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A

Overview of Software

A.1 Introduction
Quite extensive software tools have become available over the last 10 15 years.
A brief overview over some of the main tools which are oriented towards
offshore/oil and gas applications are presented in this appendix. These tools have
been categorised into the following:
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QRA software
QRA software tools for scenario and probability analysis
QRA software tools for consequence analysis
Risk management software
Qualitative risk assessment software
Reporting and analysis of incidents and accidents.

Brief summaries are presented as an overview, followed by brief sections presenting some of the main characteristics of these products. These summaries have
been prepared by the software vendors. Only those products are detailed where a
response was received from the vendors. The descriptions are structured as
follows:
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Name and purpose of software


Scope of software
License conditions, pricing etc

It should be stressed that there is a large amount of general software tools for CFD
from many different suppliers. These have not been included in the presentations
that follow throughout this appendix. Some of these may have quite valid
applications during estimation of loads from fire or explosion, or for gas dispersion
or oil slick movements. Because there are so many software tools available in this

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Appendix A: Overview of Software

category, it becomes impossible to give an overview of all relevant tools. None of


these are therefore included.
Software tools that are only directed at onshore usage are not included in the
reviews, neither are tools for production/transport regularity analysis.
All software tools that are mentioned in the following are commercially
available from the vendor as listed.
Table A.1. Overview of software for quantitative risk analysis
Software

Purpose

Contact

ASAP

3D geometrical description and analysis of a


fixed set of event trees

Lilleaker Consulting,
Oslo, Norway

COSAC

Risk assessment tool for early project


phases of a field development for concept
evaluation and screening

Scandpower Risk
Management, Kjeller,
Norway

CRA Tool

Risk assessment tool to rapidly risk rank


various offshore development concepts

Atkins, Glasgow, UK

NEPTUNE

Comprehensive Offshore Quantitative Risk


Assessment software

DNV Software,
London, UK

PLATO

3D geometrical platform model, analysing


explicitly development and timing of escalating hazards, fire, explosion and structural
collapse

Environmental
Resources
Management, London,
UK

RiskSpectrum

Fault tree and event tree software

Relcon, Stockholm,
Sweden

RISK

Comprehensive offshore quantitative risk


assessment tool

ERS Technology, UK

SAFETI

Comprehensive QRA tool for Flammable,


Explosive and Toxic Impact

DNV Software,
London, UK

A.2 Electronic Contacts


The following is a listing of electronic contacts to the software providers:
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ERS Technology, UK
www.erstechnology.com
Lilleaker Consulting, Norway
www.lilleaker.com
Century Dynamics, Horseham, UK
www.autoreagas.com
DNV Software, london, UK
www.dnv.com
Safetec Nordic, Trondheim, Norway
www.safetec.no
Atkins, Glasgow, UK
www.atkinsglobal.com/oilandgas
EQE, London, UK
www.eqe.co.uk
Fire Safety Design, Sweden
www.fsd.se
Four Elements, London, UK
www.erm.com
Prediction Technologies Inc
www.predictiontechnologies.com
Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway
www.scandpower.no
Atkins, Bristol, UK
www.atkinsglobal.com

Appendix A: Overview of Software

525

Table A.2. Overview of QRA software for scenario and probability risk analysis
Software

Purpose

Contact

BlowFAM

Evaluation of blowout risk during specific


well operations

Scandpower, Kjeller,
Norway

COAST

Shipping traffic database, using GIS for


user interface and graphical pres. of
information on shipping routes and vessel
characteristics

Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway

COLLIDE

Analysis of collision risk between vessels


and platforms

Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway

DATABASE
MANAGER

For storage, handling, and display of


reliability analysis data

ERS Technology, UK

EGRESS

Mustering and evacuation simulation for


evacuation/rescue modelling

ERS Technology, UK

LEAK

Calculation of the frequency of leaks at an


installation

DNV Software,
London, UK

RDATPlus

Bayesian data analysis

Prediction Technologies, MD, USA

CARAFault
Tree

Fault tree analysis and construction

Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway

Table A.3. Overview of QRA software for consequence analysis


Software

Purpose

Contact

AutoReaGas

CFDbased explosion simulation

Century Dynamics,
Horseham, UK

FIREX

Empirical prediction of main


characteristics and responses

FLACS

Explosion simulation

Gexcon, Bergen, N

KAMELEON
FireExKFX

Fire and gas dispersion simulation

ComputIT, Trondheim,
Norway

MONA

Advanced tool for simulation of single


comp. multiphase systems

Scandpower Risk
Management, Kjeller,
Norway

OLGA

Transient multiphase flow simulator for


systems comprising flow lines, risers and
process equipment.

Scandpower Risk
Management, Kjeller,
Norway

PHAST

Windowsbased toolkit for determination of consequences of accidental


releases of hazardous material

DNV Software,
London, UK

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Gexcon, Bergen, Norway


ComputIT, Trondheim, Norway
Relcon, Stockholm, Sweden
Scandpower Petroleum Technology, Norway

fire

Scandpower Risk
Management, Kjeller,
Norway

www.gexcon.com
www.computit.no
www.relcon.se
www.scandpowerpt.com

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Appendix A: Overview of Software

Table A.4. Overview of software for qualitative risk analysis


Software

Purpose

Contact

PHAPro

Hazard recording and reporting tool,


including four Process Hazard Analysis
techniques; HAZOP, What If/Checklist,
FMEA and Preliminary Hazard Analysis

DNV Software,
London, UK

PHAROS

Integration of job hazard analysis process


with the Permit to Work System
Safety management through a hazards
register

EQE, London, UK

FMEA and FMECA analysis

Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway

Kyrass
Sabaton

Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway

Table A.5. Overview of software for accident/incident analysis


Software

Purpose

Contact

ProSafe

Registration of information from unplanned


occurrences, including analysis and
reporting capabilities for trends and patterns
to be defined

EQE, London, UK

Synergi

Registration analysis and reporting of


information from incidents, accidents and
unplanned occurrences

Pride, Stavanger,
Norway

A.3 Quantitative Risk Analysis Software


A.3.1 ASAP
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

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Vendor
Pricing

3D geometrical description and analysis of a fixed set of


event trees
Lillesoft a.s., Baerum, Norway
License fee using ASAP on the Lillesoft Terminal Server:
NOK 160,000 (12 months) NOK 90 000 (6 months)
NOK 50,000 (3 months)
NOK 20,000 (1 month) Prices valid through 2006.

ASAP is a computer analysis package that calculates the risk related to hydrocarbon leaks, fires and explosions on oil and gas installations. Complex interactions in
horizontal and vertical directions are taken care of by adjusting the models to
threedimensional geometry. Scenarios such as gas and liquid jets followed by gas
dispersion and fire development can be seen in 3D graphic, giving a good interpretation of the accident.

Appendix A: Overview of Software

527

Table A.6. Overview of risk management software


Software

Purpose

Contact

Hazard Log
Database
Management

Registration and management of hazards

Atkins, Bristol, UK

PRISM

Audit tool for Safety Management


Assessment of Safety Management
performance

ERS Technology, UK

Riskplot II

Risk summation and presentation tool,


including outputs of risk contours, FN
data, risk transects and a listing of
dominant events

Four Elements, London,


UK

ORBIT
Offshore

Computer system designed to support the


analysis work related to Risk Based
Inspection, RBI, for offshore topside
systems

DNV Software,
London, UK

BowTieXP

Management of major risks to people, the


environment, assets and reputation by
means of Abowtie@ graphical interface
diagram

Governors BV,
Netherlands

THESIS

Management of major risks to people, the


environment, assets and reputation by
means of bowtie graphical interface
diagram

ABS Consulting,
Warrington, UK

ASAP consists of a design package, physical and statistical models along with
design interface models. The latter constitutes the connection between the physical
models and the design. In the design package the user designs the geometry of the
installation and the process flow diagram for equipment containing hydrocarbons.
All the models are intelligent in the sense that they automatically adjust to the
geometry and logic the user defines. This implies that design changes and concept
development are catered for in a fast and consistent manner by the program.
ASAP is currently being redesigned to cope with transient analysis of gas
dispersion, detection, ignition and equipment escalation according to NORSOK Z
013 and Statoil/Norsk Hydro internal Guideline for protection of pressurised
systems exposed to fire.
A.3.2 COSAC
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

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Vendor
Pricing

Risk assessment tool for early project phases of a field development for concept evaluation and screening
Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway
NOK 120,000 per license.

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Appendix A: Overview of Software

COSAC is a computerised tool for efficient risk assessment in the early project
phases of a field development.
COSAC analysis and results are tailor-made for concept evaluation and
screening. Its aim is to increase the safety of new offshore developments by
utilising 20 years of experience gained from risk analyses. Some of the main
features of COSAC include reducing uncertainty, improving the quality and
efficiency of early phase safety evaluations. COSAC provides a safety score for
every risk factor associated with an offshore field development concept. A low
score indicates safety concerns and/or lack of documentation of important safety
issues. Therefore, a low safety score in COSAC puts these issues in focus. In
addition the user is provided with information on how to resolve the problems
identified by COSAC.
A.3.3 CRA Tool
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

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Vendor
Pricing

Fast track risk tool that can be used in the assessment of


various offshore oil & gas concepts
Atkins, Glasgow, UK
Contact vendor for information.

The Concept Risk Assessment (CRA) Tool focuses on the key parameters that
drive the risk levels in new offshore oil and gas developments. The model was
developed in conjunction with BP and Shell, driven by a requirement to rapidly
rank large numbers of concepts in terms of their risks to the asset, personnel and
the environment.
The tool has been used to assist in the selection of the best concept for around
thirty new oil, gas and condensate developments in the North Sea and worldwide.
The novelty is that the risk assessment is based on a number of preprocessed risk
building blocks for each item of hazardous equipment. These are then moderated
by gearing factors to take account of specific aspects of the design.
A.3.4 NEPTUNE
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing

Offshore risk analysis


DNV Software, London, UK
Available upon request

Neptune is the successor to OHRAT, and was released in 1999. Neptune is a


comprehensive software tool for designing, calculating and providing full traceability of a quantitative risk assessment. The system architecture has been designed
to give maximum flexibility with respect to system configurations (client/server,

Appendix A: Overview of Software

529

distributed solutions, data communication, and web solutions). Neptune contains


models for calculation of discharge, dispersion, pool formation and evaporation,
flammable and toxic effects and impact. Also contained with Neptune are models
designed for the specific needs of offshore installations, such as smoke generation,
endangerment of muster areas, collision with ships, and many more. In addition,
special attention has been given to allow users to incorporate new models.
Neptune offers flexible modelling of hazards and risks through a wide range of
analytic capabilities including consequence modelling, event tree modelling, leak
frequency calculations, sensitivity and whatif analysis. Neptune is based on a
very simple concept; data flows from one model to another model along specified
paths. Data is input only once, and if a change is made anywhere within the study
this will be carried along the specified paths and affect the rest of the study.
Neptune operates under MSWindows and has tools like Excel (incl. Visual
Basic) fully integrated.
A.3.5 PLATO
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

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Vendor
Pricing

3D geometrical platform model including representation of


safety related engineering components and design features,
analysing explicitly development and timing of escalating
hazards, fire, explosion and structural collapse
Environmental Resources Management (ERM), London, UK
GBP 36,000 (leasing schemes also available)
Optional annual maintenance: GBP 3,000 per year (telephone
support and free minor software revisions).

PLATO uses a 3D model of the platform in which all safety related engineering
components and design features are explicitly represented. The development and
timing of escalating hazards such as fire, explosion and structural collapse are
simulated with automatic generation of scenarios where safety related components
affect the outcome. Results can be processed not only for the overall level of societal and individual risk but also to determine the primary escalation mechanisms and
key safety critical equipment. The primary benefits over event tree methods are
modelling realism, auditability, explicit representation of geometry/time and ease
of update for evaluation of design options or platform modifications.
A.3.6 RiskSpectrum
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing

Fault tree and event tree software


Relcon AB, Stockholm, Sweden
Contact RELCON for pricing.

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Appendix A: Overview of Software

RiskSpectrum PSA Professional offers an intuitive user interface for modelling


everything from the basic fault tree with AND and ORgates to advanced fault tree
and event tree integration of sequences in linked event trees with boundary conditions and CCF events.
The integrated analysis tool (RSAT) is specially designed for solving large PSA
models and offers MCS (minimal cut set), sensitivity, importance and time
dependent analysis. RiskSpectrum PSA Professional also includes an MCS editor
and an advanced post-processing function. The software has the following analysis
functions:
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Powerful analysis functions based on a fast cut set algorithm, which


generates and stores minimal cut sets (MCS).
For any existing MCStable, RiskSpectrum calculate uncertainty, importance, sensitivity, and time dependent reliability measures.
Analyses can be carried out on several levels: Any fault tree gate, any individual event tree sequence, any consequence (every event tree sequence
can be assigned one or more consequences, e.g. a plant damage state).
An analysis case can specify a boundary condition set which includes a
list of logical settings to apply to the model. The boundary condition set
can include settings of true/false state for house events, basic events and
gates. This is very useful both for running analysis of the same base model,
but with different variations, or for sensitivity analysis.
Analysis groups can be used for defining complex sets of up to thousands
of analysis runs carried out in an automated sequence. This is particularly
valuable when recalculating the entire PSA.
Success top events in event trees are handled both qualitatively and quantitatively.

RiskSpectrum Professional is specially designed to fulfil the demands for


complete Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) software tool for nuclear power
installations.
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Linking between event trees and fault trees, and linking of chains of
event trees
House events and exchange events for complex variations of a base model,
which makes it easy to manage different plant configurations, specialisation of models for different initiating events and/or different accident
sequences. These features are particularly valuable in carrying out external
event analyses.
CCF groups for automated CCF quantification based on several different
CCF models.

Fully graphical event and fault tree editors and inherent Windows functions such as
cut, copy, paste and draganddrop makes RiskSpectrum Professional easy to
learn and use.
RiskSpectrum Professional uses an open database format utilising the
Microsoft Access format. Each of the database tables is essentially unlimited in

Appendix A: Overview of Software

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terms of number of records, except the obvious limit in available space on the
storage media (hard disk).
A.3.7 RISK
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing

Comprehensive offshore quantitative risk assessment tool


ERS Technology, UK
Not available.

RISK is a linked spreadsheet QRA model developed on EXCEL. It enables users


to clearly identify the key stages of the risk assessment process and follow
individual major hazard events from their initiation, through accident development,
to the contribution they make to accident scenarios, TR Impairment, individual risk
and PLL. Key features of RISK are:
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Developed using industry standard spreadsheet software package


(EXCEL).
Is user friendly and can be interrogated by engineers without the need for
formal training.
Is easy to tailor to meet specific project requirements.
Is transparent and focuses on key scenarios at an appropriate level of detail.

A.3.8 SAFETI
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

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Vendor
Pricing

Comprehensive QRA software tool for flammable, explosive


and toxic impact
DNV Software, London, UK
Available on request.

SAFETI (Software for the Assessment of Flammable, Explosive and Toxic Impact) is the most comprehensive and widely used onshore QRA package available.
It is a Windows based system that provides a user friendly, industry standard
method for quantifying major chemical risks. It enables analysis of the likelihood
and severity of major hazards and makes use of the PHAST models to predict the
consequence of major releases. By combining these with their frequencies and
taking account of population location and density, along with ignition source
location for flammable and explosive effects, a number of presentations of 'risk' are
possible. These include risk contours, F/N curves, risk transects and risk ranking at
specific points.

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Appendix A: Overview of Software

A.4 QRA Tools for Scenario and Probability Analysis


A.4.1 BlowFAM
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

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Vendor
Pricing

Evaluation of blowout risk during specific well operations


through assessment of approximately 300 elements, which
influence the probability of a blowout
Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway
License condition: Price NOK 120,000. Requires
membership of Sintef Offshore Blowout Batabase.
Membership of BlowFAM steering committee: NOK 250,000
(includes three user licences). Use of BlowFAM in projects
on royalty basis: NOK 40,000.

BlowFAM is a PCtool for evaluation of blowout risk during specific well operations. BlowFAM has been developed in close cooperation with drilling/well
intervention professionals in the participating companies. In addition, drilling
specialists from several contractor companies have contributed.
The BlowFAM model has identified approximately 300 elements, that
influence the probability of a blowout. Many of these are applicable for the whole
well life while others are only relevant for a specific well phase, e.g. drilling of the
well. These elements are rated in regard to their importance to the risk. Main risk
contributors for a specific development can be identified and costefficient risk
reducing measures may be implemented.
The BlowFAM model is also a valuable tool for communicating risk elements
to the drilling professionals involved in the well operations.
A.4.2 COAST
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

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Vendor
Pricing

Shipping traffic database holding details on regular shipping


traffic on the Norwegian and UK Continental Shelves as well
as other areas of the world. Includes graphical presentation of
information on shipping routes and vessel characteristics
using GIS
Safetec Nordic, Norway
Not available.

COAST is a shipping traffic database that operates on a GIS platform, and holds
detailed information on the regular shipping traffic on the Norwegian and UK
continental shelves, as well as other areas of the world. The data in COAST is
presented as shipping routes, where each route contains information such as the

Appendix A: Overview of Software

533

annual number of vessels on the route, distribution of vessel types and sizes, route
width (std. dev.), etc. COAST facilitates searches around userdefined positions
to identify the traffic pattern, traffic density and vessel characteristics inside the
search area, as well as distance and bearing from the search position. The GIS
program automatically plots the identified routes on electronic charts.
COAST was developed by Safetec during 1995/96 in a project funded by
UKOOA, HSE and DETR and successfully achieved its main objective which was
to provide a comprehensive, uptodate and easy to use database on shipping
movements which could be used to assess risks between shipping and offshore
installations in UK waters. In 2002 COAST Norway was developed, funded by
the OLF, providing a much more comprehensive and detailed coverage of
Norwegian waters, in addition to the North Sea.
The main data sources for COAST are Lloyds port log data, AIS data, radar
data and a large number of traffic surveys. Additional surveys and data collections
are undertaken each year to maintain the accuracy of the system. A new platform
for COAST is being developed, to meet the requirements of new and much more
comprehensive data sources that have become available.
A.4.3 COLLIDE
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing

Analysis of collision risk between vessels and platforms


Safetec Nordic, Norway
Not available.

COLLIDE is a collision risk tool developed by Safetec under the sponsorship of


offshore operators in the UK, Norwegian, Danish, German and Dutch sectors to
assist in the assessment of ship collision risk. The tool has the primary function of
calculating the frequency and consequence of ship impacts against any offshore
structure.
The system provides models for assessing the risks associated with passing
(merchant, tankers, fishing, standby, supply) and visiting traffic (alongside installations, standby, supply) and gives consideration to both drifting and powered collision scenarios. The main data source for COLLIDE is detailed shipping traffic
data. This data may come from COAST, or from other available sources. Other
inputs include installation details, environmental data (wind, wave, etc.), vessel
characteristics, etc.
The COLLIDE model has regularly been updated to take into account the
effects of technological developments and additional information sources becoming available.
A.4.4 Database Manager
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.

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Appendix A: Overview of Software

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Function
Vendor
Pricing

For storage, handling, and display of reliability analysis data


ERS Technology, UK
Not available.

Database Manager is a tailored database capable of hosting reliability and safety


data. Data can be input or supplied by ERS Technology from its own databases.
Database Manager then enables the data to be configured, searched and analysed,
and presented in various reporting formats.
Data Manager facilitates file and data transfer to and from other databases. It
accepts virtually unlimited data input, constrained only by hardware availability. It
handles a wide variety of database taxonomies, including all major reliability
database taxonomies.
A.4.5 Egress
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

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Vendor
Pricing

Mustering and evacuation simulation for evacuation/rescue


modelling
ERS Technology, UK
Not available.

The EGRESS code allows the movement of large numbers of personnel, such as
when mustering on an installation, to be simulated. The platform layout is
modelled as a matrix of interconnecting cells. The code covers both the physical
movement and behavioural decision-making of personnel. The output is graphical
and the movement watched as a realtime graphical representation. It was
developed as part of a joint industry project in the UK between ERS Technology,
Shell, Texaco, Exxon, and the Health and Safety Executive.
The code has been used both offshore and onshore for the oil and gas and other
industries to provide assessments of the movement of people during incidents.
A.4.6 LEAK
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing

Calculation of the frequency of leaks at an installation


DNV Software, London, UK
Available on request.

LEAK is a software tool which calculates the frequency of leaks at an installation,


typically an oil platform. Each installation is broken down into a number of areas
which are themselves split into a number of segments each containing a list of
equipment groups. Each equipment group is built up of base elements such as
valves, flanges, pipes, etc. LEAK will calculate the leak frequency for the instal-

Appendix A: Overview of Software

535

lation, area, segment or equipment group based on built-in historical leak


frequency data. The total frequency for each user defined category is reported
together with each contributor. The model used expresses the frequency of a leak
being larger than a certain size as a continuous function of the equivalent hole size
diameter. The historical data used in the calculations is read from a database,
enabling the most uptodate data to be included.
A.4.7 RDAT Plus
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing

Bayesian data analysis


Prediction Technologies, Hyattsville, MD, USA
Not available.

RDAT Plus is a fullfeatured Bayesian data analysis package for risk analysts. It
is designed for users who need to perform system specific analyses, but who also
have a need to develop generic prior distributions based on industry data.
RDAT Plus provides the user with a powerful, yet simple and flexible environment for storing and organising many types of reliability data and related information. A hierarchical structure enables the user to develop functional or structural
or any other type of breakdown, at any level of detail. The elements of this hierarchy act as folders containing the reliability data and the results of Bayesian
analyses performed on the data sets.
With RDAT the user may specify the prior distribution in many different
ways depending on the type and level of information available. These include a
wide variety of parametric distributions (e.g., lognormal, beta and loguniform)
using any of a number of input options such as lower and upper bounds, mean and
variance, or the distribution parameters. Furthermore, RDAT enables the user to
develop generic distributions based on industry data (counts of failures in other
plants) as well as expert estimates. The resulting distributions will represent the
planttoplant variability of failure rate of a given class of components or initiating
events, and can be used in a plant specific analysis in order perform the TwoStage
Bayesian procedure.
A.4.8 CARAFault Tree
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing

Fault tree analysis and construction


Sydvest Software (www.sydvest.com)
The price for a single user license is NOK 12,000 (approximately USD 1,450/EUR 1,750).

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Appendix A: Overview of Software

CARAFaultTree is our tool for fault tree analysis and construction. A fault tree
is a logical diagram that displays the interrelationships between a potential critical
event (accident) in a system and the reasons for this event. By constructing a fault
tree you analyse how a system can fail, and the analysis also gives you insight into
how the components contributes to the system reliability. With its intuitive
graphical user interface, the program lets you create fault trees in a flash. A total of
six system performance measures and six measures of component importance are
available, along with enhanced report utilities.

A.5 QRA Tools for Consequence Analysis


A.5.1 AutoReaGas
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

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Vendor
Pricing

Integrated CFD software tool for analysing combustion in


flammable gas mixtures and subsequent blast effects.
Century Dynamics, Horseham, UK
Not available.

AutoReaGas is a powerful interactive, integrated CFD software tool for analysing


combustion in flammable gas mixtures and subsequent blast effects. Industrial
applications of the software include risk and safety assessment of offshore platforms and onshore petrochemical and process plants, power plants, mining installations and transportation systems.
AutoReaGas can perform numerical simulation of gas cloud explosions including flame propagation, turbulence and the effects of objects in the flow field. The
code can also simulate the propagation of resulting blast waves and their interaction with structures.
The software is jointly developed by Century Dynamics and TNO and
successfully integrates many features of the well known REAGAS, BLAST and
AUTODYN codes to provide a unique capability in one commercially available
and supported code. The code has been, and continues to be, extensively validated
against experimental data.
AutoReaGas is available as a paid-up licence or as an annual licence and a
trial and training is also available.
A.5.2 Firex
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function

Prediction of main fire characteristics and responses of fire


scenarios based on empirical correlations

Appendix A: Overview of Software

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Vendor
Pricing

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Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway


PCsoftware NOK 45,000.

The program system FIREX is capable of predicting the main fire characteristics
and responses of six fire scenarios:
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Pool fire in the open


Pool fire in enclosure
Fire on sea surface
Jet fire
Diffusive flare fire
Fireball/BLEVE.

FIREX is based on well known prediction methods, which have been compared
and verified against experimental data. FIREX predicts:
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Incident heat radiation onto targets not engulfed by the flames, as a


function of the distance from the fire.
Heat flux to targets engulfed by the flames as a function of time from the
onset of the fire.
Temperature response of steel structures as a function of time and degree
and type of insulation.
Smoke production and visibility in smoke as a function of time from the
moment of ignition.
Pool fire hazard ranges.
Fireball hazard ranges.
For pool fires in enclosures; ceiling temperature, development of hot gas.

A.5.3 FLACS
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&

Function

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

3D CFD software tool for analysing gas and air flows in


industrial environments as well as in the atmosphere. Major
application areas include ventilation, dispersion and gas
explosions and subsequent blast effects
Gexcon, Bergen, Norway
Price matrix with various options upon request to
flacs@gexcon.com.

The development of FLACS has been carried out continuously since 1980 with
the cooperation, support, direction and funding of ten international oil and gas
companies as well as legislative bodies of three countries. Application specific

538

Appendix A: Overview of Software

validation, wide applicability and efficiency when using FLACS has been given
high priority in the development work.
The software has been used for explosion consequence assessment and risk
analysis for more than 300 offshore installations and onshore industrial areas world
wide (by Gexcon) and is also used by numerous consultants worldwide (4050
user groups of FLACS worldwide, 2006). In addition it is increasingly being used
for general industrial CFD analyses, particularly where flows in and around
complex geometries is an issue. In recent years it has also been validated for atmospheric dispersion use.
Particular characteristics of FLACS and its application include:
x

Explosion simulations
x Any ignition point location
x Hydrocarbon gases (e.g. any mixture of methane, ethane, propane,
butane, ethylene, propylene, acetylene) and hydrogen
x Variable gas cloud size
x Variable gas concentration
x Vent panels: weight, opening mode, opening pressure
x Yielding walls: failure mode
x Effect of water spray: nozzle type, flow rate, location
x Any type of louvered walls, angle of blades, effective openings
x Prediction of blast wave strength outside the explosion area
x Effect of inert gases; CO2, N2, and varying O2 concentration .
Dispersion simulations
x Modelling of gas release
x Leak source location, size, and direction
x Forced and natural ventilation conditions
x Concentration profiles at gas detector locations
x Jet release/diffusive release
x Realistic scenario design: Ignition at any time or location during
dispersion
x Exhaust release and dispersion.
Ventilation simulations
x Modelling of external wind field
x Modelling of forced/HVAC ventilation
x Louvre drag factors
x Air change rates at varying external wind conditions
x Effect of netting and other blockages
x Flow velocities in the module and through the louvre
x Wind chill index calculations
x Helideck safety assessment.

Appendix A: Overview of Software

539

A.5.4 KAMELEON FireExKFX


The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&

Function

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

CFDbased tool for prediction of gas dispersion and fire


characteristics and response in complex geometries, as well
as fire mitigation and extinguishment analysis and design
ComputIT, Trondheim, Norway
Short and long term leasing contracts, licenses ranging from
academic to commercial licenses.

Kameleon FireEx KFX is an advanced simulator dedicated to gas dispersion and


fire simulation with the following main characteristics:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Three-dimensional transient finite volume CFD code.


Includes CAD import capabilities (PDS, PDMS, Flacs macro, others).
Interfaced with the finite element structure response codes Fahts/Usfos .
Includes detailed lagragian models for fire mitigation by water systems
(sprinkler, deluge, curtains, mist etc.).
Includes efficient and user friendly pre- and post processor capabilities.
Developed by ComputIT/NTNU/Sintef with the partners Statoil, Total, ENI
group, Hydro, ConocoPhillips, Gaz de France, Ruhrgas and Sandia National
Laboratories (USA).
Used for a large number of industrial analyses world wide for more than 20
years.

Industrial analyses performed by KFX can typically be:


x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Simulation of all kind of fires; pool fires, jet fires, spray fires, flares, fire in
enclosures, in complex congested areas, or in open space. This includes
detailed calculation of temperatures, radiation, smoke, visibility, concentrations of species, toxic gases, noise etc.
Fire impact on structures and process equipment
Optimization of passive fire protection
Fire temperature, radiation and smoke impact on humans
Evaluation of escape routes
Simulation and evaluation of fire mitigation by water systems; sprinklers,
deluge, mist, curtains
Flare simulations; radiation, noise (not standard KFX version), detailed tip
simulations
Dispersion of gas
Calculation of explosive cloud sizes
Gas and fire detection systems
Combustion in furnaces, engines, furnace design etc.
Reduction of emissions; CO, NOx, others

540

Appendix A: Overview of Software

x
x
x
x

HVAC (ventilation simulations)


Turbulent flow analysis with respect to helicopter operations, buildings,
environments etc
Fluid flow and combustion in general
3D visualization, animations, contour plot in real CAD geometry.

A.5.5 Mona
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&

Function

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

Advanced and general tool for simulation of single


component multiphase systems
Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway
To be discussed.

MONA is an advanced, general tool for simulation of singlecomponent multiphase systems. MONA can handle general network of pipelines and vessels and
thermal nonequilibrium conditions. MONA's ability to simulate water hammer
and cavitation is validated against loops in Sweden and Germany.
A.5.6 Olga
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&

Function

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

Transient multiphase flow simulator for systems comprising


flow lines, risers and process equipment
Scandpower Petroleum Technology, Kjeller, Norway
Available as lease for a limited period or as a permanent
licence.

OLGA is a simulator for transient multiphase flow phenomena. OLGA can


model general networks of flowlines, risers as well as process equipment.
OLGA is more accurate in predicting pressure gradients, liquid holdup, flow
regimes and flow rates than competitive models and correlations. OLGA's ability
to predict release behaviour from condensate pipeline (reflecting bottom topography), is of significant importance in risk analysis of offshore installations.
OLGA is verified and validated against more than 10,000 experiments at the
two-phase-flow test loop operated by SINTEF in Trondheim.
A.5.7 PHAST
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.

Appendix A: Overview of Software

&

Function

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

541

Windowsbased toolkit for determination of consequences of


accidental releases of hazardous material
DNV Software, London, UK
Available on request.

PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools) is a Windowsbased toolkit,


which determines the consequences of accidental releases of hazardous material. It
examines the progress of a potential incident from initial release, through formation of a cloud, with or without a pool, to its dispersion. The program uses DNV's
unique Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) to apply the appropriate entrainment and
dispersion models as the conditions change and to integrate the relevant individual
models such that the transition from one behaviour pattern to another is smooth,
continuous and automatic. It is applicable to all stages of design and operation
across a range of process and chemical industry sectors and may be used to identify
situations which present potential hazards to life, property or the environment.

A.6 Qualitative Risk Assessment Software


A.6.1 PHAPro
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&

Function

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

Hazard recording and reporting tool, including four process


hazard analysis techniques; HAZOP, What If/Checklist,
FMEA and Preliminary Hazard Analysis
DNV Software, London, UK
Available on request.

PHAPro is a Windows based hazard recording and reporting tool which includes
four process hazard analysis techniques in a single integrated product. The available techniques are HAZOP, What If/Checklist, FMEA and Preliminary Hazard
Analysis. Fully user customisable risk matrices, up to 10 by 10, are available for
severity and likelihood ranking of consequence, safeguards and recommendations.
Comprehensive recommendation management facilities are available to manage
the multitude of recommendations arising from a typical HAZOP study. Other
features include wizards to simplify complex tasks, file templates, timed backup
and auto recovery, spell checker and all standard windows functionality such as
cut, copy and paste, find and replace and drag and drop editing.
A.6.2 PHAROS
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.

542

Appendix A: Overview of Software

&

Function

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

Integration of job hazard analysis process with the Permit to


Work system
EQE, London, UK
From GBP 5,000 per annum to GBP 50,000 per annum
depending on the number of installations

Pharos is a powerful system that integrates the job hazard analysis process with
the Permit to Work system controlling the planning and execution of hazardous
activities. It incorporates many years of EQE's experience in the design and
implementation of Permit to Work systems and application of workplace hazard
management processes.
The elements within the system include, hazard assessment and job hazard
analysis, work tracking and coordination, (including interfaces with maintenance
systems), and isolation/lockout control. The system enhances safety with reduced
operational costs by the combination of risk assessment methodology and
computer technology.
A.6.3 Kyrass
The following is a short description of this software, its function, vender, pricing
and main features.
&
&
&

Function:
Vender:
Pricing:

Safety management
Sydvest Software (www.sydvest.com)
The price for a single user license is NOK 20,995.

Kyrass is a software tool designed to help businesses performing safety management in a practical manner. It is used to establish a register of hazard sources and
to manage this register. Kyrass is used to identify and prioritise risk reducing
measures and facilitates the documentation of reviews, revisions and evaluations.
The Kyrass safety management tool is currently a Norwegian tool (i.e. the user
interface is in Norwegian).
A.6.4 Sabaton
The following is a short description of this software, its function, vender, pricing
and main features.
&
&
&

Function:
Vender:
Pricing:

FMEA and FMECA analysis


Sydvest Software (www.sydvest.com)
NOK 9,500 (appr 1,160 EUR / 1,500
Sabaton FMEA
USD)
Sabaton FMEA
NOK 19,500 (appr 2,390 EUR / 3,090
Pro
USD).

Sabaton is an analysis tool supporting FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) and FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis). FMEA and

Appendix A: Overview of Software

543

FMECA are typically used in product and system development to reveal possible
failures and failure modes, and the effects of these failures. The analysis results
typically in proposals for design improvement aimed at eliminating system failure
or mitigating the effects of component failures. With Sabaton you simply start a
new analysis by selecting analysis form template, or you make your own fully
userdefined form. Sabaton supports you in conducting FMEA and FMECA analyses according to international standards such as ISO 9000, SAE J1739, SAE
ARP5580, IEC 60812, BS 57605 or MILSTD 1629.

A.7 Reporting and Analysis of Incidents and Accidents


A.7.1 ProSafe
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&

Function

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

Registration of information from unplanned occurrences,


including analysis and reporting capabilities for trends and
patterns to be defined
EQE, London, UK
From GBP 5,000 to GBP 150,000 depending on the number
of installations

ProSafe is a Safety & Loss Prevention system developed for the Oil & Gas
industry. It captures information from any unplanned occurrence that causes, or has
the potential to cause, harm to people, the environment, assets or a company=s
reputation. The information is then analysed and reports, (graphs, charts, text),
produced. Its data mining capabilities enables trends and patterns to be defined that
help focus the deployment of resources to prevent future loss.
Prosafe=s embedded data dictionary enables companies to change the system
to incorporate their own terminology and language. It is also scaleable enabling its
use across many geographical locations or as a single departmental system.

A.8 Risk Management Software


A.8.1 Hazard Log Database Management Tool
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&
&
&

Function
Vendor
Pricing

Registration and management of hazards


Atkins, Bristol, UK
STG 7,500, plus tailoring for system / customer requirements
(typically STG 3,000), for a oneoff purchase.

544

Appendix A: Overview of Software

The Atkins Hazard Log Database Management Tool has been developed based
upon the Safety Hazard/Risk Management requirements of UK MoD Defence
Standard 0056. It is currently in use on a number of UK MoD defence projects
ranging from whole ship projects to shorebased facilities, as well as a trinational
(UK/France/Italy) naval defence communications project.
Furthermore, the Hazard Log Database has also been tailored for use on the
Lewisham Extension to the Docklands Light Railway, and is proposed for a
number of other civilian and defence projects in the UK, Europe and Asia.
The Atkins Hazard Log Database Management Tool is based in Microsoft
Access 2, and can be run on PC or Network facilities.
The clear advantage of the tool is that it provides a systematic and traceable
means of managing system safety in accordance with a recognised standard
process. It facilitates an effective approach to the management of safety risk
reduction measures adopted and actions placed to provide the appropriate levels of
confidence in the final safety justification.
Atkins are able to tailor the Database to the specific needs of the system
application under assessment, and the needs of the managing authority.
Each copy of the tool requires an individual licence.
Where multiple use is required on a number of system element contracts for
instance, then pricing can be structured differently, and Atkins are open to discussion in these matters.
A.8.2 Prism
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
& Function
Audit tool for Safety Management Assessment of Safety
Management performance
& Vendor
ERS Technology, UK
& Pricing
Not available.
PRISM is an audit tool that is designed to penetrate each level of an organisation
using a structured and systematic methodology. The audit involves both interviews
and inspections to build up a picture of both the documented management systems
and their implementation.
The code has been used both offshore and onshore for the oil and gas and other
industries to provide assessments of the state of development of a company's
Safety Management System.
A.8.3 Riskplot II
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&

Function

Risk summation and presentation tool, including outputs of


risk contours, FN data, risk transects and a listing of dominant events

Appendix A: Overview of Software

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

545

Four Elements, London, UK


GBP 7,900 for a single user licence.

RISKPLOT is a risk summation and presentation tool. A regulatory version is


currently being developed for UK HSE. Outputs include risk contours, FN data,
risk transects and a listing of dominant events. The risk for each scenario is
calculated, accounting for:
&
&
&
&
&

wind direction, speed and stability


the number of people affected in specified time periods
whether populations are indoors/outdoors, fixed (e.g. within dwellings) or
mobile (e.g. motorists)
topographic effects (e.g. the presence of hills or cliffs)
whether event locations are at a fixed point, multiple points or distributed
along a line source (e.g. pipeline).

A.8.4 ORBIT Offshore


The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&
&
&

Function
Vendor
Pricing

Offshore risk based inspection tool


DNV Software, Hvik, Norway
Available upon request.

ORBIT Offshore is a software tool that uses DNV's Risk Based Inspection (RBI)
technique to help users optimise their inspection management programme. DNV's
RBI technique, as described in DNV RPG 101 Recommended Practice for Risk
Based Inspection of Topsides Static Mechanical Equipment, is used to calculate
the risk due to corrosion, erosion and cracking for pressure equipment in a marine
environment.
ORBIT Offshore is designed to help users sustain high productivity and
reliability of their offshore platforms by minimising lost production and downtime
through effective inspection and maintenance. It assists in the management of
safety and equipment integrity to user specified levels.
It helps you to achieve these objectives systematically and efficiently. It allows
you to quantify the risk for process and utility systems and equipment on topsides
and FPSOs. Risk can be defined in terms of potential loss of life, cost, or both. A
costeffective inspection programme can then be devised based on the greatest risk
reduction per cost of inspection
A.8.5 BowTieXP IADC Edition and Black BowTieXP
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&

Function

Management of major risks to people, the environment,


assets and reputation by means of bowtie graphical interface diagram

546

Appendix A: Overview of Software

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

Governors BV, Netherlands


Please visit www.bowtiexp.com for uptodate pricing information.

BowTieXP is a system which assists companies in the analysis and management


of their major risks to people, the environment, assets and reputation. The reports
from BowTieXP can form part of a formal Health, Safety & Environmental Case,
can be used for communication to personnel responsible for safety critical
activities, and for daytoday management of the facility. BowTieXP is available
in a special IADC edition that has been optimised to meet the needs and
requirements of the offshore industry. BowTieXP supports the new IADC HSE
Case Guidelines and makes the production of HSE Cases easier and more
productive. Special IADC HSE Case guideline templates
The BowTieXP suite of products goes several steps further than other bowtie
tools and allows risk analysis to be tested against incident data (Black
BowTieXP addon). Modelling of simultaneous operations and many other
advanced risk analysis features are also available in the BowTieXP suite of
products (Standard, Advanced, Server, RKM Edition, Black BowTieXP). Also,
BowTieXP and Black BowTieXP integrate with recognised incident investigation systems like TOPSET (which has a proven track record over 20 years),
including the new TOPSET BlackBox tool for more productive incident
investigations.
BowTieXP provides a structured approach for completing the risk management process and ensures that controls identified are linked to a companys business and to individuals responsibilities.
The bowtie graphical interface diagram provides an extremely useful
representation of the risk management process that is readily understood at all
levels in a company and also allows for simple data entry.
A.8.6 THESIS
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
&

Function

&
&

Vendor
Pricing

Management of major risks to people, the environment,


assets and reputation by means of bowtie graphical interface diagram
ABS Consulting, Warrington, UK
GBP 5002,000 per licence depending upon numbers of
licences and modules required.

THESIS (The Health, Environment, Safety Information System) is a software tool


that can effectively demonstrate how a facilitys safety management system can be
implemented. It assists companies/operators in the analysis and management of the
hazards and risks to which their business is exposed, and graphically displays and
illustrates the relationship between hazards, controls, risk reduction measures and a
businesss HES activities.

Appendix A: Overview of Software

547

THESIS is an application, originally developed by Shell and now jointly with


ABS. It has been developed based on the bowtie concept to visually display how
hazards are controlled and how the risk associated with them is reduced to As Low
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). It documents the provenance of information
and the reference sources from which the information is obtained, i.e. it is an ideal
audit tool.
The bowtie graphical interface diagram provides an extremely useful representation of the risk management process that is readily understood at all levels in a
company and also allows for simple data entry.

Glossary

The following definitions are coordinated with ISO terminology (ISO/IEC Guide
73:2002) where relevant.
Acceptance criteria
(for risk)
Accidental event
Accidental effect

Acute release

ALARP (As Low as


Reasonably
Practicable)
Barrier element
Barrier function
Barrier (or risk)
influencing factor
Barrier system

BLEVE

Causal analysis

Criteria that are used to express a risk level that is


considered acceptable for the activity in question, limited
to the high level expressions of risk.
Event, or chain of events, that may cause loss of life,
health, or damage to environment or assets.
The result of an accidental event, expressed as heat flux,
impact force or energy, acceleration, etc. which is the
basis for the safety evaluation.
The abrupt or sudden release in the form of a discharge,
emission or exposure, usually due to incidents or
accidents.
ALARP expresses that the risk level is reduced - through a
documented and systematic process - so far that no further
measure may be identified, except those that have costs
that are grossly disproportionate to the benefits.
A component of a barrier system that by itself is not
sufficient to perform a barrier function.
A function planned to prevent, control, or mitigate
undesired events or accidents.
Conditions that influence on the performance of barrier
systems.
Technical, human and/or organisational measures
designed and implemented to perform one or more barrier
functions.
Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion, is defined as
rupture of a hydrocarbon containing vessel due to being
heated by fire loads.
The process of determining potential combinations of
circumstances leading to a top event.

550

Glossary

Consequence
Consequence
evaluation
Contingency
planning
Control (of hazards)
Cost/benefit
evaluation

Chronic release
Defined situations of
hazard and accident

Design Accidental
Event
Design Accidental
Load

Dimensioning
Accidental Event
Dimensioning
accidental load
Effectiveness
analysis of safety and
emergency
preparedness
measures
Emergency
preparedness

Emergency
preparedness analysis

Outcome of and event.


Assessment of physical effects due to accidents, such as
fire and explosion loads.
Planning provision of facilities, training and drilling for
the handling of emergency conditions, including the actual
institution of emergency actions.
Limiting the extent and/or duration of a hazardous event to
prevent escalation.
Quantitative assessment and comparison of costs and
benefits. In the present context often related to safety
measures or environmental protection measures where the
benefits are reduced safety or environmental hazard.
The continuous or ongoing release in the form of a
discharge, emission or exposure.
A selection of possible events that the emergency
preparedness in the activity should be able to handle,
based on the activity=s design accidental events, as well as
hazardous and accidental situations associated with a
temporary increase of risk, and less extensive accidental
events.
Accidental events that serve as the basis for layout,
dimensioning and use of installations and the activity at
large, in order to meet the defined risk acceptance criteria.
The most severe accidental load that the function or
system shall be able to withstand during a required period
of time, in order to meet the defined risk acceptance
criteria.
See Design Accidental Event
See Design Accidental Event
Analysis which shall document the fulfilment of functional
requirements to safety and emergency preparedness.

Technical, operational and organisational measures that


are planned to be implemented under the management of
the emergency organisation in case hazardous or
accidental situations occur, in order to protect human and
environmental resources and assets.
Analysis which includes establishment of defined
situations of hazard and accident, including dimensioning
accidental events, establishment of functional
requirements to emergency preparedness, and
identification of emergency preparedness measures.

Glossary

Emergency
preparedness
organisation
Environmental
resource

The organisation which is planned, established, trained


and exercised in order to handle occurrences of hazardous
or accidental situations.
Includes a stock or a habitat, defined as:
Stock

Environment safety
Escalation
Escalation factor
Escape

Escape way

Establishment of
emergency
preparedness
Evacuation

Event Tree Analysis

Fault Tree Analysis

Functional
requirements to
safety and emergency
preparedness

551

A group of individuals of a stock present in a defined geographical area in a


defined period of time.
Alternatively
The sum of individuals within a species
which are reproductively isolated within a defined geographical area.
Habitat
A limited area where several species
are present and interact. Example: a
beach.
Safety relating to protection of the environment from
accidental spills which may cause damage.
An increase in the consequences of a hazardous event or a
sequence of events.
Conditions that lead to increased risk due to loss of
control, mitigation or recovery capabilities.
Actions by personnel on board surface installations (as
well as those by divers) taken to avoid the area of accident
origin and accident consequences to reach an area where
they may remain in shelter.
Routes of specially designated gangways from the
platform, leading from hazardous areas to muster areas,
lifeboat stations, or shelter area.
Systematic process which involves planning and implementation of suitable emergency preparedness measures
on the basis of risk and emergency preparedness analysis.
Abandonment of the installation from sheltered areas by
the dedicated evacuation means. Emergency evacuation is
normally the main consideration, as precautionary evacuation is less demanding on the evacuation resources.
Inductive analysis in order to determine alternative
potential scenarios arising from a particular hazardous
event. It may be used quantitatively to determine the
probability or frequency of different consequences arising
from the hazardous event.
Deductive quantitative analysis technique in order to
identify the causes of failures and accidents and quantify
the probability of these.
Verifiable requirements to the effectiveness of safety and
emergency preparedness measures which shall ensure that
safety objectives, risk acceptance criteria, authority
minimum requirements, and established norms are
satisfied during design and operation.

552

Glossary

Internal control

Main safety function

Major accidents

Material damage
safety
Mitigation
MOB-boat
Muster Station
Muster area

Occupational
accidents

Personnel safety
Probability
Reliability analysis

Residual Accidental
Event.
Residual risk
Risk
Risk acceptance
Risk analysis
Risk assessment
Risk avoidance

All administrative measures which are implemented to


ensure that the work is in accordance with all requirements
and specifications.
Safety functions that need to be intact in order to ensure
that personnel that are not directly and immediately
exposed, may reach a place of safety in an organised
manner, either on the installation or through controlled
evacuation.
Accidents where multiple (often 5 or more) fatalities may
be caused, often resulting from a hydrocarbon leak or from
a serious structural damage.
Safety of the installation, its structure, and equipment
relating to accidental consequences in terms of production
delay and reconstruction of equipment and structures.
Limitation of any negative consequence of a particular
event.
Man over board boat
A place where personnel may gather in a Safe Haven prior
to evacuation or abandonment from emergency situations.
Area on the platform where the personnel may be
sheltered from accidental conditions until they embark into
the lifeboats.
Accidents relating to hazards that are associated with the
workplace (falls, slips, crushing etc.), thus other hazards
than hydrocarbon gas or oil under pressure. These
accidents are normally related to a single individual.
Safety for all personnel involved in the operation of a
field.
Extent to which an event is likely to occur.
Analysis of causes and conditions of failure, inspection,
maintenance and repair, and the quantitative assessment of
up-times and down-times.
Accidental event which the installation is not designed
against, therefore it will be part of the risk level for the
installation.
Risk remaining after risk treatment.
Combination of the probability of an event and its
consequence.
Decision to accept a risk.
Systematic use of information to identify sources and to
describe the risk.
Overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation.
Decision not to become involved in, or action to withdraw
from, a risk situation.

Glossary

Risk control
Risk evaluation
Risk identification
Risk management
Risk management
system
Risk perception
Risk reduction
Risk transfer
Risk treatment
Safety goals

Safety objective
Serious accidents
Shelter Area
Stakeholder
Working accidents

Worst case
consequence

553

Actions implementing risk management decisions.


Process of comparing the estimated risk against given risk
criteria to determine the significance of the risk.
Process to find, list and characterise elements of risk.
Coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation
with regard to risk.
Set of elements of an organisation's management system
concerned with managing risk.
Way in which a stakeholder views a risk, based on a set of
values or concerns.
Actions taken to lessen the probability, negative
consequences, or both, associated with a risk.
Sharing with another party the burden of loss or benefit of
gain, for a risk.
Process of selection and implementation of measures to
modify risk.
Concrete targets against which the operations of installations at the field are measured with respect to safety.
These targets shall contribute to avoidance of accidents or
resistance against accidental consequences.
Objective for the safety of personnel, environment and
assets towards which the activity shall be aimed.
See major accidents.
An area on the platform where the crew will remain safe
for a specific period of time in an emergency situation.
Any individual, group or organization that can affect, be
affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by, a risk.
Accidents relating to other hazards than hydrocarbon gas
or oil under pressure (falls, crushing etc.) normally related
to a single individual.
The worst possible HSE consequences resulting from a
hazardous event. For this to occur, all critical defences in
place must have failed.

Abbreviations

AIR
AIS
ALARP
ARCS
ARPA
bara
barg
BBD
bbls
BD
BFETS
BLEVE
BOP
BORA
CAD
CBA
CCA
CFD
CPA
CPP
CSE
DAE
DAL
DFU
DHSV
DP
dwt
E&P
E&P Forum
EER
EESLR
EFSLR

Average Individual Risk


Automatic Identification System
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
Admiralty Raster Chart Services
Automated Radar Plotting Aid
bar absolute
bar gauge (overpressure)
Barrier Block Diagram
barrels
Blowdown
Blast and Fire Engineering for Topside Systems
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
Blowout Preventer
Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis
Computer Aided Design
Cost Benefit Analysis
Cause-Consequence Analysis
Computational Fluid Dynamics
Closest Point of Approach
Controllable Pitch Propellar
Concept Safety Evaluation
Design Accidental Events
Design Accidental Loads
Defined situations of hazard and accident
DownHole Safety Valve
Dynamic Positioning
Dead Weight (tonnes)
Exploration and Production
Previous name of organisation now called OGP
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
Risk due to explosion escalation by small leaks
Risk due to fire escalation by small leaks

556

Abbreviations

EIA
EIF
EQDC
ESD
ETA
Ex
FAR
FCC
FEM
Fi-Fi
FLACS
FMEA
FPS
FPSO
FPU
FRC
FSU
FTA
GBS
GIR
GIS
GoM
GPS
GR
GRP
GRT
HAZID
HAZOP
HC
HCL
HCLIP
HES
HIPPS
HOF
HR
HSE
IEC
IMO
IR
IRPA
ISO
JIP
LCC
LEL
LFL
LNG
MIRA

Environmental Impact Assessment


Environmental Impact Factor
Emergency Quick DisConnector
Emergency Shut Down
Event Tree Analysis
Explosion [protected]
Fatal Accident Rate
Frigg Central Comlex
Finite Element Method
Fire Fighting
Flame Accelerator Software
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Floating Production System
Floating Production, Storage and Off-loading unit
Floating Production Unit
Fast Rescue Craft
Floating Storage Unit
Fault Tree Analysis
Gravity Base Structure
Group Individual Risk
Geographical Information System
Gulf of Mexico
Global Positioning System
Group Risk
Glass fibre Reinforced Plastic
Gross Register Tons
Hazard Identification
Hazard And Operability Study
Hydrocarbon
Hybrid Causal Logic
Hydrocarbon Leak and Inventory Project
Health, Environment and Safety
High Integrity Pressure Protection System
Human and Organisational Factors
Human Reliability
Health and Safety Executive
International Electro-technical Commission
International Maritime Organization
Individual Risk
Individual Risk per Annum
International Organisation for Standardisation
Joint Industry Project
Life Cycle Cost
Lower Explosion Level
Lower Flammability Level
Liquefied Natural Gas
Environmental risk analysis (Miljrettet risikoanalyse)

Abbreviations

MMI
MNOK
MOB
MODU
MP
MSF
MTO
NORSOK
nm
NMD
NOPSA
NPD
NPV
NTNU
NTS
OLF
OR
OTS
P&ID
PETRAD
PFEER
PFP
PGS
PHA
PLATO
PLL
PLS
POB
PRS
PSA
PSA
PSD
QA
QC
QM
QP
QRA
R&D
RABL
RAC
RACON
RAE
RAMS
RNNS
ROV

557

Man-Machine Interface
million Norwegian kroner
Man Overboard
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
Main (propulsion) Power
Module Support Frame
Man, Technology and Organisation
Norwegian offshore standardisation organisation (Norsk Sokkels
Konkurranseposisjon)
Nautical Mile
Norwegian Maritime Directorate
National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority [Australia]
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
Net Present Value
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Norwegian Technology Standards Institution
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (Oljeindustriens Landsforening)
Overall Risk
Operational Condition Safety (Operasjonell Tilstand Sikkerhet)
Piping and Instrumentation Drawing
Program for Petroleum Management and Administration
Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response
Passive Fire Protection
Petroleum Geo-Services ASA
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Software for dynamic event tree analysis
Potential Loss of Life
Progressive Limit State
Personnel On Board
Position Reference System
Petroleum Safety Authority [Norway]
Probabilistic Safety Assessment
Process Shut Down
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Quality Management
[Frigg] Quarters Platform
Quantified Risk Assessment
Research and Development
Risk Assessment of Buoyancy Loss
Risk Acceptance Criteria
Radar signal amplification
Residual Accidental Events
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety
Risk Level [project] (Risiko Niv Norsk Sokkel)
Remote Operated Vehicle

558

Abbreviations

RRM
Risk Reducing Measure
SAFOP
Safety and Operability Study
SAR
Search and Rescue
SBV
Standby Vessel
SCR
Safety Case Regulations
SIL
Safety Integrity Level
SJA
Safe Job Analysis
SLR
Risk due to small leaks
SOLAS
Safety of Life at Sea
SSIV
SubSea Isolation Valve
ST
Shuttle Tanker
SUPER-TEMPCALC
Software for 2D temperature analysis
TASEF-2
Software for 2D temperature analysis
TCP2
[Frigg] Treatment Platform 2
TH
Thruster
TLP
Tension Leg Platform
TP1
[Frigg] Treatment Platform 1
TR
Temporary Refuge
TRA
Total Risk Analysis
TST
Technical Safety Condition (Teknisk SikkerhetsTilstand)
TTS
Technical Condition Safety (Teknisk Tilstand Sikkerhet)
UEL
Upper Explosive Limit
UFL
Upper Flammability Limit
UPS
Underwater Production System
USFOS
Software for non-linear and dynamic analysis of structures
VEC
Valued Ecological Component
VHF
Very High Frequency
VOC
Volatile Organic Compounds
VTS
Vessel Traffic System
WOAD
Worldwide Offshore Accident Database (ref. DNV)

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Index

abandonment;236; 254; 479; 552


accident;2; 79; 1518; 2024; 2830;
43; 45; 46; 49; 5255; 5759; 61; 62;
64; 66; 67; 71; 7786; 88; 91107;
111113; 123125; 131; 136; 139;
143145; 158; 167; 175180; 186;
189198; 206; 214217; 220; 221;
233236; 239; 243; 250252; 257;
261263; 269; 271275; 278; 311;
314; 332; 334; 335; 344; 345; 351;
354; 355; 399; 407; 412; 426; 432;
435; 437; 447; 454; 459; 468; 477;
478; 482; 500; 502;512
accumulated frequency;25; 39
AIR;10; 19; 2123; 29; 3537; 63; 66;
68; 69; 246; 500
air diving;273
ALARP;5; 6; 10; 11; 51; 63; 65; 72; 76;
126; 305; 405; 466; 479; 497; 500;
502; 521
Alexander L. Kielland;52; 55; 61; 78;
93; 100; 258; 263; 407
asset risk;25; 27; 39; 138
assumption;44; 56; 70; 185; 190; 222;
239; 240; 244; 288; 294; 359; 364;
370; 378; 381
attendant vessel;51; 5557; 60; 356; 360;
445; 446
availability;27; 40; 48; 66; 90; 129; 134
137; 140; 145; 151; 167; 171; 186;
193; 214216; 237; 257; 262; 269
271; 326; 458460; 466; 489; 495;
511; 515
bad weather conditions;101; 103
BFETS;3; 282; 298; 309; 325; 333; 337;
347; 452

blowdown;18; 126; 183; 215218; 297;


462; 475; 488; 498500
blowout;39; 40; 48; 54; 74; 79; 8087;
113; 125; 130132; 138; 141; 175;
189191; 230; 236; 258; 263; 265;
279; 311; 339; 432; 441; 467; 468
BORA;49; 122; 136; 154; 170173; 183;
335; 407; 495; 496
Brent A;78; 89; 90; 117; 214; 277; 278
buoyancy compartment;111; 133; 442
cargo tanks;115; 480; 483
cause analysis;120123
check lists;161
chi-square distribution;148
collision;27; 41; 46; 108; 113; 123; 133;
139; 142; 170; 241; 251; 279; 302;
353368; 371388; 391397; 400;
403; 405; 417432; 448; 461; 473
columns;84; 100; 102; 289; 323; 380;
388; 442; 454
combustion reaction;280; 281; 283
comparative studies;129; 497
Concept Safety Evaluation;1; 157
condensate;209; 212; 472
conditional probability;18; 174; 179;
185; 212; 216; 241; 330; 349; 370;
396; 466
consequence analysis;120; 157; 195;
230; 280; 457; 473
consequence category;39
control centre;261
control room;93; 102; 215; 259; 261;
454; 510
Cost Benefit Analysis;500
cost of reinforcement;343
critical temperature;221

574

Index

CSE;1
cumulative function;35
DAE;300; 555
DAL;555
damage;4; 8; 16; 2427; 3840; 7075;
79; 84; 87; 89; 90; 94; 96; 105; 112;
115; 120; 126; 133; 138; 143; 191;
207; 214; 216219; 220225; 228
231; 251; 262; 277; 306; 314; 334;
345; 350356; 359; 378; 380; 385;
386; 396; 408; 411; 414; 426; 432;
435441; 454; 456; 464; 473; 498;
499; 500; 502; 503; 504; 505; 512
data sources;140; 150; 151; 364; 412
decision to evacuate;236
decommissioning;11; 274; 275
Deep Sea Driller;78; 98; 99; 117
depressurisation;131; 132; 206; 486
design basis;2; 123; 301; 332; 468; 471;
486; 487
DFU;493
dimensioning fire;299; 300; 301; 455
dimensions of risk;16; 76; 137
DP-system;49; 361
dropped load;436; 439; 442; 457
dropped objects;133; 134; 136; 192; 279;
435; 443; 474
ecological component;232
EER;236; 238; 241; 263
Ekofisk A;78; 94; 95; 117; 258; 265
Ekofisk B;78; 79; 80; 117; 229; 258
Emergency Preparedness Analysis;13;
62; 67
Enchova;78; 83; 117
environmental risk;4; 8; 27; 64; 67; 73
75; 138; 228; 230
EQDC;556
escalation;9; 18; 24; 47; 78; 8097; 99;
101; 102; 104108; 111; 114; 117;
123; 125; 135139; 158; 176178;
181; 183; 186; 190; 194196; 214;
217219; 236; 241; 248; 250; 278;
279; 304; 312314; 330; 345; 349
351; 407; 457; 459; 468; 469; 499;
500; 513
escape;17; 18; 21; 29; 37; 65; 66; 91; 92;
100; 132; 145; 176; 179; 191; 224;
227; 235; 241; 243; 245; 248256;
259261; 271; 291293; 437; 468;
481; 483; 484
ETA;122

evacuation;9; 1821; 29; 65; 66; 7988;


91101; 103106; 145; 157; 175179;
190; 224; 225; 227; 228; 235238;
249; 251263; 384; 468; 481; 483
evaluation of risk;1; 16
event tree analysis;125; 134; 175; 262;
310; 342
exceedance diagram;40; 312; 330
exploration drilling;84; 183; 311; 412;
435
explosion;3; 11; 12; 47; 65; 77; 8496;
109111; 120; 125; 132; 134; 136;
139; 141; 170; 177; 186190; 204;
211226; 235; 243252; 265; 277;
280; 298; 308339; 342351; 400;
402; 432; 452; 455; 459;467; 472;
473; 478; 484487; 491; 497500;
512515; 518; 520
exposed hours;19; 20
external ignition model;209
Exxon Valdez;78; 115; 229
falling object;4; 54; 120; 143; 437443;
448; 453
FAR;1923; 2932; 36; 45; 5463; 66;
68; 237240; 246; 272275; 408; 446;
478; 480484; 488
fatality analysis;235; 251; 255; 262
fire;3; 912; 18; 47; 48; 65; 77; 80; 83
96; 110; 116; 120; 125; 126; 130136;
139; 141; 145; 150; 157; 163; 170;
175195; 206225; 234; 235; 244
254; 262; 265; 277317; 332; 336;
345349; 384; 385; 395; 397; 400
404; 439; 440; 453478; 483491;
496502; 507; 509515; 520
fixed installation;28; 3335; 53; 54; 143;
284; 368; 418; 420; 454; 467
FLACS;157; 329; 330; 347; 348
flare;53; 54; 95; 208216; 336; 498
floating production;2; 13; 111; 136; 202;
289; 380; 399403; 442; 453; 454;
467; 468; 495
flotel;3335; 59; 61; 100; 113; 258; 264;
355; 407; 409; 412
flow rate;131; 132; 137; 192; 200; 204;
205; 215; 324; 432; 467; 468; 472
FMEA;3; 122; 153; 167
f-N curve;17; 35; 36; 69; 480; 481
FPPY;17
FPSO;33; 49; 96; 107112; 142; 193;
257; 332; 354; 400; 402; 418430;
449; 454; 477; 480483

Index

FRC;84; 91; 106; 107; 265; 267; 268;


444
frequency assessment;360; 401
FTA;122; 167
functionality;103; 171; 214; 215; 511
gas cloud;85; 94; 97; 120; 148; 190193;
204; 205; 211; 213; 214; 237; 248;
315329; 341348; 449; 450
generator;195; 196
generic data;140; 146; 147; 149; 375
global failure;379; 380; 381
Glomar Java Sea;78; 103; 117
group risk;17; 21; 36; 63
hazard identification;121; 156; 159; 161
163; 404; 413
HAZID;121; 161; 274; 404; 408
HAZOP;3; 122; 153; 157; 163167; 274;
517; 518
helicopter evacuation;227; 237; 258
HES management;ix; 9; 10; 13; 88; 93;
127; 134; 153; 154; 399; 488; 494;
510; 520
HOF;125; 136; 215; 422
HSE;2; 10; 11; 58; 63; 65; 66; 142145;
202; 206212; 225; 333; 356; 381;
401; 412; 418; 445; 495; 508; 511
hull;33; 106; 143; 157; 226; 260; 332;
384; 385; 399; 407; 417; 433
ignition;18; 47; 7897; 117; 120; 126;
130; 131; 141145; 157; 176; 179;
185; 190196; 204214; 236; 243
251; 255; 258; 278290; 297300;
310; 315329; 334337; 340; 346;
460; 462; 466; 473; 474; 485; 489;
490; 513
ignition source;89; 94; 144; 157; 190;
196; 206214; 286; 316329; 336;
341; 460; 473; 474; 513
ignition temperature;204; 206; 281
immediate ignition;213; 286; 317
impact angle;438; 441
impairment;10; 16; 17; 23; 24; 37; 63
68; 128; 137; 186; 217; 224226; 252;
261; 340; 459; 460
impairment frequency;24; 37; 66; 186
initial screening;162
initiating events;119; 121; 122; 123; 129;
167; 172; 180; 182; 407
installation specific data;142148; 150;
158
instantaneous release;285; 286
insulated steel;295; 296

575

Ixtoc;78; 80
jacket structure;143; 353; 354; 379; 388;
395
Jotun;78; 96; 97; 117
leak;18; 43; 44; 50; 78; 83; 84; 87; 89
97; 125; 131; 132; 142; 145; 146150;
157; 158; 172; 173; 177; 180196;
200215; 225; 236; 241248; 258;
263; 277284; 298; 310; 318; 324
329; 334; 335; 339347; 407; 449;
460474; 485490; 496; 508; 515;
518; 520
LEL;317
local failure;395; 407
major accident;ix; 7; 8; 16; 17; 20; 23;
29; 30; 38; 5255; 61; 64; 7779; 95;
99; 111; 234; 235; 477; 482; 510; 511
major hazard;55; 61; 62; 66; 95; 152;
180; 233; 235; 274; 290; 477; 493;
510; 511
manhours;21; 33; 4345; 5557; 62;
201; 275; 446; 478; 482
marginal angle;394
material damage risk;4; 16; 39; 75; 306;
307; 464; 465; 499; 512
matrix presentation;39
minor damage;40; 353
MIRA;70; 228; 229; 231; 232
Mobile Drilling Units;258; 454
modelling of fire escalation;217
modification phase;33
MODU;87; 319
module support beam;442; 443
NMD;10; 400; 409
non-essential personnel;111; 113; 236;
261
Norne;78; 107; 257; 425; 426
Norpipe;354; 355; 386
NORSOK;13; 43; 6267; 119; 151157;
250; 299; 301; 303; 380; 455; 456;
471; 517
NPD;2; 3; 62; 79; 83; 98; 103; 105; 142;
299; 301; 455; 514
NPD regulations;301
NPV;351; 503; 505; 506
occupational accident;17; 20; 21; 29; 30;
5255; 6166; 145; 239; 274; 444;
481; 482
Ocean Oddesey;78; 86
Ocean Ranger;78; 101; 102; 117; 263;
265; 269; 399; 402; 454
Ocean Vanguard;78; 112; 410; 433

576

Index

OREDA;145
Oseberg B;354; 355
overall risk level;62; 273; 512
oxygen;223; 281; 291293; 315
P-34;78; 112; 402
P-36;78; 109; 117; 402
passive fire protection;18; 139; 157; 184;
217220; 285289; 295; 298; 305;
314; 456; 457; 471; 500507; 514
personnel risk;17; 26; 58; 66; 128; 465;
512
Petrobras;111; 112
PFEER;10; 11; 508513
PFP;298307
PHA;3; 122; 162; 164; 557
pick up;87; 266; 268
Piper Alpha;2; 3; 10; 54; 67; 8993; 142;
145; 186193; 214; 225; 241; 248;
249; 265; 277; 291; 314; 345
platform design;407
platform specific modelling;208; 219
PLATO;175; 195; 196
PLL;10; 17; 21; 23; 2935; 63; 68; 70;
241; 242; 350; 463; 480; 483; 502;
503; 506; 508
POB;2123; 35; 69; 227; 252; 263
Preliminary Hazard Analysis;3; 122;
162; 164
probability study;128; 136
process accidents;40; 350
process area;47; 48; 150; 211; 217; 218;
284; 315; 335; 339; 341349; 440;
483; 484; 485; 489
process leak;126; 206; 211; 310; 467;
480; 483
production delay risk;16
PSA;1; 3; 5; 6; 8; 48; 55; 60; 63; 64; 96;
112114; 142145; 158; 171; 200;
202; 205; 227; 233; 303; 340; 365;
399; 403411; 429; 436; 445; 455;
457; 477; 515
public domain source;143
pump room;87; 102; 212; 400; 402
QRA;14; 10; 11; 17; 27; 35; 42; 43;
119129; 138140; 153161; 166;
172; 175; 176; 180; 189; 194196;
211; 212; 218; 233; 238; 244; 246;
250; 303312; 330; 344350; 399
403; 408; 412; 448; 452; 463; 474
478; 493; 494; 495; 499; 508; 509;
512; 513; 514; 516; 518
quantification of risk;274; 490

RABL;400; 404406; 432; 433


real risk;16
recovery time;229; 230
regulatory requirements;10; 64; 399;
408; 452; 490
Reint;355; 364
reliability;10; 14; 48; 89; 94; 122; 134;
145; 167; 169; 171; 179; 194; 214;
215; 216; 237; 335; 362; 373; 384;
386; 399; 448; 471; 474; 498; 511
reliability analysis;122; 179; 216; 362;
400
rescue;9; 11; 12; 18; 21; 80; 8591; 99
101; 106; 129; 137; 145; 157; 226
228; 236; 252; 257; 262271; 445
448; 481; 483; 484
rescue fatalities;18; 262; 483; 484
rescue study;263
residual production phase;33
Reynolds number;438
riser fire;132; 257
risk; 145; 4976; 86; 88; 90; 97; 99;
111; 119130; 134147; 151159;
161; 164; 165; 170177; 191196;
206; 214; 217; 219221; 228; 230;
233246; 249; 251; 253; 255257;
261; 264; 271275; 297299; 306;
307; 334; 335; 347; 350366; 372;
375; 381388; 391394; 399409;
412419; 423; 426; 435; 436; 448
468; 473503; 505; 507521; 546
Risk Acceptance Criteria;51; 62; 65; 70;
76; 478
risk acceptance criteria for temporary
phases;76
risk analysis; 1; 3; 4; 7; 10; 14; 16; 43;
63; 86; 88; 90; 125129; 134; 137;
138; 142; 146; 151; 153; 154; 194;
228; 249; 256; 358; 399; 400; 407
409; 448; 451; 455462; 466; 479;
493; 494; 508; 518; 520
risk aversion;16; 21; 22; 35; 36
risk estimation;26
risk level;10; 11; 21; 31; 43; 50; 51; 55
63; 6669; 71; 72; 74; 99; 126; 144;
146; 152; 155; 235; 237; 238; 257;
264; 272; 273; 307; 350; 351; 363;
372; 382; 384; 403; 404; 408; 412;
455; 480; 481; 487; 488; 494; 495;
497; 498; 502; 508514; 517520
RiskSpectrum;135; 137; 179; 194
RRM;502; 503; 505; 506

Index

Safety Case Regulations;2; 10; 24; 65;


495
Safety Integrity Level;474
SAR;98102; 256259; 264270; 447
SBV;265
scenario based analysis;246
Sea King;257; 260
Seacrest;78; 105
sensitivity analysis;506
serious damage;40
shape coefficient;438
shuttle tanker;27; 41; 4851; 62; 107;
108; 142; 354; 355; 360; 361; 389
394; 417421; 425430; 454; 473
shuttling;28; 34; 35; 58; 260; 272; 273;
365; 368; 369; 518
significant damage;40; 143; 307; 500;
503; 504
significant effect;50; 71; 132; 190; 351;
498
SJA;3; 155
slick thickness;286; 289
smoke;65; 8793; 126; 132; 150; 191;
207; 217; 224; 225; 226; 250261;
280; 284; 290293; 338; 460; 509
soot production;225; 292; 294
spill risk;71; 137
statistical simulation;236; 262; 270
Statpipe;96
steel jacket platform;238; 355; 356; 380
storage and offloading;400
stranding;371
structural failure;31; 76; 78; 104; 217;
224; 236; 245; 261; 279; 378; 395;
397; 440; 448; 462; 483
subsea equipment;133; 440; 441
subsea gas leak;449
sudden rupture;191
supply vessel;41; 79; 80; 98; 104; 143;
353358; 360; 387; 389; 393

577

support structure;24; 193; 226; 241; 278;


289; 298; 300; 303; 332; 394; 399;
436; 495
survivability;134; 135; 192; 214; 216;
314; 399; 511
synthesis;123; 271
system description;129
system level;162
tanker accident;71
technological risk;16
thruster;402; 421; 422
thruster capacity;421
towline;40; 106
TRA;1; 152; 153; 155; 157; 558
trusses;298; 303; 354; 388
turret;418; 420; 422; 454; 483
UEL;192; 317
UK Health and Safety Executive;142;
239; 333
underwater production system;441
uninsulated steel;222
USFOS;134; 301305; 307
VEC;39; 232
ventilation;205; 208; 291293; 299; 303;
319; 322; 326; 327; 329; 335; 336;
345; 346; 348; 473; 497; 498; 500
vessel;20; 27; 28; 51; 53; 56; 79; 80; 84
87; 9498; 101107; 111115; 133;
142; 143; 150; 165; 190; 193; 200;
221; 222; 236; 263269; 284; 299;
320; 353367; 369389; 392397;
402; 411; 414; 416; 417; 422; 432;
435; 442447; 470; 471; 473; 487
wellhead area;80; 212; 252; 339344
wellhead platform;37; 39; 41; 79; 94;
339; 342; 454; 520
West Gamma;53; 78; 105; 117; 258;
263; 401; 402; 407; 444
West Vanguard;78; 84; 85; 112; 113;
117; 258; 265; 319
wireline operations;183
WOAD;39; 141144; 311; 353; 439
workover;79; 130; 183; 437

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