Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka 1950s

By the same author:
Indo-Ceylon Relations since Independence

Strategic Factors in Interstate
Relations in South Asia
Foreign Policy of
Sri Lanka
A Third World Perspective
SHELTON U. KODIKARA
Chanakya Publications
Delhi
~ G N POLICY OF SRI LANKA

\
A Third World Perspective

by
Ch..
hr
Shelton U. Kodikara
Copyright @
1982 Shelton U. Kodikura
First Published 1982

by
CHANAKYA PUBLICATIONS
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Price: Rupees Eighty
Printed 1"n India at

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Preface
No apology is needed fo/ a book on Sri Lanka's Foreign

Policy. For a small State, 25,000 square miles in extent and inhabited by a population of 15 million~ Sri Lanka has played a
remarkably active role in world politics since independence in
. 1948 to the present day. Yet, this role has not received the
scholarly attention it deserves in the current literature of
international relations. Books such as Lucy Jacob's Sri Lanka:
From Dominion to .Iiepublic (1973). H.S.S. Nissanka~s Foreign
Policy of Sri Lanka 1mder S.J:V.R.D. Bandaranaike (1976),
D.1V!. Prasad's Sl'i Lanka's Foreign Policy tmder the Ban:lara11aikes (1973) have dealt with special periods or aspects of Sri
Lanka's Foreign Policy. My _own Inda-Ceylon Relations Since
Independence (1965) was the first atternpt at exploring in some
detail the bilateral relations of Sri Lanka with its most important, and only near neighbour, India, and in Strategic Factors
in Interstate Refqtlons in South Asia (l979) I have attempted to
discuss small power interaction with specific reference to the
South Asian milieu and the ro]e of major powers in the
region.
South Asia is acquiring a special importance in contempor~
nry wor]d politics. and in this volume I have attempted to place
Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy in its historical and g]obal context.
Although the book is not 1arge, it compresses many years of
research carrjed out by me in the United States, U.K. India
and Sri Lank~. My jntercst in the subject began when I submitted a Master's thesis on Some Aspects of Ceylon's Foreign
Policy, 1948-1958' for the University of Denver, USA, in 1958,
and has continued since. This book is presented as an original
contribution to the subject, although parts of it have appeared
as articles in academic journals, Chai,tcr Two, for example,
draws on material published in my article HContemporary IndoLanka Relations in Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences, J 978,
Vol. I (i); Chapter Three is based essentially on my article
"Ceylon's Relations with Communist Countries, 1948-1966"
appearing in South Asian Sltldics (Jaipur) 196', Vol. I (2);
Chapter Six contains some material published in my ''Continuity
and Change in Sri Lanka's Foreign policy l 974-1979", Asian
Survey, September 1980, Vol. 20; and Chapter VII abridges a
series of lectures delivered by mo at the South Asia Studies
CentrcJ University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, in April 1982.
It is hoped that this book will provide both the specialist as

well as the general reader with an intelligible account of the
development of Sri Lanka's nonaligned foreign policy from
1949 to the present, A Bibliography has been dispensed with
but I have provided documentation of sources, largely from
official records and from the Sri Lanka and foreign press, where
considered necessary. The Appendices arc devoted to documents of topical interest. I have used the terms 'Ceylon' and
Ceylonese' concurrently with Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan, partly
to adhere to the usage in quotations before Sri Lanka replace<l
Ceylon to designate the country officially in 1972 and partly,
because the term Ceylon has been still retained in official usage
in instances such as 'Bank of Ceylon', Ceylon Petroleum
Corporation', etc.
My thanks are due to Professor K.P. Misra, Professor of
International Politics and Dean, School oflntrnationaJ Studies,
JNU, New Delhi, not only for reading the manuscript and
making valuable suggestions, but also for assistance rendered in
guiding this book towards publication.
My thanks are also due to Professor Rama Kant, Director,
South Asia Studies Centre, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, for
facilities offered when I delivered four leclures at the centre on
the theme 'Sri Lanka and Asian Regionalisrn~wltich will shortly
be published separately as a monograph. The Indian Council of

Social Science Research made a visit to India possible in April
1982 and perhaps without the jncentive provided by this visit~
this book may not have seen the light of day. I also gratefully
acknowledge my thanks to the University of Peradeniya and the
National Science Council of Sri Lanka for research grants which
enabled me to complete this work. Finally I am much behold~
en to the publishers of this book for the care and despatch
which they have endowed on bringing out this book within a
short space of time.
Peradeniya
May 1982.
Shelton U. Kodikara
Contents
Preface
Map
xi
I.
Foreign Policy Decision-Making

in Sri Lanka
2.
IndoLanka Reiations
21
3.
Sri Lanka and the

Communist Powers,
1948-1965
54
4.
Sri Lanka and the \Vest

1948-1965
82
5.
Continuity and Change in

Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy 1965-1970
117
6.
Sri Lanka's Non-Alignment

Policy after 1970
135
7.
Sri Lanka and Asian

Regionalism
163
APPENDICES
Appendix I
U.N. General Assembly Resolution
on Declaration of the Indian
Ocean as Zone of Peace
194
Appendix II
1\.1inistedal Conference of
Non-Aligned Countries, New Delhi,
1981: Political Declaration
197
Appendix Ill
Colombo Joint Communique
204
Appendix IV
Kathmandu Joint Communique
208
Appendix V
Inaugural Address at Conference
of Foreign Secretaries of South
Asian Nations at Colombo
212
INDEX
219
1
Foreign Policy Decision-Making
in Sri Lanka
Decision-making approaches to the study of policy formation and implementation have now increasingly gained currency in political literature, and some have even claimed for such
approaches the status of disciplinary individuality.' Whether
ornot we could agree with Sidjanski, that decision-making
studies constitute a new phase in the discipline of political
science, following the institutional phase, the group approach,
and the study of ruling classes and leaders, there can be no
doubt that the decisionmaking approach "weaves together
the 'other approaches used in -political science", that all political
institutions can be looked upon as top level decision centres
and all parties and pressure groups as autonomous decision
centres in a polyarchical society, while the leaders-as the
persons. who actually take the decisions-participate in or influence their formation.
Snyder, an early theorist on foreign policy . decision...making
defined the subject as follows:
Decision-making is a process which results in the selection

from a socially defined, limited number of problematical
alternat~ve projects, of one project intended to bring abou~
t~e particular future state of affairs envisaged by tbe decis1on-makcrs.2
Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka
Snyder argued that if a sound conceptual framework could be

constructed, decision-making analysis would be appropriate
for any area ofpo1itica1 science where there was an interest
in policy forn1ation or judgment of some kind. In Snyder.,s
analytical model, enquiry was focused both on the decisionmaking unit or nucleus and the persons responsible, but the
criticism bas been made that he failed to take sufficient account
of the role of the environment in the decision-making
process.
This lacuna was filled by David Easton's application of the
systems model to decision-making, by means of which be drew
attention to the relationship between the decision and the environment. Easton ascribed to the decision-viewed as an output
in a political system-a tangible effect on the environment,
which in turn influenced the political system through the operation of inputs. The link between decision-output and effect-input
was illustrated by a feedback loop. Easton was not concerned
specifically with foreign policy decision-making. He considered
the environment, which roust be assumed to extend beyond the
boundaries. of the political system, as an inevitable if not central
concept of decision~making analysis, owing to the interplay of
inputs and outputs. 8 Snyder's and Easton's analyses have been
considered as supplementing, not supplanting, each other,
although both have been criticised on the ground that their
conceptualization is vague and tentative. 4
Moreover, as Sidjanski has pointed out, certain risks or
disadvantages inherent in the decisional method must not be
overlooked. Political life is not made up exclusively of decisions, and it might therefore be risky to concentrate wholly on
decisions or conflict situations of an exceptional nature at the
expense of imperceptible but lasting changes. Political decisions
are, also, often based on attitudes as much as on rules, and
rules reflecting decisions and explicit acts may not be the sole
reflection of political reality. In particular contexts, failure to
make decisions might be just as significant as their existence,
and exclusive concentration on decisions overlooks a wide
range of political reality.
Foreign Policy Decisfo11-Maki11g i11 Sri Lanka
A crisis situation and the feverish atmosphere associated

with it mass demonstrations, the pressures of public opinion,
flavour or clinfate of a period, and imperceptible
changes-all these are essential political factors, even
though they are not always reflected in decisions.5
th;
Thus it is possible tU.at a decisioaa.l analysis can give a. frag"IDented picture of political events. Even so, this writer as
stated above views decision~making studies as constituting a
new phase in political science, since they have the merit of
bringing together other approaches used. ''While ~eintroducing
the dynamic and evolutionary factor, the decision-making proCess bdngs all of these elements into play in an attempt to capture dynamic reality".c
These preliminary observations are not intended as an
exhaustive account of theoretical approaches to decisionmaking, nor as providing a 1nicro-levelanalyticalframeworkfor
the study of Sri Lanka"s foreign policy, or any specific aspect
ofit. But they are considered as providing a useful backdrop
for a consideration of institutional and other factors which are
relevant to a. study of its foreign policy, in its declaratory and
operational aspects. A decision-making approach to the study
of foreign policy can be especially rewarding in a participatory
democracy such as Sri Lanka, where the government in power
has changed at every general election since 1952, and where
leaders, parties, groups, as weH as institutionaI structures have
all articulated a consistent interest in foreign policy issues. It
is realised that any meaningful discussion of the basis of
foreign policy cannot be made without a gOod deal of empirical
research into considerations which entered into specific decisions in specific situations and~ moreover,, that all the facts
which influenced a particular foreign policy decision are not
usually available to the scholar or writer, and may be unknown
to the decision-makers themselves, One cannot also take it as
granted that decision-makers necessarily act on the premise of
a rationality of choice between alternative policy options, for
the issues involved may ho obfuscated by lack on information)
the cognitive faculties and personal predilections on the decision-makers themselves, But if we were to proceed from the
.assumption stated by Millar, that "all writing on foreign policy
which is not theoretical and abstract is a collection of approximations 10 the truth incompJetcJy assessed on the: basis of inadequate cvidcncc",7 no academic exercise in the field would
be possible at all, though Millar himself recognised that a duty
was cast upon scholars nnd others writing on foreign policy to
provide as many relevant facts as they could, assessed ns validly
nnd objectively as possible. From the Sri Lankan perspective,'
it might be helpful to describe the institutional framework within
which foreign policy is made) and then to identify cnvironmentnl constraints and inputs which influence foreign policy decision-making.
The Institutional J<'ramcnork of Foreign Policy
Making in Sri Lnnkn
For thirty years, from 1948 to 1978, the Prime Minister
stood at the apex of the foreign policy decision-making process
in Sri Lanka. Section 46(4) of the independence (Soulbury)
constitution required that the Prime Minister should also hold
the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs, and even when
this constitutional requirement was done away with under the
First Republican Constitution in 1972, tl1c then Prime Minister
Mrs Handaranaikc, continued to hold these portfolios until the
change of government in 1977. After the July 1977 elections,
Mr J.R. Jayewardena as Prime l\1inister retained the office of
Jv1inistcr of Defence, but for the first time appointed a separate
Minister of Foreign Affairs. \Vhen the new government, first
by a constitutional amendment, then by an entirely nc,v
{second) republican constitution, instituted a Presidential form
of government in place of the Westminster model, Mr Jaycwardcna. as first executive President, Head of St::1tc as well as
Head of Government, continued to impart initiatives~ and give
directives on important foreign policy issucs8 apart from conducting personal diplomncy in his official capacity, as when he
Jed the Sri Lanka delegation to the sixth Non-aligned Summit
held in Havana in l 979.
In this regard Mr Jaycwardena was merely continuing along
established tradition in foreign policy decision-making in Sri
Lanka, where the Head of Government has customarily lmd a
large, perhaps the largest say in the formulation of foreign.
Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Sri Lanka
policy. The situation was not unlike that w~ich o_bt_ained in

India, where Nehru combined the o:fficesofPnme Mm1ster and
Minister of External Affairs in his person for the first seventeen
years of independent India, becoming during this period "the
philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his
country's policy towards the outside wor1d/' 9 Since 19487 eight
-Oifferentpersons have held the office of Prime Minister in Sri
Lanka, and one of these the office of executive President since
1978. Ifwe exclude the present Prime Minister, who has no
;formal foreign policy responsibilities~ and the caretaker administration of W. Dahanayake (September 1959 to March 1960),
every other Head of Government in Sri Lanka has had his or her
personal style and personal influence on foreign policy decisionmaking. From a decision-making point of view, this holds
_good even for the various administrations of Dudley Senanayakc (1952-53, March-July 1960, 1965-70), which generally
.adopted a low profile in foreign policy. D.S.Senanayake's foreign
policy, for example, (1948-52) veered towards strong support of
the Commonwealth, the connection with which was considered
to be the essential condition of Sri Lanka's security, Sir John
Kotelawela's (1953-56) was marked by a strident anti-co=unism, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (1956-59) articulated an eloquent, often rhetorical Nehru-style non-aligned philosophy, while
Mrs Bandaranaike developed a special relationship ,~ith China
but at the same time emerged as one of the Non-aligned Movement's most ardent advocates. The quiet but successful diplomacy of the present Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mr A.C.S.
Hameed} is a feature of the present government's foreign policy,
but the sp~cial links forged by this government with Japan
and Singapore were clearly due to decisions and attitudes eroanating from Presidenes House.
The Prime Minister as Foreign Minister and the present
Foreign Minister in his own right is assisted by a Deputy
Minister (formerly known as Parliamentary Secretary), who is a
member of the governing party in Parliament, but his decisionmaking functions have been minimal. Nor has Sri Lanka had
the counterpart of the Cabinet Foreign Affairs Committee as
was established in India. The principle of Cabinet secredy is
observed~ and Cabinet decisions normally do not come within
"the purview of public knowledge. The Prime Minister Foreign
3
Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka:
Minister or the President (who now presides at Cabinet meetings), as the case may be, would not in normal circumstances
be insensitive to views on foreign policy issues expressed at
Cabinet level, but it is reaso11able to suppose tbat usually the
authority of the Prime Minister (in the past} and of the
President (at present) combined with the fact that they have
access to a greater range and volume of information on foreign
policy questions than any of their Cabinet colleagues have
been decisive in ensuring Cabinet acquiescence in their proposals. No Cabinet Minister has so far resigned from the
Government on a foreign policy issue, unless C. Suntheralingam's resignation on the citizenship question in 1948 is
regarded also as an expression of dissent on the conduct of
Indo-Lanka relations. In 1952, three senior members of Dudley
Senanayake's Cabinet opposed the projected Rice-Rubber
Agreement with China, but decided to abide by the majority
view after the Cabinet endorsed it.
India's membership of the League of Nations, and the
constitution of its Political Department, which had responsibility for relations with the Indian princes and foreign states had
created, before 1947, the nucleus of the institutional set-up
which formed the basis of the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs. Sri Lanka's original Ministry of External Affairs and
Defence, however, was wholly a post-independence creation,
drawing its original cadre at the higher level from the Ceylon
Civil Service, and at the lower level from the General Clerical
Service. Foreign affairs within the Ministry were organised at a
rudimentary level, due both to problems of financial and
personnel resources. In the early independence years, there-
fore, Sri Lanka's diplomatic relations were confined to a few
countries, mostly in the Commonwealth (UK, Australia,
Canada, India, Pakistan), with Burma and Italy added, the last
presumably on account of Sri Lanka's Catholic population. Sri
Lanka had sjgned Defence and External Affairs agreements
with the UK, which came into effect on the day Sri Lanka
became i:ddependent, and by section 4 of the latter the UK
agreed, if so requested by Sri Lanka, to make available the
facilities of its diplomatic and consular missions where Sri
Lanka itself did not have such missions, and Sri Lanka in theear]y independence years availed itself of these facilities, as ,veil
Foreigh Policy Decilion-Making in Sri Lanka
as Britain's advocacy in the United Nations. Sri Lanka's

membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, the regular
meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and the paraphernalia of the Commonwealth Relations Office did much in these
years to offset Sri Lanka's inexperience in foreign affairs as well
as the lack of a proper institutional structure to sustain these.
In 1955, Sri Lanka had diplomatic representation jn only nine
countries. together with accreditation in twelve other countries.
Partly this was due to the policy of governments, until 1956,
not to establish diplomatic missions in communist countries,
even though the Peoples' Republic of China had been granted
de jure recognition by Sri Lanka, following upon a British
initiative, as early as January 1950. After 1956, Sri Lanka l1as
had diplomatic representation in China, USSR and Yugoslavia
with accreditation of representativs in other socialist countries.
particularly in Eastern Europe, and in 1956 Sri Lanka also
established its mission in New York after admission to the
United Nations in December 1955. In 1980, Sri Lanka maintained diplomatic missions in some 25 countries, with accreditation to a further 38 countries. 10
The key official of the Ministry's institutional structure is
the Secretary, and it is signHicant that this office has always
been filled since independence by a civil servant and not by a
career diplomat. The internal organisation of the Ministry
has developed structurally from the time of independence, when
the Department of External Affairs was constituted into only
two divisions under Assistant Secretaries, viz., (a) Foreign
Relations and (b) Protocol and Nationality, and these divisions
were further subdivided into a limited number of geographical
and functional arcas.11 In 1965, two posts of Director of
Foreign Relations were created as an intermediate cadre between the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries, and a post of
Assistant Secretary (Publicity) was added. Recruitment to the
career service bagan in 1948 on the basis of the same competitive examination as was conducted for the Ceylon Civil Service,
with an additional interview for applicants for the Overseas
Service and an extra paper on World Affairs for such candidates. the age limit, 24 for civil servants, being raised to 30 for
overseas service applicants during the period 1950 to 1955
after which it was brought to a par with tbat for the civii
0
scrvicc. 1 : During Mr Bandaranaikc~s time, a few recruits were

taken above the age limit of 30 by open advertisement on the
basis of an interview by a Selection Board which considered
general intc]Hgcncc, personal qualiticsi experience abroad,
knowledge of International Affairs, International Law, and
languagcs.13 Aparl fro111 these variations in recruitment, however, tho Sri Lanka Overseas Service has more or less steadfastly adhered to the open competitive examination ns the basis
of entry to tl1c career service. There has been no instances of
lateral entry by persons suitably qualified from the professions
and, in fact, in 1957, members of the legal profession were
specifically debarred from sitting the open competitive cxamination.u Part]y this has been due to elitism in the career
service itself nnd to the strong opposition which has manifested
itself from time to time from the Overseas Service Association.
against political appointees as well as 1atcral entrants from
outside. But partly it is also a reflection of the apathy of
successive governments to undertake a serious reform of the
Foreign ?\1inistry during the thirty years of its existence, and
even at the present time wl1en Sri Lanka"s intcrnation31 role
:ind responsibi1itics liavc increased out of all proportion to her
size and status us a smaU Po,ver in the international community.
The table on page 9 shows the present structure of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since the sixties, a Directo.r-Gcneral of Foreign Affairs has functioned immediately below the
Secretary, and the number of Directors working under him
have incre:i.scd with the functional and geographical divcrsi
fication of the Ministry's rcsponsibilitfos. In 1981 a second
Director-General was appointed and 14 Directors now head
the Divisions of UN and Conferences, Non-aligned Confcren- ces, South Asia, East Asia, 1V[iddle East, Africa, \Vest, Publicity
(three Directors) Economic Affairs, Non-aligned Conferences
and Overseas Administration. while the Protocol Division is
headed by the chief of Proto~ol and the Legal Division by the
Legal Adviser. Th~ Citizenship Division, 1ocatcd in the Department of Immigration und Emigration 1 is h~aded by this
Department's Controller, who was ex officio Assistant Secretary
in the ~1inistry but this division is no longer parf of the Ministry. Heads of Divisions are assisted by Assistant Directors or
Assistant Secretaries, as the case may be.
10
Foreign Policy ofSri Lank
Although a Policy Planning Division has existed for some

time in the Ministry, it is common knowledge that it has had
no impact at all on research or policy planning to speak of and
it has now been abolished. Nor has there been a Historical
Division such as existed in India to such good purpose during
India's 'time of troubles' with China during 1959-62. Storage
and retrieval of information in the Ministry is, therefore, still
primitive, and it has not been unknown for ministry officials to
seek the assistance of foreign embassies in Colombo in the preparation of their briefs. In such a context, it is not surprising
that the range of advice and background data which the
Foreign Affairs Minister could draw upon in a given situation
from his ministry officials is necessarily limited. This is not
entirely to disregard or devalue the ministry~s role in the island's
foreign-policy formulation. In the negotiations leading up to
the Sirima-Shastri Agreement of 1964, e.g., or those preceding
the signing of the Maritime Boundary Agreement with India,
ministry officials have played a valuable role, and the same can
be said for Sri Lanka~s contributions to the Law of the Sea
Conferences in recent years. But these apart, it would be true
to say that the ministry today functions in much the same way
as it did in the fifties, and that important initiatives in foreign
policy decision-making are still politically inspired.
Writing about Presidential decision-making in the White
House, Theodore Sorenson averred that "there will always be
subordinates who are willing to te!I a President only what they
want him to hear, or, wl}at is even worse, only what they think
he wants to hear". 15 This tendency is not unusual in decisioncentres, and persons ultimately responsible for making decisions, in Sri Lanka as well as elsewhere, may consider it
insufficient or inadvisable to place re1iance on official channels
of information alone. Outside the Foreign Office, unofficial
channels of information and sources of influence may be located
in the Press. or particular representatives of it, in personal
relations with foreign emissaries or Heads of State/Government,
or from pressures emanating from the domestic milieu.
In Sri Lanka, the top decision-maker in foreign policy,
whether Prime Minister/Foreign Minister or President, has
therefore come to depend, apart from the ministry sources of
advice) also upon independent sources of information. D.S~
Foreign Policy DetisiotiMakhzg in Sri Lanka
11
Senanayake and Sfr John Kotelawela gave a weekly 1?reakfast

appointment to the Political Correspondent of the Ceylon Daily
News and the present President is said to be in close touch with
tho head of the Lake House Press." At the time when the
Prime Minister was also Foreign Minister, the Secretary to thePrime Minister, though outside the structural framework of the
Foreign Office, often became a policy adviser in his own right,
and sometimes played an important part in international conferences where the Prime Minister was involved. Mr Felix Dias
Bandaranaike, when he was Parliamentary Secretary for Defence
and External Affairs in Mrs Bandaranaikes first administration
(1960-65) played the most active role in foreign policy decisionmaking of any other Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to
date, largely because of1he Prime Ministees political inexpe
rience when she first took up the office; but even when he was
unconnected with the Foreign Office and held other portfolios
during Mrs Bandaranaike's second administration (L970 77),.
he was entrusted with important foreign policy responsibilities.
and virtually acted as MrsBandaranaike'sForeign Minister. In
some instances, notably in the case ofS.W.R.D. Bandaranaike,.
the Prime Minister was to all intents and purposes his own
adviser. According to H.S.S.Nissanka:
Sri Lanka1s stand on various issues at the General Assembly
seems to have been directly guided by Bandaranaike. This
is apparent from hjs public statement on the Suez and
Hungarian issues. In his speech at the United Nations on
22nd November 1956, he described how he gave instructions to his representative at the UN at 3 a.m. at nfght. 17
Parliament
Foreign policy formulation is not a subject that can easily
be brought within the purview of parliamentary control.
The necessity to ensure secrecy in diplomatic negotiations, the
need for quick responses to international crisis situations and
!"o~ foreign policy decisions to be made even when Parliament
is 1n recess or under dissolution, have all made subordinate the
rol: of Par~i~mentin democratic politics in the matter of foreign
policy dcctston-rnaking. The ineffectiveness of democratic
12
Fore1g11 Policy of Sri La11ka
,decision-making in foreign policy has been commented upon

since de' Tccqueville's classic Democracy in America averred
that foreign polities demanded scarcely any of those qualities
which a democracy possessed but required~ on the contrary, all
the faculties in which they were deficient, a sentiment echoed
by more recent writers like Max Beloff,18 and reiterated by
Joseph Frankel, who held that "as large clumsy bodies, parliaments cannot effectively exercise initiative, and their participation upsets diplomacy". 19 No approximation to the Congressional-style committees on the American model were set up in
Sri Lanka's Parliament after the adoption of Presidential
_government under the second Republic, and in fact, all executive powers including defence remain firmly vested in the Presi-<lent of the Republic. But, by the expedient of amendment of
Parliament's Standing Order, Sri Lanka has established Ministry
-Consultative Committees in 1978 on the Indian and French
models but if we are to go by the Indian experience this
-departure is not likely to have any visible impact on foreign
policy decision making. 20
Even so, it is in Parliament that the Foreign Minister is
-exposed to the most important public discussions on foreign
policy. A specific issue of foreign policy might lead to the
--discussion of a substantive motion; or a foreign policy statement of tbe Prime Minister/Foreign Minister may lead to a
debate; or foreign policy generally may be discussed in the
contest of the debate on the Throne Speech or President's
Address, or the Appropriation Bill when the votes of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs are being discussed; or an Opposi-tion member of Parliament may move the suspension of Stand--ing Orders to discuss a current topic of international affairs.
-Purther, the Foreign Minister, or someone in his behalf, is
obliged to reply to the Opposition at Question Time, and on
a11 these occasions the Prime Minister/Foreign Minister and
other members of the government are called upon to defend
their po1icies.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, therefore, wiU not easily
-expose himself to tbe criticisms of the parliamentary Opposition
by espousing a controversial foreign policy unless it is an
important article of faith in the party programme. During the
period 1948-56 there existed a fundamental divergence of
Foreign Policy pecision-Making in Sri Lanka

approach between Government and Opp_osition on import~nt
foreign policy issues in Sri Lanka. Smee 1956, successive
governments-have espoused Non-alignment as the basic tenet
of their foreign policy, though governments headed by the SLFP
have tended to be pro-socialist in orientation, while UNP
governments have veered toward the West. The present President himself has often stressed the continuity in foreign policy
between present and previous administrations, though a recent
non-official cmnmentator claims for the present administration
of Mr Jayewardena (1977-) a more ~stricf adherence to nonalignment than any previous government. 21 The fact is that
elements of consensus on issues such as anti-colonialism, antitacism, disarmament and arms control have existed in Sri
Lanka whatever the party political complexion of the government in power, while elements of dissensus have existed mostly
on issues concerning the East-West conflict. Parliament has
been the main forum where these elements of dissensus have
been discussed, but it is not only the views expressed by theparliamentary Opposition, but also the attitudes of the Government Parliamentary Group, which bear upon decisions taken
on important foreign policy questions. The time-frame of
reference and the nature of the government's Parliamentary
majority no doubt influence the role of the government parlian1entary group in foreign policy decision-making. As the following pages attempt to demonstrate, the necessity to take account
of the Buddhist, Indian or Muslim interest in foreign policy
decision-making imposes constraints on the decision-makers~
which may appear within Parliament itself, or outside it, and
outside influences may make themse[ves felt within the government parliamentary group. But the size of the governmenfSmajority influences the effectiveness or otherwise of dissent
within the group. Under the second republican constitution,.
the role of the government backbencher has in fact been greatly devalued, in that a defector from a party automatically loses
his seat after the election year 1983, and until then can retain
it only if he has the backing of parliamentary majority.
The _UNP govemment came into Jine with the main Opposition
parties on the issue of making Sri Lanka a Republic due to a
proposal which originated in the Resolutions Committee of its.
parliamentary group. 22 A General Secretary of the same party,,
14
alleged divergences with the party leadership, among other

-differences, on the Inda-Lanka citizenship question, when he
resigned from the party in 1967,23 and criticism of government
policy in the government parliamentary group was probably an
important cause of Sri Lanka~s reversal of policy on the Hungarian issue in the United Nations in 1957. 24 All MPs have their
constituents, and all MPs are therefore sensitive to public opinion
trends in the country, whether they are specifically related to
foreign policy issues or not. The proportional system of representation adopted under the second republican constitution may
make public pressures on individual MPs less important than
before. But MPs by and large do re-contest elections, and tend
to be the most habitual purveyors of public opinion trends
to government decision centres.
TI1e Environment
In discussing the impact of public oplnion trends, we shift
our concern from the institutional to the environmental factors
relevant to decision-making, recognising that, the domestic and
external milieu impose influences and constraints which are
'-.directly perceived by the decision-makers, apart from those
brought to bear upon them through theinstitutionalframework.
The influence which domestic protest had in influencing
US policy in Vietnam, and the continuing importance of the
Jewish lobby in US foreign policy in the Middle East provide
classic examples of the importance of the domestic milieu in
foreign policy decision-making.
T11e Domestic Milien in Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka, too, the political importance of the Muslim

component of the population (6% of total population), combined with her fraternal relations with Arab countries which
shared a common colonial experience, has determined the
island's consistent pro-Arab and strongly anti-Israeli stand on
the Middle Eastern question. Likewise, on foreign policy
issues where Budd.hist interests are involved, successive Sri Lanka
.governments have either been under pressure from Buddhist
interest groups or have themselves initiated action supportive
Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Sri Lanka
15
of such interests. The Chinese action in Tibet in 1959, for

example, engendered a reaction in Sri Lanka . Buddhist ci:ctes,
which organised public meetings condemning the Chinese
suppression of the Tibetan uprising, and which call~~ ~p_on
the Prime Minjster, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, to take the1mtmttve
in calling an Asian Regional Conference to discuss Tibet
-0r to refer the matter to the UN.25 Bandaranaike, who had
-established diplomatic relations with China only two years
before, did not accede to these requests. But during 1963, Mrs
Bandaranaike as Prime Minister persistently espoused the cause
-0f Buddhists in South Vietnam. Not only did she make a personal appeal to President Kennedy jo use his good offices with
.South Vietnam to ensure the grant of freedom of worship and
religious equality to the Buddhists of South Vietnam, but she
<lirected UN initiatives in this respect, seeking the support of
Buddhist countrfos for these initiatives, and later personally
meeting, in Colombo, the envoys of India, Burma, Japan and
Thailand to discuss the South Vietnam question. 26 The Sri
Lanka amba~sador in Washington, in a broadcast over the
Amerjcan Broadcasting Company network declared that
South Vietnam posed a potential threat to peace in Asia, and
that "the entire Buddhist world is aghast at the stories of persecution in South Vietnam." 27 Again: it must be presumed
that it was pressure from Buddhist interest groups which prompted Dudley Senanayake, Mrs Bandaranaike's successor as
-Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, to despatch
-the prominent Buddhist leader, scholar and diplomat, DR G.P.
Mafalasekera on a one-man fact-finding Mission to South Vietnam in 1966. Nor was the.Buddhist response to foreign policy
isolated to specific issues such as those of Tibet and Vietnam.
President Jayewardena, representing Sri Lanka at the Japanese
Peace Treaty Conference held in San Fransisco in 1951 (then
in the capacity of Finance Minister) quoted from Buddhist
scripture to the effect that "hatred ceases not by hatred but by
love" when, on behalf of Sri Lanka, he waived reparations for
damage done by the 'Japanese in Colombo and Trincomalee
du~ing the second wor]d war. And the most important foreign
pohcy pronouncement of the first Prime Minister, D.S.Senana-yake, was contained in his "middle way., speech, delivered over
-the BBC in London in 1951, in which he extolled the virtues of
16
Foreign Policy of Sri Lanku
the middle path, scripturally hallowed in Buddhist tradition,

between the extremes of communism and anti-communism thy
which he meant power rivalry between tlle USSR and the US).
Apart from this, Sri Lanka's non-aligned foreign policy,
as it developed, as in other former colonial territorfos in Asia
and Africa) was compounded with clements of nationalism,
anticoloniaHst sentiment, and psychological responses to the
widening disparity between North and South, between the 'have'
and 'have-not' nations. It was after four hundred and fifty
years of foreign rule that Sri Lanka became independent in
1949. Nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiment therefore
entered strongly into the consciousness of Sri Lankan political
and intellectual leaders gencraHy, and combined with pride in
independence was a ,vjdcsprcad antagonism towards all remaining colonial Powers, and sympathy for nations yet subject to
colonial status. Attitudes toward the West were influenced by
political n1cmorics of past associations with colonial Powers,and by fears of new threats to independence or forms of neocolonialism. It was, indeed, a Sri Lankan Prime who denounced ~communist colonialismt at the Bandung conference in 1955,
this was hardly typical of the Sri Lankan outlook. Generally,
Sri Lankan leaders absolved communist countries of the 'cosmic guilt' 28 of colonialism, which was identified as a by-product
of Western capitalism.
Sri Lanka's commitment to a non-aligned foreign policy, too,
was strengthened by the new emphasis which the Non-aligned
Movement began to give to economic imperatives after the
Algiers Summit in I 973, by the formulation and search for a
New International Economic Order after I 974, and by virtue of
the fact that Sri Lanka's own chairmanship of the movement
(!976-79) straddled the governments of rival political parties
headed by Mrs Bandaranaike and Mr Jayewardena, respectively. Membership of the Non-aligned Movement ,and commitment to its goals, therefore provided basic continuities in Sri
Lanka's foreign policy, and tied up foreign policy postures with
pressures emanating from the domestic environment.
Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Sri Lan!ca"
17
External Milieu
In
played
cess in
put it
the same way~ international economic determinants

a large part in the foreign policy decision-making proSri Lanka. As a Sri Lankan Representative to the UN
at a General Assembly session.
Ceylon offers a perfect case study of the effect of adverse

trends in world market prices on the economy of a developing country wl1ich relies preponderantly on agricultural
exports as a source of foreign exchange earnings. 29
Being a country .whose very existence depended upon world
market forces beyond her control, Sri Lanka placed great
emphasis on preservation and expansion of her external export
markets, and the maximisation of external economic assistance.
It was an anti-communist western-oriented UNP government
which first negotiated the Rubber-Rice agreement with the
People's Republic of China in 1952, despite a US embargo on
the sale of strategic war n1aterials to China, and the agreement
has been renewed up to date.30 The fact that the Arab countries
of West Asia are important~ to Sri Lanka's tea trade is not
without bearing on her foreign policy in this area. Sri Lanka
might denounce South Africa's apartheid policy but could not
do without the South African rnarket for Ceylon tea.
The primacy of internal economic development, and the
dependence of the island's export~import economy on external
economic and technical assistance has therefore been a
major factor influencing Sri Lanka's policy of promoting international cooperation and avoiding entangling alliances with
Power blocs. Mrs Bandaranaike declared at Belgrade in
1961:
lt is not coincidence that the majority of the underdeveloped nations believe in a policy of Non-alignment. They are
only too aware of the enormous tasks which confront them

in the economic field and the need to devote their slender
resources to the fulfilment of these tasks. They also realise
that the tension which exists between ideological b]ocs can
be traced directly to the existence of economic imbalance.
18

As long as there exists a gulf between the developed and
the underdeveloped countries the possibilities of tension
are immense. 31
Economic determinants apart, geographical location pro~
vides another important environmental constraint on foreign
policy decision-making generally, and as in the case of Sri
Lanka, where geo-strategic location is juxtaposed to the jnterest
of other Powers, such constraints constitute a crucial variable
in the decision-making process. One need not subscribe to the
locational determinism implicit in Kautilya's Arthasastra to
recognise the mutual importance attached to foreign policies
pursued by neighbouring countries vis a vis each other and the
rest of the international community. The British conquest of
Sri Lanka at the end of the eigtheenth century was determined
by the strategic importance of Trincomalee harbour, and the
necessity to deny its use to the French, in the context of the
security of British possessions in India. Trincomalee still p]ays
a strategic role in relation to Sri Lankan foreign policy, and
the uses of Trincomalee as a naval base still remain a matter of
international concern, particularly to India. The factor of
geography has decided that India is Sri Lanka's only close
neighbour, and considering the vast disparities in their size and
military power it is not unnatural that there should exist in Sri
Lanka ever-present fears and anxieties on the very score of
juxtaposition to a colossus. It might be said to be inherent in
Sri Lanka's status as a militarily weak small Power lying within
India~s periphery that her freedom to pursue a foreign policy clearly injurious to India,s interests is limited by considerations ofher
own national interest. Sri Lanka's close commitment to the
Commonwealth during the period 1948-56, friendly ties mainrained since then with Pakistan and China, and her major roJ e
ju the Non-Aligned Movement and commitment to non-aligned philosophy can be interpreted, in a sense, as diplomatic
devices to counter-balance Sri Lanka's unequal relationship
with India. For Sri Lanka, relations with India are crucia],
and may even be said to form the point of departure of her
foreign policy generally.
Foreign Policy Decision-Malcing i,z Sri Lanka
19
This proposition remains true whether perceptions o_f th:

,1ational interest vary from government to governn1ent 1n Sn
Lanka and irrespective of the fact that conception of national
interest may not be easily identifiable and objectively
ascertainable-.
NOTES And REFERENCES
1See Dusan Sidjanski. (ed.) Political Decisio,i Af"akilrg Processes

(Amsterdam, London. New York, 1973), Ch.[, and Charles Roig, '"Some
Theoretical Problems in Decision-Making Studies", ibid, p.20
2R.C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and B. Sap in, Foreign Policy Declsionft!aking: An Approach to the Study of J,uernatlo11al Retaiio11s (New York,
1962), p. 90
3David Easton, A Systems A11alysis of Polltical Life (New York,
1965)
4R.oig, op. cit, pp 22-23

5Sidjanski, op. cit-, p. 5
6fbid, p. 4
7T.B. Millar, on Writing about Fooeign Policy", Australian Outlook,
2!:72, April J967.
ssn Lanka's condemnation of thclSovict intervention in Afghanistan
is believed to have emanated from a Presidentia] initiative.
0 Michacl Brecher. Neliru:
A Political Biography (London, 1959),
-p. 564, quoted in K,P. Misra, Foreign Policy and its P/annr'trg (Bombay,
1970), l\1isra writes that in practice till at least 1962~ foreign policy
;cmained Nehru's monopoly, and not much parliamentary or scholady
attention was devoted to its various facets. In the sphere of planning,
l1c exercised almost exclusive influence, though traces of the tangential
impact of certain individuals and institutions might be detected here
and there. Ibid, p. 20
10Directory cf the Oi~rseas Missions of the Republic of Sri Lanka~
Ministry of Foregin Affairs. Colombo.
"See W.A. Wiswn Warnapala, Tlte Making of Foreign Policy: A
Study of the Origin ar,d the Nature of the Oversea:; Service~ Ceylon
-Studies Seminnr 1971 series No: 2/19.
l'!ibid.
13ibid.
HExcepfions to this principle are provided by the short-term recruitment of 10 officers to the service from the profe3sfons and public
service in the peri.od leading up to and immediately succeeding the
Colombo Non-Aligned Summit.
15 Jhcodorc Sorensen, Decisio11-Making in the White House (Columbia
University Press~ 1963), 1960 Indian ed., pp. 19-20
20
19631,~s;;. ~3Lan~e~::~~~ iZ:e:u:'::: ~vZ!i;~~t~:rr:~o~~:~ i~~~~:~~~:

2
1
:
Migaras widely read articles in JYeekend reveal inside information of

policy decisions at the highest Jeve1s.
rl'H.S.S. Nissanka, The Foreign Polley of St i Lanka under S. W.R.D.
Bandaranaike (Colombo, 1976), p. 84.
1ssee Max Deloff, Foreign Policy and the Democrahc Process (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press. 1955), pp. 85-86.
19Joseph Frankel, The Makf1tg of Foreign Policy: An Analysts of
Decision-Making (London, 1963), p. 25.
20See Misra, op. cit., pp. 34-44. An approximation to the American
model, 'however, 1s provided by the creation of a Select Committee of
Parliament to review higher government and Corporation appointments,
including ambassadorial appointments,
21Sce article by Devinda R. Subasinghe, "Philosoplzy Behind Foreign
Policy" (Part IX), in Ce)'lon Dally News~ (i May 1981, where i:t is stated
itlter alia: "Previous UNP administrations may have had to-and
indeed did -follow a deliberate low profile, western-oriented foreign
policy given the domestic requirements of the time, the strengths and
weaknesses of the leadership and the international context of the
time".
22T/ie Timev ,London), 11 January 1955.
23Ceylon Daily News, 5 November 1967.
2fSec infra, PP
2sceylon Daily News, 1 June 1959.

26See Ce/yon Today, Vol . .l2, July 1963; ibid, September 1963.
21/bfr].
28The phrase is George Kennan's.

29Ceylon Daily News, 7 November 1967.
::iorhere now appears to be second thoughts on the continuation of
the agreement, however, in the conte1Ct of Sri Lanka~s achievement of
near self-sufficiency in rice production. See statement of the Trade and
Shipping Minister as reported in The Sun, 8 May 1981.
31CeJlon Today, VoJ.X, September 1961, pp. 1.9 for te>,,t of speech.,
2
Indo-Lanka Relations
A visiting Indian Finance Minister described Indo-Lanka

,relations in early 1981 as being "at their best". 1 Even if one were
to consider this comment in the context of the diplomatic courtesies observed by visiting dignitaries, it cannot be gainsaid that
Indo-Lanka relations over the years since independence stand out
as a unique example of the manner in which two neighbouring
--states in South Asia have succeeded in resolving disputes and
problems, some of which appeared at times to be intractable, by
recourse to political cooperation-discussion, negotiated settlement and continued diplomatic effort-carried out in a mutually
-operative spirit of give and take. At the time of independence Sri
Lanka had .an unresolved maritime boundary problem with India,
involving disputed possession of a small island in Palk Strait,
threat perceptions from India, and a protracted dispute regarding the citizenship status of persons of Indian origin resident
in Sri Lanka. The citizenship issue, on which agreement was
reached between the two countries in 1964 and 1974, stiH awaits
fi.naltsation in the context of changing circumstances~ but the
maritime boundary has now been demarcated, and threat perceptions. though intrinsic to a Sma11-Power Big-Power relationship, arc now more--imagined and less real than they used to be
in the early years after independence.
The bilateral relationship is unique, too, from India's point
-of view, in the context of her protracted problem of adjustment
,vith Pakistan, her uneasy relationship with China and the~ambi-
22
valence of India's other small neighbours, Bangladesh, Nepal

and Bhutan, towards hcr. 2 The incorporation of Sikkim into
the Indian Union in 1975 led to qualms in the other Himalayan
states, but appeared to be hardly noticed in Sri Lanka. Sri
Lanka, being an Island state, enjoys considerable advantages
over India~s other smaller neighbours in being more accessible
by air and sea; but by the same token. Sri Lanka's geostrategic
location in the Indian Ocean area has always remained a
significant parameter relevant not only to problems of Indias
own security but also to the general question of power rivalry
in the whole Indian Ocean area.
From a geopolitical point of view, two influences in the IndoLanka relationship stand out as important: the locational factor,
and disparity in size, population and power between tbe two
countries. Sri Lanka's location at the southern tip of the Indian
peninsula, separated from India by a narrow stretch of water,
the Palk Strait, which is no wider than 20 miles in certain
places, has continued from historical times, to exert a determining influence on tl1e course of the island's history. The
majori;y of tl1e Sri Lanka people, whether they be Sinhala,
Tamil or Muslim, belong to the same ethnic stock as India's
population, and cultural affinities extend not only to religion
(Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam), but nlso to language, Tamil
being common to Tamilnadu as well as North Sri 1,Lanka,
and Sinhala being related to the North Indian vernaculars such
as Hindusthani, Marathi, Gujerathi and Bengali.
Also important from the ]ocational point of view is the
existence of a strategic harbour at Trincoma1ee, facing theBay of Bengal on the island's cast coast. In and after the 16th
century, western imperialisms bad made sea~power the basis
of their expansion in Asia and Africa. A concept of the
strategic unity of India and Sri Lanka had emerged during this
period and, especially under the British, possession of Sri
Lanka came to be regarded as a prc~requisite to the defence
and security of India. The British therefore made Trincomalee
an important bastion in their defence network in the East.
Although Trincomalee no longer plays a role as a naval base,
its strategic Jocation makes it a matter of much international
concern, and India which has no comparable natural harbour
on its east coast, is most concerned about its potential status.
Indo-La,nka Relations
23
and uses. Writing in the mid-forties, K.M.Panikkar, the

well-known Indian scholar-diplomat had averred that the
strategic unity of India, Burma, and Sri Lanka was so obvious
that one of the pre~requisites to a "realistic policy of Indian
defenceH was the "internal organisation of India on a firm and
stable basis with Burma and Ceylon. 013 Panikkar did not press
this point of view after the independent existence of these
countries had become an accomplished fact, though be continued
to advocate the concept of the Indian Ocean as Mare Nostnmi
for India justifying an extended Indian security sphere in the
Indian Ocean area. Following this general theory, another
writer on Indian naval defence declared:
The first and primary consideration is that both Burma
and Ceylon must form with India the basic federation for
mutual defence 1,;,,/tetlzer they wi!I it or 1101. It is necessary
for their own sccurity.4
This was written in 194<!, but when a President of the Indian
National Congress echoed the same sentiment the same year in
a Bombay speech, he said that ..,India must sooner or later
enter into a treaty with the Ceylonese people so that Ceylon
may become an organic pa-rt of the body politic'\ and went on
to explain what was plainly an expression of expansionism as
follows:
India and Ceylon must have a common strategy and
common defence strength and common defence resources.
It cannot be that Ceylon is in friendship with a group with
which India is not in friendship-not that Ceylon has no
right to make its own alignments and declare its own
affiliations-but if there are two hostile groups in the
world, and Ceylon and India are with one or the other of
them and not with the same group, it will be a bad day
for both.
Nehru himself, in 1945" had pointed to the ethnic, linguistic,

and cultural unity of India and Sri Lanka to support the view
th.at the latter would inevitably be d1:awn into a closer union
with India, ''presumably as an autonomous unit of the Indian
24
Federation~'. 6 These were not just chauvinist effusions of

responsible Indian spokesmen on the eve, and in the euphoria,
of Indian independence. Many of them sincerely believed that
the British withdrawal had thrust the responsibility of the
defence of the South Asian region on Indian hands, and
that India was the natural successor to Britain as the
guardian of the Jndian Ocean. Against what contingency a
federated defence structure must be created under Indian
auspices was not clearly enunciated by these spokesmen; nor
did it occur to them that what the states in the Indian periphery
might want to guard against was precisely Indian interventionism or expansionism. Burma underlined her independence
and separateness from India by keeping out of the Commonwealth of Nations; for the same reasons Sri Lanka opted for the
Commonwealth and sought, in the Commonwealth connection,
to redress the balance against India. One Sri Lankan Prime
I\1inister went so far as to assert, in 1954, that Panikkar's
writings were tantamount to an Indian proclamation of a
'1vI:onroe Doctrine' for South Asia. 7 On this, as well as on
numerous other occasions in the fifties Pandit Nehru himself
personally sent special messages to the Sri Lanka government or publicly repudiated any suggestion that India had
designs to interefere with the island's sovereignty and assured
Sri Lanka of India's goodwill and peaceful intentions towards
her. Yet, perception of a threat from India was a very real
element in foreign policy decision-making in Sri Lanka, more
especially during the period 1948-56, but to a lesser extent even
after, and India's own strategic concerns regarding Sri Lanka's
foreign policy posture and alignments have been continuing. A
former commander of the Indian Navy could write as late as
1974 that:
Sri Lanka is as important strategically to India as Eire is to
the United Kingdom or Taiwan to China. . . As long as
Sri Lanka is friendly or neutral~ India has nothing to worry
about but if there be any danger of the island falling under
the domination of a power hostile to India, India cannot
tolerate such a situation endangering her territorial
integrity.a
25
When, in July 1963, Sri Lanka and China entered into a Maritime Agreement givjng most favoured nation status to t~e
contracting patties in respect of commercial vessels enga?ed in
cargo and passenger services to and from the two countnes or
from a third country, the nature of the agreement became a
subject of great concern in India, where attitudes were _i1?flue~.::ed partly by allegations of the parliamentary Oppos1t10n m
Sri Lanka itself that the agreement provided facilities to Chinese
warships.'11 5imilarly, during the East Bengal crisis preceding
the Inda-Pakistan war of 1971, the grant by Sri Lanka of air
'transit facilities through Colombo from West to East Pakistan
after overflights by Pakistani aircraft had been stopped by India
herself, caused considerable misgivings in Indian circles, where
it was believed that Pakistani troops disguised as civilians were
being transported through Colombo on PIA :flights to Dacca. 10
Whether or not facilities would be granted by Sri Lanka to the
United States Navy in Trincomalee in the context of the present
escalation of Indian Ocean power rivalry between the US and
USSR is a matter not only of Indian, but of wider concern.
It is not an unnatural concomitant of India's own perception of her regional security interests that she should evince
interest and concern over Sri Lanka's international relations.
But it is also inherent in the geopolitical situation~ in the locational determinism of Indo-Lanka relations, that a fear psychosis of India should persist in Sri Lanka to a greater or lesser
-Oegree, depending on variables such as the international situation, issues of domestic politics, and the personality factor.
Reference has been made to di..sparity in size and population as
being a bas.ic determinant, apart from location, of the nature of
the Indo-Lo.nka relationship. India has an area of 1,261,597
sq.miles, which is fifty times larger than Sri Lanka,s area of
25,332 sq.miles, and India's estimated population of 650 million
is 43 times larger than Sri Lanka's population of 15 million.
Implicit in this disparity are tendencies on the part of Sri
Lanka's decision-makers to seek diplomatic reinsurance in
various forms against any attempt by India to dominate her
and, on I:1dia's own part, a t~ndency to regard Sri Lanka (toget~e: :v1th other small neighbours) as a legitimate object of
India s interest and concern as a country lying within its security
sphere and, concomitantlyJ a tendency also to assume that Sri
26
-, Foreign Pp/icy of Sri L anku

').~;. ,..,
Lanka's policies IfiuSt Oe7P'f~cri6ed by, tlie demands of Indian

national interests. .. ~k~;;:.,.
.
.,,c
.~-f.-<.:"$=..;.' _.
The International Context of'Indo{t'i;nk:i
'tfltWI L__
Sri Lanka and India have been members of the Commonwea1th since their independence and were, together with Pakistan, the first non-white Dominions in it. Sri Lanka and India
have been members of the Non-aligned Movement since its.
inception in 1961, and even before this date~ dming the fifties,
espoused a common approach to important international issues~
e,g, Indonesian independence in 1949, Suez and Hungary in
1956, the issue of national liberation generally, disarmament,
and resistance to military pacts. Sri Lanka and India were
among the five states which met from time to time in the midfifties, known as the Colombo Powers, which met at Prime
Ministerial level in 1954 to consider the situation in Indo-China,.
and which sponsored the Bandung conference in 1955, Not
being a member of the UN till the end of 1955, Sri Lanka took
advantage of Commonwealth meetings and meetings at the
Asian regional level to articulate her foreign policy positions.
For both countries, the Commonwealth connection is now less
important than before, and both countries affirm a commitment
to Non-alignment. This is not to say that the two states have
not diverged from each other on specific issues of international
politics, Bandung itself provided an instance were Nehru and
Kotelawela disagreed fundamentally on the latter's indictment of
'communist colonialism'. Contemporary examples include those
relating to recognition of Kampuchea, Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan and attitudes to the US and USSR generally, India
being allied under a Friendship Treaty with the USSR, and Sri
Lanka's new economic order being heavily dependent on
western economic aid. However, what is of greater relevance
for Inda-Lanka relations is Sri Lanka's attitude, past and
present, to I ndo-Pakistani relations and to the question of IndiaChina relations.
Sino-Lanka relations had a tendency to ebb and flow with
changes of governl1lent in Sri Lanka. Chou En-lai's two visits
to Sri Lanka were undertaken "(in 1958 and 1964) when the
Bandaranaikes were in power, while all three visits of a Sri
Jndo-Lanka Relations
27
Lankan Head of Government to China were undertaken 5in

1963 and J 972) by Mrs Bandaranaike. But the Rubber-Rice
Agreement was contracted by a UNP go;emment, it has so _far
been more important economically to Sn Lanka than to China,
and the agreement has been renewed for the usual five-yearly
term since 1952 so far, whatever the political complexion of the
Sri Lankan government in power. Chinese economic assistance,
too, has been given on generous terms, and Bandaranaike administrations, in particular, strove to maintain cordial relations
with the People's Republic. When the Sino-Indian war brokeout in 1962, therefore, Mrs Bandaranaike resisted pressure from
elements within the Government party as well as from
the parliamentary Opposition to brand China the aggressor. 11
Instead, she took the initiative in summoning the Colombo conference of six Non-aligned nationc, with the object of exploring
ways and means of bringing India and China to the confere11ce
table with a view to settling the boundary dispute. Moreover
Mrs Bandaranaike herself made the trip to Peking together
with Subandrio of Indonesia to explain the conference proposals
and their clarifications, in January 1963, and the same month
visited New Delhi for the same purpose together with representatives. of UAR and Ghana~ No concrete results came from these
initiatives-India accepted the conference proposals ;n toto,
China only with reservations. Nevertheless,. the mediation oi
the Non-aligned powers did provide a breathing-space for
the disputants to adjudicate their rival claims in an atmosphere
free from stress, and perhaps it also obviated further escalation
of hostilities. Though India might perhaps have been more
pleased had Sri Lanka~s official attitude to the war been proIndian, she appreciated the Sri Lanka governmenCs independent
stand, and there is no evidence to indicate that Indo-Lanka
relations were in any way jeopardiSed thereby. Nepal~ too, had
adopt~d a neutral stand on the India-China dispute.
Sn Lanka also scrupulously kept aloof on the Kashmirdispute between India and Pakistan and observed neutra1ity in
the wars fought between these two countries in 1947-48 1965
and l 971. Maintenance of friendly ties with Pakista~ had'
always been a_ basic efoment in Sri Lanka's foreign policy. So- w~s ~reservation of Pakistan's integrity and maintenance of thecxistmg balance of power in South Asia. When the East Bengali
28
cns1s erupted in 197[, therefore, Sri Lanka was caught in an

ambivalent position, appearing to veer towards Pakistan in the
hope of a solution to the crisis which would prese1ve the integrity of Pakistan. The government of Mrs Bandaranaike laid
itself open to the charge that it had aided and abetted in the
ruthless suppression of East Bengali patriots by permitting air
transit rights during the crisis to Pakistani civilian aircraft
through Colombo, when no proper checks were instituted to
prevent military personnel disguised as civilians or military
equipment from being transported in these aircraft. The Sri
Lanka government was perhaps remiss on this issue though it
could hardly have instituted new procedures to search civilian
aircraft while in transit whhout a breach of air trafhc rights. Sri
Lanka regarded the East Bengal crisis as an internal affair of
Pakistan and, even after the crisis was over, in order not to
offend Pakistan susceptibilities, did not accord recognition to
Bangladesh until March 1972. These events did not tarnish the
Indo-Lanka relationship, nor the friendship which had subsisted
between Mrs Bandaranaike and Mrs Gandhi. Mrs Gandhi, in
fact, paid a personal visit to Sri Lanka early in 1973.
Overriding these issues in importance was the community
of outlook between India and Sri Lanka on Non-alignment,
especially on the proposal inspired by Mrs Bandaranaike on the
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Like Tito of Yugoslavia and
Makarios of Cyprus, Mrs Bandaranaike had a special status
within the Non-aligned Movement as having attended the first
five Non-aligned Summits between 1961 and 1976, and as having
assumed the Chairmanship of the Movement at the Colombo
Summit in August 1976. Mrs Gandhi herself, as Prime Minister
of India, was associated with Mrs Bandaranaikc in three Non~
aligned Summits, those held in Lusalm (1970), Algiers (1973),
and Colombo (1976), Mrs Gandhi's third visit to Sri Lanka as
Prime Minister being on the latter occasion.
Apart from common participation at these conferences1 and
a shared community of outlook as regards the principles of
Non-Alignment wl1ich was implied in such participation, India
and Sri Lanka were much concerned to preserve the Indian
Ocean as an area of peace in the context of the escalation of
Great Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean from the late sixties
-oil wards. Both countries had an important status as littoral/
JndoLanka Refations
29
island states in the Indian Ocean. and saw the increasing naval
activity of outside Powers as a threat to the peace and integrity
of littoral, hinterland, and island states in the aTea, as well as.
an obstacle to their advance from colonial economic to economically developed status. India strongly supported the Sri
Lankan initiative to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace,
at the Lusaka Summit in 1970 as well as in the United Nations,
when it was adopted as a Resolution at its 26th session in 1971.
She is a member of the 23-member Ad Hoc Committee chaired
by Sri Lanka appointed by the UN General Assembly to seek
ways and means of implementing the proposal. And although
prospects for the successful holding of the Ad hoc Committee
meeting, fixed for June 1981, are now connected with events in
Afghanistan, where Sri Lanka has condemned outright the
Soviet intervention whereas official Indian pronouncements on
the subject have been muted,12 there is no doubt that common
membership of the Non-aligned Movement has broadened the
context in which Inda-Lanka relations are being conducted.
However~ the fact that common membership does not imply
community of approach on every international issue, whether thecontext is Indo-Lanka relations or relations among other Nonaliglledstates, hardly needs reiteration. Changes in the inter-national envnonment and in the internal structure of the states
concerned do impinge on bilateral or multilateral interstate
relations. The present Jayewardena administration bas claimed
a stricter adherence to the principles of Non-alignment than
previous governments. In India, the present administration of
Mrs Gandhi has been criticised by the opposition Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) for what has been termed its runidimensional
tilt towards the Soviet U nion.-13 These pronouncements seem to
imply that Non-alignment must be a policy of equidistance
from the power blocs. But, as K.P. Misra has cogently argued
both the concept of equidistance and the concept of 'naturai
alliance with one bloc or the other, are inconsistent with Nonalignment.
The secret of the resilience and, in a sense, universalization
of th~ concept ofnon-a~ignment is that it has been dynamic
that ~t has been respo~s1ve to ever-changing international
relations~ and that 1t has been permissive of diversity anci
30

multiplicity of approaches consistent with a hard~corc unity
on some irreducible, minimum principles.14
Mrs Gandhi began her inaugural address to the Delhi Non.aligned Conference by quoting from :rviahatma Gandhi, who
had said: "India wants to be independent of everybody who
wants to own this country. We do not want a change of
masters. We want to be masters on our soil."15 If there has
been a 'tilt' in India's Non-alignment policy towards the
Soviet Union, it certainly has not prevented recent Indian
overtures for normalisation of relations with China.16 There
does not appear to be, therefore, a qualitative difference between
the non-alignment policies followed by India and Sri Lanka,
respectively.
The Political Declaration of the Colombo Summit (1976)
had condemned "the establishment, maintenance and expansion of foreign and imperialist military bases and installations,
such as Diego Garcia, by the great Powers in the pursuit of
their strategic interests" as constituting "a direct threat to the
independe~ce, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
-development of States in the region." The New Delhi Declaration (1981) likewise expressed concern over "the growing
build-up of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean
area", deplored the escalation of military preparations by the
great powers, which "systematically nullified" the concept of
the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone, and reaffirmed a determination to work for the success of the Conference on the Indian
Ocean to be held in Sri Lanka in 1981. There was no specific
-reference to Diego Garcia in the Ne\v Delhi Declaration, 17
Maritime Boundary Agreements: India & Sri Lanka

Projection of similar interests by India and Sri Lanka as
regards the Indian Ocean has been further reflected by definitive agreements reached between the two countries on the question of demarcation of their maritime boundaries. The ncces-sity for demarcating these boundaries had been emphasised by
tho C;'!;.tension, by both states, of their territorial waters and
contiguous areas, and by disputed possession of the island of
Kachcha Thivu in Palk Strait. In March I 956, India, by
Presidential Proclamation, had extended her territorial waters
from the conventional three miles to six nautical miles, and in
J 957, by a further Proc1amation, India had claimed jurisdi~t1?n
over a contiguous area 100 nautical miles from the outer l1m1ts
of her territorial waters, with the specific object of protecting
~fisheries and other living resources in this arean. This Proclamation laid down that. subject to "the provisions of any international agreement or convention to which India is, or may
hereafter become, a party", she claimed the right to "regulate all fishing activities in the said areas in order to enforce
the laws and regulations that may be issued from time to time
for the purposes afore-said". These decisions were communicated to Sri Lanka and, since India's hundred-mile fishing zone
covered Sri Lanka~s own Wedge Bank and Chank fishing
_,grounds, Sri Lanka herself issued Proclamations extending her
territorial waters to six nautical miles and claiming fishing
rights over a contiguous area 100 mile from her territorial
waters. In 1967, the two countries further extended their
territorial seas up to 12 miles, respectively. The dispute over
possession of Kachcha Thivu, an uninhabited coral island about
one square mile in area, and located almost midway between
India and Sri Lanka in Palk Strait, pre-existed these developments. The government of Madras State claimed Kachcha
Thiyu as belonging to Ramanathapuram Samasthanam, which
had been taken oycr by the Madras government under the
Zumindari Abolition Act. Sri Lank.a adduced evidence to prove
l1istorical rights over the island, its ecclesiastical jurisdiction by
the Romcn Catholic diocese of Jaffna jn Sri Lanka, and its use
as a naval bombardment range under Ceylon Defence regulations during World War II. Apart from the existence of this
dispute, India's and Sri Lanka's extension of their territorial
waters and contiguous zones were over-lapping in Palk Strait
-and Palk Bay. 18
In o;der to resolve these outstanding issues, India and Sri
Lan~a signed an agreement demarcating their maritime boundary m Pnlk Strait up to Adams Bridge, on June 26, operative
from July 8th, 19!4. The agreement demarcated a boundary in
the sea.from a por~t about 18 nautical miles northwest of Point
Pedrn 1n Palk Stra1t to Adams Bridge, a distance of approxima1cly 86 nautical miles. The agreement gave each country soverei-
32
Forelgn Policy of Sri Lanka
gnty and exclusive jurisdiction over the land and waters on its.
-Side of the boundary line. The vessels of each country were to
enjoy in each other's water the rights of navigation as they had
traditionally enjoyed, while each country was to be free to explore and exploit a]l petroleum and mineral resources fa!Hng.
on its side of the boundary. Provision was made for the two
countries to agree O!]. the method of most effective exploration,
where the petroleum or mineral deposits were found to extend
from one side of the boundary to the other. The most significant aspect of the agreement, from Sri Lanka's point of view,
was that it resolved, once and for all, the vexed question of
sovereignty over the island of Kachcha Thi vu, which had been a
matter of dispute between the t,vo countries for over two decades. The agreement did not refer specifically to Kachcha Thivu,
but under this island fell on the Sri Lanka side of the boundary.
This agreement related to the international boundary between
India and Sri Lanka in their historic waters in Palk Strait and
Palk Bay, and resolved the question of overlap created by the
extension by both countries of the limits of their territorial seas
from six to twelve nautical miles in I 967.
A further Maritime Boundary Agreement of 1976 extended this boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of
Bengal, and gave each party sovereign dghts and exclusive
jurisdiction over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones, as well as over their resources, whether living or
non-living, falling on its side of the boundary. Under this agreement, each party \vas also required to respect rights of navigation through its territorial sea and exclusive economic zone in
accordance with its Jaws and regulations and the rules of international Jaw.
In respect of the marine area between India and Sri Lanka
in the Gulf of Mannar, the agreement defirted, by latitudes
and longitudes and 13 points which were equidistant from
the coasts of the two countries. Under the agreement, the
lines connecting these points constituted the maritime boundary in the area. It was further provided that the extension of
this boundary beyond point 13 M would be considered.
The agreement further stipulated that if any single geological, petroleum or natural gas structure or field existing on one
side of the boundary was exploited on the other side of the
Jndo~Lanka Relations
33
boundary~ the two countries should reach agreement as t~ the

manner in which the structure or field shall be most effectively
exploited, and the manner in which the proceeds deriving therefrom, shall be apportioned. The Agreement was dated 23rd
March 1976, and ratified on 6th July, 1976.19
Practical effect to this agreement has been given by the

Maritime Zones L:iw of 1976 and the Presidential Proclamation gazetted on 15th Jauuary 1977 which provide as follows:
(I) The territorial sea of Sri Lanka shall extend to a distance of 12 nautical miles from baselines measured
from the low water mark of ordinary sprjng tides along
the coast of the mainland and along the seaward side
of islands;
(2) The contiguous zone of Sri Lanka shall extend 24
nautical miles seaward from the baselines from which
the territorial sea is measured;
(3) The exclusive economic zone of Sri Lanka shall extend
to the sea to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baseline from which the territorial sea is measured;
(4) The pollution prevention zone shall extend to the sea
to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the territorial sea is measured.to
The proclamation also defined the historic waters of Sri
Lanka in the Palk Strait, Palk Bay and the Gulf of Mannar
and declared that (a) the historic waters in the Palk Strait and
Palk Bay shall form part of the internal waters of Sri Lanka
and (b) that the historic waters in the Gulf of Mannar shall
form part of the territorial sea of Sri Lanka.
The Continental shelf of Sri Lanka had already been define_d in the Maritime Zones Law of 1976 as the natural prolongation of the land boundary of Sri Lanka into the sea up to the
outer edge of the Continental Margin yet to be defined in
International Law or up to a distance of 200 nautical miles
from the coast, whichever is more. The delimitation of the
~ntcruational boundary must be regarded as a historiclandmark
11!. Inda-Lanka_ re~ations, and the culmination of many years
0
~ hard negottahng between the two countries. India herself
made a simultaneous proclamation defining the extent and
34
legal status of the historic waters between the two countries in

the Palk Strait, Palk Bay and the Gulf of Mannar. A Supplemental Agreement dated 22nd November 1976 between India
and Sri Lanka determines the extension of their maritime
boundary of Gulf in the Mannar from position 13 m to the Trijunction point between Sri Lanka, India and the Maldives,
while these three countries entered into a further .agreement
determining the Trjjunction point itself in July 1976.
The Gitizenship Question in Indo-Lanka Relations

The most notable diplomatic achievement of Sri Lanka's
relations with India, however, was the signing of the IndoCeylon Agreement of October 1964, relating to the question of
persons of recent Indian origin in Sri Lanka. This question, a
carry-over from the colonial period, had become a controversial issue in Sri Lanka politics as early as the 1930s, and had
become the subject of Indo-Lanka negotiations from this time
onwards. With the approach of independence in Sri Lanka and
particularly after the Donoughmore constitution of 1931 had
conferred on Sri Lanka a semi-responsible government, a conflict of economic and political interest between persons of
Indian origin and indigenous elements of the population had
come to be highlighted. Even before independence, the Senanayake-Bajpai talks in 1940-41 and the protracted correspondence
between D.S. Senanayake and Pandit Nehru in 1947-48, had
attempted to provide some agreed basis for solution to this
question.
In the post-independence period, Mr Dudley Senanayake's
talks with Pandit Nehru on this question in 1953, and the
agreement entered into between Sir John Kotelawela and
Pandit Nehru in January and October 1954, proved inconclusive
and abortive. The Indo-Ceylon Agreement of October 1964
(also referred to as the Sirima-Shastri agreement) was therefore
preceded by a long history of negotiation between the two
countries, and its immediate background, on the Sri Lanka side
was a determined effort on the part of the Sirima Bandaranaike
government in the early sixties to find solutions to the problem
and, on the Indian side, an earnest desire on the part of tbe
Lal Bahadur Shastri government to improve India~s relations
Jndo-Lanka Relations
35
with neighbouring countries and foster a spirit of mutual trust

.and friendship among them in the wake of the Sino-Indian
'War.Under the 1964 agreement} Sri Lanka agreed to grantciti~e~sbip to 300,000 of an estimated 975,000_pers_o~s ofl~dian or,gm
in the island. India agreed to grant Indian c1t1zensh1p andrepat~
,iate to India 525,000 such persons, the period of the validity of
the agreement being 15 years. Natural increases in thestip:1~ated
numbers for repatriation to India and grant of Ceylon c1t1zensWp, respectively, were also co~vered by the agreement, which
provided for transfer of assets of repatriates up to a specified
Innit. The 150,000 persons not covered by th is agreement were
to be the subject of further negotiation. In January 1974 Mrs.
Bandaranaike and Mrs. Indira Gandhi agreed to take equal res--ponsibility for them, i.e., 75,000 persons of this number would
be given Ceylon citizenship, in addition to the 300,000 earlier
.agreed upon, and the remaining 75,000 would be repatriated to
India, in addition to the 525,000 earlier agreed upon. By
further agreement tbe period of validity of the agreements was
<'xtended to 1981.
Implementation of the agreements has been beset with
numerous political and administrative difficulties, and up to the
end of October 1981, only 255,425 plus a natural increase in
this number of 75,038, making up a total of 330, 463 persons
had been granted Indian citizensb.ip and repatriated to India;
while the number granted Ceylon citizenship was 145,956 plus a
natural increase in this number of 40,924, making up a total of
186,880 persons.21 Divergent interpretations relating to the 1964
..agreement between the two countries, and delay on Sri Lanka's
part in framing enabling legislation to put the agreement into
operation, were among the main political problems which
slowed down the implementation of the 1964 agreement. Admini~trative difficulties of implementation related, among other
thtngs, to delays on the Sri Lanka side, of payment of gratuities
and_ exc~ange con!r~l permits to would-be rapatriates, the
In~1an High Com;111~s1on's o:'11 tardiness in disposal of appli.ca~tons for repatrmttoni and its persistent reluctance to furnish
a hst of persons who had applied for Indian nationality and
r~pa:riatioo to India. Since the agreement stipulates recipro<:!ty m the grant of Ceylon citizenship and repatriation in the
36
ratio of 4:7, slowing down of one process inevitably involved

slowing down of the other. A major outstanding problem connected with implementation of the agreements was the fact
that when the lists were closed for application for Ceylon citizenship or repatriation to India, respectively, on 30 April
1970, it was found that approximately 625,000 stateless persons
ofindian origin had applied for Ceylon citizenship, while only
400,000 persons had applied for repatriation to India. In
other words, India had a shortfall of 125,000 to fulfil its targets under the 1964 agreement; while the number who had
applied for Sri Lanka citizenship was more than twice the number envisaged under the agreement.
Sri Lanka's contention aU along has been that it was India's..
responsibility to fulfil its obligation under the agreement, and
that the Indian High Commission should extend its date for
accepting applications in order to make up for the shortfall of
125,000 persons required to be repatriated to India. While not
agreeing to this, Indian authorities have contended that they win
informally take on additional persons to their lists for repatriation. By 1975, the number of applications received by the Indian
High Commis,;ion had increased to 480,000, still showing a
shortfall of 45,0QO. During the course of Pdme Minister
Indira Gandhi's goodwill visit to Sri Lanka in April 1973,
it was mutually agreed that the pace of repatriation to India
under the terms of agreement would be accelerated such that
there would he a ten per cent increase in repatriation over
and above the targets stipulated in the agreement. This would
have involved a ten per cent increase over 35,000 repatriates
which is the annual target figure necessary to implement
the agreement whhin the stipulated time period. Leaving
out the natural increase, however, the target of 35,000 was exceeded only once from 1964 to the present, i.e., in the year 1974
when the number of repatriates to India was 35,141. The average annual repatriation to India under the terms of the agreement has been 15,657 (natural increase excluded) during the
period 1964 to 1977 inclusive.
A number of factors have hitherto hindered the proper
implementation of the Indo-Lanka citizenship agreements.
Important among these have been divergences of party-political
approach towards these agreements in Sri Lanka. Apart from
37
the initial question which arose, soon after the signing _of the
1964agreement, whether compulsory repatriation was_env1saged
under it, which has turned out to be largely acade~1c so_
there bas been a basic difference between the two ma1n poltttcal
parties in Sri Lanka as regards the recip_ro~ity require~ent for
grant of Sri Lanka citizenship and repatnation to India under
the terms of that agreement. SLFP governments under Mrs
Bandaranaike strictly adhered to the letter of the agreement
.stipulating grant of Sri Lanka citizenship to four persons for
every seven persons actually repatriated to India. However,
when the government of Dudley Senanayake(1965-70) belatedly
-enacted the Indo-Ceylon Agreement Implementation Act in
mid-1967, this stipulation was changed such that it became
sufficient to -grant Sri Lanka citizenship to four persons for
-every seven persons registered as Indian citizens, though staying
tcmporarHy in Sri Lanka until the date of their repatriation on
residence permits. When Mrs Bandaranaike returned to power
in 1970, an amendment to the Implementation Act passed in
1971 once again the original stipulation tying the grant of Sri
Lanka citizenship to actual repatriation to India, and making
employment of a temporary residence permit overstay an
-0.ffence. The UNP government of J.R. Jayewardena once
again restored, by amendment of the Act, reciprocity in the
_grant of Sri Lanka and Indian citizenship, respectively, retaining
the 4:7 ratio. It is pertinent to note here that the ewe leader
S. Thondaman was a supporter of Dudley Senanayake's 1965-70
administration and is a Cabinet minister under Jayewardena.
The divergence of approach on this issue becomes impor~
tant in tbe context of possible abuse of the grace period allowed
-on temporary residence permits for those registered as Indian
citizens to wind up their affairs and leave for India. Under Mrs
Band~ranalke's administration (l 970-77)J temporary residence
-permtts up to two years, later reduced to one year, were granted
to w?uld-be repatriates to facilitate receipt of their employees
-prov1?-ent fund benefits and transfer of assets. But residence
permit overstays became a nagging problem for successive Sri
Lanka governments. Some of the overstays were no doubt
caused by delays in payment by the Sri Lanka authorities of
~PF benefits and gratuity, but these authorities found in mid
1975, 45,000 overstays, some of whom had obtained iheir EPP
rar,
38
Foreign Policy of Sri Lankac
benefits, invested their monies elsewhere and continued to be

employed. In May 1975, estate superintendents were vested
with power to discontinue overstays from employment, though
without prejudice to his right of residence and rations on the-estate, but this became a subject of much controversy between
the Sri Lanka government and the Indian High Commission
authorities in Colombo. With tbe change of government after
the July 1977 elections. with Thondaman as a Cabinet minister,.
several wage increases consequent upon the devaluation of the
rupee and strong inflationary trends, the amendment of the Act
itself in a manner beneficial to would-be repatriates, the
problem of overstays, indeed of the working of the agreements.themselves, became aggravated and problematical. In a public
statement in September I 980, the Sri Lanka Controller of'
Immigration and Emigration alleged that 67,307 persons who
had been given their Indian passports had "still not left for
India". This evoked n quick response from an official of the
Indian High Commission, who asked whether the Controller
could locate these persons, and whether they bad received their
gratuity and provident fund. Stating that such payments were
related to change of ownership of Sri Lanka estates "three or
four tin1es in the past few years" (due to the Land Reform Law
of 1972 which, lwwever, did not apply to company owned
estates where the majorhy of Indian-origin estate workers arC'
employed), this official continued:
Our experience also is that the procedure for applying for
their provident fund is cumbersome and the worker is left
entirely at the mercy of the superintendent and his staff
through whose office he has to make a formal application.
We conducted a survey, and found that over 80 per cent oi
the repatriates who have been given passports since May
1979 bad not received their EPF till July 1980."
Sri Lanka officials have averred that often repatriates are not
to be found in the addresses given by them, and that large
sums of EPP funds are lying unutilised. The crux of the present
problem regarding overstays may therefore be the physical
location of them and there is evidence to indicate that .some
would-be repatriates and many stateless persons themselves have
Inda-Lanka Relations
39
merged with the rest of the population, especially in Tamilspeaking areas of the country, either in urban employment,
generally in domestic service or as squatters in remoter parts.
The new approach of the Jayewardena government to implement the citizenship agreements will certainly have the legal
effect of reducing the number of the stateless still remaining in
Sri Lanka, but whether it will casen the problems which Sri
Lanka sought to solve by these agreements is problematical.
EELAM and Indo-Lnnka Relations

The question of according citizenship to stateless persons
of Indian origin relates to an important dimension of national
politics in Sri Lanka which impinges on the bilateral relationship with India. Another such dimension} even more important
from the point of ,iew of national integration in Sri Lanka, is
the question of dissident Tamil politics, the demand for a
separate Tamil state (EELAM) put forward by the Tamil
political leadership in Sri Lanka, and Indian attitudes to these
issues of domestic politics.
Dissident Tamil politics go back to 1949, when S.J.V.
Chelvanayakam founded the Federal party, alleging discrimination against (Indian) Tamils on the citizenship question, and
gathered momentum when Sinhala was made the official language of Sri Lanka in place of English in 1956. In India, where
constitutional provision existed to replace English with Hindi
as the official language, in 1965, emergent Tamil agitation in the
early sixties led Pandit Nehru to provide for the indefinite continuance of English as an associate ~link' language while the
status of Tamil as a regional language remained unchanged,
In Sri Lanka the demand ,vas not for the continuance of
English, but for <parity of status for Tamil as an official
language, and connected to this were demands that peas.ant
settlement of Sinhalese in new land settlement schemes should
be stopped in "traditional Tamil homelands, itself a concept
evoking considerable controversy,23 and that tbe constitutional
structure of Sri Lanka should be re-modelled on a federal basis
so as to give Tamils a greater say in the conduct of their affairs..
Chc]vanayakam was an avowed Gandhian using Gandhian
techniques to press these demands and although considerable
40
advances were made by successive Sri Lanka governments to

accommodate Tamil as a regional language with full rights in
the Tamil provinces~ as a national language of Sri Lanka (under
the second republican constitution) and as a language with full
rights for educational purposes, he kept the Federal party in the
n1ainstream of the opposition during the greater part of his
po1itical career,24 and in October 1976~ joined with other Tamil
political parties and groups to form the Tamil United Front,
which later called itself Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)
demanding a separate state for Tamils on the ground of ethnic
discrimination against Tamils.
During the tenure of office of the DMK party in Tami!nadu
during the period 1967-77, a situation existed where Tamil
elements both in India and Sri Lanka were preaching a philosophy of dissent based upon the unity of the Tamil race and
culture, and demanding greater autonomy from the central
government in the administration of Tamils. The po1itical and
spiritual forerunner of the DMK, the Dravida Kazhagam, was
frankly and openly secessionist in its programme. The DMK
overtly toned down the secessionist plank on its platform after
sece3sion was made, in the Nehru era, a treasonable offence,
though its commitment to a separate state for Tamils was
covertly retained in the guise of demands for greater autonomy.
It is believed, for example, that the imposition of Presidential
rule in Tamilnadu on 31 January 1976 was in part intended to
per-empt an anticipated open avowal of separatism at public
meetings scheduled for early February. 25
However that may be, an important tactic of the Sri Lanka
Tamil political leadership was devoted to internationalising
their cause, and gaining the support ofTamilnadu political
parties has received high priority in this context. The DMK
under M. Karunanidhi was sympathetic to the cause of Sri
Lanka Tamils, organised public meetings in honour ofChelvanayakam, feted other Federal party leaders, and under an energetic protege of Karunanidhi, Dr R. Janarthanam, who acted in
the capacity of President, World Tamil Federation, appeared to
take an active supilortive role in this cause in Sri Lanka itse]f. 26
The DMK is no Ioi\ger in power in Tamilnadu, and its leader's
interest in Sri Lanka politics appears to have waned. Janarthanam himself is no lo~ger with the DMK,, and now functions
J11do-Lanka Relations
41
.as Chief government Whip in the Madras Legislative Council

in the AIADMK government of M.G. Ramachandran. The
scenario has changed in Madras since the 1977 elections, but
in October i 974, the offices of the Deputy High Commission as
well as the Mahabodhi Society of Sri Lanka in Madras were
.attacked by bombs, and this was not unconnected with Tamil
politics in Sri Lanka. 27 The tempo of violence, especially against
{mostly Tamil) police officers investigating robberies and politic-a] murders in the no1th in Sri Lanka has increased, and the
Sri Lanka Police believe that many of the criminals and
terrorists find sanctuary in South India. In such a context, the
attitude of the Government of India, and the Government of
iamilnadu to the Tamil question in Sri Lanka, especiaUy their
attitude to the question of Ee/am has become a matter of fundamental concern for Sri Lanka governments.
In 1978, Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai, responding
to a Sri Lankan Tamil who canvassed his opinion about "a
__growing movement (in Sri Lanka) to press for federation with
India", declared:
I don't encourage them. They should not do this. They're
Ccyloniens and not Tamilians. 28
ln June 1979, India's High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, Mr
Thomas Abraham, to]d a meeting in Jaffna that although
..governments had changed in India and Sri Lanka from time
to time, friendly relations had always existed between the two
-countries. Stating that '"no force could break this historical and
geographical affinity'\ the High Commissioner said that India
would never support the demand of the TULF for a separate
state in Sri Lanka. 29
Similar views were expressed by M.G. Ramacbandran, Chief
Minister of Tatnilnadu when be addressed the fifth Tamil
Language Research Conference held in Madurai in January
1981. The conference was attended by TULF politicians led
by its leader A. Amirthalingam, Sri Lanka government ministers, the Speaker of the Sri Lanka Parliament and academics
from fndia, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere, and the TULF attempted
to exploit the occasion to enlist sympathy and 'internationalise
support for Ee!am. Apart from the CPI, however, no political
42
party of standing in South India supported these efforts; the

DMK dissociated itself completely from the conference, and in
his conference speech Mr Ramachandran himself objected to
references to the so-caJJed Tamil problem in Sri Lanka, declared
that the conference would not allow itself to be used as a
platform for anyone to propagate any political ideology, nor
did Tamilnadu want to interferejn the internal affairs of any
country. Mr Ramach and ran emphasised that the government
and people of Tamilnadu wanted to maintain the best of relations with the governments and peoples of other countries,..
particularly with those of their neighbours.' The Hindu
perhaps expressed a consensus of press opinion in India when it
declared, in 1977:
The TULF leaders should forget, once and for all, the idea
of a separate state, and work peacefully with the Sinhalese,
and it is for the Government to act swiftly to create thenecessary climate of confidence, so that the Tamils no
longer feel they are a neglected lot and mere second class
citizens. 31
The Jayewatdena government, which assumed office after the
general elections of July 1977, did attempt to create the climate
of confidence necessary for the TULF leadership to have entered into a dialogue wjth the government on substantive issueSconcerning the Tamil people. Three Tamil Ministers were
appointed to the Jayewardena government, one of these, an
erstwhile TULF member, as Minister of Regional Development,.
with responsibility for implementation of the constitutional
provisions regarding the Tamil language. The Republican
constitution of 1978 itself, besides making both Sinhala and
Tamil the national languages of Sri Lanka, gave statutory
recognition to the use of the Tamil ]anguage also as a language
of administration and as a language of the courts, apart from
the official language which remained Sinbala. Even more
significantly, the District Development Councils Act was enacted in August 1980, with the object of decentralising administration and effecting a devolution of power on a district basis in
the 24 administrative districts of Sri Lanka in a ,wide range of
subjects which included education, agriculture, agrarian services,.
/11doLa11ka Relations
43
land use and land settlement, employment and rural development. However, while the TULF leadership welcomed these
advances as partial solutions, it retained its commitment to the
idea of the separate state. The TULF leader Amirthalingam
went on record at Madurai to the effect that his party would
"fight to the end'' for a separate state and, eve:rt more unpardonably, was reported at a function organised by the Madras
Tamil Friendship Association on the same visit to have said
that just as India helped in the struggle of Bangladesh, "it
should come forward to help the Tamils of Sri Lanka in their
freedom struggle", and that for this purpose he bad met the
leaders of all political parties in Tamilnadu and solicited their
support.32
Utterances such as these were hardly conducive to creating
a climate of confidence between Government and TULF leadership, and sparked off a noconfidence motion in Amirtbalingam
(who was also Leader of the Opposition) which was sponsored
by a group of the government parliamentary party itself.:1 3 A
further obstacle to amity between government and the TULF
leadership was the escalation . of terrorist activity, bank
robberies, and communal violence in 1981. The communal
violence of August 1977 was largely a derivation from the postelection mob violence of the previous July.:.i-1 After a year ol
comparative communal peace free of terrorist activity in 1980,
however, the year 1981 was marked by a spate of bank and
other J1oldpups, accompanied bypo1itical murder and communal
violence. ln March 198 l a convoy carrying Rs 8 million to
the Peoples Bank in Jaffna was waylaid at Neeravelly, resulting
in the killing of two police officers. In May, the chief UNP
candidate for the forthcoming DDC elections, A. Thiagarajah
was shot at and succumbed to injuries, The same month, four
police officers on duty at a TULF meeting were shot at and
two of them were killed. In July, the police station at Annacottai in Ja1fna was attacked by terrorists, resulting in the death
of a1_1othcr officer and the loss of a11 its arms and ammunition.
Ear~1cr terro:ist activity lmd been directed almost exclusively
ngamst Tnmrl police officers, In 1981, which brought thenum~er of police killed by terrorists to 20, Sinhalese and
Musltm personnel were also among the victims.
44
Foreigu Policy of Sri Lanka
In June, the inevitable backlash occurred in the South,

where organised Sinhalese mobs attacked and set fire to TULF
-0fficcs, shops, the Jaffna MP's residence and the Public Library,
all in Jaffna. 35 Communal violence also took its toll in the
midland estate areas of the country, where Indian origin estate
workers became targets of organised attacks. A tourist from
Tarnilnadu, rcturniag from a pi1grimage to Kataragama in the
south was among those who were killed. Disaffection in the
south had been increasing with terrorist activity in the north
and the unabated demand for Eelam; it gathered momentum
due to jnflammatory speeches made by some members of the
,government parliamentary party and these, cumulatively, had
their repercussions in Tamilnadu. 30
The communal disturbances in Sri Lanka led to a surge of
protest in Tamilnadu in which all political parties in the State
were associated. An All party meeting organised by the Sheriff
of Madras condemned the violence in Sri Lanka and urged the
Government of India to raise the issue in the United Nations.37
The Chief Minister Ramachandran adhered to the view that incidents in Sri Lanka were a foreign issue which the State Government had no powers to deal with. But he met both the Prime
Minister and Home Minister in New Delhi, and requested them
to ensure the security of Sri Lanka Tamils. The State Government also passed a resolution condemning these incidents, and
also organised an all-party peaceful hartal on September 12th,
198 I, in order to convey to the Sri Lanka government the
intense' feelings of the people of Tamilnadu on the subject. 3 EI
The opposition DMK, however, attempted to carry their protest
a step further by picketing the office of the Deputy High
Commission of Sri Lanka in Madras. This, however, was
prevented by the State government. Hundreds of DMK volunteers attempting to picket the diplomatic mission were arrested
in Madras, and others were taken into custody in Madurai and
Tirunclveli districts. Among those arrested was tho DMK
leader M.Karunanidhi himself. 30 In Bombay, on November
1981, the Sri Lanka Trade Commissioner's office was broken
into by a group of four calling itself Azad Hind Sena, which
was responsible for damaging the office's telephones and plate
:glass windows and for burning the Trade Commissioner's car.40
45
Tension died down after September 1981 by the belated

inauguration of amity talks between the Sri Lanka government
and the TULF leadership with a view to prevent the recurrence,
of communal violence. It would seem that a moratorium has.
also been declared on the Eelam demand and that the Sri Lanka
President has conceded a TULF request that unarmed
Homeguards be set up in Jaffna to preserve law and order. 41 It
remains to be seen how these arrangements if agreed to will
actually work out in practice. There is no doubt, however, that
the Eclam demand itself had become a discrete factor bearfog
on future Sinhala-Tamil relations in Sri Lanka, and on IndaLanka relations themselves.
Personal Identities
Throughout the course of Indo~Lanka relations since independence the jnteraction of personal jdentities at the highest
level has been a factor of considerable importance in determining the nature of state interaction. At the helm of affairs in
India during the first seventeen years of its independence,. until
1964, was the towering figure ofJawaharlal Nehru, universally
admired, respected and revered -in Sri Lanka. Even though
Sri Lanka Prime Ministers in the early period of independence,
until 1956, were more prone than their later successors to give
credibility to a threat, whether conceived as political, military
or demographic,. from India, and more inclined to rely on the
Commonwealth as an essential factor in Sri Lanka's security, a
sta11ce which itself was worrying to India in the context the
existence of British bases in the island, their identity with
Nehru on numerous international issues, and their admiration
for him was unquestioned, As President J.R. Jayewardena,.
then a cabinet minister under Dudley Senanayake stated the
case:
We have no animosity against India or against that noble
statesman. Pandit Nehru. It is not that we love Pandit
Nehru and India less, but that we love our countrymen
more. 42
46
For his own pait Pandit Nehru reciprocated the esteem and
affection with which he was held in Sri Lanka. He was greatly
attracted by Sri Lanka as a repository of Buddhist culture and
.apart from persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, for whos;
welfare he felt a special responsibility, extended his goodwill to
the people of Sri Lanka generally, while building up a tradition
of close cooperation with Sri Lanka's political leaders. Apart
from his personal visits before independence, Nehru visited Sri
Lanka four times since 1950: first in connection with the
Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference held in Colombo
that year; second, to attend the Southeast Asian Prime Minis~
ters' conference held in Colombo in 1954; third, in connection
with the Buddha Jayanti celebrations in Sri Lanka in 1957; and
finally, in October 1962, to declare open the Ayurvedic
Research Institute in Nawinna, these visits spanning the tenure
of office of four different Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka, namely
D.S.Senanayake, Sir John Kotelawela, S. W.R.D. Bandaranaike
and Mrs Bandaranaike. His last visit was in fact made at a
time of crisis in India-China relations, and just one week before
the India-China war began on 20th October 1962.
Nehru's relations with S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike were especially close; both men were brought up in the same tradition of
liberalism and moderate socialism, and both shared remarkably
similar views on Third Worldissues,non-alignment and international affairs generally. The tradition of goodwill and co-operation initiated by Nehru was carried on by his successors,
and close friendship and rapport between Mrs Indira Gandhi
and Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike became later a factor of considerable importance in the Indo-Lanka personal equation.
The nature and incidence of high-powered state visits to
and from India during tbe premiership of Dudley Senanayake
{1965-70) also indicated the importance that was attached to
maintenance of a balanced relationship by both sides. At the
invitation of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Dudley Senanayake
visited New Delhi as Prime Minister in November-December
I 968, returning a state visit paid to Sri Lanka by Mrs Gandhi
herself in September 1967. In October 1967, the Sri Lanka
GovernorAGenera1, W. Gopa11awa, was the state guest of the
Indian President Zakir Hussain and in January 1970, Indian
l'resident V. V. Giri himself paid an official visit to Sri Lanka.
Jndo~Lanka Relations
47
Returning to New Delhi after his visit, President Giri declared:

"Both countries have come to the conclusion that they must
.always be good friends". 43 Generally during the course of these
visits, community of interests in the region were stressed, while
prospects for increased cooperation in the economic sphere in
-areas such as trade, agriculture, the tea industry and technical
,assistance were explored, It was not irrelevant to the nature
.a.nd incidence of these visits that the Dudley Senanayake of
J 965-70 had the support of all the main political parties (MEP,
Federal Parties, political wing of the CWC} which, besides the
UNP, had taken India's side in the India-China war of 1962.
Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaikc, though neutral in this war,
.and though espousing a policy of friendship both with China
and India, was eminently successful in her personal relations
with her Indian counterpart as Prime Minister. Soon after becoming Prime Minister for the first time in 1960, she had undertaken a Buddhist pilgrimage of India, in N ehru~s time and
subsequently, during the premiership of Lal Bahadur Shastri,
travelled again to New Delhi to negotiate successfully the IndoCcylon Agreement of October 1964. When she became Prime
Minister for tlle second time in 1970, Indira Gandlti was Prime
Minister of India and besides. the traditional friendship which
subsisted between the Nehrus and J3andaranaikes, they also
found personal rapport in the fact that they were the first two
women Prime Ministers of the world. Mrs Gandhi was in Sri
Lanka in 1973 and 1976, Mrs Bandaranaike was State guest in
India in 1974, and often passed through New Delhi on her
other foreign visits. When, at general elections held in India
and Sri Lanka in March and July, 1977, respectively, both Mrs
Oantlhi and Mrs Bandaranaike were defeated, their sense of
-common interest and personal identity became even more
pronounced.
At thcsametime, awareness of the common experience of the
UNP and Janata parties in having forged spectacular electoral
victories against governments wli"ich had had a relatively long
tenure of power provided a new bond between the governments
-0fMorarji Desai and ~.R. J~yewardena, which ~eplaced, during
the Jana.ta party rule 1n India, the old personal equation with a
new one. Jayewardena and Desai were both spartan and ascetic
in their personal tastes and lives, and were united in a common
48
Foreign Policy of Sri Lanker
end~avour !o free their societies of the evils of corruption, nepotism and intemperance. Hosting the Sri Lanka Foreign Minister to a state banquet in New Delhi, Foreign Minister A.B.
Vajpayee declared:
The year 1977 is a landmark in the history of both India
and Sri Lanka. There were many similarities in the way the
people of the two countries asserted their right to choose
their representatives. They rejected the party in power and
entrusted the business of government to the opposition~
with a fresh mandate to take the nation forward to new
frontiers of freedom and progress.u
But both Prime Ministers were also united in a common endeavour to investigate the period of emergency rule which prevailed
both in India and Sri Lanka prior to the elections. Attempts
to take legal action against Mrs Gandhi on this score, however,
rebounded to the discredit of the ruling Janata party and, combined with intra-party conflicts and its sheer failure at governance, led to Mrs Gandhi's dramatic comeback at the elections
of 1980.
In Sri Lanka, after Jayewardena had assumed powers as
executive President in a new Presidential form of government
inaugurated in September 1978, Mrs Bandaranaike was charged
before a special Presidential Commission of responsibi1ity for
unwarranted and illegal prolongation of emergency rule (from
1972 to February 1977)and, on the findings of this Commission,
deprived of her civic rights for a seven-year period on a motion
moved and passed by a two-thirds majority in Parliament.45 Mr
Felix Dias Bandaranaike, a prominent m-ember of the SLFP and
nephew of Mrs Bandamaike (defeatt,d at the polls in 1977) was
similarly arraigned before the Specia 1 Presidential Commission
and deprived of civic rights for seven years. During the pendency of the case against her, Mrs !:landaranaike had conversed
with Mrs Indira Gandhi over the telephone, and her son Anura
Bandaranaike, himself an MP~ had ,visited New Delhi. Professor
A.J. Wilson has commented thr;t the Special Presidential
Commissions oflnquiry (Special Provisions) Act No. 4 of 1978
"seemed to be of the ad Jwminem type and appeared to be
directed against the Prime Minister and some of the leading
49
Inda-Lanka Relations
government".46
members of the 1970-77

\Ve are not concerned
here with the merits and demerits of the case adduced against
Mrs Bandaranaike:, or whether she was guilty or uot guilty of
abuse or misuse of power as alleged during the period 1972 to
1977. But from the perspective of the personal equation in IndoLanka relations, the imposition of civic disabilities on 1'.1rs
Bandaranaike, a cause celebre in itself in Sri Lanka. politics, has
certainly soured the goodwill which existed at the highest levels
between thetwocountries,andit is no exaggeration to state that
at no time in the past has the personal relationship between the
two Heads of State declined to such low straits as now. As stated
at the beginning of this chapter, the visiting Indian Finance
Minister might say that Indo-Lanka relations are now "at their
best". But there appears to be a coolness in Mrs Gandhi's attitude
to ministers of the Jayewardena government. Apart from her
long-standing f-rientlsl1ip and personal relations with. 'h'lrs 'Bandaranaike, Mrs Gandhi has faced precisely the same attempts by
the Opposition parties when she was out of power to oust her
from the Indian political arena, though with scant success in her
case, Her sympathy for Mrs Bandaranaike was, therefore, undiluted and overt. She made public references to the "harassment" of the Bandaranaike family by the Jayewardena government, evoking protests not only from the Bharatiya. Jana ta Party
but also by members of the Government party in Sri Lanka that
she was interfering in the internal affairs of a neighbouring
country.47 The Venerable Meetiyagoda Gunara.tne Thera, a
UNP stalwart among the bhikku fraternity, addressed a personal
letter to Mrs Gandhi alleging that be himself, among others,
was maltreated in jail during Mrs .Bandaranaike's period of
emergency rule." 8
By late 1981, the police were able to get a breakthrough
in their investigations into Tamil terrorism, mainly due to a
split in terrodst ranks into two groups, the tigers, led by Uma
Maheswaran and the Terres, led by Prabhakaran. J\.1utualrivalry
and tip-offs by members of these groups bad led to the arrest of
about 40 lrnrdcore terrorists belonging to both groups by early
1982." Information supplied by them had revealed that the
terrorists leadership J1ad been operating from fsafe houses' in
South India, mainly from Salem. But the fact that terrorism
was still a factor to be reckoned with was demonstrated in late
50
J,"'oreign Policy of Sri Lanka
March 1982, when yet another Tamil police officer was killed
in the North, bringing the number of Tamil, Sinhala, and
Muslim police and army officers to be killed in the North to
over 30. 50 Attempts by a London-Based organisation calling
itself the Tamil Coordinating Committee to make a Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI) "to delare the independence
of Tamil Eclam and form a provisional government outside the
country'" also fizzled out, and the TULF leader Amirthalingam
took pains to dissociate himself from the move.51 In pre-election
year,howevcr, the political affiliations and political stance of the
TULF become a matter of general concern to all major political
parties in the Island, especially in the context of the operation
of the PR systen1 of representation at a general election in Sri
Lanka for the first time.
Tamilnadu political reactions to the Tamil question in Sri
Lanka and the use of South Indian cities as their base of operations by leaders of the Tamil terrorist movement demonstrate
the close relevance of Indo-Lanka re1ations to questions of
internal politics in Sri Lanka. Mrs Bandaranaike's March 1982
visit to India and her private meeting with Mrs Indira
Gandhi, referred to in a later chapter, also accentuated the
importance of this connection. Personal identities have customarily played an important role in the texture of Indo-Lanka
relations. They may prove to have an important bearing on the
future of Indo-Lanka relations as well.
NOTES nnd REFERENCES

1... Venkataraman reported in The Hindu, 7 January. 19812fndia has in principle accepted Bhutanese sovereignty. but the 1949
Treaty of Friendship between the two countries gives India responsibility to advise Bhutan in preserving its territorial integrity and conducting its foreign relations. lndia~s advice in regard to the conduct of
foreign policy docs not, however, impose a mandatory obligation on
Bhutan, which in recent years has diverged from India in voting at the
United Nations~ for example.
aK.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (London, 1945), P 9S.
The following pages draw partly on material in my Indo-Ceylo11 Relations Since Independence (Colombo. 1965), pp. 32-34; see also my
Strategic Factors ;n Inter.stale Relalio11s in Soll/h Asia (Canberra, ANU
I1ulo-La11ka Relations
51
Pre5:K~ii? ~af%;a~ iie
1
9
Nmal Defence of India (Bombay, 1949), P 30.
Emphasis added.
'5As stated by Dr Pattabhi Silaramaya in interview with representative of Ceylon Daily News. 23 April 1949,
GQuoted in w.H. Wriggins, Ce;lon: Dilemmas of A New Nation
Uaivershy Press, 1960), p. 399.
7Sir John Kotelawela in House of Rep. Deb., (1954). Vol. 20, coll.
:51~52,
BRavi Kaul, "The Indian Ocean: A Strategic Posture for India", in
T.T. Poulousc. l,rdian Ocean Power Rn'alry (New Delhi, 1974) p. 66.
9See infra, pp.
101f such were in fact the case, the Sri Lanka government appeared
to be unaware of it.
llQf the Opposition parties, the UNP under Dudley Seoanayake,
the MEP under Philip Gunewardena, the Federal Party under
-chelvanayakam, and Thondaman's CWC (political wing) strongly
rupported India in the war.
121n her inaugural address to the New Delhi Ministerial Conference
of Non-Aligned Countries (February 1981). Mrs Indira Gandhi ex:pres-sit1g deep distress at events in Afghanistan, declared: 0 Let us hope that
big powers wil1 not be tempted to take advantage to enlarge local
-disputes into wider confrontations. In the name of peace and the future
of mankind. we plead with the combatants, and appeal to those who
.arc waiting in the wings, to call their young men back to their homes.'
NAC/F1'1/DEL/Doc 4/Rcv 4, Annex 11.
l 3See Tiu: Indian Express, 24 April I98 I. Tho criticism was made
in the conte).t of India's stand on Afghanistan and recognition of the
Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea.
1 41<..P. Misra, The Conceptual Profile of Non-Alignment.. , in
K.P. Misra and K.R. Narayanan, Non-Aligmnenl in Contemporary
Jntcmational Relations (New Delhi, 1981). p. 208.
1 ~NAC/FM/DEL/Doc,4/Re~. 4, Annex lI
16See, e g. transcript or interview between the prominent Janata
~arty. MP. Dr Subramaniam Swamy and Deng Xiaoping, conducted
;~ ~h~~;~~~e or the Indian ambassador to Peking, in India Today.
(Princeton
11
Non-Aligned Conference: Basic Documents, 1976. Addendum to
Basic Documents 1961-1975. Colombo, BCIS, 1976, p., p. 49.
-6 15 Sce Kodikara, Indo-Ccylon Relatr"ons Slnce Inffependence, pp. 59,.
! T/Je State.rma11 (Calcutta), 23 November 1976.

9
:Co!1tiguous zone is a jurisdiction zone for purposes of prevention

and enforcement of customs, sanitary, financial, and health/
1
mmigrahon reg~latio~s of Sri Lanka. There is no absolute sovereignty
'here. only_ exercise of Jurisdiction in certain specified areas.
. Exc_lus1ve Ee. ~one-area where a country exercises sovereign
nghts m Cli:plorahon and exploitation of the living and non-living
?f v1~Iatr,?n
52
Foreign Po!icy of Sri Lanka:
resources of the Zone. The concept is accepted in International law,

but no Convention has been reached yet.
21Tbc background to the Agreetnent is discussed in detail in Kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relati"ons Since 1,ufependcnce,,pp. JOL-40. Citizenship
and Repatriation statistics from Department of Immigration and Emigration, Colombo.
22Ceylo,z Daily News, 11 September 1980.
23Sec e.g. Venerable Madihe Pannasceha Maha Nayake There's
memorandum submitted to the Sansoni Commission, published under
the title Eelam-1/te Truth (Colombo, n.d.), pp. 2-3, where it is pointed
out that "the traditional homeland of the Tamils is the whole of Sri
Lanka just as much as Sri Lanka is the traditional homeland of the
Slnhala people and of the Burghers, the Moors, the Malays and every
other minority community living in this land".
2 IExcept for a brief interlude in the government of Dudley Senanayake during the period 1965-68
2 5 See The Hindu 1 and 2 February 1976.
26 Janarthanam in this capacity undertook tours of foreign countries, parlicularly those with Tami1s in the resident population like UK
and Malaysia "to explain the problems of the Sri Lanka Tamils and to
muster_the suppott of the Tamils living in those countries". Alai Osar
(Madras). S January 1975. According to Daily Tltant/11 (Madras) 2S
December 1975, Janarthanam returned to Madras via Colombo after a
European tour, having been refused a visa in Colombo. The Sansoni
Commission appointed by the President to investigale Sinhala-Tamil
communal violence of August 1977, refers to Janarthanams presence
and role at the Fourth Tamil Language Research Conference held in
Jaffna in 1974 as having been productive of the commotion which led
to disruption of electric cables and the death by electrocution or se\'cn
Tamils in the crowd. Janarthanam, considered a security risk by lhe
Police, attempted to address the meeting against Police orders. Sec
Sansoni Commission Report. Sessional Paper 7 of 1980, Ch I, para
158, Ch. U paras 46 ff.
21;bid, Ch. I .. para 143.
2 8 Reportedjn Ceylon Daily News, 10 June 1978.
29ibid, 2S June 1979.
3 0The Hindu, 9 January 1981.
31fbid, 8 September 1971.
32/oc. cii; aJso TMnatlwm (Madras), 17 January 1981. In an exclua
sive interview with the Indian Expu:ss, 5 January 1981, Amirtba1ingam
was reported as saying: Qn1y the formation of Tamil Echun would be
a viable solution to the problems afflicting the Tamils for decades
now".
33For text of no confidence motion, see Pnrliame11tary Debates~ Vol.
15, (24 July 1981), coll. 1279-80.
MSce S.U. Kodikara, "The Separatist Ec]am Movement fo Sri
Lanka: An Overview", India Quarterly, Vol. 37, April-June 1981, PP
194-210.
Indo.Lanka Relations
53
asceylo11 DaUy News, 2 June 1981; The Hindu, 3 June 1981.

36Disciplinary action taken by the Sri Lankan President against
-some of those responsible for these speeches involved the dismissal of
Deputy Minister and expulsion of a government M.P. See the Imfian
Express Dec. 23, 1981.
31The Hindu, 11 June 198L.
assee Ceylon Daily News, 9 September 198l.
39Jbid; The Hindu, 13 September 1981.
lf.OSwt, 27 January 1982. The group, hitherto unknown probably
-comprised Sri Lanka. Tamils who had gone to Bombay in search
,of employment .
.fl.Ccyltm Daily News, l<i September 1981
4'!.I-fouse of Rep. Deb., (195.2), Vol, 13, col. 876.
43Ce,vlon Daily News, 16 January 1970 .
.f4Jbid, 11 April 1978 .
.f5'J"he Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law, No, 7 of
1978, enacted before the promulgation of the 1978 Constitution, pro-vided for action to be taken against any person in respect of whom the
Commission had been set up under the Jaw, lind against whom the
Commission recommended dcprival of civic rights by reason of acts of
commission or omission by such person before or after the commencement of the Constitution. For Members or Parliament. imposition of
civic disabilities and/or expulsion from ParJiament had to be effected
by a Resolution introduced in Parliament by the Prime Minister with
the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers, and which had the support
-Of two-thirds of the whole number of MPs (including those not present), (Art. 81 (1) and (2) of 1978 Constillltion). A Writ of Ccrtiriori
brought before the Court of Appeal by Mrs Bandaranaike that the
Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry Law No. 7 of 1978 di.d not
-provide for investigation into matters arising prior to the enactment of
the law was upheld, But the Government immediately proceeded to
-pass the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (Special Provisions) Act
No. 4 of 1978 which virtually annulled the judgment of the Ap{Jeal
Court; and alc;o passed the First Amendment to the Constitution which.
by ifs Section 18A (1) stated that if a judge, a former judge of the
Supreme Court or Court of Appeal sat on a Presidential Commission.
an applica.ti.on for legal redress against such a Commission, if made before any other court or tribunal, must automatically be transferred to
the Supreme Court for final decision.
46
A.J, Wilson, The. Gaullist System i/J Asia: Tlie. Constitution of Sri
Lanka {London, 1980), p. 106.
47
Sec Ceylon Dally News, 6 November 1980 .
.f.Bibid, 31 October 1980.
411 Jbid, 10 February 1982.
50 Wcekc11d, 1 February 1982. ln early April 1982, a deputation
of Tamil police officers requested the DIG (Northern Range) to transfer them out of the Jaffna peninsula, for reasons of personal safety.
li1 Ccyloll Daily News, 11. and 1Z December 1982.
3
Sri Lanka and the Communfat
Powers, 1948-1965
The "linkagen between foreign policy and domestic politics

is now too well established in the current theory and literature
of International Relations to require elaboration here. In discussing the foreign policy of a small state such as Sri Lanka,
however, emphasis on the personal styJe and the party political
complexion of the government in power as an important foreign
policy determinant is not misplaced. For, althougl1, as will be
shown, important elements of continuity have existed in Sri
Lanka's foreign policy from independence up to the present
time, significant shifts in policy have also resulted from changes
in the party complexion of the government, and especia11y from
changes in the personal style of the political leader at the apex
of the decision-making process. David Vital opined that there
was a greater likelihood that policy-making in a small statewould be "the product of a single, dominant mind and less
that of a committee striving for a comprehensive view. Perception of affairs is more direct, less influenced by, and less dependent on, advisers. There may be a great and significant
element of personal insight. .. " 1
We have noted that the Prime J\1inister of Sri Lanka was
required by the constitution to be also N1inister of Defence and
External Affairs until 1972 and that in practice the Prime
Minister remained the Minister of External Affairs as well as
Sri Lanka and the Communist Powers
55
of Defence until 1977. Periodisation of the discussion of Sri

Lanka's foreign policy according to the nature of the government in power therefore seems justified, especially since the
change of government in 1977 not only brought into being a
separate ::rvl:inister of Foreign Affairs for the first time but also
because it led to the inauguration of a Presidential form of
government in which the President and not the Prime Minister,
as before, became the effective bead of the policy-making process. fn this chapter and the next, we deal with the period
1948-1965 which encompasses the rule of the UNP party,
1948-56, as well as the SLFP coalition governments 1956-65
with two brief interludes late in I 959 and in early 1960, comparing and contrasting, first, their respective attitudes and
policies towards the Communist Powers, and second, their
attitude and policies towards the West.
UNP Government and the Commuoist Powers 1948-56

Three main factors may be said to have determined the
UNP attitude to the communist countries in this period: first,
the intimacy of the association with the British; second, the
Soviet veto of Ceylon's application for membership in the
United Nations; third, the domestic political situation. The
importance of the British connection for UNP Prime Ministers
will be discussed at some length in the ne:\t chapter, but it was
one of the fundamental bas.es ofUNP foreign policy, the point
of departure of all relations with the communist countries.
This attitute was determined not only by the long historical
association with the British~ sentiment, the1nanneroftheBritish
transfer of power to Ceylon, and existing commercial ties, but
also by recognition that Ceylon's security interests were best
served by a close association with the United Kingdom.
Accordingly, on the day that Ceylon became independent, the
Ceylon-U.K. Defence Agreement came into force, under the
terms. of which Britcin retained the use of an airbase at
Katunayake and the naval base at Trincomalee. For UNP
Prime Mh1isters during this period, the Defence Agreement
remained tho indispensable condition of Ceylon~s security.
The attitude of the Soviet Union to Ceylon"s application
for UN membership was another major factor determining the
56
island's foreign policy orientation during this period. In May

1948 Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake had applied for Ceylon's
admission to the United Nations; in August 1948 this application was vetoed by the Soviet delegate in the Security Council;
a second Soviet veto blocked Ceylon's entry to the international body in December 1948, and a third in September 1949.
Thereafter, and until Decemher 1955, when the Soviet Union
agreed to the "package deal", Ceylon's application for UN
admission became involved in the exigencies of cold war politics. The applications for UN membership by Albania and
Mongolia had themselves been blocked by Britain and the
United States, and the Soviet veto was obviously retaliatory,
but the reasons advanced for the Soviet attitude was that
Ceylon was not fu]Jy sovereign. The Soviet delegate in the
Security Council, Mr Jacob Malik, declared that there was no
evidence of Ceylon's independence but to the contrary, the
evidence of the press would indicate that she remained a colony
of the United Kingdom. He pointed to the existence of British
air and naval bases, and the presence of ;British troops as
derogations of sovereignty. The powers of the GovernorGeneral, too, were held up as an example of Ceylon's Hcolooial
status". The Security Council, said Mr Malik, must distinguish
between real and false independence. 2 This attitude hardened
Ceylon in her pro-western affiliations during this period, and
partly determined her policy of refusing to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR and other communist countries.3
Moreover, the UNP government had come into power at
the 1947 elections after a bitter contest with Marxist parties,
and there constituted the main parliamentary opposition group
until 1951. Since at the elections Marxist parties bad been
condemned as revolutionary parties aiming at a totalitarian
form of government and the destruction of religion and democratic freedom, the governm-,nt of D.S.Senanayake could easily
identify the interests of Ceylon with those of the western bloc,
which claimed to stand for democracy against totalitarianism.
Explaining his attitude to the Soviet Union, Senanayake
declared:
.sr; Lanka and 1/re Commimist powers
57
"Enslavement of the world is what we believe to be their

attitude. Our view is quite the contrary. Since it is the
freedom of this world we are concerned with, we will never
be with Russia until she gives up Iler poHcy/' 4
In his public speeches, D.S. Senanayake frequently uttered

warnings about the danger of following Russian ideals in Ceylon, explaining that if Ceylonese looked up to Russia, they
would lose their heritage.C Senanayake's attitude, which greatly
influenced the foreign policies of later UNP Prime Ministers,
must be placed in the context of the expansion of communism
in the countries of western Europe, and the extension of communist influence in the countries of western Europe, notably
in Italy and France, which in the late !940's had engendered a
sense of alarm and distrust of the motives of the Soviet Union
in the minds of leaders in the West as well as in Asia. The
pro-western orientation of Indian foreign policy up to about
the end of 1949 was determined partly, accordingly to J.C.
Kundra, by the perception of a threat posed by communfats to
ihc foundations of democratic government in India. 0 In Feb~
ruary 1949 Nehru had described communist activities in India
.as "bordering on open revolt" and in September the same year
the Communist Party of Madras had been banned.' At the
Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Colombo
-in January 1950, British Foreign Secretary, Mr Ernest Bevin
declared that (Cthe mainspring of Russian policy was not simply
Communism, but a nineteenth~century expansionism"'; 8 in his
view, the Potsdam Conference bad made it clear that the
.Soviet Union wanted the complete Russian domination
of Europe. However, the Russian designs in Europe had
been forestalled by a policy of western conso1idation, as
manifested in the Marshall Plan, the Brussels Treaty, the
Atlantic Pact and so on; hence the Soviet Union had turned
I1cr attention to tl1e East, and the nations of Asia were in real
d_anger of losing their newly won independence to the subver-stve activities of international communism. 0 The Common~
:,,calth Foreign Ministers' Meeting had itself been summoned
1n order to devise ways and means of averting this danger.
. !n such a context, it was not surprising that UNP Prime
~fimsters should have adopted a completely negative attitude
58
towards communist countries. UNP governments only ignored

the question of establishing diplomatic relations with these
countries, but consistently refused to grant visas to foreign
communists to visit Ceylon. In September 1950, for example,
D.S.Senanayake refused the visa applications of communist
delegates frorn the Soviet Union, France, the People's Republic
of China and other countries to attend the tenth anniversary
celebrations of the Communist-led Ceylon Trade Union Federation in Ceylon. 10 In June 1951, J.G. Crowther, President of
the British Peace Committee, who had been invited by the
Ceylon Counterpart of this Committee, was refused permission
to visit Ceylon.11 Prime Minister Sir John Kotclawela not only
turned down the applications of Dr Cheddi Jagan and Harry
Pollitt to enter Ceylon, in March 1955, he even refused to
allow a team of 60 Soviet scientists to visit Ceylon to ,vatch
the solar eclipse which was expected irt July, though such permission was granted to scientists from the United States) the
United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and India." Repeated Chinese
requests to permit tho visit of a Chinese goodwill mission to
Ceylon were likewise rejected,13 and Kotelawela a]so took
steps to ban the import of communist books, periodicals and
films into Ceylon, and frequently made the charge which, however, was not substantiated, tha.t the Soviet Union sent forge
sums of money to the Communist Party of Ceylon through
Swiss banks.14
The refusal to have any dealings with communists or with
communist countries was a guiding principle of UNP foreign
policy during this period, but there were two notable exceptions
to the rule; first, in January 1950. Ceylon accorded n:-cognition to the Peoples' Republic of China and was among the
earliest non-communist countries to do so; second, at the end
of 1952, Ceylon entered into an important Trade Agreement
with communist China~ undCr the terms of which Ceylon agreed
to sell specified quantities of rubber in return for supplies of
Chinese rice, over a five.year period. Ccylon"s policy on these
two issucsJ which seems inconsistent with her general attitud_e
to communist countries during this period, bears c]oscr cxam1
nation.
Sri Lanka mid the Comnmnist Powers
59
Recognition of Communist China

Ceylon recognised the Peoples' Republic of Chi?a on_ 5
January 1950, and simultaneously terminated her_ ralallo_ns with
the Chinese Nationalist Govemment.15 The Umted Kingdom
had accorded recognition to the new communi&t reg~~e on ~he
same day, and it would appear that Ceylon's rec~gmt10~ pohcy
was largely influenced by the attitude of the United Kingdo~.
The British decision to grant early recognition to commumst
China was itself governed by a variety of factors, among which
the special British position in Hongkong, thei_r large c?mmercial interests in the country and the possible react10n-c:; of
Chinese overseas populations in Southeast Asia, had been
dominant. Regarding the timing of the British recognition_,.
two important considerations had been the Indian government's own decision to recognise the new regime in China in
the second half of December 1949, and the recommendations
of a Conference of U.K. diplomats held in Singapore, which
had suggested that in order to forestall the risk of disturbance
among the Chinese -populations of Southeast Asia, recognition
should be accorded to the communist regime before the end of
1949.16 Consultations on this question had been going on since
August 1949 between the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth_,.
the United States and other countries. A meeting of Commonwealth High Commissioners had also discussed the subject in
London, and the British decision to accord recognition to
China had been made known to the representatives of these
countries. In granting early recognition to China, therefore,..
Ceylon \~as merely foUowing Britain's lead on the question.
Havmg granted recognition, however, UNP governments
a"!'pearcd reluctant to follow up with the establishment of
~1plomatic ,relations_,~ith communist China. Indeed, in conveymg Ceylon s rccogmtion to the new Chinese Foreign Minister,
D.S .. Sena1:ayake_had expressed a desire to enter into diplomatic rcl~t1ons with 1he new regime. Communist China had
~cen_ quic~ _to accept tl1e Ceylonese offer of recognition. and
o~e1gn Mm1~ter Chou-En-Lai had invited Ceylon's represcntat,v_es to Pckmg to negotfate the establishment of diplomatic
~el~hons.17 Scnanayake considered this request unusual but
intimated to the Chinese government that Ceylon was ~sin~
60
the good offices of British diplomatic representatives nntil the

Island was in a position to make a direct representation from
Ceylon. 18 According to D.S.Senanayake, no further communi~
cation on this subject was received from China,1 9 while the
Sino-British negotiations preparatory to the establishment of
U.K. representation in China were themeselves protracted over
a long period.
The fact that diplomatic missions were not exchanged between China and Ceylon dnring this period cannot be regarded
as being due to tradiness on China's part. Though D.S.Senanayake implied that this was due to China dropping the subject,
his successor, Dudley Senanayake implied, under pressure from
-the parliamentary opposition, that Ceylon's financial position
did not permit the opening ofan embassy in Peking.' The
next Prime Minister, Sri John Kotelawela, was more explicit; he
-declared that "visiting communists were apt 1o disseminate
more harm than goodwill" and that therefore "Ceylon's rela-tions with Red China should be restricted to trade alone." 21
As stated earlier, Kotelawela even refused to permit the -visit of
.a Chinese goodwill mission, explaining on one occasion that
he was concerned about communist infiltration in neighbouring
Asian countries and considered that Ceylon's interest with
communist China related only to trade and should remain at
that. 22 However, an invitation from Chou-En-lai to Kotela"'\Vela to visit China in the week preceding the Bandung conference was not rejected but postponed for a later date, though
it never materialised, I(otelawela being defeated at the poHs in
April 1956. After Bandung Conference Kotelawela's attitude
to China appeared to have mellowed,"' but he still declared
that dissolution of the Corninfonn was the essential pre-condi-tion necessary for the establishment of diplomatic relations. 24
The Trade Agreement with China
In October 1952, a Ceylonese trade delegation in Peking

entered into a contract under which China agreed to supply
Ceylon with 80,000 tons of rice "within a short period" i_n
exchange for rubber and other products from Ceylon. This
.agreement was for p,urposes of short-term barter trade, but
it was followed in December by the negotiation of a long-term
Sri Lanka and the Commzmist Powers
61
trade agreement under the terms of which Ceylon was guaranteed 270,000 metric tons of rice each year for five years, and
China agreed to buy 50,000 metric tons of Ceylonese rubber
each year over the same period. The prices at which thesecommodities were to be exchanged were stated in the agreement
but were to be subject to revision annually by the two countries.26
The Ceylon-China Trade agreement was advantageous to
Ceylon botlf in respect of rubber and of nee. The rubber
price guaranteed by China was 40 per cent higher than prices
obtaining in the West and Ceylon was guaranteed rice of"a
snpedor grade at approximately two thirds of the world price
of rice of an inferior grade. " 26 The Pact was later subjected to
a good deal of criticism from a strictly political standpoint.
especially in the United States, but it is clear that political considerations did not enter into tbe calculations of the Government of Ceylon. Indeed, Ceylon signed the trade agreement
with China "not so much from economic motives as from economic compulsions." 77 In doing so. Ceylon not only defied a
United Nations embargo on the export of strategic materials,
including rubber, to communist China and North Korea, but
also came within the purview of United Sta.tes legislation which
provided for withdrawal of economic aid from countries contravening the UN embargo.213 The reasons which impelled
Ceylon to enter into this agreement at a time when her foreign
policy orientation was strongly anti-communist need examination.
The Government of Sri Lanka hoped to derive three benefits fi om the agreement; first, to ensure a steady supply of rice
into Sri Lanka at a time of world scarcity of that commodity;.
second, to save the Ceylonese rubber industry from ruin by
assuring producers of a fair price and a reliab]e market when
western prices were uneconomic and western markets uncertain;
and third, thereby to stabilize the Sri Lankan economy, liquidate the deficit in her trade and payments balance, and avert
the drain on Sri Lanka's e.x.ternal assets.
The world scarcity of rice was caused both by the dislocation of production and distribution of rice during the
second world war as well as by the population explosion
in Asia which followed upon it. Sri Lanka imported
Foi~ign Policy of Sri Lanka

annually abo'ilt 350,000 to 400,000 tons of rice for her
requirements, and was seriously affected by the rice shortage.
An added difficulty was that the international shortage of rice
had greatly increased the world price for this commodity. By
the middle of 1952, there was insufficient rice in Sri Lanka to
maintain with certainty even the prevailing low ration of 5{
-0unces a day for any length of time. 20 In September 1952, the
Government of Sri Lanka issued a statement/ on the food
--crisis and appealed to other nations to sell tJ!.eir rip1e ,At,.lower
prices.'
\ ls; ~
'LThe ability of Sri Lanka to pay the high prices being demanded for rice depended to a large extent on the export
prices she obtained for her raw material products-principally
tea, rubber and coconuts. However, at the same time as the
rice scarcity was affecting Sri Lanka worst, rubber itse]f was
becoming subject to the vagaries of the international market.
Indeed. the international rubber market had become highly
.artificial in the years following the Korean war. The Korean
war had led to boom prices for rubber in the latter part of
1950 and the first quarter of 1951, but thereafter prices began
to decline.31 The price decline was basically due to a decline
in demand and followed from three factors: first, the United
States~ decision, early in 1952, to gradually cease stockpiling of
rubber; second, the United States government's protection of
ber synthetic rubber industry; and third, the exclusion of Communist China from international rubber markets due to the UN
embargo and the United States legislation. Already in April
1951, as a result of protests in the United States and Britain,
the open general license for rubber exports from the Federation
-0f Malaya and Singapore bad been withdrawn and traditional
sources of Chinese rubber had therefore become closed. China
entered the Sri Lanka rubber market /n September 1951,32 and
-during the following ten months, bad purchased about 39.2
million pounds of Sri Lankan rubber, or nearly 20 per cent of
the total export. During the first ;ten months, of 1952, China
had already become the principal buyer of Sri Lankan rubber."
The Chinese entry into the open market in Sri Lanka came
at a time of crisis for the Ceylonese rubber industry. Rubber
prices had been falling since the peak reached in early
1951, and in October 1951, when the rubber sold to countries
IS 'i
Sri Lanka and the Comnmnfst Powers
63
-other than China was bringing in only Rs. 1.10 (19 pence)
per pound, which was the prevailing world price, Ceylonese
rubber producer moved for a 32 per cent cut in wages as the
only way they could carry on. 34 Earlier, in June, a deputation
representing Ceylonese rubber producers met Prime Minister
D.S. Senanayake, and urged that shipments of rubber to China
.shoul.d not' be banned, as such a step would further depress
prices which had been falling steadily since the Singapore
shipments to China stopped Senanayake assured the deputation
-that Sri Lanka would continue to be a free market for all
buyers until the Government decided otberwise.35 Indeed,
Chinese purchases of rubber "were increasingly standing out
as the factor preventing a collapse of the Ceylon rubber
-industryn at this time. 36
The decline in export prices related to Sri Lanka's tea and
coconut products as wen as to rubber~ though the price decline
in tea was substantially smaller than for the other commodities;37 collectively, this led to an adverse movement in the
island's terms of trade. Her total export earnings decreased
by 20 per cent for the first half of 1952, compared with the
first half of 1951. 38 A large export surplus was suddenly changed into a large import surplus and in the first half of 1952
there was a considerable depletion of short-term foreign assets.
The reserves acquired during the Korean boom were entire1y
lost."' By September 1952, that is, at the time that Sri Lanka
despatched her first trade delegation to Peking, the government
were ju the throes of a financial crisis and were forced to
introduce austerity measures to meet the situation,40
It was against this economic background that Ceylon entered
into the Trade Agreement with China. The Sri Lanka government hoped that a favourable trade agreement with China
would not only ensure a steady supply of rice, but also put the
.Ceylonese rubber industry on its feet again, and help Sri Lanka
liquidate its deficit in the trade and payments balance.
It was not, however, without exploring aU avenues of pre-serving the traditional trade relations with the West that Ceylon
embarked on the agreement with China. Indeed, D.S.Senanayake had earlier rejected a Russian offer to bulk purchase the
entire rubber output of Ceylon for the year 1949, for political
rcasons. 41. From the time of the passing of the Kem Amend-
64
Foreign Palley af Sri Lank'
ment in the United States in June I 95 l to July 1952, Ceylon

was in constant touch with the United States government on
the subject of the rubber trade. A Ceylonese request that 1he
United States should grant the island exception from the Kem
Amendment as affecting her rubber exports had been refused. 42
Negotiations for the U.S. bulk purchase of Ceylonese rubber
were also bogged down in disagreements over the price, the
United States offering the average Singapore price, the Ceylon
government suggestion that the rubber price be determined by
the average London-New York-SingaporeMColombo prices was
not acceptable to the United States." In July 1952, at the height
of the food crisis in Ceylon, Sir Oliver Goonetilteke, Minister
of Food and Agriculture, was sent on a mission to Washington
to negotiate (a) urgently needed rice supplies, (b) a rubber
agreen1ent, and (c) U.S. economic aid. This Mission, too,
ended in failure.M In September, the Government of Sri Lanka
despatched its first trade mission to China.
The Political Significance of the Agreement
As stated earlier in this chapter, the negotiations of the

trade agreement with China did not deflect UNP Prime Ministers of this period from the anti-communist bias of their foreign
policies or from their decision not to establish diplomatic rep
resentation in communist countries. Ceylon did, indeed, agreec
to permit Communist China to open a Trade Agency in Colombo in 1953 to oversee rubber shipments to China, but it had
no diplomatic status;1li and generally the question of diplomatic
relations with China was shelved. In fact during the premiership of Sir John Kotelawela (1953-56), the Sri Lanka government's anti-communism became more pronounced than ever,
and culminated in I(otelawela~s celebrated attack on communist colonialism at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. In
his much publicised speech to the Political Committee of this
conference on April 21, Kotelawela pointed outthat colonialism
took many forms. Delegates were all well aware of western
colonialism but there is uanother form of colonialism about
which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in
our minds and to which ef,1me of us would perhaps not agree to
apply the term colonialism at all. " 46 The reference was to
65
central and east European countries such as Hungary, Rumania

Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithunia, Esthonia
and Poland.
Are not these colonies as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa and Asia? And if we are united in our
opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty openly
to declare our opposition to Soviet colonial~m as much as
to Western 1mperialism?" 47
Kotelawela refrained from following up these remarks with
a formal proposal but his speech engendered a bitter controversy among the delegates, which was resolved only by the
condemnation, in the final communique of the conference 1 of
colonialism "in all its manifestations". The dominant motive
in the Ceylonese Prime 1'1inister's mind when he made the
speech appears to have been objection to the "ultimate and
constant aim" of the communists, which was "to weaken and
undermine the legally constituted governments of our countries
so that at the appropriate time we can be transformed into
satellites of Soviet Russia or Communist China."48 At Bandung,
Kotelawela reportedly informed Chou En-lai that the Ceylon
government had clear evidence of local communists getting
help ftom outside, and he had asked for a pledge that the
Cominform or its members would refrain from lending support
to communist parties in non-communist countries. "Peaceful
co-existence~, according to Kotelawela, needs to be thus spelled
out and put on a positive basis. But Chou En-lai had refused
to give such a pledge replying that the Cominform was a
Russian organisation and had nothing to do with China.49
Thus, the trade agreement madeno difference to Ceylon~s
foreign policy towards China, during this period, which remained much tho same as. before the negotiation of the agreement.
The vicv1o that this agreement marked a "significant breach" in
the anti-communist foreign policy of Sri Lanka during this
period50 cannot, therefore, be seriously maintained, though it
became, in the Bandaranaike era, the coping-stone of a new
policy of friendship and amity in Sino-Lanka relations.
66
Tile SLFP Era: April 1956 to March 1965

The change of government following upon the elections
held in April 1956 Jed to a significant change in Ceylon's foreign
policy, notably in its attitude towards communist countries.
However, quite apart from the change of government, there
were other factors which determined the nature of the island's
relati?ns with such countries during this period. In the first
place, the Soviet attitude towards Asian countries itself underwent a significant change in the post-Stalin era. Soviet policy,
dictated by the Marxist-Leninist interpretation, had regarded
post-war nationalism in Asia merely as a phase of bourgeois
reaction, the tool of western imperialism, that the countries of
Asia which had become independent in the wake of the second
world war were not in fact independent, and that they would
become so only when revolutionary democratic' forces (under
the aegis of communist parties) ousted the existing governments
and established peoples' democracies. After the demise of
Stalin, however, there came about a greater Soviet appreciation
of the fact that independence in Asian countries had been
achieved quite irrespective of Leninist doctrlne, and that national liberation movements bad been largely responsible for
independence in such countries. The new Soviet policy, as
exemplified in such innovations as the 20th Congress of the
CPSU acknowledged that there was a democratic element in
the bourgeois nationalist movements, and that bourgeois democratic movements were themselves a prelude to the socialist
revolution and were therefore a progressive force.
The new Soviet policy manifested itself in a change of
attitude by communist parties outside the Soviet Union. In
Sri Lanka, the CP had already, in the mid-fifties, begun
collaborating with non-marxist parties, and had extended its
support to the victorious coalition headed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike at the 19 56 elections.
Sesondly, at the end of 1955, the Soviet Union withdrew
its objections to the applications of several countries for UN
membership, and agreed to the 'package dear whereby Sri
Lanka was admitted to the international body.
When the new Bandaranaike government assumed office in
April 1956, therefore~ two obstacles in the way of closer co-
Sri Lanka and the Commimist Powers
67
-Operation between Ceylon and the communist countries had

already been removed. In its first speech from the Throne, the
new government declared:
In its foreign policy, my Government will not align with
any power blocs. The position of the bases at Katunayake
and Trincomalee will be reviewed. Every endeavour will
be made to establish close collaboration and co-operation
with other countries. Consideration will be given to the
exchange of diplomatic representation with countries in
which Ceylon is not at present rcpresentated.u1
While the new government's early negotiation with the
Tiritish for the withdrawal of their bases in Sri Lanka itself
removed the taint that the island was aligned with the western
bloc~ Prime Minister Bandaranaike established his policy of nonalignment on a firm basis by exchanging diplomatic represent.atives with communist countries, beginning with 1he Soviet
Union and China. In September 1956, Sri Lanka and China
and Sri Lanka and the Soviet Union signed joint communiques
-on the establishment of diplomatic, economic and cultural
relations.52 The question of diplomatic representation with
China was' finalised during Chou En-lai's visit to Sri Lanka
early in 1957. In February 1957 Wilmot A. Perera was appointed Sd Lanka's first ambassador to China. The same year
Professor G.P. Malalasekera was appointed Ceylonese ambas-sador in Moscow.
Morever, unlike bis pn:decessor, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike
did not entertain fears about the subversive designs ofinternalionalcommunism. On the contrary, he shared the conviction
-of the new Ceylonese ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet
Union was genuinely desirous for peace.53 Soon after his
.assumption of office, in June 1956, Bandaranaike had annulled
the ban on the importation of literature from the Soviet Union
China and other communist couiltries, which had been imposed
by Kotelawela in 1953.54 The government began exploring the
possibilities of increased trade with communist countries and
the prospects of economic and technical assistance from tho
Soviet bloc.
{i8
Foreign Policy of Sri Lankw
Chou En-lai's visit to Sri Lanka in February I 957 was

followed by that of a Soviet cultural delegation in November,"
and by the visit of Prime Minister Villiam Siroky of Czechoslovakia in February 1958. 56 Exchange of students and scholars
between Ceylon and the communist countries, and free travel
by Ceylonese in such countries, was begun. The new outlook
of the Sri Lanka government is well exemplified by its policy on.
the Hungarian revolution of I 956.
Sri Lanka and the Hungarian Revolution
Three distinct stages can be discerned in the evolution oi
Ceylon's po Hey in respect of the Hungarian uprising ofOctoberNovember 1956 and the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary.
In the first stage, Sri Lanka appeared reluctant to condemn
outright the Soviet armed intervention and dissociated herself
from the earlier UN General Assembly resolutions on the
subject; in the second stage, Sri Lanka took a decided stand
against the Soviet action and not only deplored the Soviet
Union's violation of the UN Charter in depriving Hungary of" its liberty and independence but also served on the five-nation
UN Committee of Hungary; finally in the third stage, Ceylon
once more retracted and went back to her earlier policy of
passive neutralism.
When the question was first discussed in the UN General
Assembly on 4 November 1956, a United States sponsored_
resolution was carried, as amended by France, which called
upon the Soviet Union to desist from armed intervention in
the internal affairs of Hungary and requested the governments
of Hungary and the Soviet Union to permit a team of UN
observers to enter Hungary on a fact-finding mission. 67 The
resolution was carried by 50 to 8 votes-Sri Lanka was one of
the 15 abstaining nations. 68 Sri Lanka abstained from voting
on two further resolutions adopted by the Assembly on 9
November. One of these, sponsored by Cuba, Peru, Ireland,
Italy and Pakistan, called upon the Soviet Union again to
withdraw its forces from Hungary; reaffirmed the request to
the SecretaTy-General to investigate the situation7 and called
for free elections in Hungary under UN auspices. 59 The other
resolution was sponsored by the United States, and calied upon
:Sri Lanka and the Con11mmist Powers
69
the Soviet Union "to cease immediately actions against the

Hungarian population which are in violation of the accepted
-standards and principles of international law, justice and
n1orality:co The resolution was passed by 53 to 8 votes; Sri
Lanka was one of 13 abstaining nations. In the debates on
1hese resolutions, the Ceylonese delegate generally deplored
the Soviet armed intervention and favoured a cease-fire and
withdrawal of foreign forces from Hungary; but he doubted the
wisdom of the Secretary-General attempting to send an observer team to I-Iungary,0 1. and felt that some of the resolutions
,injected political considerations into what should be purely a
1mrnanitarian matter and vitiated the chances of a successful
.solution to the dispute.
By the middle of November, however, Sri Lanka's policy
had undergone a significant change. Hungary }lad figured on
"the agenda at the conference of Southeast Asian Prjme
7vlinisters summoned by Nehru in Delhi to discuss the Suez
crisis. And although the communique issued by the Prime
Ministers (of India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma and Sri Lanka)
was more moderate in those sections which applied to Hungary
than in those which referred to the Middle East, it still expressed
"'deep distress" at the "tragic events" in Hungary, considered it
1:hc "inalienable right of every country to shape for itself its
own destiny free front all external pressure", and stated that
"''Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily
.and that the Hungarian people should be left free to decide
their own future and the form of government they will have
without external intervention from any quarter." 62 This new
attitude was carried by Sri Lanka to the UN General Assembly
where, on November 21st she sponsored a resolution jointly
with Indio. and Indonesia, requesting Hungary to permit UN
observers to enter its territory, "without prejudice to its sovereignty~', to determine conditions there.63 This request, however,
was refused by the Kadar regime in Hungary on the ground
that it violated the sovereignty of Hungary and that the recent
events in that country were exclusively an internal affair outside
the competence of the U nitcd Nations.0 .i. In the UN General
Assembly, Sri Lanka was now more forthright in its condemnation of the Soviet Union and not only did her delegate, R.S.S.
-Ouncwardena, deplore the violation of the oode of conduct by
70
Forcig11 Policy of Sri Lanka
n nation (the Soviet Union) which we expected believed in

preserving peace, order and the well-being of the world"," but
also supported 1hc twenty-power resolution moved in the General Assembly condemning !he Soviet Union's violation of the UN
Charter in depriving Jlungary of its liberty and independence
and the Ilungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental
rights." In January 1957, Sri Lanka 1;as appointed to the five11ation committee established by the United Nations to report
on Hungary on the basis of "direct obscrvntion in Hungary and
chcwhcrc'". From the outset, however, the work of the committee was hampered; both the Sovie! Union and the Kadar
regime in Hungnry refused aH co-operation with it, and
withheld pcrmis!:.ion for jts entry into Hungary. The invcstigationt therefore, was not based on direct observation in
Hungary. but involved, as the Committee c;i:.pJa.incd, "the study
of copious documentation from various sources and in several
lnnguagcs1 n.s well as the questioning, of more than a hundred
witncsscs.t 1G7 In effect, the testimony wns based largely on the
evidence of refugees who had fled from Hungary since the
revolt.
The Committee Report, which was signed unanimously nnd
published in June 1957, described the events in Hungary as
a Hspontancous national uprising" due to many factors, one
of \Vhich was the "inferior status of Hungary with regard to the
USSR", The committeo rejected the thesis that the uprising
was fomented and drew its strength from reactionary circ1cs in
Hungary nnd from ,vcstcrn imperinlists, and although it
suspended it,; judgement on the question of the alleged in vita
tion extended to the Soviets both before the first and second
interventions it concluded thnt "following the second So, ict
intervention on 4 Novcmbcrt there has been no evidence of
popu1nr support for ?\.1r Kadars Govcrnmcnt.r.~
The Sri Lanka delegate fully subscribed to the committee
findings, but when the Report came up for discussion in the
General Assembly in September 1957, he made a complete
l'Oltc face; in the voting on a rc'iotution condemning the Soviet
Union's armed intervention in Hungnrj~ .and "its continued
defiance'' of earlier Assembly resolutions, Sri Lanka was one of
10 abstaining countries. This was rather odd behaviour for a
country which had been represented in the 1ivc-nation special
1
71
committee and which had signed its unanimous report on

Hungary,o 0 apparently, the Ceylonese delegate received lastminute instructions from home to the effect that while he was
to vote for acceptance of the report "ns an exparte and
incomplete report", he was not to support any move that would
alienate Ilungary or the Soviet Union from the United
Nations. 10 Thus, Sri Lanka finally reverted to lier earlier stand
of not offending the Soviet Union on the question Of Hungary.
The New Attitude Tm,ards China
The Bandaranaike government's reluctance to prejudice
good relations with the Soviet Union on the question of
Hungary was ba~ed on the premise that friendship with all
nations was one of the objects of its foreign policy, and the
foundation of Sri Lanka's closer collaboration and co-operation with the Soviet Union had been laid only weeks before the
outbreak of the Hungarian revolution, the island~s first diplomatic representative to Moscow having been appointed only
in February 1957. In their relations with China, too, the
regime of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (1956-59) and of Mrs
Sirimavo Bandaranaike (1960-65) displayed the same aversion
to vitiating the new foundations of friendship and amity by
taking a stand against Chinese policies in Tibet and India.
Sino-Ceylonese relations had received a great fillip by the
visit to Ceylon of Chou En-lai between 31 January and 5
February 1957. During the covrse of the visit, the Chinese
leader had stressed the five principles of peaceful co-existence
(panchasila) and the "Bandung spirit" as being the basis of
Chinas foreign policy and the essential basis for the cooperation of conn tries with different political systems. 71 In an
address to a joint meeting of the Houses of Parliament, Chou
stated that the Chinese people had much respect and admiration
for the independent policy of peaceful neutrality and anticolonialism of tlrn Ceylon Government. EAplaining Chinese
foreign policy, he added:
" . ~ countries large or small, strong or weak, are all equal
and should have the right to implement their own independent and sovereign policies. They also have the obligation
72
not to infringe on other countries' sovereignty, nor to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.12
In a joint Statement signed with Mr Bandaranaike, these
sentiments were reaffirmed,' and the conviction expressed that
unations can live with each other despite divergent and different
social systems." The Prime Ministers further recorded their
disapproval Or antagonistic military blocs, supported disarmament, stressed the need for the prohibition of nuclear weapons
and the cessation of nuclear tests and that international disputes should be settled by mutual understanding and peaceful
negotiation. 73
A severe strain was imposed on these principles by the
Chinese actions in Tibet in 1959 and in India in 1962. The
Chinese decision to do away with Tibetan autonomy and incorporate Tibet as an integral part of Chinese territory led to a
national uprising which was suppiessed by China. These events
and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India had their impact on
Sri Lanka where several Buddhist organisations held public
meetings to protest against the Chinese action and to prevail
upon the Prime Minister to summon an Asian regional conference to discuss the Tibetan question, or to refer the matter
to the United Nations. In June 1959, for example, the Sri
Lanka Malza Bhikslm Sangamaya organised a public meeting to
arrange for the collection of funds to help Tibetau refugees in
India, to invite the Dalai Lama to Sri Lanka, and to summon
a conference of various religious denominations to fight the
communist threat. 74 Prime Minister Bandaranaike, however,
considered the Tibetan question an internal affair of the Chinese
and refused to be drawn into a policy of condemnation of
Chinese policy or of taking the initiative in international
action.
Again, when the Sino-Indian war broke out in October
1962, Prime Minister Sirimavo Eandaranaike resisted the pressure from elements within the government party as well as
from outside it to brand China the aggressor but instead took
the initiative in sllmmoning the Colombo conference of six
non-aligned nations to explore ways and means of bringing
India and China to the conference table and settling the boundary dispute. The pro_posais which emanated from this ~onfer-
Sri Lanka and t!te Communist Powers
73
ence, together with their clarification were persona~ly explah~ed

in Pe"king by Mrs. 'Bantl.arana\ke and the Indones1an Foreign
Minister Dr Subandrio in January 1963 and in New Delhi by
Mrs Bandaranaike and representatives of the UAR and
-Ghana the same month. The Indian government accepted the
-Colombo proposals in toto, but the Chinese acceptance was
subject to reservations,75 and although in the event the mediation of the non-aligned powers did not lead to a resolution of
the conflict, it provided at the time a breathing space for the
-disputants during which their rival claims could be subjected
to a calm and dispassionate evaluation by a body of impartial
-opinion. Sri Lanka~s role as a peace-maker in the Sino-Indian
-conflict was motivated by her manifest desire to prevent the
.continuation of hostilities between two countries with both of
which she had close political and economic ties, and with neither
-of which she could have afforded a breach of the existing goodwill and friendly relations.-7 6 Indeed, Sri Lanka's role and
neutralist stand in this dispute appeared to have been greatly
appreciated in China, where Mrs Bandaranaike was warmly
:received and feted during her visit in January 1963.77 In a
Joint Communique issued by the Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka
and China in Peking on 8. January 1963, it was affirmed
that:
Ceylon and China are bound by many ties of friendship,
economic co-operation and cultural and religious exchanges.
The two Prime Ministers are determined to strengthen
these ties, further develop economic co-operation between
the two countries and to work together in international relations in the cause of Asian-African solidarity and world
peace.-;s
In implementing this policy of economic co-operation, Sri
Lanka and China entered into a Maritime Agreement in July
1963, which gave most favoured nation treatment to the contracting parties in respect of commercial vessels engaged in cargo
and passenger services to and from the two countries or a third
country~ A similar agreement Itad been entered into between
Sri Lanka and the USSR in February 1962 and, in the words of
a Ceylonese government spokesman, "we were prepared to sign
74
similar agreements with any country with whom we had diplo

matic relations and who wished to conclude such agreements.
There was nothing sinister or circumspect or peculiar in these
agreements/' 79 It was pointed outJ too, that in the event of war
the terms of the agreement would be subject to review depending on the prevailing circumstances. The maritime agreement
with China required six months'" notice of termination, however,.
and although it obviously related to trade and passenger services, its text failed to clarify that theuvessels" covered by it were
"mercantile vessels" only. The Leader of the Opposition, Dudley
Senanayake, cansidered this omission to be ominous, and in the
1965 general election campaign held up this agreement as an
instance of the increasing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka which
resulted from SLFP policies. Since the bulk of the island's
trade with China is centred on the strategic port ofTrincomalee, the opposition could make the charge that the Sirimavo
Bandaranaike' government had handed over Trincomalee to
the Chinese. 80
Thus, although the SLFP era had witnessed a radical departure in Sri Lanka~s relations with communist countries, parti~
cularly the development of close collaboration and co-operation at the economic level with China, the impression was
created in certain quarters that in consequence communist influence in Sri Lanka had increased, and that the SLFP's nonalignment policy was pro-communist.
Economic Co-operation with Communist Countries
Perhaps the most significant new development in Sri Lanka's
external relations in the SLFP era was the new orientation
given to the island's foreign trade and the inauguration of
economic and technical assistance from communist countries
to Sri Lanka. Before independence~ Sri Lanka's commercial
relations had been almost exclusively confined to the \\'est, the
United Kingdom claiming the preponderant share of the
island's external trade. This pattern of trade bad already, be
fore 1956, begun to change under the impetus ofUNP policies,
and the trade agreement with China, which was widely supported in political and business circles in Sri Lanka, had been
negotiated by a UNP government. Indeed, Dudley Senanayake
Sri Lanka and the COmmtmist Powers
75
had categorically declared in 1953 that it was only by trade on

a multilateral basis that the island's economic progress could be
attained. 81 Senanayake pointed out, in answer to leftist critics,
that licenses were being granted for trade with Russia and
other countries, and that this trade was being encouraged: and
his acting lvfinister of Commerce and Trade quoted statistics.
to prove that the volume of Sri Lankas trade with East
European countries had been increasing since pre-war times. 82
However, until Bandaranaike became Prime Minister in 1956,
1he volume of Sri Lanka's trade with communist countries
remained small and> if the China trade is excluded, almost
negligible.
Bandaranaike gave an added impetus "to the trend towards
diversification of trade, holding that the elimination of trade
barriers was an important pre-requisite not only for economic
development but also for easing international tensions. 83 Accordingly, tbe agreements signed by him with the USSR and
with China in September 1956 contained protocols for the
development of trade and economic co-operation as well as
for the establishment of diplomatic relations. In February 1958the SLFP government entered into a trade and payments
agreement with the USSR which provided for tl1c ~xchange oi
commodides between the two countries on a "swing creditH
basis, the nmount fixed at 300,000 pounds sterling (840,000).
The agreement was to be valid for one year, and automatically
renewable unless either party gave notice to terminate it. 134
Besides renewjng the trade agreement wHh China in 1957
and 1962, SLFP governments also entered into bi-lateral trade,
agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland
and Rumania. These agreements not only decreased the depend~
ence of Ceylon on western mnrkets for the .sale of her raw
material products, but also opened up new sources from which
the island could obtain her requirements of food and manufactured products.
Economic and Technical Assistance from

Communist Conntrics
Besides the expanding market for Ceylonese products and
the larger area from which the island could select her require-
76
F~reig1i Policy of Sri Lanka
ments of capital and consui:ner goods, the enlargement of

-diplomatic relations under the SLFP also resulted in a wider
-circle of friendly nations from which economic and technical
~ssistance could be obtained. Ceylon's first agreement with, a
communist country for the provision of economic and technical
.assistance was signed with Czechoslovakia in August 1956.
By this agreementt the government of Czechoslovakia provided
,credit facilities for tho purchase of capital goods, at 3 per cent
-on unpaid instalments due. In effect, the credit facilities were
to be made available for 50 per cent of the value of goods
imported from Czechoslovakia, no limit being pJaced on the
value on such imports. Up to June ! 966, a sum of Rs. 7.9
million had been drawn under this Credit, which has been
utilised mainly for the purchase of equipment and machinery for a shoe factory, a textile mill; the Kantalai Sugar
Factory, tile factories and a Hydro Power Station. 8 ;> In
February 1958, the Soviet Union concluded an economic aid
.agreement with Ceylon under the terms of which a line of
-credit of 27 million new roubles (Rs. 142.8 million) was
;granted at 2.5 per cent interest, repayable in 12 years. The
iine of credit was meant to meet the cost of supplies and
services from Soviet organisations and to provide necessary
equipment, machinery and materials in respect of agreed
"Projects. Up to 30 September 1965, a sum of Rs. 83.4 million
had been expended under this agreement, the bulk of the ex-penditure being devoted to the establishment of an Iron and
Steel Works (Rs. 41.8 million), a tyre and tube factory (Rs. 28.8
million), a flour milling plant and grain elevator (Rs. 6.3
million), and the Kantalai Sugar Cane Plantation (Rs. 3.5
million)."
In April 1963, Poland extended to Ceylon a line of credit
-of Rs. 38 million for financing the imports of complete industrial plant and machinery from Ploand for the establishment of
a Hardware and Small Tools Manufacturing Plant. The period
of repayment was 8 years and the rate of interest 2.5 per
cent.s7
The biggest donor of foreign aid to Ceylon among the

-communist countries, however, was the Peoples" Republic of
China. Byan agreement signedin September !957, China offered
economic aid in the form of goods up to the value of Rs. 75
Sri Lanka and the Commzmist Powers
77
million to Ceylon. These goods were to be s.upplied on a grant

basis, but Ceylon was required to spend an equal amount on
the rubber replanting programme. By a further loan agreement
signed between the two countries in September 1958,.
China made available a loan of Rs. 50 million at 2.5%
interest for the purchase of goods from China. This loan is.now interest~free and to be repaid in the currency of a third
country agreed upon by both parties or by means of the export
of goods from Ceylon acceptable to China. A further Rs. 50
million on a grant basis was made available by Chma for the
supply of complete plants, agricultural implements, and machinery by an Economic Aid Agreement signed between the twocountries in October 1962. Finally, in October 1964, an agreement signed between Ceylon and China p-rovided for an interestfree loan of Rs. 20 million to finance complete sets of equipment
machines and farm implements. This loan was to be repayable
in 10 annual equal ]nstalments by means of goods acceptable to
China or by means of the currency of a third country agreed
upon by both parties. While the loan made avatlable under the
agreement signed in September 1958 has been utilised entirely
so far for the import of rice from China, the commodittes..
supplied on a grant basis under the two Economic Aid Agreements have consisted largely of rolling stock for the Railway,
textile power looms, rice milling machines, steel products and
tyres and tubes, nnd textiles.
In February 1965, a Trade and Economic Agreement was.
signed between Ceylon and the German Democratic Republic
under the terms of which the GDR agreed to provide credit
in Rs 200 million {at 2 5 per cent repayable in 10 years) for
the cstabhsbment of major textile finishing and chemical projects. Repayment was to be in the form of Ceylon products to be
agreed upon by both parties. Soon after this agreement was
signed, however, the general elections resulted in a change or
government in Ceylon.
78
Foreigll Policy of Sri Lanka

NOTES and RErERENCES
ipp. ~~-;~i.d Vital. The Inequall/y ofStates (Oxford University press, 1967),
2
L.H. Laing, ..Admission of Indian States to the United Nntionsn
American Journal of Intematio11al Law, 43: (50, January 1949; R.H~
Fifield "New States in the Indian "Realm". American Journal of Jnternatio11al Law, 46': 459, July 1952.
3
A government spokesman declared in 1950; "How could we send
an ambassador to Russia when she does not accept the fact that we
. .are an independent country?", Ceylon House of Representatives Debates,
(1950), Vol. 8, col. 462.
4/bid., col. 486
5See, for instance, Ceylon Daily News, 11 March 1948, p. 1
0
J.C. Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-S4: A Study of Relations
with the Westem Bloc, (Gromingen, J.B. Wolters 1955), p. 52 et seq.
7Jb;d,
8Commomvcaltli Meeting on Foreign Affairs, Jmmary 1950, Minutes

of Meetings mu/ Memoranda~ Co]ombo~ Government Press, 1950.
9 1bfd.
10The Times, 14 September 1950; Ceylon Daily News, 12 September
1950,
11Jbid., 18 June 1951; See also Ceylon Ho1(se of Representatives
Debates, (1951) Vo1. 10, colJ. 1744-47; Tlte-'Hilulu, 14 December 1953.
12Asian Recorder, Vol. 1 (13), p. 138.
l3See the New York Times, 14December 1953, p. 2; ibld., 28 January
1954, p. s.
14See, for instance, New York Times, 22 December 1953, p. 2; 4
January 1954, p. 2; 15 July 1954, p. 5; 9 December 1955, p. 10.
16Ceylo1t House of Representatives Debates, (l9S1), Vol. 10, coU.
1713-1714. See also press communique issued by the Ceylonese
Ministry of Defence and External Affairs in Ceylo11 Daily New.r, 7 January 195016As stated by Ernest Bevin and Philip Noel-Baker to the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference, op.cit.; for India's policy on
this subject, See K.P. Misra, "India~s Policy of Recognition of States
.and Government", The Ameril'an Journal of luternational Law, SS:398403, April 1961.
11Ceylon House of Representatives Debates (1951.) Vol. 10, coll. 1744-47
18/bid. The request for negotiations preparatory to the establishment of diplomatic relationswasmadc toothcrcountrics as well.Comm
unist China asked for such negotiations apparently to sath.fy itseJf that
rela'lions were on the basis of perfect equality and that the powers
.concerned had made a comp]cte break with the .Nationalist Government in Formosa. See, K.P. Karunakaran, India irz JVorld A.ffalrs, 1950
53 (Ca1cutta, Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 68. Under clause 4 of
-Ceylons External Affairs Agreement with the United Klngdom (1941),
-where Ceylon had no diplomatic representatives, the United Kingdom
Sri Lanka and tlw Communist Powers
79
.agrccd, if so requcstcd by Ceylon, to arrange for its representatives to

.act on behalf of Ceylon.
lfJ[oc. cit.
2oceylon House of Rcpresentatiies Debates, (1953) Vol. 14. coll. 483-4.

:?1Sir John Kolelawela, An Asian Prlnu! Ministcr~s Story (London,
I-in.rap, 19S6) p. US.
2'.:New York Times, 14 December 1953, p. 2, Ibid. 28 January 1954,
p. 8
23Sce, for instance, his views as reported in ibid. 27 April 1955,
p. Ji.
2-fCey/011 House of Represcmt(ltiJ,es Debates (1955) Vol. 22, coll. 707.

'!JiThc Times, 22 December 1.952, p. 4
!?OAs stated by Mr Susantha de Fonseka, a member of the Ceylonese
trade delegation to an editor of U.S. News a,zd 1Vorld Report, 34 30, 3
April 1953.
:?7John Cardewt "CeyJon~s Trade with China: the Economic
Background", New Commonwealth, 25: 377, April 1953.
'!.!.SJn June 1951, the U.S. Congress had passed the Kem Amend
n1ent, which provided for withdrawal of economic aid from countries
-contravening the UN embargo, but in October. the Battle Act replaced
the Kem Amendment, and downgraded rubber to a strategic material
over which there was no embargo, but, which was to be the ~ubject of
'Specially negotiated arrangements with the United States.
:?OAs stated by Mr Dodd, Director-General, FAO, reporting to the
FAO Council in Rome. TIie Tunes, 10 June 1952, p. -S
sou Chang, "Ceylon9 s Trade with Communist China", Far Eastem
Sz1ncy, 22: 70, May 1953.
S1conomic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Econo;1ic Survey
.of Asia and the Far East, 1952 (Bangkok 1953) p. 9
32Li Chang, op. cit-, p. 11
33Jbi'd. During this period Chinese purchases of rubber amounted to
46.3 million pounds, while rubber exports to the U.K. and U.S.A. during
the same period amounted to only 26 6 and 31. 9 milJion pounds
:respectively.
3 -ICardcwt op. cit., p. 378.
3 '5Tl,c Times, 11 June 1.951.
30/oc.cit.
37Economic Commission forAsia and the Far East, Ecottamtc Survey
.of Asfa attd the Far East, 1953, Bangkok, 1954, p. 43.
'3$ECAFE Survey, 1952, p. 31-39.
39 /blcl., p. 46.
40 Sec The Times, 22 September 1952, p. 6
. 41Sec Ceylon House of Reprcsrmtatiles Debates (1948) Vol. 5 col. 683;
1b1d. (1949) Vol. 5, col. 1332; T11c Financial Tones lLondon)~ 8 October
19~8. The Malayan Straits Times, 13 October 1948, commenting on the
pligllt of the Ceylonese rubber industry and the Russian offer observed
that the Soviet offer could conceivably be the salvation of ;he whole
rubber industry of Ceylon . The Soviet offer is (thus) a unique and
80
astonishlng opportunity for the rubber p]anters of Ceylon_n According.

to The Hit1du, 22 November 1948, both the United States and Britain
were understood to have expressed their misgivings on the possible
bulk sale of Ceylon's entire rubber output to Russia on the ground
that it was a strategic war material. Exp1ainiog bis refusal to accept
the Russian offer, D.S. Senanayake is reported to have said: "If I
consider any party or country as dangerous to Ceylon, it is Russia.''"
The Dmly Telegraplt, 7 December 1948.
42Cardew, op. ell., 377-78
43Jbia.
4-f[bid. See also The Times, 26 February 19S3, p, 6.
45The New York Times, 6 January 1953.
46For text of speech, sec Royal Institute of International Affairs,.
Documents on International Affairs, 1954, (London, Oxford University
press,) 1951, p. 412,
,r'!Jbid.
48New York Times, 22 April 1955, p. 2.
49 G. Mc Turnan Kahin, The Asian-African Co1ifereuce, BandungIndonesia, April 1955 tlthaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1954). p. 18 and n. 4; Kahin, who was present at the Conference,
speculates that Chou's attitude probably influenced Kotelawela's decision to introduce the issue of Soviet colonialism in the Political Com
rnittee. It would appear, however, that Kotelawela's speech was written
by him in Colombo, and taken to the conference as a policy statement
of the Ceylon government. See, in this connection, Carlos P. Romulo,
The .A:feaning of Bandung, (Chapel Hill, 1956,) p. 10.
socr. $. Arasaratnam, Ceylon (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 16.
51Housc of Representati1es Debates (1956) Vol. 24, col. 25,
52New York Times, 15 September 1956, p. 2; ibid. 2 September l956.,
4
p.:a.
53See Weekly Times (Colombo) 29 January 1958, p. 4.
5-INew York Times, 2 June 1956, p. 4.
55Tfte JVeekly Times (Colombo) 20 November 1957, P s.
5GSee New York Times, 2 February 1958, p. :3.
5'1United Nations Rel'iew. 3:104-5, December 1956.
5SNew York Tones, S November 1.956.
.59Loc. cit.
6 0UN Re,i~w. 3:105, December 1956.
6 1Jbid. p 6.
G2New York Times, 1S November 1956, p. 14G'3Jbid., 22 November 1956, p 1.
UN Renew, 3:8, January 1957.
li5New York Times, 12 December 1956, p. IO.
tGJbid. 13 Dacerober 1956, p. l; UN Reiie1v, 3:19, January 1957
61United States Department of State Bulletin, 37:63, 8 July 1957.
GS[bid., pp. 63-65.
-0 9 See comment in 17:e Times, 16 September 1957, P 6.
Sri Lanka a,ul the Communist Powers
81
would appear that the Sri Lanka government's reversal or

policy wa.i;. du~ targo!ly to prc5suro from political elements at home. In
the first place, Ceylon's UN delegate, R.s.s. Gunewardena, was b~ing
subjected to a good deal or criticism in Sri Lanka for having sub3cribed to the Committee Report on Hungary. In July 1957, al a meeting or
the Government Parliamentary Group, S.D. Bandarnnaike moved a
motion of no confidence in Mr. Gunawardena, and the Pcim::i Minister
had to intervene to prevail upon Mr Bandaranaike to withdraw his
motion. About the same time, the Federation of Socialist Trade Unions,
backed by tho two government parties, had stated that considerable
damage had been done by the Ceylon representatives stand on the
Hungarian question. The Communist Party was also reported to be
preparing a memorandum to be submitted to the Prime Minister on
the statements made by Mr. Gunewardena on the Hungarian question.
Sec Weekly Times (Colombo). 3 July 1957, p 2 and I 3. Secondly, it
was known that the Soviet Newspaper Pral'da had attacked Mr Gunewardcna for his stand on Hungary, and this factor Was also perhaps
not unrelated to the govcrnmenes decision to instruct its delegate as it
did. Sec New York Times, 14 July 1957, p. 6'11Sec New York Times, 2 February 1951, p. 13; Aslan Recorder Vol.
3 (7), p. 1293.
70ft
12flnd.
'13Jbitl., p. l294j see also New York Times, 6 February 1957, p. 2,

and ibid 10 February 1957, p. 21. In February 1964 Chou En-lai paid
a second official visit to Sri Lanka.
NCeylo1t Dflily News, 1 June 1959.
'75For India's acceptance or Colombo proposals, see letter of 5
March 1963 from Nehru to Chou En-lai, India News (Colombo) 13
March 1963; the Chinese acceptance was incorporated in a Jetter or 19
January 1963 from Chou En-lai to Mrs. Bandaranaike,for text ofwhich
sec Peking Re1 icw, 6: 10-11, 1 February 1963.
1GSce pp. supra.
' 7 For Sirimn.vo Bandaranaike's visit to China, sec Embassy of the
Peoples Republic of China, C/Jina Today, No. 15, February 1963.
1SC/zina Totlay, p. 2.
19 See Times of Cey/011, 1 I March 1965.
8 For the Prime Minister's rebuttal of this charge, see ibld.
81Housc of Reprcsentatfres Debates, (1953), Vol. 14, col. 552.
82/bid. cot. 506-08.
83
See U.S. News mul World Report, 40:61, 20 April 1957.
8'fJVeekly Times (Colombo), 12 February 1958, p. 2.
85Scc United States Department of States, TheSino-Soriet Economic
0.ffensfre in Lcss Dclelopcd Countries. Department of State Publication
6632: \Vashington, 1958, p. 87; Ministry of Planning and Economic
~!:~.s, ~;.o~~~~t of Ceylon, Foreign Afr! (Colombo, Government
1
SG]bfd.~ p. 32.
87 Ibid., p. 30.
1
4
Sri Lanka and the West,
1948-1965
Sri Lanka's foreign policy during the first eight years of her
independence was marked by close collaboration with the West,
a policy strictly adhered to by all three UNP Prime Ministers
who held office dming this period.
However, while the characterisation of tJNP foreign policy
as being basically pro-western seems justifiable on the ground
of the strong ideological antipathy of these governments to
communism, two reservations must be made regarding this
policy. First, Sri Lanka's affinity to the West at this time was
more a reflection of the post-independence ~honeymoon period'
with the metropolitan power than an identification with the bloc
politics of the western alliance. Second, there were certain
issues of foreign policy like anti-colonialism, disarmament and
arms contro], and non-involvement with power blocs on which
a consensus existed among Ceylonese political parties, and
whatever the government in power, Sri Lanka's policy on these
issues tended to be broadly the same. Besides, the condemnation
of colonialism, about which all governments in Sri Lanka were
equally vehement, was implicitly a condemnation of the West;
for despite Kotela\vela's views about Communist colonialism,
articulated at the Bandung Conference (1955), the consensus
among political Parties in Sri Lanka was that the "cosmic guilt"
of colonialism attached appropriately to the west. Indeed, all
Sri Lanka and the West
83
UNP Prime Ministers since independence have claimed to

follow a policy of non-alignment, and attempts have been made
to sl10w that there was no basic difference between the foreign
policy of Sri Lanka under the UNP government during the
period 1953-56, and that of the SLFP government which followcd.1 As the previous chapter attempts to demonstrate, there
was in fact an important difference as between UNP and SLFP
.attitudes to communist countries. In this chapter, the basic
determinants of policy in regard to the West wjll be explored
in each of the periods ]948-56 and 1956-65.
The Period 1948-56
The most powerful determinant of UNP foreign policy was
.antipathy to communism and the perception of a treat to the
newly established parliamentary institutions from communist
subversion in Sri Lanka. Preservation of western-type parliamentary institutions was therefore a basic factor which determined relations with the West. u As far as the United States
is concerned", said D.S. Senanayake~ "there is not the slightest
-doubt that she holds the view that we hold. That is, they are
for democracy ... 2. As between communism and western democracy, the choice for Senanayake was clear. A member of his
.cabinet stated the position more explicitly:
In this world today there are really two powerful factors;
the United States of America and the USSR. We have to
follow either the one or the other, There can be no halfway house in the matter. We have decided, and we intend
as long as we are in power, to follow the United States of
America and its democratic principles.3
However, these sentiments were merely the expression of
"the ideological attachment of UNP governments to the political
institutions of western democracy, and did not connote Sri
Lanka's support of the policies devised by the United States
government to combat communism~ such as collective security
pacts. Indeed, as will be discussed Jater, UNP governments
Temaine~, during this period, oppos.cd to such pacts, although
the United States embassy was permitted, despite the protests
84
of the parliamentary Opposition_, to distribute anti-Soviet and

anti-communist literature through the medium of provincial
government offices. 4
However, it was not to the United States that Sri Lanka
looked for guidance and leadership in her foreign policy during
this period; it was the Commonwealth, particularly relations
with the United Kingdom, which became the sheet-anchor or
Sri Lanka policy. The policy laid down by D.S. Senanayake,
that friendship with Britain was Sri Lanka's greatest security,
was closely adhered to by both his UNP successors during this
period, all of whom tended to regard the Commonwealth as a
kind of third force in a world of power blocs headed by the
United States and the USSR, in which Britain's role was seen
as that of mediator and preserver of the peace. Defining foreign
policy in the Governor-General's speech in 1950, D.S. Senanayake declared that "my Government is keenly aware of the
significance and unity of purpose of the Commonwealth in the
effort to preserve peace in the post-war world and will use its
utmost endeavour to cherish and safeguard these valuable
associations. " 5 In regarding the Commonwealth as a factor in
the maintenance of world peace, D.S. Senanayake appeared to
absolve Britain from the charge of involvement in power
politics. In an important foreign policy pronouncement broadcast over the BBC in London in 1951, Senanayake declared that
"the older among the Great Powers now realise the need to
n1obilise the moral power of the world in search oflasting peace
in preference to mobilizing the physical power, but some of
the newcomers into top rank have got to learn wisdom by
experience.'G The fact that Britain was herself a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and therefore an integral
part of the collective security arrangements in the western
world did not appear to deflect Senanayake from this view. Nor
did any UNP Prime Minister during this period consider their
avowed policy of non-alignment to be contradicted by Ceylon"s
Defence Agreement with Britain. 7
By this agreement, it bad been provided that the governments of the United Kingdom and Sri Lanka would give to
each other "military assistance for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of essential communications" and for thfa purpose the-
.Sri Lanka and the West
85
United Kingdom was autbodzed to base in Sri Lanka nava.

and air forces and land forces "as may be mutually agreed'\
including the use of naval and air bases and ports, etc. At the
time of its negotiation there was hardly any threat to the
m-i1itary security of STi Lanka, and Jennings' view that D.S.
Senanayakc signed the Defence Agreement rather as an inducement to Britain to hasten Sri Lanka's independence than for
any military purpose seems plausible. 8 However, the British
bases in Sri Lanka acquired for UNP Prime Ministers an unintended value as an insurance against a vaguely formulated
threat from India, and there is no doubt that they also regarded
them. as strengthening Sri Lanka's role as a bastion of anticommunism in Asia and providing the necessary military security in case of an overt communist threat.
In Sri Lanka opinion against the Defence Agreement ancl
"the maintenance of British bases was not confined to the
Marxist opposition parties. Especially after the establifihment
of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation in 1954, there was a
wide consensus of opinion outside UNP government circles
which held that the bases were inconsistent with the policy of
neutralism professed by the Government, and that they would
inevitably draw Sri Lanka into the conflict betweenpower-blocs. 9
The view that the Defence Agreement "formally associated
Ceylon throughout the period of the cold war with the senior
Commonwealth partner, who was also a principal associate in
1he North Atlantic Treaty Organisation"10 is incontestable;
though the view that therefore "Ceylon would have been drawn
into North Atlantic camp in any conflict with the communist
bloc''11 seems Jess plausible. UNP governments, however, took
their stand on the mutuality provisions. of the agreement to
justify it. Thus, in a Press Note explaining the Defence Agree
:ment in 1951, D.S. Senanayake stated:
It is a simple arrangement by which the Government of the

United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon agreed
to give each other such military assistance for the security
of their respective territories as it may be in the mutual
interest to provide. The nature of the assistance which
one party may render to the other and the procedure or
rendering it have also to be agreed to mutually .12
~6
Later, Sir John Kotelawela insisted that Sri Lanka's defence

commitment with Britain was not a permanent arrangement,
and that "We are masters of our own naval and air bases and
we can certainly ask Britain to quit the at a momenCs notice.'1 3
There is no doubt that the use of the bases by foreign powerl>
for military purposes outside Sri Lanka was generally subject
to prior permission being obtained from the Government ot
Sri Lanka, although there appear to have been instances when
they were so used by the United Kingdom without such permission. For instance, British fighter planes based on Trincomalee appear to have been used, without the speci:fie permis~
sion of the Government of Sri Lanka, for action against
Malayan communists in 1948. 14 On other occasions: however,
the British bases were used with the prior knowledge and permission of the Sri Lanka Government for military objectives.
outside Sri Lanka. In 1950, Sri Lanka granted harbour facilitiel>
to an American flotilla on its way to Korea, and when asked
whether this did not conflict with the policy of non-alignment
professed by the government, D.S. Senanayaka declared:
I do not see any reason why facilities which were available

to the Americans in the past should not be availabk
now.rn
In 1954, during the latter stages of the battle of Dien Bien Phu
the Kotelawela government granted permission to the United
States to route, through the Sri Lanka airbase at Katunayake,
American military aircraft carrying French paratroops between
France and Hanoi. 10 On each of these occasions, the Sri Lanka
government had authorized the use of the bases for action
against communists or communist movements. Thus1 although
all three UNP Prime Ministers claimed to be following a policy
of non-alignment during this period, it was strictly a policy
which identified Sri Lanka's interests with the West, particularly with the United Kingdom.
Yet, there were certain issues on which Sri Lanka diverged
sharply from the West even during this period. For UNP
Prime Ministers, non-alignment consisted primarily of three
elements: first, opposition to colonialism; second, opposition to
.aU forms of arms production and the armaments race ancl
87
nuclear testing and nuclear weapons production in particular; third~ rejection of the idea of collective security as the
proper defence against communism.
TI1e anti-colonial motif has been one of the most consistent strands of Sri Lanka foreign policy since independence.
Since Sri Lanka became a member of the United Nations only
towards the end of the period of UNP rule, UNP governments
did not have the UN forum to express their view on the subject.
But in a series of Asian and Asian-African regional conference
culminating in Bandung in April 1955~ Sri Lanka expressed
her opposition to colonialism "in all its manifestations". Sri
Lanka was one of the countries invited by Nehru to the Delhi
conference on Indonesia in January 1949, and not only fully
supported the conference resolutions supporting Indonesian
independence (Sri Lanka was a member of the four-nation
Drafting Committee at the conference), but consistently took a
firm stand against the Dutch "police action" against Indonesia.
In fact, before the conferenee had convened on 23 December
1948, the Sri Lanka High Commissoner in London had already
delivered a Note to the Netherlands Ambassador intimating the
decision of the Government of Sri Lanka that ships or aircraft
carrying troops, arms or warlike material of any kind which
might be used against the Indonesian republic would be denied
entry into any Sri Lanka harbour or air.field, and Sri Lanka
was the first country to take such action.17
At the conference of Southeast Asian Prime Ministers held
in Colombo at Sri Lanka's initiative in April-May 1954, Sri
Lanka together with India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Burma not
only denounced colonialism in general and called for the indep~ndence for Indo-China, Morocco, Tunisia, etc., but also
''viewed with grave concern the developments in regard to the
hydrogen bomb and other weapons of mass destruction". 18
Pending an agreement for the elimination and prohibition of
hydrogen bombs, the Prime Ministers felt that no further
explosion of such bombs should take place. These sentiments
received n1ore widespread support when the AsianAfrican
Conference met at Bandung in April 1955. The final communique of this conference declared that "colonialism in all its
manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to
an end'\ and that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjuga-
88
tion, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and
co-operation. u Further, the conference "considered that disarmament and the prohibition of production, expedmentation and
use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilisation from the fear and
prospect of wholesale destruction,, and declared that universal
disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of
peace.
It is no doubt true that at both these conferences the attitude of Sri Lanka was tinged by a strong antipathy to communism and by the belief that international communism,
equally with western imperialism, was a scourge to be eradicated. Indeed, even before his speech attacking communist
colonialism at the Political Committee of the Bandung Conference, Sri John Kote1awela had been at variance with Nehru
regarding the Indo-Cbina war, Nehru regarding this war primari~
ly as a nationalist struggle against the French, Kotelawcla considering it as a struggle of communism against antipcommunism.
Despite these variations of policy, Sri Lanka during this period
generally refused to be formally aligned with the western bloc.
Thus, although Kotelawela seemed attracted towards SEATO
because it was essentially a pact against communism, and
stated that he was "heartily in sympathy" with its object, he
kept Sri Lanka out of it on the ground that the defence
against communism should primarily be an economic defence,
not military.
The Response to Corn'.fuunism: The Colombo Plan
,
Tbe idea that;'the proper defence against communism ~~r

the new states of,Asia was economic regeneration and not m1Ittary preparedness\_, had been accepted at the meeting of Commonwealth Foreign M1i;1isters held in Colombo in January 1950. At
this conferencr~ as stated below,1 British Foreign Secretary
Ernest Bevin ha embarked on an analysis of the nature of the
communist thre, t~ in particular on the designs of the Soviet
Union in Asia. I or the Australian delegation, however, "the
consolidation of 1omrnunism in China and the evident threat
Sri Lanka and tlze 1Vest
89
of its emergence as a growing force throughout South-East

Asia H constituted the main political problems of the future and
this, according to the delegation, underlined "the urgency of
international efforts to stabilise government and to create conditions of econon1ic life and living standards under which the
ideological attractions which communism exerts will lose their
force".::!.O
rt would appear that one of Sri Lanka's delegates to the
-Conference, J.R. Jayawardena, had independently come to the
-sameconclusion. and in a Draft Resolution submitted to the
Conference on I Ith January proposed a Commonwealth Economic Plan in order to raise living standards in the underdeveloped countries of South-East Asia)n The same day the Australian
-delegate, P. Spender introduced a more comprehensive resolution in the same sense; while on 12th January a Joint Memorandum on Economic Policy in South and South-East Asia,
submitted by Sri Lanka, Australia and New Zealand, was
..accepted by the conference. This memorandum recommended
that the participating Governments should:
{a) examine the possibility of making financial assistance
available for essential productive purpose in South and
South-East Asia;
(b) support as high a priority as possible for projects presented to the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development which would be in accordance with
the Bank's objectives;
{c) contribute to the technical assistance work of the
United Nations and its specialised Agencies, and to
support in these organisations as high a priority as
possible for the needs of South and South-East Asia;
(d) examine the possibility of making supplementary bilateral arrangements in appropriate cases for the provision of direct technical and other assistance; and
(e) generally consider proposals for the economic development of the area keeping in view the possibilities of
mutual assistance.
. \Vith a view to the implementation of these recommendations the conference further accepted the suggestion that a
90
Consultative Commitlee be set up, membership of which would

be open to all Commonwealth Governments which desired toparticipate. The first meeting of the Consultative Committee
was held in Sydncy,Austra!ia, in May 1950, where it was agreed
that the Commonwealth countries in the area should draw up
development programs covering a six year period, from 1 July
1951 and that other countries in the area should be invited to
take similar action. Agreement was also reached at this meeting on the establishment of a Technical Co-operation Scheme.
The Colombo Plan, thus evolved, was avowedly intended to
provide for economic cooperation and consultation as an antidote to communism.~:!
Sri Lanka's Reaction to Scnto, 1954
When collective defence for Southeast Asia was being mooted Britain made inquiries from the Colombo Powers, in August
1954, as to what their attitude to a proposed South-east Asian
Treaty Organisation would be. India forthwith refused to participate in any such organisation, but Sir John Kotelawela
expressed tentative interest in the proposal. Sir John proposed
on August 2 that the Colombo Powers should confer before
replying to the British off'er.:?3 India however, politely refused
to have anything to do with the treaty, although Sir John was
mistakenly Jed from the Indian Prime Minister's correspondence to believe that Nehru had an alternative to SEATO."
Burma and Pakistan accepted the Kotclawela invitation,
although the Burmese Prime Minister U Nu declared that he
was opposed to joining any alliance and was only inclined to
consider an alternative::?:. TJ1e Indonesian Government too,
while declining the invitation, stated that they could see no
reason for any conference in the light of Indonesia's decided
stand againstjoining any treaty arrangement. 20 The Kotelawela
plan came to nothing. Another proposal made'by Sir John to
Nehru, that the Colombo powers cosider an all-Asian defence
alliance as an aternative to the projected Southeast Asian Treaty
also fell through due to the latter's opposition." On August 13
the Government of Sri Lanka declared that they would keep cran
open mind" on SEATO although they would not participate in
it.
Sri Lanka and tfle West
91
When the treaty was signed in Manila on September 9,

Sir John Kotelawela issued a statement saying 'that it was too
early to say what the attitude of Sri Lanka towards SEATO
would be. He must have time, he said, to think and observe and
review the entire situation in consultation with his colleagues,.
the Prime Ministers of the other Colombo powers. He found
that SEATO left it open to non-signatory countries, like Sri
Lanka, to join if they wfahed, and that signatory powers wereprepared to come to the assistance even of non-signatory
nations, if the latter so desired. These were not gratuitous or
meddlesome offers, and could not be criticized on such
grounds. 29
In December, however, while in Manila en route to attend
the Bogar Conference in Indonesia, Sir John declared that
"what Asia needs is not blocs with set rules and regulations and
objectives, but something like the Commonwealth, which is 1ike
a family; 30 and in the New Commonwealth he wrote that while
he was 0 heartily in sympathy" with the main object of SEATO
which was to check Communism in South-east Asia, be did not
believe that the particular means proposed to achieve it was
correct. "The stress in SEATO is on the military aspect, but
my belief is that the defence against Communism should be an
economic defence.''31
On this issue, there is revealed an ambivalence in the Kotelnwela attitude. He was attracted to SEATO because it wai.. essentially a pact against Communism, but did not wish to deviate
from the neutralist position avowed by him as well as by his predecessors in office. This ambivalence is revealed in a statement
made by Sir John in February 1955. On that occasion he reiterated that, regarding SEATO, "the door is open and will continue to be open".
We might join SEADO (sic)'ifwe thought it advantageous,
or be away from it if we decided to observe neutrality in
the event ofa war. SEADO is nothing but a.defence arrangement and we may or may not avail our.selves of the benefits
of that arrangement a~ the case may be. We shall keep an
open mind."32
92
Foreign Policy of Sri Lank.a
It would appear that with the passage of time, Sir John

Kotelawela was gradually veering towards acceptance of
SEATO as a necessary bulwark against Communism in Southeast Asia. In April 1955, in an intervie,v after his return to Sri
Lanka from the Bandung Conference, he hinted that Sri Lanka
might join a Western defence pact like SEATO. In answer to a
.question about Sri Lanka's attitude to regional alliances, the
Prin1e Minister replied that in the past countries were afraid of
joining blocs but now it was a case of getting assistance from
one's friends to meet a situation that might arise. The principle
of collective security, he said, was accepted by the Bandung
.Conference, so that there might be iio misunderstanding about
alliances that might be entered into for one's defence. 33
This trend in the Prime Minister's policy which, in effect,
meant a veering away from neutralism, must be ascribed to his
,own personal views, and was by no means representative of
opinion in Sri Lanka. Sir John's own party and public opinion
.generally were not in favour of SEATO, while the parliamentary opposition were strongly critical of it. 34 R.G. Senanayake,
Minister of Commerce and Trade in the Kotelawela Cabinet
:gave expression to a widely held fear when he stated that Sri
Lanka would invite an atomic "Pearl Harbour'' if she offered'
berself as a military base. The United States, he said, was
trying to promote a Southeast Asian defence pact "irrespective
-of" the ultimate decisions at the Geneva Conference, of the
neutralist conclusions of the Southeast Asian Prime Ministers
Conference he1d in April, and "even the consensus of Commonwealth opinion." 35
In August 1954, the Soviet Government newspaper Iztestia
had warned the Colombo Powers that they would place themselves in ''economic bondage" to the United States if they
joined the alliance, and a Moscow broadcast added that SEATO
sought specifically to "torpedo" the Geneva agreements on
Indo-China. 30 This latter argument recurred in a statement made
by Nehru in September 1954 on the "oddities" of the Southeast
Asian Treaty: namely, that the problems of Asian security and
Asian peace were discussed at Manila mainly by non-Asians;
that a few countries had joined together to protect other
countries even after they had shouted that they did not want
:any such protection; and that the three colonial Powers interes..-
93.
ted in preserving the status qua in Asia were deliberately

obstructing the historic processes of national liberation.37
These arguments were not without effect in informed circles.
in Sri Lanka, where, also, the Inda-Pakistani competition in
armaments which SEATO engendered could not but cause con~
cern. 38 Hans Morgenthau noted that even for the United States
SEATO was "a useless alliance from the military point of view
and a harmful one poJiticalJy and economically in that it alienates the broad masses of Asians''. 39 In Sri Lanka, apart from
the wavering support it sometimes received from Sir John
Kotelawela, SEATO did not commend itself to any influential
body of opinion not only because of the generat desire to steer
clear of power blocs, but also because military pacts deflected
human and material resources from vital economic development programmes. Since independence, top priority in Sri
Lanka has always been assigned to economic development, and
increased economic and technical assistance was regaI"ded by
some, including on occasions Kotelawela himself, as the proper
defence against Communism. Up to the signing: of the Manila
Pact, however, and for some time after, Sri Lanka, for reasons
which will be elaborated below, had received hardly any
economic or technical assistance from the United States.
United States Economic and Technical Assistance to Sri Lanka
On 7th November 1950 a general agreement for technical'

co-operation under the Point Four programme was entered
into between the United States and Sri Lanka in Colombo. 40
The two Governn1ents mutually Undertook to cooperate with
each other in the interchange of technical knowledge and skills
and in related activities designed to con tribute to the bala need
and integrated development of the economic resources and
productive capacities of Sri Lanka. Separate agreements were
to he arrived at for tl1e working out of particular technical
- cooperation programmes and projects. The Government of Sri
Lanka undertook to abide by the conditions laid down by the
United States Congress regarding publicity, coordination and
integration of technical cooperation programmes being carried_
on in Sri Lanka.
94
This agreement was the second tu be concluded by the United

States since the inauguration of Point Four, the first having
been with Iran. But Sri Lanka's agreement was the first of its
kind in that unlike the United States Agreement with Iran,
which had provided for the development of specific projects,
the agreement with Sri Lanka merely set up general conditions
for United States aid and reserved for separate accords the
function of covering specific projects for technical cooperation.
Although Sri Lanka expected much from this Agreement,
<levelopments in the United States following the Korean war
placed various obstacles in the way of its implementation. As
a result of the Korean war, the United States Congress passed
restricting legislation governing the grant of assistance. The
Kem Amendment to the third Supplemental Appropriation
Act passed in June 1951 prohibited the extension of economic
-0r financial assistance to countries exporting to the Soviet
Union or other Communist countries "arms or armaments or
military material, or articles or commodities which ... may
be used in the manufacture of arms, armaments or mi1itary
materials or the shipment of which to the Soviet bloc is
embargoed by the United States."41
The necessity for improved legislation on the subject led to
the Mutual Defence Assistance Control Act, popularly known
.as the Battle Act, in October the same year. The Battle Act
went even further than the Kem Amendment-it provided for
the cutting off of military as well as economic assistance _if
certain conditions were not met. In Title 1 of the Act the policy
-0f the United States was declared to be to
app1y an embargo on the shipment of arms, ammunition
and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum,
transportation materials of strategic value and items of
primary strategic significance used in the production of
arms, amn1unition and implements of war to any nation or
combination of nations threatening the security of the
United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and of countries under its domination, 42
No military economic or financial assistance was to be
:supplied to an; nation or group of nations unless it applied a
Sri Lanka and the JVest
95
similar embargo on the specified shipments. The determination

of what items were to be included within the terms of the
embargo was to be left to the discretion of the administrator of
the Act. An element of flexibility was, however, introduced by
the provision that the President was empowered to waive the
restrictions of the Act in the case of those assisted countries
-shipping strategic materials other than arms, armaments and war
materials to the Soviet bloc if it were considered that such
countries were making a contdbution to the "mutual security
of the free world'' .43
Since Sri Lanka had already by September 1951 permitted
-Chinese purchases of rubber in the open market in the island,
the United States Economic Aid Agreement never really came
111.to operation. As seen in the last chapter, requests made by
tlte Government of Sri Lanka for exemption under the Kem
Amendment and the Battle Act were turned down. Until I 956,
when the United States aid policy in Sri Lanka was revised>
the only assistance received by Sri Lanka under the Agreement
was the provision of an agricultural specialist who was in the
island a few months in 1951. 44
The economic compulsions which led Sri Lanka to enter
into the trade agreement with China at the end of 1952 were
.also little understood ju the United States. In January 1953,
Averell Harriman, retiring Director of Mutua] Security~
<Cxpressed 'critical concern' over this agreement. Harriman
said that Sri Lanka had concluded the agreement after rejecting
an American offer to buy Sri Lanka,.s rubber at Hpresent world
market prices"; Sri Lanka preferred the five year deal with
Peking, he said, because the Communists had agreed to pay
prices 40% higher than the market prices. The Sri Lanka
Government also insisted on a 50 million dollar programme of
United States economic aid~ spread over the following five
years, as part of its conditions for sale of rubber to the
United States. As the United States could make no such
promises> Sri Lanka signed the Agreement with the Communists
uh1 spite of the fact that Sri Lanka has an anti-Communist
Governmentn. Harriman pointed out that this deal was
important because Sri Lanka was the on\y non-communist
country shipping rubber to Moscow-dominated areas. 45 The
statement that Sri Lanka was the only non-communist country
96
shipping rubber to Moscow-dominated areas was factually incorrect. For example, the United Kingdom had exported to the
Soviet Union 42,000 tons of natural rubber in 1951 and 88,000
tons in 1952.40 The Sri Lanka Government pointed out that West
European countries exported rubber to the Soviet Union which
was used foraircraftand vehiclesso1d to China. Besides the price
of rice in Sri Lanka's traditional markets has been pushed up by
newcomers. The Sri Lanka Government also took the view that
the London Rubber Conference of 19th February 1950 had
failed because consumers were out to secure all the rubber they
could at their own prices. A "perfectly reasonable request by
producers for an International Rubber Agreement on the lineSof the International Wheat Agreement was rejected by theconsumers". The Sri Lanka Government had made several
attempts to conclude a bulk purchase agreement with America
but these failed because the United States Government offered
the average Singapore price for rubber while the Sri Lanka
Government had considered the Colomba price as the most
appropdate. The United States had also taken no steps to
initiate negotiations with a view to granting Sri Lanka exemption from the U.S. legislation which precluded the grant of
American aid. Besides, Sri Lanka's Mission to \Vashington to
procure rice and some measure of American aid had failed. A
government communique issued on t11e subject emphasised
that "while the Government of Sri Lanka remains and will
continue to be opposed to Communist doctrines and methods,
it considers that the primary and most important duty of any
government is to safeguard the economic will-being of jts
people." 47 Sri Lanka's policy in this respect was also determined
by the fact that the United States, with its protection of the
synthetic rubber industry and its imposition of destinational
control, had manipulated the prevailing world prices of rubber.
This was considered particularly unfair to Sri Lanka's producers because the plight of Sri Lanka's rubber industry had been
determined largely by Sri Lanka's excessive tapping of rubber
trees during the second world war, specially after the faH of
Malaya to the Japanese, when Sri Lanka remained the only
source of natural rubber for the Allied Powers.
On 10th ]\,fay J 954 the Times of Ceylon reported that the
United States had suggested that Sri Lanka should terminate her
97
rubber contract with Communist China for American aid. Sir

John Kotelawela denied this. But two weeks later, The Times
revealed that "the initiative in the move to torpedo the China
Pact for American aid as far as very recent events are concerned
bas not come from the United States Government but from
three Ceylon Cabinet Ministers who have had secret discussions
with United States offi.cials".48 Commenting on the new
report on May 10_, State Department officials confirmed that
if Sri Lanka would stop selling rubber to Communist China the
United States would undoubtedly give her economic and
technical assistance. 49
The reappraisal of American aid thus started was continued
on the occasion of Sir John Kotelawela"s visit to the United
States in December 1954. The Prime Minister had been given
a mandate to discuss economic aid during his visit by the UNP
majority in Parliament. and in an address to the Overseas Press
Club in New York City soon after his arrival, he put the case
for aid with characteristic force:
.. Communism does not flourish on a full stomach. Wo
want economic help in abundance. If America appreciates
this and acts accordingly she would have done a great
service to Asia. We want aid in the technological fie]d and
we want you to help us build up our industries. If America
will give us this aid she can safely leave to Asia the job of
defending herself against Communism. Incidentally Ceylon
has not received a cent of American aid although Ceylon is
the stoutest adversary of Communism in Asia. 50
It may be assumed that Kotelawetas visit to the United
States resulted in a new attitude by the United States to the
question of economic assistance to Sri Lanka. In March 1955
Harold Stassen, Director of the United States Foreign Operations Administration, arrived in Sri Lanka for talks with Sri
Lanka leaders on the question of American aid.51 Stassen
recognised that there are some special circumstances in connection with Sri Linka~s shipments of rubber to China and trade
f~r rice and reported an increased understanding of the position, programmes and objectives of Sri Lanka. 62 In March the
next year John Foster Dulles, then visiting Colombo, stressed
98
Foreign P;/icy of Sri Lanka
the importance of economic aid to Asia and announced that

"no special exemption from the Battles Act was needed to
provide U.S. aid to Sri Lanka for the American government,
after a study of Sri Lanka's development programme, found
Sri Lanka qualified to receive American aid/' 53
On 28th April 1956 the two Governments entered into an
economic assistance agreement which reaffirmed the conditions
set up in the general agreement of November 1950 and provided
for the grdnt of economic aid to Sri Lanka, 54 Under the
Agreement 5 million dollars was allocated for the fiscal year
1956. In 1957 the grant was increased to 7 million dollars."
Ironically enough, the beneficiary of American aid was not
the Government of Sir John Kotelawela but the Bandaranaike
Government which had come to power in April 1956 and which
did not share the same hostility towards Communism as the
former government. Indeed, the grant for 1957 was announced
in Sri Lanka soon after the Chinese Premier Chou En-Jai had
ended his official visit to Sri Lanka with promises of economic
aid.
The Period 1956-1965
The advent of the Bandaranaike Government in 1956 connoted a significant shift in Sri Lanka's relations with the West
as it had done in respect of Sri Lanka's relations with Communist
countries. Bandaranaike had emphasised that the proper
position for a country like Sri Lanka was that of a country like
Switzerland in Europe,50 i.e. a country following a neutral
policy and non-aligned with any power blocs. Bandaranaike's
approach to foreign policy was determined by two main
factors. First, he believed that given a period of peace the
extremes of Communism and democratic capitalism wou]d
disappear and the rest of the world would start moving towards the Centre. A suitable middle ground would evolve,
probably a type of democratic Socialism. 57 It was his conviction that out of the conflict between capitalism and socialism
a synthesis would arise which was the true answer to the various
problems of the underdeveloped countries. 68 Secondly, Bandaranaike believed that Sri Lanka, like other Asian countries
Tecently emerged from colonia] status, was faced with a dual
Sri Lanka and ihe Jll'est
99
problem: of converting a colonial society into a free society and

of doing this in a context of a world which had itself changed.
In the search for such a solution in this dual problem we
naturally do not wish to bind overselves to any particular
bloc or ideology. We wish to look about us in building a
society for our country most suited to our own genius and
the needs of the modern world. There may be things we
take from the capitalistic West or the Communist East.
This, in other words, is the philosophy ofneutralism. 59
On this basis, the Prime Minister wanted to be "friends

-0f all, enemies of noneu. 00 Bandaranaike took steps to establish
.diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Chinat to permit the importation to Sri Lanka of Communist literature, and
entered into closer collaboration and closer commercial ties
whh the Communist countries. A significant instance of the
,implementation of the new policy was Bandaranaike"s request,
soonafter he became Prime Jv:Iinister, that the United Kingdom
shou]d withdraw their bases in Sri Lanka. While in London for
-the Primo Ministers' Conference in 1956, he initiated discussions with the Goven,ment of the United Kingdom for the
-transfer of British bases in Sri Lanka.01 Negotiations for the
transfer of the bases began ht London in December 1956, when
it was agreed in principle that the bases would be handed over
to Sri Lanka in 1957 on a date to be agreed between the two
_governments. In subsequent discussions held in Colombo in
June 1957, the two governments reached agreement on the
timing and method of the withdrawal. Under the terms of this
agreement the Royal Naval base at Trincomalee was formally
transferred to the Sri Lanka Government on 15th October 1957
and the Royal Air Force station at Katunayake was handed
overon 1st November 1957. Most of the United Kingdom
establishments, however, were to be withdrawn within a period
of three years, while some facilities were to be maintained up to
5 years. The Government of Sri Lanka agreed to pay a sum of
Rs. 22 million spread overS years ufor the fixed assets of the
United Kingdom services to be taken over, and in final settlement of certain claims arising out of the occupation and dispo
sal of bases.' 162 Bandaranaike insisted that the transfer was not
100
made "in any spirit of hostility'\ but because "our foreign_

policy which is based on friendship with all nations and nonalignment with any power bloc of the world, necessitates such
a ~teJ?." 63 Bandaranaike also reiterated that his non-alignment
Policy was not anti-Western or hostile to the United States.
Sri Lanka's friendship with the Soviet Union and Communist
China did not in any way connote hostility to the United States.
On the contrary, "we are closer to the United States than the
others because we too believe in a democratic way of life''. 64
Indeed, although Bandaranaike declared his intention of making Sri Lanka a republic within the Commonwealth, he strongly
believed in the value of the Commonwealth connection and
regarded it as a kind of third force between the world power
blocs. For not only did it possess such benefits as the Sterling
area and means of regular consultation~ but it also stood for
something more tangible-"a way of life which includes parliamentary government, an independent judiciary, no discrimination between the State and the citizen, and the rule oflaw. I
feel we should make an effort to foster thi"s way of life, to show
it to other countries." 65
Yet despite these assertions of friendship with the West
there is no doubt that the new foreign policy of Sri Lanka
implied a significant decrease in western influence in Sri Lanka.
The withdrawal of the British bases in Sri Lanka, in particular,
was badly received in the United States, and in March 1957, a
New York Times commentator, C.L. Sulzberger, wrote that
"the blandly neutralist administration in Ceylon applies its
neutralism in a manner entirely benevolent to Moscow and
Peking". 66
The new goveinment's policy on the Suez crisis, which,
erupted soon after its assumption of office, indicates the extent
to which Sri Lanka's foreign policy had diverged from the pre1956 tendency towards close alignment and co-operation with,
the United Kingdom.
The Suez Crisis

When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956,
Sri Lanka strongly supported the measure. In a statement to-the House of Representatives, Bandaranaike made his position.
.Sri Lanka and the West
101
perfectly clear:
We do not question the right of Egypt to nationalize the

Suez Canal Company with its implications. We do not
question that position at all. We accept her right to do it,
and we accept the fact that she has done it with the impli,cations that arise therefrom.- We are also very much concerned, naturally, with two matters. We desire to obtain a
peaceful settlement of a dispute that is, if I may say so,
rather endangering peace. We are very much concerned
with the preservation of peace. We are also concerned with
,certain uses that we make of the Suez Canal for our trade,
incoming as well as outgoing. We feel it may be possible
to recognise the position of Egypt in that way, while at the
same time obtaining reasonable guarantees for the use of
the Suez canal. ... 67
In August 1956, Bandaranaike received an invitation to

attend the London Conference which was being called to con:sider the Suez que;;stion, but before accepting the invitation he
asked Britain, France and the United States to clarify tb~ir
.attitude to Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company,
stating that the Western communiqueindicatedtbattheconvening powers had already made up their minds to internationalize
control of the canal and that, if both Egypt and the convening
powers stood firm, there was no alternative but war, and Sri
Lanka's participation in the conference would serve no useful
:purpose. 68 Later, Bandaranaike stated categorically that Sri
Lanka could not accept any conference decision opposing
Egypt's right to nationalize, 6 !J
In response to his request for clarification, the Prime
1v[inister received assurances that international control of the
canal happened to be the view of Britain and France; and that
Other countries attending the conference would be at perfect
liberty to express different vie,vs if they so desired.'0 Accordingly, when the London Conference met on August 19, the Sri
Lanka delegate, Sir Claude Corea, opposed the plan put
forward by United States Secretary John Foster Dulles for an
inte.rna.tional operating board for 'the cana\.'ll. The other powers
which declared their opposition to this plan were the Soviet
102

7
Union, India and Indonesia. z The proposal to set up a Suez

Canal User~s Association was also roundly condemned by Sri
Lanka as well as by India, Bandaranaike describing the measure as "a giant step towards war'\ 73
During July through October, when the crisis in the Middle
East was developing, Bandaranaike kept in close touch with
the Colombo Powers, especially with India, as well as with
Egypt, with a view to ascertaining their attitudes to the problem." A report that Bandaranaike and Nehru wouldflytoCairo
to discuss the issue with Nasser was denied by Nehru, but on
September 15 Nehru conferred with the representatives in New
Delhi of Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma and Sri Lanka, and suggested that tbe Colombo Powers keep in close touch with each
other. 75
The Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in October, and
the Franco-British military action in the Suez Canal Zone
caused hostile reactions both in India and Sri Lanka. On
October 31, Nehru issued a sharply worded statement denouncing Israel, Britain and France, warning them that the attack
would have far-reaching results in Asia and Africa. The same
day, Nehru reportedly called in the representatives of Egypt,
Britain, France, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Sri Lanka
to discuss the situation in the Middle East. 70 The following day,
he accused Britain and France of "clear and naked aggression
against Egypt''. 77 In Sri Lanka, too, political and press circles.
expressed strong disapproval of the Franco-British military
intervention in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, and warmly welcomed United States' pleas for cessation of hostilities. Bandaranaike himself declared on November 1, that he was sending an
urgent appeal to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden,
Premier Mollet of France and the United Nations urging that
"British and French troops should even at this stage be withdrawn from Egyptian territory before the situation worsens".
He also announced that Sri Lanka would remain neutral in the
event of a major war developing from the crisis. 78 On November 3, it was announced in New Delhi that the Prime Ministers
of the Colombo Powers would meet in the IndLn capital on a
suggestion made by Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia. 79
The Middle Eastern eris.is. came up for discussion in theUnited Nations Security Council, but due to exerdseofthe veto
103
by Britain and France effective action by the Security Council

was precluded. On October 31, Yugoslavia offered a draft
resolution calling for an emergency session of the General
Assembly to consider the question, and the proposal was
accepted with Britain and France dissenting. The Assembly,
meeting on the night of November 1-2, passed a United
States' resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Middle
East. This was reaffirmed in another resolution, sponsored by
nineteen Asian and African countries (of which Sri Lanka was
one) calling for a cease-fire within twelve hours. The Assembly
also adopted a Canadian proposal for an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise a cessation of
hostilities. 80
In the United Nations, Sri Lanka gave full support to the
idea ofa United Nations force, and even offered to provide 150
men and officers for it. 81 Eisewhcrej Prime Minister Bandaranaike strongly advocated withdrawal of foreign troops from
Egypt. At the meeting of the Colombo Powers in New Delhi
during November 12-14, Bandaranaike, in a joint communique
with the other Asian Prime Ministers, expressed "strong disapproval and distress at the aggression of, and the intervention
by the great powers against weaker countries"', recalling that
this was "in violation of the provision of the U.N. Charter and
also a direct contravention of the spirit and letter ofuprinciples
laid down at the Bandung Conference". The Prime Ministers
welcomed the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, and demanded their uimmediate implementation'',
as well as the uwithdrawal of all foreign forces from Egypt".
While welcoming the creation of an international U.N. force,
the Prime Ministers stated that this force should be a temporary
one, and should be restricted to the directions laid down in the
U.N. resolution. 8 :?
While in the United States to attend the United Nations
General Assembly sessions in November 1956, Bandaranaike
discussed the Middle Eastern situation with President Eisenhower, and reported "quite a considerable and substantial
agreementu in their views. The Prime Minister told White
House newspapermen that he had "ex.pressed the gratitude of
my p:oplen for the United States' stand during the crisis;B3
later, m London, Bandaranaike d~clared that United States
104
Fo,eign Policy of Sri Lanka
policy in the Middle East crisis had "greatly enhanced he~

prestige with the Asian powers," and ''helped to remove the
misunderstanding about America which has existed in some
countries. " 84
Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in January 1957, when the belligerents in the Middle East had
declared their acceptance of a cease-fire and a U.N. force,
Bandaranaikc reiterated that "as long as foreign troops remain
on Egyptian territory, the position is one fraught with the
greatest danger which may bring about results leading to a
third world war. Those forces must be withdrawn now, with0ut any delay." 85
Two conclusions may fairly be drawn from Sri Lanka's
policy during the Suez crisis. First, in foreign policy at least,
Sri Lanka's Commonwealth association had undergone a significant change. Not only did Sri Lanka declare that she
would observe military neutraliLy in the event of the crisis
developing into a major war, but diplomatically, Sri Lanka
strongly opposed the policy of her senior Commonwealth partner, Britain. Second, the foreign policy of Sri Lanka had
moved closer to that of India than was the case under Bandaranaike's predecessors. The Indo-Sri Lanka outlook was the
same in regard to the Suez issue, and Bandaranaikc and Nehru
were in close touch with each other as we11 as with their other
_..!=.R.IIBrb.QJ'ower colleagues during the period before and after
the invasio~gypt.
The B~~~~r[~naike government's Suez policy indicated a
clear shift from ~1e earlier close dependence to th~ _commo~wealth and the earlier tendency to follow the Bnt1sh lead m
foreign affairs. In other respects as wdl the advent of this
government and tbe SLFP government which followed it heralded a dimunition of western influence. Neither S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike nor Sirimavo Bandaranaike shared Kotelawela's
view of communist colonialism, and their denunciations of
colonialism were specifically directed against the western
powers. In the Joint Statement of the latter'~ visit to_ Sri Lanka
in May 1957, the Prime Ministers _expressed their ~~~cem
about "developments in some parts of Western Asia and
stated that the problems of that area could "only be solved by
1he peoples of the countries within that region being left to
105

86
work out their own destiny". This sentiment was repeated in

Bandaranaike's Joint Statement with Premier ViHiam Siroky of
Czechoslovakia in February 1958.81 On the occasion of
the visit of President Soekarno to Sri Lanka in January 1958,
Bandaranaikc issued a Joint Statement with the Indonesian
Jeader in which, inter a/fa, "colonialism in all its manifestations"
was condemned, specific support being declared for the Indonesian position in the West Irian issue. 88
In these Joint statements the Bandaranaike government's
concern over nuclear stockpiling had also been repeatedly
expressed. the "immediate suspension" of atomic and hydrogen
bomb testing had been called for, and the harmful effects of
nuclear testing by all the nuclear powers had been deplored.
Sri Lanka's policy on t11ese issues was expressed with much
_greater force by Mrs Bandaranaike at conferences of non.aligned nations held in Belgrade in 1961 and in Cairo in 1964.
Indeed, the final declaration of the Cairo conference incorporat,ed three specific proposals which had been suggested by Sri
Lanka: :first, that the concept of nuclear free zones should be
extended to cover areas and oceans which had hitherto been
free of nuclear weapons; second, that all non-aligned nations
should take immediate action to close their ports and airfields
to ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or which are
-equipped for nuclear warfare; third, that colonial powers
should not only undertake to liquidate existing bases in colonial territories, but that they should refrain from establishing
in colonial territories new bases which could be used for aggressive purposes.80 In implementation of this policy, Sri Lanka
not only refllsed refuelling facilities to Soviet aircraft going to
Indonesia as part of the USSR's aid to that country in its confrontation against Malaysia, but also denied facilities to UK
.and US aircraft going on military missions to Malaysia. 9 0 In
August 1963, Sri Lanka not only signed the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, but also urged the original parties to the treaty to
:abandon underground tests and other governments to work towards this end and to bring about a treaty on total disarmament. 91
SLFP policy, especially as it evolved under the government
of1,'-Irs Bandaranaike, became more outspoken in its anti-pact""
antt-colonialist and anti-militarist approach ~o foreign policy.
106
At the end of 1963, this government refused permission to the

United States Seventh Fleet to enter Sri Lanka territorial
waters and protested against the presence of this fleet in the
Indian Ocean. At a banquet in her honour in Peking in January 1963, Mrs Bandaranaike declared:
The nations that have newly emerged in Asia and Africa
n1ust stand together in their struggles or must run the risk
of succumbing once more to the rapacious designs of
the West. The old saying that united we stand divided we
fall applie, with equal force to nations as it does to individuals. The spirit of Bundung is in part a crystallisation of
this thought. The seven years that have elapsed since that
historic conference have seen the birth of nations which
like ourselves shook off the shackles of colonialism and
enjoy once more the sovereignty that is rightly theirs.'"
TJ1e indictment of the "rapacious West" in this speech led
commentators to consider Sirimavo Bandaranaike's non-alignment policy to be different from that of her husband and
oriented in favour of the communist countries. However, while
this speech was largely meant as an expression of Sri Lanka's
anti-co]onialism, on which Sri Lanka governments had always.
held strong views, there is no doubt that relations with the
West during Sirimavo Bandaranaike's regime became considerably strained.
The Oil Nationalisation and the Suspension of United States'
Economic Aid
One of the principal factors in the deterioration of relations.
between Sri Lanka and the U.S.A. during the regime of Mrs
Bandaranaike was the nationalisation of the importation and
distribution of oil in Sri Lanka.
The import and distribution of oil in Sri Lanka had been
a monopoly of three foreign companies-Caltex and Sta~d.ard
Vaccum which were American, and Shell, which was Bnttsh.
While 80% of Sri Lanka's oil requirements were imp~rted by
these companies from Middle Eastern countries, thepnces payable related not to the cost of production on oil in these coun-
107
tries but to monopolistic posted prices obtaining in the Gull

of Texas. In 1961, in an effort to reduce the import cost of oil
and to save foreign exchange, the Government of Sri Lanka
set up the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation with the object of
importing oil from other sources of supply, such as the USSR
and UAR. The Government took the view that the oil business
in Sri Lanka was already highly overcapitalized, therefore,
instead of providing for new storage and distribution facilities,.
the Corporation was empowered to
(a) requisition a part of the existing oil import and distribution facilities in the island;
(b) pay compensation for the facilities taken over, tho
amount payable to be determined by a Tribunal;
(c) control the price at which petroleum products weresold.t1a
After the establishment of the Corporation, however, it
was found that the price of its own purchases of oil from such
sources as the USSR, UAR and Rumania were substantially
lower than of the foreign Oil Companies. Accordingly on 27
February 1963 the government gazetted maximum c.i.f. prices
re]ating to imports of petroleum products. The Oil Companies,
however, protested that it was quite impossible for them to
import oil at the c.i.f. prices fixed by the government. Accordingly, as a temporary measure, the Oil Companies were allowed
a foreign exchange quota for 6 months based on their share ol
the market in each oil product, but valued at the Corporation
c.i.f. prices. 111
This policy made it necessary for the Corporation to have
additional storage and distribution facilities from the oil companies. However, since the latter were unwilling voluntarily
to give any additional facilities to the Corporation and had
expressed their dissatisfaction at the foreign exchange quota
and their inability to import oil at or below the maximum
c.i.f. prices, the government deemed themselves to be absolved
of an earlier guarantee given that nationaUsation of oil was not
intended by the establishment of the Corporation, which wou]d
compete on a fair basis with the companies. As Minister M_
Senanayake stated in Parliament:
108

The companies refer to an assurance given by the Gover~
nment that its objective was not to eliminate the private
companies or nationalize petroleum. The U.S. Government
refers to an assurance given by the government that the oil
companies would be permitted to operate in Ceylon on the
basis of fair competition. While it is true that the original
intention of the Government was to set up an organization
to compete with the oil companies, circumstances had
changed so much during the last four months that the
government was compelled to take this vital decision. 95
In the circumstances the Government of Sri Lanka decided

<>Y the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (Amendment) Act of
1963, to vest in the Corporation, with effect from I January
1964 (or earlier if necessary), the sole and exclusive right of
importing, exporting, sellingt supplying and distributing certain
.specified petroleum products. 96
:Reaction of the United States Government

The partial take-over, under the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act of 1961, of some assets and facilities of the three
foreign oil companies in Sri Lanka had been effected in AprilMay 1962. In July, in reply to representations from the United
-States embassy in Colombo, the Sri Lanka government had
given the assurance that compensation would be paid and that
steps were being taken to expedite the assessment of compensa-tion and its payment for the assets and facilities taken over. 97
In the United States itself, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
had been changed by the Hickenlooper Amendment (incorporated as section 620 (e) of the Act), which came into effect on 1
August 1962, and which required the US President to suspend
,assistance to any country receiving US aid, if such country had,
after I January 1962, (a) nationa)ized or ex'propriated or
seized ownership or control of property owned by any US
citizen, or by any corporation, partnership or association, not
less than 50 per cent of which was owned by US citizens, or (b)
imposed discriminatory taxes, restrictive conditions etc.,
which had the effect of nationalising or expropriating property
:So owned, without the Hequitable and speedy" payment of

compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange
or without providing relief from such taxes. Appropriate steps
towards this end were to be taken within six months of the.
nationalisation, expropriation, etc., or of the enactment of the
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act whichever was later~
and the President had the discretionary power of resuming aid
if appropriate steps in this sense were in fact being taken.
On 29 October 1962, the US embassy drew the attention
of the Government of Sri Lanka to these provisions oftbe
Foreign Assistance Act. Since the latter had accepted in
principle the liability to compensation (the procedures for payment ofwhicb had been incorporated in section 46 and 47 of
the Act of 1961), and even agreed to the request of the companies that compensation should be paid as a lump sum, there
did not appear any valid reason why Sri Lanka should have
been brought within the purview of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Indeed, in December I 962, the Sri Lanka Government
published the statutory notice giving the companies one month
notice for submission of claims. But on the 24th of the same
month, the US embassy presented a Note stating that the compensation Tribunal should evaluate all the properties and rights,
"both tangible and intangible" of the oil companies in accordance with ''accepted principles of international ]awH~ or provide for a fair evaluation by other ways such as arbitration. 98
\Vhile the Government of Sri Lanka accepted the necessity for
a speedy and equitable payment of compensation, it took the
view that the principles of assessment as ]aid down in section
46 and 47 of the Act of 1961 were not inconsistent with international law/m and that, regarding ccintangible rights", ifby
such were meant that Sri Lanka should pay compensation for
business goodwill or that the facilities taken over should be
evaluated as going concerns, such a concept was unacceptable to,
Sri Lanka. The United States, however, could not agree that
the criteria for assessment under section 46 and 47 were necessarily consistent with established principles of international
law, or that they satisfied the conditions set out in section 620
(e) of the US Foreign Assistance Act. 100 The US Government
adhered to the uestablished principle of international law that
in evaluating expropriated property all elements or interests. ol
value which make up the total worth of the property must be
110
-evaluated and compensated." 101 The Government of Sri Lanka

were required, before I February 1963, to submit the matter
to an independent arbitrator, or to initiate the seiection of
arbiters, and the procedure for arbitration. The Sri Lanka
Government could hardly comply with this request, which was
communicated on 20 January 1963. On 8 February, Sri Lanka
was informed that sanctions under the Foreign Assistance Act
had been imposed and that US aid was suspended. The Government of Sri Lanka thereupon called off all negotiations for the
payment of lump-sum compensation; a compensation Tribunal
was not appointed until the end of September.
Sri Lanka's Reaction to the Suspension of US Aid

Among political parties in Sri Lanka, a wide consensus
prevailed on the question of the suspension of US aid to Sri
Lanka: it was universally condemned. The strictures ranged
from the UNP's characterisation of the suspension as being
"too hasty"102 to the CP's denunciation, of the US action as
being a "crude attempt to use its so-called aid as a political
weapon to coerce the Government and people of Sri Lanka
into obeying its dictates'' and "to interfere in our internal
affairs, undermine our sovereignty and insult our national selfrespect."103 The United States, declared the MEP leader
Philip Gunewardena, "is a rich, big, powerful, bull" .101 The
former Prime Minister and leader of the LPP, W.Dahanayake,
-0nly condemned the action oftbe United States government, not
as being contrary to the spirit of international practice and the
rule of international law, but also as flouting "the courtesies and
decencies of international conduct." 105 On behalf of the Fede-'
Tai Party, S.J. V.Chelvanayakam stated that under her law Sri
Lanka had every right to take over the oil companies, though
he recognised that the United States, too, had every right,
under her law, to suspend aid.100 The general view, which
found expression in the UNP's J.R.Jayewardena, was that the
Petroleum Corporation Act had laid down ''a very fair and
just -irl.ethod for the assessment of compensation..''107 Even the
New York Times was critical of United States policy on this
issue. 108 Although Sri Lanka became the first instance of its
application, the Hickenlooper Amendment had been specifi-
.Sri Lanka and the TVesl
Ill
cally directed against Brazi1; also, the suspension of US aid was

not to app1y to aid in food. 109 The Sri Lanka government
.anticipated a foreign exchange saving of approximately Rs.22
million as a result of the nationalisation, and this would have
partially offset the loss in economic assistance. But the nationalisation question led to deterioration of Sri Lanka's relations,
not only with the United States and Britain, th6 power chiefly
-concerned in this question, but with the West genera11y.
In January 1964, the Sri Lanka government impounded a
consignment of the American Time magazine, which contained
an article derogatory to the Prime Minister. 110 The next month
.an East German goodwill mission arrived in Sri Lanka, and
negotiated the raising of the status of the existing Trade
Mission to that of a Consulate-General of the German Demo,cratic Republic in Colombo. The Sirima Bandaranaike government adhered to this decision despite protests from the British
.and French diplomatic missions in Colombo, and a threat by
West Germany to suspend economic assistance.:1 11 The Presi-dent of the IBRD declared that the World Bank would grant
no loans to Sri Lanka on account of the inadequacy of compensation proposed for nationalised foreign assets. 112 These events,
.and the official visit of the Chinese premier Chou En-lai to Sri
Lanka in February 1964, appeared to confirm an impression,
which gained gro.und both in local and foreign circles, tbat the
SLFP government had deviated from a policy of strict nonalignment and had come under the sway of the communist
powers. As seen in the last chapter, the negotiation of the
Maritime Agreement with China was held up by critics as
further evidence of.communist influence, and the inclusion of
three Trotskyite ministers in the government in the middle of
1964 seemed to mark the nadir of western influence in the
island. That there was a shift away from the West in foreign
policy during this period is evident, though it was not a shift from
non-alignment as such. The Sirima Bandaranaike government's
.adherence to a non~alignment policy had been reiterated at the
Cairo conference in 1964, and nonwinvolvement with power
blocs, opposition to armaments and anti-colonialism remained
essential elements of the island's foreign policy, It remained
true however, that increase in Chinese influence was used as
-One of the main arguments against the government by opposi-
112
Foreig11 Policy of Sri Lanka
tion partie~ at the general election of March 1965; and Sirima

Bandaranatke herself, in what must be regarded as a referenceto the United States, ascribed her defeat at these elections tothe collaboration of foreign and local vested interests.113
NOTES and REFERENCES

'-See, e.g., R.M. Harney, .. ,The Foreign Policy of Ceylon Under
Two Premiers", Australian Outlook, 14 : 69.
H. of R. Deb., (1950), Vol. 8, col. 487.
3Jbid., col, 293.
Ibid. (1951), Vol. 10, coll. 1012-13. Asked by an Opposirion
member of Parliament whether the government would also permit thedistribution of Marxist literature in the same way, a government spokesman answered in the negative, the reason advanced being that we,
are prodemocratic and anti-communist".
5 Ibid. (1950), Vol. 8, col. 8.
GCeylon Daily News, 10 January 1951, p. 7.
7D.S. Scnanayake declared in Parliament in 1941: "1 feel that we
cannot get a greater friend than Britain. I say that deliberately nnd I
hope that every Member, every person in this country, would realise
what that friendship would mean to us/' H. of R. Deb., Vo}. 3, col. 83.
8Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government (Cambridge,
1956), pp. 50-51.
9Jn February 1955, for example, C. Suntharalingam, an Independent M.P., gave notice of a motion of No Confidence in the Go\ernment of its failure to terminate the Defence Agreement with Britain,
The same month, a Ceylonese daily The Morning Times commented
that the question of the continuation of British bases in Ceylon should
be reviewed. In May the same year the Colombo Municipal Council
passed a resolution calling upon the government to end its Defence
Agreement with Britain. See The Times, 11 February 1955; Asfan
Recorder, Vol. 1 (7), p. 73, and Vol. L (20), p. 222.
lON. Mansergb, The Multi-Racial Commonweallli (London, Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1955), p. 37.
llK.P. Krishna Shctty, .. Ceylons Foreign Policy: Emerging_
Patterns of NonAlignment .. , South Asian Studies, 1 : 6, April 1966.
12Ceylon Dafiy News, 23 January 1951.
13Asiart Recorder, Vol. 1 (8), p. 85.
1,rsee, H, of R, Deb., (1948), Vol. 4, coll. 2007-0Sj ibid. col. 1060.
11b;d., (1950) Vol. 8, con. 1856-60.
1 6 T/ie Times, 24 April 1954, p, 6,
11Tfie Times, 24 December 1948; for D.S. Senanayake's statement
on the subject, H. of R. Deb., (1949) Vol, 5, col. 198. For report of
Sri Lanka and the JVest
113
tbc speech of S.W.R.D. Bandnranaike, Sri Lanka delegate to the Delhi

Conference, see Ceylon Daily News, 22 Janua:r~ 1949.
l8Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on lrrtemation"l Affairs, 1954, (London, Oxford Univerr.ity Press) 1957, pp. 166-69.
This group of five states came to be referred to, at this time, as the
Colombo Powers.
. ...
l9See pp. 100 infra.
:ocommonwcalth Meeting on Foreign Affairs, January 1950.
Minutes of Meetings and Memoranda. Ec011omi'c Policy ,,, South and
South-East Asfa: Memormulum by the Australian Delegation. Colombo,
Government Press. 1950.
21/bid, Draft Resolt1tio,i submitted by the Mbtistry of Finance,
Sri Lanka.
22Thc original members of The Colombo Plan were Australia,
Canada, Sri Lanka, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United
Kingdom~ together with Malaya and British Borneo. Subsequently,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan
and the Pl1ilippincs joined as full members of the Plan, while the
United States, which already in 1950 had assistance programmes in
operation in the area, attended as a full member of. the meeting of
the Consultative Committee from 1951.
23New York Times, 3,August 1954, p, 3.
2 4 Tllc Times, 5 August 1954, p. s.
2GNew York Times, 6 August 1954, p. 3.
26Jbid., 5 August 1954, p. 2,
27Jbid, 12 August 1954
2.BJbid., 14 August 1954, p. 4.
'2. 9 The Times, JO September 1954, p. 7.
:JOJbid., December 28, 1954, p. 6.
:nsir John Kotalewela, "Ceylon as Switzerland in Asian, New
Commonwealth, 29 : 316, 4 April 195S.
3 ~Asi"arz Recorder, Vol. 1 (8). p. 8S.
:1 3 Ibid,
!l<t'Jloyal Institute of International Affairs, S11ney of Imernational

Affairs, 1954, (London: Oxford University Press, 19S1) p. 288. For
Communist leader.P. Keuneman's views on SEATO, see H. of R. Deb.,
(1954) Vol. 20, coll. 35-37.
35Ncw York Times, 17 May, 1954, p. 2.
36 Ibid., 6 August 1954, p. 3.
31Tfte Times, 10 September 1954, p. 7.
tBThc Indian expenditure 10n armaments rose from 30 million
pounds sterling in 195S to 90 million pounds sterling in 1957. See
Morgcnthau, ..Alliances''. Conj/11ence, 6: 327~28, Winter,
_i;~~~-
as Ibid,, p. 333.
40
Unitcd Stntcs Department of State, Point Four General Agreement ~
for Tcclmical Cooperatlon betwet.~11 Ceylon and the United States of
Amerz"ca, Treaties and other International Acts series 2138.
114
Forcig11 Policy of Sri Lanka

1
\Villinm A, Drown, Jr. and Rcdvcrs Opie, Amcric'mt I'mdcn

..rfa,ttmmrr (Wnshmp,ton: the Brookings lnslilnlion J953) p JGS
42 lb/d., p. 257,
'

.
."
fjJbld.
UNc1r York Times, U October 1951. I' 4,

.f!JJ71e Tlmc.s, 19 January J9S.3, p. S;
.SGSec United S1ntC$ Scnnlc, Committee on Government Operations

Pcrman~nl Sub~Commlttcc on Invc:stign,tions, Contnil of Tiat!c with
the So\'1ct Bloc. Jr11alm lkport, 83rd Congress, 1st Sc,;sion, 1953, p. n.
4
),:V':' ~Por Government Pres;,; communique on the subject sec TIie
Tlmn, 26 F:1brunry l9S3,
11 M::iy 1954, p. nnd 13 Mny 1954, p. 4 .
~;;~;\.~;~rJ. Tunes,
.G\lNtu York T,mcs, 2 Dcccmb~r 195,t, p. 5.

al/bid,
>:Jl,id., 6 March 1955, p. 35,
~Ibid., 12 Mnrch 1956, p. 7.
:au.s. Department or State, Ecmmmir As.ristmrrc to Ceylon.

Acramr11t bell cm tltr Unit((/ Stairs of America and Ceylon. Treaties
and Other lntcrn:i.lionnl Acts, !;Cries 3SS4.
lDNrw l'orJ.. Tim('s, 8 Fcbrunry 1957, p, S,
:;-f.Scc, for cxnmple, Jf. (}IR. Deb., (19.53) VoJ. J4, col, 509.
:;':'Sec, U.S. Nell's and World Report, 40 : 61, 20 April 1956.
li~Scc:, JJ'ec/..ly Times, (Colombo) 27 No\'embcr 1957~ r,. 2.
611 Quott:d in H.C. Tnussig, .. CC)']on in the New \Vorld", Eastern
JVorhl, 11 : 13, 1-ifnrch 1957,
r.nNrw York Times, 22 November 1956, p. SL
r.tT/w Times, 7 July 1956, p. 6,
G2]\'nr York Timts, 8 June J9S1. p. 3,
t.'JJT,itf., 16 October l9S7.
MJbid., 26 May 1957,
""'The Timrs, 6 July 19SG. Jn an -address to the Commonwealth
l'arliamr:nlnry Conference held in New Delhi on 2 December 1957,
Dandnrn.naike dcclnrcd thnt '"when history :sums up the contribution
of the British people to civiti7ation and to human welfare, it will say
that their chief contribution l>Jl'> been lhc dcvc]o_prncnt of the spirit of
democracy ,through broad fonm nnd machinery which l11cy 11ave
devised for the purpose-the parliamentary system of Government".
Department of Information, The rorC'igu Pofi<'J' of Ccy/a,r-Extracts
from Stat!'numts by tl:c Pdmc J.fir,lstcr, the lion. S.1V.R.D, Bmufnranaike
(Colombo, Government Press, 1958) 2nd ed., p, 55.
GGNcw York Times, 25 March J9S7, p. 24.
'7I{. of R, J>,b, (1956), Vol, 26, coll. 14042,
"5New York Times, 1 August 1956, p. 3.
6 r1Jbid. 10 August 1956, p. 3.
'H. of R, D,b., (1956), Vo]. 26, col. 140.
11Ncll' York Times, 19 August 1956, p. 2.
'1!!.Jb,"d,, 22 August 1956, p. J.
115
73Jbfd., 14 September I9S6. p, 6.

'4H. of JI_. Deb., (1956) Vol. 26, coll. 1404!.
15New York Times, 1S September 1956, p. 2; 16 September 1956',
p. 7.
1~Jbid., J November 1956, p. t,:i..
'71Jbid., 2 November 1956, p. 13.
18Jbitl.
19Jbid.
sounited Natio11s Re,iew, 3: 1, December 1956.

S1New York Times. J l November 1956, p. 29,
S'.!Jbid., 15 November 1956, p. 14.
S3Jbfd., 23 November 1956, p. 8.
MJbid,, 5 December 1956, p. IS.
S'iiUnited Nations Rc1icw, 3 : 54, January 1951.
S6Tfte Hmdt,, 20 May 1957.
S7New York Tlmes, 2 February 1958, p. 3,
ssweekly Times, 29 January 1958* p. 1.
secey/011 Daily News* 12 November 1964.
MScc The Statesmrm (New Delhi), 5 August 1964.
tllin a statement issued by the Ceylonese Ministry of Defence and
'External Affairs on tbc signing of the Test Ban Treaty Ceylon Govemmcnt"s position was clarified thus: Ceylon's position has ahvays been
that it would be.satisfied only with an agreement on totat disarmament.
However, the Government of Ceylon feels that the present Treaty is
an important first step to the ultimate wider goal, since it creates the
-psychological climate necessary for a ,vidcr agreement". For texts of
-staternenls issued by the Government of Ceylon on this issue, see H. of
R. Deb., (1963), Vol. 53, coll. 1167-68.
9ZCMna Today, February 1963, p. 12.
03For Minister T.B. Illangaratne's speech on the second reading of
the Ceylon Petrnleum Corporation Billt see H. of R. Deb., (196L) Vol.
42, coll. 437,Z et seq. Next to rice oil was the most important single
item of import to Sri Lanka. and the annual value of oil imports was
Rs. 150 million. Ibid., col. 4387.
9 'lJbid., (196'.3), vol. 52, coll. 133.5-53. Senate Deb. (1963), Vol. 18,
coll. 1766-67.
9 $H. of R. Deb.~ (1963), vol. 52, col. 1344.
" 8Aviation fuel and bunker oil were excluded from the provisions of
1hc Act.
t17Sec statement of Finance Minister P.B.G. Kalugalla in H. of R .
.Deb., (20 February 1963), Vol. 50, coll 1635-43.
fJSJbitf.
MThe principles which should govern the payment of compensation

by Sri Lanka were laid down in section 47, which provided for the
payment or the actua1 price paid by the owners of the acquired
property, together with an additional amount for the value of improvc-n1cn1s, but less deduct.ion or a reasonable amount for depreciation. If
the purcbaso price paid by the owner was not ascertainable, the law
Foteign Policy of Sri lanker

provided for the payment of the market price.
lOOH. of R. Deb., (1963), .Yo]. 50, co]. 1640.
101Jbid.
lO'JJfo"d., coll. 2033-61 for speech of J.R. Jayawardena. The UNP
leader Dudley Senanayake declared 1hat the US would be '"well
advised to take some lessons in the manner of dealing with these
questions from other nations in the world who have done so for a
much longer time and who would, I think, certainly not have rushed,
in this hasty manner. . . . " ibid., col. 2156.
103Jbid., col. 2093.
10-lJbid. co]. 2133,
I05Ibid., co]. 2010.
10GJbfd.,, coll, 2089-91.
10'1 Ibid., col. 2048.
108New York Times, 16 February 1963, p. 6,
lOtJJbid., 9 February 1963, p. 2.
llOJbid, 23 January 1964, p. 7.
Ill[bid., 11 February 1964, p. 43.
112/bjd., 11 September 1964, p, 43.
1.1ssee ,Report of Mrs Bandaranaikc's Presidential address to the-15th annual sessions of the SLFP, in The Ceylon Obsener, 21 July
1961.
5
Continuity and Change in
Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy
1965-1970
\Vith the defeat of the Sirima Banda-ranaike government at

the polls in March I 965, Dudley Senanayake was appointed
Prime Minister (for the fourth time) at the head of a UNP
dominated coalition government, which inclutled the Tamil
Federal Party and the erstwhile Trotskyist leader Philip
Gune,,1ardena.
In its policy pronouncements. the Scnanayake government
declared its adherence to non:..alignment and friendship with
all nations as the guiding principle of its foreign relations. On
specific colonial issues, for example; continuity with the pre--vious governmenCs policy was certainly preserved. The new
government also reaffirmed the previous regime"s commitments
towards bringing about general disarmament. On the question
of China's admission to the UN, contlnuity with the earlier
policy was again m:iintained, the Senanayake Government
holding that this involved not the admission ofa new member
but the recognition of the rights ofa long-standing member of
the international body. On important issues such as Vietnam,
Rhodesia, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, also, policy orientations
initiated earlier were in many respects maintained. Where the
"Ilew govcrnm~nt diverged sharply from its predecessor were in
its _general attitude to communism and communist countries, in
118
Foreign l'o/icy of Sri Lanka
particulnr in its bi-lntcral relations with China, on the one hand

and its international alignment vis-a-vis the \Vest, and in parti:
cular, in its bi . .Jatcral rclntions with the United Statcs,on the
other.
The advent of the Dudley Scnanayake government did not
l1crnld a complete return to the nnti-communism of the prc1956 period, but relations with the communist world did deteriorate ~tcndily, culminating in the near breakdown of relations
with the Peoples Republic of China. In April 1965, soon after
the 3ssumption of office by the new government, three communist cmba:isics in Colombo were requested to reduce their
staffs to the barest minimum and the External Affairs Ministry
refused. to renew the expired residence visas of two members of
tl1c Chinese embassy. The l\tinistry nlso refused entry visas to
two Indonesian Communist Party members who desired to
aucncl the communist.sponsored Ceylon Pia.ntations \Vorkcrs 1
Union Conference held the same month. 1 The new government
a1so reimposed the earlier ban on the importation of communist
literature 10 Sri Lankn, which hnd been annulled in 1956.
The government's attitude to China hnd already been
predetermined by virtue of the foe( that the Maritime Trenty
with China had already been made the subject of party political
debate during the course oftl1e 1965 general election campaign,
when Mr. Scnanayake alleged that Mrs. Bandarnnaike's government J1ad enterc<l into n. secret agreement with Chinn to lease
Trincomalcc to the Chinese so that they might use it as a stepping stone to invade lndfo.1? Mrs, Bnndnrnmdke denied that her
government entered jnto a secret agreement of any kind with
China. She pointed out in a press communique that the :Mari
time Agreement had not only been made public, but that it had
actually been tabled in Parliament in August, 1963.' Further,
the then Parliamentary Secretary to the 1'.finistry ofE;i;tcrnal
Affairs and Defence, 1vfr. Felix Dias Bnndnranaikc had pointed
out in Parliament that it wns n purely commercial agreement
dealing with commercial vessels engaged in cargo and passenger
services to and from the two countries or from a third country.
He had elucidated:
Most favoured nation treatment is granted by this agreement
to the contracting parties. This means nothing more nor
Continuity and Change ill Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy
119
less than that we would grant to China the same treatment

that we would grant to other nations in respect of taxes,
dues, and charges on vessels and other Customs and
quarantine formalities.
In the event of war, the terms of the agreement, like that
of any other, will be subject to review depending on the circwnstances then prevailing.4
The Agreement, which required six months notice of termination, referred to vessels of the two countries, not specifically
to commercial vessels, which was the reason for sparking off.
the controversy, and which led newspaper editors to speculate
that the agreement had repudiated the policy of non-alignment,
and gave China the right to send warships to Sd Lanka ports,
and make use of their facilities. 5 In retrospect, the controversy
is now purely academic, for the Senanayake government did
not annul the agreement after it assumed office, and allowed it
to operate during their entire tenure of power up to 1970.
However, the controversy over the agreement set the tone
of the new administration's relations with China, which was
marked by acrimonious debate, allegation and counter-alleg- .,
ation during the next five years.
The diplomatic denouement commenced with the intrusion
of Labour Minister 1VI.H. Mohamed to the realms of diplomacy when he addressed a protest to the Chinese embassy in
Colombo, regarding the alleged ill-treatment of China's Muslim
subjeots during the Cultural Revolution, by Chinese Red
Guards. When the Chinese embassy refused to entertain any
protests from the Minister, he issued a statement condemning
alleged Chinese atrocities against Muslims. This was fo1lowed
by a stronglywworded Chinese protest note to the External
Affairs Ministry, decL'lring that utbe Ceylon Government
should bear an unshirkable responsibility for Mr Mohamed's
statement because he is a Ministcr." 6 Rejecting the Chinese
note, however, the Prime Minister took up the position that
the lvlinister had made a public statement, both in his individual capacity and as one of the leaders of the Muslim community
in Sri Lanka. Ironically enough, Sri Lanka's ambassador to
China was at this same time denying Chinese persecution of
120
A further stage in the deterioration of Sino-Ceylonese

relations was marked by an acrimonious dispute and Exchange
of Notes between the Chinese Embassy in Colombo and the
Government of Sri Lanka on the subject of the alleged pilferage
and confiscation of diplomatic goods consigned to the Chinese
Embassy. Tn a strongly worded Note addressed to the Ceylonese
Ministry of External Affairs and Defence, on 15th August,
1967, the Chinese Embassy protested against the pilferage and
destruction by uvfoious elemcntsu in the port of Colombo of
certain Chinese diplomatic goods, which included "a great
number of works, quotations and pictures of Chairman Mao".
Alleging connivance in the robbery by the Sri Lanka Government and customs authorities, the Note referred to the repeated
antiChina activities by the Sri Lanka Government during the
past two years, as evidenced by tl1e forcible examination of the
diplomatic articles of the Chinese Embassy, the withholding of
:rvfao badges, and the forfeiture and destruction of books and
periodicals from China.' Tlie Ceylonese External Affairs
Ministry rejected as "frivolous and absurd the Embassy's
unwarranted accusation that this petty pilferage was done with
the connivance and at the instigation of the Government of
Ceylon". 8 In Beijing, however, a body of Red Guards had
staged a four-hour demonstration against the Ceylonese
Embassy on 20th August, before the intervention of a unit of
the Chinesearmy. 0
Reverting to the Sri Lanka Government's alleged antiChina activities, in another Note handed over on 22nd August,
the Chinese Embassy declared:
It must be pointed out in all seriousness that since it came
to power, the present Ceylon Government. 7.aeaded by the
United National Party has been all along ve.ry barefaced in
following behind the US imperialist& to create "two
Chinas" and conniving at the Chiang banrit gang clem:nt's
dirty anti-China activities of hostility to,:.vards the Chmese
people, and has all along played with tl1 / counter-revolutionary dual tactics. 10
This outburst appeared to have been provoked by visits to

Sri Lanka of Chinese from Tahvan to participate in the Inter-
Cominnity and Change in Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy
r21
national Commission of Jurists, the Wor]d Maha Sangha Conw

ference, Lawn Tennis Championships as well as to make a,
survey of the Ceylonese tea industry; and by visits of Ceylonese
to Taiwan to attend the Asian Confederation of Chambers of
Commerce, to study scientific methods of sowing paddy, and so
on, all of which were alleged to have been carried out "either
with the approval and support of the Ceylon Government, or
directly and openly by the Ceylon Government itself." 11 The
Ceylonese Prime Minister vehen1ently denied that he had
moved to a position of recognising two Chinas; on the contrary,
l1e himself had supported China's entry to the United Nations
while on a visit to the United States, and his representative in
the United Nations had himself pointed out that the question
at issue was not that of two Chinas" but the right of the
Peoples Republic of China to be accredited to the United
Nations. 12 "As far as we are concerned"~ said the Prime
1\rinister,
0
,vc want to be 011 the best of terms with China. But be it

China, t11c U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., or any other power, we
will not be bullied or badgered by anyone. 18
The next point in the diplomatic contest was tbe withholding of 300 badges with a profile of Mao Tse-tung by the
-Ceylonese customs authorities. In a protest note banded over
to the Ministry of External Affairs and Defence on 1st September, the Chinese Embassy demanded that the Ministry "enjoin
the Ceylon Customs authorities to deliver all the badges to the
Chinese Embassy, not short of a single one" .14 The Note had
added that "the presentation of these badges by tbe Chinese
Embassy to the friendly Ceylonese people is entirely a normal
function for promoting the friendship bet\veen the hvo peoples,
and is in full accord with internationti.l practice'\ 15 In the Sri
Lanka Government's view, however, nthe unauthorised disposal of imported articles by a foreign mission (was) totalJy at
variance with international law and practice and would constitute an interference in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.16
Besides, the Chinese Embassy was seeking clearance for 500
-other ~Iao badges. in addition to the 300 already awaiting
clearance at the Customs. The Sri Lanka Government decla1ed
122
Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka-
its inability to release any such badges uas are in excess of

the reasonable personal and official requirements of the
Embassy.17
This controversy gained momentum at a time when the
third Sino-Ceylonese Rice-Rubber Agreement, signed in 1962,
was nearing its expiry date, and doubts both in official and
unofficial quarters in Sri Lanka whether China would, in fact
renew the agreement which had been orjginally negotiated bv a
government headed by Dudley Senanayake himself, appea~ed
to find support in the language of the Chinese Embassy's
Notes, which had referred to the impossibility of ensuring the
normal functioning of trade between the two countries in the
prevailing political context. Indeed, Ceylon Daily News was led
to comment that:
The malevolence of the Chinese attitude in the current
Sino-Ceylon Hcrisis'' must prove to all but the naive, the
committed-and the dedicated-that we as a people can no
longer remain subservient to foreign food suppliers.1 8
While stating that the Sri Lanka Government's reactions to the
Chinese protests were conditioned by the fear that a stronger
attitude on. its part might well have resulted in non-renewal of
the trade agreement, this journal recognised that such an
eventuality "would make our national food problems more
acute than ever before and, in the process, p]ace the Nationa L
Government in a position of embarrassing political discomfiture" .19 The Sri Lanka Government's attitude to the question
of joining the Association of South East Asian Nations, too,
appeared to have been influenced by the necessity for renewing
the trade agreement with China. The Sun~ quoting "informed
political and diplomatic sources"' in Colombo, reported t1iat at
a meeting between the Ceylonese Minister of Trade and Commerce and Chinese representatives in Sri Lanka, the latter had
indicated that the renewal of the agreement would depend on
Sri Lanka staying out of ASEAN. The Trade Minister was
reported to have iinmediately communicated China's views on
ASEAN to Dudley Senanayake, who was then on a state visit
to Malaysfa.20 Since in Ceylon,s prevailing economic context
the renewal of this agreement was a matter of great importance,
Continuity and Change ln Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy
123
there was ground for believing that Sri Lanka's non-participation

in ASEAN, in whicll the Prime Minister had expressed considerable interest, was due to Chinese opposition to this organisation. In November 1967, the trade agreement with China was
renewed for a further five year term.
Even more significant in the shift of emphasis in the
Scnanayake governmcnes foreign policy was the new attitude
to the United States. Soon after coming to power in March
1965, this government affirmed its intention of negotiating with
the nationalised oil companies to resolve the question of the
scale and quantum of compensation to be paid to them. In
June, 1965, an agreement was signed with the United States,
unde:r the terms of which Sri Lanka agreed to pay, over a period
of five years, a sum of Rs. 55 million to the companies. The
government gave high priority to the normalisation of relations
with the United States, particularly with a view to resumption
of economic assist:1.nce from that country in the context of the
Island's economic difficulties, and US economic assistance was
resumed under an agreement signed in February, 1966. Prime
Minister Senanayake's visits to several western countries,
including the United States~ and restimption of aid to Sri Lanka
from the World Bank, after the oil nationalisation crisis, were
also indicative of the changed atmosphere in Sri Lanka's foreign
relations. It would appear that Prime Minister Senanayake was
seriously considering joining the Association of South~east
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, and he discussed the matter
with the Prime 1v!inister of Malaysia during the course of a visit
to that country the same year. He dropped the idea, however,
because of the vehemence of the criticism of Opposition parties
to the idea, and probably also because the fate of the rencnal
of the rubber-rice agreement with China depended upon it.
US Economic Assistance & Relations with the World Bank

Following upon the agreement with the United States in
June 1965 determining the scale and quantum of compensation
payments to the nationalised oil companies, Sri Lanka was
again considered eligible to be the recipient of US economic
assistance. In February 1966, an agreement was signed with
the US 1!Y wbich Sri Lanka obtained a $ 7.5 million loan to
124
Foreign Polley of Sri Lanka
help finance the import of essential commodities for industrja]

and agricultural development. A further Food for Peace
agreement under US Public Law 480 was signed between the
two countries in March, 1966. Under this agreement, the US
.agreed to provide 50,000 metric tons of wheat flour and 5000
metric tons of corn grain sorghum (worth $ 4.1 million).
Payment for these commodities was to be made in Ceylon
rupees, and 70 %1 of the counterpart funds thus obtained was
to be made available to the Sri Lanka Government in the form
of long-term loans for development projects.
The change of emphasis in Sri Lanka's foreign policy
implied in these agreements is further highlighted by consideration of resumption of aid from the World Bank, and the increasing influence which the Bank came to exercise over the domestic
policies of the Sri Lanka government during this period. The
resumption of World Bank aid benefitted Sri Lanka to the
extent of$ 50,000 a year, organised through the agency of an Aid
Ceylon Club. But continuation of the annual commitment
involved conformity with the Bank's wishes that food subsidies
should be reduced, that greater opportunity for private initiative
be given both in domestic and international investment, that
public investment proposals be screened more carefully, and
"that there be a rationalisation of economic policies generalJy,
.so that domestic production could be increased and current
account deficits in the balance of payments could be reduced
over a period of time.
In accordance with these proposals, Sri Lanka cut the rice
subsidy in 1966, and devalued the Ceylon rupee by 20% in 1967.
The World Bank commented that the cut in the rice subsidy
"which was a substantial fiscal burden absorbing roughly a
,quarter of the revenue of the government of Ceylon was
encouraging evidence of the Governmenes determination to do
what is necessary to establish conditions conducive to economic
growth." 21 Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake defended the
devaluation of the Ceylon rupee as being Hincvitable". According
to him "The rupee was devalued. It bas been overvalued for
sometime. This is clearly evidenced by black market transactions.
... The case for devaluation was strong before the UK de~
-valued. After the_ (UK) devaluation, it was stronger." 22 The
Parliamentary opposition, led by the SLFP, however, condemned
Continuity and Change in Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy
12S:
the devaluation measure as a surrender to the dictates of the

World Bank. Mr. Felix Dias Bandaranaike, characterising the
government as having ''devalued our sovercjgnty to the IMF'',
declared that the devaluation foUowed from an IMF warning
tlmt if it did not do so, its credits would be in danger. 23 That
the IMF was satisfied ,with the direction and achievement of
Sri Lanka's economic policies during this period is evident from
its report to the Aid Consortium in Paris in March 1969, which,
covering the "Current Economic Position and Prospects of
Ceylon,,, commended especially the work of the Ministries ol
Agriculture, Industries and Planning and Economic Affairs
concluding that "tl1ere is Jitt]e doubt that Ceylon is a creditworthy borrower." 2.i
The devaluation of the Ceylon rupee was followed, in May
1968, by the introduction of an exchange reform scheme, the
Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificate Scheme (REECS)
which entailed a further devaluation of the rupee by 44% covering about a quarter of Sri Lartka's international transactions and
elimination of import. control for about 15% of Sri Lanka's
imports, primarily indpstrial raw materials and some machinery
and spares. These steps were commended by the IMF as being
important for rationalising the price mechanism and using it
for more effective..resource allocation than before. The IMF
noted a]so that the economic policies of the Senanayake government since '1965 had resulted in accelerating economic growth,
especially in the 1nunufncturing sector. It was noted, for
example, that the rate of growth of GDP had, in 1967, for the
first time in three years exceeded "by a significant amount" the
rate of population growth, and that in 1968 "the rate of growth
of GDP appears to have accelerated to about 6 or 7%/'25
This report was-written in pre-election year, which also bailed
the "green revolution achieved under Senunayake~s stewardship. The massive electoral defeat of the Senanayake gover,nment in the May 1970 general elections showed, however, how
little these achievements counted in the voting behaviour of the
newly enfranchised young and uncommitted voter, who reacted
to continuing unemployment, especially among graduates, and
to the rice subsidy cuts and rising cost of living, by returning
the opposition United Left Front with a two-thirds majority toParJiament.
U6
Large-scale western economic assistallce began to come in

to Sri Lanka for the first time under the administration of
Dudley Senanayake (1965-70) and this was certainly an
important factor determining the direction of Sri Lanka's
foreign policy during this period. Of the US S 200 million granted to Sri Lanka by way of economic assistance by the United
States during the period 1950-1970, more than half was received
by Sri Lanka during the 5-yearperiod 1965-70. That Sri Lanka's
foreign policy veered sharply towards the West has been noted
in the above pages. Yet on specific international issues, such as
Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Czechoslovakian crisis
-of I 968, the Senanayake government endeavoured to pursue an
uncommitted stand, indeed in the Arab-Israeli conflict affirming
a position no different from that of previous regimes. We now
proceed to examine Sri Lanka~s poJicy on these issues during
this period.
Attitude to the Vietnam Question
The Vietnam war was perhaps the single most important
international issue to which the Senanayake government had
to address itself after its assumption of office in March, 1965.
Not only was it an important issue internationa11y, but it
also had serious implications in the domestic political context
in Sri Lanka, because on this issue the government had to take
account of the opinion of important Buddhist pressure groups
as well as of student bodies in the country.
Soon after assuming office in March 1965, Prime Minister
Dudley Senanayake signed a joint appeal for peace in Vietnam,
made by 17 Head of states and Governments of non-aligned
-countries, in which the signatories affirmed their dedication "to
the principle of the inviolability of and respect for the sover~i
gnty and territorial integrity of states. " 25 The appeal was m
pursuance of the 1964 Cairo Declaration, and on this question
the government was maintaining continuity with the policy of
the previous administration. The joint appeal had urged the
parties directly concerned with the Vietnam War to start nego.
tiations as soon as possible, without posing any preconditions
so that a political solution to the prob1ems of Vfotnaro may be
:found. The joint appeal was made on !st April. On 10th
Co11tinuity and Change in Sri Lanka~s Foreign Policy
127
April, the Government of Sri Lanka issued a press statcme1:1t on

Vietnam in which it welcomed the statement of President
Johnson, made on 7th April, 1965, that the United States
Temained ready for unconditional discussions, in the search for
a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. The Government also wel-comed the pledge of the president, that until peace was achieved in Vietnam, the United States would do its best to prevent
the conflict from spreading. The Government hoped that the
other parties to the conflict would be of the same wind, and that
"there would now be an opportunity to have peace talk uin an
atmo5.phere conducive to a succe5sful outcome; namely, in the
.absence of all hostilities and without a further aggravation of
tension in the region". The Government hoped, further that
.. 'these discussions will pave the way for the establishment of a
reunified, independent Vietnam~ whose: peoples will be enabled
to exercise unfettered freedom, without any outside interference."
The expected peace talks did not materialise; on the
-other haild, the Johnson administration proceeded to escalate
the war in Vietnam with a view to brnging it to a speedy con~
,cJusion, and to holding peace negotiations from a position of
strength. A perhaps unintended result of the escalation of the
war was. the manner in which the administration of South
Vietnamese Premier Cao Ky conducted itself in regard to the
Buddhists of South Vietnam, permitting the occupation by
troops of places of religious worship, and the use of force on
monks and nuns, which resulted in a nun and others sacrific~
lng their lives.
The impact of these events on a predominantly Buddhist
country like Sri Lanka was only to be expected. The government came under strong pressure from the parliamentary opposition, from a large body of Buddhist opinion in the country,
as well a(from organised groups of students, to express itself
against the presence of American troops, and the regimes maintained by them, which they regarded as being responsible for
the plight of Buddhists in Vietnam.
On 30th May, Prime Minister Senanayake summoned the
U.S. Ambassador, and conveyed to him his own concern and the
-concern of the people of Sri Lanka at recent events reported
:fromSouth Vietnam affecting the Buddhists of that country. The
128
Forelgn Policy Of Sri Lankti
gist of the Prime Minister's message was that besides humanitarian considerations, there was the bond of common religion
between Sri Lanka and Vietnam, and that it was his hope that
the US Government would use its good offices with the administration of Premier Cao Ky to ensure that the Buddhist population and places-of worship were treated wjth due consideration, and that calm and confidence would be restored in the
crisis situation in ,South Vietnam.
On 30th June 1966, Prime Minister Senanayake expressed
bis deep concern over the US.Government's decision to bomb
oil installations in Hanoi and Haiphong. He declared;
My Govt considers that a solution of the Vietnam problem can only be a negotiated political settlement. I am
-aware that the United States Govt has made proposals
for unconditional negotiatiorts. I am also aware that the
Govt in Hanoi has put forward a four point proposal fornegotiations. In this background, I feel that an extension
of the bombing must inevitably harden positions and
retard the realisation of this objective of a negotiated peace.
It could further lead to a widening of the conflict with
serious implications for the peace of our region and the
wider wor]d community. Our distress is no less for the loss
of human life and the damage to civiI.ian property, which
must result-from these latest ,developments. I would urge
.on all parties directly'involved in this conflict that they act
with great restraint in the interests of peace and,bope that
the United States Govt will reconsider its decision and
-stop the Current extension of the areas ofbombing. 21
In July 1966, Senanayake sent a fact-finding mission,led by the
prominent Buddhist leader, scholar and diplomat, Dr. G.P.
Malalasekara, to inquire into the situation in Vietnapitwith particular reference to the Buddhists of that country.
Sri Lanka and the West Asian Crisis: June 1967
The renewal of hostilities between Israel and the Arab
countries in June 1967, the third Arab-Israeli war since 1948,
proved yet another foreign policy crisis wliich .bad 'important
Continuity and Change in Sri Lankds Foreign Policy
129
overtones for the domestic. polit~cs of Sri Lanka. Support of

the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict was inherent in the
Sri Lanka situation, not only because of the tradition established by Bandaranaike when he categorically denounced
the Franco-British-Israeli invasion of Egypt in I 957, but also
by virtue of the vital importance of the Arab market for the
island's tea trade. Another factor was that the Muslim element
of the Sri Lanka population was closely identified with the
Arab cause, and alienation of this minority was a political liability that no government of Sri Lanka could afford to incur.
The 1967 crisis which preceded the breakout of war was
-sparked off by disputes bet,veen the two sides as regards rights
of passage in the Gulf of Aquaba and the Straits of Tiran, over
which the UAR imposed a blockade, Israeli ailegations of terrorist raids on Israel originating in Syria, and Israers punitive
attack on Syria in April 1967. There was also a threat that
Israel would march on the Syrian capital of Damascus. In May
1967, the UAR requested the UN Secretary-General to withdraw the UNEF which was patrolling the UAR side of her
border with Israel, and following upon this, UAR forces
took up positions on their side of the border followed suit
by Isreal on her side of the border. The massive preemptive attack on the Arabs by Israeli forces early in June
took the Arab world completely by surprise, and was made
while UN authorities were trying hard to find a way out of
the impasse between the two sides. Within the space of six days,
Israel had gained complete mastery of the air and
Israeli ground forces had overrun the entire Sinai peninsula, a
portion of Jordan from Israers borders up to the Dead Sea,
and Syrian territory overlooking the Golan Heights. A ceasefire brought hostilities to an end after six days of their eruption,
with Isreal holding large territorial gains after their third con~
flict with the Arabs.
In early June 1967,just before the eruption of hostilities,
Prime 1\1.inisterSenanayake made a lengthy statement in Padia~
ment, outlining his government's position on the conflict, ,vhich
concentrated 1arge1y on the legalistic aspects of the disputes
at issue, and which contained lengthy quotations from UN
doc~~cnts on the subject. It concluded by affirming that '"the
positron of the Ceylon Government today is no different from
130
what it was in 1957" . 28 However, unlike the opposition parties

which unequivocal1y condemned Israel, and despite pressure
from Muslim elements within his own , Party, Senanayake
refrained from naming Israel as the aggressor in the conflict,
though he affirmed the government's position that any territory gained through hostilities should be returned. On July
4th, 1967~ Sri Lanka was one of 17 countries which sponsored
a Resolution in the UN General Assembly which noted that the
armed forces of Israel were in occupation of areas including
territories beloning to Jordan, Syria and the UAR, and called
upon Israel, inter alia, immediately all its forces to the positions
they held before June 5th, 1967. 53 voted for the resolution,
46 voted against and 20 nations abstained. Not getting the
required twothirds majority, the resolution was not adopted.
On this issue the main divergence between government and
opposition was on the issue of naming Israel as the aggressor in
the 1967 war.
Sri Lanka Attitude to the Czech Crisis: August, 1968
The Czechoslovak crisis of August 1968 also had important
implications for the domestic politics of Sri Lanka. The crisis
was the outcome of liberalisation and humanisation tendencies
which bad been set in motion in Czechoslovakia under the
leadership of the Dubcek regime, which were intended to abolish censorship and controls in respect of mass media of communication, to separate institutions of the Communist Party
and the National Front from state institutions (Dubcek's predecessor Novotny had held both the party Secretaryship as
we!l as post of President of the State), to bring about internal democracy in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in
the context of the general democratisation process, and to
establish workers' councils in factories. These tendencies
were viewed with strong disfavour by the Soviet Union
and her other Warsaw Pact partners in East Europe as being
likely to bring about a chain reaction in other Warsaw Pact
countries and as being a security threat to the whole defence
system of Eastern Europe. Early in August, an attempt was
made to patch up differences between Czechoslovakia and the
Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary at
Continuity and Change in Sri Lanka~s Foreign. Policy
131
a meeting which was held in Bratislava, which drew up what

was called the Danube Declaration. The Declaration provided
for a strengthening of the Warsaw Pact, but conceded that
each state was free to form its own political policies, provjded
the Communist Party remained the main power. This compromise, however, was not regarded by Czech leaders as involving
the reversal of their reform program. On the night of 30th
August, without prior warning, forces of the Soviet Union, East
Germany, Poland, Dulgaria and Hungary invaded Czechoslovalda, and by the 21st occupation of the entire country was
-complete.
The crisis had repercussions on the party political situation
in Sri Lanka, and came, to some extent, asan embarrassment to
the Senanayake government. In Sri Lanka, the Coalition
parties SLFP-LSSP-CP, signatories to the Common program,
found themselves in disagreement over the crisis. On 24th
August, the SLFP and LSSP issued a joint statement under the
"Signature of their party leaders which condemned "the invasion
and occupation of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia
and the subversion of the lawful Government by the armed
forces of the USSR, GDR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria",
and Jreitcratcd their attachment to the policy of non-alignment with any military or power bloc The other coalition
partner, the CP, however, was constrained to strike a subdued
note, stating, on 25th August, that "the unhappy events in
Czechoslovakia'" had caused great concern to the Communist
Party of Ceylon, which was alarmed by the counter-revolutionary activities" which were being developed in Czechoslovakia by right-wing and reactionary forces supported by impe-'
rialists and West German revancbists. The CP statement
concluded that it was "not yet clear that the situation in
Czechoslovakia had deteriorated to such an extent that the only
-possible step to defend Socialism was the despatch of troops by
the five Warsaw Treaty powersn. 29 The CP's reluctance to
condemn outdgltt the S0viet intervention. nearly disrupted the
unity of the coalition partners. The LSSP, true to its long-standing anti-Stalinist traditions, app1auded the Dubcek regimes reforms, and condemned the CP for its ambivalent attitude. Tn a
-statement issued on 10th Se!}tembet, 196%, the CP took 11p the
position that it was in the best interests of progressive forces,
132
Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka,
whenever disputes or conflicts arose in international relations.

.among states which these forces considered as their friends, to
do all that was in their power to help resolve these disputes orconOicts. The gist of the CP attitude to the crisis was expressed
in the following words:
All the states involved in the recent Czechoslovakian
events are members of the same socialist political alliance and the same military Warsaw Treaty. Under thesepolitical and military agreements, all these states assumed
collective and individual obligations in regard to ensuring
the security of the socialist community as a whole as well as
the security and gains of socialism in each member state. 30
The CP reiterated its support of the Common Program and it~
position on external affairs, declaring that a policy of non~
alignment with any military or power bloc was, in the opinion
of the CP, both a correct and eminently reasonable policy tofollow. The latter declaration accorded with the basiC position
of the other two Coalition partners, and the polemical debate
between the C P and LSSP was called off by the end of
October. 31 Mrs. Bandaranaike, Leader of the Opposition and
leader of the Coalition, herself intervened to bring about this
result and restore CoaJition unity.
The Government, itself a coalition of the UNP, and six
other political parties and groups, took the opportunity of
attacking the CP for lack of patriotism in its stand on the Czech
issue. But the Government itself was careful, in its own PresScommunique issued on 25th August, to avoid use of the terms
invasion or occupation to describe the events in Czechoslovakia~
usingJthe term 'intervention' instead. Declaring that the Government of Ceylon believed that the people of a country had
every right to decide the political, economic and social system
under which they lived, the statement averred that only t~e
duly constituted and legitimate Government of Czechoslovakla
reflecting the will of the people, had the right to determine theaffairs of that sovereign and independent country, and that
a foreign interference could contitute a violation of ~he
fundamental and universally accepted prinClp1es govermng
.relations between states.
Contim1lty and Change in Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy
133
On 21st August, the Soviet ambassador in Sri Lanka had.

called on the Prime Minister to present the Soviet case, which
was based on the thesis that the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact
..allies had been ::1sked by Party and Government leaders in
Czechoslovakia uto render the fraternal Czechoslovak people
-urgent assistance including assistance with armed forces". On
23rd August, the Czech ambassador called on the Permanent
"Secretary. Ministry of External Affairs and Defence1 and handed over a statement of the Presidium of the National Assembly
of Czechoslovakia 1 which protested against the occupation of
Czechoslovakia by five Warsaw Pact countries, and which
-demanded categorically the immediate withdrawal oftbe armies
of these countries, and full respect of the state sovereignty of
.the CSSR. 3 ::i In its Press statement, the Government presented
both sides of the case, and concluded as follows:
The Govt. of Ceylon strongly disapproves of the intervention of the USSR and four of its Warsaw Pact allies in
Czechoslovakia. The principles of the Charter could be
upheld only by the speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces
and by restoring to the Govt and people of Czechoslovakia their inalienable right to determine their own future
free from all external pressures. 33
The guarded nature of the Government pronouncement may

-perhaps be exp1alned by the fact that the Government was at
this time negotiating aid for several industrial projects from the
Soviet U nionand East European countries, notably the Thulhid)"a textile complex, with assistance from the East German
Government which was located in the Prime Minister's own
electorate. Added to these reasons, the Industries Minister,
Phi1ip Gunawardcna may have had his own personal differences
with his crs.twhile colleagues in the Left, and these too may
l11ve weighed with th~ Government. However that may be, both
Govcrnm~nt and Opposition were in basic agreement in
supporting the Czech case in the crisis, though there were
-diff~ra11cc:. of emphasis in their re;pective stands.
134

NOTES and REFERENCES
1T!,e Hindu, 12 April, 1965.

2 Times of Ceylon, 20. 2. 65; Supra.
3 Jbid, 11 March 1965; for text of Agreement and Exchange of
letters, see Ceylon Daily News, 6 March, 1965.
<H, of R. Deb., {1963), Vol. 53, Col: 986.
5See e.g. comment jn Sunday Observer, 1. 3. 65.
6Cey/011 Daily News, 25 February, 1967; The Statesman (New Delhi)
6 March, 1967.
7Text of Note in Ceylon Daily News, 16, August, 1961.
Bibid., 21 August, 1961.
9 Jbid.
10Jbid. 24 August, 1967.
ll]bfd.
12Jbf{!.
13 /bid.
J.lf.Jbfd. 2 September, 1967,
'lli[bid.
lGJbid. 7 September, ]967.
17Jbid-
1SLeading article in issue of 22 August, 1967,

19 Ibid.
20Tfie Sun, 8 October, 1967.
21Ceylon Observer Magazine Edition, 24 April, 1967.
22Jbid, 24 November, 1967.
2sceylon Doily News, 21 November, 1967.
2'fJbid, 12 March, 1969.
25Jbu/.
26Text of appeal in Times of Ceylon, 3. 4. 65.
27Press Communique, Ministry of External Affairs and Defence, 30
June, 196().
2BTfre Sun~ 3 June 1967.
2f1Thc Nati~11. 29- 8, 68.
soceylon Dally News. 11 September, 1968.
:nsee The Sun, 31. 10. 68.
a2ccylon Daily News, 25 August 196833Text in Ibid.
6
Sri Lanka's
Non-Alignm~nt Policy After 1970
It was in the seventies that the Non-Aligned Movement

gathered n1omentum, and began to play a role as a factor to
reckon with in global politics. Six years had elapsed between
the second Non~Aligned Summit conference held in Cairo in
1964 and the third held in Lusaka in 1970. After Lusaka, the
holding of a triennial Summit Conference of Non-Aligned
Heads of States or Governments became conventional, and the
decade of the seventies was marked by the convening of four
such conforences: Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo
(1976) and Havana (1979), with the membership of the NonAligned Movement increasing spectacularly at each successive
conference, until it stood at 95 at Havana~ with a further
increase in prospect at the forthcoming Non-Aligned Summit
to be held in Baghdad in 1982.1
For Sri Lanka as indeed for many of the smaller states
among the non-aligned community, membership of the NonAligned Movement and commitment to its consensual decisions
implied a widening of the institutional area of foreign policy'
decision-making, and collective deci<;ion-making also implied
a limitation of the area of choice among foreign policy
options beyond the limitations imposed by sma11 power status
itself. Dut for a small power, Sri Lanka has played a remarkably active role within the Non-Aligned Movement since its
136
~nception in 1961, more especially in the seventies, initiating

1mportant proposals relevant to non-aligned policy, and playing
a leading role in their propagation. Following from this, the
impact of internal regime changes on foreign policy change in
Sri Lanka became Jess marked than was the case before 1970
especially since Sri Lanka's chairmanship of the Non-Aligned
Movement straddled the tenure of office of two different
governments, that of Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike (I 970-77),
and that of J.R.Jayawardena (1977-1983). In this chapter, we
shall deal with Sri Lanka's non-alignment policy under each of
these administrations.
The government which took office under Mrs Sirimavo
Bandaranaike after the May 1970 elections wasacoalition-the
United Left Front-consisting of Mrs Bandaranaike's own
SLFP, the Trotskyite LSSP and the CP (Moscow wing). The
Common Programme adopted by the Front prior to the elections
envisaged the promulgation of a new Republican constitution
in Sri Lanka, land reform and a greater emphasis on the state
sector in economic development. Implementation of this programme necessarily implied a leftward shift in domestic policy
which, considered against the background of the previous
government's clear pro-western ori~mtation and its poor relations
wjth China, connoted a leftward shift in foreign policy also.
The new Republican constitution was proclaimed in 1972
and the new government's nationalisation measures, devised
with the intention of bringing about the socialist society envisaged in the new constitution, followed suit. Foreign policy
initiatives were quicker in implementation. In May 1970
itself the new government gave diplomatic recognition to the
German Democratic Republic, North Vietnam, North I<.orea
and the South Vietnamese Revolutionary Government. The
first state guest of the new government was Madam Nguyen
Thi Binh herself, Foreign Minister of the Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, who expressed her usincere and profound
gratitude to the Ceylonese people for the valuable sy,npa1hy
and support they have always reserved for the South Vietnamese
people's struggle against US aggression and for national salvaM
tion". 2 In July 1970, diplomatic relations with Israel were
suspended in pursuance of the United Front's election and
Throne speech -pledge that such a step would be taken unless
Non-Alignment Policy After 1970
137
Israel conformed with UN Resolution 242 of 22Novcmber

1967 and subsequent dates, withdrew its forces from occupied
territory or reached a so1ution of the Middle Eastern problem
acceptable to the Arab states. 3
The traditional Bandaranaike policy of close friendship with
.China was resumed with special emphasis excepting for a brief
interlude during the height of the April insurrection of 1971
in Sri Lanka, when Chinese complicity in the insurrection was
suspected. Suspicion of a possible Chinese role in the insurgency
centred on a mysterious Chinese ship carrying arms consigned
to Tanzania, which was in Colombo harbour at the time of the
commencement of insurgent attacks and when China became
the only major power which failed to respond to the Sri Lanka
government's appeal for military assistance, the ship itself
sailing away while the appeal to China for such assistance was
under consideration in Beijing. 4 The insurgency bad drawn
its inteUcctual stimulus from a variety of Marxist sources,
among its ideological forebears being Mao Tse Tung, Kim Il
Sung and Ohe Guevara. The Sri Lanka government ordered
the closure of the North Korean embassy on the ground that
some of its activities had given strength and support to the
insurrectionists, while the erstwhi]e leader of the pro-Beijing
Communist party was taken into custody. Meanwhile, four
Indian frigates joined Sri Lanka patrol boats in a search for
mysterious Chinese ship which had disappeared.5 Sino-Sri
Lanka relations were restored to normalcy only after Mrs
J3andaranaike broadcast to the nation, late in April, that foreign
powers were not involved in the insurgency, and after Chou
En-lai himself wrote to her stating that ufriendsbip between
-China and Sri Lanka is in the fundamental interest of the two
peoples and can stand tests'', and that "the Chinese government
-and people highly treasure the friendship between our two
-countries/' The letter also commended the Sri Lanka Government in having brought under control" a handful of persons
w~o style themselves Guevarists, and into whose ranks foreign
~pies (have) sneaked". The letter was accompanied by an
mt crest-free, long-term loan of Rs I 50 million. 0
China had :figured, even in tho sixties, as an important aid
.donor to Sri Lanka; in the seventies, the scale of Chinese economic assistance to the island increased significantly. After
138
Foreign Policy of Sri Lanktr
the insurgency:- Sri Lanka also received from China another

interest-free loan of Rs 265 million to finance agro-based
industries, and a further interest-free Joan of Rs 48 million to
finance an integrated textile mill. In addition, China offered
as an outright gift five high-speed naval boats, delivering four
of these by July 1972. The agreement to finance Sri Lanka's
agro-based industries and textile mill was signed on the occasion of Mrs Bandaranaike's visit to China in 1972~ perhaps the
high-water mark of Sino-Sri Lanka relat ons, for Mrs Bandaranaike was accorded a warm welcome in Beijing on this occasion, had an audience with Chairman Mao, and generally made
a telling impression on the Chinese government and people~
In May 1973, Chinese technicians and workers completed, at a
cost of Rs 35 million, the Bandaranaike Memorial International
Conference Hall, which became the venue of the fifth NonAligned Summit conference and which stood out in Colombo
as a glittering showpiece of Chinese goodwill.
Sri Lanka's close connections with ChinaduTing this period
was not prejudicial to the island's relationship with lndia. The
Bandaranaikes traditionally maintained equally good relations
with the Nehrus, and h-1rs Bandaranaike and Indira Gandhi in
particular found a community of interest at a personal as weH
as political level. Soviet commentators, however, raised their
eyebrows at the Chinese building a conference hall before the
promised textile mill, and alleged that China was trying to
establish Sri Lanka as a Chinese bridgehead in the Indian
Ocean, though the Soviet government itself later gifted to the
government and people of Sri Lanka an impressive statue of
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, which was erected on a prominent site
overlooking Galle Face Green near the old Parliament building
in Colombo. 7
There was no official comment in Sri Lanka over the IndoSoviet treaty of 1971, but this came in the aftermath ofthcApril insurrection in Sri Lanka, and at a time when the gove~ment was beholden to India USSR as well as USA, UK,
Pakistan and Yugoslavia ro/ the rc~diness and speed' with
which they had come to the is1and's assistance in her hour of
need. But the East Bengal crisis and the emergence of Bangladesh caught Sri Lanka in an ambivalent position, for the
integrity of Pakistan, and pre~ervation of the existing-balance
No11-Alignme11t Policy After 1970
139
of power in South Asia, was one of the cardinal principles oI

its foreign policy. During the Indo-Pak war of 1971, Sri Lanka
initially kept aloof, expecting a solution of the East Bengali
crisis which would preserve the integrity of Pakistan. Even after
the crisiswasover, in order not to offend Pakistani susceptibilities, Sri Lanka did not accord diplomatc recognition to Bangladesh until March 1972. In the process, however, Sri Lanka did
unwittingly offend Indian susceptibilities. For the Sri Lanka
government granted air transit facilities through Colombo
from West to East Pakistan after over.flights over India had
been stopped for Pakistan aircraft, and although these transit
facilities had been granted to Pakistani civilian aircraft, which
had rights through Colombo, the possibility appears to have
been over-looked by the Sri Lanka government that military
personnel disguised as civilians and perhaps even equipment
which could be used for war purposes in East 'Bengal, tnight be
carried in these aircraft. Long after the event, the reputed.
Indian defence analyst R.Subrahmanyam wrote in the Indian
and Foreign Review:
There is no reciprocity of commitment between India and
its neighbours in regard to each others' security. Mrs..
Bandaranaike got Indian help when Sri Lanka was in deep
trouble during the JVP insurgency but repaid her debt by
permitting the ferrying of Pakistani troops to Bangladesh
to continue their genocidc. 8
This charge was of course specious insofar as it jmplied theconnivanco, or prior knowledge, of th{! transport of Pakistani
troops via Colombo to Dacca in 1971. Actually as early as
1965, when similar speculations were entertained in Indian
circles that Pakistani n1ilitary aircraft were being routed through
Colombo from West to East Pakistan after overflights through
India had been stopped, the Sri Lanka government had made
its position clear to all diplomatic missions in Colombo that
the countrys airports and seaports would be closed to aircraft
and ships of all countries carrying troops or armaments on
w~rlike missions. and on this occasion Pakistan had been permitted to fly one plane carrying medical supplies. 0 As in the case
of the IndiaChina war of 1962t Sri Lanka's policy during the:
[40
Inda-Pak war of 1971, consistent with her policy during previous Indo-Pakistani wars, was to keep aloof from the conflict
although, just as in 1962, Indian sensibilities were understand.ably aroused at Sri Lanka's failure to support another non.aligned country. Mrs Bandaranaike was, of course, a seasoned
non-aligned politician, having represented Sri Lanka as Head
.-of Government at the Belgrade, Cairo, and Lusaka NonAlig11ed Summit Conferences, and she was to go on to repre-sent Sri Lanka at Algiers in 1973 and take up the Chairmanship of the Movement in Colombo in 1976. In foreign policy,
Mrs Bandaranaike's second administration (1970-77) was therefore notable for its contribution to Non-Aligned Movement, a
contribution for which Bandaranaike was herself largely
responsible.
The main thrust of Mrs Bandaianaike's non-alignment
-policy was directed at obtaining acceptance in the comity of
nations of her own proposal to ensure that the Indian Ocean
was made a peace zone. At the Lusaka confo.!rence of NonAligned nations held in September 1970, Mrs Bandaranai&e
reminded delegates of her original proposal at the 1964 Cairo
,conference to make the Indian Ocean area a nuclear free zone~
declared that Latin America and Africa had already been
acco1ded such a status, and urged that "all countries bordering
the Indian Ocean shonld join us not only in giving effect to
this proposal but also in keeping the Indian Ocean as an area
of peace. " 10
The Lusaka summit adopted a resolution calling upon the
'UN General Assembly to adopt a declaration of the Indian
Ocean as a Zone of Peace from which Great Power rivalry and
competition should be eliminated. At the Commonwealth
-Conference held in Singapore in January, 1971, Sri Lanka put
the case for a Peace Zone in the Indian Ocean with characteri~
.:Stic force:
The Indian Ocean area is a region of low solidarities or
community of interests. Although it forms a geographical
and historical entity, there are few cooperative links between countries in the region and these are either bilateral
or sub~regional. A peace zone in tlle Indi~n Ocean wiH
provide countries of this region with time to develop trends
141
towards integration and co-operation so that in course of

time the Indian Ocean region could move from an area of
low solidarity to an area of high solidarity. In effect a
peace zone will provide the transitional minimum conditions for the development of an '"Indian Ocean community
in which problems of security will be dealt with by an
orderly and institutional meaps for promoting peaceful
change.11
Sri Lanka's delegatioll ~explained at Singapore that the

ultimate object of the peace zone would be "to stabilise the
Indian Ocean as a power vacuum so that the abrasive conflicts
of the 'cold war' do not enter it and the region could concentrate on the solution of its major problems of security, underdevelopment, etc/' The s,ttting up of the military base at
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean by the United States and
Britain was vehemently opposed by Sri Lanka in January, 197L
Prime Minister Bandaranaike herself assumed leadership in
the advocacy of the concept at the United Nations in 1971, and
at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference and Algiers
Conference of Non-Aligned nations held in 1973. Speaking at
the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly, i\1r&Bandaranaike declared:
Our object is to contain the activities of foreign powers and
ensure that they do not make our part of the world a battle
gfound for their rivalries.12
Defining her conception of the zone of peace, Mrs Bandaranaikeexplained:

The essence of our proposal is that in the Indian Ocean a
defined area shall be declared to be a zone of peace and reserved exclusively for peaceful purposcs under an appropriate regulatory. system. \Vi.thin the zone no armaments of any .kind,
dcf:ns1ve or offensive, may be instaUed on or in the sea, on the
subJa~ent sca~cd or on la"?d areas. Ships of all nations may
exer71se the_ right of ~rans,t. but warships and ships carrying
warlike cqmpment, mcludmg submarines, may not stop for
other ~ha~ emergency reasons of a technical, mechanical, or
lrnmamtanan nature. No manoeuvres by war.ships _of any
142
state shall be permitted. Naval intelligence operations shall be

forbidden. No weapon tests of any kind may be conducted.
The regulatory system to be established will be under effective
international control .. ,13
The UN Resolution of 1971, declaring the Indian Ocean
as a Zone of Peace, called upon littoral and hinterland states
-0f the Indian Ocean, permanent members of the Security
Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean
to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation
of the Resolution. Its adoption by India and twenty other
nations in 1972, and the setting up under UN auspices, of an
Ad Hoc Committee under Sri Lanka's chairmanship to take
further steps to implement the proposal, were major personal
-victories for Mrs Bandaranaike. Later travails in the imp1ementation of the proposal notwithstanding, IOZP remains high on
the agenda of objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement yet to
be completed.14
In September 1974, in an effort to prepare the ground for
the forthcoming 5th Non-Alignment Summit, the Sri Lanka Prime
Minister undertook goodwill tours of four countries: Pakistan,
The Federal Republic of Germany, Rumania and Yugoslavia.
In her address to a joint session of the Senate and Pakistan
National Assembly on 5 September 1974 Mrs Bandaranaike
attempted to explain the motives of Sri Lanka's non-alignment
policy in the folio wing terms:
The rationale of our policy of non-alignment is non-involvement in military alliances or Power blocs, for involvement results in polarising nations into opposing camps
who base their relations with each other on a footing of
political or military competition, That could lead to ten
sions, and in turn to confrontation and eventual conflict
-0n a global scale-a situation which is unthinkable, where
the whole world could well be blown up darkly into
oblivion by the refinement of distructive weapons that
nations possess tOday, Non-alignment therefore enjoins
that the only positive, rational and ciVilised basis for the
resolution of disputes between nations is not by resort to
war but rather by peaceful discussion. And the corollary
-to such a peaceful approach is the steady pursuit of global
143
disarmament and the eventual renunciation of w~r as. a

method of resolving international disputes. As we see 1t,
t is the one policy that can ensure a climate of_ peace upo_n
1
which social and economic growth can be env1saged .. It 1s
the one policy that is an investment for the preservat10n of
world peace.15
The Sri Lanka Prime Minister further stated in the course
-0f the same address that what was now causing the greatest
.concern in the Asian region was the recent development of the
beginning of great power rivalries, a recurrence of which could
,eventully lead to the domination of Asia by European powers
asm the past.
From another angle, the then Director-General of Foreign
Affairs of Sri Lanka attempted to define the scope of the Peace
Zone concept in April \916, as follows:
The concept ofa Peace Zone isan extension of Non-alignment, beyond the borders of individual countries, over a
wider area. The Indian Ocean is bordered by countries
which have a common experience of colonial domination
m the context of rivalry between powers from. outsid~ the
rngion. The declaration seeks to avert the danger of new
threats to the sovereignty of these nations from a repetition of military rivalry between foreign powers.
By definition, every Non-aligned country is a Zone of
Peace because it has shut its doors to the import of the
rivalries and tensions of others into its own territory. The
Peace Zone would make the Indian Ocean its littoral and
hinterland, an area of cooperation rather than tension and
conflict..It envisages the emergence of an Indian Ocean
commumty.
The P~ace Zone. concept is a plan for a system of universal
col~ect1ve s~c~nty without military alliances, a system in
,~h1cb there IS mterde~endence not dependence, and cooper'tion, not confrontation. There is also no room . th.
c~ncept for special privileges, either for individual J~oun~~
r1es or for groups of countries; no attempt to circumscribe
144
th~. frccdon~ ?f 11avigat!~n on the l1igh seas. It is only

mtlttary activity and military nvalry which we seek to
exclude. International Law and conduct were determined in
the past by military and naval might. Today the right of

the states of the region to a viable sense of security is as
valid as the right of nations to use the high seas for peaceful pursuits."
Basically, therefore, what Sri Lanka and like-minded states
inte11dcd to achieve by the Peace Zone concept was a coordination of effort by al! littoral and hinterland states in the Indian
Ocean area "lo realise their com,nitmcnt to a policy of
dcnuclcarisation which would entail the permanent renuncia-
tion of a nuclear weapons option and the denial of the use of

their territories, territorial waters and air space to nuclear
~ wCapons of other stn.tes."
The ',\!giers Summit in l 973 had also broken new ground
in non-aligned policy by giving priority to questions of economicdevelopment nnd economic decolonisation. The Colombo
Summit Conference, following upon initiatives begun at Algiers,
Jaid much emphasis on problems of economic development, and
the Economic Dcclarntion, and the Action Programme for
Economic Cooperation, which emanated from it, must be regarded as among the most significant contributions ofnon-a1ignmcnt to problems of development in third world countries. In
presenting the decisions of the Colombo Summit to the 31st
session of the UN General Assembly in September 1976 the
then Chairman of the group of non-aligned countries, Mrs
Bn11daranaikc 1 declared:
A constant thread running through all the economic documents of the Colombo Summit fa the emphasis on collective
self-reliance. I should make it clear that this approach is
not one of hostility and confrontation towards any single
country or group of countries. It has been the unfortunateexperience of the developing countries, however, that despite two decades of pious promises of partnership and
interdependence, no real partnership has been possible onJy
that the strong have become stronger.17
No11-Alig11me11/ Po/ieJ After 1970
145
Although Non-alignment had always emphasised global

cooperation., global interdependence llad not so far become a
way of life. The realities of the present time demanded that
genuine cooperation must begin now, and the decisions of the
Fifth Colombo Summit signified a determination to make that
beginning, even if it were among the developing nations, as a
first step. In her address to the Representatives of Non-aligned
countries at the UN in New York_, 1st October 1976, r..1rs
Bandaranaike as Chairman of the Group put this whole question in a nutshell;
Our self-respect demands that when we speak of self-reliance

we should not have to address appeals to other nations for
succour and sustenance. The world is indeed interdependent, but interdependence was never intended to mean
almost total dependence for some and grudging concessions
by others.18
This did not imply that a dialogue between developed
countries, the North-South dialogue, was entirely ruled out.
Indeed, to have expected a clear-cut degree of unanimity among
86 countries belonging to different socio~political systems~ and
professing divergent political ideologies on the whole gamut of
questions of economic cooperation would have been too much
to expect, even granted a commitment to the principles of nonalignment. Even thougb the economic documents of the 5th
Summit did express an agreed consensus, the discussions were not
without their travails, arising from divergences and differences
among participants on questions such as those raised by landlocked countries and their rights of access to the sea, the relative
merits of economic self-reliance as opposed to aid, the role of
multi-nationals,and"so on. Despite these divergences, however, the
broad consensus w11'ich emerged was that aid, whether bilateral or
multi.latcra1, was not and could not be a solution to the world?s
economic problems. Perhaps the most important message of
the conference was that "just and equitable relations also require
that them should be a realistic appraisal of the steep and spiralling differentials between the commodity exports of the developing countries and the manufactured goods they import from
the doveloped'\ Past conferences of UNCTAD and current
146
dialogues in Paris were important only in this context. It was,

then, in the Action Programme for Economic Cooperation,
such as it emerged at the Colombo Summit, that its real achievement, from a long-term perspective, must be judged.
Action Programme for Economic Cooperation, 1976
The Action Programme for Economic Co-operation
adopted by the 5th Summit Conference of non-aligned nations
on the recommendation of the Economic Committee of the
Foreign Ministers Conference comprised the- following:1. Establishment of a joint Financial Institution for the
promotion of financial and monetary co-operation among developing countries with a view to creating conditions for accelerating the development of developing countries.
2. The establishment of a developing countries payments
union.
3. Forms. and mechanism of co-operation and association
of commercial banks of developing countries to include the exchange of information experience in banking policies and practices, training of personnel and the use of each other's currencies
in their commercial exchange.
One of the most significant proposals in the economic
sphere adopted at the 5th Summit was that moved by Sri
Lanka's Prime Ministers Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, to establish a commercia1 bank for the developing countries.
4. To promote as far as possible private fOreign investment
in developing countries within the frame-work of their national
policies.
5. Raw Materials: In the context of previous plans and
programmes of action taken by non-aligned countries to implement a strategy on raw materials, it was decided that the establishment of additional producers~ associations for primary
"Gommodities of export interest to developing countries should
be encouraged~ and that existing producers associations should
be strengthened. Further, that steps be finalised to set up a
-Council of Producers, Associations.
The establishment of a Developing Countries Fund for 1he
iinancing of buffer stocks of raw materials, and bringing about
Non-A/ig11mellt Policy After 1970
147
effective methods of operation in order to secure a just and

remunerative price for export products, and to protect and
.improve in real terms the purchasing power of non-aligned
.countries and to expand the real value of their export earnings.
6, Trade: The development of joint import procurement
policies, methods and arrangements for the procurement of
goods, technology and services from developed countries and
the adoption of standardized specifications and procedures.
The jnitiation of action for the implementation of a global
system of trade preferences among developing countries based
-0n arrangements wh~ch best suit thent having regard to their
differing levels of development and differences in their trade
regimes.
The creation of new and expanded trade flows among
developing countries based on the selection of specific products
which have immediate potential for trade among developing
countries.
Establishment of multinational marketing enterprises
among developing countries as a means of benefiting from the
marketing, transport and distribution of developed countries.
Consultation among developing producer and consumer
countries to ensure mutually satisfactory supply and purchase
terms and conditions among developing countries themselves
-and collectively to strengthen the means of control over their
resources and the exercise of fullsovereigntyover their resources
.and the means of production, transport nnd distribution.
Adoption of common strategies to ensure greater participa1ion of developing countries in the processing, transport, marke:ting and distribution of their exports and increase in their share
-earnings therefrom.
7. Industrialisation: Encouragement of multilateral industrial cooperation policies as a complement of national policies
and plans in the achievement of industrial targets and elaboration of inter.regional, regional and sub-regional project prol)Osals and development of industry inventories for establishment of multi~national enterprises among ihe non-aligned.
These were among the main items included in the programme for economic action adopted by the 5th Summit.
It was a m~tter of some significance that the Secretary-General of the United Nations was hir1self present as an
148
Observer at the Colombo Summit, and that he, too, reflected

on the need for a more equitable worJ<l economic order which
would guarantee peace and security throughout the world. The
Secretary General ofUNCTAD who also addressed the Plenary,
was emphatic on the need for Non-aligned and other developing countdes to strengthen and consoHdate their collective
solidarity in negotiating with the developed world to win their
just demands for the establishment of the New International
Economic Order.rn
Referring to the New International Economic Order, which
had now become one of the overriding objectives of the Nonaligned Movement, the Economic Declaration of the Colombo
Summit declared :
The Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned count'.

ries were firmly of the view that nothing short of a complete restructuring of existing international economic relations will provide an enduring solution to the world
economic problem, particularly those of the developing
countries.20
Sri Lanka, together with other non-aligned nations, accepted
the Action Programme as no more than the "blueprint and
structural framework'' for a new International Economic
Order.
When J.R. Jayewardena became the non-aligned group's
new chairman after the change of government in Sri Lanka in
July 1977, the commitment to non-alignment generally, and in
pa1ticular to the realisation of the New International Economic
Order remained basically unchanged though it acquired a new
onentation following upon changes in personal style and the
economic philosophy of the new UNP government. In Dece1'.1ber 1977, the new Foreign Minister A.C.S. Hameed declared m
Parliament that ''our commitment to Non-Alignment is unquestionable and unchallengeable", but that the new UNP
government hoped to give Sri Lanka's foreign policy a new
orientation with a strong economic undertone. 21 In his inaugural
address to the Colombo Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating
Bureau of Non-Aligned countries in June 1979, President Jaye-wardena himself stat 1ed categorically :
. Non-Alignment Policy After 1970
149
Non-Alignment runs like a golden thread through the

fabric of our country's foreign policy, though changes may
take place in th.e quality, colour and shape of that fabric
from time to time. At no stage has our country deviated
from that policy. Atno stage, I will make bold to say, will
it do so in the future. 22
At an international conference marking the 25th anniver-sary of Bandung, Foreign Minister Hameed summed up the
UNP government's foreign policy as being one of "friendship
with aIJ, alliances with noncH and as one of non-alignment with
'camps and blocs.'' 23 UNP spokesmen have often articulated
their concern n.t the uncertain prospects for the achievement of
the NlEO. Expressing his own disillusionment, President
Jayewardena, in a luncheon speech hosted by the Japanese
Prime 1vlinister in Tokyo in September 1979, declared :
There is (also) widespread disillusionment over the prospects for restructuring international economic relations, and
bringing about equitable North-South economic relations.
Nevertheless it is coming to be recognised that the further
dynamic development of the North cannot be dissociated
from the further development of the South in an increasingly interdependent world.
It is our earnest hope, therefore, that the present period of
difficulty wm not lead to total disi11usionment but rather
that it will provide an impetus to both North and South to
grapple effectively with the problems that affect our common
destinies.
Later in the same speech, Jaycwardena averred: "W~ in Sri

Lanka believe that Non-Alignment provides tl1e best hope for
a better order in international relations, based on the true
independence of States, equality in State relations and peaceful
coexistence between all States in the world irrespective of
ideological and other divisions" .2 1 The case for the NIEO was
put jn even stronger terms by Prime 1\1inister Premadasa in an
.address to the UN General Assembly in September 1980:
150

The exploitation which leads to poverty is endemic' in the
structure of international economic relations today. That
is why we talk of a New International Economic Order. It
is an order where human rights are respected; where economic inequalities and poverty are eliminated; where malnutrition and illiteracy are removed.
And the Prime Minister went on to say that be was not referring to a new order which must exist between nations only, but
one which must e:xist "in our own countries", for Hwe cannot
have world peace without being at peace ourselves , .. " 25
Addressing the sixth Non-Aligned Summit at Havana, where
he handed over the chairmanship of the Movement to Cuba's
Fide! Castro, President Jayewardena expressed his conviction
that at the end of their deliberations, the non-aligned countries
would realise and remember that they were all companeros,
despite the differences of approach and emphasis which was
inevitable in a Movement so large and diverse as that of the
Non-Aligned.
we are bound by links and inspired by circumstances that
rise above and go beyond differences.. We are all companions in a guest for international justice; and we are all
comrades in struggles against forces that impede the progress of our peoples. 20
The high rhetoric of some of these speeches, made at important
international gatherings, may not always have matched actual
performance on the domestic front; indeed, as wHI be shown
later in this chapter, the UNP government's whole attitudeto the question of economic interdependence and the NorthSouth impasse, as well as the North's own reaction to this
government's overtures for assistance, were significantly different from the kind of situation and response which obtained in
the pre-1977 period. There is no doubt, however, that both
before and after 1977, the governments in power in Sri Lanka
were joined together in a common endeavour to bring about a
better life for the people both within the confines of the NonAligned Movement as well as outside it.
151
Mrs Bandaranaike's. own special contribution to the Non-Aligned Movement had been her sponsorship of the proposal
to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. Jayewardena's
special emphasis was on disarmament. He made a specific
appeal for creating a World Disarmament Authority at the
February 1978 regional meeting of Commonwealth Heads of
Government in Sydney. 27 Under Sri Lanka's sponsorship, the
proposal that a \VorldDisarmament Authority be created within
the UN framework was adopted by the non-aligned group and
later by the UN General Assembly itself. Jayewardena told the
Havana Summit:
In selecting-areas of concentration for international negotiation and discussion, perhaps the most important work of
the Non- Aligned 1v1ovement in recent times was in connection with and at the Special Session of the UN General
Assembly devoted to Disarmament. 28
And he summed up the achievement of that SpeciaJ Session as
refocussing attention on an issue of global concern that could
not be left to arms producers to resolve in their own 'ebb\
reactivating a number of moribund UN institutions,, creating
new ones, and giving the whole question of international negotiation for disarmament a new sense of urgency. Disarmament
had been a subject of intense concern to Third World countries
ever since the 1950s, and J ayewardena was expressing a consensus in attacking western security policies. "Arms control leading
to disarmament", he said, "must remain core objectives of the
JVIovcment because these are essential components of the state
of peace we desire~'.
P.reside:nt Jayewardena himself was notably inarticulate on
the Indian Ocean Peace Zone concept, itse1f conceived by the
non~aligncd community as an important aspect of disarmament.
But 11is Foreign Minister Hamecd told the Ministerial Meeting
of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau in Havana in May
1978: \Ve stand uncompromisingly for a total elirnination of
great power military presence and- bases, as being the only
certain means of removing tension and conflict in the aTea".29
Sri Lanka~s stand on the Peace Zone was not opposed to
the right of innocent passage~ or transit facilities for foreign
152
warships and warships of the US, UK, USSR, France as wc1l ns

India have been permitted visits to Colombo lmrbour. Clearance
for such visits has customarily been dependent on whct11er or
not the vessels concerned have a nuclear capability, and whether or not they present '1mval objections', such ns the transport
of arms, equipment, or assault troops for action in the region.
Sri Lanka's chairmanship of the UN Ad Hoc Committee appointed to devise ways and means of implementing the 1971 UN
Declaration provides an important element of continuity on this
issue between the Bandaranaike and Jayewardena govcrnmenfa.
The fact that despite (or because of) prevailing tensions between
the superpowers in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region,
all permanent members of the Security Council attended n
meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee as full members for the first
time in February 1980 (China had been attending meetings even
before this) may indicate scope for diplomatic action and some
prospects for success for the IOZP proposal, even though the
meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee scheduled to be held in
Colombo in 1981 has had to be postponed for 1983 in the face
of deterioration of East-West relations.
In recent years, continuity in Sri Lanka's foreign policy has
become increasingly predicated on considerations of Third
World solidarity and upon specific decisions taken at Summit,
Bureau, or Coordinating Committee levels of the Non-Aligned
Movement. Traditionally, no qualitative change has occurred
in various transitions from UNP to SLFP governments on
questions relating to Arab-Israeli relations, majority rule in
Zimbabwe,, racism in South Africa, and the important problem
of relations with India. Foreign Minister Hamced reiterated Sri
Lanka's traditional stand on the Middle East when he cond
emned, in the UN General Assembly, Israeli occupation of
territory "seized in war in violation of a fundamental principle
of international law--the inadmissibility of acquisition of
terdtory by force", the establishment of Jewish settlements in
the occupied territories, and fsrael's continued refusal to rcco~
gnize the rights of Palestinians. He alludedin the same vein to
South Africa and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia w11cn he denounced "the
assaults on human dignity and the human rights of the black
peoples of Southern Africa by the racist and repressive white
minority regimes in that area". :io
-1,;onAlignment Policy After 1970
153
Relations with India have been discussed in a separate

Chapter, bllt in view of their operational signrficance for Sri
Lanka's foreign policy generally, the impact of the change of
government in 1977 perhaps needs some elaboration. Jayewardcna's own massive electoral triumph in July 1977 in Sri Lanka
came in the wake ofa dramatic electoral victory of the Janata
Party under Morarji Desai in India, this being the first time
that the Congress Party had been defeated in the Centre, and
the two leaders found common cause to concert diplomatic
Ielat1ons at the highest personal level, just as Inda-Lanka rela'trons had been kept on an even keel during the time of Mrs
Indira Gandhi and :t\1:rs Bandaranaikc, largely because of their
past traditions of friendship and personal relations. When
Jayewardena assumed the office of the first executive President
-0f Sn Lanka in February 1978, the ranking minister in the
]ndian government, Home Minister Charan Singh was present
.at the inauguration ceremonies. Jayewardena himself undertook state visits to India and Nepalin October-November 1978,
and the next year Morarji himself was a state guest in Sri
Lanka. With the fall of the Morarji Desai government and the
spectacular return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980however, the
personal relationship between the Indian and Sri Lankan Heads
-of State cooled noticeably, particularly after the deprivation of
Mrs Bandaranaike's civic rights under the Jayewardcna governmcnt on grounds mainly of misuse and prolongation of emer~
gcncy powers under her regime. Mrs Bandaranaike's private
vis1t to India in March 1982, and her meeting with Mrs Gandhi
-on this occasion also caused considerable speculation in Sri
Lanka, as to whether Mrs Gandhi was attempting a mediator:,,
role in the context of the split in the SLFP between factions
headed by Mrs Bandaranaike and her crstwltile deputy 1v1aitri11ala Senanayakc. Any suggestions of Mrs Gandhi 'interfering'
in Sri Lanka~s internal affairs, however, were scotched by official
circles jn New Delhi, which dismissed this meeting as being of
'a personal natu1c\ 31 This change in the personal equation
notwithstanding, India and Sri Lanka continued to be bound
together by their firm commitment to Non-Alignment, and the
Rs 100 million line of credit extended by India to Sri Lanka in
January 1981 followed upon a credit of Rs 300 million given
three years earlier, while the scale of Indian private foreign
154
Fol'eign Policy of Sri Lanka
investment in Sri Lanka also increased markedly after 1977.

Mrs Bandaranaike had been adept at maintaining good
relations with India and the People's Republic of China at the
same time, but her attitude towards China had sometimes caused
misgivings in the West as well as in India. The decline of Sri
Lanka's relations with China at the time of the Cultural
Revolution under a previous UNPadministration under Dudley
Senanayake had been referred to in the previous chapter.
Chinese pragmatism was now matched by Jayewardena's own
soon after he assumed office. Chinese Vice-Premier Geng Biao
visited Sri Lanka in June 1978 and, paying a warm tribute to
Sri Lanka's contribution to the maintenance of the integrity,.
vitality and effectiveness of the Non-Aligned Movement, declared that "the positive role played by Sri Lanka in international
affairs has won the appreciation of the people of China and of
the world". 32 Foreign Minister Hameed himself responded by
declaring that "the ties between Sri Lanka and China are as
old as the hills", and that it was a UNP government in 1950
that first recognised the Peoples Republic of China. In July
1981, Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua
himself visited Sri Lanka on Sri Lanka's invitation, as part of a
tour ofindia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.33 ln August 1979,
Sri Lanka's Prime Minister R. Premadasa bad been visiting
China in the course of a tour of six countries, had remarked on
"some very significant changes in China under Chairman Huas
leadership" (the Four Modernisations), and been the recipient
of a Rs 500 million Chinese loan, interest-free, repayable over
20 years." In October 1977, Sri Lanka and China had renewed
for the sixth time the long-standing Rice-Rubber agreement,
providing for the exchange of 49,000 tons of Sri Laokan rubber
for 2,00,000 tons of Chinese rice for the year l 978.' It was not
without significance for Sino-Sri Lanka relations that the views
of the two countries on Afghanistan and Kampuchea happened
to coincide.
Sri Lanka was one of the non-aligned countries which unequivocally condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
On Kampuchea, the stand taken by President Jaye,vardena. at
Havana in September 1979, that Sri Lanka would not recognise
the Heng Samrin government as it bad been set_ up by. th_e
intervention of foreign forces in violation of nonal1gned princi-
No11-Alig11me11t Policy After 1970
155
ples, continued to be the policy stance of the government.

Representing Sri Lanka at the international conference on.
Kampuchea held at UN headquarters in July l 98 I, Foreign
Minister Hameed declared: "To accept the principle of intervention or to give it legitimacy in any form would be to make
all small states vulnerable and powerful states belligerent." Sri
Lanka, he said, totally rejected the argument of '"effective control', because any Government, however spurious its credentials,
could establish effective control over a territory buttressed by
foreign forces deployed in strength. At this conference, Sri
Lanka supported the A SEAN states' three~pbased proposal, for
a solution of the problem: withdrawal of foreign forces, introduction of UN peace~keeping machinery~ and an internationally
supervised election. 36
Oneoftbe Jaycwardena government's significant policy initiatives was directed lowards development of a closer relationship
with Japan. Jayewardena had alway::. been a popular figure in
Japan because of his stand at the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference,San Francisco, 1951, when he had waived reparations on
behalf of Sri Lanka, citing the Buddhist text that "hatred ceases
not by l1atred but by love". \Vhen he visited Japan in September
1979, on his way back from the Havana Summit, the Emperor
of Japan himself reminded him of this, and declared: "our people were profoundly moved by it at that time, and they wiJI
never forget it 1n the future. I wish to take this opportunity
to convey to him our gratitude for it." 37 Japan had been a
member of the Sri Lanka Aid Consortium set up under World
Bank auspices since its inception. After the Jayewardena visit,. the
quantum of direct bilateral assistance increased, with Japanese
commitments. to provide aid for the completion of a television
broadcasting station, for food production and housing projects,.
and assistance in constructing a 1001-bed hospital in the proposed new capital city of Kotte. Further, Japan extended to Sri
Lanka a loan of 5.8 billionyen(US S 26.4 million) to help finance
Sri Lankan shipping, including the purchase of three new
freighters. Since 1966,. Japanese loans to Sri Lanka had amounted to approximately 49 billion yen~ and Japanese private investment in Sri Lanka has been estimated at US $7.8 million.3B
The traditional UNP foreign policy of veering towards thc\Vcst was continued by the Jayewardena government_
156
Bandaranaike administrations had brought about nationalization of banking) insurance, and the distribution of petroleum.
which touched on sensitive westen1-mainly British and Ame:
rican-intercsts. The Sirima Bandaranaikc government's Land
Reform Law of 1972 put a 50-acre ceiling on private1y-owned
land (25 acres for paddy land). and the land reform of 1975
resulted in the nationalisation of public company-owned tea
plantations (mostly British). Further, the Business Acquisition
Act resulted in the state take-over of seyeral local business
enterprises and foreign agency houses, among them the prestigious Colombo Commercial Company and the British Ceylon
Corporation. Under the financial stewardship of Mrs Bandaranaike's coalition partner, Dr N.11. Perera, Sri Lanka went
through a series of austerity budgets from 1970 to 1975, and
even after 1975, when Dr Perera was forced to resign office.
During this period the government had consistently ignored
the \Vorld Bank~s advice to abolish consumer subsidies and
devalue the rupee.
The ne,v government of J.R. Jayewardena took office v..-ith
a new economic policy geared to a. system of pub1icand private
_sector competition. Accordingly, consumer subsidies were
generally scaled down, the consumer food subsidy witbdrmvn
from those with an income of more than Rs 300 per
mensem., and a new scheme of assistance through food stamps
introduced. The government's main economic objectives were
centred on the Mahaweli River Basin Project, the most massive
multi~purposc agricultural development project undertaken so
far in Sri Lanka, on the establishment of Investment Promotion
Zones to attract private foreign capital for manufacturing
industry for ihe export market. and on the Greater Colombo
Development Scheme. A concomitant of the new economic
policy was the unification ofa basic rate and a premium rate of
exchange of the rupee (the premium rate baving applied to
certain foreign exchange transactions), and the Sri Lanka rupee
was allowed thereafter to float. This meant doubling of the
value of hard currencies in respect of the Sri Lanka rupee7 but
.after 1977, existing stringent foreign excJmnge controls on
payments were liberalised, 1he government's monopoly in various sectors such as state trading were graduaJly relaxed, ,vhile
-:a comprehensive import 1ibera1ization accompanied these
157
changes and a new tariff structure replaced quantitative restrictions as a means of protecting domestic enterprise. 39
In an address to the Japanese Federation of Economic
Organisations during the course of his September 1979 visit to
Japan, President Jaycwardena summed up the economic policy
of his government in the following words:
We adopted a package of new economic policies which envisaged a sweeping departure from a highly controlled,
inwardIooking welfare-oriented economic strategy to
a more liberalised, outward looking and growth-oriented
one. Fundame11.tal to the new economy was the adoption
of a reaUstic rate for the Sri Laoka Rupee with a view to
reducing the price distortions arising from the previous
attempts to maintain an overvalued currency by means oI
stringent trade and payments control. The then prevailing
multiple exchange system was unified and the Rupee was
allowed to float. The resulting trade liberalisation was
expected to revive domestic industry by freer flows of raw
materials. spares and machinery, by higher capacity
utilisation and by greater competition which at the same
time was expected to provide better export incentives by
inducing the import substituting industries to expand outwards to export markets.
Vrle have given its due place to the private sector. Though
these changes are radical we are determined to maintain
the impressive achievements in social welfare and quality oi
life which had been favourably commented upon by the World
Bank and the international community. I must mention that in
terms of the physical quality of 1ife index our achievement is
second only to Japan and a few other countries in Asia. This
basic human needs approach will not be sacrificed at the altar
of economic growth ... The IMF has commended our approach and has agreed to provide us with standby balance of
payments support during the period oftransfonnation. \Ve
are also confident of assistance from friendly countries in
tiding over this short but difficult period."' 0
158
Early in 1978 the IMF did, indeed, grant Sri Lanka a standby loan of Rs 5000 million spread over three years to be ntilized
for liberalising imports, and it agreed to finance the government's foreign exchange budget deficit to assist in its economic
recovery program.<1 Total IMF aid to Sri Lanka for the period
1st August 1977 to 31st July 1981, used for financing part of
the balance of payments deficits in the country, amounted to Rs
-8657.4million, compared to a totalofRsl394.4millionIMFaid
granted to the previous government for tile period 1971 to the
end of June 1977. 42 Even accounting for current rates of
inflation, estimated at 30 %, and the deva1uation of the rupee
.after the unification of the rate of foreign exchange in Sri
Lanka, these figures correspond to a significant increase in IMF
.aid to Sri Lanka US Development assistance also progressively
increased. As of early 1982, the total US commitment to assist in the accelerated Mahaweli Development Project stood at
Rs 1717.9 million (US 83.8 million), apart from tl,e normal
.allocations under PL 480 and US AID assistance for specific
programs such as those'of the Paddy Marketing Board. Apart
from this, the 14th Sri Lanka Aid Consortium meeting in Paris
(:including Austialia, Canada, France, West Germany, Sweden,
Norway, Netherlands, Japan, Britain and the United States)
pledged an unprecedented Rs 6000 million for Sri Lanka's
development programmes. 43 Replying to questions from an
SLFP MP, the Minister of Finance and Planning told Parliament that of the loans and foreign aid the government bad
received, more than 35 % were outright grants, not repayable,
-and that no government so far had obtained so much for Sri
Lanka in outright grants." One such was the JOO million (Rs
4000 million) grant given by the UK for the Victoria project
under the Maha weli scheme. The scale, quantum and sources of
1:hese loans and grants, however, had important implications for
Sri Lanka's foreign policy.
Compared to the previous government, the UNP_ gave
relatively more weight to western bilateral and multilateral
interdependence. The momentum of the Jayewardena govern ..
ment's economic policies has tended to create the free market
economy in Sri Lanka, in place of the state welfarist ap~noaches
which marked the policies of previous governments which were
1hased on forms of state: control and monopolies, import substitu-
159
tion, foreign exchange restrictions, and a greater emphasis on

redistribution of incomes, all of which pertained to an ideology
which was basically anti-capitalist and therefore anti-western.
The primary focus of the Jayewardena government's foreign
policy remained Non-alignment, but domestic economic pressures have necessitated even a greater reliance on western assistance than was customary for previous governments, even
-previous UNP governments. At a luncheon hosted in his
honour by the Japanese Prime Minister in September 1979,
President Jaycwardena declared:
V{e are continuing with the State sector while trying to
make it dynamic, and we arc continuing also with the welfare se~vices as part of our strategy to effect a socialist
transformation of Sri Lanka. We have therefore an economy
that is 60 per cent State owned and thus socialist. At the
same time, the present Government is providing for an
appropriate role for private enterprise. 45
Not all would agree with the President's prognosis about
-the socialist transformation of society, and certainly since that
speech the State sector has progressively given way to private

.-enterprise. Selection of Sri Lanka as one of the eleven states to
benefit from US special assistance to developing' countries in
tllc post-Cancun Reagan administrations's foreign aid programme may therefore be significant.
At the same time, however, Sri Lanka was not likely to com.Promise on its vaunted independent stand in world politics,
-especially in the year of the Baghdad Non-Aligned Summit, and
the Jayewardena government took an important policy decision
when it decided to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and grant it full diplomatic status in Colombo in March
1982. 40 The Sri Lanka government's attitude to the Palestinian
question had been clearly spelt out the previous August when
Acting Fjnance Minister Tyronne Fernando addressed a
seminar held in Colombo under the auspices of the UN Conimittee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestini..an People, wI1en he declared:
160
Fo,eign Policy of Sri Lanka

T1rn Government of Sri Lanka recogn iscs the inalienable
national rights of the Palestinian people and their struggle
for the realisation of these rights under the leadership and
guidance of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The Palestine question is at the core of the Middle East problem and
there can be no solution to this problem without a just
settlement of this issue. And, further, there can be no dura~
blepeace without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in this process.47
NOTES nnd REFERENCES

lMembership of the Non.Aligned Movement, beginning with 25 at
BcJgrade, increased to 47 at Cairo, .53 at Lusaka, 75 at Algiers, and 86
at Colombo.
2Srm, 18 July 1970; Ceylon Daily News, 29 July 1970.
3 1bid, 16 June 1970; Times of Ceylon, 10 July 1970, Early in June,
the Ceylon Society for Justice in Palestine, a Muslim pressure group~
had been urging the government to sever diplomatic ties with Israel~
ibid, 11 June 1970.
.JSee Senate Deb., (1972), Vol. 32, col. 823.
r1TJrc Hit1dll, 14th April 197 J; for Indian Defence Minister Jagjivan
Ram's statement in this connection, see Ministry of External Affairs,
New Delhi, Bangladesh Documents, (Madras, 1971), p. 702.
GTcxt of Prime Minister Bandaranaike's broadcast in Ceylon Daily
News, 25th April 1971; for TJ1c China communication. Ibid 22 May
1971.
1For comments of E. Astapenko quoted from Literatw11ara Gazetta,
see The Sun, 28 August 1973.
8Quotcd in Lanka Guardian, Vol. 4 (1), 1 March 1982.
DSee the Hi11d11, 27th May 196'5.
lOCeylon Daily News, 11 September, 1970. At Cairo Mrs Bandaranaikc called upon all non-aligned states to close their ports and airfieds
to ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and for the liquidation
of bases in colonbl-1erritorios.
11/bid, 14 January, 1971.
12.Jbid, 14 October, 1971.
l:JSce Cey/011 Today, Vol. 20, Sept-Oct. 1971, p. 14.
\_
l4Although the UN General Assembly enjoined on the Ad P.oc
Committee the task of convening a conference to be held in Sri Lan~a
in 1981, the existing state of relations among the superpowers preclude{
the holding of this meeting, which has now been postponed for 1983.
Non-Alig11111e11t Policy After 1970
!6L
l5Tcxt of address in Sri La1tka Today, Vol. 23, October-December.

1974,
lGFrom Text of address to the Colombo Rotary Club (8 4. 1976J.
},finislry of External Ajfalrs, Colombo.
l?'Non-Aiignment-A Deliberate choice: Text of
spe;::ches
by Mrs Sirima R D. Bandaranaike, Prime A1inis/cr of Sri Lanka;
Colombo, Government Deparlmcnt of Information, n. d, p. 18.
lS[bid, p. 55.
19For the Economic Declaration and Action Programme of the
Colombo Summit, sec Bandnranaike Centre for International Studies,
Non-Aligned Conference: Basic Documents 1976, Addendi,m to Basfc
J961-1975 (Colombo, 1977), pp. 15-33.
'20Jbfd, p. 19.
21Ceylon Daily News, 8 December 1977.
22.rcxt of speech in Sri Lanka Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. I, July
1978-June 1979.
23/bicf, Vol, 2, January-June 1980, p. 16.
2.f'Text of speech in Ceylon Daily News, 12 September 1979.
25Address to UNGA, 29 September 1980.
2oneparlment of Informa1ion, Sri Lanka, Tolerance, Non-Aggression and Mutual Respect: Text of Speeches by Hls Excellency J. R.
Jayewardemz, President of Sri Lanka. Colombo, 1919, p. 12.
27 Ccylo1t Daily News, 15 February 1978.
28/oc. cit, p. 15.
2DWeekeud (Colombo), 2l May 1978.
30This part of the present chapter draws upon material in my
article continuity and Change in Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy, 19741979'\ Asian Survey, Vol. 20, September 1980, pp. 879-890.
3 1.Sec Lanka Guardian, Vol. 4, No- 21, 15 March 1982.
32 Ccylon Daily News, 24 and 27 June 1978.
33/bid, 2 and 6 July 1981.
MSri Lanka Foreign Affairs Record, Vol 2, No. 1, July-Septemb~r
1979,
35 Ceylon Daily News, 29 October 1977.
36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombo. Press Release 133/81 of 1S
July 1981.
37Ccylon Daily News~ 14 September 1979.
38/bid.
39See Central Bank of Ceylon, Annual Roports of the A{onetary
Board to t/Je HoJJ'h!e Minister of Finance for 1977 a11d 1978.
4
DTcxt of speech in Sri Lanka Foreig11 Affalrs Record, Vol. 2, No. l
July-September J.979, pp. 19-22.
'
:~Swiday Times, 6 November 1977; Ceylon Daily News, 3 January
197
42
Figures revealed in Parliament on behalf of Minister of Finance
see Ibid, 1 December 1981.
'
May 1978; figures for US assistance as reported in ibid, 2?
1'.fa~:::isi.
162
Fo1'eig11 Policy of Sri Lanka

4.4/bid,
4.5Sri Lanka Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 2, No. 1, July-September

1979, p. 17.
4.GCeylon Daily News, 31 March 1982.
41Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombo, Press Release 158/81 of 10
August 1981.
7
Sri Lanka and Asian Regionalism
The foregoing chapters have dealt with Sri Lanka's Foreign

-Policy in its historical and global context, with particular
--reference to the East-West conflict, and its pervasive manifestations since the 1950s. No account of Sri Lanka's foreign
policy would be complete, however, without reference to its
consistent advocacy of tho motif of Asian regionalism which
has often run concurrently with non-aligned policy, but which
has also sometimes stood as a separate and distinct aspect of
it. This concern with the Asian regional approach, to problems
of development and world politics, was first adumbrated at the
Asi.an Relations Conference held in New Delhi in 1947, then
found expression in the various conferences of the Prime
Ministers of India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma and Sri Lanka
in the mid-fifties, and culminated in the historic Bandung
Conference where newly independent African countries were
inducted into the concept of a regional approach and, in latterday times, have found formation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and more recently, in the move
to establish regional cooperation in the South Asian States
specifically by attempts at institutionalisation of the cooperative
,endeavour.
The following pages will describe Sri Lanka's role in these
developments and relato them to the basic foreigri poJicy issues.
I shall take up first the part played by Sri Lanka in A.sian and
164
Foreign Policy of Sri Lank<r
Asian-African regional Conferences, 1947-1955, and then

discuss Sri Lanka's interest in ASEAN and South Asian regional
cooperation.
The Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April 1947
The Asian Relations Conference, which met in New Delhi
(March 23rd to April 2nd, 1947) was convened by India largely
owing to the initiative of Jawaharlal Nehru though Nehru
generously conceded that the "idea of such a Conference arose
simultaneously in many minds and in many countries of Asia".
Of the 28 countries officially listed as represented at the Conference, as many as nine were Soviet republics from the Asian
region (e.g. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikstan, Mongolia,.
Kazakhstan, Armenia); many others were still under colonial
rule (India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam).
China and Afghanistan were represented at the Conference. So
was the Palestine, Jewish Delegation; and observers were prcw
sent from the Arab League, Australian Institute of International
Affairs, India Institute London, Institute of Pacific Relations,.
Moscow, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the
United Nations Organisation itself.
The main object of the Conference was declared to be the
exchange of idea,; regarding "common problems which aJL
Asian countries had to face in the post~war era and to study
them in Round Table groups". 1 Accordingly, Round Tables
were organised for the discussion of National 11ovcments for
Freedom, Migration and Racial Problems, Economic Develop
ment and Social Services, Cultural Problems and Status of
\Vomcn. No resolutions were adopted, except one relating to
the establishment of a permanent Asian Relations Organisation.
The significance of the conference lay not so much in what it
achieved but in the mere fact that it was held. It was ltailed as
marking the beginning of a new era, the dmvn of a new period
of development and advancement in Asian history. For Nehru,
the Conference marked a watershed in human history. nAsia't
he said nafter a long period of quiescence, has suddenly
b.ecome' important again in :world affairs";2 and Mrs. Sarojini
Naidu, who presided over the Conference was almost \Vords"'\Vorthian in ]1cr enthusiasm, exhorting Hfelf ow Asians, commdcs
165
.Sri Lanka and Asian Regionalism

3
and kinsmen" to arise and "march forward to the Dawnn. It

was inevitable that the conference discussions in such an
emotion-charged atmosphere should have assumed a PanAsianist and~ by implication an anti-western form, although
Pan-Asianism was far removed from Nehru's own conception of
1he Conference.
The Sri Lanka delegation of 15, led by S. W.R.D. Bandar-anaike was not an offi.cia1 delegation (nor were other delegations
participating at the Conference). Sri Lanka delegates wholeheartcclly endorsed the main conference decision that in all
Asian countries, national freed.om movements should "move
in the direction of securing social, poJitical, economic and
-<::ultural democracy for all their peoples", and that no Asian
country should give any direct or indirect assistance to any
-colonial power in its attempt to dominate countries in Asia.
A Sri Lanka delegate was constrained to refer, however, to the
fear of small countries like Sri Lanka that domination, not
necessarily political but economic and demographic, could ,vell
emanate from the Asian Big Powers, India and China. On the
-other hand, delegates from Sri Lanka were, at this time, sensitive to possibilities that forms of military and economic subjection to the western colonial powers could continue even after
the formal grant of independence to colonial territories.
\Vbile it was realised in the Round Table discussions on
Economic DevClopment, that there was little scope in the
-prevailing context for autonomous economic development in
many countries of Asia, the solution proposed was not importation of western capital aid and technical assistance, but
increased inter-Asian cooperation. Considered from contem- ~
porary perspectives on the NorthSouth dialogue and the quest
for a New International Economic Order it seems interesting
that there was, in 1947, a great deal of suspicion of foreign
capital 1 the essential point being, as an Indian delegate put it,
"how to liquidate the large foreign establishments in colonial
countriesn. 4 Delegates from Sri Lanka as well as from other
countries, including India, expressed great misgivings about
"dollar imperialism," saying that they did not wish to shake
-0ff a political master to be subjected to an economic master.s
Tn the Round Table on Racial Problems and Inter-Asian
}.1igration, the consensus of opinion was that uequaUty between
i!66
Foreign Policy of Sri Lankac
all citizens of a country, irrespective of race and creed, should

be the rule for all countries. While condemning unequal
treatment it was hoped that governments would take measures
to implement the principle of equality", 6
At the end of the conference, Nehru remarked on the
significant unanimity of view of delegates "from the four corners.
of the mighty Asian continent". Since 1947, indeed, the attitude
to foreign economic assistance had changed in most Asian
countries. However, the political aspirations and sentiments
expressed at New Delhi in 1947 remained part of the postcolonial legacy of all countries now designated as belonging to
the Third Wor]d, and these were given even more forceful
expression during the course of tbe next two decades.
The South-East Asian Prime Minist-ers Conference, Colombo,_

April-May 1954
Between the Asian Relations Conference and the Southeast

Asian Prime Ministers' Conference of I954 intervened tbe
eighteen-nation conference on Indonesia, convened by Nehru
in New Delhi in December 1949. This conference was in a
follow-up of the Asian Relations Conference, its primary
object being to support the national liberation of Indonesia at
a time when the Dutch had mounted a police action to retain
control of Indonesia. Bandaranaike was again Sri Lanka's.
chief delegate to the Conforence representing the UNP government of D.S. Senanayake, who had steered Sri Lanka herself
to independence in February 1948. This government was
among the first to undertake specific measures, to assist in the
realisaltion of Indonesian independence-it closed Sri Lanka's
harbour and airports to Dutch ships and aircraft engaged
in the police action.
More momentous in the evolution of the Asian regional
concept from Sri Lanka's point of view was the summonlng in
Colombo of the meeting of the Prime Ministers of India,
Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia by the Sri Lankan Prime
Minister, Sir John Kotelawela in April-May 1954.' Evidently
Sir John originally had modest aims for the conference, env1sa
ging that it would concern itself primarily with discussions.
relating to problems of economic development in the area. Its
167
scope was enlarged, however, largely at the instance of Nehru,

who was anxious to articulate concerted Asian neutralist
pressure at a time when the crisis in Indo-China was at Hs
height, with a view to forestalling the possibility of a third
World War.
When the conference opened on 18th April, subjects Jisted
for cliscussion in the opening speeches of delegates were limited
to security of newly independent states, economic developn1ent,
dangers of communist subvero:;.ive activities, and a proposal to
summon an Asian-African Conference. India and Sri Lanka,
however, referred directly to Inda.China, and the question of
hydrogen bomb explosions in the Pacific Ocean, and it appeared
that Nehru was determined to discuss only these two subjects.8
In support of the Indian stand~ the Indian delegation
distributed to the otller conferenca delegates copies of a speech
made by Nehru on April 24, in which he had proposed a sixpoint peace plan for Inda.China. This peace plan put forward
by the Indian government "in all humility and with the earnest
desire and hope that (it) will engage the attention of the
(Geneva) Conference as a whole and each of the parties concerned", contained the following propositions:
1. In order to foster ,ca climate of peace and negotiation",
the Government of India coappeal to all concerned to
desist from threats, and to the combatants to refrain
from stepping up the tempo of war".
2. An immediate cease-fire should be brought about.
3. Guarantee of complete independence for Indo-Cbina.
4. Direct negotiations between the "parties principally
concerned"~.
5. Guarantee of non-intervention "to which 1he U.S., the
U.S.S.R., the U.K., and China shall be primary parties".
A convention of non-intervention should be enforced
under U.N. auspices.
6. The United Nations should be informed of the progress
of the Conference. Its good offices for purposes of
conciliation under the appropriate articles of the
Cliarter, and not for invoking sanctions, should be
soughtn. 9
168
Foreign Policy of Sri La11ka
When this plan was circulated at the Colombo Conference

however, it failed to wjn general endorsement from the Asia~
Prime Ministers. Unanimous agreement was reached only on
two of the six points-those relating to an immediate ccasc~flrc
and the guarantee of complete independence for Indo-China'.
Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, argued that
detailed recommendations, as set out in the Nehru plan, might
embarrass and impede tho negotiations of the Big Powers,
Communist Chinn, nnd possibly o1hcr interested powers at
Geneva. Mohammad Ali contended that if a cease-fire were
achieved, the question of non-intervention by Powers not
directly involved in the conflict would not arise. The otl1er
Prime Ministers agreed with his ~ug_gcstion that the Asian
states in the Colombo Conference should avoid action which
would lead to dissension in the Geneva mccting.10
A further disagreement among the Prime Ministers manifested itself when the subject of Communism came up for discussion. /1. draft Resolution, declaring that international Communism was the biggest potential danger in South and Southeast
Asia, had recommended that the Conference should agree (a)
to reiterate its faith in democracy, (b) to take measures to prevent Communist interference, and (c) to exchange information
on further resistance against Communism. 11 This resolution
was favoured by Mohammad Ali of Pakistan, K.otclawcln of
Sri Lanka and U Nu of Burma; but Nehru insisted that a
resolution on Communism was inconsistent with India's policy
of non-alignment. Formal recognition of the dangers of communism, he said, would be tantamount to a declara_tion in
favour of the \Vest, and would mean tying these Asian countries
to the "'Anglo-Amcrkan bloc". 1 :? Nehru wa':i supported in this
stand by Ali Sastroamidjojo, Prime Minister oflndoncsia. Sir
John, as "one of the most outspokenly anti-communist of
Asian statcsmcn", 18 was "particularly anxious to secure a dcclar..
ation on international Communism",:u but in the light of the
stand of India and I11doncsia, 1J1c matter was relegated to the
drafting committees for compromise.
There were other items, J1owevcr, on wJ1ich the Prime
Ministers were able to reach agreement. TJ1csc focluded a
condemnation of c0Ionialism,1'a demand for a standstill agreement to halt explosions of thermo-nuclear weapons, and a
169
resolution, introduced by Pakistan, demanding independence

"as soon as possible" for Morocco and Tunisia. Another
resolution was adopted by India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia
-calling for the admission of Communist China to the United
Nations. Sri Lanka, not being a UN member herself at the
time, did not associate herself with this rcsolution. 15
Despite their differences of opinion, however, the Final
Communique issued by the Prime Ministers on May 2 gave
-cvjdcnce of a ,csubstantial community of outlook The Prime
Ministers called for an immediate cease-fire in Inda-China, and
-proposed that France should declare that she is "irrevocably
committed to the complete independence of Inda-China". While
-welcoming the attempts being made jn Geneva to find a solution to the problem, the Prime Ministers declared that they felt
that any resolution Hrcquired direct negotiations between the
parties principally concerned, namely, France, the three Assodatcd States of Inda-China and Vietminh as well as other
parties invited by agreement'\ No mention was made of nonintervention by the Big Powers, but it was stated that the
success of direct negotiations would be greatly helped "by an
agreement on the part of all the countries concerned and particularly China, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
U.S.S.R. on the steps necessary to prevent the recurrence or
resumption of hostilities".
The Prime Ministers also c'viewcd with grave concern the
-developments in regard to the hydrogen bomb and other
weapons of mass destructio11". Pending an agreement for the
-elimination and prohibition of hydrogen bombs, -the Prime
Ministers felt that no further explosions of a hydrogen bomb
should take place. On the question of China, the Prime Ministers supported the representation of the Government of the
Pcoplc~s Republic of China in the United Nations, and felt that
such representation would "help to promote stability jn Asia,
case world tensions and assist in bringing about a more realistic
approach to the problems concerning the world, particularly
the Far East"~
The Prime Ministers deplored the continued existence of
-colonialism in general; regarding its particu1a-r expression in
1v1orocco and Tunisia, it was stated that the independence of
these two countries should be recognised. A compromise was.
0
170
arrived at on the subject of communism, w11ich had caused so

much bickering at the Conference. The Communique stated:
The subject of communism in its nationaJ and international'
aspects was generalI.y discussed and the Prime Ministers
made known to each other their respective views on and
attitudes toward the Communist ideologies.
The Prime Ministers affirmed their faith in democracy and
democratic institutions and, being resolved to preserve in
their respective countries the freedom inherent in the democratic system, declared their unshakeable determination to
resist interference in the affairs of their countries by external Communist, anti-Communist, or other agencies.
They were convinced that such interference threatened the
sovereignty, security, and political independence of their
respective states and the right of each country to develop
and progress in accordance with the conceptions and desire
of its own people. 16
The Conference was undoubtedly a great success. For the

first time a sense of Asian solidarity was demonstrated in regard
to specific issues of international affairs. In certain Asian
circ1es there bad been a sense of bitterness that Asian affair&
were still to a large extent being settled outside the Asian continent,17 but as. political observers in New Delhi pointed out, the
Colombo Conference "served notice on the world that they are
capable ofiacting as a unit in affairs of mutual concern.'' 15 As
Nehru said, "the Colombo Conference of South Asian Prime
Ministers certainly opens a new chapter in Asian relations and
holds out much promise for the future." 19 The Colombo Conference became the forerunner of other meetings between India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia, who came to be
labelled at this time as the Colombo Powers.
The most significant feature of the Conference, as The
Hindu pointed out, was the constructive contribution it made
to the solution of the Indo-China problems. 20 During the Conference, Anthony Eden, then attending the Geneva Conference,
sent a telegram to the three Commonwealth Prime Ministers.
Sri Lanka and Asian Regionaltsm
17r
at Colombo asking them whether they were prepared to participate in action to support any settlement arrived at in Geneva. 21
A direct wireless )ink was established between Colombo and
Geneva_, and Eden kept the Asian Prime Ministers informed of
the progress of the Geneva Conference and of British views. 2 2;
Kotela\vela mentions that the Big Four at Geneva were anxious
to be informed of the Asian viewpoint on Indo-China, and
indecd 1 had invited the Asian Premiers to set up a Southeast
Asian body to administer the transition Government there if
the western Powers and the People's Republic of China answered the call for an immediate cease-fire. 23
In response to the Eden telegram_,. Nehru replied that if
the Geneva Conference arrived at an acceptable decision, and
if India were invited to do so by both sides, it would be willing
to participate in, or be associated with a guarantee; but it was
pointed out that India would not accept the obligation to use
force against any one who contravened the terms of the settlement.24 Sri Lanka's stand was the same. However, it was made
patently clear at the Conference that different kinds of neutralists existed among the Colombo Powers. The Nehru style of
neutralism (or non-alignment) was not acceptable to Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, and Burma. The Kotelawela brand of neutralism
was not acceptable to India and Indonesia. If the divergent
points of view were reconciled at all, and the Conference was
extended an extra. day in order that differences of opinion
might be reconciled, it was due largely to Sir 01iver Goonetillekc, then Governor-General designate of Sri Lanka, whoseindefatigable labours in the drafting committees resulted in
terminology which was acceptable to the opposing factions. 2 S
The basic predilections of the Prime Ministers at the Conference also afford instructive insights. Indonesia's Sastroamidjojo was mainly concerned with a proposal for the summoning
ofa large-scale Asian-African Conference; on the controversial
issues he was content to follow the Indian lead. Burma~s U Nu
played a passive role; on the controversial issues, he was content to follow Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Pakistan's Mohammad
Ali considered it pretentious of the Conference to attempt to
solve the Indo-China problem when there were issues of greater
moment to the Asian Premiers nearer home, such as Kashmir.M
He was not prepared to allow any discussion of the proposed.
7
172
Foreign Policy of Sri L,mka
Pakistani-United States military pact." He did make a halfhearted attempt at a kind of leadership in the Arab world-the
resolution on Tunisia and Morocco was sponsored by him; but
another resolution, also sponsored by him1 calling for usteps to
check Israeli aggression against neighbouring Arab states" was
dropped when Nehru opposed it." The effective contrast at
the Conference must be seen in the attitudes of India and Sri
Lanka.
Nehru's primary concern was with Western colonialism in
:general; and with its manifestation in Inda-China in particular.
Kotelawela's primary concern was with intemational communinism in general; and with the potential threat it held for Southeast Asia in particular. The one was preoccupied with an Asian
country fighting for its freedom; the other was concerned with
1he independence and integrity of Asian countries which had
already won their freedom. But while Nehru considered the
war in Indo-China primarily as a nationalist struggle against the
French, Kotclawela and also Mohammad Ali, were more acutely
aware of its cold war implications. For this reason they were
unwilling to subscribe to a denunciation of western colonialism
without at the same time denouncing international communism.
In this stand they were supported by U Nu. Hence the compromise formula adopted in the Final Communique that the
Prime Ministers were determined "to resist interference in the
affairs of their countries by external Communist 1 anti-Communist or other agencies".
1
The Bogar Conference of the Colombo Powers, December 1954
The Bogar Conference held in Indonesia, 28-29 December

1954, was the curtain-raiser for the historic Bandung Conference
held in the following year. Both emanated from a proposal
made in Colombo in April 1954 by Ali Sastroamidjojo, Prime
Minister of Indonesia that an immediate Asian-African Conference be held. The final communique of the Colombo Conference, having endorsed this proposal had delegated to the
Indonesian Prime Minister the task of working out its implementation.
At Bogor., the Prime Ministers of Indonesia, India,Pakistan,.
""Burma and Sri Lanka reviewed the international situation, set

down the objectives of the proposed Asian-African Conference
and discussed the question of representation at this conference.
On the question of representation it was decided that only those
governments of Asia and Africa which had independent governments would be invited. The agenda was set down as follows:
(a) To promote goodwill and cooperation among the
nations of Asia and Africa; to explore and advance
their mutual as well as common interests, and to establish and further friendliness and neighbourly relations;
(b) To consider social, economic and cultural problems and
relations of the countries represented;
(c) To consider problems of special interest to Asian and.
African peoples-for example, problems affecting
national sovereignty and of racialism and colonialism.
(d) To view the position of Asia and Africa and their
peoples in the world of today and the contribution tl1ey
can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.:::0
Notable among those not included in the list of invitees were
South Africa. Israel and North and South Korea.
Reviewing the international situation the Prime Ministers
aexpressed gratification at the result oftbo Geneva Conference
on Indo-China and the cessation ofllostilitics"; supported Indonesia on the West Iran issue, "expressed their continued support
to tl1e demands of the peoples of Tunisia und their legitimate
right to self-determination; reiterated their great concern in
respect of the destructive potential of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions" and requested the powers concerned to bring
about their cessation. The date of the Asian-African Conference was set for tl1c last week of April 1955.
The Bandung Conference, Jn<loncsia, April 1955
Twenty nine countries were .represented at Bandung. Apart.
from tlie five sponsoring states, there were: Afghanistan,.
Cambodia, Peoples Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the
Gold Coast, Persia, Iraq, Japan. Jordan; Laos Labanon
Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Phili ppincs, Saudi Arabia, Sudan:
174
ForcignPol/cy of Sri Lanka
Syria, Siam, Turkey, North and Soulh Vietnam nnd Yemen.

The 29 countries, adding up to n population of nearly one and
a half billion tepresenlecl more than half the world's population and consisted of countries with diverse religious and political and social systems. Yet as President Soekarno said:
"We arc united by a common detestation of Colonialism in whatever form it nppcar.1. \Ve are united by a common detestation
of racialism. And we nrc united by a common determination to
preserve and stabilise pence in the world."' 0 Their calling of
the Con.forcncc~', says Kahin, "Wns symptomatic of their protest-along with many of the states they invited-against the
failure of the Western powers to consult with them and to
share with them sufiicicntlyin dccisionsaffocling thccountricsof
Asia~\~ 1 Asia. is no longer passive, said Nehru. It had been passive
enough in the past, It was no more a submissive Asia; that,
too, was a thing of the past, The Asia of today was dynamic,
full of lifc.:.i:! The sense that Asian countries had a right to be
consulted and to be heard in Asian affairs had been implicit in
the decisions arrived at by the Colombo Powers in their meeting of April-t\1ay, J 954. The same sense was made explicit in
various statements by Nc1uu.:i...-i
AU five sponsoring countries were deeply concerned about
the tensions that threatened the peace of the world; and they
'\Vere certain that Asia and Africa bad something to offer
to alleviate these tensions. India wantc<l to extend the area of
peace on the basis or the non-alignment of nations between
the power blocs. Burma wanted a general acceptance of the
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, to which Pakistan
added two other principles, catting them the "Seven Pillars of
Pcacc/~;'l:t Indonesia, and, to a greater or lesser degree, the
other powers as ,veil, believed that colonialism, Htlleoldscourge
under which Asia and Africa have suffered for ages," was one
of the main causes of international te1isions. Eradication of
this evil thing was, therefore, a primary pr'crequisite of intcrnationa1 peace. (Indeed, Indonesia was grcntly concerned at
the Conference to promote her own cnsc against the Netherlands on the \Vest Irian issue). Sri Lanka was specially interested in three issues at the conference; First, co~existence in the
Asian-African region; second, the East-VVcst deadlock over the
.applications for UN membership of about a dozen countries.
175
including Sri Lanka; third, economic co~operation.

There was also a sense among the sponsoring countries that
Asia and Africa could mobilize their moral strength on be~
half of international peace. President Soekarno stated in his
-opening address that the peoples of Asia and Africa wielded
1ltt1e physical power, their economic strength was dispersed and
slight. They could not indulge in power politics. Diplomacy
for them was not a mct.tter of the big stick, and their statesmen
were not, by and large, backed up with serried ranks of jet
bombers. But, he added, "we can do much. We can inject the
voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilize all the
spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and
Africa on tlic side of peace. " 36 In the same strain, Sir John
Kotelawela spoke of "the strength of our weaknes$", and sug_gcsted that the countries of Asia and Africa should offer
themselves as mediators in the power struggle' between "the
giants of Communism and anti-Communism''. '"In a world'',
J1c added,
driven to the verge of madness by the omnipresent spectres

of fear and violence and hatred, from which it is unable
to escape, itis our historic privilege and our solemn duty to
offer the hope, however belated and remote, of a way out.aa
A particular cause of common concern among the Sponsoring countries was the increasing tension between the United
States and China, and the fear that this might precipitate an
.atomic war. A related factor was the desire of the five sponsors
c to lay a firmer foundation for China's peaceful relations with
the rest of the world, not only with the West, but equally with
themsefres and other areas of S<?._utlzeasf Asia periphe,a/ to
China.n 37 An important objective in this connection was their
desire to detach China from her close diplomatic alignment
with Soviet Russia, because this> it was believed~ would dimi~
nish the tendency towards polarization of world power blocs,
and thereby reduce the possibility of war. 38 As Kahin bas
stated:
176
Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka,

The governments of the five sponsoring countries-but.particularly India, Indonesia and Burma-envisaged t11e,
Asian-African Conference as providfog a means for enabl
ing China to estab1ish the contacts necessary to increase her
diplomatic independence of Soviet Russia. They conceived
ofit as an educational device which would serve both to
enlighten the Chinese as to the realities of their international,
environment and to educate leaders of those non-Communist Asian and African states which had little or no contacts.
with Communist China as to the actual attitudes of Peking's.
leaders toward both non-Communist Asia and the West."
The Colombo Powers were also aware of the covert

support extended to local- Communist parties in the area by
Moscow and Peking. It was with this in mind that the BurmesePrime Minister canvassed, at the Bandun Conference, the=
general acceptance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which had been formulated by Nehru and Chou En-Iai
the year before. Nehru had believed before the Conference
that the possibility of China's adherence to the Five Principles,
which Chou En-lai had reiterated during his visit to New Delhi
in June 1954, would be enhanced if China publicly acknowledged adherence to thes~ principles. The Asian-African Conference wa.s regarded, especially by India and Burma, as providing a suitable environment for this purposC;". From the very
outset, however, Sir John Kotelawela was skeptical about co-existence as a philosophy unless specific guarantees were given that
Communist countries would not interfere in the internal affairs
of the democratic nations. In a statement to the Press while at
Bandung, Sir John expressed his belief in co-existence, ifproperly
conceived, as the only alternative to destruction and death.
But co-existence could not be a one-sided affair, said Sir John,
"and what is the guarantee that the story of the camel in the
Arab's tent will not be repeated when we agree to co-exist? In
bis conception, the cessation of international communism, and
particularly the dissolution of the Cominform, was an essential
preliminary to co-cxistence.'10 Kahin mentions, citing Sir John,
that Chou En-lai had been told by Sir John at Bandung that
the Ceylon Government had clear evidence of local Communists getting help from outside. Sir John l1ad asked for a pledge
Sri Lanka and Asian. Regionallsm
177
that the Cominform or its members would refrain from ]ending

support to Communist parties in non~Communist countries.
"Peaceful co-existence", according to Sir John, needed to be
thus spelled out and put on a positive basis. But Chou had
refused to give such a pledge,41 replying that the Cominform
wns a Russian organisation, and had nothing to do with China.42
Kahin speculates that Chou's attitude probably precipitated
Sir John's decision to introduce the issue of Soviet colonialism
in the Political Committee of the Conference.43
The Achievement of the Conference
The delegates at the ConfCrence were divided among three

working committees-the Political Committee, the Economic
co.operation Committee, and the Cultural Co-operation Committee. By far the most important issues were discussed in the
Political Committee. Much of the discussion in this committee
centred around two controversial issues-colonialisin, and
upromotion of world peace and co-operationn.
Problems affecting national sovereignty and colonialism
had been among the declared objectives of the Asian-African
Conference, and, as was to be expected, there was considerable
unanimity among the delegates on the subject of Western colonialism. But already-in the Open Sessions a discordant note
had been struck by the Iranian delegate, Djalal Abdeh, who
referred to the new colonialism of Soviet Russia. He was
fo1lowcd by the Iraqi delegate, who made specific mention of
Turkestan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, and
Czechoslovakia, as areas of Soviet colonialism. 44 When the
subject of dependent peoples and colonialism came up for
discussion in the Political Committee, Prime Minister Kotelawela engendered a bitter controversy by unexpectedly reintroducing the problem of Soviet colonialism. In his much
publicized speech to the Political Committee on April 21, Sir
John Kotelawela pointed out that colonialism took many forms.
Delegates were all well aware of Western colonialism, but,
added Sir John, "there is another form of colonialism about
which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our
minds and to which some of us would perhaps not agree to
apply the term colonialism at all".
178

Think for example of these satellite States under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe-Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia
Lithuania, Esthonia and Poland. Are not these colonic;
as much as any of the colonial territories in Afri~1. and
Asia'? And if we are united in our opposition to colonia~
!ism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our
opposition to Soviet colonialism as n1uch as to Western
imperialism?J. 5
Sir John refrained from following up these remarks

with a formal proposal, at the instance of Nehru and
others; but the trend of his speech was picked up by
the Pakistani Prime 1vlinister Molrnmmad Ali, who expatiated on the subject of Soviet imperialism, while taking
care at the same time to exclude China from his fulminations.
Thereupon Turkey introduced a resolution, backed by fran,
Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines,
aud the Sudan, in which nan types of colonialism, including
international doctrines resorting to the methods of force, infiltration and subversion", were condemned.'16 Doth Nehru and
Chou En-lai attempted to co~bat the concept of Soviet colonialism, but without success, and the matter was delegated to a
subcommittee composed of delegates from Burma, Sri"Lanka,
China, India, Labanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, and
Turkey who were entrusted with the task of formulating a
statement on colonialism acceptable to all twenty nine delegations.
The majority of subcommittee insisted on a condemnation
of"colonialism in all its forms", but Chou and Kdshna Menon
of India refused to accept this phrase. 47 Eventually Chou was
willing to compromise. The term "manifestations" was substituted for "forms'\ and the Final Communique of the Conference declared that "colonialism in all its manifestations is an
evil which should speedily be brought to an end"." The Communique also declared that "the subjection of peoples to ali~n
subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a dental
of fundamental human rights. is contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world
peace and co-operationn. SpecificaUy, the Conference declared
179
its support for the independence of Algeria, Morocco 8.nd

Tunisia; for the rights of the ATab people of Palestine; for the
position of Indonesia on the West Irian issue; and for the
position of Yemen on the Aden issue.
The other subject of controversy was "promotion of world
peace and co-operation". Herc the controversy centred mainly
round two concepts--peaccful co-existence, and the right of
nations to single or collective' self-defence, In the Political
-Committee discussions, the Burmese Prime Minister advocated
support for the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, but,
in the context of the prevailing mistrust of Communist states,
some countries were not prepared to accept co-existence as a
viable concept. Cambodia, for example, held that it was up to
the Communists to demonstrate their peaceful intentions, and
introduced a resolution which called upon the participating
countries to "scrupulously respect the independence of all other
countries''. Pakistan introduced the "Seven Pillars of Peace",
which incorporated, in addition to the Five Principles, the
right of nations to single and collective self-defence. The principle of collective self-defence came under strong attack from
Nehru, who held that pacts increased insecurity and heightened
the possibility of war. "Every step", he said, <=that takes place
in reducing that area in the world which may be called the
unaligned area is a dangerous step and leads to war":10 But
Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Philippines come out in strong
support of the Pakistani position.
Chou En-lai himself introduced seven principles 1 incorporating the Five Principles, but adding further safeguards.
These were: respect for each other's sovereignty and terdtorial integrity; abstention from aggression and threats against
one another; abstinence from interference or intervention in the
internal affairs of one another; racial equality and non-discrimination; equality of all nations; respect for the right of the
people of all countries to choose freely theirpolitical and economic systems, and that relations between countries should be
mutually beneficial. 6 0
Each of these principles Chou illustrated with specific Chine-Sc guarantees given or promised to China's uneasy neighbOurs.
7'he spe.ech was eminently successful in that it created a deep
1mpress10n on many of the non-Communist delegations, even
180
to the extent of altering their attitudes. Chou also made particular reference to relations between the United States and China
The Chinese people, he said,did not want a war with the United
States. They were willing to settle international disputes by
peaceful means. If delegates would like to facilitate the settlement of disputes between the United States and China by
peaceful means, it would be most beneficial to the relaxation
of tension in the Far East and a.lso to the postponement and prevention of a world war. Later Chou released to the Press a
statement to the effect that:
The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter
into negotiations with the United States Government to
discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and
specially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan
area. 61
The upshot of the discussion in the Political Committee on
"promotion of world peace and co-operation" was that a set of
ten principles was adopted for incorporation in the Final Communique. These included respect for fundamental human rights,
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations,
recognition of equality of a1l nations and races, abstention from
intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another
country, respect for the right of each nation to defend itself
singly or collectively, abstention from the use of arrangements
of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of
the big powers, refraining from acts or threats of aggression,
settlement ofa11 international disputes by peaceful means, promotion of mutual interests and co-operation, and respect for
justice and international obligations:52
Despite the controversies engendered in the Political Committee on the subjects of colonialism and promotion of world.
peace and cooperation, a wide consensus prevailed on other
problems considered, in the Political, as ,veU as in the Economic
and Cultural Committees. The delegates agreed that member~
ship in the United Nations should be universal, and called o~
the Security Council to support admission of all States quahfied for membership in terms of the Charter, mentioning specifically Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, and a
Srl Lanka
and Asian Regionalism
181
united Vietnam. Further the Conference were of the opinion

that Asian and African countries were under~represented on the
Security Council. The Conference tcconsidered that disarmament and the prohibition of production, experimentation and
the use of nuclear and thermo~nuclear weapons of war are
imperative to save mankind and civilization from the fear and
prospect of wholesale destructionu, and declared that universal
disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of
peace. T11e Conference also declared its strong support of the
fundamcgtal principles of Human Rights as set forth in the
U.N. Charter, but deplored "the policies and practices of racial
-segregation and discrimination which form the basis of govem~
mcnt and human relations in large regions of Africa and in
other parts of the worldn. Special mention was made in this
connection of South Africa. The achievements of the Conference's Cultural and Economic Committees were relatively
less lmportant.
Despite the abstract nature of many of its formal resoluiions, and despite the serious divergence of views which prevailed, the Asian-African Conference achieved a surpdsing
-degree of success. Its major achievement, as Kahin pointed out, was its educational function-uthe attainment by
the representatives of the twenty-nine participant countries of
.a much fuller and more realistic understandingofone another's
-point ofview.''53 One constructive result was that the fear and
mistrust of China, entertained by many Asian countries, were
largely allayed. Indeed, for Chou En-lai, the Conference was a
"diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude".s.s: In many ways
the Conference was educational for China too. It brought
China face to face with the realities of her Asian political
-constellation, a.nd also with the extent of anti-Communist feeling in many countries. The Conference also contributed to the
relaxation of international tension, particularly in the Far East.
The Chinese Prime Minster's declarations of t11e problem of
Formosa "led first to an easing and, eventually, almost to a
dying away of tension between China and the United States in
that area",55 even though this was only a temporary
-phenomenon.
182
Sri Lanka and Regional Cooperation in Sonth Asia
In his inaugural address to the Conference of Foreign

Secretaries of seven South Asian countries held in Colombo
in April 1981, Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister A.C.S. Hameed
expatiated on the rationale for rgional cooperation in South
Asia in the following terms:
We are (also) sustained by a great deal of communality.
Geographically, our region is clearly definable. Historically
and culturally we share the same or a similar heritage.
The major religions of the world co-exist in our region.
Non-Alignment is common to all our foreign policies. Our
art, architecture, literature, and music.are strikingly similar.
Our region's folklore-which expresses the genius of a
people in distilled and homespun form-goes back to the
same roots. And, although we are in different stages of
development, our development needs and our development strategies have many common elements.
And the Minister went on to add:

Just as much as Colombo has served as a focal point for
different forms of cooperation, successive governments of
Sri Lanka have strongly endorsed and supported the ideal
of an integrated regional approach to our common problems, and towards our common aspirations. 66
Inaugurating a Seminar on South Asian Regional Cooperation
in Hyderabad, India's Minister for External Affairs, Sri P.V.
Narasimha Rao declared, also in April 1981:
India's approach to regional cooperation is positive. We
are convinced that it will add a new and'qualitativc dimension to the ongoing activities amongst the countries o~
the region in a mcani0gful and ovcr-~11 bene.ficial manner;.,,
183
These remarks were made on the occasion, and the eve, of a

meeting held at Foreign Secretary leveJ, on the initiative of
President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh, by India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, to
pursue the materialisation of South Asfan regional cooperation. This meeting, held in Colombo in April 1981 was the
first step in the direction of such a regional .approach, and was
largely exploratory in character. The seven participating
countries listed five areas in which Study Groups assigned to five
of the participants would undertake feasibility studies for
regional cooperation, with powers to review existing cooperative arrangements, determine the potential and scope for future
cooperation, and to draw up work programmes for this purpose. Areas of study assigned to the five countries were as
follows:
Agriculture
Rural Development
Telecommunications
Meteorology
Health & Population Activities
--
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
India
Nepal
In accordance with a decision reached at in Colombo, the

Foreign Secretaries of the seven participating countries met six
months later, in November 198 I, in Kathmandu, for the purpose
of agreeing on the need for establishing 'appropriate modalities"
for implementation of the recommendations for the Study
Groups. At this meeting they also identified an Immediate
Action Programme and a Long-Term Action Programme, and
a.dded three other areas for cooperation namely:
Transport
Postal Services
Scientific and
Technological
Cooperation
Maldives
Bhutan
Pakistan
184
A further meeting, this tilile at Foreign Jvfinister level, was projected for mid-1982. At the Kathmandu meeting it was agreed
to convert the existing Study Groups into Working ,Groups in
each of the five areas identified in Colombo, and to rotate the
Chairmanship of the Working Groups, the periodicity of which
would be initially decided by each Group. The major task of
the Working Groups was to be the drawing up of a comprehensive programme of action for cooperation both long4crm
and immediate. The Immediate Action Programme was to
include such components as exchange of data and information,
exchange of experts, training facilities> scho]arships, etc., and
organisation of seminars, workshops, and so on on a regional
basis; while the Long-Term Programme of Action would include
inter alia assessment of needs and resources, preparation of
specific projects of a regional nature and modalities for financing the projects. The Joint Co111munique of the Colombo
meeting had stressed that Hregional cooperation was not
intended or eKpected to be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation but could complement both; nor should it
be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations". 58
\VHhin the framework of South Asian regionalism, much
emphasis is being placed on development of Himalayan resources, but the cooperative endeavour so modestly begun by the
seven countries also offers much scope for development of
telecommunications, shipping, transfer oftechnology, scientific
research and agriculture. None of these countries have surrendered their options to enter into bi1ateral or other mu1ti-1ateral
arrangements, nor had they lost faith completely in the NorthSouth dialogue to promote international economic cooperation.
Indeed, at tho New Delhi Consultations in February 1982,
India's Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, who had hosted the meeting of 44 countries: gave expression to her deep concern "at the
visible deterioration in the global economy even in this shor~
period of four months since the Cancun surnmit"; 59 But, though
post-Cancun developments were disappointing, she found Hn~
room for despair". In fact the whole purpose of the New Delhi
Consultations was to help determine how effectively d~ve:oping countries could set in motion the North-South negot1ati.ons
while promoting at the same time South-South cooperation,
recognising, according to Indian official spokesmen, the "cos-
185
mctic relationship existing between the North-South dialogue

and South-South cooperationn. 60
Developing countries liad placed great reliance on UN
Resolution No. 34/139 ofl979, which envisaged global talks within the UN framework on energy, raw materials, trade, development_, currency and financial questions, and which they regarded
cas an important landmark in their quest for a New International
Economic Order. Divergences between the western industriaIN
ised nations had brought ongoing discussions <liTected towards
1his end to a halt, and the main objective of the Cancun summit
neld in August 1981, which had been summoned outside the UN
framework, was to unfreeze this situation, But the United
States was strongly opposed to NIEO discussions within the UN
framework; President Reagan at Cancun made the US position
-clear by stating that there should be no talks on general principles, only on specific issues. His position was that US ajd to
,developing countries would be granted mostly on a bilateral
basis, and that developing countries should honour and ackno~
wledgc the Brctton Woods institutions-IBRD, IMF and
-GATT-and not create new international institutions. At
Cancun President Reagan also exhorted developing countries
to go in for private enterprise, attributing their poverty to
planning and control of economic development, and he stated
unequivocally tl1at US aid would depend on whether developing countries eneouraged private enterprise. 61 Countdes like
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Thailand, Kenya. the Philippines and
Oman were among the eleven 'countries selected for special
bilateral US aid.
In the post-Cancun New Delhi talks in February 1982, three

different approaches to the aborted North-South problem made
themselves felt. Countries like Malaysia, Ecuador and Algeria
favoured the pursuit of commitments made in UN General
Assembly Resolutions for global negotiations until such ncgotia1:ions were made acceptable to the North as a part of restrucfuring the: global economic system. A second approach was
acceptance by the South of wliat was politica11y feasible with a
vi7w to subsequent enlargement of the scope of negotiations. A
third approach -put forward by Sri Lanka, was that a deadline
,should be set for completion of global negotiations on procc~
-dul'e before the next UN General Assembly met on this issue.
186
And to protect the interest of the Sonth, it was suggested that

peripheral bodies should enable North-South agreement on
various sectoral issues which could be brought before the central forum (UN Assembly) for evolving an integrated pattern."
Actually, no consensus 011 the strategy to be adopted to
bring about a global round of negotiations between developing
and developed countries emerged from the New Delhi Consultations, from where the problem was again shifted to the Group
of 77 at UN headquarters. However, jn the same vein as his
celebrated Aruslm speech calling for increased South-South
cooperation> President Nyerere, who was presented with the1981 Third World Prize by Mrs. Gandhi at the time of the New
Delhi talks, declared that a South-South Commission should be
established in order to bring about a more meaningful and
organised cooperation among TJ1ird World countries. Instead
of trying "to catch up with the North", he said, Third World
countries should pursue their own developmental goals through
mutual cooperation and self-reliant technology."" Indeed, it
would appear that the need for collective self-reliance among
the developing countries of the South has never been more
pressing than it is at present. Foreign Minister Hameed, in the
speech quoted above, gave clear expression to Sri Lanka's stand
on this issue:
As far back asin 1947 when the Asian Relations Conference
was held in New Delhi, Sri Lanka's officially stated hope
was that the momentum set in motion by that conference
would lead eventually, to the creation of a structure of
cooperation in our region. We have continued to hold that
view, and it was that same spirit which moved us in our
various exertions connected with the Colombo Plan, the
Bandung Conference, and the evolution of the Non-Aligned
Movement. Our own commitment to Non-Alignment waSand,remains built on a firm Asian philosophical base.
Interestingly enough, the concert of South Asian. regional~sm
received support both from the United States and from Chma,
While in Dacca in the course of her South Asian tour in August
198!, Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the United
Nations, declared that .she fa'/oured the creation ofa South
Sri Lanka and Asian Regionalism.
187
Asian forum for regional cooperation as a means of establishing..

peace and stability in the area,G-r while the Chinese Foreign
Minister bimself, during the course of his visit to Sri Lanka in
July 1981 expressed his support for the idea. Foreign Minister
Huang Hua. too, was in Sri Lanka in the course of a tour of
India, Sri Lanka and the Maldivcs.<15
Sri Lanka and ASEAN
Sri Lartka~s interest in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations goes back to the time of its founding in 1967. In October l967, there were prolonged deliberations between Dudley
Senanayake, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, and Tunku Abdul
Raliman, Prime Minister of Malaysia, on the ques.tion of Sri
Lanka~s membership of tlle Association-in fact a PTI news.
report from Kuala Lumpur on the subject was headlined
"Ceylon poised on ASEAN's doorstep" 66-and it has now been
revealed from the highest quarters in Sri Lanka that the final
communique of ASEAN's inaugural meeting was kept open for
twenty four hours to enable Sri Lanka to make up Hs mind to
join the organisation. but Sri Lanka decided 10 keep out ofitin
1967. The snag as regards Sri L.'l.nkas membership appears 10
have been ASEAN's avowed anti-.Chinese orientation at _the
time, and Senanayake's own reservations on this score and his
sensitivity to the association's imp1ied military and defence implications.67 In the event, A SEAN itself, though established in
1967, did not get off the ground until the 1970s, mainly due to
conflicts of interest among its membership, and it became a
going concern only after the reunification of Vietnam and the
communisation of the Jndo~Chinese peninsula in the mid-seventies. An important landmark in the development of ASEAN
was the Bali Summit of the five states (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) held in 1976 in the
aftermath of the Vietnam war, which marked the formalisation
of a growing political consensus among them, and which put
an end to their diverse bilateral discords.
By a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed at Bali, the
ASEAN states agreed to conduct their future relations on the
basis of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all states, the
188
Foreign Policy of Sri Lmtka
right of every state to lead its national existence free from

external interference, subversion and coercion, non-interference
in the internal affairs of one another, settlement of disputes by
peaceful means, renunciation of the threat or the use of force
.and effective cooperation amongst themselves. Article 11 of
the Treaty provided for members to "strengthen their national
resilience in political, economic, socio~cu1tural as well as security fields", and article 13 for "efforts to achieve regional
prosperity and security" and for cooperation in "all fields for
the promotion of national resilience". More specific provision
for greater political cooperation was provided for in another
-document of the Bali Summit-the Bali Concord-which
required that intra-regional disputes should be settled as soon
as possible, and which called for members to harmonize their
views, coordinate their positions and, where possible, take
common actions.
Of the five ASEAN states, three (Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia) belong to the Non-aligned movement. Thailand
and the Philippines have military arrangements with the United States; Thailand by way of the Manila Treaty, which is still
<:onsidered to be in force even though the South East Asia Treaty
-Organisation is now disbanded, and through the Rusk-Thant
agreement of 1962, which provided a security umbrella for
Thailand, Subic Bay in the Philippines being the main naval
base of the US Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. Singapore and
Malaysia were linked in a Five Power Defence Arrangement
with Australia, New Zealand and the UK in 1971, mainly for
purposes of combating communist insurgency but, having lain
-dormant for many years, it was revived at Australia's initiative
in the context of escalating tension in the Indo-Chinese
peninsula, Singapore having associated herself in joint sea and
air exercise with Australia in October 1980 and June 1981."
Assessments vary as to the economic performance of the
ASEAN states as a regional entity to date. Sri Lanka's Prime
Minister R.Premadasa described ASEAN in May 1981 as "a
_going concern". Although indeed ASIAN took its time to get go
ing as a viable concern, there is no question that the associati?n
has made impressive advances in bringing about preferenti~l
trade arrangements, cultural cooperation, and made a start m
.establishing joint industrial ventures in such areas as urea, soda
189
ash, super-phosphates and more recently, in joint manufacture

of parts for automotives. ASE AN received a big boost with the
signing of a five-year non~preferential cooperation agreement
with the European Economic Community which came into effect
on 1st October 1980. The agreement, the first of its kind between
EEC and a group of non-associated countries negotiating as a
regional entity, was intended to give a major stimulus to the
commercial, economic, and developmental cooperation already
in existence between the two sides on a non-contractual basis.
Recognising ASEAN as a "developing region'', FEC undertook
to support the efforts of the five countries concerned by carrying
out specific projects designed to accelerate the growth of ASEAN
members and of the region as a whole. Significantly, the ASEANEEC link-up on economic and commercial matters was followed
by a Joint Statement on Political Issues, made by the Foreign
Ministers of ASEAN as well as EEC, in March 1981, which
expressed an identity of view on the international relations of"
Southeast Asia in general, nnd on intervention by foreign
powers in Kampuchea and Afghanistan, in particu]ar. 69
Sri Lanka made its formal application for ASEAN membership on 29 May 1981. after Prime Minister Premadasa had
completed a tour of four ASEAN states (Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand and Malaysia) during the course of which he had
made preliminary soundings about Sri Lanka's entry with
leaders of these four states. In Prime Minister Picmadasa's
view, usri Lanka share (d) broadly similar goals and objectives
both in its internal and external policies~' with the ASEAN
states. 0 He did not consider that Sri Lanka's policy of NonAlignll1-ent would in any way be vitiated by joining ASEAN,
for although the Philippines and Thailand had American
military bases. Hthese bases exist in those countries at the request
of the governments of those countries". Besides, he considered
price stabilisation for Sri Lankan products as one ~ftbepossible
economic benefits that could accrue from a connection with
ASEAN.
Since Sri Lanka's chief exports are primary products like
tea, rubber, and coconuts, which are produced by the
ASEAN countries, our associating closely with these
countries as producers could assist greatly in working_
190

towards stable and remunerative prices for these products.
Trade expansion, and exploration of the possibilities of joint

-industrial ventures with ASEAN were the two main economic
advantages anticipated by the Prime Minister from Sri Lanka's
entry to the association, though he appeared to overlook the
possibility that these objectives could just as well be promoted
by bilateral arrangements with each of the ASEAN countries
concerned. Nor did the Prime Minister spell out the possible
implications for Sri Lanka of the preforential trading arrangements already under implementation by the ASEAN countries.
Somewhat more explicitly, Sri Lanka's Deputy Foreign ]\Finister
Tyronne Fernando declared at a Rotary lunch in Colombo in
March 1982 that the UNP government's commitment to private
-enterprise and its success so far c.had drawn us closer to systems
prevailing in ASEAN countries~' and that Sri Lanka's connection with these countries \vould be for mutual economic
benefit.71- 11oreover, for the Deputy ~1:inister, the small states
-0f the Indian Ocean area had common interests, srrounded as
they were by 'giants' like India, USSR, China and Australia,
.and ASEAN's way of thinking reflected these interests. For
him, Sri Lanka's membership in ASEAN would only be a
1natter of time, and it would not mean a departure from NonAlignment.7:i
Prime Minister Premadasa had expected that Sri Lanka's
.application for membership in ASEAN would be considered
.at the 14th Ministerial meeting of the association held on June
17th, 1981. Already before this, however, reservations about
:Sri Lanka's application for full membership in ASEAN had
been expressed by countries such as Malaysia and Singapore/ 3
No decision on Sri Lanka's application was taken at the 14th
Ministerial meeting of ASEAN. In January 1982, in an interview with a Sri Lankan press correspondent_. l\lafaysia's Prime
1-finister Dr Mahathii- Mohammed, while personally welcoming
the idea of Sri Lamka's admission to ASEAN, is reported to
,have stated:
The main problem regarding your countr~(s membership
is primarily a geographical one. ASEAN is cssen tiaily a
Southeast Asia grouping. We are now trying to determine
:Sri Lpnka and Asian Regionalism
191
whether Sri Lanka is in fact a South East Asia nation. If

geographical boundaries arc not observed our whole con-,
cept of a regional grouping will fall by the wayside."
Deputy Minister Tyronne Fernando had stated that the argument about geography "would not hold water'\ However that
may be, a constraint of another kind which possibly inhibited
Sri Lanka admission to the association at a time when general
elections in Sri Lanka were drawing near, was the unequivocal
statement by the SLFP that "a future SLFP government (would
not) retain or accept membership in ASEAN as presently
constituted since it considered ASEAN to be an association
of nations with domestic and foreign policy objectives which
Sri Lanka did not accept". 7~ Among the objections listed by
the SLFP were foreign military bases and provision of rest and
recreation facilitief:. by ASEAN states to foreign powers, their
suppression of soda1ist and Jabour movements, ~and restriction
-0fthe right of free elections in these states. The SLFP believed
that Sri Lanka's policy of non-alignment would be compromised by joining ASEAN. 1he Communist Party of Sri Lanka.
too, in a separate statement, condemned the UNP government's
efforts to join ASEAN, stating that this decision Hmarks the
start of a formal break with the policy of non-alignment". In
the SLFP's statement, it was unequivocally declared: "Sri
Lanka's primary interests wou1d be on South Asia rather than
South East Asia". 7 rl It would seem) in these circumstances, that
the most that Sri Lanka can hope for is 'dialogue status in
ASEAN, such as has been accorded to other countries like
Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, EEC~ and the United
States.
0
NOl'ES and REFERENCES

1
Asian Relations: Report of the Proceedings and Documentalicn if

the !'irst.Astan Rcfatfons Con{crencc, New Delhi, Jl,.f'arch-April 1947 (Ne:v
Del~,, :"-smn Relations Organisation, 1948), pp, 3, 21-22.
-]bi'd,J p. 21.
3 Ibtd., p. 254,
'Ibid., p.]2S.
192
Foreign Policy of Sri Lan/ca
5 Nicho1as
Nanscrgh, The Commonwealth and the Nations (London,

1948), p. 106.
OAsian Relations, p. 98.
7For the genesis of the Conference, Seo Sir John KotcJawela, TheAsian Prime Ministers Story (London, 1956), pp. 96, 117,
8 See New York Times, 1 April 1954, p. 12; The
Times, 29 April,
1954,
0Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on lnternationat
Affairs, 1955 (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 123-24.
10New York Times, April 29, 1954, p . .3.
11TJ,e Times, May 1, 1954, p. 6.
12/bid; New York Tlmcs, May 1., 1954, p. 2.
13R,J.I A. Survey, 1954, p. 288,
14Kotelawcla, op, cit., p. 123.
l5New l'ork Times, May I, 1954, p. 2,
16Royal Institute of Intcrna1iona.LAffairs, Documents of International

Affairs, 1954 (London: Oxford University Press), pp. 166-69.
17R,I.I.A. S1mey, 19S4, p. 286.
IENew York Times, May 9. 1954, IV, p. 5.
19H/ndu Weekly Re1icw, May 10, 1954, p 2,
20/bid., p. 5.
21T/Je Times, April 30, 1.954, p. 8.
22 Jbid.
23Kotclawela, op, cit., p. 120.
2tR.I.J.A., Survey. 1954, pp. 28188.
25New York Times, May 3, 1954. p. 8; "The Colombo Conference"~
World Todny, 10: 294, July 19S4; Kotclawcia, op, cit., pp. 12S-26.
2GNew York Times, April 29~ 1954, p. 3.
2. 7 Ibid,, April 3, 1954. p. 4.
2SNew York Times, May, 1, 1954, p. 2.
:!.9Statcment by the Five Asian Prime Ministers, Bogor, 29 December
1954, R.I.J.A., Documents, 1954, pp. 169-72.
::~~~lr:,~;::~:;~si-i::t~
Prt:~sian-Affairs Confere11cc; Bandmrg,

Indonesia, April 1955, (lthacd, New York: CotneU University Press,
1954), P 4,
::~~::.--;.~; Z!;mple, his views on the proposed Manila Pact, The
Times, September 1.0, 1954, p. 7.
34:Kahin, op. cit., p, 12.
35R,I.J.A., Documents, 1955, p, 402.
3GJbid., P, 405.
37Kahin, op. cit., pp. 4-5. Emphasis Kahinys.
SBJbid., p. 6.
39 Jbid., pp. 6-7.
4 0Kote1awela op cir., pp. US-86,
0
<HKahin, op. cft., p. 18, note'~42Kotelaweta, Toe. cit.
'
193
43Kahin, /oc. cit.

4-fKahin. op. cit., pp. U-13.
4.jR ].I.A., Documents, 1955, p. 412.
WKahin, op. cit., p. 20.
41Jbid., p. 30.
4BR.].I A., Documents, 1955, p, 433,
4DKahin, op. cit., pp. 21-23,
50Jbid., pp. 2527,
S1Kal1in, op. cit., PP 28-29,
SZR,l,J.A., Documents, 1955, pp. 435-36.
ll~Kahin, op. dt., p. 3S
S.IR.I.I.A, Documents, 19S5, p. 399,
55/bid.
56Sri Lanka Minister of Foreign Affairs Press Release No, 79/81.
57Prfotcd hand-out of Minister~s speech, 25 April 198J..
oesee Appendix.
fi9T/Je Hindu, 23 February 1982,
r.opatrlot (Delhi).,. 10 February 1982.
61See, Narinrral Herald (Delhi), 10 February 1982,
G2Hindus11111 Times, 24 February 1982.
G3Hindusthan Times, 23 February 1982.
Reported in the Smz, 24 August 1981,
65See Ceylon Daily News, 2 and 6 July, 1981
OOibid, 7 October 1967.
G7Jbld, 28 September and 6 October 1967.
GBSec L. Buszynshi, .. Thailand and the: Manna Pact", World Today,
February 1980, p 46~ also Ceylon Daily News, 6 July 1981.
6 9Keesings Archives, 27 March 1981, p. 3017S.
-:occylcm Daily News, 18 May 1981..
71Scm, 10 March 1982,
'l2Jbfd.
73Sce, e.g. Ceylon Daily News, 20 May 198L
7.SJbid, 11 January 1982.
'l5Sun, 12 June 1981.
APPENDIX I
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
2832 (XXVI) ON DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN
OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE, 16 DECEMBER 1971
The General Assembly,

Conscious of the determination of the peoplesof the littoral
and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to preserve their
independence, sovereignt,y and territorial integrity, and to
resolve their politica1, economic and. social problems under
conditions of peace and tranquilJity,
Recalling the Declaration of the Third Conference of
Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held
at Lusaka in September, 1970, calling upon all States to consider and rcspect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which
Great Power rivalries and competition as well as bases concei~
ved in the context of such rivalries and competition should be
excluded, and declaring that the area should also be free of
nuclear weapons,
Co11vinced oftbe desirabi1ity of ensuring the maintenance of
such conditions in the Indian Ocean area by llleans other than
military aIJiances, as such aHiances entail financial and other obligations that call for the diversion of the limited resources of the
States of the area from the more compelling andjproductive task
of economic and social reconstruction and could fllrther involve
them in the rivalrfos of power blocs in a manner prejudicial to
their independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing
international tensions,
._ Concerned at recent developments that portend the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean area, thereby posing
a serious threat to the maintenance of such .conditions in the
area,
Appendices
19S
Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in the

Indian Ocean would contribute towards arresting such developments, relaxing internati.onal tensions and strengthening international peace and security,
Convinced jilrther that the establishment of a zone of peace
in an extensive geographical area in one region could have a
beneficial influence on the establishment of permanent universal
peace based on equal rigb.ts and justice for all, in accordance
with the purpose and principles of the Charter ofth.c United
Nations,
1. Sdlemnly declares that the Indian Ocean, within limits
to be determined, together with the air space above and the
ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereb;y designated for all time
as a zone of peace;
2. Calls upon the great powers. in conformity wjth this
Declaration~ to enter into immediate consultations with the
littoral States of the Indian Ocean witb a view to;
(a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of their milit~
ary presence in the Indian Ocean;
,(b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military
installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition
of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and
any manifestation of the great power military presence in
the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power
rivalry;
3. Calls upon the littoral and hinter1and States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and
other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of
the objective of establishing a system of universal colJective
-security without military alliances and strengthening internaw
tiona1 security through regional and other cooperation to enter
into consultation with a view to the implementation of this
Declaration and such action as ma)' be necessary to ensure that:
(a) \Varships and military aircraft may not use: the Indian Ocean
for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the
196
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United

Nations;
(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of
international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of
the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected;
(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any
international agreement that may ultimately be reached for
the maintenance oftbe Indian Ocean as a zone of peace;
4. Requ.ests the Secretary-General to report to the General
Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the progress that bas
been made with regard to the implementation of this Declaration;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its
twenty-seventh session an item entitled 'Declaration of the
Indian Ocean as a zorte of peace'.
2022nd plenary meeting.
16 December 1971
APPENDIX II
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED
COUNTRIES, NEW-DELHI
FEBRUARY 1981
POLITICAL DECLARATION
ROLE OF THE MOVEMENT AND THE POLlCYOF
NON-ALIGNMENT
14. The growth of the Movement, which now comprises 95

members-countries from different continents em bracing different
-economic, political and social systen1sand liberation movements
-is proof of the fact that the policy of Non-Alignment
has been perceived by the peoples and leaders of these countries
as a means of promoting and consolidating their hard-won
national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, for
tho social and economic upliftment of their peoples and for the
-consolidation of world peace. The fact that nearly every single
nation which has achieved independence during the past two
decades has decided to follow the policy of Non-Alignment is a
glowing testimony to the vitality and strength of the Movement
,of Non-Aligned Countries and to the ability and strength of
the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and to the ability of
'the 1\1..ovement to provide an. efficient bulwark for consolidating
national independence. Recalling that the Movement of
Non-Aligned countries has been an essential factor in the
decolonization process that has led to the achievement of
freedom and independence by many countries and peoples,
the Ministers reaffirmed the need to continue and intensify the
-struggle against colonialism and to ensure the right to sclfd~tcrmination and independence of peoples under alien occup.ation and domination, The Ministers observed that the policy
198
of Non-Alignment and the Movement of Countries, which

emerged out of the struggle of peoples for national independence and emancipation, played a decisive role in the struggle forinternational peace. They drew attention to the historic re3ponsibility of the Non-Aligned countries in the endeavour to
establish a new system of international relations based on respect
for independence, equal rights and co-operation and for equal
security, prosperity and development of all peoples.
15. To achieve their objectives, the Non-Aligned countries
have found it necessary to assert their independence from the
great powers and their military alliances or blocs so as to
maintain their freedom of judgement and action and to promote
the concept of peaceful coexistence in order to be free to
dedicate themselves to their economic and social reconstruction.
The Non-A1igned countries, in their approach and endeavour
for the achievement and maintenance of international peace
and security, have to face up to continually changing circumstances and challenges, while faithfully adhering to the principles
and objectives of the Movement of NonAligned Countries.
While the Movement was conceived in the context of a bipolar
world characterized by the Cold War between the two great
powers in all parts of the globe, it is today faced with an
international situation of greater complexity. In the present
period of acute international crisis, which presents a grave
danger to world peace and security, the Movement of NonAligned Countries and the policy of Non-Alignment are
indispensable for the promotion of international peace, cooperation and progress. In splte of many vicissitudes, the
Movement has demonstrated the capacity not only to survive
but also to respond to challenge and change, without sacrificing
its basic principles and objectives. There is no other visib~e
alternative open to Non-Aligned countries to protect their
independence and sovereignty than to maintain and foster
unity and solidarity among themselves, and to reject any
attempt which endangers the unity of Movement and diverts
from its original principles by pressures from any quarter. It is.
essential more than ever before to reassert the role of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries as an independent non-bloc
factor in international relations and as a positive moral aTI<l
political force for the -preservation and strengthening of peace-
!t
Appendices
199
and security in the world. Indeed, the continued strengthening

of the Movement is indispensable in order to halt and reverse
the current dangerous drift which could lead the world to
conflicts of alarming proportions.
16. The Ministers reaffirmed that the quintessence of the
policy of Non-Alignment involved the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, nco-coloniatism, apartheid, racism including
zionism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, in-tcrference or hegemony, as well as against great
power and bloc policies. In other words the rejection of alJ
forms of subjugation, dependence, interference or intervention,
direct or indirect, and of all pressures, whether political, economic, military or cultural, in international relations.
17. Reiterating their firm commitment to the principles and
objectives of the Movement as defined in the Belgrade Declaration, as reaffirmed in the Cairo, Lusaka, Algiers and Colombo
Declarations and as enumerated and reaffirmed in the Havana
Declaration, the Ministers called for the strict observance of
these principles and the furtherance of these objectives by all
Non-Aligned countries. The realization of these objectives is,
for the Non-Aligned countries, a matter not only of idealism
but also of practical self-interest and self-preservation. In an
era <>f global interdependence, when all life on our planet is
endangered by the threat ofa nuclear war~ global problems
related to peace and security, detente, disarmament, decolonization and development require a global response. The
Ministers recognized that while differences'of perception might
exist among various Non-Aligned countries on specific aspects
of the international situation, the Movement, as a whole, is
united on the need for the universal relaxation of tensions: the
l1alting and reversing of the arms race_, particularly the nuclear
arms race; the achicvment of general and complete disarmament;
the continuation of the struggle against colonialism,impedalism,
racism, including zionism, apartheid, all forms of expansionism,
foreign occupation, dominatiort and hegemony; supporting
the struggle of the national liberation movements; the achievement. of self-determination and independence by peop1es
underallcn and colonial domination; the promotion of active
pea::ru1 coe~istertcc among all states irrespective of their
pohhcal, social or economic systems; democratization of
200
international relations and the establishment of' the New

International Economic Order. In their endeavours to achieve
these goals, the Non-Aligned countries are ready to co-operate
with all other democratic and peace-lov.ing countries and
forces on the basis of equality. The Ministers once again
reaffirmed the need for strict adherence to the principle
of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal and
external affairs of states which is one of the basic principles of
Non-Alignment. The violation of this principle by any country
is totally unacceptable and unjustifiable under any circumstances. They reiterated the principled commitment of NonAligned countries not to facilitate or be parties to great power
confrontation and rivalry and the strengthening of existing
military alliances through participation in military arrangement
or through the provision of military facilities for great power
military presence conceived in the context of great power conw
fiicts. In this context, the Ministers recalled and reaffirmed
the criteria for participation in the Movement, as adopted in
1961, and called for their strict observance.
18. The Ministers reaffirmed that the establishment of the
New International Economic Order is an intergral part of the
struggle of the peoples for political, economic, social and cut~
tural liberation and that the consolidation of political independence through economic emancipation is of paramount import~
ance.
19. They stressed, once again, that the present international
economic system based on injustice, inequality, exploitation
and dependence is incompatible with the development needs
and requirements of developing countries. In this context they
re-emphasized that the current crisis in the international economic system continues to reflect underlying structural maladjust
ments and a persistent lack of equity in international economic
relations.
20. The Ministers noted the lack of progress in international negotiations on restructuring the current state of
international economic relations and establishing the New
International Economic Order, due mainly to the intransigent
attitudes adopted by developed countries which had not sho~
the necessary political win and bad used political and ec~no~xc
pressures in order to maintain their privileged and dommatmg
.Appendices
201
-positions vis-a-vis the deve1oping countries.

21. The Ministers reaffirmed the developing countries'
,determination to oppose threats and pressures of all kind as well
as aU other practices which directly or indirectly affect their
economic and social development, on the one hand, and their
iuuity and cohesion on the other.
22. The Ministers reiterated their firm commitment to
the principle of collective self-reliance, which constitutes a
fundamental element of international co-operation and of
.action for the establishment of the New International Economic
Order. In this regard, the Ministers reaffirmed that the intensification of mutual co-operation on the basis of equality,
mutual benefit, complementarity, solidarity and mutual assistance in the cause of accelerating their development and
strengthening their unity in the negotiations with the developed
countries would constitute an important factor in the achievement of the basic objectives of the developing countries, which
-in turn would contribute to a real restructuring of international
economic relations, through the establishment of the New
International Economic Order,
23. The Ministers noted with satisfaction that effective
'beginnings have been made in co-operation in the fields of
~nformation and mass communication media between the NonAligned and developing Countries. In this respect, of special
--significance were decisions and 1-esolutions adopted during the
twenty-first session of the General Conference of UNESCO on
the establishment of an International Programme fOr Development of Communication (IPDC) and related matters.
24. The Ministers reHemphasizcd the importance of the
interrelationship between information and communication
systemS on the one hand and the development processes in the
-developing countries on the other as a matter of continuous
.and conscious concern of the Non-Aligned countries. They
took critical note of tendentious media reporting by the
transactional infomtation agencies and organizations against
developing countries and liberation movements and noted that
:1\edia of all categories of the countries tend to :interpret events
1n and disseminate information on developing and Non-Aligned
countries in a biased and prejudiced manner. Mi.sin formation
.and incomplete and biased information produced by the media
202
Foreign Policy of Sr(Lanka
of the developed countries have .affected the stability and

development of developing countries in many respects. This
situation continues in spite of the advances and efforts made
by the Movement. Colonial and neo-colonial dependency
and unfair monopo1istic practices still characterise the organisation and flow of information depending on their narrow
predilections and interests.
25. The Ministers stressed that the decisions of the fourth
meeting of the intergovernmental Coullcil for co-ordinatiQn 'in
the field of information, held in Baghdad in June 1980, the
Second Conference of the News Agency Pool and of the Broadcasting Organisations of the Non-Aligned Countries and other
recommendations made under the aegis of the Non-Aligned
Movement on the subject should be implemented to meet the
objective of bringing about a ne'!V and just world information
order.
15. -Th~-Minist;;;;~ok note with satisfaction of the progress report on the activities of the News Agency Pool of the
Non-Aligned Countries since 1976 presented to the Conference
and invited governments and information institutions of the
Non-Aligned Countries to take an active part in the implementation of these decisions. The Ministers reiferated the call of
the Havana Conference of Heads of State or Government to all
member states to co-operate with Sri Lanka in the setting up of
a Documentation Centre of Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo, which proposal had been welcomed by that Conference
as an important contribution to the development of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and an appropriate means of
facilitating research into and study of NonAlignment in
international politics. The Ministers recommended that their
governments respond to the questionrtaire circulated by Sri
Lanka for the establishment of a computerized data bank tofacilitate the collection, organisation and retrieval of documents.
emanating .from the Movement's twenty-year history.
27. The Ministers affirmed their determination to strengc
then mutual co-operation in this field and for the creatioi, of a
new international information order, as conceived at the
Colombo Conference of Heads of State or Government in 1976
and proclaimed by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or
Government in Havana.
Appendices
203
28. The Ministers reiterated their pledge to respect and

advance individual human rights as well as the rights of peoples
in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
Ministers declared that peace and security could not be assured
in the world if all people did not enjoy their fundamental human
rights. The right of people under colonial and foreign domination to self-determination and the freedom of all peoples freely
to choose their own political, economic and social systems, as
well as the right to permanent sovereignty over and exploitation
of national resources should be scrupulously respected. They
reaffirmed that the right to development is an inalienable
collective right which belongs to all peoples. They reaffirmed
that economic, social and cultural rights are inseparable from
civil and political rights. They emphasised that the unreserved
implementation of human rights is an integral part of the
struggle for the transformation and democratization of
international relations and must not be exploited as an instrument of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign
countries.
29. The Ministers stressed the importance of the strictest
respect for the rights of national, ethnic and religious minorities,
which should be especially protected against the crimes ol
genocide and other violations of basic human rights.
30. The Ministers condemned colonialism, nco-colonialism,
apartheid~ zionism and racial discrimination as the most wide-spread and revolting forms of the violation of human rights.
APPENDIX III
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
At the invitation of the Government of the Democratic

.Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Foreign Secretaries of
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka, met in Colombo from 21st to 23rd April, 1981, in
pursuance of the initiative taken by His Excellency President
Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh to consider the possibilities of
~_g~.t>!ishing-regional co-operation among the countries of South
Asia.
2. The Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, the Honourable
A.C.S, Hameed, inaugurated the meeting with a keynote address
-emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation. He drew
attention to the commitment of Sri Lanka to the ideal of an
integrated regional approach to the common problems and
common aspirations of the peoples of South Asia. The Foreign
Minister welcomed the initiative of the President of Bangladesh
which led to the convening of thismeeting of Foreign Secretaries.
Regional cooperation, he stressed, can enable countries to derive
<atrength from each other, whether by way of enhanced trade,
institutional linkages~ sharing of technology, improved human
resources or mutual investment. The objective of such cooperation was to develop collectlvc self-reliance as a parallel
strategy to global economic cooperation. He exhorted the Foreign
Secretaries to work constructively for the establishment of a
framework for regiona1 cooperation in South Asia.
The Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh speaking on behalf
,of the Foreign Secretaries of South Asia thanked the Foreign
Minister of Sri Lanka for his inspiring address.
Appe11dices
205
3. The Forejgn Secretaries elected by acclamation Mr.

W.T. Jayasinghe, Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka, as the Chairman of the meeting.
4. The Foreign Secretaries noted that this was the first
occasion on which they were meeting together in a South Asian
regional context. They stressed the historic significance and
importance of the meeting which was a manifestation of the
will of the seven countries to cooperate regionally. It was agreed
that regional cooperation jn South Asia is beneficial, desirableand necessary. They noted the need to proceed, step by step,
on the basis of careful and adequate preparation for early
realization of such cooperation,
5. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that the Bangladesh

Paper provided a basis for their discussions.
6. They agreed that decisibns should be taken on the basis
of unanimity.' They further agreed that bilateral and contentious issues should be excluded from their deliberations.
7. They agreed that regional cooperation should be based
on and in turn contribute to mutual trust, understanding and
sympalhetic appreciation of the national aspirations of the
countries of the region. Such cooperation should also be based
on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial
integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal
affairs of the other States and mutual benefit.
They further agreed that regional cooperation was not
intended or expected to be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation but could complement both; nor should it
be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations.
8. The Foreign Secretaries noted that the South Asian.
countries arc cooperating with one another and with other
developing countries in various international forums. Theyagreed that efforts should be made to strengthen this cooperation, particularly on matters of common interest.
9, The Foreign Secretaries agreed that there were several
areas in which mutually beneficial regional cooperation could
take place and in this connection took note of the areas or
cooperation mentioned in the Bangladesh Paper. As an initial
~t= ~,s
agreed that five Study Groups would be set up in the1
:'r?
:206
Fareign Pa/icy af Sri Lanka

1. Agriculture
2. Rural Development
3. Telecommunications
4. Meteorology
5. Health and Population Activities.
I 0. Each of those groups would have a coordinator

country. It was agreed that the coordinator countries for the
various Study Groups would be tbe following:
1. Agriculture
2. Rural Development
3. Telecommunications
4. Meteorology
5. Health and Population
Activities
-Bangladesh
-Sri Lanka
-Pakistan
-India
-Nepal
These groups would conduct in-depth studies and make

concrete recommendations to the next meeting of Foreign
.Secretaries, which will be convened within six months.
I I. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that the Terms of
Reference for these Study Groups would be as follows:
(l) Review existing cooperative arrangements pertaining
to the region;
(2) Determine the potential and the scope of regional
cooperation and the overall benefits and costs of
such cooperation to the cou_ntries of the region.
(3) Draw up a work programme incorporating:
(a) Ways and means of establishing and strengthening regional cooperation;
(b) Specific Projects/Programmes in each area;
(c) Arrangements for implementing and monitoring
the work programme.
(4) Make such other
appropriate.
recommendations as may be
.Appendfces
207
'12. The Foreign Secretaries also agreed to set up a Committee of the Whole comprising senior officials of the seven
,countries to identify and report on other areas of possible co.operation for consideration at their next meeting.
It was decided that Sri Lanka would be the coordinator
-country for the Committee of the whole. It was further decided
-that all countries wouJdnominate their representatives on this
Committee and send information in this regard within three
weeks to tile Foreign Office of Sri Lanka. The First Meeting
-0f the Committee of the Whole would be convened not later
than August 1981.
13. The Foreign Secretaries agreed to examine at their
next meeting whether the stage had been reached to recommend
lo the Foreign Ministers the convening of a meeting at their
level.
14. The Foreign Secretaries considered the institutional

3rrangements for regional coOperation set out in the Bangladesh Paper and agreed that this matter needed further examjnation.
15. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that Kathmandu,
Nepal will be the venue for their next meeting.
l6. At the conclusion of their meeting the visiting Foreign
Secretaries expressed their sincere and warm appreciation to
the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting and
.generous. hospitality accorded to all the delegates.
<:olombo
23rd April, 1981.
APPENDIX IV
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
SECOND MEETING OF SOUTH ASIAN
FOREGN SECRETARIES
KATHMANDU, NEPAL-2nd-4th NOVEMBER, 198r
I. At the invitation of His Majesty's Government of Nepal,
the Foreign Secretaries of South Asian Countries comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan
and Sri Lanka met in Kathmandu from 2 to 4 November
l 981 in accordance with the decision of their First Meeting held in Colombo in Aprill 981.
i. The Foreign Secretaries elected by acclamation Mr. Jagdish

S.J.B. Rana, Foreign Secretary, His Majesty's Government
of Nepal, as the Chairman of the Meeting. They also ex~
pressed their appreciation for the valuable work done by
the Chairman of the First Meeting, His Excellency Mr.
W. T. Jnyasinghe, the Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka.
3. The Rt. Hon'blc Prime Minister and Minister for.Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Surya Babadur Thapa, inaugurated the Meeting
with a keynote address stressing the importance of regional
cooperation to meet the growing Challenges of peaCe and
development facing the countries of South Asia. The
Prime Minister pointed out that the concept of regional
cooperation was a logical res,Ponse to the pressing problems.
of development and the interdependent nature of the contemporary world and added that cooperation and a common
approach were needed to fight 'the battle against widespread poverty ~n the countries of the region and to . minimise the adverse impact of external factors on their dev~-
AppCJubces
209
lopment efforts. They observed that such programme of

cooperation would revitalise the economics of the region
and add incentive and strength to national development
efforts which were being undertaken by each member
country to improve the lot of their respective peoples. The
Prime Minister urged the Forejgn Secretaries to direct
their efforts towards working constructively for the early
realization of the common goal of regional cooperation.
4. The Foreign Secretary of India His Excellency Mr. R.D.
Sathe, speaking on behalf of the Foreign Secretaries of
South Asia, thanked the Rt. Hon"blc Pnmc Minister
and Minister for Foreign Atlhirs of Nepal for his inspiring
address.
5. The Foreign Secretaries reiterated that regional cooperation in South Asia was beneficial, desirable and necessary
and reaffirmed the determination of their respective count~
ries to cooperate with each other indevelopingandaccelera
ting the process of such cooperation.
6. The Foreign Secretaries paid warm tributes to the vision
and statesmanship of the late President Zia-ur-Rahman of
Bangladesh for initiating the proposal for South Asian
regional cooperation.
7. The Foreign Secretaries considered and endorsed the
recommendations of the Five Study Groups established in
their 1.feeting in Colombo. They recognised that these
recommendations fall into two broad categories ofclassification viz. those that were amenable to immediate implementation of cooperative activities on the one hand a11d those
that were immediate and long-term in naturerequiring a
longer gestation period on the other.
8. In this connection, the Foreign Secretaries agreed on the
need for\ establishing appropriate modalities for implementation of the recommendations. They agreed to convert the
existing Study Groups into Working Groups in each of the
five areas of cooperation already indentificd. The Chairmanship of the \Vorking Groups would be by rotation, the
periodicity of which would be initially determined by each
group. The present coordinators of the five Study Groups
would act as the first Chairman of the respective Working
Groups. They further agreed that the Foreign Secretaries,
210
Foreigh Policy of Sri Lanka
will meet fron1 time to time to review recommendations

monitor progress and lay down guidelines for furthe;
action.
9. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that the major task of each
Working Group would be to draw up a comprehensive
programme of action for cooperation in both the immediate
and long term phases.
The Immediate Action Programme would include such

components as:
(a) Exchange of data and information
(b) Exchange of experts, training facilities, scho1arship etc.
(c) Organization of Seminars, Workshops etc., on a regional basis.
The Long~term Programme of Action wou]d inter-alia

include:
(a) Assessment of needs and resources

(b) Preparation of specific projects of a regional nature.
(c) Modalities for financing the projects.
10. The Working Groups would report progress both with
regard to the implementation of the immediate action prograrn1nes as wen as for the processjng of the Jong-term
programrne for the consideration of the Forejgn Secrctar~es
at their meetings to enable them to set out further course
of action.
11. The Foreign Secrelaries reviewed the conclusions of the
Committee of the Whole and endorsed its report. They
were mindful of the need to veiw regional cooperation as an
evolutionary process to be seen in a long-term perspective,
as well as a flexible process which would permit the elaboration of cooperative arrangements in as many fields as are
mutually agreed upon. Recognising that they had already
agreed upon the modalities and terms of reference at their
meeting in Colombo in April 1981 they agreed for the
present to institute studies in the following additional areas
pf coo_peration,
211
Appendices
Coordinator
Area
1. Transport
2. Postal Services
3. Scientific and
Technological Cooperation
Cowitry
Maldives
Bhutan
Pakistan
12. The Foreign Secretaries recognised that it would be beneficial to promote cooperation among the official national
planning organisations of the countries of the region and
agreed to initiate action with a view to discussing this
matter in greater depth at their next meeting.
13. The Foreign Secretaries agreed to hold their n~xt meeting
within six to eight months to consider the implementation
of their agreed decisions or regional cooperation. They
also agreed to remain in consultation during this period
with a view to recommending at the next meeting to their
Ministers the convening of a Meeting at their level in
1982.
- 14. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that the venue of their next
meeting should be finalised by the current Chairman in
consultations with other colleagues.
15. At the conclusion of their n1ecting the visiting Foreign
Secretaries expressed their sincere and warm appreciation
to His Majesty~s Government of Nepal for the exceI1ent
arrangements made for the meeting and generous hospitality extended to all the delegates.
Kathmandu,
4 November, 1981.
APPENDIX V
TEXT OF THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS DELIVERED AT
THE BMICH ON TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 1981 BY THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HON. A.C.S.
HAMEED AT THE FOUR-DAY CONFERENCE
OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES OF SEVEN
SOUTH ASIAN NATIONS
In greeting you today, I have decided to omit the formal

assurance of warmth and hospitality in our welcome to visitors.
The omission is deliberate, but is not meant to be offensive.
On the contrary, it is meant to draw attention to the fact that
any restatement ofourwelcomewou1d beredundant. For, surely,
each one of you must know already-with the same certainty of
a Sri Lankan visiting any one of your countries-that a pleasant and pleasurable reception is automatic to all of you-that
is beyond doubt and therefore beyond the need for reiteration.
You are truly at homehere,as we are at home in your countries.
In a very real sense, we are all part of the same extended family.
Our Asianness makes us oue. So, instead of talking to you
about friendship and hospitality in our island home, a
freindship and hospitality which are already assured, let me
instead greet you in terms of the importance of the tasks, rcspo~
nsibilities, and challenges that lie ahead of you.
History occasionally bestows on groups of peoples the
challenge and the opportunity of decisively influencing and
directly shaping human destiny. You form such a group, chosen
by history to make history. From that point of view, you are
both fortunate and favoured. My greeting to you, therrfore,
takes the form of a salutation. I acknowledge the profound
importance of the role you have been called upon l? play, and
Appendices
r commend you for undertaking that role. i
:m
urge, as well, that

in approaching your tasks you keep in mind continuously the
impact that your deliberations can have on the lives of about
a fifth of the entire human family. That, Gentlemen~ must
surely give you a sense of exhilaration, and inspire you to work
singlemindedly tit outlining the broad framework for regional
co-operation in South Asia. Yours is not just another conference, not just another occasion for rhetoric, not just another
time for recording debating points. Yours is an opportunity to
create a turning point in the affairs of our peoples.
Interest in regional co-operation has be:n increasingly felt
in all our capitals. Here in Sri Lanka, we are both pleased and
privileged that our capital has served as the focal point for
harnessing those interests. It was here, I should remind you,
that the word non-alignment entered the lexicon of international relations. It was here that the historic decision was
taken by the Colombo powers to hold a post-colonial gathering
of once-subject peoples, at Bandung. It was here, too that the
Colombo Plan waS born. Each of those events had implications
which extended beyond our region, to bo sure. At the same
time, they expressed the stirrings felt within our region, stirrings
which are felt even today and which, indeed have brought you
together.
Just as much as Colombo has served as a focal point for
different forms of co-operation, successive governments of Sri
Lanka have strongly endorsed and supported the ideal of an
integratcq regional approach to our common problems, and
towards our co111mon aspirations. As far back as in 1947 when
the Asian Relations Conference was held in New Delhi, Sri
Lanka's officially-stated hope Was that the momentum set in
motion by that conference would lead eventually to the creation of a structure of co-operation in our region. We have
continued.to hold that view, and it was that same spirit which
moved us in our various exertions connected with the Colombo
Plans the Bandung Conference, and tbe evolution of a NonAligned Movement. Our own commitment to Non-Alignment
was and remains built on a firm Asian Philosophical Base.
H.E. President J.R. Jayewardena has long maintained a
close interest in regional co-operation. This is partly because
of his deep])' and strongly-held belief that self-reliance is at
214
the core of Human Development. It also reflects his interest

in ensuring that economic and political structures should be in
harmony with philosophical and cultural traditions-and these
are common to our region. Against that background, H.E. has
touched on regional co-operation in his recent discussions with
Heads of State or Government in the region. On the basis of
these discussions, as well as on the basis of soundings I have
myself had occasion to make we have good reason to hope that
the time is appropriate for moving in the direction of formalised regional co~operation. We welcome the .recent initiative
of the P, esident of Bangladesh, which directly led to your
meeting. We appreciate the collective and positive response to
that initiative from all Governments of the region. That response is more than adequate proof that the will to co-operate
exists-one of your tasks is to examine in what forms and in
which areas that will should be collectively expressed.
Formally structured regional co-operation usually involves
the establishment of an association of states in a contiguous
geographical area for the purpose of promoting and safeguarding the interests, whether they be political or economic, of
participating member-countries. Whetlier the States of South
Asia should seek the establishment of such a formal association,
or whether they should initially be content with a Jess formal
structure which will evolve into an integrated association over
the years is a matter that you will have to consider, as weU as
your Foreign Ministers and Heads of State or Government.
Whatever form regional co-operation takes, however, your
discussions and others which follow must take into account the
advantages to all our peoples that can'--accrue from regional
collectivity. Of course, the development of a country, and
thereby the self-improvement of its people, is fundamentally a
national responsibility. That responsibility cannot be shifted
on to neighbouring 1shoulders.
The goals of dev~lopment and the structures of development must also come from deep within a Jlation's own needs,
hopes and traditions. But the external environment has an
influence on domestic programmes .. Regional co-operation can
help to bring about improvements in the external environment
in such a way that it assists and exerts a positive influence on
the development process within individual countries. Equally,
Appendices
215
regional cooperation can enable countries to derive strength

from each other, whether by ,vay of enhanced trade, institutional 1inkagcs, a sharing of technology, improving human
resources, or mutual investment. This, in turn, can lead to the
creation of a regional environment characterized by both political stability and human development. From the year beginning, therefore, we should view regional co-operation not as some
fancy intellectual exercise, nor as merely a means of harmonizing an assortment of regulations, nor as the occasion for meaningless platitudes, but as truly a constructive element in the
development process. Development is for people. Regional
co-operation must help to improve the lives ot" people. If that
is. our starting point, then our priorities actually define themselves. They will include the following:
1. Closer co-operation in international fora in relation to all

matters directly concerning the peace, security and economic development of the region.
2. The developn1ent of mechanism for unified negotiations in
dealings with already established regional organisations.
3. The possibility of settlement of disharmonies or disputes
within the region without external intejference or manipulation.
4. The growth of colkctive self-reliance through regional,
economic and technical co-operation, including expanded
intra-regional trade and industrial complementarity.
Agricultural co-operation is equally important.
5. The use of collective self-reliance as a factor in negotiations
leading to the establishment of a new international economic order.
6. The encouragement of human interaction within the
region through systematic cultural exchanges, tourism and
institutional co-operation.
7. In o'Verall support of the above, a sustained programme of
public information through which knowledge of each other
can be shared at all levels .
. Objective factors and a sense of urgency to your tasks. A
ser~es of events and trends have made it necessary for us to
umte and work towards common gonls with both dedication
216
Pore/g11 Policy of Sri La11kq
and speed. The international political 3.nd security Cnviron-

ment is tense, and fraught with many dangers. There are hopeful signs, to be sure, that the super powers might move in the'
direction of negotiated accommodation. We welcome this.
But at the same time w~ have to protect our own interests. We
must ensure that our own interests are neither hindered nor
complicated by external involvement or interference. All our
countries have long hoped for the establishment in our region
of an area of peace free from confrontation:. We will continue
to endure the agony ofunfilfilled hope ifwe do not work together at making that hope come true. We need at the same
time to work cohesively at developing regional co11ective selfreliance as a parallel strategy to global economic negotiation.
The round of global negotiation which was due to commence earlier this year has not yet been scheduled. Pre-negotiation preparations have stumbled and been stalled in the
Agenda-making process. I am optimistic enough to nope that
global negotiation will commence eventually, perhaps after the
North-South Mini-Summit now expected to be held in October.
We don't need to wait for that. Indeed, we should not. Development co-operation at the regional level can
set in motion
more swifty, across a wider sweep of areas, ,than is praclicable
in terms of international co-operation where more complex.ities
and constraints exist. Moreover, a str0ng region, wen aware
of its own priorities and working collectively towards attaining
these, can hook itself into the global system more effectively than
a set of relatively weak States each contesting the same area.
The advantages of regional co-operation, thus, are yery
real. This should not blind us to the fact that the task of
unifying the development activities of sovereign States each
with its own domestic obligations, is not simple. There are
psychological barriers to be overcome; out moded concept.s to
be discarded. We ~re fortunate, however, that despite_- the
difficulties and perhaps differences, we are also sustained by _a
great Jeal of commonality. Geograpl1ically, our regioll is
clearly definable. HistoricaJly and culturally, we share the
same or a similar herhage.
.
The major religions of the world co~exist in our reg10n.
Non-Alignment is common to an our foreign policies. Our a~t,
architecture, literature, and music are strikingly similar. Our
be
Appendlce.\
217
reg10n s f0JkI0re-wh1ch expre~ses the genius of a peopJe in

distilled and hopespun form-goes back to the same roots.
And, although we are in different stages of development, our
development needs and our .development strategies have many
common elements. I invite you to undertake your tasks on the
basis of identifiable commonality, and not to be overawed by
difficulties and differences. I invite you, also to cast aside any
fears, doubts, and any sense of hesitation that exist in the
region. These are all the products of mind-sets which have not
grasped the reality that c1eative collectively can sm,tain our
peoples. That is what we really must strive to acheve, with
dedication and sincerity.
We can be emboldened by the fact that a substantial degree
of regional interaction already exists. The level of bilateral
activity within our region, for instance, is high. The public and
private sectors in many of our countries have already begun
to co-operate with each other. Our governments are active in
a number of Asian Institutions. More recently our non-governmental institutions have begun to work closely with each other,
~pecificaUy for the purpose of identifying areas for regional
co-operation. Institutions in almost all our countries are now
linked together in a series of sectoral studies as their contribution to planning for regional co-operation. At 1he same time~
a number of studies are being conducted in the region, with
assistance from UNCTAD, on international economic relations
as they affect South Asia. The aim of these studies is to examine international economic issues concretely in specific
national and regional contexts. In a sense, therefore, the
region?s scholars have already begun to do our work for us.
Given our commonality, our high level or bilateral activity and
existing forms of co-operation, the task ahead is rea11y one of
putting these pieces together in a cobe5ive and productive
whole. As a politician, let me give you a politician?s assessment
that the pieces will be put together only when the political will
to do this has been summoned. The fact that the governments
whie~ all _of y~u represent have endorsed the holding of your
mcetmg 1mphes to me, that the process of summoning that
will bas begun.
1
218
The process can be quickened by a carefully prepared

summit meeting at which a declaration of intent is adopted,
and the broad goals of regional co-operation defined. The
momentum that such a summit meeting creates will have to be
maintained at the political level, at the official's level and
through clo.N interaction b~tween gove:nment and non~govern~
mcnt sectors thereafter. Your task, as I see it, is to prepare
proposals covering all this activity and, after the proposals
have been adopted at the highest political level, to ensure that
they are transfo.med into living reality, undoubtedly, that is a
challenging task. It should also be a rewarding one.
I have already talked to you about putting the pieces together. Let me take that thought a little further. I ask you
to think of South Asia as potentially a superb engine capable
of running at full speed. Today, some of the parts for that
engine are lying around Without them, the engine is coughing,
spluttering, and moving slowly. Choose the correct parts,
instal them in the proper places, and you will have a superb
engine, capable of moving our people towards a state of welIbeing. Your responsibility is to put that engine together.
I wish you well in your endeavours.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Republic Building,
Colombo-I, 21st April 1981.
Index
Abraham, Thomas 4 I
Action Progrnmmc for Economic
Co-operation 144, 146
AIADMK4l
Aid Ceylon Club 124
Algiers Conference of Non-Aligned Nations 16, 140, 141, 144
Ali, Mohammad 168,171, 172, 178
Amirthalingam, A. 41, 43, 50
Apartheid 203
Arab-Israeli relations 1S2
Arab-Israeli War 128,129
Asian African Conference 87, 167,
171, 172, 173
Asian Dig Powers 165
Asian Confederation of Chambers
of Commel'cc 121
Asian Regional Conference 15

Asian regional co-operation 182,
183
Asian regionalism 163
Asian Relations Conference 163,
164, 166,213
Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) l 22, 123,
163, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191
Atlantic Pact 57
Atomic tPearl Harbour' 92
.t\yurvedic Research Institute in
Nawinna 46
Azad Hind Sena 44
Baghdad Non-Aligned Summit 159

Dali Summit 187, 188
Bnndaranaike, Aruna 48
Bandaranaike. Felix Dias 11, 48,

118, 125
Dandaranaike, Mrs 4, S, IJ, 16,
46, 74, 104, 105, 106
Budhists' cause 15
on international cooperation
17
on Indian citizens 3S. 37
on Indian-China war 41, 12,
73
charged for emergency rule 48,
49, 53
stand on Chinese in Tibet 71
nationalisation of oil 106
contribution
non-alignment
136-138, 140-142, 145, 152
relations with India 1S3, 154
Bandaranaike, SWRD 5, 8, 11, 15,
46, 66,
establishes
non-alignment
policy 67
stand on Chinese in Tibet 71
on Suez crisis 100-lOJ, 102,,
!03, 104
on colonialism 10S
on Arab-Israeli wars 129
his statue gifted by Soviet
Union 138
Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall J 38
Bandung Conference 26, 60, 64.,
71, 82, 87, 88, 92, 103, 163,
172, 173, 176, 213
Bangladesh 43
Bangladesh Paper 20S, 207
220
Foreign Policy o/ Sri Lanka
Battle Act 94, 95, 98

Ba tile of Dien Bica Phu 86
BBC 15
Belgrade summit 17, 140

Bevin, Ernest 57, 88
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 29,
49
Bogar Conference 172
BriLish Peace Committee 58
Bretton Woods-Institutions 185
Brussels Treaty 57
Budha Jayanti Celebrations 46
Burma 6
Business Acquisition Act 156
Cairo Conference 140, 105
Cairo DecJaration 12S
Cancun Summit 184, 185
Cao, Ky 127, 128
Ceylon-China Trade Agreement 61
Ceylon Civil Service 6, 7
Ceylon Daily News 11, 122
Ceylon Defence Agreement with
Britain 84
Ceylon
Petroleum
Corporation
l07
Ceylon Petro]cum Corporation
(Amendment) Act 108
Cc)lon
Plantations
Workers'
Union Conference 118
Ceylon Trade Union Federation
58
Ceylon~UK Defence Agreement
55, 84, 85, 112
Charan Singh 153
Che Guevavra 137
Chelvanayakam, SJV 39, 40, 110
Cheddi, Jagan 58
Chou-En-Lai 26, 59, 60, 65, 67,
68, 71, 80, 98, L37, 176-181
China Pact 97
China, Peoples Republic of 7, 16,
17, 18, 99, 100, l37
Chinese Actions in Tibet 72
Citizenship Issue 2L
Cold War between great powers 198
Colombo Commercial Company
156
Colombo Conference 27, 28, 3.0,

144, 145, 146, 148, 168, 170,
112, 2oz
Colombo Ministerial Meeting 148
Colombo Plan 88, 90, 113
Colombo Powers 26, 90, 92, 102,
103, 170, 174, 176
Colombo Status 56
Cominform 6:S. 171
Commonwealth 5- 7, 24, 26, 45,
84, 100
Commonwealth Confornce 140
Commonwealth Economic Plan 89
Commonweallh foreign Ministers
Conference 46, 57 Commonwealth Government 90
Commonwealth
Parliamentary
Conference l14
Commonwealth relations office 7
Common Programme of Sri Lanka
131,132
Communism 57, 93, 98, 117
Communist colonialism 26
Communist literature 118
Communist Party 130 132
Communist Party of Ceylon 58,
131
Communist Party of Madras 57
Communist Powers 55
'Cosmic guilt' 16, 82,
Corea, Sir Claude 101
CPSU (Commanist Party of Sovfot
Union) 6'6
Crowther, J.G. 58
Czech Crisis 130, 132
Czechoslovakia 76
Dahanayake, W. 5, 110
Danube declaration 131
David Vittal 54
Decision-making 2-5, 11, 12
Delhi Non-Aligned Conference 30,
SL
Desai~ Morarji 41, 47, 153
Diego Garcia 30, 14L
District Development Council Act
42
Djalal Abdeh 177
221
Index
DMK 42, 44
Do11ar imperialism 165
Danoughmorc Constitution 34
Dubcek regime 130, 131
Dulles, John Foster 97, 101
Dutch Police action1
against
Indonesia 87
East Bengal crisis 25, 138, 139
East-West relations 152
Eastern David 2
Economic Aid Agrccmcrit 77
Economic bondage' 92
Economic dccluration 144
Eden 102, 170, 171
EELAM 39, 41, 45
Eisenhower, President 102, 103
Emergency Rule 49
Federation of Socialist Trade
Unions 81
Fernando Tyronnc 159, 190, 191
Fidel Castro 150
Five-power Dcrcnce arrangement
188
Five principles of pcaccful Coexistence (Poncl1s'1ila) 71, 174,
176, 179
Five Study Groups 209
Food and Peace agreement 124
Foreign
E-..change Entitlement
Certificate Scheme (FEECS)
125
Fro.ncoBrilish Mililary aclion in
the Suez Canal Zone 102
Gandhi, Indira 2830, 35, 36", 46,
49. 50. J 38, 153, 184
Gandhi, Mahatma 30
General Clerical Service 6
General Election, 1970 125
Geneva Conference 92, 173
Geng Biao 154
Giri, V.V. (President) 46", 47
Goonctillekc, Sir Oliver 171
Gopalfowa, W. 46
Greater Colombo Dev. Scheme
156
Green Revo]ution 125

Gunewardena, Philip 11.7, 133
Gunewardena, R.S.S. 69, 81
Hameed, A,C.$. 148-155, 1.82, 186
Hans, Morganlhau 93
Harold Stassen 91
Harriman, Averall 95
Harry Pollitt 58
Havana Declaration 199
Havana Summit JSJ, 155, 202
'Have' and havcnot' nations 16
Heng Samrin Government 154
Hickcnlooper Amendment 1_09,
110
Hilldu, the 170
Huang Hua 154
Human rights 181
Hungarian question 71, 81
Hungarian revolution 68, 71.
Hydrogen bombs 87
IMF I58
Immediate Action Programmf!. 183,
184
Indian National Conference 23
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
28-30, 143, 144, 151
Indian Ocean as ft'fa1e Nostrum 23
Iodo-Ccylon Agreement Implementation Act 34. 37, 47
IndoChina 167-169, 112, 173
lndoChina relations 46
I ado.China War 46, 47, 88, 139
Inda-Lanka Citizenship Agreement
14, 36
Indo-Lanka relations 6, 21, 25, 33
IndoPakistan War of 1971 25, 140
IndoSovict Treaty of 1971 138
Intcrnationa1
Commission
of
Jurists 121
International
Programme
for
Development of Communication 201
Investment Production Zone 156
Tsracli~Egyption Conflict 102
Isra~li Invasion of the Sinai
Peninsula 102
222
Jacob Malik 56
Janarthanam, Dr. R. 40, 52
Janata Party 153
Japanese Federation of Economic
Organisation 157
Japanese Peace Treaty Conference
15,155
Jayewardena, J.R. 4, 13, 15, 16,
29, 37, 42, 45, 47-49, 110, 136,
148-159, 213
Jayewardcna Government 155, 158
Jayasinghe, W.T. 205, 208
Johnson, President 127
Joint Memorandum on Economic
Policy in South and South
East Asia 87
Joseph Frankel 12
Kachcha Thivu 30, 3 l, 32
Kadar Regime of Hungary 69, 70
Kahin 174-177, 181
Kampuchea 154
Kantalai Sugar Cane Plantation

76
Karunanidhi, M 40, 44
Kautilya Arthashastra 18
Kem Amendment 63, 64, 79, 94,
95
Kennedy, President 15
Kim Il Sung 137
Kirkpatrick, Mrs Jeane 186
Korean War 62, 94
Kotelawela, Sir John 5, 11, 34, 46,
58, 98, 166, 168
anti-communism policies 21,
58, 60, 64, 65, 80, 104, 172,
175-178
on defence commitment wHh
Britain 86
on Indo~china war 88
on SEATO 90-93
Kundra, J.C. 53
Lake House Press 11

Land Rcronn Law 38, 156
Lawn Tennis Championships 121
Law of the Sea Agreement 10

League of Nations 6
London Conference IOI
London Rubber Agreement 96
Long-term Action Programme 181,
184, 210
Lusaka
Non-Aligned
Summit
Conferences 29, 140
Mahabodhi Society of Sri Lanka
41
MahawclJ River Basin Project J56,

158
Maka1ios 28
Malalasckera, G.P. 1S, 128
Malayan Communists 86
Manila P.ict 93
Manila Treaty J 88
Mao badges 120, 121
Mao Tse Tung, Chairman 120,
lZI, 137, 138
Maritime Boundary Agreement 10,
25, 31, 32, 73, 74
Madtirne Treaty with China 118
Maritime Zone Law 33
Marshan PJan 57
Marxist literature 112
Max Beloff 12
Meetiyagoda Gunaratne Thcra 49
Menon, Krishna 1.18
Middle Eastcrn Cdsis 1.02, 152
Millar 3, 4
Ministerial meeting or the Non
Aligned Co-ordinating Bureau
of Havana 151
Misra> K. P. 29
Mohammed, M. H. 119, 190
Mollott 102
Monroe Doctrine 24
Morni11g Times, the
Multi-Nationals 14S
4
Naidu, Sarojni 164

Narasimha Rao, P. V. 182
Nasser 102
Nationalisation of oil 107, I 11,
123, 136
National Movement for Freedom
164
223
Index
Novotny 130
Nehru, Ja.waharlal (Pandit) S, 23t
24, 26, 34, 39, 45-47. 57, 69,
70, 88, 90, 102, 164-167, 172,
174, 178
New Delhi Declaration 30
New
International
Economic
Order (NIEOJ 148, 149, 165,
184
News Agency of the Non-aligned
countries 202
New York Times 100, 110
Nguyen Thi Binh, Madnm 136
Nissanka, H. s. S. 11
Non-Aligned 5, 16, 1S, 20, 28, 29,
86, 100, 117, 119, 131, 135,
136, 145, 150, 190, 197-201,
213,216
Non-Aligned Movement 150
Non-AJigned Summit, First 28
Non-Aligned Summit, Si,-:;th 4, i50
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 84, 8S
North-South Dialogue 145, 165,
185, 185
North-South Mini Summit 216
Nuclear Free Zone 105
Nuclear Test l3an Treaty 105
Nycrcrn, President 186
Overseas Service Association 7, 8
Package deal for Ceylon's admission to UN 56, 66
Paddy Marketing Board 158
Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO) 159
Palk Strait 21. 22
Pan Asianism 165
Panikkar, K.M. 23
~Parify of Status' for Tamil 39
Parliament's Standing Order 12
People's Bank in Jaffna 43
perern N.M. (Dr) 156
Petroleum Corporation A<:t l 10
Point Four programme 93, 94
Poland 70
Policy Planning Division 10
Potsdam Canference 51
Premadasa, Prime
Minister
R.
149,154,188,189,190
Prc;idential Commission of Inquiry
(Special Provision) Act NO. 4
53
Presidential Govcrnmcnl 12
Rahman, Tunku Abdul 187
Ramachandran, M.G. 41, 42, 44
Rana, fogdish s.J.B. 208
Rapacious West' 106
Reagan, President 185
Rccognilion of Communist China
59
Regional Co.operation 214, 215
Rice-Rubber
Agreement
with
China 6, 17, 27, 122, 123
Round Table Conference I 64
Romld Table on Racial Problems
165
Roya] Air Force 99
Rusk-Thant Agreement 1.88
Safe.t10us.es' 49
Sansoni Commission 52
Sa~troamidjojo Ali: 168, 171
Sathe, R D- 209
SEATO 88, 91. 93
SenanayaJ...e-Bajpai talks 34
Senanayakc. Dudley s. G, 11, 15,
45, 47, 60, 74. 75, 122, 126
appointed Prime Minister U 7
relations with
communists
JIS, 154
foreign policy 123
rupee devaluation 124
on Vietnam war 126
on West Asian crisis 1:30
and ASEAN 187
Scnanayake, M. I07t 153
Senanayal:c, R.G. 92
Senannyakc, D.S. 34, 46, 5660,
63, 83, 84, I12, 166
Separate State for Tamils 40. 43
Seven Pi11ars of
Peace 174,
179
Shastri, Lal Bahadur 47
224
Sidjanski 2 t,;.
Sinhala Tamil Communal Vioh{llce
sz
. .," ,'
Sino-Lanka relations 26, 65, 11,

120, J37, 154
Sino-Indian War 27, 3S, 72, 73
Sirima-Shastri Agreement 10, 34
Snyder 2
Sockarno, President 105, 174, 175
Sorenson, Theodore 10
South Africa1s2
South Asian Regionalism 184, 186
South East Asian Prime Ministers
Conference 46, 92
South East Asia Treaty Or2anisation (SEATO) 85, 90, 188
South-South Commission 186
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan
154
Soviet Union 76, 96, 99, 100

Sp.ccial Presidential Commission
of Inquiry Law No 7 53
Special Presidential Commission
oflnquiry (Special Provision)48
Spindcr, P, 87
Sri Lanka Aid Consortium 125,
155, 158
Sri Lanka Maha Bhikshu Sangamaya 72
Sri Lanka Overseas Service 8
Study Groups 206
Subandrio 27, 73
Subrahmanyam, R, 139
Suez Crisjs 69, 100. 101, 104
Suez Canal Users' Association 102
Srm, the 122
Sunthcralingnm, c. 6, 112
Supplemental Appropriation Act 94
Swing Credit 15
Tacquevillc 12
Tamil Co-ordinating Committee SO
Tamil Ea1am 50
Tamll Ecderal Party I 17
Tami] Friendship A5,sociation 43
Tamil Language Research Conferences 41, Sl
Tamil Terrorism 49, 50
Tamil pnited Libcr~tiOn Front

(TULF) 40-45
Technical Co-operation Scheme 90
Thapa, Surya Bahadur 208
Thiangarajah, A. 43
Thondaman, S. 3J; 38
Times of Ceylon 96
Tito 28
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation
187
Treaty of Friendship SO
'Two Chinas' 120, 121
UN Cornmitt~c on Hungary 68
UNCTAD 145, 1.48, 217
ON Declaration 1971 1S2
Unilateral Declaration of Independence 50
United Nations 7,26, 44,55,56,.194
United States Economic Aid
Agreement 95
United States Seventh Fleet 106,188
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 203
U Nu 90, 168, 171, 172
US AID 158
US Pub]ic Law 480 124, 158
USSR 7
Vajpayec, A.B, .48
Vietnam War 125, ]87
Villiam Siroky 68, 105
Warsaw Pact 130, I 31, l33

Westlrian Crisis 5, 123, 174
Westminster Model 4
Wilmot A, Perera 67
Wilson, A,J. 48
Working Groups 209, 210
World-Bank 123,124,155
World Disarmament Autb'ority 1Sl
World Maha Sangh Conference 12[
World Tamil Federation 40
World War ,Jl 15, 31
~world War III' 167
Zakir Hussain 46
ZiauI' Rahman 183; 204, 209..

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Indo-Ceylon Relations since Independence

~ G N POLICY OF SRI LANKA

A Third World Perspective

1982 Shelton U. Kodikura

First Published 1982

All Rights Reserved

Printed 1"n India at

No apology is needed fo/ a book on Sri Lanka's Foreign

It is hoped that this book will provide both the specialist as

be published separately as a monograph. The Indian Council of

Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Sri Lanka and the

Sri Lanka and the \Vest

Continuity and Change in

Sri Lanka's Non-Alignment

Sri Lanka and Asian

Decision-making is a process which results in the selection

Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka

Snyder argued that if a sound conceptual framework could be

Foreign Policy Decisfo11-Maki11g i11 Sri Lanka

A crisis situation and the feverish atmosphere associated

Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka

Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Sri Lanka

policy. The situation was not unlike that w~ich o_bt_ained in

Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka:

Foreigh Policy Decilion-Making in Sri Lanka

as Britain's advocacy in the United Nations. Sri Lanka's

Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka

scrvicc. 1 : During Mr Bandaranaikc~s time, a few recruits were

Foreign Policy ofSri Lank

Although a Policy Planning Division has existed for some

Foreign Policy DetisiotiMakhzg in Sri Lanka

Senanayake and Sfr John Kotelawela gave a weekly 1?reakfast

Fore1g11 Policy of Sri La11ka

,decision-making in foreign policy has been commented upon

Foreign Policy pecision-Making in Sri Lanka

Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka

alleged divergences with the party leadership, among other

T11e Domestic Milien in Sri Lanka

In Sri Lanka, too, the political importance of the Muslim

Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Sri Lanka

of such interests. The Chinese action in Tibet in 1959, for

Foreign Policy of Sri Lanku

the middle path, scripturally hallowed in Buddhist tradition,

Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Sri Lan!ca"

the same way~ international economic determinants

Ceylon offers a perfect case study of the effect of adverse

only too aware of the enormous tasks which confront them

Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka

Foreign Policy Decision-Malcing i,z Sri Lanka

This proposition remains true whether perceptions o_f th:

NOTES And REFERENCES

1See Dusan Sidjanski. (ed.) Political Decisio,i Af"akilrg Processes

4R.oig, op. cit, pp 22-23

Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka

19631,~s;;. ~3Lan~e~::~~~ iZ:e:u:'::: ~vZ!i;~~t~:rr:~o~~:~ i~~~~:~~~:

Migaras widely read articles in JYeekend reveal inside information of

2sceylon Daily News, 1 June 1959.

28The phrase is George Kennan's.

A visiting Indian Finance Minister described Indo-Lanka

Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka

valence of India's other small neighbours, Bangladesh, Nepal

and uses. Writing in the mid-forties, K.M.Panikkar, the

19631,~s;;. ~3Lan~e~::~~~ iZ:e:u:'::: ~vZ!i;~~t~:rr:~o~~:~ i~~:~: