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Overview of Software
A.1 Introduction
Quite extensive software tools have become available over the last 10 15 years.
A brief overview over some of the main tools which are oriented towards
offshore/oil and gas applications are presented in this appendix. These tools have
been categorised into the following:
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QRA software
QRA software tools for scenario and probability analysis
QRA software tools for consequence analysis
Risk management software
Qualitative risk assessment software
Reporting and analysis of incidents and accidents.
Brief summaries are presented as an overview, followed by brief sections presenting some of the main characteristics of these products. These summaries have
been prepared by the software vendors. Only those products are detailed where a
response was received from the vendors. The descriptions are structured as
follows:
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It should be stressed that there is a large amount of general software tools for CFD
from many different suppliers. These have not been included in the presentations
that follow throughout this appendix. Some of these may have quite valid
applications during estimation of loads from fire or explosion, or for gas dispersion
or oil slick movements. Because there are so many software tools available in this
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Purpose
Contact
ASAP
Lilleaker Consulting,
Oslo, Norway
COSAC
Scandpower Risk
Management, Kjeller,
Norway
CRA Tool
Atkins, Glasgow, UK
NEPTUNE
DNV Software,
London, UK
PLATO
Environmental
Resources
Management, London,
UK
RiskSpectrum
Relcon, Stockholm,
Sweden
RISK
ERS Technology, UK
SAFETI
DNV Software,
London, UK
ERS Technology, UK
www.erstechnology.com
Lilleaker Consulting, Norway
www.lilleaker.com
Century Dynamics, Horseham, UK
www.autoreagas.com
DNV Software, london, UK
www.dnv.com
Safetec Nordic, Trondheim, Norway
www.safetec.no
Atkins, Glasgow, UK
www.atkinsglobal.com/oilandgas
EQE, London, UK
www.eqe.co.uk
Fire Safety Design, Sweden
www.fsd.se
Four Elements, London, UK
www.erm.com
Prediction Technologies Inc
www.predictiontechnologies.com
Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway
www.scandpower.no
Atkins, Bristol, UK
www.atkinsglobal.com
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Table A.2. Overview of QRA software for scenario and probability risk analysis
Software
Purpose
Contact
BlowFAM
Scandpower, Kjeller,
Norway
COAST
Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway
COLLIDE
Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway
DATABASE
MANAGER
ERS Technology, UK
EGRESS
ERS Technology, UK
LEAK
DNV Software,
London, UK
RDATPlus
CARAFault
Tree
Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway
Purpose
Contact
AutoReaGas
Century Dynamics,
Horseham, UK
FIREX
FLACS
Explosion simulation
Gexcon, Bergen, N
KAMELEON
FireExKFX
ComputIT, Trondheim,
Norway
MONA
Scandpower Risk
Management, Kjeller,
Norway
OLGA
Scandpower Risk
Management, Kjeller,
Norway
PHAST
DNV Software,
London, UK
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fire
Scandpower Risk
Management, Kjeller,
Norway
www.gexcon.com
www.computit.no
www.relcon.se
www.scandpowerpt.com
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Purpose
Contact
PHAPro
DNV Software,
London, UK
PHAROS
EQE, London, UK
Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway
Kyrass
Sabaton
Safetec Nordic,
Trondheim, Norway
Purpose
Contact
ProSafe
EQE, London, UK
Synergi
Pride, Stavanger,
Norway
Function
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Vendor
Pricing
ASAP is a computer analysis package that calculates the risk related to hydrocarbon leaks, fires and explosions on oil and gas installations. Complex interactions in
horizontal and vertical directions are taken care of by adjusting the models to
threedimensional geometry. Scenarios such as gas and liquid jets followed by gas
dispersion and fire development can be seen in 3D graphic, giving a good interpretation of the accident.
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Purpose
Contact
Hazard Log
Database
Management
Atkins, Bristol, UK
PRISM
ERS Technology, UK
Riskplot II
ORBIT
Offshore
DNV Software,
London, UK
BowTieXP
Governors BV,
Netherlands
THESIS
ABS Consulting,
Warrington, UK
ASAP consists of a design package, physical and statistical models along with
design interface models. The latter constitutes the connection between the physical
models and the design. In the design package the user designs the geometry of the
installation and the process flow diagram for equipment containing hydrocarbons.
All the models are intelligent in the sense that they automatically adjust to the
geometry and logic the user defines. This implies that design changes and concept
development are catered for in a fast and consistent manner by the program.
ASAP is currently being redesigned to cope with transient analysis of gas
dispersion, detection, ignition and equipment escalation according to NORSOK Z
013 and Statoil/Norsk Hydro internal Guideline for protection of pressurised
systems exposed to fire.
A.3.2 COSAC
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
Risk assessment tool for early project phases of a field development for concept evaluation and screening
Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway
NOK 120,000 per license.
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COSAC is a computerised tool for efficient risk assessment in the early project
phases of a field development.
COSAC analysis and results are tailor-made for concept evaluation and
screening. Its aim is to increase the safety of new offshore developments by
utilising 20 years of experience gained from risk analyses. Some of the main
features of COSAC include reducing uncertainty, improving the quality and
efficiency of early phase safety evaluations. COSAC provides a safety score for
every risk factor associated with an offshore field development concept. A low
score indicates safety concerns and/or lack of documentation of important safety
issues. Therefore, a low safety score in COSAC puts these issues in focus. In
addition the user is provided with information on how to resolve the problems
identified by COSAC.
A.3.3 CRA Tool
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
The Concept Risk Assessment (CRA) Tool focuses on the key parameters that
drive the risk levels in new offshore oil and gas developments. The model was
developed in conjunction with BP and Shell, driven by a requirement to rapidly
rank large numbers of concepts in terms of their risks to the asset, personnel and
the environment.
The tool has been used to assist in the selection of the best concept for around
thirty new oil, gas and condensate developments in the North Sea and worldwide.
The novelty is that the risk assessment is based on a number of preprocessed risk
building blocks for each item of hazardous equipment. These are then moderated
by gearing factors to take account of specific aspects of the design.
A.3.4 NEPTUNE
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
PLATO uses a 3D model of the platform in which all safety related engineering
components and design features are explicitly represented. The development and
timing of escalating hazards such as fire, explosion and structural collapse are
simulated with automatic generation of scenarios where safety related components
affect the outcome. Results can be processed not only for the overall level of societal and individual risk but also to determine the primary escalation mechanisms and
key safety critical equipment. The primary benefits over event tree methods are
modelling realism, auditability, explicit representation of geometry/time and ease
of update for evaluation of design options or platform modifications.
A.3.6 RiskSpectrum
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing
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Linking between event trees and fault trees, and linking of chains of
event trees
House events and exchange events for complex variations of a base model,
which makes it easy to manage different plant configurations, specialisation of models for different initiating events and/or different accident
sequences. These features are particularly valuable in carrying out external
event analyses.
CCF groups for automated CCF quantification based on several different
CCF models.
Fully graphical event and fault tree editors and inherent Windows functions such as
cut, copy, paste and draganddrop makes RiskSpectrum Professional easy to
learn and use.
RiskSpectrum Professional uses an open database format utilising the
Microsoft Access format. Each of the database tables is essentially unlimited in
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terms of number of records, except the obvious limit in available space on the
storage media (hard disk).
A.3.7 RISK
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing
A.3.8 SAFETI
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
SAFETI (Software for the Assessment of Flammable, Explosive and Toxic Impact) is the most comprehensive and widely used onshore QRA package available.
It is a Windows based system that provides a user friendly, industry standard
method for quantifying major chemical risks. It enables analysis of the likelihood
and severity of major hazards and makes use of the PHAST models to predict the
consequence of major releases. By combining these with their frequencies and
taking account of population location and density, along with ignition source
location for flammable and explosive effects, a number of presentations of 'risk' are
possible. These include risk contours, F/N curves, risk transects and risk ranking at
specific points.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
BlowFAM is a PCtool for evaluation of blowout risk during specific well operations. BlowFAM has been developed in close cooperation with drilling/well
intervention professionals in the participating companies. In addition, drilling
specialists from several contractor companies have contributed.
The BlowFAM model has identified approximately 300 elements, that
influence the probability of a blowout. Many of these are applicable for the whole
well life while others are only relevant for a specific well phase, e.g. drilling of the
well. These elements are rated in regard to their importance to the risk. Main risk
contributors for a specific development can be identified and costefficient risk
reducing measures may be implemented.
The BlowFAM model is also a valuable tool for communicating risk elements
to the drilling professionals involved in the well operations.
A.4.2 COAST
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
COAST is a shipping traffic database that operates on a GIS platform, and holds
detailed information on the regular shipping traffic on the Norwegian and UK
continental shelves, as well as other areas of the world. The data in COAST is
presented as shipping routes, where each route contains information such as the
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annual number of vessels on the route, distribution of vessel types and sizes, route
width (std. dev.), etc. COAST facilitates searches around userdefined positions
to identify the traffic pattern, traffic density and vessel characteristics inside the
search area, as well as distance and bearing from the search position. The GIS
program automatically plots the identified routes on electronic charts.
COAST was developed by Safetec during 1995/96 in a project funded by
UKOOA, HSE and DETR and successfully achieved its main objective which was
to provide a comprehensive, uptodate and easy to use database on shipping
movements which could be used to assess risks between shipping and offshore
installations in UK waters. In 2002 COAST Norway was developed, funded by
the OLF, providing a much more comprehensive and detailed coverage of
Norwegian waters, in addition to the North Sea.
The main data sources for COAST are Lloyds port log data, AIS data, radar
data and a large number of traffic surveys. Additional surveys and data collections
are undertaken each year to maintain the accuracy of the system. A new platform
for COAST is being developed, to meet the requirements of new and much more
comprehensive data sources that have become available.
A.4.3 COLLIDE
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing
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Function
Vendor
Pricing
Function
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Vendor
Pricing
The EGRESS code allows the movement of large numbers of personnel, such as
when mustering on an installation, to be simulated. The platform layout is
modelled as a matrix of interconnecting cells. The code covers both the physical
movement and behavioural decision-making of personnel. The output is graphical
and the movement watched as a realtime graphical representation. It was
developed as part of a joint industry project in the UK between ERS Technology,
Shell, Texaco, Exxon, and the Health and Safety Executive.
The code has been used both offshore and onshore for the oil and gas and other
industries to provide assessments of the movement of people during incidents.
A.4.6 LEAK
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing
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Function
Vendor
Pricing
RDAT Plus is a fullfeatured Bayesian data analysis package for risk analysts. It
is designed for users who need to perform system specific analyses, but who also
have a need to develop generic prior distributions based on industry data.
RDAT Plus provides the user with a powerful, yet simple and flexible environment for storing and organising many types of reliability data and related information. A hierarchical structure enables the user to develop functional or structural
or any other type of breakdown, at any level of detail. The elements of this hierarchy act as folders containing the reliability data and the results of Bayesian
analyses performed on the data sets.
With RDAT the user may specify the prior distribution in many different
ways depending on the type and level of information available. These include a
wide variety of parametric distributions (e.g., lognormal, beta and loguniform)
using any of a number of input options such as lower and upper bounds, mean and
variance, or the distribution parameters. Furthermore, RDAT enables the user to
develop generic distributions based on industry data (counts of failures in other
plants) as well as expert estimates. The resulting distributions will represent the
planttoplant variability of failure rate of a given class of components or initiating
events, and can be used in a plant specific analysis in order perform the TwoStage
Bayesian procedure.
A.4.8 CARAFault Tree
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
Vendor
Pricing
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CARAFaultTree is our tool for fault tree analysis and construction. A fault tree
is a logical diagram that displays the interrelationships between a potential critical
event (accident) in a system and the reasons for this event. By constructing a fault
tree you analyse how a system can fail, and the analysis also gives you insight into
how the components contributes to the system reliability. With its intuitive
graphical user interface, the program lets you create fault trees in a flash. A total of
six system performance measures and six measures of component importance are
available, along with enhanced report utilities.
Function
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Vendor
Pricing
Function
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Vendor
Pricing
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The program system FIREX is capable of predicting the main fire characteristics
and responses of six fire scenarios:
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FIREX is based on well known prediction methods, which have been compared
and verified against experimental data. FIREX predicts:
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A.5.3 FLACS
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
The development of FLACS has been carried out continuously since 1980 with
the cooperation, support, direction and funding of ten international oil and gas
companies as well as legislative bodies of three countries. Application specific
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validation, wide applicability and efficiency when using FLACS has been given
high priority in the development work.
The software has been used for explosion consequence assessment and risk
analysis for more than 300 offshore installations and onshore industrial areas world
wide (by Gexcon) and is also used by numerous consultants worldwide (4050
user groups of FLACS worldwide, 2006). In addition it is increasingly being used
for general industrial CFD analyses, particularly where flows in and around
complex geometries is an issue. In recent years it has also been validated for atmospheric dispersion use.
Particular characteristics of FLACS and its application include:
x
Explosion simulations
x Any ignition point location
x Hydrocarbon gases (e.g. any mixture of methane, ethane, propane,
butane, ethylene, propylene, acetylene) and hydrogen
x Variable gas cloud size
x Variable gas concentration
x Vent panels: weight, opening mode, opening pressure
x Yielding walls: failure mode
x Effect of water spray: nozzle type, flow rate, location
x Any type of louvered walls, angle of blades, effective openings
x Prediction of blast wave strength outside the explosion area
x Effect of inert gases; CO2, N2, and varying O2 concentration .
Dispersion simulations
x Modelling of gas release
x Leak source location, size, and direction
x Forced and natural ventilation conditions
x Concentration profiles at gas detector locations
x Jet release/diffusive release
x Realistic scenario design: Ignition at any time or location during
dispersion
x Exhaust release and dispersion.
Ventilation simulations
x Modelling of external wind field
x Modelling of forced/HVAC ventilation
x Louvre drag factors
x Air change rates at varying external wind conditions
x Effect of netting and other blockages
x Flow velocities in the module and through the louvre
x Wind chill index calculations
x Helideck safety assessment.
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Function
&
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Vendor
Pricing
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Simulation of all kind of fires; pool fires, jet fires, spray fires, flares, fire in
enclosures, in complex congested areas, or in open space. This includes
detailed calculation of temperatures, radiation, smoke, visibility, concentrations of species, toxic gases, noise etc.
Fire impact on structures and process equipment
Optimization of passive fire protection
Fire temperature, radiation and smoke impact on humans
Evaluation of escape routes
Simulation and evaluation of fire mitigation by water systems; sprinklers,
deluge, mist, curtains
Flare simulations; radiation, noise (not standard KFX version), detailed tip
simulations
Dispersion of gas
Calculation of explosive cloud sizes
Gas and fire detection systems
Combustion in furnaces, engines, furnace design etc.
Reduction of emissions; CO, NOx, others
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x
x
x
x
A.5.5 Mona
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
MONA is an advanced, general tool for simulation of singlecomponent multiphase systems. MONA can handle general network of pipelines and vessels and
thermal nonequilibrium conditions. MONA's ability to simulate water hammer
and cavitation is validated against loops in Sweden and Germany.
A.5.6 Olga
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
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Function
&
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Vendor
Pricing
PHAPro is a Windows based hazard recording and reporting tool which includes
four process hazard analysis techniques in a single integrated product. The available techniques are HAZOP, What If/Checklist, FMEA and Preliminary Hazard
Analysis. Fully user customisable risk matrices, up to 10 by 10, are available for
severity and likelihood ranking of consequence, safeguards and recommendations.
Comprehensive recommendation management facilities are available to manage
the multitude of recommendations arising from a typical HAZOP study. Other
features include wizards to simplify complex tasks, file templates, timed backup
and auto recovery, spell checker and all standard windows functionality such as
cut, copy and paste, find and replace and drag and drop editing.
A.6.2 PHAROS
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
Pharos is a powerful system that integrates the job hazard analysis process with
the Permit to Work system controlling the planning and execution of hazardous
activities. It incorporates many years of EQE's experience in the design and
implementation of Permit to Work systems and application of workplace hazard
management processes.
The elements within the system include, hazard assessment and job hazard
analysis, work tracking and coordination, (including interfaces with maintenance
systems), and isolation/lockout control. The system enhances safety with reduced
operational costs by the combination of risk assessment methodology and
computer technology.
A.6.3 Kyrass
The following is a short description of this software, its function, vender, pricing
and main features.
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Function:
Vender:
Pricing:
Safety management
Sydvest Software (www.sydvest.com)
The price for a single user license is NOK 20,995.
Kyrass is a software tool designed to help businesses performing safety management in a practical manner. It is used to establish a register of hazard sources and
to manage this register. Kyrass is used to identify and prioritise risk reducing
measures and facilitates the documentation of reviews, revisions and evaluations.
The Kyrass safety management tool is currently a Norwegian tool (i.e. the user
interface is in Norwegian).
A.6.4 Sabaton
The following is a short description of this software, its function, vender, pricing
and main features.
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Function:
Vender:
Pricing:
Sabaton is an analysis tool supporting FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) and FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis). FMEA and
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FMECA are typically used in product and system development to reveal possible
failures and failure modes, and the effects of these failures. The analysis results
typically in proposals for design improvement aimed at eliminating system failure
or mitigating the effects of component failures. With Sabaton you simply start a
new analysis by selecting analysis form template, or you make your own fully
userdefined form. Sabaton supports you in conducting FMEA and FMECA analyses according to international standards such as ISO 9000, SAE J1739, SAE
ARP5580, IEC 60812, BS 57605 or MILSTD 1629.
Function
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Vendor
Pricing
ProSafe is a Safety & Loss Prevention system developed for the Oil & Gas
industry. It captures information from any unplanned occurrence that causes, or has
the potential to cause, harm to people, the environment, assets or a company=s
reputation. The information is then analysed and reports, (graphs, charts, text),
produced. Its data mining capabilities enables trends and patterns to be defined that
help focus the deployment of resources to prevent future loss.
Prosafe=s embedded data dictionary enables companies to change the system
to incorporate their own terminology and language. It is also scaleable enabling its
use across many geographical locations or as a single departmental system.
Function
Vendor
Pricing
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The Atkins Hazard Log Database Management Tool has been developed based
upon the Safety Hazard/Risk Management requirements of UK MoD Defence
Standard 0056. It is currently in use on a number of UK MoD defence projects
ranging from whole ship projects to shorebased facilities, as well as a trinational
(UK/France/Italy) naval defence communications project.
Furthermore, the Hazard Log Database has also been tailored for use on the
Lewisham Extension to the Docklands Light Railway, and is proposed for a
number of other civilian and defence projects in the UK, Europe and Asia.
The Atkins Hazard Log Database Management Tool is based in Microsoft
Access 2, and can be run on PC or Network facilities.
The clear advantage of the tool is that it provides a systematic and traceable
means of managing system safety in accordance with a recognised standard
process. It facilitates an effective approach to the management of safety risk
reduction measures adopted and actions placed to provide the appropriate levels of
confidence in the final safety justification.
Atkins are able to tailor the Database to the specific needs of the system
application under assessment, and the needs of the managing authority.
Each copy of the tool requires an individual licence.
Where multiple use is required on a number of system element contracts for
instance, then pricing can be structured differently, and Atkins are open to discussion in these matters.
A.8.2 Prism
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
& Function
Audit tool for Safety Management Assessment of Safety
Management performance
& Vendor
ERS Technology, UK
& Pricing
Not available.
PRISM is an audit tool that is designed to penetrate each level of an organisation
using a structured and systematic methodology. The audit involves both interviews
and inspections to build up a picture of both the documented management systems
and their implementation.
The code has been used both offshore and onshore for the oil and gas and other
industries to provide assessments of the state of development of a company's
Safety Management System.
A.8.3 Riskplot II
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
&
&
Vendor
Pricing
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Function
Vendor
Pricing
ORBIT Offshore is a software tool that uses DNV's Risk Based Inspection (RBI)
technique to help users optimise their inspection management programme. DNV's
RBI technique, as described in DNV RPG 101 Recommended Practice for Risk
Based Inspection of Topsides Static Mechanical Equipment, is used to calculate
the risk due to corrosion, erosion and cracking for pressure equipment in a marine
environment.
ORBIT Offshore is designed to help users sustain high productivity and
reliability of their offshore platforms by minimising lost production and downtime
through effective inspection and maintenance. It assists in the management of
safety and equipment integrity to user specified levels.
It helps you to achieve these objectives systematically and efficiently. It allows
you to quantify the risk for process and utility systems and equipment on topsides
and FPSOs. Risk can be defined in terms of potential loss of life, cost, or both. A
costeffective inspection programme can then be devised based on the greatest risk
reduction per cost of inspection
A.8.5 BowTieXP IADC Edition and Black BowTieXP
The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing
and main features.
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Function
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Vendor
Pricing
Function
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Vendor
Pricing
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Glossary
The following definitions are coordinated with ISO terminology (ISO/IEC Guide
73:2002) where relevant.
Acceptance criteria
(for risk)
Accidental event
Accidental effect
Acute release
BLEVE
Causal analysis
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Glossary
Consequence
Consequence
evaluation
Contingency
planning
Control (of hazards)
Cost/benefit
evaluation
Chronic release
Defined situations of
hazard and accident
Design Accidental
Event
Design Accidental
Load
Dimensioning
Accidental Event
Dimensioning
accidental load
Effectiveness
analysis of safety and
emergency
preparedness
measures
Emergency
preparedness
Emergency
preparedness analysis
Glossary
Emergency
preparedness
organisation
Environmental
resource
Environment safety
Escalation
Escalation factor
Escape
Escape way
Establishment of
emergency
preparedness
Evacuation
Functional
requirements to
safety and emergency
preparedness
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Glossary
Internal control
Major accidents
Material damage
safety
Mitigation
MOB-boat
Muster Station
Muster area
Occupational
accidents
Personnel safety
Probability
Reliability analysis
Residual Accidental
Event.
Residual risk
Risk
Risk acceptance
Risk analysis
Risk assessment
Risk avoidance
Glossary
Risk control
Risk evaluation
Risk identification
Risk management
Risk management
system
Risk perception
Risk reduction
Risk transfer
Risk treatment
Safety goals
Safety objective
Serious accidents
Shelter Area
Stakeholder
Working accidents
Worst case
consequence
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Abbreviations
AIR
AIS
ALARP
ARCS
ARPA
bara
barg
BBD
bbls
BD
BFETS
BLEVE
BOP
BORA
CAD
CBA
CCA
CFD
CPA
CPP
CSE
DAE
DAL
DFU
DHSV
DP
dwt
E&P
E&P Forum
EER
EESLR
EFSLR
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Abbreviations
EIA
EIF
EQDC
ESD
ETA
Ex
FAR
FCC
FEM
Fi-Fi
FLACS
FMEA
FPS
FPSO
FPU
FRC
FSU
FTA
GBS
GIR
GIS
GoM
GPS
GR
GRP
GRT
HAZID
HAZOP
HC
HCL
HCLIP
HES
HIPPS
HOF
HR
HSE
IEC
IMO
IR
IRPA
ISO
JIP
LCC
LEL
LFL
LNG
MIRA
Abbreviations
MMI
MNOK
MOB
MODU
MP
MSF
MTO
NORSOK
nm
NMD
NOPSA
NPD
NPV
NTNU
NTS
OLF
OR
OTS
P&ID
PETRAD
PFEER
PFP
PGS
PHA
PLATO
PLL
PLS
POB
PRS
PSA
PSA
PSD
QA
QC
QM
QP
QRA
R&D
RABL
RAC
RACON
RAE
RAMS
RNNS
ROV
557
Man-Machine Interface
million Norwegian kroner
Man Overboard
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
Main (propulsion) Power
Module Support Frame
Man, Technology and Organisation
Norwegian offshore standardisation organisation (Norsk Sokkels
Konkurranseposisjon)
Nautical Mile
Norwegian Maritime Directorate
National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority [Australia]
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
Net Present Value
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Norwegian Technology Standards Institution
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (Oljeindustriens Landsforening)
Overall Risk
Operational Condition Safety (Operasjonell Tilstand Sikkerhet)
Piping and Instrumentation Drawing
Program for Petroleum Management and Administration
Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response
Passive Fire Protection
Petroleum Geo-Services ASA
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Software for dynamic event tree analysis
Potential Loss of Life
Progressive Limit State
Personnel On Board
Position Reference System
Petroleum Safety Authority [Norway]
Probabilistic Safety Assessment
Process Shut Down
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Quality Management
[Frigg] Quarters Platform
Quantified Risk Assessment
Research and Development
Risk Assessment of Buoyancy Loss
Risk Acceptance Criteria
Radar signal amplification
Residual Accidental Events
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety
Risk Level [project] (Risiko Niv Norsk Sokkel)
Remote Operated Vehicle
558
Abbreviations
RRM
Risk Reducing Measure
SAFOP
Safety and Operability Study
SAR
Search and Rescue
SBV
Standby Vessel
SCR
Safety Case Regulations
SIL
Safety Integrity Level
SJA
Safe Job Analysis
SLR
Risk due to small leaks
SOLAS
Safety of Life at Sea
SSIV
SubSea Isolation Valve
ST
Shuttle Tanker
SUPER-TEMPCALC
Software for 2D temperature analysis
TASEF-2
Software for 2D temperature analysis
TCP2
[Frigg] Treatment Platform 2
TH
Thruster
TLP
Tension Leg Platform
TP1
[Frigg] Treatment Platform 1
TR
Temporary Refuge
TRA
Total Risk Analysis
TST
Technical Safety Condition (Teknisk SikkerhetsTilstand)
TTS
Technical Condition Safety (Teknisk Tilstand Sikkerhet)
UEL
Upper Explosive Limit
UFL
Upper Flammability Limit
UPS
Underwater Production System
USFOS
Software for non-linear and dynamic analysis of structures
VEC
Valued Ecological Component
VHF
Very High Frequency
VOC
Volatile Organic Compounds
VTS
Vessel Traffic System
WOAD
Worldwide Offshore Accident Database (ref. DNV)
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Index
574
Index
CSE;1
cumulative function;35
DAE;300; 555
DAL;555
damage;4; 8; 16; 2427; 3840; 7075;
79; 84; 87; 89; 90; 94; 96; 105; 112;
115; 120; 126; 133; 138; 143; 191;
207; 214; 216219; 220225; 228
231; 251; 262; 277; 306; 314; 334;
345; 350356; 359; 378; 380; 385;
386; 396; 408; 411; 414; 426; 432;
435441; 454; 456; 464; 473; 498;
499; 500; 502; 503; 504; 505; 512
data sources;140; 150; 151; 364; 412
decision to evacuate;236
decommissioning;11; 274; 275
Deep Sea Driller;78; 98; 99; 117
depressurisation;131; 132; 206; 486
design basis;2; 123; 301; 332; 468; 471;
486; 487
DFU;493
dimensioning fire;299; 300; 301; 455
dimensions of risk;16; 76; 137
DP-system;49; 361
dropped load;436; 439; 442; 457
dropped objects;133; 134; 136; 192; 279;
435; 443; 474
ecological component;232
EER;236; 238; 241; 263
Ekofisk A;78; 94; 95; 117; 258; 265
Ekofisk B;78; 79; 80; 117; 229; 258
Emergency Preparedness Analysis;13;
62; 67
Enchova;78; 83; 117
environmental risk;4; 8; 27; 64; 67; 73
75; 138; 228; 230
EQDC;556
escalation;9; 18; 24; 47; 78; 8097; 99;
101; 102; 104108; 111; 114; 117;
123; 125; 135139; 158; 176178;
181; 183; 186; 190; 194196; 214;
217219; 236; 241; 248; 250; 278;
279; 304; 312314; 330; 345; 349
351; 407; 457; 459; 468; 469; 499;
500; 513
escape;17; 18; 21; 29; 37; 65; 66; 91; 92;
100; 132; 145; 176; 179; 191; 224;
227; 235; 241; 243; 245; 248256;
259261; 271; 291293; 437; 468;
481; 483; 484
ETA;122
Index
575
Ixtoc;78; 80
jacket structure;143; 353; 354; 379; 388;
395
Jotun;78; 96; 97; 117
leak;18; 43; 44; 50; 78; 83; 84; 87; 89
97; 125; 131; 132; 142; 145; 146150;
157; 158; 172; 173; 177; 180196;
200215; 225; 236; 241248; 258;
263; 277284; 298; 310; 318; 324
329; 334; 335; 339347; 407; 449;
460474; 485490; 496; 508; 515;
518; 520
LEL;317
local failure;395; 407
major accident;ix; 7; 8; 16; 17; 20; 23;
29; 30; 38; 5255; 61; 64; 7779; 95;
99; 111; 234; 235; 477; 482; 510; 511
major hazard;55; 61; 62; 66; 95; 152;
180; 233; 235; 274; 290; 477; 493;
510; 511
manhours;21; 33; 4345; 5557; 62;
201; 275; 446; 478; 482
marginal angle;394
material damage risk;4; 16; 39; 75; 306;
307; 464; 465; 499; 512
matrix presentation;39
minor damage;40; 353
MIRA;70; 228; 229; 231; 232
Mobile Drilling Units;258; 454
modelling of fire escalation;217
modification phase;33
MODU;87; 319
module support beam;442; 443
NMD;10; 400; 409
non-essential personnel;111; 113; 236;
261
Norne;78; 107; 257; 425; 426
Norpipe;354; 355; 386
NORSOK;13; 43; 6267; 119; 151157;
250; 299; 301; 303; 380; 455; 456;
471; 517
NPD;2; 3; 62; 79; 83; 98; 103; 105; 142;
299; 301; 455; 514
NPD regulations;301
NPV;351; 503; 505; 506
occupational accident;17; 20; 21; 29; 30;
5255; 6166; 145; 239; 274; 444;
481; 482
Ocean Oddesey;78; 86
Ocean Ranger;78; 101; 102; 117; 263;
265; 269; 399; 402; 454
Ocean Vanguard;78; 112; 410; 433
576
Index
OREDA;145
Oseberg B;354; 355
overall risk level;62; 273; 512
oxygen;223; 281; 291293; 315
P-34;78; 112; 402
P-36;78; 109; 117; 402
passive fire protection;18; 139; 157; 184;
217220; 285289; 295; 298; 305;
314; 456; 457; 471; 500507; 514
personnel risk;17; 26; 58; 66; 128; 465;
512
Petrobras;111; 112
PFEER;10; 11; 508513
PFP;298307
PHA;3; 122; 162; 164; 557
pick up;87; 266; 268
Piper Alpha;2; 3; 10; 54; 67; 8993; 142;
145; 186193; 214; 225; 241; 248;
249; 265; 277; 291; 314; 345
platform design;407
platform specific modelling;208; 219
PLATO;175; 195; 196
PLL;10; 17; 21; 23; 2935; 63; 68; 70;
241; 242; 350; 463; 480; 483; 502;
503; 506; 508
POB;2123; 35; 69; 227; 252; 263
Preliminary Hazard Analysis;3; 122;
162; 164
probability study;128; 136
process accidents;40; 350
process area;47; 48; 150; 211; 217; 218;
284; 315; 335; 339; 341349; 440;
483; 484; 485; 489
process leak;126; 206; 211; 310; 467;
480; 483
production delay risk;16
PSA;1; 3; 5; 6; 8; 48; 55; 60; 63; 64; 96;
112114; 142145; 158; 171; 200;
202; 205; 227; 233; 303; 340; 365;
399; 403411; 429; 436; 445; 455;
457; 477; 515
public domain source;143
pump room;87; 102; 212; 400; 402
QRA;14; 10; 11; 17; 27; 35; 42; 43;
119129; 138140; 153161; 166;
172; 175; 176; 180; 189; 194196;
211; 212; 218; 233; 238; 244; 246;
250; 303312; 330; 344350; 399
403; 408; 412; 448; 452; 463; 474
478; 493; 494; 495; 499; 508; 509;
512; 513; 514; 516; 518
quantification of risk;274; 490
Index
577