The Congress of Berlin (13 June 13 July 1878) was a meeting of the representativ

es of the Great Powers of the time (Russia, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hunga
ry, Italy, Germany and the Ottoman Empire)[1] and four Balkan states (Greece, Se
rbia, Romania and Montenegro), aiming at determining the territories of the stat
es in the Balkan peninsula following the Russo-Turkish War of 187778. The Congres
s came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, which replaced the pr
eliminary Treaty of San Stefano signed three months earlier between Russia and t
he Ottoman Empire.
Borders in the Balkan peninsula after the Treaty of Berlin (1878)
The German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who led the Congress, undertook to stab
ilize the Balkans, recognize the reduced power of the Ottoman Empire, and balanc
e the distinct interests of Britain, Russia and Austria-Hungary; at the same tim
e he tried to diminish Russian gains in the region and to prevent the rise of a
Greater Bulgaria. As a result, Ottoman holdings in Europe declined sharply; Bulg
aria was established as an independent principality inside the Ottoman Empire; E
astern Rumelia was restored to the Turks under a special administration; and the
region of Macedonia was returned outright to the Turks, who promised reform. Ro
mania achieved full independence, forced to turn over part of Bessarabia to Russ
ia in order to gain Northern Dobruja. Serbia and Montenegro finally gained compl
ete independence, but with smaller territories, with Austria-Hungary occupying t
he Sandak (Raka) region.[2] Austria-Hungary also took over Bosnia and Herzegovina,
whereas Britain took over Cyprus.
The results were first hailed as a great achievement in peacemaking and stabiliz
ation. However, most of the participants were not fully satisfied, and grievance
s regarding the results festered until they exploded in the First and the Second
Balkan wars of 1912-1913, and subsequently in a World war in 1914. Serbia, Bulga
ria, and Greece made gains, but far less than they thought they deserved. The Ot
toman Empire, called at the time the "sick man of Europe," was humiliated and si
gnificantly weakened, rendering it more liable to domestic unrest and more vulne
rable to attack. Although Russia had been victorious in the war that occasioned
the conference, it was humiliated at Berlin, and resented its treatment. Austria
gained a great deal of territory, which angered the South Slavs, and led to dec
ades of tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bismarck became the target of hatred
by Russian nationalists and Pan-Slavists, and found that he had tied Germany to
o closely to Austria in the Balkans.[3]
In the long run, tensions between Russia and Austria-Hungary intensified, as did
the nationality question in the Balkans. The congress was aimed at revising the
Treaty of San Stefano and at keeping Constantinople in Ottoman hands. It effect
ively disavowed Russia's victory over the decaying Ottoman Empire in the Russo-T
urkish War. The Congress of Berlin returned territories to the Ottoman Empire th
at the previous treaty had given to the Principality of Bulgaria, most notably M
acedonia, thus setting up a strong revanchist demand in Bulgaria that in 1912 le
d to the First Balkan War.
Background[edit]
Pro-Greek ethnic map of theBalkans by Ioannis Gennadius,[4] published by the Eng
lish cartographer E. Stanford in 1877
In the decades leading up to the Congress of Berlin, Russia and the Balkans had
been gripped by a movement known as Pan-Slavism, a desire to unite all the Balka
n Slavs under one rule. This movement, which evolved similarly to thePan-Germani
c and Pan-Italian movements that resulted in the unification of their respective
nations, took different forms in the various Slavic nations. In Imperial Russia
, Pan-Slavism meant the creation of a unified Slavic state under Russian directi
on essentially a byword for Russian conquest of the Balkan peninsula.[5] The rea
lization of this goal would result in Russias controlling of the Dardanelles and
the Bosphorus, giving it economic control of the Black Sea and substantially inc
reasing its geopolitical power. In the Balkans, Pan-Slavism meant unifying the B
alkan Slavs under the rule of a particular Balkan state though which state was m

eant to serve as the locus for unification was not always clear; initiative waft
ed between Serbia and Bulgaria. It is worth remembering that the creation of a B
ulgarian Exarch by the Ottomans in 1870 intended to separate the Bulgarians reli
giously from the Greek Patriarch and politically from Serbia.[6] From the Balkan
point of view, the peninsula needed a Piedmont, and a corresponding France to s
ponsor its unification.[7] Though the views of how Balkan politics should procee
d differed, both began with the deposition of the Sultan as ruler of the Balkans
and the ousting of the Ottomans from Europe. How this was to proceed, or whethe
r it was to proceed at all, was the major question to be answered at the Congres
s of Berlin.
The Great Powers in the Balkans[edit]
The Balkans were a major stage for competition between the European Great Powers
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Britain and Russia both had stake
in the fate of the Balkans. Russia was interested in the region both ideologica
lly as a pan-Slavist unifier and as a way to secure greater control of the Medit
erranean, while Britain was interested in preventing Russia from doing exactly t
hat. Furthermore, the unification of Italy and Germany had stymied the ability o
f a third European power, Austria-Hungary, to further expand its domain to the s
outhwest. Germany, as the most powerful continental nation after the Franco-Prus
sian War of 1871 and one without large direct interests in the settlement, was t
he only power which could mediate the Balkan question.[8]
Russia and Austria-Hungary, the two powers most invested in the fate of the Balk
ans, were allied with Germany in the League of Three Emperors, founded to preser
ve monarchy and conservatism on continental Europe. This meant that the Congress
of Berlin was mainly a dispute among supposed allies with conflicting goals. Ot
to von Bismarck and the German Empire, the arbiter of the discussion, would thus
have to choose before the end of the congress which of their allies to support.
This decision was to have direct consequences on the future of European geopoli
tics.[9][8]
Ottoman brutality in the SerbianOttoman War and the violent suppression of the He
rzegovina Uprising fomented political pressure within Russia, which saw itself a
s the protector of the Serbs, to act against the Ottoman Empire. MacKenzie says,
"sympathy for the Serbian Christians existed in Court circles, among nationalis
t diplomats, and in the lower classes, and was actively expressed through the Sl
av committees."[10] Eventually Russia sought and obtained Austria-Hungary s pled
ge of benevolent neutrality in the coming war in return for ceding Bosnia Herzeg
ovina to Austria-Hungary in theBudapest Convention of 1877.
The Treaty of San Stefano[edit]
After the Bulgarian April Uprising in 1876 and the decisive Russian victory in t
he Russo-Turkish War of 18771878, Russia liberated almost all of the Ottoman Euro
pean possessions. The Ottomans recognized Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia as ind
ependent, and the territories of all three were expanded. Russia created a large
Principality of Bulgaria as an autonomous vassal of the Sultan. This expanded R
ussias sphere of influence to encompass the entire Balkans, something that alarme
d other powers in Europe. Britain, which had threatened war with Russia if they
were to occupyConstantinople,[11] and France, did not want another power meddlin
g in the Mediterranean or the Middle East, where both of them were prepared to m
ake large colonial gains. Austria-Hungary desired Habsburg control over the Balk
ans, and Germany wanted to avoid their allies going to war. The German chancello
r Otto von Bismarck thus called the Congress of Berlin to discuss the partition
of the Ottoman Balkans among the European powers and to preserve the League of T
hree Emperors in the face of European liberalism.[12]
The Congress was attended by Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, R
ussia and the Ottoman Empire. Delegates from Greece, Romania,Serbia, and Montene
gro attended the sessions concerning their states, but were not members of the C
ongress. The Congress was solicited by Russia s rivals, particularly by AustriaHungary and Britain, and hosted in 1878 by Otto von Bismarck. The Congress of Be
rlin proposed and ratified the Treaty of Berlin. The meetings were held at Bisma
rcks chancellory, the former Radziwill Palace, from 13 June 1878 until 13 July 18
78. The congress revised or eliminated 18 of the 29 articles in the Treaty of Sa

n Stefano. Furthermore, using as a foundation the treaties of Paris (1856) and W

ashington (1871), the treaty effected a rearrangement of the Eastern situation.
Main issues[edit]
Ethnic composition map of the Balkans by the German-English cartographer E. G. R
avenstein of 1870.
The principal mission of the participants at the congress was to deal a fatal bl
ow to the burgeoning movement of pan-Slavism. The movement caused serious concer
n in Berlin, and even more so in Vienna, which was afraid that the repressed Sla
vic nationalities would revolt against the Habsburgs. London and Paris were nerv
ous about the diminishing influence of the Ottoman Empire and about Russian cult
ural expansion to the south, where both Britain and France were poised to coloni
ze Egypt and Palestine. Through the Treaty of San Stefano, the Russians, led by
chancellor Alexander Gorchakov, had managed to create a Bulgarian autonomous pri
ncipality under the nominal rule of the Ottoman Empire, thus sparking British "G
reat Game"--the well-entrenched fears of growing Russian influence in the Middle
East. The new principality, including a very large portion of Macedonia and wit
h access to the Aegean Sea, could easily threaten the Straits that separate the
Black Sea from the Mediterranean. This arrangement was not acceptable to London,
which considered the entire Mediterranean to be a British sphere of influence,
and saw any Russian attempt to gain access there as a grave threat to its power.
On 4 June, before the Congress opened on 13 June, Prime MinisterLord Beaconsfie
ld had already concluded the Cyprus Convention, a secret alliance with the Ottom
ans against Russia, whereby Britain was allowed to occupy the strategically plac
ed island of Cyprus. This agreement predetermined Beaconsfield s position during
the Congress and led him to issue threats to unleash a war against Russia if it
did not comply with Turkish demands. Negotiations between the Austro-Hungarian
Foreign Minister Gyula Andrssyand the British Foreign Secretary Marquess of Salis
bury had already "ended on 6 June by Britain agreeing to all the Austrian propos
als relative to Bosnia-Herzegovina about to come before the congress while Austr
ia would support British demands."[13]
Bismarck as host[edit]
The Congress of Berlin is frequently viewed as the culmination of the "Battle of
Chancellors" involving Alexander Gorchakov of Russia and Otto von Bismarck of G
ermany. They were able to effectively persuade other European leaders that a fre
e and independent Bulgaria would greatly improve the security risks posed by a d
isintegrating Ottoman Empire. According to historian Erich Eyck, Bismarck suppor
ted Russia s position that "Turkish rule over a Christian community (Bulgaria) w
as an anachronism which undoubtedly gave rise to insurrection and bloodshed and
should therefore be ended."[14] He used the Great Eastern Crisis of 1875 as proo
f of growing animosity in the region.
Borders of Bulgaria according to the preliminaryTreaty of San Stefano (red strip
es) and the supersedingTreaty of Berlin (solid red).
Bismarck s ultimate goal during the Congress of Berlin was not to upset Germany
s status on the international platform. He did not wish to disrupt the Three Emp
eror s League by choosing between Russia and Austria as an ally.[14] In order to
maintain peace in Europe, Bismarck sought to convince other European diplomats
on dividing up the Balkans so as to foster greater stability. During the process
of division, Russia began to feel short-changed even though it eventually gaine
d independence for Bulgaria. One can therefore see the underpinnings of the alli
ance problems in Europe prior to the First World War. One reason why Bismarck wa
s able to mediate the various tensions present at the Congress of Berlin stemmed
from his diplomatic persona. He sought peace and stability when international a
ffairs did not pertain to Germany directly. He viewed the current situation in E
urope as favorable for Germany, therefore any conflict between the major Europea
n powers threatening the status quo was against German interests. And at the Con
gress of Berlin, "Germany could not look for any advantage from the crisis" that

had occurred in the Balkans back in 1875.[14] As a result, Bismarck claimed imp
artiality on behalf of Germany at the Congress. This claim enabled him to presid
e over the negotiations with a keen eye for foul play.
Though most of Europe went into the Congress expecting a diplomatic show much li
ke the Congress of Vienna, they were to be sadly disappointed. Bismarck, unhappy
to be conducting the Congress in the heat of the summer, had a short temper and
a low tolerance for malarky. Thus, any grandstanding was cut short by the testy
German chancellor. The ambassadors from the small Balkan territories whose fate
was being decided were barely even allowed to attend the diplomatic meetings, w
hich were mainly between the representatives of the Great Powers.[15]
According to Henry Kissinger,[16] the congress saw a shift in Bismarck s Realpol
itik. Until then, as Germany had become too powerful for isolation, his policy w
as to maintain the Three Emperors League. Now that he could no longer rely on Ru
ssia s alliance, he began to form relations with as many potential enemies as po
ssible.
Legacy[edit]
Ethnic composition map of the Balkans in 1877 by A. Synvet, a known French profe
ssor of the Ottoman Lyceum of Constantinople.
Bowing to Russia s pressure, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro were declared indep
endent principalities. Russia keptSouth Bessarabia, which it had annexed in the
Russo-Turkish War, but the Bulgarian state it had created was first bisected, th
en split further into the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, both of
which were given nominal autonomy under the control of the Ottoman Empire.[17] B
ulgaria was promised autonomy, and guarantees were made against Turkish interfer
ence, but these were largely ignored. Romania received Dobruja. Montenegro obtai
ned Niki, along with the primary Albanian regions of Podgorica, Bar and Plav-Gusin
je. The Turkish government, or Porte, agreed to obey the specifications containe
d in the Organic Law of 1868, and to guarantee the civil rights of non-Muslim su
bjects. The region of Bosnia-Herzegovina was given over to the administration of
Austria-Hungary, which also obtained the right to garrison the Sanjak of Novi P
azar, a small border region between Montenegro and Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovin
a were put on the fast track to eventual Habsburg annexation. Russia agreed that
Macedonia, the most important strategic section of the Balkans, was too multina
tional to be part of Bulgaria, and permitted it to remain underthe Ottomans. Eas
tern Rumelia, which had its own large Turkish and Greek minorities, became an au
tonomous province under a Christian ruler, with its capital at Philippopolis. Th
e remaining portions of the original "Greater Bulgaria" became the new state of
Bulgaria.
Allegorical depiction of Bulgarian autonomy after theTreaty of Berlin.
Lithograph by Nikolai Pavlovich
In Russia, the Congress of Berlin was considered a dismal failure. Finally defea
ting the Turks decisively after the many inconclusive Russo-Turkish wars of the
past, many Russians expected something colossal a re-imagining of the Balkan borde
rs in support of Russian territorial ambitions. Instead, Russias victory resulted
in a decisive Austro-Hungarian gain on the Balkan front. This gain was brought
about by the rest of the European powers preference for a powerful Austria-Hungar
y, an empire that threatened basically no one, to a powerful Russia, which had b
een locked in competition with Britain in the so-called Great Game for most of t
he century. Russian chancellor Gorchakov said of the subsequent Treaty of Berlin
I consider the Berlin Treaty the darkest page in my life. The Russian people were
by and large furious over the European repudiation of their political gains, an
d though there was some thought that this represented only a minor stumble on th
e road to Russian hegemony in the Balkans, it in fact gave Bosnia-Herzegovina an
d Serbia over to Austrias sphere of influence, essentially removing all Russian i
nfluence from the area.[18]
The Serbs were upset with "Russia [...] consenting to the cession of Bosnia to A

ustria."[19]
Risti who was Serbias first plenipotentiary
ne of the Russian delegates, what consolation
ied that it would have to be the thought that
because within fifteen years at the latest we
Vain consolation! comments Risti.[19]

at Berlin tells how he asked Jomini, o

remained to the Serbs. Jomini repl
the situation was only temporary
shall be forced to fight Austria.

Greek Delegation in the Berlin Congress

Italy was dissatisfied with the results of the Congress, and the tensions betwee
n Greece and the Ottoman Empire were left unresolved. The Bosnians and Herzegovi
nians would also prove to be a problem to the Austro-Hungarian Empire in later d
ecades. The League of Three Emperors, established in 1873, was destroyed, as Rus
sia saw lack of German support on the issue of Bulgaria s full independence as a
breach of loyalty and alliance. The border between Greece and Turkey was not re
solved. In 1881, after protracted negotiations, a compromise border was accepted
after a naval demonstration of the Powers, resulting in the cession of Thessaly
and the Arta Prefecture to Greece.
Thus, the congress sowed the seeds of further conflicts, including the Balkan Wa
rs, and ultimately the First World War. In the "Salisbury Circular" of 1 April 1
878, the British Foreign Secretary, the Marquess of Salisbury, made clear his an
d his government s objections to the Treaty of San Stefano and the favorable pos
ition in which it left Russia.[20] According to A. J. P. Taylor, writing in 1954
: "If the treaty of San Stefano had been maintained, both the Ottoman Empire and
Austria-Hungary might have survived to the present day. The British, except for
Beaconsfield in his wilder moments, had expected less and were therefore less d
isappointed. Salisbury wrote at the end of 1878: We shall set up a rickety sort
of Turkish rule again south of the Balkans. But it is a mere respite. There is n
o vitality left in them."[21]
Though the Congress of Berlin constituted a harsh blow to Pan-Slavism, it by no
means solved the question of the area. The Slavs of the Balkans were still in th
eir majority under non-Slavic rule, split between the rule of Austria-Hungary an
d the ailing Ottoman Empire. The Slavic states of the Balkans in fact learned th
at banding together as Slavs didnt benefit them as much as playing to the desires
of a neighboring Great Power, damaging the unity of the Balkan Slavs and encour
aging competition amongst the fledgling Slav states.[22]
The underlying tensions of the region would continue to simmer for upwards of th
irty years until they again exploded in the Balkan Wars of 19121913. In 1914, the
assassination of Franz Ferdinand led to the First World War. In hindsight, we c
an see that the stated goal of maintaining peace and balance of powers in the Ba
lkans utterly failed, as the region remained a theater of conflict for Great Pow
er politics far into the twentieth century.[23]
Internal opposition to Andrssy s objectives[edit]
The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Andrssy, in addition to the occupation and
administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, also obtained the right to station garriso
ns in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which remained under Ottoman administration. The
Sanjak preserved the separation of Serbia and Montenegro, and the Austro-Hungar
ian garrisons there would open the way for a dash to Salonika that "would bring
the western half of the Balkans under permanent Austrian influence."[24] "High [
Austro-Hungarian] military authorities desired [an ...] immediate major expediti
on with Salonika as its objective."[25]
On 28 September 1878 the Finance Minister, Koloman von Zell, threatened to resig
n if the army, behind which stood the Archduke Albert, were allowed to advance t
o Salonika. In the session of the Hungarian Parliament of 5 November 1878 the Op
position proposed that the Foreign Minister should be impeached for violating th
e constitution by his policy during the Near East Crisis and by the occupation o
f Bosnia-Herzegovina. The motion was lost by 179 to 95. By the Opposition rank a
nd file the gravest accusations were raised against Andrassy.[25]
On 10 October 1878 the French diplomat Melchior de Vog described the situation as
follows:

Particularly in Hungary the dissatisfaction caused by this adventure has reach

ed the gravest proportions, prompted by that strong conservative instinct which
animates the Magyar race and is the secret of its destinies. This vigorous and e
xclusive instinct explains the historical phenomenon of an isolated group, small
in numbers yet dominating a country inhabited by a majority of peoples of diffe
rent races and conflicting aspirations, and playing a role in European affairs o
ut of all proportions to its numerical importance or intellectual culture. This
instinct is today awakened and gives warning that it feels the occupation of Bos
nia-Herzegovina to be a menace which, by introducing fresh Slav elements into th
e Hungarian political organism and providing a wider field and further recruitme
nt of the Croat opposition, would upset the unstable equilibrium in which the Ma
gyar domination is poised