--

CEHTTIF:_~E':: ::~~'.U:E COPY

.":::"""i\c"

">

II'

fl

.....

fl

"'"

..

WILFRE=..0 , .

\ , ...'N
~~<t-
~

~public of tbe Jbilippine~

~upreme

l~

Division ~~':d..:. of Court

T;;inJ Di:vi~Ion

QI:ourt

FEB l 7 2016

;flllanila
THIRD DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, QUEZON CITY &
PABLO MENDOZA,
Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. NO. 176549

Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson
PERALTA,
PEREZ,*
REYES, and
JARDELEZA, JJ.

ROMEO C. CARRIEDO,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

x--------------------------------------------~-~--x
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari' assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision dated October 5, 2006 2 and Resolution dated January l 0,
2007 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88935. The Decision and Resolution reversed the
Order dated February 22, 2005 4 issued by the D~partment of Agrarian
Reform-Central Office (DAR-CO) in Administrative Case No. A-9999-03CV-008-03 which directed that a 5.0001 hectare piece of agricultural land
(land) be placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.

Designated as Regular Member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 2311 elated January
14, 2016.
Rollo, pp. 14-22.
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. concurring, id. at 164-179.
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. concurring,jd. at 28-29.
CA mllo, pp. 56-61,

Decision

G.R. No. 176549

The Facts
The land originally formed part of the agricultural land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 17680,5 which in turn, formed part of
the total of 73.3157 hectares of agricultural land owned by Roman De Jesus
(Roman).6
On May 23, 1972, petitioner Pablo Mendoza (Mendoza) became the
tenant of the land by virtue of a Contrato King Pamamuisan7 executed
between him and Roman. Pursuant to the Contrato, Mendoza has been
paying twenty-five (25) piculs of sugar every crop year as lease rental to
Roman. It was later changed to Two Thousand Pesos (P2, 000.00) per crop
year, the land being no longer devoted to sugarcane.8
On November 7, 1979, Roman died leaving the entire 73.3157
hectares to his surviving wife Alberta Constales (Alberta), and their two
sons Mario De Jesus (Mario) and Antonio De Jesus (Antonio).9 On August
23, 1984, Antonio executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Succession with Waiver
of Right10 which made Alberta and Mario co-owners in equal proportion of
the agricultural land left by Roman.11
On June 26, 1986, Mario sold12 approximately 70.4788 hectares to
respondent Romeo C. Carriedo (Carriedo), covered by the following titles
and tax declarations, to wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

TCT No. 35055

(Tax Declaration) TD No. 48354
TCT No. 17681
TCT No. 56897
TCT No. 17680

The area sold to Carriedo included the land tenanted by Mendoza

(forming part of the area covered by TCT No. 17680). Mendoza alleged that
the sale took place without his knowledge and consent.
In June of 1990, Carriedo sold all of these landholdings to the
Peoples Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PLFI) represented by its president,
Bernabe Buscayno.13 All the lands, except that covered by TCT No. 17680,
were subjected to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme and
were awarded to agrarian reform beneficiaries in 1997.14
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Comprising a total of 12.1065 hectares. DAR-CO Records, pp. 537-539.

CA rollo, p. 57.
Id. at 73-74.
Rollo, p. 165.
Id. at 166.
Id.; DAR-CO Records (A-9999-03-CV-008-03), pp. 500-503.
Rollo, p. 166.
CA rollo, pp. 75-78.
DAR-CO Records (A-9999-03-CV-008-03), pp. 493-495.
Id. at 571-572; rollo, p. 166.

Decision

G.R. No. 176549

The parties to this case were involved in three cases concerning the
land, to wit:
The Ejectment Case
(DARAB Case No. 163-T-90 | CAG.R. SP No. 44521 | G.R. No.
143416)
On October 1, 1990, Carriedo filed a Complaint for Ejectment and
Collection of Unpaid Rentals against Mendoza before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Tarlac docketed as
DARAB Case No. 163-T-90. He subsequently filed an Amended Complaint
on October 30, 1990.15
In a Decision dated June 4, 1992,16 the PARAD ruled that Mendoza
had knowledge of the sale, hence, he could not deny the fact nor assail the
validity of the conveyance. Mendoza violated Section 2 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 816,17 Section 50 of RA No. 119918 and Section 36 of RA
15
16
17

18

CA rollo, pp. 69-72.

Id. at 62-75.
Providing That Tenant-farmers/Agricultural Lessees Shall Pay the Leasehold Rentals When They
Fall Due and Providing Penalties Therefor (1975). Section 2 of PD No. 816 reads:
Section 2. That any agricultural lessee of a rice or corn land under Presidential
Decree No. 27 who deliberately refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the rentals
or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years shall, upon
hearing and final judgment, forfeit the Certificate of Land Transfer issued in his
favor, if his farmholding is already covered by such Certificate of Land Transfer, and
his farmholding.
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 50 of RA No. 1199 reads:
Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. Any of the following shall
be a sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:
(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land
himself personally or through the employment of farm machinery
and implements: Provided, however, That should the landholder not
cultivate the land himself or should fail to employ mechanical farm
implements for a period of one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the land
and damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossession: Provided, further, That the land-holder shall, at least
one year but not more than two years prior to the date of his petition
to dispossess the tenant under this subsection, file notice with the
court and shall inform the tenant in wiring in a language or dialect
known to the latter of his intention to cultivate the land himself,
either personally or through the employment of mechanical
implements, together with a certification of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources that the land is suited for
mechanization: Provided, further, That the dispossessed tenant and
the members of his immediate household shall be preferred in the
employment of necessary laborers under the new set-up.
(b) When the current tenant violates or fails to comply with any of
the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of
this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply
when the tenant has substantially complied with the contract or with
the provisions of this Act.
(c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the
landholder's share: Provided, however, That this shall not apply when
the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.
(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than that
specified by agreement of the parties.

Decision

G.R. No. 176549

No. 3844,19 and thus, the PARAD declared the leasehold contract
terminated, and ordered Mendoza to vacate the premises.20
Mendoza filed an appeal with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). In a Decision dated February 8, 1996,21 the
DARAB affirmed the PARAD Decision in toto. The DARAB ruled that
ownership of the land belongs to Carriedo. That the deed of sale was
unregistered did not affect Carriedos title to the land. By virtue of his
ownership, Carriedo was subrogated to the rights and obligation of the

19

20
21

(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices

which will contribute towards the proper care of the land and
increased agricultural production.
(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the
land which will impair its productive capacity.
(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his
immediate family or farm household of a crime against the
landholder or a member of his immediate family.
Agricultural Land Reform Code. Section 36 of RA No. 3844 reads:
Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any
agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the
landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his
rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the
land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than
five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the
lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one
agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him:
Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land
himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it
shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have
the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions.
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of
the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of
this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a
purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated
through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to
crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a
fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation
of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
Rollo, p. 75.
Id. at 76-83.

Decision

G.R. No. 176549

former landowner, Roman.22

Mendoza then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44521. In a Decision dated
September 7, 1998,23 the CA affirmed the DARAB decision in toto. The CA
ruled that Mendozas reliance on Section 6 of RA No. 6657 as ground to
nullify the sale between De Jesus and Carriedo was misplaced, the section
being limited to retention limits. It reiterated that registration was not a
condition for the validity of the contract of sale between the parties.24
Mendozas Motions for Reconsideration and New Trial were subsequently
denied.25
Mendoza thus filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 143416. In a Resolution dated August 9, 2000,26
this Court denied the petition for failure to comply with the requirements
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An Entry of Judgment was issued on
October 25, 2000.27 In effect, the Decision of the CA was affirmed, and the
following issues were settled with finality:
1) Carriedo is the absolute owner of the five (5) hectare land;
2) Mendoza had knowledge of the sale between Carriedo and Mario
De Jesus, hence he is bound by the sale; and
3) Due to his failure and refusal to pay the lease rentals, the tenancy
relationship between Carriedo and Mendoza had been terminated.
Meanwhile, on October 5, 1999, the landholding covered by TCT No.
17680 with an area of 12.1065 hectares was divided into sub-lots. 7.1065
hectares was transferred to Bernabe Buscayno et al. through a Deed of
Transfer28 under PD No. 27.29 Eventually, TCT No. 17680 was partially
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, emancipation patents (EPs) were issued to
Bernabe, Rod and Juanito, all surnamed Buscayno. These lots were
identified as Lots C, D and E covered by TCT Nos. 44384 to 44386 issued
on September 10, 1999.30 Lots A and B, consisting of approximately 5.0001
hectares and which is the land being occupied by Mendoza, were registered
in the name of Carriedo and covered by TCT No. 34428131 and TCT No.
344282.32

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 89-95.
Id. at 92-93.
CA rollo, p. 113.
Rollo, pp. 96-97.
Id. at 98.
DAR-CO Records (A-9999-03-CV-008-03), pp. 451-452.
Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the
Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor (1972).
DAR-CO Records (A-9999-03-CV-008-03), pp. 553-555.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 510.

Decision

G.R. No. 176549

The Redemption Case

(DARAB III-T-1476-97 | CA-G.R. SP
No. 88936)
On July 21, 1997, Mendoza filed a Petition for Redemption33 with the
PARAD. In an Order dated January 15, 2001,34 the PARAD dismissed his
petition on the grounds of litis pendentia and lack of the required
certification against forum-shopping. It dismissed the petition so that the
pending appeal of DARAB Case No. 163-T-90 (the ejectment case discussed
above) with the CA can run its full course, since its outcome partakes of a
prejudicial question determinative of the tenability of Mendozas right to
redeem the land under tenancy.35
Mendoza appealed to the DARAB which reversed the PARAD Order
in a Decision dated November 12, 2003.36 The DARAB granted Mendoza
redemption rights over the land. It ruled that at the time Carriedo filed his
complaint for ejectment on October 1, 1990, he was no longer the owner of
the land, having sold the land to PLFI in June of 1990. Hence, the cause of
action pertains to PLFI and not to him.37 It also ruled that Mendoza was not
notified of the sale of the land to Carriedo and of the latters subsequent sale
of it to PLFI. The absence of the mandatory requirement of notice did not
stop the running of the 180 day-period within which Mendoza could exercise
his right of redemption.38 Carriedos Motion for Reconsideration was
subsequently denied.39
Carriedo filed a Petition for Review with the CA. In a Decision dated
December 29, 2006,40 the CA reversed the DARAB Decision. It ruled that
Carriedos ownership of the land had been conclusively established and even
affirmed by this Court. Mendoza was not able to substantiate his claim that
Carriedo was no longer the owner of the land at the time the latter filed his
complaint for ejectment. It held that the DARAB erred when it ruled that
Mendoza was not guilty of forum-shopping.41 Mendoza did not appeal the
decision of the CA.
The Coverage Case
(ADM Case No. A-9999-03-CV-00803 | CA-G.R. SP No. 88935)
On February 26, 2002, Mendoza, his daughter Corazon Mendoza
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Rollo, pp. 84-87.

Id. at 99-104.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 105-116.
Id. at 112-113.
Id. at 113-114.
Id. at 121.
Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez,
Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro concurring, id.. at 118-127.
Id. at 123-126.

Decision

G.R. No. 176549

(Corazon) and Orlando Gomez (Orlando) filed a Petition for Coverage42 of

the land under RA No. 6657. They claimed that they had been in physical
and material possession of the land as tenants since 1956, and made the land
productive.43 They prayed (1) that an order be issued placing the land under
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); and (2) that the DAR,
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) and the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) of Tarlac City be ordered to proceed with the
acquisition and distribution of the land in their favor.44 The petition was
granted by the Regional Director (RD) in an Order dated October 2, 2002,45
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
petition for coverage under CARP filed by Pablo Mendoza,
et al[.], is given due course. Accordingly, the MARO and
PARO are hereby directed to place within the ambit of RA
6657 the landholding registered in the name of Romeo
Carriedo covered and embraced by TCT Nos. 334281 and
334282, with an aggregate area of 45,000 and 5,001 square
meters, respectively, and to distribute the same to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.46

On October 23, 2002, Carriedo filed a Protest with Motion to

Reconsider the Order dated October 2, 2002 and to Lift Coverage47 on the
ground that he was denied his constitutional right to due process. He alleged
that he was not notified of the filing of the Petition for Coverage, and
became aware of the same only upon receipt of the challenged Order.
On October 24, 2002, Carriedo received a copy of a Notice of
Coverage dated October 21, 200248 from MARO Maximo E. Santiago
informing him that the land had been placed under the coverage of the
CARP.49 On December 16, 2002, the RD denied Carriedos protest in an
Order dated December 5, 2002.50 Carriedo filed an appeal to the DAR-CO.
In an Order dated February 22, 2005,51 the DAR-CO, through
Secretary Rene C. Villa, affirmed the Order of the RD granting coverage.
The DAR-CO ruled that Carriedo was no longer allowed to retain the land
due to his violation of the provisions of RA No. 6657. His act of disposing
his agricultural landholdings was tantamount to the exercise of his retention
right, or an act amounting to a valid waiver of such right in accordance with
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

CA rollo, pp. 127-130.

Id. at 128.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 48-51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 150-170.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27, 52-54.
Id. at 56-61.

Decision

G.R. No. 176549

applicable laws and jurisprudence.52 However, it did not rule whether

Mendoza was qualified to be a farmer-beneficiary of the land. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, the Order dated 2 October 2002 of the
Regional Director of DAR III, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.53

Carriedo filed a Petition for Review54 with the CA assailing the DARCO Order. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88935. In a
Decision dated October 5, 2006, the CA reversed the DAR-CO, and declared
the land as Carriedos retained area. The CA ruled that the right of retention
is a constitutionally-guaranteed right, subject to certain qualifications
specified by the legislature.55 It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory
land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an
injustice against the landowner.56 It held that Carriedo did not commit any of
the acts which would constitute waiver of his retention rights found under
Section 6 of DAR Administrative Order No. 02, S.2003.57 The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, the present
Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform-Central
Office, Elliptical Road, Diliman, Quezon City (dated
February 22, 2005) is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one enteredDECLARING the subject
landholding as the Petitioners retained area. No
pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.58

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners maintain that the CA committed a reversible error in
declaring the land as Carriedos retained area.59
They claim that Paragraph 4, Section 6 of RA No. 6657 prohibits any
sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of
private lands upon effectivity of the law.60 Thus, Regional Director Renato
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 11-47.
Rollo, p. 170-171.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 173-175; 2003 Rules and Procedure Governing Landowner Retention Rights.
Rollo, pp. 177-176.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.

Decision

G.R. No. 176549

Herrera correctly observed that Carriedos act of disposing his agricultural

property would be tantamount to his exercise of retention under the law. By
violating the law, Carriedo could no longer retain what was left of his
property. To rule otherwise would be a roundabout way of rewarding a
landowner who has violated the explicit provisions of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.61
They also assert that Carriedo waived his right to retain for failure or
neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which he may have
done earlier by exercising due diligence, warranting a presumption that he
abandoned his right or declined to assert it.62 Petitioners claim that Carriedo
has not filed an Application for Retention over the subject land over a
considerable passage of time since the same was acquired for distribution to
qualified farmer beneficiaries.63
Lastly, they argue that Certificates of Land Ownership Awards
(CLOAs) already generated in favor of his co-petitioners Corazon Mendoza
and Rolando Gomez cannot be set aside. CLOAs under RA No. 6657 are
enrolled in the Torrens system of registration which makes them
indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.64
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration is whether Carriedo has the right
to retain the land.
Our Ruling
We rule in the affirmative. Carriedo did not waive his right of retention
over the land.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes landowner retention
rights under Article XIII, Section 4, to wit:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to
such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention
limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners.
61
62
63
64

Id.
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.

Decision

10

G.R. No. 176549

The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary

land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied.)

RA No. 6657 implements this directive, thus:

Section 6. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly
or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the
size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares.
xxx
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall
be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner:
Provided, however, That in case the area selected for
retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have
the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a
beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with
similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses
to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a
leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under
this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in
another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder
to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must
exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the
time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for
retention. In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers
or farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act
shall be respected. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

In Danan v. Court of Appeals,65 we explained the rationale for the

grant of the right of retention under agrarian reform laws such as RA No.
6657 and its predecessor PD No. 27, to wit:
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed
right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It
serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the
tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice
was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the
landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land
which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's
dominion, thus sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the
landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.
For as long as the area to be retained is compact or
contiguous and does not exceed the retention ceiling of five
(5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained
65

G.R. No. 132759, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 113.

Decision

11

G.R. No. 176549

must prevail. xxx66

To interpret Section 6 of RA No. 6657, DAR issued Administrative

Order No. 02, Series of 2003 (DAR AO 02-03). Section 6 of DAR AO 02-03
provides for the instances when a landowner is deemed to have waived his
right of retention, to wit:
Section 6. Waiver of the Right of Retention. The
landowner waives his right to retain by committing any of
the following act or omission:
6.1

Failure to manifest an intention to exercise his right to

retain within sixty (60) calendar days from receipt of
notice of CARP coverage.

6.2

Failure to state such intention upon offer to sell or

application under the [Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLT)]/[Direct Payment Scheme (DPS)] scheme.

6.3

Execution of any document stating that he expressly

waives his right to retain. The MARO and/or PARO
and/or Regional Director shall attest to the due
execution of such document.

6.4

Execution of a Landowner Tenant Production

Agreement and Farmers Undertaking (LTPA-FU) or
Application to Purchase and Farmers Undertaking
(APFU) covering subject property.

6.5

Entering into a VLT/DPS or [Voluntary Offer to Sell

(VOS)] but failing to manifest an intention to exercise
his right to retain upon filing of the application for
VLT/DPS or VOS.

6.6

Execution and submission of any document indicating

that he is consenting to the CARP coverage of his
entire landholding.

6.7

Performing any act constituting estoppel by laches

which is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which he may have done
earlier by exercising due diligence, warranting a
presumption that he abandoned his right or declined
to assert it.

Petitioners cannot rely on the RDs Order dated October 2, 2002

which granted Mendozas petition for coverage on the ground that Carriedo
violated paragraph 4 Section 667 of RA No. 6657 for disposing of his
66
67

Id. at 128 citing Daez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133507, February 17, 2000, 325 SCRA 856.
Paragraph 4, Section 6 of RA No. 6657 provides:
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management,
contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner
in violation of the Act shall be null and void: Provided, however, That those
executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of
Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter,

Decision

12

G.R. No. 176549

agricultural land, consequently losing his right of retention. At the time

when the Order was rendered, up to the time when it was affirmed by the
DAR-CO in its Order dated February 22, 2005, the applicable law is Section
6 of DAR 02-03. Section 6 clearly shows that the disposition of agricultural
land is not an act constituting waiver of the right of retention.
Thus, as correctly held by the CA, Carriedo [n]ever committed any
of the acts or omissions above-stated (DAR AO 02-03). Not even the sale
made by the herein petitioner in favor of PLFI can be considered as a waiver
of his right of retention. Likewise, the Records of the present case is bereft
of any showing that the herein petitioner expressly waived (in writing) his
right of retention as required under sub-section 6.3, section 6, DAR
Administrative Order No. 02-S.2003. 68
Petitioners claim that Carriedos alleged failure to exercise his right of
retention after a long period of time constituted a waiver of his retention
rights, as envisioned in Item 6.7 of DAR AO 02-03.
We disagree.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.69 Where a
party sleeps on his rights and allows laches to set in, the same is fatal to his
case.70
Section 4 of DAR AO 02-03 provides:
Section 4. Period to Exercise Right of Retention under
RA 6657

68
69
70

4.1

The landowner may exercise his right of retention at

any time before receipt of notice of coverage.

4.2

Under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme, the

landowner shall exercise his right of retention within
sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of coverage.

4.3

Under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and the

Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT)/Direct Payment
Scheme (DPS), the landowner shall exercise his right
of retention simultaneously at the time of offer for
sale or transfer.

all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of
five (5) hectares.
Rollo, p. 140.
Olizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107075, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 148, 157-158.
Periquet, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69996, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 697.

Decision

13

G.R. No. 176549

The foregoing rules give Carriedo any time before receipt of the
notice of coverage to exercise his right of retention, or if under compulsory
acquisition (as in this case), within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice
of coverage. The validity of the notice of coverage is the very subject of the
controversy before this court. Thus, the period within which Carriedo should
exercise his right of retention cannot commence until final resolution of this
case.
Even assuming that the period within which Carriedo could exercise
his right of retention has commenced, Carriedo cannot be said to have
neglected to assert his right of retention over the land. The records show that
per Legal Report dated December 13, 199971 prepared by Legal Officer Ariel
Reyes, Carriedo filed an application for retention which was even contested
by Pablo Mendozas son, Fernando.72 Though Carriedo subsequently
withdrew his application, his act of filing an application for retention belies
the allegation that he abandoned his right of retention or declined to assert it.
In their Memorandum73 however, petitioners, for the first time, invoke
estoppel, citing DAR Administrative Order No. 05 Series of 200674 (DAR
AO 05-06) to support their argument that Carriedo waived his right of
retention.75 DAR AO 05-06 provides for the rules and regulations governing
the acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands subject of conveyances
under Sections 6, 7076 and 73 (a)77 of RA No. 6657. Petitioners particularly
cite Item no. 4 of the Statement of Policies of DAR AO 05-06, to wit:
II.

Statement of Policies

4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5)

71
72
73
74
75
76

77

DARAB Records (A-9999-03-CV-008-03), pp. 445-448.

Id. at 448.
Rollo, pp. 237-251.
Guidelines on the Acquisition and Distribution of Agricultural lands Subject of Conveyance
Under Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of RA No. 6657.
Rollo, pp. 241-245.
Section 70 of RA No. 6657 reads:
Section 70. Disposition of Private Agricultural Lands. The sale or disposition
of agricultural lands retained by a landowner as a consequence of Section 6 hereof
shall be valid as long as the total landholdings that shall be owned by the transferee
thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceilings
provided for in this Act. Any sale or disposition of agricultural lands after the
effectivity of this Act found to be contrary to the provisions hereof shall be null and
void. Transferees of agricultural lands shall furnish the appropriate Register of Deeds
and the [Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)] an affidavit attesting that
his total landholdings as a result of the said acquisition do not exceed the
landholding ceiling. The Register of Deeds shall not register the transfer of any
agricultural land without the submission of this sworn statement together with proof
of service of a copy thereof to the BARC.
Section 73 (a) of RA No. 6657 reads:
Section 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. The following are prohibited:
(a)
The ownership or possession, for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in
excess of the total retention limits or award ceilings by any person,
natural or juridical, except those under collective ownership by
farmer-beneficiaries;
xxx

Decision

14

G.R. No. 176549

hectares retention area, the transfer is considered violative

of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five
(5) hectares sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the
corresponding titles issued by the Register of Deeds (ROD)
in the name of the transferee shall, under the principle of
estoppel, be considered valid and shall be treated as the
transferor/s retained area but in no case shall the
transferee exceed the five-hectare landholding ceiling
pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of R.A. No. 6657.
Insofar as the excess area is concerned, the same shall
likewise be covered considering that the transferor has no
right of disposition since CARP coverage has been vested
as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still registered in the
name of the landowner after earlier dispositions totaling an
aggregate of five (5) hectares can no longer be part of his
retention area and therefore shall be covered under CARP.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Citing this provision, petitioners argue that Carriedo lost his right of
retention over the land because he had already sold or disposed, after the
effectivity of RA No. 6657, more than fifty (50) hectares of land in favor of
another.78
In his Memorandum,79 Carriedo maintains that petitioners cannot
invoke any administrative regulation to defeat his right of retention. He
argues that administrative regulation must be in harmony with the
provisions of law otherwise the latter prevails.80
We cannot sustain petitioners' argument. Their reliance on DAR AO
05-06 is misplaced. As will be seen below, nowhere in the relevant
provisions of RA No. 6657 does it indicate that a multiple or series of
transfers/sales of land would result in the loss of retention rights. Neither do
they provide that the multiple or series of transfers or sales amounts to the
waiver of such right.
The relevant portion of Section 6 of RA No. 6657 referred to in Item
no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 provides:
Section 6. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly
or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the
size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-size farm, such as the commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
78
79
80

Rollo, p. 245.
Id. at 214-236.
Id. at 227, citing Philippine Petroleum Corp., v. Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, G.R. No. 90776,
June 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 82.

Decision

15

G.R. No. 176549

exceed five (5) hectares. xxx

Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition,
lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of
private lands executed by the original landowner in
violation of the Act shall be null and void: Provided,
however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be
valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds
within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of
this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30)
days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in
excess of five (5) hectares. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 70 of RA No. 6657, also referred to in Item no. 4 of DAR AO

05-06 partly provides:
The sale or disposition of agricultural lands retained by
a landowner as a consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be
valid as long as the total landholdings that shall be owned
by the transferee thereof inclusive of the land to be
acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceilings provided
for in this Act. Any sale or disposition of agricultural
lands after the effectivity of this Act found to be
contrary to the provisions hereof shall be null and void.
xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, Section 73 (a) of RA No. 6657 as referred to in Item No. 4 of

DAR AO 05-06 provides,
Section 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. The
following are prohibited:
(a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Act, of
agricultural lands in excess of the total retention
limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or
juridical, except those under collective ownership
by farmer-beneficiaries; xxx

Sections 6 and 70 are clear in stating that any sale and disposition of
agricultural lands in violation of the RA No. 6657 shall be null and void.
Under the facts of this case, the reasonable reading of these three provisions
in relation to the constitutional right of retention should be that the
consequence of nullity pertains to the area/s which were sold, or owned by
the transferee, in excess of the 5-hectare land ceiling. Thus, the CA was
correct in declaring that the land is Carriedos retained area.81
Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 attempts to defeat the above reading by
providing that, under the principle of estoppel, the sale of the first five
hectares is valid. But, it hastens to add that the first five hectares sold
81

Rollo, pp. 142-143.

Decision

16

G.R. No. 176549

corresponds to the transferor/s retained area. Thus, since the sale of the first
five hectares is valid, therefore, the landowner loses the five hectares
because it happens to be, at the same time, the retained area limit. In reality,
Item No. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 operates as a forfeiture provision in the guise
of estoppel. It punishes the landowner who sells in excess of five hectares.
Forfeitures, however, partake of a criminal penalty.82
In Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.,83 this
Court said that for an administrative regulation to have the force of a penal
law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime
by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be
provided by the statute itself.84
Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of RA No. 6657 clearly do not provide that a
sale or disposition of land in excess of 5 hectares results in a forfeiture of the
five hectare retention area. Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 imposes a penalty
where none was provided by law.
As this Court also held in People v. Maceren,85 to wit:
The reason is that the Fisheries law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned
under the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In
other words, Administrative Order Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro
fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been
easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.86

The repugnancy between the law and Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 is
apparent by a simple comparison of their texts. The conflict undermines the
82

83
84
85
86

See Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 1059, 1064:
Such forfeiture has been held, however, to partake the nature of a penalty.
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property
without compensation, in consequence of a default or an offense, and
the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus
defined, is imposed by way of punishment, not by the mere
convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a
prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the
legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the
prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to
transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign
power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)
In Blacks Law Dictionary, a forfeiture is defined to the the
incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the
consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to
comply with some requirement of law. It may be said to be a penalty
imposed for misconduct or breach of duty. (Com. Vs. French, 114
S.W. 255)
G.R. No. 159149, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 638.
Id. at 649.
G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450.
Id. at 456.

Decision

17

G.R. No. 176549

statutorily-guaranteed right of the landowner to choose the land he shall

retain, and DAR AO 05-06, in effect, amends RA No. 6657.
In Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles
(RMBSA) v. Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF),87 this Court was
confronted with the issue of the validity of the amendments to the rules and
regulations implementing PD No. 1752.88 In that case, PD No. 1752 (as
amended by RA No. 7742) exempted RMBSA from the Pag-Ibig Fund
coverage for the period January 1 to December 31, 1995. In September
1995, however, the HDMF Board of Trustees issued a board resolution
amending and modifying the rules and regulations implementing RA No.
7742. As amended, the rules now required that for a company to be entitled
to a waiver or suspension of fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for
both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided in
the Pag-Ibig Fund. In ruling against the amendment and modification of the
rules, this Court held that
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the
HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995
Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing
R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its
employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund,
it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And
when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption
through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of
P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of
Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the
delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not
consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed,
administrative issuances must not override, supplant or
modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or
amend the law.89 (Citations omitted; underscoring
supplied.)

Laws, as well as the issuances promulgated to implement them, enjoy

the presumption of validity.90 However, administrative regulations that alter
or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void, and courts not
only may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations.91 Thus, in
this case, because Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 is patently null and void, the
presumption of validity cannot be accorded to it. The invalidity of this
87
88
89
90

91

G.R. No. 131082, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 777.

Amending the Act Creating the Home Development Mutual Fund (1980).
Supra note 88 at 786.
Dasmarias Water District v. Monterey Foods Corporation, G.R. No. 175550, September 17,
2008, 565 SCRA 624 citing Tan v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., G.R. No. 148420, December 15, 2005, 478
SCRA 115, 123-124, citing Walter E. Olsen & Co. v. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil. 259 (1922) and
San Miguel Brewer, Inc. v. Magno, G.R. No. L-21879, September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 292.
California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank, 51 Cal 3d 1, 270 Cal Rptr 796, 793 P2 2 (1980)
citing Dyna-med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1388-1389 (1987) and
Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Assn., 39 Cal.3d 374, 387 (1985).

Decision

18

G.R. No. 176549

provision constrains us to strike it down for being ultra vires.

In Conte v. Commission on Audit,92 the sole issue of whether the
Commission on Audit (COA) acted in grave abuse of discretion when it
disallowed in audit therein petitioners' claim of financial assistance under
Social Security System (SSS) Resolution No. 56 was presented before this
Court. The COA disallowed the claims because the financial assistance
under the challenged resolution is similar to a separate retirement plan which
results in the increase of benefits beyond what is allowed under existing
laws. This Court, sitting en banc, upheld the findings of the COA, and
invalidated SSS Resolution No. 56 for being ultra vires, to wit:
xxx Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no
uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or
retirement plan other than the GSIS for government
officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and
[iniquitous] proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil
that Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law and is
therefore invalid, void and of no effect. xxx
We are not unmindful of the laudable purposes for
promulgating Res. 56, and the positive results it must have
had xxx. But it is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had
no authority to maintain and implement such retirement
plan, particularly in the face of the statutory prohibition.
The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or
amend laws or worse, render them nugatory.
It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute
and an administrative order, the former must prevail. A rule
or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the
provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public
administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which
it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond
the scope intended. xxx Though well-settled is the rule that
retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the
retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing to interpret in
either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the
absence of any doubt as to the ultra-vires nature and
illegality of the disputed resolution constrains us to rule
against petitioners.93 (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

Administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of

the law for administrative regulations cannot extend the law or amend a
legislative enactment.94 Administrative issuances must not override, but must
remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement. They are
92
93
94

G.R. No. 116422, November 4, 1996, 264 SCRA 19.

Id. at 30-31.
Landbank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118712 & 118745, October 6, 1995,
249 SCRA 149.

Decision

19

G.R. No. 176549

intended to carry out, not to supplant or modify the law.95 Administrative or

executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.96 Administrative regulations issued
by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law.97 As he
exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a
requisite that he should not transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute
for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising
legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking
body.98
If the implementing rules and regulations are issued in excess of the
rule-making authority of the administrative agency, they are without binding
effect upon the courts. At best, the same may be treated as administrative
interpretations of the law and as such, they may be set aside by the Supreme
Court in the final determination of what the law means.99
While this Court is mindful of the DARs commitment to the
implementation of agrarian reform, it must be conceded that departmental
zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.100
Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive
then is an acceptable substitute; otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth.101
As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Item no. 4 of DAR
AO 05-06 for being ultra vires, we hold that Carriedo did not waive his right
to retain the land, nor can he be considered to be in estoppel.
Finally, petitioners cannot argue that the CLOAs allegedly granted in
favor of his co-petitioners Corazon and Orlando cannot be set aside. They
claim that CLOAs under RA No. 6657 are enrolled in the Torrens system of
registration which makes them indefeasible as certificates of title issued in
registration proceedings.102 Even as these allegedly issued CLOAs are not in
the records, we hold that CLOAs are not equivalent to a Torrens certificate
of title, and thus are not indefeasible.
CLOAs and EPs are similar in nature to a Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT) in ordinary land registration proceedings. CLTs, and in turn the
CLOAs and EPs, are issued merely as preparatory steps for the eventual
issuance of a certificate of title. They do not possess the indefeasibility of
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108358, January 20, 1995, 240
SCRA 368.
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 7.
Valerio v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-18587, April 23, 1963, 7
SCRA 719.
People v. Maceren, supra note 86 at 459.
Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople, G.R. No. L-58870, December 18, 1987, 156 SCRA 629,
658.
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Santiago, G.R. Nos. L-29236 & L-29247,
August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 498.
Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-26534, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 498, 511.
Rollo, p. 21.

Decision

20

G.R. No. 176549

certificates of title. Justice Oswald D. Agcaoili, in Property Registration

Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deed\), 103 notes, to wit:
Under PD No. 27, beneficiaries arc issued certificates
of land transfers (ClTs) to entitle them to possess lands.
Thereafter, they are issued emancipation patents (EPs) after
compliance with all necessary conditions. Such EPs, upon
their presentation to the Register of Deeds, shall be the
basis for the issuance of the corresponding transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) in favor of the corresponding
beneficiaries.
Under RA No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified.
Only certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) are
issued, in lieu of EPs, after compliance with all
prerequisites. Upon presentation of the CLOAs to the
Register of Deeds, TCTs are issued to the designated
beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does
not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area
covered thereby. Under AO No. 2, series of 1994, an EP or
CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found
to be Qart of the landowner's retained area. (Citations
omitted; underscoring supplied.)

The issue, however, involving the issuance, recall or cancellation of

EPs or CLOAs, is lodged with the DAR, icM which has the primary
jurisdiction over the matter. 105
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 5, 2006 is AFFIRMED. Item no. 4 of DAR Administrative
Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is hereby declared INVALID, VOID and OF
NO EFFECT for being ultra vires.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

103
1()4

105

20 I I En., I'. 758.

Aninao v. Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 160420, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 526.
Bagongahasa v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 179844, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 338.

G.R. No. 176549

Decision

PRESBITERO VELASCO, JR.

Assocjate Justice
CJfairperson

.PERALTA
Associate Justice

REZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above 9ecision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to !J.fe writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

PRESBITERr. VELASCO, JR.

Assa iate Justice
Chairper on, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson's attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
c::.l'..L~ =~ .~:~:.;::::COPY

WILFRFI/J -/.
-;

~:~
..

FEB 1 7 201g