively or passively belongs, indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property right,
unless extinguished by causes provided by law.
The owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the
easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the
exercise of the easement.
Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time
that may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have
entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their posessession is presumed to
have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.
As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to
the 3-meter strip/zone, the Supreme Court d=finds and so holds that both the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General and the local government
of Las Pinas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved.
The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the
latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No.
7279 (otherwise known as the Urban Development and housing Act of 1992).
CABAHUG vs NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

689 SCRA 666, 2013
TOPIC: EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
The owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land if the
easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary
rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment
and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent
with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or
objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or
destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary.
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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, vs. FELICISIMO TARCELO and HEIRS OF

COMIA SANTOS
G.R. No. 198139
September 8, 2014
Upon payment of just compensation to the defendants, subject to the deductions
of the sums due the Government for unpaid real estate taxes and other imposts, the
plaintiff shall have a lawful right to enter, take possession and acquire easement of
right-of-way over the portions of the properties together with the improvements sought
to be expropriated for the purpose stated, free from any and all liens and
encumbrances.
ALICIA B. REYES vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. VALENTIN and ANATALIA
RAMOS
G.R. No. 194488
February 11, 2015
TOPIC: COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
The issue of ownership is irrelevant to the case; filing of a complaint for

easement is a recognition of the servient property owners rights. Petitioner does not
question the ownership or the registration of respondents title over the property. We are
limited to the issue of petitioners easement rights. On that matter, petitioners act of
filing a complaint for easement of right of way is an acknowledgement that the property
is owned by respondents. It is tantamount to a waiver of whatever right or claim of
ownership petitioner had over the property.
The aspect of necessity may not be specifically included in the requisites for the
grant of compulsory easement under the Civil Code. However, this goes into the
question of "least prejudice." An easement of right of way imposes a burden on a
property and limits the property owners use of that property. The limitation imposed on
a property owners rights is aggravated by an apparent lack of necessity for which his or
her property will be burdened.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 165354
January 12, 2015
TOPIC: EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY and EXPROPRIATION
The expropriator who has taken possession of the property subject of

expropriation is obliged to pay reasonable compensation to the landowner for the period
of such possession although the proceedings had been discontinued on the ground that
the public purpose for the expropriation had meanwhile ceased.
NATIONAL CORPORATION, vs. SOCORRO T. POSADA, RENATO BUENO, ALICE

BALIN, ADRIAN TABLIZO, TEOFILO TABLIZO, and LYDIA T. OLIVO
G.R. No. 191945
March 11, 2015
TOPIC: EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY and EXPROPRIATION
When the taking of private property is no longer for a public purpose, the
expropriation complaint should be dismissed by the trial court. The case will proceed
only if the trial court's order of expropriation became final and executory and the
expropriation causes prejudice to the property owner.
SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA and HERMINIA VERGARA vs. ERLINDA

TORRECAMPO SONKIN
G.R. No. 193659
June 15, 2015
TOPIC: EASEMENT OF NATURAL DRAINAGE OF LAND, EASEMENT OF LIGHT
AND VIEW
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in elevation
than the Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters that flow
from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code: xxx the owner of the lower
estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner
of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.
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In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance and,
accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to minimize the
burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded the
easement and constructed their house directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins
the Vergara property, thereby violating the National Building Code in the process,
specifically Section 708 (a) thereof which reads: The dwelling shall occupy not more
than ninety percent of a corner lot and eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to the
provisions on Easement on Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be
at least 2 meters from the property line.
While the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the house of Sps. Sonkin
was the act of Sps. Vergara in dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus,
pushing the perimeter wall back and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage,
the former is nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing to observe
the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but also for
disregarding the legal easement constituted over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin
must necessarily and equally bear their own loss.
HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO and LIBY P. CALIMOSO, vs. AXEL D.

ROULLO.
G.R. No. 198594
January 25, 2016
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding
the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement where the
distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would be
caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a
single tenement, we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail
over the shortest distance criterion.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners lot would
cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners property.
Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public road, it is not the least
prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and that an option to traverse two
vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is available.
We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement;" that "a longer way
may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. SPOUSES ILDEFONSO B. REGULTO and

FRANCIA R. REGULTO.
G.R. No. 202051
April 18, 2016
A legal easement of right-of-way exists in favor of the Government over land that
was originally a public land awarded by free patent even if the land is subsequently sold
to another. It would be otherwise if the land was originally a private property, to which
just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an
easement of right-of-way.
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DONATION
(Article 725-773)
MARIO SIOCHI vs. ALFREDO GOZON, et.al
G.R. No. 169900
March 18, 2010
TOPIC: CONJUGAL PROPERTY CANNOT BE DONATED WITHOUT CONSENT OF
OTHER SPOUSE
Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by
one spouse without the consent of the other spouse.
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO vs. ASUNCION G. FERRER

G.R. No. 187056
September 20, 2010
TOPIC: CAPTION IN THE DEED OF DONATION NOT CONTROLLING
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis
Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter
vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. Since
the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and
final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment
the donor learned of the donee's acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes
the donee the absolute owner of the property donate
Irrevocability is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances
mortis causa, where revocability is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis
causa has the following characteristics:
a)
b)
c)
It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the

transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of
a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
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MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ vs. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION and DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY
G.R. No. 192916
October 11, 2010
TOPIC: MORTIS CAUSE MUST CONFORM WITH FORMALITIES ON WILLS
The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the
formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills, otherwise, the donation is void and
would produce no effect.
GONZALO VILLANUEVA vs. SPS. FROILAN

G.R. No. 172804
January 24, 2011
TOPIC: INTENT OF THE DONOR MUST BE CONSTRUED
Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to
give effect to the donors intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of
donations styled as mortis causa dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds,
eventually considered the transfers inter vivos, consistent with the principle that the
designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that
the donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling criteria [but] x x
x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to
the real intent of the transferor. Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are
resolved to favor inter vivos transfers to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.
LILIA ADA vs. FLORANTE BAYLON

G.R. No. 182435
August 13, 2012
TOPIC: REVOCATION AND REDUCTION OF DONATIONS
Although the gratuitous conveyance of the said parcels of land in favor of
Florante was valid, the donation inter vivos of the same being merely an exercise of
ownership, Ritas failure to inform and seek the approval of the petitioners or the RTC
regarding the conveyance gave the petitioners the right to have the said donation
rescinded pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code.
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CERILA J. CALANASAN vs. SPS. DOLORITO

G.R. No. 171937
November 25, 2013
TOPIC: ONEROUS DONATION
Rules of contract govern the onerous portion of donation. Rules on Donation only
apply to excess.
A pure/simple donation is the truest form of donation as it is based on pure
gratuity. The remuneratory/compensatory type has for its purpose the rewarding of the
donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A
conditional/modal donation, on the other hand, is a consideration for future services; it
also occurs where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the
donee, whose value is inferior to the donation given. Lastly, an onerous donation
imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation; this is made for a valuable
consideration whose cost is equal to or more than the thing donated.
ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK vs. HENRY H. FURIGAY, ET. AL

G.R. No. 191178
March 13, 2013
TOPIC: REVOCATION OF DONATION
It stated that an action for rescission grounded on fraud should be filed within
four (4) years from the discovery of fraud. ASB filed the action for rescission only on
October 14, 2005 or after four (4) years from the time the Deed of Donation was
registered in the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan, on April 4, 2001. The fouryear prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the deed of
donation and not from the date of the actual discovery of the registration of the deeds of
donation because registration is considered notice to the whole world.
HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL vs. HEIRS OF ANGEL MIGUEL

G.R. No. 158916
March 19, 2014
TOPIC: SIMPLE DONATION THAT IS NOT SUBJECT OF REFORMATION
The complaint failed to allege that the donation was conditional and the deed of
donation attached as an annex of the complaint showed that no condition was imposed
50 | P a g e
for the donation. As such, it was a simple donation that is not subject of reformation
under Article 1366 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1366. There shall be no reformation in the following cases:
(1) Simple donations inter vivos wherein no condition is imposed;
(2) Wills;
(3) When the real agreement is void.
CALALANG vs. CALALANG-GARCIA

G.R. No. 184148
June 9, 2014
TOPIC: OFFICIOUSNESS OF THE DONATION INTER VIVOS
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in
our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir
is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be
computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the
donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid
only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the
fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948)
CARINAN vs. CUETO

G.R. No. 198636
October 8, 2014
TOPIC: FORMALITIES FOR DONATION OF MOVABLES
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the
document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the
donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be
void.
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REPUBLIC vs. FEDERICO DACLAN ET.AL

G.R. NO. 197115
March 23, 2015
TOPIC: DEVOLUTION NO EFFECTS ON DONATION
Devolution (refers to the act by which the national government confers power and
authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities) cannot have any effect on donations where the purpose for which the
donations were made remained and carried out.
General rule, rights and obligations derived from contract (such as donation) are
transmissible except by stipulation or by provision of law.
MILAGROS REYES vs. FELIX ASUNCION

G.R. No. 196083
November 11, 2015
TOPIC: RULES ON CONTRACT MUST GOVERN ONEROUS DONATION
The rules on contract should govern the subject contract because the donation is
onerous as the burden is imposed upon the donee of a thing with an undetermined
value. Further, it is not necessary that the contract be in public instrument. It is only for
convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of
the acts of the parties as among themselves.
FILADELFA T. LAUSA, ET.AL vs. MAURICIA QUILATON, ET.AL

G.R. No. 170671
August 19, 2015
TOPIC: NO SUCH THING AS INNOCENT DONEE
There is no such thing as innocent donee as applied to innocent purchaser for
value. An innocent purchaser for value pays for the full price of the property, while a
donee receives the property out of the donor's liberality. Additionally, what the law does
not include, it excludes, and a donee is not included in the expansion of the term
innocent purchaser for value.
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HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO vs. PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF

THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH
G.R. No. 195990
August 05, 2015
TOPIC: DONATION OF THING OUTSIDE COMMERCE OF MEN IS VOID
Donation of a property which is outside the commerce of man is void.
Consequently, ownership does not transfer to the donee. If subsequently the donor
acquires title, the donee still acquires no title because the donation was void from the
start.
ROSARIO VICTORIA AND ELMA PIDLAOAN vs. NORMITA JABOB PIDLAOAN,

ET.AL
G.R. No. 196470
April 20, 2016
TOPIC: DEED OF DONATION EXECUTED DONE ON ERRONEOUS BELIEF OF
PARTIES IS RELATIVELY SIMULATED
There are two types of simulated documents absolute and relative. A document
is absolutely simulated when the parties have no intent to bind themselves at all, while it
is relatively simulated when the parties concealed their true agreement. The true nature
of a contract is determined by the parties intention, which can be ascertained from their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts. In the present case, Elma and Normitas
contemporaneous and subsequent acts show that they were about to have the contract
of sale notarized but the notary public ill-advised them to execute a deed of donation
instead. Following this advice, they returned the next day to have a deed of donation
notarized. Clearly, Elma and Normita intended to enter into a sale that would transfer
the ownership of the subject matter of their contract but disguised it as a donation.
Thus, the deed of donation subsequently executed by them was only relatively
simulated.
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JEAN TAN vs. REPUBLIC

investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC

REPUBLIC vs. CORTES

CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC., vs. THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS

MODESTO vs. URBINA

CASILANG, SR. vs. CASILANG-DIZON

SUPAPO vs. SPOUSES DE JESUS

VITUG vs. ABUDA

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SPS. MARANON

MIGUEL J. OSORIO PENSION FOUNDATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA vs. MAGDUA

3. That the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

CO GIUK LUN vs. JOSE CO

BASBAS vs. SAYSON

RICARDO RIZAL et.al. vs. LEONCIA NAREDA et.al.

HEIRS of ALBINA G. AMPIL vs. TERESA and MARIO MANAHAN

CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, et al. vs. EMILIA FIGURACIONGERILLA

Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the

REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA v. MARIO and MARGIE LAURON

VILMA QUINTOS vs. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS

REMAN RECIO vs. HEIRS OF THE SPOUSES DO AND ALTAMIRANO

MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN vs. SPOUSES RODRIGO C. MARCELO AND CARMEN

INING vs. VEGA

(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an

HILARIA BAGAYAS vs. ROGELIO BAGAYAS

EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR. vs. SPOUSES ABUDA

ARAMBULO vs. NOLASCO

QUINTOS vs. NICOLAS

CLIDORO vs. JALMANZAR

LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

HEIRS OF REYNALDO DELA ROSA vs. BATONGBACAL

FERNANDEZ vs. VILLEGAS

QUIJANO vs. AMANTE

EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. SAMSON-BICO

CABRERA vs. YSAAC

TORRES, JR. vs. LAPINID

TAMBUYAT vs. TAMBUYAT

DOMINGO vs. SINGSON

SPOUSES BUTONG v. PLAZO

NUNEZ vs. SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC.

FUENTES vs. ROCA

SO vs. FOOD FEST LAND, INC.

Two elements are paramount in possession, there must be occupancy,

CARBONILLA vs. ABIERA

BENEDICTO vs. VILLAFLORES

MODESTO vs. URBINA

ASIA UNITED BANK vs. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC.

MUOZ vs YABOT JR.

GAITERO vs. ALMERIA

BARRIENTOS vs. RAPAL

ABALOS vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO

ROGELIO J. JAKOSALEM vs. ROBERTO S. BARANGAN

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT

GEORGE S. TOLENTINO, et.al vs. PACIFICO S. LAUREL, et.al.

REPUBLIC vs. METRO INDEX REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

HEIRS OF ROGELIO ISIP, SR. vs. QUINTOS

REPUBLIC vs. MARTIN NG

ESTANISLAO vs. SPS. GUDITO

VEVENCIA PABALAN vs HEIRS OF MAAMO

SPS. SILVERIO vs. SPS. MARCELO

HEIRS OF MELENCIO YU vs. CA