Case Name: Marine Radio Communications Association of the Philippines, Inc.

(MARCAPI) vs. Reyes Date: November 6, 1990Topic: Self-Reliant and Independent

Economic Order
Rule of Law:Section 20, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State recognizes the indispensible role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise,
and provides incentives to needed investments.
Doctrine:The Constitution does not bar the government from undertaking its own initiatives
especially in the domain of public service and neither does it repudiate its primacy as chief
economic caretaker of the nation.Section 20, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, and others w/ private
sector participation, were created as a response to State monopoly of economic forces (GOCC),
which held back competitiveness in the market. Such provisions do not remove the fact that the
government is still the chief economic caretaker of the nation, especially in the domain of public
service.

Facts:
MARCAPIs main business concern is public correspondence : a marine radio
communications -correspondence bet vessel passengers or crew and the public. July
1998 the Department of Transportation and Communications unveiled an P880
million maritime coastal communications system project : Purpose: ensure safety of
lives at sea through the establishment of efficient communication facilities between
coast stations and ship stations and improvement of safety in navigational routes at
sea.The project aimed to provide ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship public
corresponding, free of charge.
MARCAPI asked DOTC to cancel the project : fall of the marine radio communications
industry.>DOTC: only for availability of distress and safety communications service:
(1. to allow the Coast Guard to efficiently receive distress signals from ships and 2 to
broadcast weather updates from coast stations to ships >the public has no confidence
in the services of the private sector, as only 1/1,000 registered operators responded to
a distress signal sent by the National Telecommunications Commission during one of
its tests
WON the DOTC should be prohibited from entering in the business of public
correspondence in view of Sec. 20, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution Public
correspondence is a social service. The duty of the State is pre-eminently, to promote
a just and dynamic social order through policies that provide adequate social
srvices and an improved quality of life for all. Section 20, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, along with other provisions prescribing private sector participation, were
created as a response to State monopoly of economic forces, which held back
competitiveness in the market. Such provisions do not remove the fact that the
government is still the chief economic caretaker of the nation, especially in the domain
of public service.Analogy used by the court: the Government merely built a bridge
that made the boat obsolete, although not entirely useless. Certainly, the owner of the
boat can not charge the builder of the bridge for lost income. And certainly, the
Government has all the right to build the bridge.
Ruling: Petition is dismissed. DOTC may push through with its marine communications
project.
Garcia (Petitioner) vs. Board of Investments (BOI) (Respondent)
G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990
DOCTRINE: Article II, Sec. 19: The State shall develop a selfreliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Article 2 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987: The sound development of the national economy in
consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism.
FACTS The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) was formed as a petrochemical
projected by Taiwanese investors. They had applied with BOI as a new domestic
producer of petrochemicals. Its main plant site was to be in Bataan. In the agreement
of terms and condition, one of the requirements to meet registration was the use of
"naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel. It was to be a with PNOC. In
February 24, 1988, the BOI certified the registration of BPC with the following perks:
1. It was given pioneer status which meant the exemption from taxes on the raw
materials, (2) repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation investments in currency

originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation and (3)
remittance of earnings on investments. In addition, the naphtha was also exempted
from ad valorem tax. On February 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East
Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally conveyed to Trade Secretary Jose
Concepion a letter informing him of the desire of BPC to amend registration for
relocation of job site from Bataan to Batangas due to the insurgency and unstable
labor situation. In addition to that, Batangas the presence of a massive liquefied
petroleum gas depot owned by Philippine Shell Corporation. This proposal was
opposed by the petitioner and President Aquino for she had a preference for the
Bataan establishment. Although BOI has taken a position of preference towards
Bataan over Batangas, its ViceChairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifies by saying: The
BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of the
petrochemical complex, as this would provide a better distribution of industries around
the Metro Manila area. ... The BOI recognizes and respect the principle that the final
choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the funding or
risk capital for the project. BOI has still not denied their position The petition was
granted on the grounds that there truly exists a controversy to this decision of
relocation
ISSUES: Whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should
be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha
only should be changed to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the
approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation (LPC) Petitioners claims: 1. Bataan was the original choice of the
BOI. There is more convenience to the fact that land is already reserved for this
purpose -no need for further purchase of real estate as opposed to a transfer in
Batangas. The labor situation does not warrant enough strength to be a reason for a
relocation. 2. The BRC government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan,
provides the necessary output to reach feedstock requirement as opposed to the
scarcity of LPG in Batangas which can hardly supply to meet consumer needs. 3.
Naphtha has been exempted from ad valorem tax and not LPG. These policies must be
venerated by foreign investors and BOI. 4. Section 10, Article XII, of the 1987
Constitution provides that it is the duty of the state to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance
with its national goals and priorities." 5. It is an admitted fact that the investor will
claim the greater proportion, considering the circumstances of the transfer and shift of
feedstock, capital requirement will be wholly minimised. Lastly, an advantage of its
current location means that PNOC will become a partner in the venture and its
significance is due to the great benefit and advantage it will contribute to the
government. Court said: In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the
plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to
Batangas except a nearabsolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely
choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain
murky to say the least. And in the light of the categorical admission of the BOI that
it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock,
whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the
wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding The Court, therefore,
holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse ofdiscretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas
and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha
and/or LPG GRANTED.
SEPARATE OPINION:
GRIOAQUINO, J., Dissenting Opinion: judicial branch has - not a judge for the actions
of the other coequal branches should be only over matters that constitute of the
executive and legislative actions that clash with the constitution. BOI, being vested
with the power of final decision had approved of Bataan as the site and the use of
naphtha only as the final and permanent decision- pending pa. No laws say that the
BOI is prohibited from approving a certain amended. Only the BOI or the Chief

Executive is competent to answer that question, for the matter of choosing an

appropriate site -political and economic decision which, -separation of powers not
prepared to hold that the BOI's decision to approve changes was the product of a
capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment - petitioner showing advantages in
Bataan and of using naphtha only as feedstock. The decision of the BOI to allow
the transfer of the LPC petrochemical project to Batangas and shift feedstock may not
nbe unwise no reason annul the BOI's action or prohibit it - within its particular sphere
of competence,
MELENCIOHERRERA, J., Dissenting Opinion: It is true that the judicial power
embodied in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the duty of Courts of justice
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion. By no means,
however, does it vest in the Courts the power to enter the realm of policy
considerations under the guise of the commission of grave abuse of discretion

PLDT vs. National Telecommunications Commission and Cellcom, Inc.

(Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. [ETCI])
Communication and Information in Nation-Building
Art. II, Sec. 24: The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nationbuilding.
Art XII, Sec. 6: The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute
to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and
similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when
the common good so demands.

Republic Act No. 6849: The Municipal Telephone Act of 1989

Doctrine:A modern and dependable communications network rendering efficient and reasonably
priced services is also indispensable for accelerated economic recovery and development. To these
public and national interests, public utility companies must bow and yield.

Facts: 1958:Congress enacted Republic Act No. 2090, granting the Felix Alberto and
Company, Inc. a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic
telecommunications in Metro Manila. >Felix Alberto and Company, Inc. later changed
its name to Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI), one of the respo. >NTC
Orders of 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 in NTC Case No. 87-39: ETCI obtained
from the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) provisional authority to
install, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System in Metro Manila after
ETCI filed an application to answer an "alleged urgent public need." The provisional
authority is subject to the condition that ETCI shall enter into interconnection
agreement with petitioner PLDT.>Petitioner PLDT opposed interconnection with its
own public switched telephone network.
While it contends that it welcomes interconnections in the furtherance of public
interest, PLDT wanted NTC to dismiss the provisional authority it granted to ETCI.
>Why?PLDT avers that the scope of the franchise ETCI received from Congress in 1958
is limited to "radio stations" and excludes telephone services -- which is precisely what
ETCI wanted to set up with the Cellular Mobile Telephone System the company earlier
applied for. >PLDT also cited PLDT has itself a pending application with NTC to install
and operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System for domestic and international service
not only in Manila but also in the provinces and that under the "prior operator" or
"protection of investment" doctrine, PLDT has the priority or preference in the
operation of such service. The NTC denied PLDT
W/N petitioner PLDT has grounds to refuse the NTC's Order to enter into
interconnection agreement with ETCI?
PLDT cannot justifiably refuse to interconnect. The Municipal Telephone Act of 1989
mandates interconnection providing as it does that all domestic telecommunications
carriers or utilities ... shall be interconnected to the public switch telephone network.
Such regulation of the use and ownership of telecommunications systems is in the
exercise of the plenary police power of the State for the promotion of the general
welfare. Further, the Supreme Court held the interconnection which has been required
of PLDT is a form of "intervention" with property rights dictated by the governments
objectives outlined in DOTC Circular No. 90-248 -- "the objective of government to promote
the rapid expansion of telecommunications services in all areas of the Philippines, ... to maximize
the use of telecommunications facilities available, ... in recognition of the vital role of
communications in nation building ... and to ensure that all users of the public telecommunications
service have access to all other users of the service wherever they may be within the Philippines at
an acceptable standard of service and at reasonable cost.

W/N ETCI is entitled to the provisional authority and has a valid legislative
franchise to operate a telephone system?
ETCI's franchise grants it "the right and privilege of constructing, installing, establishing and
operating in the entire Philippines radio stations for reception and transmission of messages on
radio stations in the foreign and domestic public fixed point-to-point and public base, aeronautical
and land mobile stations, ... with the corresponding relay stations for the reception and
transmission of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony..." NTC, in an

Order construed the technical term "radiotelephony" liberally as to include the

operation of a cellular mobile telephone system. SC held NTC -deserves great weight

and respect - "administrative agency possessed of the necessary special knowledge,

expertise and experience" to define these terms.
W/N PLDT has the priority or preference in the operation of a Cellular Mobile
Telephone System in this case?
Neither PLDT nor any other public utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly
position in view of the Constitutional proscription that no franchise certificate or
authorization shall be exclusive in character or shall last longer than fifty (50) years.
Additionally, the State is empowered to decide whether public interest demands that
monopolies be regulated or prohibited.
W/N the NTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting ETCI the
provisional authority to install a Cellular Mobile Telephone System?NTC acted
within its jurisdiction since it does have jurisdiction over all telecommunications
entities- discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority.SC held that the
encompassing objective: common good. DISMISSED
Gutierrez, J., dissenting opinion: The Court has sustained nothing less than the
desire of respondent ETCI to set-up a profitable business...through the use of billions of
pesos worth of another company's properties -core question is purely and simply
whether or not to grant ETCI's desire for economic gains through riding on another
firm's investments.
Justice Gutierrez also disagreed with the majority in terms of ETCIs franchise.
permitted without a valid legislative franchise.
Cruz, J., concurring and dissenting opinion
requirement for PLDT to interconnect -I think it violates due process If ETCI wants to
operate its own telephone system, it should rely on its own resources instead of riding
piggy-back on PLDT. Unfair: share with a newcomer and potential rival.

Pimentel vs Executive Sec. of DSWD July 17, 2012 Autonomy of Local

Governments
Petitioners: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., SERGIO TADEO and NELSON ALCANTARA
Respondents: EXIECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA and SECRETARY CORAZON .JULIANOSOLIMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD)

Rules of Law:
Art 2 Section 25 (1987 Consti) - The state shall ensure the autonomy of the local governments.
Art 10 Section 3 (1987 Consti) -The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,
Section 17 (Local Govt. Code). Basic Services and Facilities. (c)Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other
special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources,
are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs
and services.
Doctrines: A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing
basic facilities and services cannot be implied, as the Local Government Code itself weighs against
it. The national government is not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned
In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, the concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of
local government units into mini-states. It isto break up the monopoly, thus, did not intend to
sever the relation of partnership of the central administration and local government units.

Facts:>2007- DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy dubbed Ahon

Pamilyang Pilipino through the release of P50 Million Pesos under a Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget and Management. >July 16,
2008- DSWD issued Administrative Order No. 16, series of 2008 (A.O. No. 16, s. 2008),
setting the implementing guidelines for the project renamed Pantawid Pamilyang
Pilipino Program (4Ps). This Conditional Cash Transfer Program scheme (CCTP)
provides cash grant to extreme poor households so the members of the families can

meet certain human development goals.( Eligible households health assistance of

P500.00/month, and an educational assistance of P300.00/month for 10 months,
maximum of 3 children.Thus, after an assessment, a household beneficiary : annual
subsidy up to P15,000.00 subject to conditions.) >Under this AO, the DSWD
institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among the DepEd, DOH,
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the National Anti-Poverty
Commission (NAPC) and the local government units (LGUs) for the implementation of
the CCTP. >Through the GAA, the Congress provided funding for CCTP: 2008P298,550,000, 2009-P10 Billion Pesos and 2011- P21,194,117,000. Petitioners
challenges before the Court the disbursement of public funds and the implementation
of the CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of the
LGUs. It amounts to a recentralization of government functions, which is contrary to
the precepts of local autonomy and the avowed policy of decentralization.
W/N the 21 Billion CCTP budget allocation violates Art 2 Section 25 and Art
10 Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Section 17 of Local
Govt.Code.No. It is not unconstitutional. The Constitution declares it a policy of the
State to ensure the autonomy of local governments and Section of the LGC provided
LGUs the duties and functions for the delivery of basic services and facilities. However
paragraph (c) of the Section 17 also provides a categorical exception of cases
involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. The essence of
this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGU. > In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, the concept of local
autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into mini-states. It isto break
up the monopoly, thus, did not intend to sever the relation of partnership of the central
administration and local government units. Pimentel v. Aguirre defined the extent of the local
government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with the national government in the pursuit of
common national goals. Thus, to yield unreserved power of governance to the LGU as to

preclude any and all involvement by the national government would be to shift the tide
of monopolistic power to the other extreme. Also, a complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be
implied, as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national
government is not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented
locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned. The allocation of a P21 billion budget
-common national goal development and social progress can by no means be an
encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments. Dismissed
DADOLE VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT --Limitation on presidential power of supervision
Petition seeking to annul the COA decision: affirming the notices of the Mandaue city
auditor which diminished the monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner
judges of the RTC and MTC stationed in Mandaue city. FACTS:o1986 RTC and MTC
judges in Mandaue started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the
yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the city.
o1991 Mandaue city raised the amount to P1,500 for each judge o March 3 1993 AO
no. 42 was passed clarifying the role of the DBM in compensation and classification of
local government positions under RA no. 1760 and RA no. 6758 oMarch 15 1994 DBM
released Local Budget circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which states that allowances wont
exceed P1,0000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities subject to
conditions. The circular likewise provided for its immediate effectivity without need for
publication oActing on the directive, the Mandaue city auditor issued notices of
disallowance to the petitioners. Their monthly allowances were reduced and they were
asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to
September 1994 oPetitioners filed with the office of the city auditor to protest the
notices of disallowance, but the city auditor treated the protest as a motion for
reconsideration. They referred the case to the COA regional office, which referred the

motion with the head office recommending that the same be denied. oSeptember 21
1995 COA denied the petition oSubsequent petitions were also denied because there
was no grounds to disturb city editor.oRespondents contend that the constitutional and
statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to judges is not
absolute.
1)WoN LBC 55 of the DBM is void for against beyond the supervisory powers
of the president YES VOID
It goes beyond the law it seeks to implement o(1) Supervision vs Control Supervision
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties oControl power of an officer to alter, nullify, modify, or set aside
what a subordinate officer has done in performance of his duties and to substitute
judgment >Taule v Santos stated that Chief executive wielded no more authority than
that of checking whether LGUs and their officials were performing their duties
oPresident has power of control over members of cabinet, but only has power of
supervision over the heads of political subdivisions elected by the people. He can only
interfere when he finds that the LGUs have acted contrary to law.(2)LBC 55 goes
beyond law it seeks to implement>RA 7160 serves as the basis of LBC 55 and allows
grant of additional allowances to judges when the finances of the city government
allow. Provision does not authorize setting a definite max limit to additional
allowances granted to judges oSetting a uniform amount for the grant of additional
allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion in Sec. 458 par.(a)(1)(xi)
of this act(3)Also void because it lacks publication
oTanada v Tuvera held that administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation oeffective and enforceable :publication in the official gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation
2)WoN the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the city of Mandaue
that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual
appropriation laws passed by government
The ordinance does not contravene appropriation laws oRespondents contend that
even if LBC 55 was void, the granting additional allowances would still be bereft of
legal basis for want of a lawful source of funds considering the IRA cannot be used for
such purposes. oCourt disagrees. Respondent failed to prove that Mandaue city used
the IRA to spend for additional allowances- no evidence submitted oJust because
Mandaue citys locally generated revenues were not enough does not mean that the
additional allowances of the petitioner were taken from the IRA and not from the citys
revenues. Petition Granted,
Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc., et al.
vs Ronaldo Zamora, et al.
Topic: Internal Revenue Allotment
Doctrines/Provisions: Local Government Code: SECTION 284. Allotment of Internal
Revenue Taxes. Local government units shall have a share in the national internal
revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current
fiscal year as follows: (a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent
(30%); (b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and (c) On the third year and
thereafter, forty percent (40%).
1987 Constitution: SECTION 6, ARTICLE X: Local government units shall have a just
share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.
Facts:
Pres. Estrada proposed an Internal Revenue Allotment of Php 121,778,000,000.
RA 8760: GAA for the Year 2000 allotted Php 111,778,000,000 as IRA for all LGUs and
an Unprogrammed Fund for Php 10,000,000,000 that can only be released only when
the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the
President.

Petitioners filed for Prohibition and Mandamus with Application of TROs on Aug. 22,
2000, challenging the constitutionality of the provisions in the GAA on the Allocations
to LGUs and the Unprogrammed Funds.
Province of Batangas and Nueva Ecija filed for motions in 2001 to intervene and the
motions were granted by the SC.
Court resolved issues anyway even if the effectivity of the GAA for 2000 has ceased.
(Note: Case was resolved in 2005.) The court deemed the case to be impressed with
public interest and is capable of repetition.
WON the petition contains proper verifications and certifications against
forum-shopping (basically, that means filing your case in the court you
believe is likely to favor you)
The petition does. On respondents claim that verification statement is insufficient
since it is required that the person verifying must have read the pleading and the
allegations are true to his knowledge:
Court rules that the statement to the best of my knowledge are true and correct
referring to the allegations in the petition does not mean mere knowledge, information
and belief, but also substantial compliance to Sec 6 of Rule 7. Technicality also
deserves scant consideration given that the question is purely of law (i.e.
constitutionality) and the veracity of the allegations (not the process in which they
were given) are not disputed or contested by the respondents anyway. Remember that
courts disregard imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure except when
substantial rights would otherwise be prejudiced. Even though natural persons may
execute verification in juridical entities such as NGOs, petition cannot be treated as an
unsigned pleading because there are individuals within these groups who executed
verifications in their own names. Whats a verification? Its a document wherein
witnesses swear or affirm the the testimony that theyre about to give or have already
given is truthful.
WON petitioners have the requisite standing to file the suit
Respondents position does not lie. The provisions were not only to be implemented by
the committees specifically mentioned in the provisions but also by the executive
branch (i.e. DBM and National Treasurer). The controversy revolves around the manner
of releasing the IRA; hence, the respondents are the proper parties to the suit.
WON the questioned provisions violate the constitutional injunction that the
just share of Local Govts in the national taxes or the IRA shall be
automatically released Respondents position does not lie.
The Respondents argue that Sec 6, Art 10 is addressed to the legislature not the
executive (petitioners argue otherwise). The Executives duty is to automatically
release the share. This means that it also enjoins the legislative not to pass laws that
might prevent the Executive from doing so. If the intention of the statute was the
contrary, it should have been worded differently.
Following the ruling in Province of Batangas v Romulo, the statute does bind the
legislative just much as it does the Executive. Possibly important holding from Taada v
Cuenco (on clear constitutional provision v contemporaneous construction aka
executive interpretation):
The reason is that the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is
more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when
applied to statutory provisions, and that except as to matters committed by the
constitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporaneous or
practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful
case. Conditional releases strip the term automatic of all meaning and would
contradict ruling in Pimentel v Aguirre, a case that has no substantial difference from
the IRA issue except that it that case, it was the executive and not the legislative that
had authorized the withholding of the IRA.
The court pronounces that even the best intentions have to be carried out within the
parameters of the Constitution and the law.
Ruling: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with TRO is granted.

Pimentel v Aguirre GR 121988 July 19, 2000

Autonomy of Local Governments- Internal Revenue Allotment
Doctrine:Local governments units enjoy fiscal autonomy. The automatic release of its share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment is provided for by the Constitution and the local government code.
The President only has the power of supervision over LGUs, not control. He also cannot adjust LGUs
shares in the IRA without first consulting Congress and the LGUs.
Rule of Law 1987 Constitution Article 2 Sec 25 The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments
Art 10 Sec 4 The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments
Art 10 Sec 6 Local governments units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.Local Government Code Sec
286(a)The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any further
action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a
quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject
to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose.
Sec 284 Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public
sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of
Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and
Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and the presidents of the "liga", to make the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units*presidents of the liga- presidents of the leagues of
local govs
AO 372 Sec 1
All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, governmentowned and controlled corporations and local government units will identify and implement
measures [in FY 1998] that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized
regular appropriations for non-personal services items
AO 372 Sec 4
Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of
the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to
local government units shall be withheld.
AO 43
Amended Sec 4 of AO 372, reduced 10% to 5%

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Sec 1 of AO 372 and to
enjoin respondents from implementing Sec 4 of AO 372 >Petitioner: The president, in
issuing AO 372, was exercising control over LGUs. The constitution only vests in the
President the authority to supervise LGUs. Sec 4 contravenes Sec 286 of the LGC and
Art X Sec 6 of the Constitution.>Solicitor General, respondents: AO 372 was issued to
alleviate economic difficulties brought about by the Peso devaluation. It is merely an
exercise of the Presidents authority to supervise LGUs. It doesnt violate the statutory
prohibition on the imposition of a holdback on their revenue shares, its just
temporary in nature, pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation.
W/N Sec 1 AO 372 is a valid exercise of the Presidents power of general
supervision over local governments.
It is well within the Presidents power to supervise local governments. Despite the
authoritative tone, AO 372 is merely directory, intended only to advise LGUs to
undertake cost-reduction measures. It doesnt contain any sanctions in case of noncompliance.
W/N Sec 4 AO 372 violates the Constitution/Local Government Code
Sec 4 orders the withholding of 10% of LGUs IRA. It contravenes the Local Govt Code
Sec 286 which provides that the LGUs share shall not be subject to any holdback by
the National Government, regardless of its temporary nature.
Ruling: Petition granted. Respondents prohibited from implementing AO 372
and 43 insofar as local government
FootnotesSupervision- power/authority to oversee an inferior body, make sure that
they are performing their duties properly. It doesnt include restraining authority. The

heads of local government are elected officials, not appointed by the President. Their
sovereign powers emanate from the people so they are subject only to the Presidents
supervision.
Kapunan, dissenting
The Petition is premature. the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged
construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the
administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the
executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and
abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function. AO 372 falls within the
powers of the President as chief fiscal officer- as chief fiscal officer he is ultimately
responsible for the collection and distribution of public money. The withholding of the
LGUs IRA is implied in the Presidents authority to adjust it in case of an
unmanageable public sector deficit.
Refutation of Justice Kapunans dissent:
On prematurity: By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt actindeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
On the Presidents authority to adjust the IRA in case of unmanageable
public sector deficit:
Yes the SEC 284 of the LGC gives the president the authority to adjust the IRA, but
subject to consultation with the presiding officers of Congress and the presidents of
the leagues of local government.

Lonzanida vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999

Autonomy of Local Governments, Term Limits
Rule of Law: Art. X, Sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160)(b) No local elective official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected.
Doctrine: Comelec can still resolve a petition for disqualification (if it was filed before election day)
even after the candidate has been proclaimed winner by the board of canvassers (in this case, the
issue was resolved with finality 2 months before the "next" elections, so petitioner served 2 years
and 10 months by virtue of a void proclamation)
An elective official will be disqualified (by the 3-term rule) if 2 requisites are satisfied: 1. The official
was elected for three consecutive terms and 2. The official fully served those terms

Facts:Lonzanida herein petitioner has served two consecutive terms as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales prior to the 1995 elections
He won the 1995 elections and started serving his term, but was contested by his then
opponent, Alvez
Jan 9, 1997 COMELEC declares failure of elections
Nov 13, 1997 COMELEC resolves election protest, declares Alvez the duly elected
mayor
Feb 27, 1998 COMELEC files writ of execution for Lonzanida to vacate his post
1998 elections, petitioner runs, but his new opponent Muli filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner
May 21, 1998 COMELEC issues a resolution granting a petition to disqualify
WON COMELEC still has jurisdiction over the disqualification of an elective
official after said official had already been proclaimed winner?
YES. The petition was filed before election day. The court held in Sunga (previous case)
that the COMELEC is duty-bound to continue hearing the case to the end. Also, the
court contends that if such (i.e, the COMELEC loses jurisdiction) were the case, the

guilty official that was wrongfully proclaimed winner could simply employ delaying
tactics to retain his seat.
WON petitioner's assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 could be
considered as one full term (to satisfy the disqualification provision)?
NO. The court holds that an elective official will be disqualified (by the 3-term rule) if 2
requisites are satisfied: 1. The official was elected for three consecutive terms and 2.
The official fully served those terms. These two requisites arent present with the
petitioner Lonzanida. First, his proclamation was deemed void, as COMELEC ruled that
Lonzanida didnt actually win the 1995 elections. Second, he left his office by virtue of
COMELECs writ of execution around March, 1998. The argument that petitioner
almost served the full term anyway has no legal basis.
Ruling: Petition granted. COMELECs previous ruling set aside.
Case Name: Adorneo vs. Commission on Elections: February 4, 2002
Topic: Term Limits
Rule of Law: Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Doctrine:Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation
of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

Facts:Ramon Talaga Jr. was elected mayor of Lucena City in 1992 and 1995. He served
two full terms. In 1998, he lost to Bernard Tagarao.
A recall election was held in May 2000. Talaga Jr. won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
Talaga Jr. ran for mayor in the following 2001 elections. He won against the petitioner.
Petitioner Raymundo Adorneo sought to nullify a COMELEC decision which declared
that Talaga Jr. did not serve for three consecutive terms, therefore allowing him to run
for mayor in the 2001 elections.
WON Talaga Jr. has served three consecutive terms as mayor of Lucena City
and should be disqualified as a candidate for the same position in the 2001
elections
Petition has no merit. Talaga Jr. has not served three consecutive terms.The continuity
of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. For nearly two
years, Talaga Jr. was a private citizen.The court cited its ruling in Lonzanida vs.
COMELEC:
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
In this case, Talaga Jr.s defeat in the 1998 elections qualifies as an involuntary
severance from office, which therefore allows him to run in the 2001 elections.
Dismissed, COMELEC D uphold
Case Name:
Socrates, Petitioner, v COMELEC, Respondent
Sandoval, Petitioner, v COMELEC, Respondent
Adoco, Gilo and Ollave, Petitioners, v COMELEC and Hagedorn, Respondents
Date: November 12, 2002
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Rule of Law:
Section 8 Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Doctrine:

The limitation on running for a fourth consecutive term only prohibits reelection on a regular
elections. A candidate who has served for three consecutive terms is allowed to run in a recall
election as the time from which he last served till the time he runs for the recall counts as an
involuntary renunciation of his term.

Facts:
On July 2, 2002, 312 of 528 barangay officials of Puerto Princesa gathered to recall
Mayor Socrates. On the same day they submitted to COMELEC a resolution to schedule
the recall election within 30 days of receipt of the resolution
On July 16 Socrates filed with COMELEC a petition to nullify the Recall election.
On August 14 COMELEC gave due course to the recall resolution and set the recall
election on September 7
On August 23 Hagedorn filed his COC for Mayor.
On August 17 Adovo and Gilo filed a petition to disqualify Hagedorn from running in
the Recall. A similar case was filed by Ollave on August 30
The cases filed against Hagedorn are all hinged on the fact that he has served as
mayor of Puerto Princesa for 3 consecutive terms and is barred from running for a
fourth time.
On September 20 COMELEC promulgated a resolution which allowed Hagedorn to run
for the recall election which was rescheduled to September 24
Hence these petitions
GR No. 154512, Socrates seeks to nullify the Recall Election
The service of the Recall resolution was legally deficient
The recall resolution was made in violation of his and the publics constitutional right
to information
GR No. 154683, Sandoval also seeking to nullify the Recall Election
Based on COMELEC only setting a 10 day campaign period and asking COMELEC to
give an additional 15 days
GR Nos. 15083-84 Adovo, Gilo and Ollave seeks to nullify Hagedorns COC
On September 24 the Court ordered COMELEC to desist from proclaiming a winning
candidate.
Hagedorn garnered the most number of votes.
W/N The Recall Resolution was valid? Yes, the barangay officials were not
disqualified to participate in the recall assembly that created the recall resolution.
Socrates right to information was also not violated because he admitted that he did
receive notice of the hearing for the recall resolution and all the pertinent documents
to the recall was submitted to COMELEC. SOcrates had all the right to examine the
documents but he failed to do so and COMELEC did not bar him from examining them
either.
W/N Hagedorn is qualified to run? Yes, The constitutional limitation on reelection
as stated in Section 8, Article X only prohibits reelection for a fourth time in a regular
election. The prohibition does not cover recall elections like the one that occurred.
Additionally the time between the last regular election and the recall election
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. The court also
stated that Term Limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to
the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
Ruling:petitions are dismissed and COMELEC is now allowed to declare a winner
for the recall election.
TITLE: Abundo, Sr. v COMELEC, GR no. 201716, January 8, 2013
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ERNESTO R. VEGA, respondents.
Petition: the petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of COMELEC affirming the RTCs decision
declaring the petitioner as ineligible for reelection.
Doctrines and Provisions:
Three Consecutive Terms may be broken or interrupted by Involuntary Interruptions. Involuntary
Interruption is claimed to result from any of these events of causes: succession of assumption of
office by operation of law; preventive suspension; declaration of defeated candidate as the winner
in an election contest; declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election

contest; proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election; removal of the official
by operation of law.

Facts: 2001 Election, Abundo, Sr. won as Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

2004 Election, Torres was initially proclaimed the winner as Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes, thus served for the position.
May 9, 2006, Abundo, Sr. was declared the actual winner, thus his assumption of office
for the remainder of the term.
2007 Election Abundo, Sr. won as Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
2010 Election Abundo, Sr. filed for candidacy for the same position.
Torres sought for Abundos disqualification.
August 9, 2010, RTC declared Abundo, Sr. ineligible for position.
Abundo, Sr. appealed in COMELEC, COMELEC dismissed the appeal. Hence this
petition;
Whether or not Mayor Abelardo Abundo, Sr. has served for full three
consecutive terms and is barred from running for another term?
No, Abelardo Abundo, Sr. did not serve the full three consecutive terms and is
therefore not barred for running for another term. It cannot be said that Abundo, Sr.
has fully served 2004-2007 term, Abundo, Sr. actually held the office and exercised the
functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as
duly elected candidate in the May 9, 2006 elections or for only a little over one year
and one month, which is less than the legally contemplated full tern of local
government official.
Ruling: PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court re hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor
of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is
accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position.
Note:Three-term Limit Rule: Disqualification: To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective
local office, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms for the post; and (2) that he has fully served the three consecutive
terms.

Goh v Bayron November 25, 2014

Topic: Term Limits
Doctrine: When COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its Current Operating
Expenditures, such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions
including the conduct of recall elections. In addition, aside from COMELECs fiscal autonomy, its
head is authorized by law to augment items in its appropriations from its savings.

Facts:
March 17, 2014 Goh filed a recall petition (procedure of removing elected official
from office through a direct vote before their term ends) against Puerto Princesa Mayor
Bayron due for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence
April 1, 2014 COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9864 certifying the sufficiency of the
recall petition but suspended the voting procedures due to lack of funds
Mayor Bayron filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of the recall petttition which
Goh countered by filing a Comment/Opposition with Motion to deny Bayronss omnibus
motion
May 27, 2014 COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 9882 suspended any proceeding
relative to recall as the recall process, as stated in said Resolution, does not have an
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act of 2014 (2014 GAA)5 and the 2014
GAA does not provide the COMELEC with legal authority to commit public funds for the
recall process
COMELEC reasoned that it could not proceed with the recall because:
All expenses incident to recall elections shall be shouldered by the commission but
A review of COMELECs budget under the 2014 GAA reveals that it does not have any
appropriation of line item budget to serve as contingency fund to conduct recall
elections

Augmentation is not possible because there is no existing line item in the Commissions
budget and recall elections is not one of the specific purposes and priorities for
Augmentation under the 2014 GAA .
The use of the Commissions current funds for recall elections is unconstitutional and
would open the responsible officials to possible personal and criminal liabilities
The conduct of elections may adversely affect the commisions preparation for the
2016 NAional and Local Elcetions >The only solution is the enactment of a law that will
pappropriate funds for the Conduct of Recall Elections-the Commission resolved not to
continue with any proceedings relative to recall as it does not have a line item budget
or legal authority to commit public funds for the purpose
June 6, 2014 - Goh filed a petition for annulment and reversal of Resolution Nos 9864
and 9882
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Resolution Nos 9684 and 9882
-Yes, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The 2014 GAA provides the line
item appropriation to allow COMELEC to fulfil its constitutional mandate of conducting
recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize COMELEC to
conduct recall elections in 2014.
Whether or not there is no budget for the conduct of recall election in the
2014 GAA preventing the COMELEC from conducting recall election-The 2014
GAA expressly provides for the line item appropriation to allow COMELEC to conduct
recall elections. This is found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the
COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a line item for the Conduct and
supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites. In addition, one of
the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is to conduct recall elections.
When the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its Current Operating
Expenditures, such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional
functions, including the conduct of recall elections. Thus, in Socrates v. COMELEC,
recall elections were conducted even without a specific appropriation for recall
elections in the 2002 GAA.
Whether or not COMELEC can tap its 10.7 billion savings to fund the conduct
of recall elections
-Yes it can augment from its saving its appropriations for personnel services,
maintenance and their operating expenses. Under the special provisions for
COMELEC, the Commission through its president is authorized to use savings from its
appropriations to cover actual deficiencies incurred for the current year. Since the
COMELEC admits that it does not have sufficient funds from its current line item
appropriation, then there is therefore an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the
current year.
Ruling: Petition granted. Resolution 9864 is partially reverse and set aside while
resolution 9882 is reversed and set aside. COMELEC is directed to immediately carry
out the recall elections of Mayor Lucilo Bayron of Puerto Princesa Palawan.
Legaspi v Civil Service CommissionGR No. L-72119 | May 29, 1987
TOPIC: Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure
RELEVANT RULE OF LAW
Art. III Sec. 7 (1987 Constitution)
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis fr policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the
right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167
[1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon
the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.

FACTS (The case doesnt really provide for why Legaspi wanted to confirm the
eligibility of the sanitarians.)

Legaspi requested for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, who had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
CSC denied Legaspis request. The Solicitor General challenged Legaspis standing to
sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be
informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concered, and
also argued that the Commission does not have ministerial duty to furnish such
information to Legaspi.
Legaspi thus prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel
the respondent Commission to disclose said information.
W/N the petitioner, Legaspi, has legal standing to assert the right to
information?
Yes, the petitioner has legal standing to assert the right to information.
In Taada v Tuvera, it has been held that:
* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show
that he is a citizen as as such interested in the execution of the laws * * *
The Court defines public in Subido v Ozaeta as:
* * * Public is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces
every person. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a
pecuniary character in the particular information sought are given the right of
inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction * * *
Since this is a matter of public right where the real party in interest is the people,
any citizen therefore has standing.
W/N the requested information is a matter of public concern
Yes, the requested information is a matter of public concern.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern here is no
rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that
eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. Each case
must be examined separately. In this particular case, it must be said that a public
official must be accountable to the people for his eligibility.
W/N mandamus is a proper remedy available to the petitioner
Yes, mandamus is a proper remedy available to the petitioner.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence
of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles
for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil
service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
RULING: The Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu
City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
Case name:
SPOUSES RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR. and Lourdes Constantino V HON. JOSE B. CUISIA,
in his capacity as Governor of the Central Bank, G.R. No. 106064. October 13, 2005
Foreign Loans
Rule of Law:
Art. VII, Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every
quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on
applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned
and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided by law.

 Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of
the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government
shall be made available to the public.
Republic Act No. 245 - An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public
Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes
Doctrine:
The Supreme Court notes that R.A. No. 245 as amended by P.D. No. 142, s. 1973, entitled An Act
Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law,
and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of, inter alia, bonds.
Each head of a department is, and must be, the Presidents alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.
o Doctrine of Political Agency.
o The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory
capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, should be of the President's bosom
confidence (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of AttorneyGeneral Cushing (7 Op.,
AttorneyGeneral, 453), are subject to the direction of the President.
o Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in
reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized
by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, each head of a department is,
and must be, the Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 245 empowers the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President
and after consultation of the Monetary Board, to borrow from time to time on the credit of the
Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to issue
therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government.
o While the President wields the borrowing power it is the Secretary of Finance who normally carries
out its thrusts.
The Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the foreign borrowing power subject to
such limitations as may be provided under law. Said presidential prerogative may be exercised
by the Presidents alter ego, who in this case is the Secretary of Finance.

Facts:

The Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 was the

culmination of efforts that began during the term of former President Corazon
Aquino to manage the countrys external debt problem through a negotiationoriented debt strategy involving cooperation and negotiation with foreign
creditors.
o
Principle Collateralized Interest Reduction Bond Issuance and
Exchange Agreement
o
Philippine Bond Issuance and Exchange Agreement
o
Interest Reduction Bond Issuance and Exchange Agreement.

On 28 February 1992, the Philippine Debt Negotiating Team, chaired by

respondent Pelaez, negotiated an agreement with the countrys Bank
Advisory Committee, representing all foreign commercial bank creditors, on
the Financing Program which respondents characterized as a multioption
financing package. The Program was scheduled to be executed on 24 July
1992 by respondents in behalf of the Republic.

Petitioners characterize the Financing Program as a package offered to the

countrys foreign creditors consisting of two debtrelief options.
o
The first option was a cash buyback of portions of the Philippine
foreign debt at a discount.
o
The second option allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine
debt instruments into any of three kinds of bonds/securities:

(1) new money bonds with a five year grace period and 17
years final maturity, the purchase of which would allow the
creditors to convert their eligible debt papers into bearer
bonds with the same terms

(2) interestreduction bonds with a maturity of 25 years and

(3) principalcollateralized interestreduction bonds with a

maturity of 25 years.
Issues:The debtrelief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing Program are
beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20, Article VII of the
Constitution.
o
The provision states that the President may contract or guarantee
foreign loans in behalf of the Republic.
o
It is claimed that the buyback and securitization/bond conversion
schemes are neither loans nor guarantees, and hence beyond
the power of the President to execute.
Even assuming that the contracts under the Financing Program are constitutionally
permissible, it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into these
contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents.
Holding:

The word bond means contract, agreement, or guarantee. All of these terms are
applicable to the securities known as bonds. An investor who purchases a bond is
lending money to the issuer, and the bond represents the issuers contractual
promise to pay interest and repay principal according to specific terms.
o
The language of the Constitution allows the President to contract and guarantee
foreign loans and it makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans
or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than
others.

Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal

authorizations, as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency.
o
The need of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the
President to execute the debtrelief contracts is made clear by the fact that the
process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments
debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance.
o
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every
aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running
the country long enough to focus on a welter of timeconsuming activities.
o
This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are
accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the
government.
Ruling:

The raison d etre of the Financing Program is to manage debts incurred by the Philippines in a
manner that will lessen the burden on the Filipino taxpayersthus the term debtrelief
agreements.
The measures objected to by petitioners were not aimed at incurring more debts but at terminating
preexisting debts and were backed by the knowhow of the countrys economic managers as
affirmed by third party empirical analysis.
o
That the means employed to achieve the goal of debtrelief do not sit well with
petitioners is beyond the power of this Court to remedy.
o
The exercise of the power of judicial review is merely to checknot supplant
the Executive, or to simply ascertain whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction but not to exercise the power vested in
him or to determine the wisdom of his act.

In cases where the main purpose is to nullify governmental acts whether as

unconstitutional or done with grave abuse of discretion, there is a strong presumption in
favor of the validity of the assailed acts.
o
The heavy onus is in on petitioners to overcome the presumption of regularity.
We find that petitioners have not sufficiently established any basis for the
Court to declare the acts of respondents as unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

Galeos, Petitioner, v People of the Philippines, Respondent

Ong, Petitioner, v People of the Philippines, RespondentDate: February 9, 2011

Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.

Rule of Law:
Article 171 Paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:...
(4) Making untruthful statement in a narration of facts.
Doctrine:
Withholding of material fact, such as knowledge of relatives in government, is still considered as
falsification of Public Document.

Facts:

Galeos was a casual employee of the municipality of Naga, Cebu till in 1994
where Ong, the OIC Mayor, extended permanent appointment to him for the
position of Construction and Maintenance Man.

In their individual SALNs for 1993, Galeos answered No to the question: To

the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?

Ong, as per requirement in RA 7160, certified the SALN of Galeos.

There was a third accused named Rivera but he died before the lower court
promulgated a decision so his case was dismissed.

It was later discovered that Ong and Galeos are cousins since their mothers
are sisters.

In 1998 members of the sangguniang Bayan of Naga filed a complaint to the

Ombudsman against Ong and Galeos for the crime of falsification of public
documents.

Galeos claimed that the SALN given to him was already filled up by the
people of the municipal hall.

The Sandiganbayan found both of them guilty for the crime of falsification of
Public Document

On appeal both of them allege that they did not falsify any statement as a
statement need a positive averment and their silence of non-disclosure did
not qualify as a statement.

Ong further alleges that he could not be guilty of falsification as he merely

administered the oath and he had no legal obligation to check the
truthfulness of the statements made by Galeos.
Issues/Holding:

W/N Falsification is committed by making untruthful statements

concerning relatives in the government? Yes, due to the answer of
Galeos on his SALN it constitutes falsification. In an earlier case the Supreme
Court stated that withholding information on data sheets is considered
falsification.

W/N Ong can be also be charged of the crime? Yes, The court stated that
it would be impossible for Ong not to know that Galeos is his cousin. Further
conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of the parties agreeing to
commit the crime. In this case Ong administered the oath of Galeos 3 times
while in office as mayor of Naga.
Ruling:
Wherefore the petitions are denied. The conviction of the two petitioners are
affirmed.

Case Name: Laxina vs. Office of the Ombudsman Date: Sept 30, 2005
Topic: Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure - Under Art. XI, Sec. 13 (Power, functions,
and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman) in the syllabus
Rule of Law Sec. 25(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 - Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Facts:
Petitioner was Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Batasan Hills,Quezon City. On 15 December
1998, Evangeline Ursal (Ursal), Barangay Clerk, filed with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) a complaint for attempted rape against petitioner. Petitioner was
later charged with sexual harassment before the RTC of QC.
On 13 March 2000, Ursal brought to DILG a complaint-affidavit charging petitioner with
grave misconduct for the alleged attempted rape. DILG referred it to the Quezon City
Council (City Council) for appropriate action.
On 30 March 2000, Ursal filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a similar complaintaffidavit charging petitioner with grave misconduct. Petitioner filed his counteraffidavit, attached affidavits of two witnesses.
On 15 August 2000, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman exonerated petitioner from the charge, dismissing the complaint for lack
of substantial evidence. But was reversed and petitioner found guilty on 2 July 2001,
upon review and approval of Ombudsman.
On 20 August 2001, Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. implemented the 2
July 2001 Memorandum Order and to submit a compliance report. He issued the order,
notifying petitioner of his dismissal from service and enjoining him to cease and desist
from performing his duties as barangay captain.
Petitioner raised this to CA, but CA dismissed the petition.
Raised to SC to (1) review CA decision, (2) dismiss administrative charge against him,
(3) issue TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin implementation of
the Order of the Ombudsman (to dismiss him) and to reinstate him to the position of
Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City.
W/N Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative case despite it being
filed with City Council YES, it has.
Rule on forum-shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, and not to
administrative cases. Despite Ursal filing identical complaints to the City Council and
Ombudsman, Ombudsman still has jurisdiction over administrative case because of its
mandate to investigate complaints against erring public officials, derived from both
the Constitution and the law.
To fulfill this mandate, R.A. No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, was enacted,
giving the Ombudsman or his Deputies jurisdiction over complaints on all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance against officers or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality therefor, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and the disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials, except those who may be removed only by
impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.
The Ombudsman was not aware of the pending case before the Quezon City Council
when the administrative complaint was filed before it. There was no mention of such
complaint either in the complaint-affidavit or in the counter-affidavit of petitioner.
Thus, the Ombudsman, in compliance with its duty to act on all complaints against
officers and employees of the government, took cognizance of the case, made its
investigation, and rendered its decision accordingly.
Ruling:
Petition is DENIED (because implementation sought to be enjoined is already fait
accompli. Petitioner had already stepped down and a new barangay chairman for Brgy.
Batasan Hills had already been sworn in. Injunction has no effect as the acts sought to
be enjoined have already been accomplished or consummated)
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 April 2002 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
pet

Office of the Ombudsman vs Madriaga Sept 27, 2006

Topic: Honest public service and full disclosure
Rules of Law:
Art. XI, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution (grants petitioner administrative disciplinary power to):
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient, [and
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
RA No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989):
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, andensure compliance therewith;
or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, that
the refusal by an officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects
to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against said officer; xxx

Facts:
San Juan School Club (the Club) charged respondents with violation of Sec. 1, Rule IV
and Sec. 1, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees
28 May 2001: Graft Investigation Officer Acua found respondents guilty of violation of
Sec. 5(a) of RA No. 6713 and imposes on them the penalty of reprimand
SEC. 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. In the performance of their duties, all
public officials and employees are under obligation to:
Act promptly on letters and requests. All public officials and employees shall, within
fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other
means of communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken
on the request

28 June 2001: Graft Investigation Officer Calderon sets aside Acuas decision, finding
respondents also guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of service
and penalizing them with six months suspension
On appeal, the Court of Appeals:
Declared in a Decision (2004) that the six month suspension meted out by the Office of
the Ombudsman to respondent Madriaga and co-respondent Bernardo is merely
recommendatory to DepEd
Office of the Ombudsman has only the power to investigate possible misconduct of a
government official or employee in the performance of his functions; it is the
disciplining authority that has the power or prerogative to impose such penalty
Office of the Ombudsman argues that the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of
1989 have conferred on it full disciplinary authority over public officials and
employees including the power to enforce its duly-issued judgments
W/N the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative
sanctions over public officials. Yes, it does. Petitioners authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely
recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of
the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
The refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary
action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority
but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating
therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring
officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that
the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer. (Ledesma vs
Court of Appeals)