Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED."4

THIRD DIVISION
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law
or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate childStephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was
born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her
mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers surname, and that
her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any
opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care
for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest
and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners care
and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the
requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her
mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of
adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there
is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of
the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit
and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the
Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie
should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following
reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under
Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any
confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural
mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the
mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law
Committees agreed that"the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother." 7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in
the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by
which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears

for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family
name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish
him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for
the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word
Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of
surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or
illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article
17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may
use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there
is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name
or the mothers surname shall be added.

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil
Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of
the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden
name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surnameemployed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance
with Article 370.

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs
mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and
that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which
reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the
child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name
be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory
that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the
mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely
because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct
surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice
David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be
mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother
by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the
Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of
legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the
surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American
tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by
the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames,
they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane
added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters."13Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter
of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree
of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 16 The
modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by
the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No.
8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for
the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia)
as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family
Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights
from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner
for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is
closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one
normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not
only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry
out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

Adopted Child

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of
right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to
avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law." 28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that
Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 168992-93

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty 5 given under Republic Act
No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002,
petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as
SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent.7Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. 8 Petitioners
husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent 9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

May 21, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was
considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. 10 The
DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael. 11

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

The Ruling of the Trial Court

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the
Decision1dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial
court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated
petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she
married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own,
petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The
children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. 3 Michael was 11
days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983. 4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to
exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately,
on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an
American citizen.

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that
since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The
trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of
RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated
16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the
exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent of her
husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as
residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint
exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of
exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and
assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has
remarried, can singly adopt.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and
the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that
the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental
authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old

and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other
spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

We deny the petition.

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She
filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to
affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other,
joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which
is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 12

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen
(16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in
the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to
adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within
the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself,
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to
be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are
not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each
other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice.
There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be
waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
Effects of Adoption

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. 13 The father and the mother
shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. 14 Even the remarriage of
the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints
another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. 15

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority
or 18 years of age16 emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the
child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. 17 However, parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption,
thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all
legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be
vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all
intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love,
guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have
reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and
his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the
petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no
longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los
Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no
moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial
decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That
being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that
since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is
mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a
legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose
the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory
heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights 19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the
surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the
legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled 20 such as support21 and successional
rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care
and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and
family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled inRepublic v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat
said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of
the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at
bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

In an Order dated 25 February 2011, 3 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that
Sampana failed to file his answer to the complaint and to appear during the mandatory conference. Thus,
both parties were directed to submit their position papers.

EN BANC
In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.
A.C. No. 10196

September 9, 2014

MELODY R. NERY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana
(Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery
believe that the petition was already filed.
The Facts
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010,1 Nery alleged that in June 2008, she engaged the services
of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for
annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana
asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then
gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery
paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2
October 2008; and (c) P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts since she
trusted Sampana.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the petition for
adoption and it was already published. Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse
before the hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch
11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana
claimed that her presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana
told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the petition for
adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. 2 Thus, in the afternoon of the
same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana
agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee
should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly
demanded for the reimbursement of theP100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded.

On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011, 5 Sampana argued that Nerys allegations
were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted receiving "one package fee" from
Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned
upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but
Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the [alien] adopter would be married to
a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could be possible." Sampana, then, required
Nery to submit the documents, including the marriage contracts and the certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage
contract, but not the certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not
file it because he was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that
Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that
the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to
refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of malpractice for
making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite
receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera recommended a penalty of three (3) months
suspension from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved Commissioner Antiquieras report and recommendation, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, [t]he Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent is guilty of
malpractice by his failure to file a petition for adoption and made complainant believe that he filed the
petition in Court, Atty. Glicerio Sampana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months and ORDERED to RETURN to complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00)
Pesos with legal interest within thirty days from receipt of notice. 7
The Ruling of the Court
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as to the penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the dutyof
fidelity to the clients cause.8 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and

competence, regardless of importance.9 A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers
to be candid and fair.10 Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client thatmay come into his
possession.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS
with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely. We also ORDER
Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with 12% interest per annum from the time of his receipt of the full
amount of money on 17 November 2008 until 30 June 2013, then 6% interest per annum from 1 July 2013
until fully paid.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the respondent;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of annulment
and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short
of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampanas proffered excuse of waiting for the
certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he
suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption
could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the aliens qualification to adopt is waived. 11
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of the
petition.1wphi1 He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the
Codes mandate to deliver the clients funds upon demand. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession. 12
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana, 13 we already found
Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his unethical and illegal
act relative to his double sale of a parcel of land. We imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year and warned him that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal service after receiving the filing and partial service
fee. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment and the previous rulings of this Court, we deem it
proper to increase the penalty for Sampanas malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.

According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the trial court,
Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the three children of former
Governor Mauricio Castro.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A.
"MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA
JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice
and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it
appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other
legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not
enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners.
The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that
granted respondents' decree of adoption. 3chanrobleslaw
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jd) and Ana
Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of
Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro
(Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname,
"Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage
had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but
succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose
after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them.4chanrobleslaw
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later.
She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila
and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they
separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. 5 She
insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their
separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Batac,
Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with
Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At
the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.10chanrobleslaw

He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report mentioned that he was
once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children. 13 It also stated that he
met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on
August 1987, and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for Adoption," the social welfare
officer noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill his
dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his
dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and surname. . . . 15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in Batac,
Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death in July
1995.17chanrobleslaw
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, 18 having ruled that "[n]o opposition
had been received by this Court from any person including the government which was
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General." 19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on
February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a
complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 21 In her
complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter,
Joanne, for the past 36 years. 22She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided
financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover,
Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed
and Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and consent.23 She also alleged that Jose
made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children
with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry.24chanrobleslaw
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in his
fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he always offered help, but it was
often declined.25 He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his
illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario.
He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He alleged that his
income had been diminished because several properties had to be sold to pay for medical
treatments.26 He then implored the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with
"justice and equity."27chanrobleslaw
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte. 28chanrobleslaw
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule
47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16,
2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption. 29chanrobleslaw
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in
2005.30They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh.
K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth certificates showed different

10

sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They
argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of National
Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover.33 It was
further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate
children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. 34chanrobleslaw
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption,
the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and
legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the hearing." 35chanrobleslaw
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose] in obtaining an
adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the interests of his
legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands were bound by the trial court decision that had
already attained "finality and immutability."37chanrobleslaw
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different
sets of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated
therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The
alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic fraud,
which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.38chanrobleslaw
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10, 2009,39 they filed
this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for
annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2)
show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its application of the law on
extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment.40 They argue that because of the fabricated
consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth certificates
presented as evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the opportunity to oppose
the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from them. 42chanrobleslaw
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied the law on
jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable
parties.43 They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of
the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent
was never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not have been deprived of
their day in court since their interest was "amply protected by the participation and
representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized public prosecutor." 45chanrobleslaw
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not only notice to
them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings. 46 They argue that since the
alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic
fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were
not indispensable parties because adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only
indispensable party is the state.48chanrobleslaw

The petition is granted.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the
Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."49chanrobleslaw
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50chanrobleslaw
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may
be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or
final resolution sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through
extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily
and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court
has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction
and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the
petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for
annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final
resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of
justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make
orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the
risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law,
and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest
court of the land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which
annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years
from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or
laches.52chanrobleslaw
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or
subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. 53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is
"[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured."54chanrobleslaw
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through

11

extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption, as
adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action." 55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it
is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that
the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent
of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified, his/her consent thereto; or

considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial
court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of
the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or
older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s)
and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the
prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to
share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over 10
years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was
necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario
were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written
consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P.
Lim:57chanrobleslaw
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the
level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse
seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is
not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her
spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained
legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina,
Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain
Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings,
it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have been committed in
this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59chanrobleslaw
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside
of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by
keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where the
defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from
discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The

12

filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.

hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the
law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court granted
the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any of the parties.
Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte.62 Larry and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay
6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne
were residents of Paraaque City, Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however, was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court gave due course to the petition on
Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he was a resident of Batac, 67 even though it is admitted
in the Home Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68chanrobleslaw

The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions. Under Article VII,
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Second, using the process of delayed registration, Jose was able to secure birth certificates for
Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry as merely the informant. 70 Worse still is
that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and
Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila, 71 and another wherein the portion for the
mother's name was not filled in at all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the
National Statistics Office, however, show that their father was Larry R. Rentegrado. 73 These
certificates are in clear contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court
in support of his petition for adoption.

(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed
on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper
material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the
name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation
of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

69

Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his motivation for adoption was
because he and his wife, Rosario, were childless, 74 to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne.
The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be
fraudulent.75chanrobleslaw
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in approving his
petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or
opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on the basis
that they were "forged instruments or perjured testimonies" 76 presented during the trial. It
failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was either
present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or testimony
was presented in court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just
determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false
testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In
other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can
guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation,
a skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or
forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury
in court testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the
proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud. 77 (Emphasis supplied)
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested
party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed
through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest
the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have

ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.

Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal
liabilities.78Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption
decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot
invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 79 since rescission of adoption can only be
availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other than
the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is reason to believe that
Joanne has grown up having never experienced the love and care of a father, her parents having
separated a year after her birth. She has never even benefited from any monetary support from
her father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree from the
University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and is now working as a doctor in
Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her
is allowed to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is
rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

13

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192531

November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 Decision 1 of the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P.
Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is
not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626. 2

In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioners entitlement to
the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered Johns
primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great
grandfather, petitioners grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision 7 in Spec. Proc.
No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption
attained finality.8Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as Johns primary
beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as Johns secondary
beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse
until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the
dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children
and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered
member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the
deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption
divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx

The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). 3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the
following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
Johns biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under
PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La
Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 5 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:

In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now be
upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the
beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein
appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC. 10 Hence,
the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:

We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer
considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on
documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of
the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECCs Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner
as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying petitioners
otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.11

14

In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally
adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive
the benefits under the ECP?

dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court's Ruling

Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and
regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as
prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation,
interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:

The petition is meritorious.

The ECCs factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record

RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioners claim for death benefits is that
eventhough she is Johns biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio,
was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol,
is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence,
absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well,
and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus,
assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her status
as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this
case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by
the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters
falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of
evidence offered by the petitioner Cornelios death certificate. 13

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe time of
employees death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employees death until he remarries;
and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not
gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and
incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority;
Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be
counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, 14 or
only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained
finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive
parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of
Johns work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as
amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the
primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and
not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self support dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis
supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceaseds
legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed
the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and,
consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation deviates from the clear
language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended

15

Examining the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is
at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the
ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in
elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation 16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is
patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae
Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordancetherefore with
the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope,
inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not
make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense thanit is
used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the
law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral
relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a
more restrictive or limited sense which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
(Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of
the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to
"legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not
distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the
phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides
that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the
lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said
descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was crafted
undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents legitimate,
illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is in contravention of the
equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional
guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate
child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind,
such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. 19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1)
The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification." 20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents.
Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate
parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being
implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant
balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On
the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 that employees and their
dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will
be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be
no other course of action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as
appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.

16

Petitioner qualifies as Johns dependent parent

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate
parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy
to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner
not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who
exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision
wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its
boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the
commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as Johns
secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioners parental authority
over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from
Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption
decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there
are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, 21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel
concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 22 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act,
provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned.1wphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopters parental authority, unlike the grounds
for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender
age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after
Cornelios death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern
contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the
catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 24 wherein the paramount consideration is the best
interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the
child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is
rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years,
and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be
expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptees biological one.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of
adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following
rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the
other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate
succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcols death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and
relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of
their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis--vis
the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the
blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority,
in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offsprings adoptive parent. We cannot leave
undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive
parents was snatched from him by deaths cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life might
have been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We
hold that Cornelios death at the time of Johnsminority resulted in the restoration of petitioners parental
authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioners dependence on John can be
established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner,
prior to Johns adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their
seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a
housekeeper, she consented to Cornelios adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelios death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy.
Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in Johns Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the
master of the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is Johns known address as per the ECCs assailed

17

Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union
branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been
restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived
together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under
RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for
work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by
blood to the member unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at
least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of
circumstances from Cornelios death during Johns minority, the restoration ofpetitioners parental
authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner
as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelios adoption of John,
without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as
a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely demise during Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to
herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered
employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

18