G.R. No.

L-25609

November 27, 1968

MARGARET ANN WAINRIGHT VERSOZA, JOSE MA. VERSOZA, JR.,

CHARLES JOHN VERSOZA and VIRGINIA FELICE VERSOZA, plaintiffsappellants,
vs.
JOSE MA. VERSOZA, defendant-appellee.

Lower Courts decision: Dismissal of the complaint upon the ground that
there was no showing that efforts have been exerted to settle the case
amicably before suit was started. [There were to motion for reconsideration
but likewise denied by the lower court]
Hence, this petition.

William
H.
Quasha
and
Associates
for
plaintiffs-appellants.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates and Jose M. Luison for defendantappellee.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Facts:
Margaret Ann Wainright Versoza, and three minor children, Jose Ma.
Versoza, Jr., Charles John Versoza and Virginia Felice Versoza loadged a
complaint forP1,500.00 monthly support, support in arrears, and damages,
and custody of children, with a petition for support pendente lite against Jose
Ma. Versoza.
Grounds for complaint: Abandoned the plaintiffs without providing for
theirsupport and maintains illicit relations with another woman.
Defendant answer: The claim is premature for it states no cause of action.
Article 222 of the Civil Code: "No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in article 2035."
Ground for dismissal of the instant case: the suit is between members of the
same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made."

Issue:
WON Article 222 of the Civil Code will apply in the instant case.
Held: Decision of the lower court, reversed.
Ratio:
Article 222 is subject to the limitations in Article 2035 of the Civil Code:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:(1)
The civil status of persons;(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal
separation;(3) Any ground for legal separation;(4) Future support;(5) The
jurisdiction of courts;(6) Future legitime.
Since the present action also revolves on the right to future supportand
because compromise on future support is prescribed, then the
conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future support and
failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit. It
need not be alleged in the complaint.
The right to support cannot be: (1) renounced; (2) transmitted to third
persons; nor (3) compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code cannot be subject to compromise and
therefore outside the sphere of application of Article 222.

RTC found no trust relation between parties and dismissed the

complaint. Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered OLaco to pay the sum representing the
value of the property sold to the Archbishop of Manila.
G.R. No. 58010. March 31, 1993.
EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA, petitioners, vs. VALENTIN
CO CHO CHIT, O LAY KIA and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Sergio L. Guadiz for petitioners.
Norberto J . Quisumbing & Associates for private respondents.
A lot in Manila was sold by Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Company in 1943 with the Deed of Absolute name to Emilia
OLaco and a new title issued in her name. In 1960, Co Cho Chit
and his wife, O Lay Kia, also Emilias older half-sister, sued Emilia
OLaco and her husband for selling the same parcel of land to the
Catholic Archbishop of Manila and for recovery of the sold lot
claiming that they were the real owners of the property and
the legal title was only place in the name of Emilia. They claimed
that Emilia breached the trust when she sold the lot to the
Archbishop of Manila.
Emilia answered that she bought the property with her own
money, and that she only left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
title to Co Cho Chit and her sister for safekeeping. When she
asked that the documents be returned to her, her sister and Co
Cho Chit claimed that they were misplaced or lost, and in view of
the loss, she asked for the issuance of a new title from the CFI of
Manila which was granted to her.

Issue: Whether or not O Lay Kia and Co Cho Chits complaint

fails to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were
exerted considering the suit is between family member.
Whether or not trust relation exists between the parties involved
Held: NO, the complaint made by O Lay Kia and Co Cho Chit
is valid. The case is a case between family members since O Lay
Kia and Emilia OLaco are half-sisters. As such, earnest efforts
towards a compromise need to have been made pursuant to
NCC 222 (in the Family Code, it is Art. 151) before the complaint
may be filed before the court, or a motion to dismiss could have
been filed under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
The attempt to compromise and its inability to succeed is a
condition precedent to the filing of a suit between family
members.
If the original complaint did not include proof of
the conditional precedent of failed efforts towards a
compromise amongst family members, the plaintiff may be
able to amend his or her complaint to include such proof.
In this case, O Lay Kia and Co Cho Chit were able to introduce
further evidence showing earnest efforts towards a compromise
had been made, even if they did not normally file an amendment.
They were able to prove that O Lay Kia pressed her sister Emilia
for the transfer of the title of the property to her and Co Cho

Chit just before Emilia got married, but instead, Emilia decided to
sell the property to the Archbishop.

Until the sale of the property to the Archbishop, Emilia

actually recognized O Lay Kias ownership. When O Lay
Kia wanted the title to be named to her and her husband
before Emilia gets married, Emilia assured her that it
would be arranged after the wedding.

There was proof shown that Co Cho Chit had the capacity
to acquire the properties given that he was the Chief
Mechanic in Paniqui Sugar Mills and was engaged
in several businesses. Emilia, on the other hand, failed
to prove her financial capacity to acquire property.

YES, there is a trust relation between the parties.

In this case, the Court held that there was a resulting trust
intended by the parties pursuant to NCC 1448 based on 5
grounds:

Lay Kia and Co Cho Chit were in possession of all

necessary documents with regards to the subject property
for 17 years which strongly suggest that OLaco merely
held the property in trust for them by using her name on
the title.

An almost the same case had already been decided

previously on another property owned by O Lay Kia but
this time, under the name of her half-brother and Emilias
sister, Ambrosio OLaco. Court eventually held that O Lay
Kia and Co Cho Chit were the rightful owners of the said
property and the reason the title was under Ambrosios
name was because they were still Chinese Nationals at
the time. This was affirmed by Ambrosio when he filed a
complaint against O Lay Kia and Co Cho Chit based on
the Anti-Dummy law.

Circumstances when Emilia attained her new title was

doubtful because it was granted on the same day a new
title was also granted to Ambrosio. The Court held that
this showed a conspiracy by the siblings to defraud and
deprive O Lay Kia and Co Cho Chit.

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

SPOUSES
AUGUSTO
HONTIVEROS
and
MARIA
HONTIVEROS, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES
GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint
for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and
Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of
a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income
from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case.
In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and
alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single.
They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income
from the land. On the contrary, according to the private
respondents, the possession of the property in question had
already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of
possession. Trial court denied petitioners motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article
151.
ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to
lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article
151.
HELD:
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as
defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of
the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase
members of the same family refers to the husband and wife,
parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers

and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and

relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this
jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros are
regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of
Article 151.

G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006

HIYAS
SAVINGS
and
LOAN
BANK,
INC. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO
MORENO, Respondent.
Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed
with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings
and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses
Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure
any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of
mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas
and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the
loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that
he could not have executed the said contract because he was then
working abroad.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the
Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members
of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any
fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed
Orders denying the Motion to Dismiss. Ianthe present case,
petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its
failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no

reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before
the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should be dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he
ruled that lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a
ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife
when other parties who are strangers to the family are involved in
the suit.
Held:
The Court is not persuaded. Article 151 of the Family
Code provides that No suit between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed.
If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must
be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not
be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Petitioner also
contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the same family
as respondent, may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the
Family Code.
Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.

NO, petitioners claims that Pablo constituted home as early as

1964. Art. 153 has retroactive effect, all existing family residences
at the time of effectivity of FC are considered family homes are
prospectively entitled to benefits accorded to family home. Thus, for
debts incurred prior to FC effectivity, property is not exempt
from attachment.

G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999

PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and
HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
Facts:
The two parcels of land owned by Pablo Taneo were levied to
satisfy the judgment in Civil Case filed by Gilig for recovery of
property in favor of the latter. The subject properties were sold at
public auction and acquired by Gilig as the highest bidder. Pablo
failed to redeem the said properties, a final deed of conveyance
was executed in favor of the respondent. Pablo died, his heirs filed
an action to declare the said deed void and to title over the land
claiming that one parcel of land had been acquired through free
patent and the other parcel of land is a family home, hence, both
parcels of land are inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance
for the payment of debt. After trial, the RTC dismissed the
complaint affirmed by CA.
Issue:
WON the family home was constituted by Pablo and thus exempts
from execution
Held:

Before the effectivity of the FC, a family home must be constituted

judicially (filing of petition) and extra-judicially (registration). It turns
out: (1) The instrument constituting the family home was registered
only in JAN 24 1966. (2) The money judgement was rendered on
JAN 24 1964. The family home is not exempt from execution since
there was a debt incurred before the registration of the house as a
family home.

Whether the subject property is exempt from execution

G.R. No. 185064

January 16, 2012

SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE

MESA, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D.
ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR
ALFREDO SANTOS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses De Mesa obtained a loan from Spouses Acero which was
secured by a mortgage over the subject property. When Spouses
De Mesa failed to pay the loan, the property was sold at a public
auction. Spouses Acero was the highest bidder and the
corresponding certificate of sale was issued to them. Thereafter,
they leased the subject property to Spouses De Mesa who then
defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals
due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment against
Spouses De Mesa. In their defense, Spouses De Mesa claimed
that Spouses Acero have no right over the subject property. They
deny that they are mere lessors, alleging that they are the lawful
owners of the subject property and, thus cannot be evicted
therefrom. The MTC ruled in Spouses Aceros favor. Spouses De
Mesa appealed the Decision.
In the meantime, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify the title of Spouses
Acero on the basis that the subject property is a family home which
is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could
have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their
unpaid loan. The RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Decision.
ISSUE:

HELD:
It is without dispute that the family home, from the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment. However, this right can be waived or be barred by
laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property
as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time
thereafter.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff,
but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public
auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners negligence or omission
to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the
presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to
assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code
is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke
and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the
sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property
as a family home.

G.R. No. 138493

June 15, 2000

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,

vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of
Teofista. She asserted that the birth certificate is void, as it was
totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and
contained false entries. She alleged that: (1)That Teofista is the
legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariosa; (2) Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is
falsified; (3) Teofistas correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
(4) Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an
illegitimate child; (5) It was clinically and medically impossible for
Hermogena to bear a child at 54 years of age; her last child birth
was when Presentacion was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofistas certificate of birth
void and ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel
the same as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion who
inherited the estate.
Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded
sisters, as showed in her certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism,
and her School Report Card. She also filed a motion on the
grounds that the petition states no cause of action, being an attack
on her legitimacy as the child of Hermogena and Eugenio; that
Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to
Art. 171 of the Family Code; that the petition was barred from
prescription pursuant to Art 172 of the family code.
ISSUE:
Does Presentacion have legal capacity to file the special
proceedings pursuant to Art. 171; whether the special proceeding is

improper and barred by the statute of limitation; whether the public

record of Teofistas birth is superior to the oral testimony of
Presentacion.
HELD:
Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies to instances
when the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The
present action does not impugn Teofistas filiation to Eugenio and
Hermogena, the reason why Presentacion took interest on
Teofistas status is to protect her successional rights.
The present action involves the cancellation of Teofistas Birth
Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify
the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was allegedly
declared void ab initio.
First, the totality of the evidence presented, negates the
presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate. The
birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the
mothers signature appears to be forged. Second, no medical
records or doctors prescription that provide as evidence of
Hermogenas pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given
birth at 54 years of age.

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioners,
vs.
ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent.
Facts: Corazon Angeles-Maglaya, herein respondent, filed
a petition for letters of appointment administratix of the intestate
estate of Francisco Angeles. She claims that she is the sole
legitimate heir of Francisco and Genoveva. Belen Angeles, 2nd wife
of Francisco, claimed that they are the surviving heirs of Franscisco
died intestate in 1998 leaving behind 4 parcels of land and
a building. Belen opposed the petition and prayed that she be
proclaimed the admistratrix of the estate. After establishing the
circumstances of her marriage to Francisco, Belen attacked the
legitimacy of Corazon, saying that her birth certificate was not
signed by Francisco. She has also failed to present the marriage
contract between her parents, Francisco and Genoveva.
Furthermore, Belen averred that she and Francisco legally adopted
Concesa Yamat during their marriage. Trial court dismissed petition
but the Court of Appeals reversed citing that respondent has
sufficiently established her filiation.
ISSUE: WON Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco and
Genoveva?
Held: Decision of CA is REVERSED and the order of the trial court
REINSTATED.
NO, Article 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate. A legitimate child is a product of and
therefore implies a valid and lawful marriage. A child is presumed
legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock. The presumption of
legitimacy in the FC actually fixes a status for the child born in
wedlock and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. The intent of the law is to prevent the status of a child born

in wedlock from being uncertain. Presumption of legitimacy may

only be availed upon proof of the factual basis that childs parents
were legally married and that his/her conception of birth occurred
during the marriage. In the case at bar, there is no absolute proof of
the decedents marriage to respondents mother Genoveva. No
marriage certificate or contract was offered in evidence. No
solemnizing officer was called to witness. Also, respondent never
questioned what would necessarily be a bigamous marriage
between Belen and Francisco.
In fact, in her petition, she alleged that petitioner is the surviving
spouse of the decedent. Under Article 172, the court concedes
that even in the absence of direct evidence of marriage of parents,
legitimate filiation of the child can be established by the following
modes :(1)Record of birth in civil registry, (2) Admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or private handwritten
instrument signed by parent concerned. In the absence of these
foregoing evidence, filiation is proved by: (3) Open and continuous
possession of the status of legitimate child (4) Any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court.
Evidence that respondent showed:(1) Birth certificate, (2) School
and government records, and (3) Photographs of her wedding and
testimonies.
Although respondent was able to show a birth certificate, this was
not signed by Francisco or Genoveva. It was signed only by the
attending physician. This document is only evidence of the birth of
the child, and not conclusive proof of her legitimate filiation. The
signature of the father is a necessary requirement in determining
legitimate filiation and it cannot be made dependent on the
declaration of the attending physician or midwife or mother of the
newborn child. The same holds true for the school and government
records which were unsigned by Francisco and the execution
of which he had no part in. Lastly, photographs are not sufficient
evidence of filiation as settled in jurisprudence. However, due to
these evidences, court conceded that Corazon might be natural
child of Francisco and Genoveva. However this is not the issue in

this case, since the respondent predicated her petition for

administration on her being a legitimate child who was legally
married to her mother. Respondent also filed a petition against the
adoption of Consesa Yamat, alleging that as the legitimate child of
Francisco, she should have been notified of the adoption
proceedings. Since the lower court has ruled with finality that she is
not legitimate since no proof has been given as to the marriage of
her parents, this petition has become moot and academic. On the
matter of administration, it should be noted that the surviving
spouse is preferred over the next of kin of decedent. Next of kin
refers to the heirs.
G.R. No. 132305

December 4, 2001

IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner,

vs.
NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila. However, his
sisters sued him for recovery of 2/3 share of the land alleging that
he had fraudulently registered it in his name. The trial court
decided in favor of his sisters.
Jose died intestate. His sisters then filed a complaint before the
RTC for recovery of the 1/3 portion of said property which was in
the possession of Ida C. Labagala (who claimed to be Ida C.
Santiago, the daughter of Jose). The trial court ruled in favor of
Labagala. According to the trial court, the said deed constitutes
avalid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled
to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as Jose's daughter.
When appealed, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of
the trial court. It took into account that Ida was born of different
parents, as indicated her birth certificate.

ISSUES:
1. WON respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action
for recovery of title and possession.
2. WON petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he
co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.
HELD:
The Court AFFIRMED the decision of the CA.
On Issue No. 1
Yes.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife.
However, the present respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child
of Jose at all.
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof
of filiation. Use of a family name certainly does not establish
pedigree. Thus, she cannot inherit from him through intestate
succession.
On Issue No. 2
No.
The Court ruled that there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not
have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to
petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could
not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the
time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential
requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which there

can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay

any centavo for the property which makes the sale void. Article
1471 of the Civil Code provides that if the price is simulated, the
sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a
donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation.
Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid
donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art.725
of the Civil Code. Being a minor, the acceptance of the donation
should have been made by her father or mother or her legal
representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of
those mentioned in the law accepted the donation for Ida.

G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994

No. The SC find no merit to the petition.

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR
BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.

Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. The above provisions do not contemplate
a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a
certain couple.

Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.

In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of

the child by:

Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various
properties. They both died intestate. The special proceedings for
administration of the properties were filed with the trial court.
Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio filed for issuance of letters of
administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa opposed the petition,
saying that she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is
capable of administering his estate. She submitted the pieces of
documentary evidence and testified that the spouses treated her as
their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to prove through
testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to beget a child during
their marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not
the biological child of the spouses who were unable to physically
procreate.
Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled
in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court
decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological
child of the late spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and
the sole heir of the late spouses.
RULING:

(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse,

with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination,
the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence.
Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file an action impugning the
legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not where the heirs of the
late Vicente are contending that Marissa is not his child or a child
by Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not born to
Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's
Certificate of Live Birth was repudiated by the Deed of ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by Vicente,
saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of the
estate.