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Fromtheoriginator

ThedebateoverthebooksofViktorSuvorovlastsfromthebeginningofthe90s.Strictlyspeaking,

this debate is not about Suvorov, and Stalin. They are in a concentrated form and identify the main outstanding issue throughout Soviet history - which sought Stalin, breaking and crippling the country and the people, building a personal, unique and nothing on a similar system of government?Forwhathappenedallthathappenedduringhisrule?Whatwasitspurpose? Options substantive reply can be only two. First - flattering to the Soviet past. Second - annihilating. ThefirstresponseofmanygenerationsofSovietpeoplearelearning,fromkindergarten.Itstates:

the USSR has consistently fought for peace. Stalin did not try to start a world war.Pact of 1939 and the seizure by agreement with Hitler areas of several European countries were forced to a defensive step. Stalin for an attack on Germany in 1941 is not prepared, he prepared for the defense and for this purpose brought to the border all the Red Army.But to defendthemselves somehowfailed,andthearmy,whichfortheattackwasnotprepared,butalsoonthedefensive forsome reason wasnotready,waskilled inthe summer of 1941as aresultof the treacherous

aggressionofGermany.[5]

The second answer for the first time in its entirety in his books gave Viktor Suvorov. It goes like this: Stalindeliberately,from the firstmomentof arrivaltothe sole power inthelate20s began toprepare the conquestof Europe. His goalwas-to militarizethe country andprovokea world war, to join it in the most convenient time and remain in the end the only winner. The provocation of the war was a success in 1939 on Europe culmination of a Soviet attack was to come for the summer of 1941, but Stalin was wrong in the timing and allowed Hitler to attack first. Sometimesthereisathirdoption-Stalinaboutanythingdidnotthink,nortodefendortoattack notprepared,noplanshadnot,andthetroopsmovedbackandforthaimlessly.Butconsiderthe optionseriouslyidiotStalindoesnotmakesense. The scientific debate about Stalin's policies on both sides of a lot of people involved, but the nameofViktorSuvorovremainsatthecenterofcontroversy.Arounditisnotpossible,although theSuvorovindirectdiscussionsdoesnottakepart.ViktorSuvorovfirstformulatedtheproblem, dotthe«i»andbroughtalotofevidenceoftheirinnocenceoftheStalinistconceptionofhistory. And he put his adversaries to have to not only refute his arguments in favor of the version of "Stalinaggressor",butconsistentlyarguealternative-thethesisofthe"Stalin-peacemaker". Altogether in 2005, about two dozen books against Viktor Suvorov in Russia. Most of them are directed against him personally. This vilification "Rezun traitor", the authors of which, even at a stretch can not be regarded as discussants in the scientific debate. Attempts to disprove the conceptofSuvorov'smoreorlesscorrectwayssofarnonehavefailed. The situation was extremely uncomfortable for his opponents. Virtually all connected "antisuvorovskaya" activity has been reduced to little success challenging the secondary and tertiary parts of his books, stuffed all the way arguments. Main counterarguments, that is

evidencethatStalinwasanattackonEuropeingeneral,andGermanyinparticular,in1941,isnot

ready,but,onthecontrary,waspreparingthedefense,noonegave.Anditseemsthatinnature donotexist. Line up the consistent protection of an alternative embodiment of Soviet history,too, so far no

one dared. To this should prove that Stalin not only in principle are not prepared to take over Europe,butalsothathisexternal,internal,economicandculturalpolicieshavebeensomeother, yetunknownpurpose.TodayweknowalotaboutStalin,toclaimwithcertainty-thisversioncan notbeproved. ItremainsSuvorov'sversionofSoviethistory,butacceptitinterferesalot.Firstofallitmeansa revision-"audit"-establishedandcanonizedpostwarpoliticalcorrectnesslooksatthehistoryof theSecondWorldWar.InthatpartofitwhichdealswiththeroleoftheSovietUnion.Changing the status of the Stalinist Soviet Union to the "sacrifice and liberator" for the status of "the executionerandtheaggressor"isdifficultforevenpeoplewhodonotfeelsympathyforStalinism. Even if they are experts in the history of the USSR. And even more so if they are - the Soviet expertsinthemilitaryhistoryoftheSovietUnion. However, in the West, for example in Germany, the scientific establishment is very irritated responds to Suvorov's book. The cause of irritation is directly opposed to Russian motives "antirevizionistov".RecentprotectthenoblereputationoftheUSSRinWorldWarII. German researchers (not all, but many) are afraid of unexpected whitewash Hitler's reputation. The logic here is simple and strangely absurd. It means that the attack was justified and

preventiveIfSuvorovrightsandHitlerattackedStalinaheadonlyafewweeks.SoHitlerwasright. Thelogicoftheabsurd,becauseasingleword,[6,7]justifyingHitler booksSuvorovnot.Hitleris Hitler.The motives of his conduct, his morals and his policy does not depend on whether Stalin wasgoingtoattackhimornot.HitlersuspectedofsympathizingwiththeSovietUnionandsoitis impossible.Andinternally-"preventive"-theGermanattackontheSovietUnioninthesummer

of1941,andnotinanother,moreconvenienttimecannotjustifyHitler.Forwhatreason?Donot

beattackedin1941m,wouldattackatanothertime.Ingeneral,itisunclearwhythereputation

ofHitler,hasunleashed(withStalin),WorldWarII,committedaggressionagainstmanycountries andestablishedtheNaziregimeonthepartofEuropeingeneralmaydependon,attackediton itsallyonaggressionproactivelyorsimplybecausethatthisverywanted. But the reputation of Stalin and the Soviet Union, in contrast to Hitler's reputation, very much dependsontheanswertothequestion,wasanattack"preventive"ornotHitler.Inthefirstcase, Stalin-anaggressor,thoughnotcompletelyheldinthesecond-almostinnocentvictim. The intensity of emotions very strongly hinders peaceful research and discussion turns around the theory of Viktor Suvorov in permanent public scandal in itself worthy of study from a sociologicalandpsychologicalpointsofview. In discussions of Russian historians on the causes and nature of the Second World War,there is one interesting point. Both parties operate secondary or indirect materials. Key archival documentsthere.Specifically,itisbelievedthatnomatterhow. In the book, MI Meltyuhova "Lost Chance of Stalin" - basic research on the prehistory of the Second World War - in the chapter "The Soviet military planning in 1940 -. 1941" of 122 references, only seven - in the archives of documents (the Russian State Military Archive and

RGASPI).That'sallthatwasavailabletotheresearcher.Meltyukhovwrites:"

study of all of these materials, together constitute the Soviet operational plan provides an

organizeddeploymentandentryintofightingtheRedArmyinaccordancewiththeobjectivesof the first strategic operations, is still, unfortunately, impossible. In the meantime, we have to restrict ourselves to the available texts of the four memos on the name of IV Stalin and VM

Molotov,containingthebasicideasofmilitaryplans

Acomprehensive

"{2}.

In the published journal visitors Kremlin Stalin's office caneasily find out what Zhukov,since his appointment as chief of the General Staff of January 2, 1941 and before June 21 was in Stalin's Kremlin office 33 times. On average, every 5 days. Only in June - 10 times. Not the slightest information about what they're doing, no. Although you can easily guess that it is the military planning. Meltyukhov: " In particular the military preparations of the USSR occupied the key position of the General Staff of the military planners still contains, unfortunately, a significant amount of" white spots ", which is associated with the preservation of confidentiality of the relevant documents, 1939-1941. Now domestic historiography has quite a solid picture of stroke production documents at the strategic level of military planning, but their content, as well as communicationwiththeplanningatthelevelofmilitaryregionsstillremainpoorlyunderstood"

{3}.

In other words, it is well known, exactly where all documents relating to the pre-war military planning. It is easy to calculate the people to whom these documents are available, which can admirethematleasteveryday.ThisfileofficersoftheGeneralStaffandthePresidentialArchive, the former Politburo archive. Oh, and their bosses. That is the most important opponents of Suvorov's conception. But other scholars generally already guess how it took place the

developmentofthesedocuments,butdonotknowanythingabouttheircontents

It turns out that somewhere very close are virtually inaccessible to the ton of research papers - key documents, the publication of which would instantly explain the situation and answer all questions. A discussion takes place only around a few accidentally dropped from a folder and fromthe context.Atthesame timetherearepeople onduty allwellaware-the keepersofthe secret archives. But they do not participate in the discussions. And maybe involved, but their informationiskeptsecret. It is clear that there is no benefit for their theories from the possession of the secrets of the archives of General Staff of the Russian state-owned military historians can not remove, otherwiseitwouldlongagoenthusiasticallydeclassified.Theonlythingtheycando-toconceal information,notallowingittotheiropponents. Thissituationgives anexoticfightthese peoplewith the"revisionists" additionalfarcicalnature. "Revisionists" easier. Documents documents but the actual processes, seized the entire country, it is impossible to hide. A study processes can be completely successful without the secret archives. Strictly speaking, from a scientific point of view, the dispute is over. The fact that Stalin was

preparinganattackonGermanyinthesummerof1941clearlydemonstratedMeltyuhovaM.,V.

Nevezhin, Pavlov and anumber of other researchers.It proved independently andata different material. Thereis noevidence thatStalinwaspreparing toin1941, nottoaggression in the West, andto thedefense,noonefound. ButthedebateaboutStalin'sprewarplansandbooksofViktorSuvorovwilllonghauntthepublic consciousness. The idea of ​ ​ this collection is the first to collect under one cover article "revisionists", ie people whose research disproves official Soviet (and post) thesis of amicable Stalin's Soviet Union. NotallauthorsfullyagreewithViktorSuvorov,notallforonereasonoranotherwouldbewilling

[8,9]

tocallthemselveshissupporters.Whatunitesthem,wethink,aserious,impartial,independent

ofideologicalandpoliticalpreferencesrelevanttothediscussiontopic.[10]

ViktorSuvorov

"MilitaryScience"Soviet-style

It'snotevenmathematicsandarithmetic. Ivanov,RussianDefenseMinister

("RedStar"March4,2005)

Honored Test Pilot, Hero of the Soviet Union Shcherbakov crushed me playfully.Once I casually

mentionedaGermanfighterMe-209wasthenthathegaveme,andsealedtothewall:itwasnot

such an aircraft! And then the whole pack of screamers, all together in the kennel Troekurov grabbedme:itwasnot!Hooray!"Icebreaker"isrefuted! The board "Icebreaker" revelatory all new books are hitting. As torpedoes. Account books refutingafterthethirddecadehaspassed.Anumberofarticlesdefiesaccount.Ineachnewbook I stigmatize and shame. Honored Test Pilot gave much food my critics. And everyone repeats:

here you us about the Me-209 lying, and this aircraft was not simple! How can you believe "Icebreaker",ifyou'retalkingaboutstuff? Icaughtuponlittlethings.Itwouldseem,well,what'sthedifference,therewasaplaneornot?

TheevidenceofmysystemMe-209isnotincluded.Nothing.Justonce(onlyonce!),Alongwitha

lot of facts I have named this unfortunate Me-209. Suppose it was not. Suppose wrong. What fromthischange?Butno.Wordnotasparrow.Donotloosen,donotgetout.Oncesmoochingin suchtrifles,gleefullyannouncedcriticism,howcanyoubelieveallyourtheory?Onceoneistold, answerme! Theansweris:Idonotgetconfusedinthedetails!Shybkocompetentexpertshavefoundalotof mistakesinmybooks.In alot ofnagging andcomments,I just donotreact. Becauseforalland do not answer. And it seems, since I do not argue with the screamers means I have nothing to object. And I do not answer a lot of the comments for other reasons. Just because the vast majority of the comments and attacks - is silly. It seems that about the Me-209. Before you condemnmeinignorance,honoredtestpilotjusthadtolookthroughthecorrespondingguides, magazines and books. I think that the distinguished test pilot it would be interesting to learn somethingaboutaviation.Isnotit?The"Icebreaker"-talkingabouttheSecondWorldWar,more

precisely,itsbeginning.So,atthestartofWorldWarII,theMe-209isnotjustthere,hewasthe

mostfamousaircraftintheworld. The race in those years was for the range for the height of the load. But the main - for speed.

BothHitlerandStalintheutmostattentionispaidtothespeedoftheaircraft.AndApril26,1939,

shortly after the day Adolf Hitler's birthday, a test pilot Fritz Wendel as a gift for the Fuehrer Me-209 set a world speed recordof 755.138 km /h. Onplanet Earth,Wendel became the man whomovedthe fastest.Prior toSeptember 1,1939 hisrecordwasnot beaten.Iemphasizethat weareontheofficialworldspeedrecord. If any man in the street does not know about Yuri Gagarin and the ship "Vostok", then there is nothingtoworryabout.IfaboutGagarinand"East"hadneverheardofacosmonaut,thenthisis serious. But while he is silent, too tolerant. It is terrible when a cosmonaut suddenly rush furiously to prove that there was never, and Gagarin was not "the East." And not just a close

circleoffriendstoprovetobe,andwillstrikethebellsforthewholeworld.[12,13]

It behaves so honored test pilot who does not know the fundamentals of the history of world aviation, which is not only heard of Wendel and the Me-209, but also rushed to the "Military-Historical Journal" deny their existence. Awful is not that well-deserved test that does notknow,butthatdoesnotrealizeitsneznaystva.Hideouslyshyignoranceisonlytheignorance ofthemilitant.Anditisveryunfortunatethatthestudyofthemilitaryhistoryofthestateofthe Russianheadofpeople withthe sameoutlook inthe fieldofaviation,likethedistinguishedtest pilot. If not worse. Scientists comrades of the "Military History Magazine" honored tester might suggest:notashame.Butforsomereasontheydidnotdothis.Andoveruslaughingthewhole world."Voennoistoricheskymagazine"entersthemainlibrariesofallcivilizedcountries.Andthe peoplesofpanic:ifthetrustRussianadvancedweaponsmilitantignorant,thenwemustbeready foranyeventuality. And in our country at the opening of a citizen Shcherbakova not responded no. Received "MilitaryHistoryMagazine"isnotinundatedwithdenialsandprotests.Viceversa.Hegathereda wholehordeofofficialKremlinexpertswhorepeatedthetestofrevelationasthemainargument thatrefutes"Icebreaker". But do not hesitate to remember that the Me-209 at one time was studied in detail by Soviet aircraftdesigner.Itflewourglorioustestpilots,amongthemSPSuprun.Thosewereotherpeople. Theyknewtheaircraft,theylovedit. How does a top secret German aircraft could be studied by our designers and pilots? It's very simple.Stalin,Irepeat,paidspecialattentiontothespeedoftheaircraft.SoIwentandordered the purchase in Germany 36 12 types of new aircraft.Could not the greatleader to pass by the

carthatfliesfasterthananyoneinthe[14]world.AnaiveHitlerisknowntobetrustedStalin.He

tookandsoldthebestaircraft.AmongthemistheMe-209.

Tests of the latest German aircraft carried out under Moscow in the Flight Test Institute, which now bears the name of an outstanding test pilot Gromov. I wonder if the citizen heard ShcherbakoveveraboutGromov,andthisinstitute?Ortoorushfuriouslytodenytheirexistence? Butadifferentkindofexamples. Marshal Konev Ivan Stepanovich has struck the world by stating that the German tank "Tiger" was armed with a 100 mm gun (Forty-fifth. M .: Military Publishing, 1966. S. 123). Since the fractureStalingrad,theRedArmywasadvancing,andthemostterriblebeastthatmetinherway - "Tiger." This predator was able to stop the avalanche of Red Army armor, sometimes very powerful and numerous. To fight it, he had to know what his strength and what is weakness. Everysoldieratthefrontwasrequiredtorememberthebasictacticalandtechnicaldata"Tiger". Thefirstandthemaincharacteristicofthetank,aswellasanyotherweapon-theabilitytokill. The war veteran was especially important to memorize, to whom and at what distances this animalisdangerous,thatis,-Characteristicsofhisgun.Andtheystartwithcaliber.Everysoldier

hammeredintohishead:88mm.Andeverysergeant.Andtheofficer.Andgeneral.Acommander

ofthefrontonthemainstrategicdirectionofthewar,MarshalISKonevdidnotknow.Andifso, itwouldbesilentforawhile.WhyIundertooktowritehismemoirs? Iobjected:lesthewroteit! Donotargue.Imyself knowthathewasnotwriting. Questionanother: whyhedidnotread?Is Marshalwasnotinterestedatleastskimownmemories? And another question: how the nonsense went through a check of the Institute of Military

HistoryoftheMinistryofDefenceandthe[15]MilitaryHistoryDepartmentoftheGeneralStaff?

AndastheMilitaryPublishingHouseoftheMinistryofDefensecouldthisbeprinted?Butthisis not a typo. On the same page as the people who were writing memoirs of Marshal Konev, stunnedprogressive mankindthe discovery: "RoyalTigers"wereeven morepowerful." Because itwasinthestoryaboutthe"Tiger"wasmentionedonlyoneofhischaracteristics-caliberguns, the phrase "King Tiger" is perceived in the sense that it stood a weapon yet larger caliber. However, any normal person, which independently examines the war, knows that "King Tiger" was a weapon of the same caliber - 88 mm. On the previous page, an outstanding commander slew news readers that T-26 was a Soviet tank fleet. In other words, the people who wrote the memoirsofMarshalKonev,hadnoideanotonlyoftheGermantanks,inparticular-ofthemost

powerful,butalsotheSoviettanks,inparticular-onthemostpopularonJune22,1941.Butany

studentwhoisinterestedinthehistoryofwarknowsthatthemaximumspeedT-26-30km/h.

It is only three examples of two pages. But all the books Marshal Konev consist only of such examples.Allthistranslatedintoforeignlanguages ​ ​ isfunandexcitementtothemassesof readers. And we have it does not respond to anybody. According to the memoirs of Konev 40 readers'conferencesheldinallmilitaryacademiesandschools,andnooneisoutraged,doesnot protest, does not refute the scribbling of articles, books and dissertations. But the level of ignorance in his memoirs Zhukov much higher than in the memoirs Konev. But my many critics (including the distinguished test pilots) that did not seem to notice. Ignorance breeds new and thefoundationsofamoreprofoundignorance. And here's the result. In April 2005 - a grand conference: stripes, epaulets, academic titles, presentations, discussions, champagne. With the landmark speech by the Deputy Minister of Defence,ChiefoftheArmedForcesofweaponsArmyGeneralA.Moscow.Andnotinthehorror thatsmackedgibberish,andthatnooneobjected.GeneraloftheArmyofMoscow,forexample, toldthattwoyearsbeforetheGermanattackontheSoviet UnionintheSovietUnion"125 new divisions wereformed." It is deducted from the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov.Interest Generalof theArmyisclear.Hewasorderedtolie,thatourcountrytowarwasnotprepared.Orarewilling to carelessly. But the Soviet Union was preparing. And seriously enough. And he could be the nextspeaker,DeputyAirForceCommanderColonelGeneralAlexanderNagovicyn,argue,notfor two years, but only since the beginning of June 1940 to the beginning of June 1941, ie, for one year, 79 new aircraft divisions were formed only a part of the Air Force. But Deputy Air Force Commander Colonel-General in matters of aviation Nagovitsin understands not very much, because no objection. And someone from the audience might add: in the same year, 61 Panzer

Divisionwasformed.Totalforoneyearonly-140aloneaviationandarmoreddivisions.Butmost

of all formed infantry divisions. And motorized. The airborne troops formed a new team (it's smaller divisions) and the body (this is more divisions), but divisions as such was not. But this doesnotmeanthatitisnecessarytoVDVdiscounted.Andbesides-theNKVDdivision. GeneraloftheArmyofMoscow-Zhukovskythinkercaliber.Hedidnotjustspeaksandthinkslike Zhukov,buthedoesitwithamazingaccuracy,downtothecommas. Marshal Zhukov: "From January 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army has received more than

seventhousandtanks.In1941,theindustryhasbeenabletogiveabout5.5thousandtanksofall

types. As for KB and T-34, the beginning of the war factories have released 1861 tank "("

MemoriesandReflections".1969,p205).

General of the Army of Moscow: "From January 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army has received more than seven thousand tanks. In 1941, the industry has been able to give [16,17]

about 5.5 thousand tanks. With regard tonew types of tanksKB and T-34, the beginning of the

warfactorieshavereleased1861tank"("RedStar",13April2005).

These figures have long been refuted. I recommend General of Moscow and all those who applauded him,"Statistical Yearbook 1»,issuedby the Ministry of Defencein 1994: KB tanks

on21Junewas711,T-34-just1400.SotheT-34andKBwasnot1861,2111.Referenceandthe

good that indicates who, when and how many tanks released, which the plant, when, to whom and how much shipped. The figures from the "Statistical Yearbook" justified and confirmed historicaldata,andthedataZhukov,Moscowsuckedoutofnowhere. NextGen. Moscowannounced thatduringthe warthe Soviet industry produced 490,000pieces ofartillery

Backgroundisasfollows:inthe60-iesofXXcentury,thisfigurewasanofficialandatextbook.It

was her Zhukov wrote in his "most truthfulbook about the war."In 1974, Zhukov died, and the figure in the meantime announced another: during the war, Soviet industry produced not 490,000 guns and mortars of all calibers, and 825 thousand. The difference, as we see, much - 335 thousand barrels. A third of a million. Also, the numbers of production aircraft have been revised, tanks and other weapons. New tsifir entered in "Soviet Military Encyclopedia." And under it was signed by Marshal AA Grechko,Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet SG Gorshkov,Air Chief Marshal PS Kutahya, army generals AA Epishev JV. Ivanov, NV Ogarkov, IG Pawlowski, IE Shavrov,INShkadov,aplatoonColonel-General,andahalflegionofacademicians,professorsand doctors. What would you do to the dead Zhukov? Can it be so wrong to insist on clearly understated figures, shove him someone the enemy's hand? Of course not! Dead Victory Marshal immediately resolutely corrected his mistake. And that did not have all sorts of unwanted conversationsexplainedinsnosochke:tsifirAndthisistakennotfromtheceiling,andtranscribed bymefromthe"SovietMilitaryEncyclopedia"whichcameouttwoyearsaftermydeath. TroubleGeneraloftheArmyofMoscowthathethinksthefirsteditionofthememoirsofZhukov. But the time is coming. There is no dispute, at the time the first edition of "Memories and Reflections" was the most truthful book about the war. But it lasted very long. Until such time, until the second edition, which completely refutes the first. And then came the third edition, which has denied the first two. There are new facts and new interpretations of history, new documentsandfigures,inaccordancewiththischange,andlooksZhukov.GeneraloftheArmyof Moscowdid not understanda simple truth: "Memories andReflections" -the basis of all bases. But it is not necessary to refer to the first edition came to hand, but only the fact that at the moment is the last. Currently there is the thirteenth edition. All previous editions - complete nonsense. Dead Zhukov twelve previous editions of his memoirs denied. It was only the thirteenthmaybeconsideredthemosttruthfulbookaboutthewar.DeadZhukovhaskeptpace with the times, but a living general of Moscow for the fast-changing views of Marshal of the Victoryhasnotkeptpace. And sitting in the hallof the big officials, claptheir hands. They are one hell: that 490,000 guns andmortarsthat825 thousand. Interestingly,when their personalincome itcomes, just asthey

careaboutthedifferenceinthe335,000?

Meanwhile, the Central Authority of the Ministry of Defense has made it clear: during the war,

"thefrontwas300thousandguns"("RedStar",7May2005).

The same paper in the same issue said,"we gave the front96 thousand tanks,108 000 aircraft,

about two million artillery shells and mortars of various calibers for war workers of the home front." IunderstandthattheMinisterofDefencecannotknowtheintricaciesofmilitaryaffairs.Butthen he is not subtlety! In my opinion, [18,19] the defense minister should read the central military newspaper. I assume that the minister does not understand green guns. Forgivable. But let imagines some other green items. I wonder whether the citizen is able to minister to tell the difference:threehundredthousandortwomillion? Ifsomeonesaidearlier,wethoughtso,butnowbelieveotherwise.Butno.Differentfiguresside by side in peaceful coexistence mode: and 300 thousand guns and mortars, and 490 thousand

and825thousand,and"twomillion".

The most amazing thing that we are talking about the official figures, pronounces the whole world faces a very responsible (I mean their positions, but not acts). The discord in the official aircraft and tank stats are not as impressive, but also interesting. Here, too, peacefully cohabit officially announced by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff are very different figures. Theyaredeclarednotonlyinthesameyear,but,aswehaveseen,inthesameday,inthesame newspaper.However,on different pages. Combat aircraft of the Soviet Union produced 108 000

duringthewar.Maybe112thousand.Or134thousand.Or136.Or137000.Everyonecanchoose

for themselves any digit. And each will be correct. And each has an official confirmation of the MinistryofDefense. Tanksandself-propelled gunsbasedon them wereproduced96thousand. Or102 thousand.Or

108.2thousand.

Againstthebackgroundofapairoftheseexamples,everymancanimaginewhatishappeningin other areas of the Russian military-historical science. Forexample, in the matter of casualties in thewar.ItiseasytocalculatehowmanydivisionsoftheRedArmyontheeveofthewar.Today, everystudent,usingopensources,isabletopersonallymakealistofallthedivisions,indicating the location, subordination, the composition and the name of the commander. And Defense Minister,his deputies,commanders andallsubordinatestructures, which arein the handsof all [20] secret and top secret files, it can not. They do not know the number of Soviet divisions on

June22,1941,evenapproximately.

Itiseasytocalculatehowmanytanks,guns,aircraftindustryproducedbeforethewarandduring the war. For all the statements lies in the archives. For, on Stalin's orders, since October 1938, each night, each director of military factory personally reported to Moscow for the implementationof the daily plan. For cheating - execution. Buffalo can not, because he wasthe customer - the army. Industry, for example, reported for the delivery of hundreds of tanks and armyreceivedninety.Wherearetheothers?So:withallthestatisticaldataoftheRFMinistryof

Defensestillconfidentlyoperatesinthesameday,thedatathattheArmyreceived300thousand

gunsandatthesametime-"almosttwomillionguns."Thinkaboutwhatishappeninginthefield of counting human losses, which account goes on tens of millions, where statistics confusing, inconsistent,unreliable,ifnotnotcarriedoutduringthefighting? Theparadoxisthis:themostignorantgeneralsoftheworldgatheredattheMinistryofDefense andtheGeneralStaffofRussia,andbythefiercestruggleforthetruthofhistoryleadsus.These samegenerals. NowhereintheworldbattleagainstthefalsifiersofthehistoryofWorldWarIIisnotcarriedout with such fury, with such scope and ferocity, like in our country. Flipping magazines overseas

militaryhistory-veryrarelypolkovnichekanyfavors

lifted. We have a phalanx of generals rod, smashing and crushing ohalnikov angry articles and

speeches.Whatthegeneralsthere.Wehavetofightthrowninnumerableforces.Letusbowour headstothepower:the GeneralStaff!AcademyofSciences! AcademyofMilitarySciences! And alongwith them-institutionsofallkindsandcalibers,thepress,radio,television,thelegionsof invisibleFrontfightersonthewebteareachandeverymask.TheStateDumahasnotgoneaway,

theMPs[21]expressedclearlyandemphatically:counterfeiters-afight!Tamperingwillnotpass!

Defendthetruthofhistory!Thelaw! Yes there were academicians and generals! What was the people's elected representatives and engineersof humansouls! Wehavetofightthe falsifiersof history of the warraised the Armed Forces. We vigilant authorities attended to this problem. Yes, we have the head of

Not only have we raised himself Supreme Commander of punishing sword of

truth in his willingness to bring down on the head of any scoundrel who dares engage in name-calling. The scope of the fight is such and such passions that unbeknownst to themselves fighters of the holy and just cause has become a national idea of ​ ​ a new, free, democratic Russia.Thewisemenindustytextbookslookingidea,andshesuddenlyshoneabovetheirheads. We reappeared Great Goal, and it is to keep our bright past of denigration. Great Goal is good because it is close. The total is only write new desyatitomnik! Another conference tocollect! To compose a comprehensive program of patriotic education! And billions for its implementation doesnotregret!Book intelligibleorderdashingwriter! Thefilmshoottopromoteayes!Expand thedocumentarchive,andletthempripechatatbastardstothewallofshame! And at the same time Great Goal - unattainable. How many conferences no wires, no escape from the factthat:Stalincannibalsandthugs, anddestroyedtensof millions ofits owncitizens, no one, no freedom could not give. Just because there was no reason to kill them freedom in theircountryandthencarryherneighboringnations.Itwasnotconfusingthemwithonehandto drivehismenbehindbarsandbarbedwire,andtheother-toteartheshackleswithneighboring nations. There is no need, they were to keep their men in the collective farms, and to reward foreign tillersof land and the right to free creative management. No desyatitomniki not be able toprovetoanyonethatthe communisthordesofslaves,drivenbymachine-gunfireintheback of defensive squads could be liberators. Could not! And they were not. Just because it did not have no idea about freedom. Just because the result of the defeat of Germany was an unprecedented increase in vertuhaysko-stukacheskoy authorities in their own country. And no matterhowmuchpublishpopulararticlesandbooks,nottocoverupthefactthatStalinwentto war ally of Hitler, with Europe divided and tormented. Do not dodge us from the past, do not

washoutblood-spattereduniformsconquerorsdonotrepainttheirjoyfultone:in1941themain

RedArmyforcesenteredthewarintheoccupiedterritoriestornandconqueredtheneighboring

countriesandendthewaroccupationin1945,whichisplottedinperpetuitytime.

government

Andwehave!Andwehavetofightweight

So Great Goal - crushing counterfeiters- and close, and fundamentally unattainable. As a carrot onastringinfrontofthemuzzleass.That'sthebeauty lies.Fightforthetruthofhistorycanbe forever.Fightersfortheideaof ​ ​ guaranteedtheCorn-oilpositions,honors,airtimeandmore billionsonpatrioticeducation.Iassume,smallvrazhenkaproudlygaze:howmanygeneralswork provided! Citizens of the generals,why,I'm your benefactor! Were itnot forme, as youwill not fall into despair! And so - no despair: award, awards, circulation, hospitable symposia and lifetimeguaranteeagainstunemployment.

There is another reason that will not allow combat counterfeiters history of the Second World War, the iron fist of the state ideology. It consists in the fact that the main fighters against

counterfeiting are both major counterfeiters. We opened to all that: the theft fight thieves, but notsmall,andpivot;withcorruptofficials-mostofthemarecorrupt;andthetruthofhistoryto protectthosewhoputitonapostpervert.Colonel-GeneralDAVolkogonov,forexample,wasthe principal military historian. A little earlier - the head of department of special propaganda Glavpura, [22.23] that is, chief liar Soviet Army. 40 years Volkogonov taught Marxism-Leninism, andthenhewasthrownintomilitaryhistory.Itwasbelieved,oncetheideologicallygroundedon allfourlegs,heandthecardsinyourhand. And Volkogonova before and after our military historical science is not refueled strategists and propagandistsandbawlers.Lieutenant-GeneralPAZhilin,forexample.Itisyouandthedoctorof sciencesandprofessor,andcorrespondingmember,andeverywinnerofawards.Andbeforeyou head the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR, this learned man held a high position of vice-rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee,iecoursesMarxistverbiage. Militaryhistoryinourcountrytakesplaceinthecategoryofagitationandpropaganda.Innormal countries,militaryhistory-ladyandthemotherofallmilitarysciences,andwehaveit-charmer ideological brothel. Under the leadership of Telpuhovskaya, Žilina, Volkogonova in our country, entiregenerations grewup completely ignorantgeneralsand marshals. Examples -see above.A Story of War at each new stage of history appears in a completely new, diverse, but always - seductiveform.Ourhistory ofwarinstantlychangetheirappearanceaccordingtothedesiresof eachnewcustomerlustful. Stalin understood that the true history of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany can not write. Too much history that came out ugly and indecent. It remained either silent or lie immensely,infinitelyandindefinitely.Stalinchosesilence.Whenitattemptstowriteahistoryof thewarnottaken.Instead,therewasacollectionof speeches byComradeStalin:"Brothersand

sisters

ButafterStalinclimbedtothethroneoncethewholegangleaders-collectiveleadership.Bythe fall of 1957 after a continuous series of violent massacres at the helm were two. Here they, ZhukovandKhrushchev,anddecided towrite ahistory of the war,knowing inadvancethatyou

cannottellthetruth.September12,1957,workbeganonthecapitalfive-volume"Historyofthe

Great Patriotic War." This great work was to approve the centuries the simple truth: in spite of theSupremeCommanderwonhisdeputy Threeweeksafterthe startof work leftZhukovonavisit toYugoslavia,onthis,hisreignended, respectively,andcompletedworkonagrandhistoricalresearch.Insteadofthefailedfive-volume six-volumestartedtoleaveafterthreeyears,andthemaincharactertherewasalreadydifferent. But someone managed to slip - even before the overthrow of Zhukov release work, pleasing to the greatest strategist of all time. September 24, 1957 was signed in the print book, "Tank Battles" German General Mellenthin, editor - Hero of the Soviet Union Lt. Gen. armored forces APPanfilov.InthisbookprovidedanassessmentoftheVistula-OderoperationoftheRedArmy:

"It is impossible to describe all that happened between the Vistula and the Oder in the first

monthsof1945.EuropedidnotknowanythinglikethissincethetimeofthedeathoftheRoman

Empire." Actually, because of this quote book translated and published. Objected - voiced phrase. In

Iamaddressingyou,myfriends!"Andthat'sall.

recognition of broken Hitler's generals, the troops in this operation Zhukov and Konev demonstrated a level of military art of Europe knew in the last fifteen hundred years. In this phrase quiteclearly stated thatthe finalphase of the warleadershiptalent Soviet marshals and generals reached such a level of prosperity and with which no comparison Bonaparte with Kutuzov and Cromwell or Frederick with Turenne and Conde. The phrase flattering. Already 8

October 1957 Zhukov, speaking to the dictator of Yugoslavia, it was first read. He voiced like to expressourlatter-dayadherentsofbelles-lettres. And yet relaxed strategist among the Yugoslav and Albanian comrades who committed the

Kremlingodfathertolkovische[24,25]andkickedthegreatcommanderofhisgang.Zhukovwent

home useless pensioner. He was immediately summoned to disassemble and made everything they thought about it. The strategist,beating their breasts, fawned anddegrading, andtoprove

Europeisnotknownsincethetimeof

death

ThisquoteZhukovrepeatedmanytimeseachyear.Here,forexample,anexcerptfromaletterto Khrushchev dated April 18, 1964. "Vistula-Oder operation, as you know, is one of the greatest operations. Soviet forces held it brilliantly, and this has earned universal admiration. Even

enemies - and they were forced to admit

thesleeve,tossedonthetablequotethatEuropedidnotknowanythinglikethissincethe time ofthedeathoftheRomanEmpire Following Zhukov, this quote decades hammering our generals, marshals and academics.

Vistula-Oder operation is considered the top martial arts and especially proud of our military

since

the time of the death of the Roman Empire"

soonasitcomestooutstandingmilitaryachievements,rememberMellenthin:"Itisimpossibleto

"That'sthenewmillenniumintheyard.AndtheRedArmy'slonggone,andtheChief

of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General of the Army Yu Baluyevsky described the grand Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army General German words: "It is impossible to

describe

Everythingseemstobegreat.BrokenHitleriterecognizesanincrediblyhighlevelofstrategicskill of the high command of the Red Army in the final stage of the war, in particular - Zhukov and Konev,whoatthetimecommandedthetroopsofthetwofrontsonthemainstrategicdirection

ofthewar.Whynotrepeatsuchflatteringforourmilitarypridewords?[27]

Yes,becauseitisnotpraiseandaccusation.

IntheoriginalGermanandinalltranslationsitisnotaboutthebrilliantvictoriesoftheRedArmy:

"Itwasatragedyofunprecedentedscale.IntheoldGermanstates-EastPrussia,Pomeraniaand Silesia - Russian showed bestial cruelty. It is impossible to describe all that has happened

betweentheVistulaandtheOderinthefirstmonthsof1945.Europedidnotknowanythinglike

thissincethetimeofthedeathoftheRomanEmpire." Immediately after the war,aspiring Hitlerite accused the Red Army in barbarism, vandalism and aimless in the mass murder of people and property, theft, robbery, rape, looting. Our generals andmarshalsorshouldrespondtothe charges,orshutup.But theHerooftheSoviet UnionLt. Gen. armored forces AP Panfilov for the sakeof the greatest strategist of all time, likethe small Schuler,shruggedcard.TheRussiantranslationofthewordonanimalcrueltyhavefallen,andthe prosecution has become a national anthem. And half a century,we console ourselves with false

describe

And just who these words are not repeated! As

leadership.Itdoesnottakeayeartoofficialmilitaryworksdozensoftimesdidnothear:"

"And Georgy victorious as the ace of trumps out of

theirmeritrepeatedquote:"Itisimpossibletodescribe

"

Europedidnotknowanythinglikeitsincethedaysof

"("RedStar",7May2005).

praise,whichiscreatedbyusingdexteroushandsandlongscissors.Forhalfacentury,noofficer,

nogeneral,nomarshal,professor,academicianandnotbotheredtoreadthebookintheoriginal

or translated into any language other than Russian. Nobody sees no hypocrisy. I will say more. ChiefoftheGeneralStaffoftheRussianArmyGeneralBaluyevskyhavenotreadthisbook,andin Russian.And there is proof of that.Once uponatime, 30 yearsago,someone mistakenly wrote the name of a German general - A. Mellenthin. So it stuck. Quote Mellenthin referents do not

rewritethebook,andeachother.Theguyswhowrotethearticle,GeneralBaluyevskywroteso-

A. Mellenthin. This is proof that the citation be deducted from another article or report. For if theycopiedthequotefromthebook,albeitfake,Iwouldhavewritten-FVvonMellenthin. Objectedthatinthiscase,theGeneraloftheArmyYuriBaluyevskyjustavictimofcheaters,lied

andignoramuses,who[28]ranthehalf-centuryago,ourscience,which,in1957,tothedelightof

the greatest generals of all time, released a falsified translation Mellenthin books sculpting of worthlessmaterialcandy. To this objection: Army General Baluyevsky have to know that was a Soviet military-historical science during the reign of the outstanding generals Zhukov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov. Therefore, taking a high post of the chief of the General Staff, he was obliged to order the verification of the correct transfer of all military books published in our country. And while this bookissuchatestisnotpassed,itshouldrefrainfrompublicquotation.Atleast,notcheckingall the books you can check out the original only the quotes that the General himself decided to repeatinhisarticle. I do not insist that every one of our General, Marshal, professor and academician read in the originalmilitarybooksinforeignlanguages.ButIcannotbeconsideredanormalsituationwhen over half a century, thousands of times the highest level strategists like clockwork repeated nauseam teeth on one quote, and neither one of them did not bother to read the book in the originalortranslatedintoanylanguageotherthanRussian.AndonhertongueisRussian,ascan beseen,notreadbyanyonewhoputonapost. The situation is very simple: we are the only country in the world in which the story of the Second World War at the state level is not studied. Over 60 years of hard work of the Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defence, set of chairs in military academies and schools do not even bother to count our divisions.Theydonotrepresentevenapproximately,howmanyandwhatweaponsthearmywas ontheeveoftheGermaninvasionandhowmanyreceivedduringthewar.Itwouldpardonablyif they kept a certain line. Then it would be clear - people are wrong and misguided. But no. Our

strategyiscalledatthesametime300thousandguns,and490thousandand825thousand,and

twomillion.Ithinkthatevenadrunkmoroncouldfigureout:thereissomethingwrong.Onlyone of these numbers may be correct. But all four at the same time can not be correct. But our Moscow-Baluyevskystrategyonmentaleffortisnotableto. If so,it begs a simple solution: toforbid anyofRemarks by Russian officials onissues relatedto thehistoryoftheSecondWorldWar,towithdrawfromsaleandilliteratelibrariesallmemoirsof Soviet generals, admirals and marshals. When will be put in elementary order in the military-historical science that will be collected, processed and verified by the most basic information about the war, then the ban will be removed. Otherwise, the defense minister, his directandimmediatesuperiorsandhissubordinateslooksillywayintheeyesoftheworld. What do the top leaders of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff? They are doing exactly

the opposite to what the situation requires. They encourage grandiose conference ignorant, disorderly generals, admirals and academicians from military history. The results of these gatherings are widely published, showing the world the incredible degree neznaystva and outrageous irresponsibility of senior officers of the Russian army. Such ignorance of military EuropeisnotknownsincethetimeofthedeathoftheRomanEmpire. In the Soviet Union it raged military-historical barbarism. After the collapse of communism, the Russian state has done nothing to fight against this evil. On the contrary, the state is ignorance implants.

Beginningin1917,ofourpeoplesystematicallyknockedinterestinhistoryingeneralandmilitary

history in particular. And yet it is impossible to comprehend modern military science, not studying constantly and persistently experience of past centuries and millennia, as well as impossible to grasp the integral calculus without knowing arithmetic. Russia lost [29] the XX-th century. He squandered. Proshlyapil. Stalin expressed himself on this score, and even steeper. And one of the main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the upcomingRussia-militarysavageryofhigherstrategicandpoliticalleadership. Theworstthingisthatignoranceofthebasicfoundationsofmilitaryscienceandmilitaryhistory in particular, are not afraid of anyone and does not disturb. A knowledge seems strange and suspicious.Citizensofcriticism,exposeme,reproveandrefute.Butdonotforgetourstrategists, ontheshoulderstrapswhichareshiningstarsofthefirstmagnitude.IfImadeamistake,thereis nothing to worry about. It will not hurt anyone. But their careless and irresponsible attitude to militaryhistoryanditspublicstatementsreflectedlightgivesanequallyirresponsibleattitudeto theimplementationofthedirectduties.ButintheirhandsthefateofRussia. Strange thing: against the "Icebreaker" is already written 32 books, protected by several dozen doctoraltheses. And what I do not only accuses, and what only did not find fault. But for some reason no one wants to notice broneboynozubodrobitelnogo ignorance of our generals, multipliedbyamegaton-classcarelessness! Thevalidityofanytheoryismeasuredbyitsexplanatorypower.Mytheoryexplainsalotofwhat was once defied explanation. Read the "Icebreaker" and you'll find the answers even to the questions that are not addressed in my books. My opponents do not need me either expose or condemn. They need to find another - a simple, clear,logical explanation for what happened in 1941. Until they come up with other theories do not, "Icebreaker" will continue its triumphal voyage.

MichaelMeltyukhov{4}

ThethresholdoftheGreatPatrioticWarof1939-1941.:becomingagreatpower

Since the late 1980s, the military and political events on the eve of the Great Patriotic War became the subject of lively debate in the Russian historiography, in which the scientific circulation a large number of new, recently classified documents was introduced, there were many studies, more objectively covering the period of national history . As a result, now it is obvious that established during the Soviet period, the concept of event 1939 - 1941 years. It requires substantial upgrading. First of all, we should abandon the Soviet-inspired propaganda absolutelyfantasticideasaboutapathologicalloveofpeacetheSovietUnion,duetowhichthere was a pretty original picture in historiography. If all the other States in its international policy guided bytheir own interests,the Soviet Unionwasengagedonly inthatdemonstratedhis love

of peace andfoughtforpeace. Inprinciple,ofcourse,recognizedthatthe Soviet Unionalso has its own interests, but they are always so vaguely described that to understand the motives of Sovietforeignpolicywasvirtuallyimpossible. Consideration of the international situation in the framework of the historical and political analysis of international relations systems shows that the Soviet leadership in the early 1920s. faced with a difficult, but quite a traditional problem. During the Revolution and the Civil War, Soviet Russia has lost an empire conquered by the Russian position on the international arena andintheterritoryofEasternEurope.IntermsofitsinfluenceinEurope,thecountrywasthrown back 200 years into the past. In these circumstances, the Soviet leadership could either agree withtheregionalstatusoftheSovietUnion,orre-startthefightforareturntotheclubofgreat powers.Having optedforthe secondalternative,the Soviet leadershiphasadopted theconcept of "world revolution", combines a new ideology and traditional foreign policy objectives to strengthenthecountry'sinfluenceintheworld.ThestrategicgoalofMoscow'sforeignpolicyhas become a global reorganization of the system of international relations, making it the main opponentsofBritain,Franceandtheirallies. In 1920-ies. The Soviet Union managed to achieve diplomatic recognition, but attempts to strengthenitspositioninEuropeandtheFarEastdidnotgivesignificantresults.Inaddition,the end of the events of the 1920s. highlighted a number of internal problems of the USSR, limited theforeignpolicyactivityofthecountry.Therefore,duringtheglobaleconomiccrisisithasbeen successfully used in the whole Soviet leadership for the beginning of radical economic modernizationbasedonthelatesttechnologicalachievementsoftheWest.

In1930-ies.theinternationalsituationhaschangedsignificantlyinconnectionwiththebeginning

of a series of open struggle of the great powers for the revision of the Versailles-Washington system. Focusing on the inevitability of the emergence of a new inter-imperialist conflict, the Soviet Unionsoughttopreventthe consolidation ofthe other greatpowers,rightly perceiving it as a major threat to their interests. The Soviet leadership cleverly used the official diplomatic channels, the possibility of illegal Comintern, social propaganda pacifist ideas, anti-fascism, assistance to some victims of the aggressors to create the image of the main fighter for peace and social progress. The struggle for "collective security" has become Moscow's foreign-policy tactics,aimedattheUSSRweightgainininternationalaffairsandtopreventtheconsolidationof the other great powers, without their participation. But the events of 1938 demonstrated that the USSR was not only still far from being able to become an equal subject of European policy, but is still considered by European great powers as an object of their policy. Under these conditions,onlyanewaggravationofthecrisisinEuropeallowedtheUSSRtoreturntopoliticsas agreatpower. This contributed to Moscow's aspirations that during the political crises of the 1930s. Versailles-Washingtonsystem inEurope andthe FarEastwasalmostdestroyed,which couldnot butleadtoanotherconfrontationbetweenthegreatpowers.Inthissense,wecansaythatWorld WarIIwasanaturalphenomenonintheperiodofchangeofthesystemofinternationalrelations andcouldhardlybeprevented,sincetheunevenness of economicdevelopmentledtoachange in the balance of forces great powers, each of which to some extent was interested in the reorganization of the Versailles-Washington system of international relations. Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union sought to complete the reconstruction of the system of international relations, Britain and France were ready for some changes that do not affect their

leading position in the world, Italy and Japan have tried to expand its influence at the regional level.TheSecondWorldWarwasareflectionoftheclashofinterestsofthegreatpowersinthe conditionsofthecollapseoftheVersailles-Washingtonsystemandjustlikethepreviousconflicts

betweenthegreatpowers,wasoftheimperialistcharacter,supplemented[32,33]theliberation

struggleoftheoccupiedcountriesandterritories.Thus,weconsidertheSecondWorldWarasa collection of wars between the great powers themselves and other countries to expand their

influenceandredrawingofboundaries,establishedin1919-1922gg.

Break Germany Munich Agreement (the occupation of 15 March 1939 the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the declaration of independence), the occupation of Germany Memel (Klaipeda) on

March22,andItalyAlbania(7April)markedthebeginningofthepre-warpoliticalcrisis.Naturally,

in these circumstances, every great power,hoped to exploit the situation for their own benefit. Britain and France sought to steer Germany's eastward expansion, which would lead to a clash with the USSR, Germany, and their mutual weakening and would strengthen the position of London and Paris on the world stage. Naturally,Moscow was not smiling as a "sacrificial lamb", and the Soviet leadership did everything to avert the threat of a possible involvement in the Europeanwar,whichwastoweakenGermany,EnglandandFrance.This,inturn,wouldallowthe Soviet Union to occupy the position of a kind of arbiter, which depends on the outcome of the war, and to maximize its influence on the continent. For its part, Germany, realizing the impossibility of the simultaneous collision with a coalition of major powers, relied on local operationagainstPoland,whichwouldimproveitsstrategicpositiontocontinuethestrugglefor hegemonyinEuropewithEngland,FranceandtheUSSR.Italytriedtogetnewconcessionsfrom England andFrance as aresult ofa conflictwith Germany,but she wasin nohurry tofight. The United States needed a war in Europe, to eliminate the possibility of Anglo-German alliance, EnglandfinallytakeplaceintheworldandtoweakentheSovietUnionthatwouldallowthemto become a major world power. Japan, taking advantage of employment other great powers in Europe, intended to end the war on their own terms in China to get the consent of the United StatestostrengthentheinfluenceoftheJapaneseintheFarEast,andunderfavorableconditions toparticipateinthewaragainsttheSovietUnion. During the political crisis of 1939 it had the two military-political blocs in Europe: the Anglo-French and German and Italian, each of whom was interested in an agreement with the USSR. For its part, Moscow had the opportunity to choose with whom and on what terms to negotiate it, and used it as much as possible, balancing between the military-political blocs.

Internationalrelationsofspring-summer1939inEuropewereatangleofdiplomaticactivitiesof

thegreatpowers,eachofwhichsoughttoachievetheirowngoals.Eventsdevelopinginparallel in several ways: going undercover and overt Anglo-Franco-Soviet and Anglo-German and Soviet-Germantalks,therewasclearanceoftheAnglo-French-PolishandGerman-Italiancoalition. Moscow in its calculation was based on the fact that the outbreak of war in Europe - as in the participation of the USSR in the Anglo-French bloc, and in maintaining their neutrality - opened up new prospects for the strengthening of Soviet influence in the continent. The alliance with BritainandFrancewouldmakeMoscowanequalpartnerwithalltheensuingconsequences,and thepreservationoftheSoviet Union'sneutralityintermsofweakeningboththe warringparties allowhimtooccupythepositionofakindofarbiter,whichdependsontheoutcomeofthewar. Basedonsuchcalculations,theSovietforeignpolicywasdefined. Continuing to operate within the framework of "collective security" of the concept, the Soviet

leadership tried to make an alliance with Britain and France. However bad the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, showed that London and Paris is not ready for equal partnership with Moscow, and the threat of the Anglo-German agreement forced the Soviet Union more than pay attention to the German proposals for the normalization of bilateral relations. Signed August 23, 1939 the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was the considerable success ofSoviet diplomacy.[34,35] theSoviet Unionmanagedtostayoutof theEuropeanwar, while receiving significantfree handinEastern Europe andgreaterroom formaneuver between warringfactionsintheir owninterests.Thankstoanagreementwith Germany,the SovietUnion for the first time in its history has received recognition of its interests in Eastern Europe on the part of one of the great European powers. In 1939, Europe wassplit into three military-political camps: English-French, German-Italian, and Soviet, each of which sought to achieve their own goals,whichcouldnotbutleadtowar. However,itshouldberememberedthattherearenorealterritorialchangesoroccupation"areas ofinterest"ofthe Soviet-Germantreatyisnotprovided{5} .Unfortunately,nowknowingfuture events,someresearchersareinclinedtobelievethatHitlerandStalinhadalready,onthenightof

Aug.24,weknewinadvancewhatwillhappeninthenext38days.Naturally,inrealityitwasnot.

Ingeneral,thesituationistheendofAugust1939wassoconfusingthatpoliticiansanddiplomats

of all countries, including the Soviet Union, tried to sign the most vague agreement, which, dependingonthe circumstances couldbe interpretedasanything. Moreover,24 August,noone

knewwhethertherewillbeanyGerman-Polishwar,orwillreachacompromise,asitwasin1938.

In this situation, the use in the secret additional protocol to the agreement on non-aggression, the term "territorial and political rearrangement" Eastern Europe could be interpreted as a versionof the new Munich,thatis,wouldallow Moscowtodeclaretheir interestson apossible internationalconference.Andtheconceptof"sphereofinterest"ingeneralcanbeinterpretedas

anything{6}.Inanycase,theSoviet-Germanpactwasanagreement,designedforanysituation.

Of course, Moscow wasinterested in defending its interests,including at the expense of others, butitis,infact,isanaxiomoftheforeignpolicystrategyofanystate.WhyonlytheSovietUnion suchactionsputtheblame? An important problem historiography event 1939 is a question of the relationship of the Soviet-German pact with the beginning of World War II. In this regard, the views of the researchers divided. Many authors have followed the western historiography,which is based on the position of the English manual, formulated by August 30, 1939, that "the fate of war and peace is now in the hands of the Soviet Union" and its intervention can prevent a war{7} , it is

believedthatthepactcontributedtothebeginningoftheSecondworldwar{8}.Forothers,the

pact had no effect at the beginning of the German-Polish war (World War II and too), as it had been planned as far back as April 1939 {9} . RA Medvedev even believes that the pact made

BritainandFrancedeclarewaronGermany{10},doesnot,however,arguingthisthesis.Togivea

reasonedanswertothisisprobablythemostimportantquestionshouldbemadetoconsiderthe

eventsfrom23Augustto1SeptemberinEurope.

IntheAugust1939issueofclarifyingthepositionofEnglandandtheSovietUnionincaseofwar

inPolandcametoGermanyinthedecisivephase.August2-3GermanyactivelyprobedMoscow,

August7-London,August10-Moscow,11August-London,14-15August-Moscow.August21

London were invited to August 23 for talks Goring, and Moscow - to sign the Ribbentrop non-aggressionpact.AndtheSovietUnion,andBritainsaidyes!Basedontheneedfirstofallto

sign an agreement with the USSR on August 22, Hitler canceled the flight Goering, although it wasreported in London on August 24 only.Meanwhile, English manual,fear derailvisit Goering

banned mobilization. Selection of Hitler can be explained by several factors. First, the German command was sure, [36.37] that the Wehrmacht was able to defeat Poland, even if it is supportedbyBritainandFrance.WhiletheperformanceoftheUSSRonthesideofanti-German coalition meant disaster. Secondly, the agreement with Moscow was to localize the German-Polishwar,tokeepEngland andFrance tointervene andgive Germany the opportunity to confront the likely economic blockade of the Western powers. Thirdly, the important role playedandthesubjectiveelement:EnglandtoooftenwenttotheGermanconcessionsinBerlin, apparently, to some extent got used to it. USSR, on the contrary, was too unyielding, and expressed Moscow's readiness for an agreement should be used without delay. In addition, it wouldbecompletelyburiedandsonottoosuccessfulAnglo-Franco-Sovietmilitarynegotiations. August22, Hitler againspoketothe military.Having described the general politicalsituation,he concluded that the situation is favorable for Germany, England and France, the intervention in the German-Polish conflict is unlikely,they will not be able tohelp Poland and the Soviet Union with the contract will be signed, which will also reduce the threat of an economic blockade of Germany. In these circumstances, is to risk defeat of Poland, at the same time restraining the West. This should quickly defeat the Polish army as "the destruction of Poland is in the

foreground,evenifthewarstartsintheWest"{11}.BusylocalizationcampaigninPoland,Hitler

considered "a contract (with the Soviet Union) as a reasonable deal. In relation to Stalin, of course,we mustalwaysbe alert,but atthe momenthe (Hitler) seesthe pactwith Stalinon the

offchanceofEnglandfromtheconflictwithPoland"{12}.Confidentthathesucceeds,Hitlerin

the morning on 23 August, when Ribbentrop even flew to Moscow,he gave the order to attack

Polandat4.30amon26August.

August 23, France said it will support Poland, but the Supreme Council of National Defence decided that any military action against Germany would be taken, if she did not attack France. The same day,Hitler wasgiven aletter of Chamberlain,in which London informsthat incaseof warEnglandwillsupportPoland,butatthesametimedemonstratedawillingnesstotermswith Germany.In England still expected tovisit Goering, and only on August 24, it became clear that he would not come. On the same day, Germany notified Poland that an obstacle to the settlement of the conflict are the British guarantee. Fearing that Warsaw will make concessions andrapprochementwithBerlin,England August25signedanagreementwithPolandonmutual aid, but military agreement has been concluded. On the same day, Germany informed the UK that 'after the decision of the Polish problem "it will offer a comprehensive agreement and cooperation of the world uptoguarantee the existence andsupport of the British Empire {13} .

ButtheeveningofAugust25thinBerlin,becameawareoftheAnglo-Polishagreement,andItaly,

whichhad previously expressed concerns about the threatof aworld war,isknown forrefusing

toparticipateinwar.Allthishasledtothefactthat20hourswasorderedtoabolishtheattackon

Poland,andmanagedtokeepthearmyatthelastmoment{14}.

August 26 Western allies have recommended Poland to order the troops to refrain from an armed response to German provocation. The next day, London and Paris offered to Warsaw to organize the mutual exchange of the population of Germany. However,in Poland we have been

assured that "to date Hitler took another decision to go to war

nothingdecisiveinthenearfuture"{15}.BritainandFrancealsostillwerenotsurethatGermany

in any case there will be

will dare to fight. August 26 in England instead of 300 thousand. Reservists were called only 35 thousand., As it was believed that the Anglo-Polish agreement will keep Germany from war. On the same day from London to Berlin received information that England would not intervene in the event of a German attack on Poland or declare war,but war is not {16} . [38,39] August 28 Britainhasrefused the German proposal toguarantee the empire,advising Berlin tostart direct negotiationswithWarsaw.IfGermanywillgotoapeacefulsettlement,Britainagreedtoconsider at a future conference, the general problems of Anglo-German relations. London Berlin again warnedthatincaseofwarEnglandwillsupportPoland,buthaspromisedtoworkonthePolesin favorofnegotiationswithGermany. AtthesametimePolandwasrecommendedtospeedupthenegotiationswithGermany.London alsoaskedMussolinitoHitlerhintedthat"iftheresolutionofthecurrentcrisislimitedthereturn of Danzig and parts of the" corridor "of Germany, it seems to us, can be found within a

reasonableperiodoftime,asolutionwithoutwar"{17}.Naturally,Warsawwasnotsupposedto

knowaboutit.IftheGerman-Polish"negotiationsledtoanagreementonwhatcountstheBritish

government,itwouldopenthewayforabroadagreementbetweenGermanyandEngland"{18}.

OntheafternoonofAugust28,HitlersetatentativedateofSeptember1attack.UsingtheBritish

proposals on the negotiations, the German government has decided to require "Danzig connection, pass through the Polish corridor and referendum [similarly carried out in the Saar region]. England may accept our conditions. Poland, apparently, no. Split {19} . August 29, Germany has agreed to direct talks with Poland on the transmission conditions of Danzig, plebiscite in the "Polish Corridor" and the guarantee of the new frontiers of Poland, Germany,

Italy,Britain,FranceandtheUSSR.ThearrivalofthePolishnegotiatorexpectedon30August.By

submitting these proposals England, Hitler hoped, "he hammered the wedge between England, France and Poland" {20} . On the same day Berlin informed Moscow about the proposals in England for the settlement of the German-Polish conflict, and that Germany, as a condition put thepreservationofthecontractwiththe USSR,the alliancewithItalyandwouldnotparticipate in an international conference without the participation of the Soviet Union, with which should

beaddressedalltheissuesofEasternEurope{21}.

August30EnglandreaffirmedtheiragreementtoworkonPoland,providedthatthewarwillnot

stop,andGermanyanti-Polishcampaigninthepress.Inthiscase,Londonagreetotheconvening of an international conference in the future. On this day, the Wehrmacht still had not received the ordertoattack Polandbecausethere wasthe possibility thatEngland will makeconcessions

andthenattackwillbedelayeduntil"therewillbenowaratall,"September2,andinthiscase,

since "the arrival of Poles in Berlin submission = " {22} . August 30 England received accurate information about the German proposals on the settlement of the Polish problem. However, London did not notify Warsaw on these proposals, and, hoping to further delay the war, in the

nightof31AugustinformedBerlinonapprovalofdirectGerman-Polishnegotiationsthatwereto

begin after a while. Early in the morning of August 31, Hitler signed a directive number 1, accordingtowhich the attack onPolandwasscheduled tobegin at4:45 AM September 1,1939 Only day August 31 the German proposals for a settlement of the crisis were transferred to Poland, England with a recommendation to respond positively to them and accelerate negotiationswithGermany.

At12:00onAugust31WarsawLondonsaidthatitisreadytonegotiatewithBerlin,providedthat

Germany and Poland mutually guarantee the non-use of force, can the situation in Danzig, and

England in the negotiations will be to provide support to the Polish side. However, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin had been ordered to play for time because in Warsaw still believed that "Hitlerdidnotdaretostartawar.Hitleronlyplaysonthenervesandpullsstringstotheextreme

"{23}.Asaresult,18.00RibbentropinaninterviewwiththePolishAmbassadorinBerlin,noted

the absence of Polish emergency commissioner and refused to negotiate. At 21.15 - 21.45 Germany officially handed over its proposals referred Poland to the ambassadors of Britain, France and the United States andsaid that Warsaw has refused tonegotiate.At the same time, the German radio reported on these proposals to resolve the crisis and about the Polish provocationsontheborder.Thesameday,ItalyhasofferedGermany'smediationinresolvingthe crisis, but it refused, Britain and France advised that there will be war {24} .1 September Germany invaded Poland, and the European crisis escalated into a war, which came on

September3EnglandandFrance.

Thus, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was not the detonator of the war in Europe. Insteadof honestperformance ofits allied obligations toPoland,BritainandFrance continue to seek an agreement with Germany, which naturally gave rise to confidence in Berlin in non-interference of the Western allies ina possible German-Polish war.In fact itwas diplomatic gamesinLondonandParishavepushedGermanyintowarwithPoland.However,nowthemost unexpectedwaythisturnedouttobeguiltyintheSovietUnion.InSeptember 1939,Britainand France had a great opportunity rather quickly to crush Germany, but, as you know, for various reasons it did not happen.After the defeatof PolandinGermany hada chance towage waron

onefront,andthatitwassuccessfullyusedin1940-1941.

Another fantastic version of the accusations against the Soviet Union put forward the Suvorov, which indicates that "the exact day when Stalin began the Second World War - is of 19 August

1939".Thisconclusioncanbeexplainedverysimply:"thebeginningofasecretmobilizationwas

the actual entry into World War II. Stalin understood this and deliberately ordered the secret mobilization of August 19, 1939. From that day war was already impossible to stop in any

scenario,"{25}.

In formulating such a categorical conclusion, Suvorov leaves the reader in the dark, why the "beginningofasecretmobilizationwastheactualentry"intothewar?Theentiremilitaryhistory ofmankindshowsthattheactualentryintothewariseitheritsformaldeclaration,orimmediate startofhostilities.Nootheractionofthepartiesenteringintoawararenot.Secretmobilization, ofcourse,ispreparingtojointhewar,butthewarcannotstart(itsolvesthepoliticalleadership), andthen,asarule,shouldbedemobilized.Anexampleofthisdevelopmentisthe"Czechoslovak crisis"in September 1938,when anumberof countries, including the USSR, conductedapartial ortotalmobilization,butthecrisishadbeen"settled"theMunichAgreement,andnowararose. Why, on the assumption that the Soviet Government June 26, 1938 decided to carry out mobilization measures in the event of war in Europe, do not announce this date "exact" day, "whenStalinbegantheSecondWorldWar?" EvenifyoutakethepointofviewofSuvorov,andeventhenitisnotclearwhytheactionsofthe USSR are the beginning of the Second World War? After all, Germany has started a secret mobilization of more August 16, 1939, first in East Prussia, and from 18 August premobilization events spread throughout the country, giving rise August 25, a total secret mobilization of the Wehrmacht. On August 24, 1939 conducted covert partial mobilization and France. However, thereisnoescapingfromthefactthatitwasanattackbyGermanyonPolandtostarttheSecond

WorldWar.Thus,thethesisSuvorovthatWorldWarIIbegan,Stalin,isablatantlie. Equally unsubstantiated assertion and Suvorov that Stalin ordered the secret mobilization of

August19,1939Someresearchersinthisreleaseasaconfirmationresultintheso-called"Stalin's

speech," supposedly uttered the day before the members of the Politburo {26} . However, as convincingly demonstrated SZ Happens, this "document" is a falsification of the French secret services {27} . [42,43] As you know, August 19, the Soviet government agreed to the visit of German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 26-27 for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact. Events in the Red Army to transfer infantry divisions deployed in ordinary three-divisionstartedinaccordancewiththedecisionsoftheChiefMilitaryCouncil(WAN)ofthe Red Army on 15 and 21 July and orders of People's Commissar of Defence of 15 August and 1 September 1939 the Politburoof the CPSU(b) approveda"planof reorganizationof landforces of the Red Army in the years 1939-1940." {28} . Indeed, on August 30 in the Soviet press appeared rebuttal TASS, according to which "in view of the worsening situation in the eastern partof Europeandinview ofthe possibilityof allsortsof surprises Sovietcommanddecidedto enhancethestrengthofthegarrisonsofthewesternbordersoftheUSSR."However,onlylatein

theeveningSeptember6,1939theorderwasgiventostartthehiddenmobilizationinLeningrad,

Kalinin,Moscow,Kiev andBelorussianspecial,OrelandKharkovmilitary districts,which covered

morethan2.6million.Militaryreserve{29}.

EnglandandFranceinthepassivepositionoftheSecondWorldWarenabledtheSovietUnionto stepupitsforeignpolicyinEasternEuropeandtostartauditingthewesternbordersimposedby him in 1920-1921 gg. In the fall of the Soviet Union in 1939, the summer of 1940 entered Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia, Karelian Isthmus, Ladoga Karelia, the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, a total area of ​ ​ 452 thousand sq. m. km and with a population of 23 million. man. As a result, the western border was moved away from the vital centers of the country and new opportunities for the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces werecreated.This greatlyimprovedthe strategic position andstrengthenthe defense capability of the Soviet Union. Thus, successfully maneuvering between the two warring blocs, the Soviet leadership was able to significantly expand the territory of the Soviet Union, returning control over strategic regions, most of which previously belonged to the Russian Empire and was lost during the Civil War as a result of external aggression. Therefore, the events of 1939-1940. We wereinacertainsense,theSovietrevengeforthedefeatintheCivilWar.Inaddition,themerger becameaprecedent,towhichtheSovietleadershipcouldbeinvokedinsolvingtheproblemsof postwar Europe. In international legal terms, all these areas have been secured in the USSR

contracts1945-1947gg.

DidtheSovietUnionhavebeenactionsagainstPoland,Finland,theBalticcountriesandRomania

aggression?AccordingtotheConventiononthedefinitionofaggressionin1933,itwasproposed

bytheSovietside,theaggressoradmittedhewhocommits"adeclarationofwartoanotherstate; invasion of its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war on the territory of another State; attack its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State; a naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state; supportprovidedbythearmedgangs,who,beingeducatedinitsterritorytoinvadetheterritory ofanotherState,orrefusal,notwithstandingtherequirementofthestate,subjectedtoinvasion, to take in its own territory all possible measures to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection " . Moreover, the convention expressly stipulated that "no consideration of political,

military,economicor other considerations mayserve as ajustification for aggression" (including internal structure, and its shortcomings, disturbances caused by the strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions or civil war, violation of other state interests ; breaking of diplomatic and economic relations, economic and financial blockade, disputes, including territorial and border

incidents){30}.[44,45]

Based on the content of the convention, it turns out that the Soviet Union has committed aggression against Poland and Finland. However, in relation to the Baltic States and Romania, countries about any aggression, there was no question, because the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was preceded by diplomatic negotiations, culminating in the agreement of the Baltic and Romanian governments totheSovietwaytosolveproblemsinbilateralrelations.Nottomentionthefactthattheuseof the term "Soviet aggression" to the occupied Romanian territory of Bessarabia impossible. As rightly notedbyA.Taylor,"the rightsof RussiaintheBaltic statesandeasternPoland(andeven moresoofBessarabia-.MM)weremuchmorereasonablecomparedtotheUnitedStatesrights

toNewMexico"{31}.Inthissense,itisimpossiblenottojointheopinionofNMKaramzin:"Let

theforeignerscondemnedthepartitionofPoland:wehavetakentheirtoll,"{32}.Asaresult,the

Soviet Union was able to re-combine the political and geopolitical boundaries between

"Western"and"Russian"civilizations,asisalreadythecaseinthelateXVIIIcentury{33}.

TheSovietleadership,aswellasmanagementoftheothergreatpowers,endeavoredtoachieve their own goals, considering the Second World War as a unique opportunity to implement the

ideasof"worldrevolution".NotbychancestillOctober1,1938atameetingofpropagandistsin

MoscowandLeningradIVStalinexplainedthat"therearetimeswhentheBolsheviksthemselves will attack if a just war, if the situation is right, if the conditions are favorable, start to attack themselves. They arenot againstthe attack,not againstallwar.What weshout aboutdefense -

thisveil,theveil.Allstatesaremasked"{34}.

Interestingassessment of the events of 1939-1941. foundin only recently has become available to researchers Blog writer VV Vishnevsky,[46] although not involved in the development of the most important military and political decisions, but nevertheless, by virtue of their job responsibilitiesandpoliticalfunctionsknowledgeableaboutthemoodofthe"top",whohadthe opportunity to receive reliable, extensive and diverse information about the activities of the Soviet leadership , on preparations for war. Assessing the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the writer on 1 September 1939 puts in his diary: "The USSR has won a free hand, while. [ ]

Diplomacy Berlin is clear: they

Today, we take the initiative, do not back down, and stepping

want our neutrality and then the punishment of the USSR; we want them bogged down in the war and then deal with them. " Passing the common sentiment: "We will beat Hitler in a year,"

Wisniewski said that "this is the most likely option. [

worldperformances.[ ]Justguesshowtherestofthegame,it'shard.Butonethingisclear:the worldwillonceagainredraw.Inthiswar,wewilltrytokeeptotheendofyourwinningpositions. Toattractanumberofcountries.Gradually,wherekindness,whereforce.Thisisanewchapterin the history of the party and the country.The Soviet Union began an active foreign policy of the

world"{35}.

Assessing the outbreak of war in Europe, Stalin in a conversation with the leadership of the

Comintern,September7,1939statedthat"thewarisbetweentwogroupsofcapitalistcountries

(rich and poor in respect of colonies, raw materials, etc.) for the redivision of the world for

]

For the Soviet Union it's time outside

dominanceovertheworld!Wedonotmindthattheyfoughthardandweakenedeachother.Not

bad,ifthehandsofGermanywillbeshakenpositionoftherichestcapitalistcountries(especially

England). Hitler himself did not understand and did not want to, upsets and undermines the

capitalist system

Non-Aggression Pact to some extent helps Germany. The next point - to push the other side " {36} . This is Stalin's statement does not remain secret, and November 10, 1939 Head of the Political Administration of the Red Army Army Commissar 1st Rank LZ Mehlis at a meeting [47] The writers said that "Germany does, in general, a useful thing, shaking the British Empire. The

destructionitwillleadtothetotalcollapseofcapitalism-itisclear,"{37}.

Similar ideas were expressed in an interview the President of the CPC and the People's CommissarforForeignAffairsoftheUSSRMolotovwiththeDeputyPrimeMinisterandMinister

ofForeignAffairsofLithuaniaV.Crewe-MickeviciusonthenightofJuly3,1940inMoscow."Now

-saidMolotov,hiscompanion-weareconvincedmorethaneverhasthatgeniusLeninwasnot wrong,assuringusthattheSecondWorldWarwillallowustogainpowerinthewholeofEurope, astheFirstWorldWarmadeitpossibletoseizepowerinRussia.TodaywesupportGermany,but justenoughtokeepherfromacceptingtheproposalsoftheworldaslongasthehungrymasses of the warring nations do not give up their illusions and do not rise against their leaders. Then the German bourgeoisie toagree with his enemy,the bourgeoisie allied states, so that the joint

efforts to suppress the insurgent proletariat. But at this point we will come to him for help, we

will the decisive battle

will come with fresh forces, well trained, and in Western Europe

betweentheproletariatandthedecayingbourgeoisie,whichwilldecidethefateofallofEurope

"{38}.

We can maneuver to push one side against the other, to better got torn.

February 10, 1941 this ideain aslightly differentwordingandgot Vishnevsky blog: "Weuse the old method of" divide and rule ". We are out of the war,something to pay for it, get a lot. We carrytraderelationswithdifferentcountries,usetheirequipment,somethingusefulgainandfor the army and for the navy and others. Helping to make war the same in Germany, feeding her, "portions",ataminimum.Doesnotpreventtheimperialistswagewarforanotheryear,two[ ].

Waittilltheyweaken.Next-actasumpire,"broker",etc."{39}.

Inthespring of 1940 itis stillinthe narrow,but quitehigh classroomsbecamelouder voices on theneedforamoreactivepolicy.ThetoneofthesestatementsaskedStalinhimself.Speakingat

ameetingofthecommissionDHWRedArmyApril21,1940,heproposedto"radicallytransform

ourmilitaryideology.[

including and offensive. It is necessary to popularize these ideas under the safety slogans, to

protectourcountry,ourborders"{40}.

The commissionDHW onmilitary ideology of May10,with akeynote speech madebythe head

ofthePoliticalAdministrationoftheRedArmyArmyCommissar1stRankLZMehlis,whoclaimed

that"theRedArmy,likeanyarmy,thereisatoolofwar.AllpersonneloftheRedArmyshouldbe

broughtupinatimeofpeace,onthebasisofacommongoal-toprepareforwar.Ourwarwith

the capitalist world is a just war, progressive. The Red Army will be active, achieving complete

Wearetalking

crushingandthedefeatoftheenemy,leavingthefightingintoenemyterritory

aboutanactiveactionofthevictoriousproletariatandworkingpeopleofthecapitalistcountries againstthe bourgeoisie,of suchanactiveaction wheninitiated justwarwillmakeourstate and itsRedArmy".Attheplenary sessionofthecommissiononMay13-14,1940,expressedsimilar ideas and other participants. In particular, the commander of the Leningrad Military District,

]Wemusteducatetheirchainofcommandinthespiritofactivedefense,

commander of the 2nd rank KA Meretskov said that "our army is preparing to attack, and the

attack we need to defend. It is absolutely right

Our army is there to ensure that our state, our country, and to

ensurethis,itisnecessarytocrush,smashtheenemy,andforthisitisnecessarytoattack"{41}.

The ideas havebeenpresentedto25 June asthedirectives onthe convenedon theinitiative of

the newspaper "Red Star", the journal "Banner" and the defense committee of the Union of Soviet Writers Writers meeting developing military issues. [48,49] The chief editor of "Red Star" EA Boltin follows instructed "engineers of human souls": "The doctrine of the Red Army - is offensive doctrine emanating from known Voroshilov phrase" beat the enemy on its territory. " Thisprovisionremainsinforcetoday.Wemustbeprepared,ifneedbe,thefirsttostrikeablow, not only to respond blow for blow. " Ought to get rid of sentiments like: "We will defend ourselves andtofightis not useful"and"toeducatepeople tounderstandthatthe Red Armyis an instrument of war, rather than an instrument of peace. It is necessary to educate people so thatany future war with the capitalist state will be a fair war,no matter who started this war." But so far not had tospeak openly about the futureof Germany asan enemy,as"politically it's bad."DuetothecomplexinternationalsituationBoltinadvisedtowriteabouttheforeignpolicy of the USSR "impressive, straight, frank, but very carefully and quietly." "Why must we have to right to say who our future enemy?" - He asked, offering to seek such forms of propaganda,

to achieve the desired effect and at the same time comply with the

externaldecorum",that"neithertheonenorothersnottooffendandnottoteasethe"{42}.

We must ensure that our country is not a

defender, but the onset of

which "would allow

With the growth of Germany's military successes growing tension in Soviet-German relations. Bothsides saweach other asenemies andwerepreparedtofightforsupremacyinEurope. The turning point was the Soviet-German negotiations in Berlin in November 1940 {43} , which revealed the real components of the Soviet-German conflict. Most important interests of both countries have faced in the Balkans, in Finland and in the Middle East. If it was not possible in

1939BerlinmadeconcessionstoMoscow,whichwasabletoautumn1940,mainlytoimplement

the agreements reached, since the end of 1940 the expansionist ambitions of Germanyand the Soviet Union came into conflict and to resolve them on the basis of a compromise that demonstrated the negotiations in November 1940 after the victory over France, Germany considered itself hegemonic in Europe and was not going to make concessions. For its part, the SovietUnion,isquiteeasytojointhenewterritories,considerFinland,theBalkansandtheBlack Sea straits to those regions where it has a preferential interest, and also did not concede. In principle, the Soviet leadership did not exclude the possibility of continuing cooperation with Germany.However,theGermangovernmentdidnotwanttogointonewconcessionstoMoscow, regardingtheUSSRasaweakenemy,defeatwhichdoesnotrequiremucheffort. ThewarbetweenGermanyandtheUSSRwasgeneratedbythestruggleforsupremacyinEurope, it also accelerated the collision of Soviet and German interests on specific political issues. Since

November1940theSoviet-Germanrelationshaveenteredanewphase-thephaseofimmediate

preparation for war. A kind of "litmus test" real intentions of Germany was for the Soviet leadership situation around Bulgaria in November 1940 - March 1941 In spite of the direct application of the Moscow Soviet interests, Germany ignored them, having achieved Bulgaria's accessiontotheTripartitePact.Apparently,thisisclearlyshowntotheSovietleadershipthatits interestsarenotrecognizedinEurope,Berlin,andthepreparationofwarwithGermanyentered thefinalstage.

Introduction In recent years, the scientific revolution, Soviet diplomatic andmilitary documents, 1939-1941. It shows that no foreign policy zigzags not interfere with the Soviet leadership to consider Germany as a potential enemy, and carefully prepare for war. With the emergence of

theSoviet-GermanborderinOctober1939,theGeneralStaffoftheRedArmybegantodevelopa

plan in case of war with Germany {44} . Special intensity this process acquired from the second

halfofMarch1940,andin1940-1941.wedevelopedfiveoptionsfortheoperationalplanforthe

use of the Red Army in case of war.This, of course, does not exclude the presence of other job options that are still available to researchers, which complicates analysis of the production of

thesedocuments.[50,51]

At the same time we should not forget that the published documents although it played an important role in Soviet military planning, but do not exhaust it. Firstly,these documents had a numberofapplications,graphicalandtextualnature,detailedthecontent.Secondly,inaddition, had a note on the procedure for the strategic deployment of the armed forces (the problem of fronts and fleets) with the application card and PivotTable distribution of military units, aircraft andpartsRGC onthefrontsandarmies; strategictransport planfortheconcentrationof armed forces in the theater of operations; covering strategic deployment plans; plan unit Logistics and material support of the army; Communications plans, military communications, defense and other documents. A comprehensive study of all of these materials is still, unfortunately, impossible. In the meantime, we have to restrict ourselves to the available texts of the four memos on the name of IV Stalin and VM Molotov, containing the basic ideas of military plans

{45}.

Beforeproceedingtotheanalysisofthesedocuments,itshouldatleastbrieflyonthehistory of their development process. The document tentatively entitled "Considerations on the foundationsofthestrategicdeploymentoftheArmedForcesoftheSovietUnionintheWestand East to 1940 -. 1941" started to be developed since the establishment of the Soviet-German border, according to the agreement of 28 September 1939 the first version of the plan was

preparedbyendJuly1940cityhastwocomplementaryversionsaboutthefateofthedocument

inthe literature. Some authorsbelieve that the changein the Soviet Union's western borders in

August1940andtheformationofnewunitsoftheRedArmyhasrequiredsubstantialrevisionof

the document. In the opinion of others, the plan was reported to the People's Commissar of DefenseMarshalSKTymoshenko,whodidnotapproveof it,because hebelievedinittoomuch importance is attached to enemy troops located to the north of Warsaw and East Prussia, and insistedonacareful studyof optionswhenthe mainforcesof theenemywouldbedeployedto

thesouthofWarsaw{46}.

Be that as it may, the new version of the plan has been prepared by 18 September,which took intoaccountthepossibilityofusingthemainforcesoftheRedArmy,dependingonthesituation in the North-West and South-West directions. These deployments of Soviet troops called in the historiographyrespectively"north"and"south".Thisfeatureoftheplanwasakindoftraditionof

theSovietGeneralStaff,since1921-years.Westerntheaterofmilitaryoperations(TVD)divided

almostexactlyinthemiddleofthePripyatRiver.SinceSeptember1939,theriverflowsentirelyin

the USSR,but the habitis this line extrapolated further west, divided the theater intotwo main areas. October 5, the version of the plan was reported to Stalin and Molotov. During the discussion of the General Staff was instructed to finalize the deployment plan with an even stronger part of the main groups in the South-Western Front. As a result, it was planned to

increase the number of troops of the Southwestern Front to 31.25% by divisions, 300% Tank

BrigadeandRegiment59%{47}.

October14revised"southern"versionoftheplanhasbeenapprovedasthecore,butithasbeen

decidedtoreworkand"northern"option.Thedevelopmentofbothlocalvariantsplannedtobe completed by May 1,1941 In this waythe Soviet armed forces havereceived a validdocument, on which conducted a more detailed military planning. The General Staff summoned military commanders, members of military councils and chiefs of staff of military districts for the developmentofoperationaldocuments,whichimmediatelyapprovedbythePeople'sCommissar of Defence. Besides this document, the Soviet leadership were presented the plans of combat operations against Finland, Romania and Turkey, [52,53] which, according to its developers, the entire operational plan gave the necessary completeness and flexibility made it possible to operate depending on the military-political situation {48 } . Unfortunately, most of these documentsarestillclassifiedandareunlikelyhistorianswillsoonbeabletoexplorethem. However,thedevelopmentofmilitaryplansonthiswasnottheend.The militaryleadershiphas sought to comprehensively evaluate the two choices of the Red Army, laid down in the

operationalplan.Toresolvethe"northern"and"southern"options2-6and8-11January1941in

the General Staff conducted two operational-strategic games. In the first game played out offensive of the Red Army in the North-West direction (East Prussia), and the second - in the South-West(SouthPoland,HungaryandRomania).Thedefensiveoperationsoftheinitialperiod of the war on the games do not lose, for the secrecy of the main design plan for a quest party simplynotedthat"blue" attack,butthey rejectedtheborderandeventotheline ofthe Vistula intheSouth-WestdirectionandDunajecintheterritoryPolandandwiththeselineswasalready game. On the territory of East Prussia offensive "red" bogged down, and the Southwest, they havemadesignificantprogress,whichledtotheabandonmentofthe"northern"variantactions

oftheRedArmy.Thus,themainfocusoftheSovietattacksouthernPolandwasdetermined{49}.

The processing of documents of an operational plan based on the experience of the January games headed by new Chief of General Staff General of the Army GK Zhukov. According to the "Plan of development of operational plans" were required to specify the documents on the "southern" version to the 22 March, and on the "northern" variant - to March 8, 1941 Unfortunately, it is not clear whether this task is accomplished, for prepared for the March 11, 1941 , a new version of the plan finally secured the rejection of the "northern" variant and

refocusedthemaineffortsofthetroopsintheSouth-Westdirection{50}.Thefateofthisoption

planisdisagreementinthe literature,assomeauthorsbelievethat"theupdatedinMarch1941

thecoursewasnotgiventheplan"{51}.However,intheabsenceofaccesstootherdocuments,

military planning, and without analyzing the still secret military plans counties solution to this questionisimpossible. Bethatasitmay,thework onthe refinementofthe operationalplancontinued,andto15May 1941 has been developed another option. In order to discuss the situation and problems of the Western frontier districts arising from this plan, May 24, 1941 in the Kremlin held a meeting recentlytookoverasheadofStalin'sgovernmentandhisdeputyMolotovCommissarofDefence, Chief of General Staff, the commanders of the troops, members of military councils and commanders Air Baltic (PribOVO), West (WSMD) and Kiev (KOVO) special, Leningrad (LVO) and Odessa (OdVO) military districts. In June, the refinement of the document continued. June 13 Deputy Chief of StaffLieutenant-GeneralNF Vatutin haspreparedacertificate of deploymentof

the Armed Forces of the USSR in the West theater,specifies the composition of the troops and their distributionfronts.Atthe sametimeIworkedovertheideaofcreatinganother front-the South,whichwascreatedaccordingtothe decisionofthe PolitburooftheCPSU(b) onJune21,

1941{52}.

Suchisthe generalpictureofthe progressofthe Sovietstrategicplanning,1939-1941.Wemust

nowapplydirectlytotheanalysisofthecontentavailable{53}materials.

Thefirstpartofthedocumentwasdevotedtoconsiderationofthearmedforcesandthepossible actions of potential enemies. As such, we figured Germany, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and Japan, ie, almost all the neighbors of the USSR. Developers document assumes that againstthewesternbordersoftheSovietUnion,Germany,Finland,HungaryandRomaniawillbe able to expand from 240 to 270 divisions, more than 10 thousand. Tanks and from 12 to 15 thousand. Airplanes. In a document dated 15 May 1941, this part is given in the substantial reduction of that is probably due to the fact that the document contains a plan of hostilities essentially only against Germany. All these data were based on Soviet intelligence and the particularshavebeensignificantlyoverestimated. Outlining the "probable opponents operational plans", the developers documents repeatedly stressed that "the documentary evidence of the operational plans of potential enemies both in theWestandintheEast,theGeneralStaffoftheRedArmydidnothave."Andfurther,outlining onlythemostprobableassumptionsinthisrespect.

TheintentionsofGermanywereevaluatedintermsoftheJuly1940follows.Expandingthemain

forcesnorthofthemouthoftheriverSan,sheisfromEastPrussiacause"amajorimpactonthe Riga to Kovno, Vilna and then to Minsk". At the same time supporting the blows are applied in Belarus from Brest to Minsk, and from the south of Poland with the aim of mastering the Western Ukraine. According to this embodiment, for the main attack will be concentrated up to 130 divisions, and the remaining 50 will operate in the south. However,it does not exclude the reverseoption,whenthemainattackwillbeappliedinUkraine,andtothenorthunfoldauxiliary actions. In this case Wehrmacht be deployed in inverse proportion. It is assumed the offensive from the territory of Romania Zhmerinkaandfrom Finland onthe KarelianIsthmus,and later in theKandalakshaandPetrozavodsk. Having outlined both options German actions, the document makes the following conclusion:

"ThemainandmostpoliticallyadvantageousforGermany,andconsequently,themostprobable

isthe1stversionofitsactions,iethedeploymentofthemainforcesoftheGermanarmytothe

northofthemouthoftheriver.San".[56]

Inthe course of further processing ofthe documentin the text weremade only partial changes on the direction of development of the German offensive operations and deploy forces. Much more important are the changes in the evaluation of the main choices of the German armed

forces.Ifitremainsunchanged,intermsoftheMarch11,1941itwasthoughtthatthemainblow

oftheWehrmachtwillbedoneinUkraineandintheBalticStatesandBelaruswillbeappliedto

supportstrikes,however,thenorthernversionisnotentirelyintermsoftheSeptember18,1940

excluded. Document on May 15, 1941 has come from the probability of only the southern directionofthemainattackoftheWehrmacht. Thus,theestimateoftheenemy'sintentionsexceptforthepossibledirectionofthemainattack has not changed significantly. However,it should be noted that in the absence of concrete data about the real plans of Germany, such estimates are based solely on the configuration of the

Soviet-Germanborder.Norisitclearwhytheauthorsofthe documentscompletely ruleoutthe possibility the main attack of the Wehrmacht in Belarus and on what basis it was concluded by themonthenorthorsouthdirectionsofthemainattacksoftheenemy.Intheanalysisofthese sections of documents constantly have the feeling that their authors are engaged in mere guessing, but if they are really prepared to repel the attacks of the enemy, it is the exact definitionofhisintentionswastobethemaintaskoftheSovietGeneralStaff. PlanningtheoperationaluseoftheRedArmy,theauthorsofthedocumentscarefullyworkedout issuesofitsstrategicdeployment.Militaryplanningdocumentsallowustotracethedynamicsof strengtheningtheWesterntheater,whichwassupposedtoidentifythemainforcesoftheSoviet troops. According to the July 1940 plan for action in the West it was allocated 68.7% of cash

forcesgroundtroops;fortheSeptemberplan-68.9%;March1941planinvolvestheallocationof

83.5%,inMay-85.1%,whiletheJunedocuments-79.2%.[57]

Whattaskswereassignedtothesetroops?AccordingtoadocumentofJuly1940,"themaintask

ofourtroopsisdefeatingtheGermanforcesconcentratedinEastPrussiaandintheareaof ​ ​ Warsaw;auxiliaryblowtodefeattheenemygroupingsintheregionofIvangorod[Deblin],Lublin, Hrubieszow, Tomaszow, Sandomierz. " Accordingly, the troops of the Northwestern Front (8th, 11tharmy,37 divisions and2 brigades)task was-"focusingonattackingthe opponentwith the ultimate objective, together with the Western Front to defeat his group in East Prussia and masterthelatest." Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th army, 51 divisions and 4 brigades) had to "hit the north district.BuginthegeneraldirectionofAllenstein,togetherwiththearmiesoftheNorth-Western FrontinflictadecisivedefeatoftheGermanarmy,focusinginEastPrussia,tolearnthelatestand enter the lower reaches of. Wisla. At the same time the army left flank kick in the general direction of Ivangorod [Deblin], together with the armies of the Southwestern Front to defeat Ivangorod-Lublinenemytroopsandalsogooutontheriver.Vistula".

BeforethetroopsoftheSouthwesternFront(5th,6th,12th,18th,9tharmy,mechanizedcavalry

group,57divisionsand4brigades)taskwasto"activedefenseintheCarpathianMountainsand

the border with Romania cover Western Ukraine and Bessarabia, simultaneously blow from the front-Great Bridges, Rava-Russian, Sieniawa in the general direction of Lublin, together with the armyleftflank of theWestern fronttodefeatIvangorod-Lublinenemytroops,gooutandgaina footholdonthemiddlereachesoftheriver.Vistula". According to the plan of 18 September 1940, "the main force of the Red Army in the West, dependingonthesituation,orcanbedeployedsouthofBrest-Litovsk,toapowerfulblowinthe directionofLublinandKrakowandthentoBreslau(Bratislav)(.sic-MM)inthefirststageofthe warcutoffGermanyfromBalkancountries,todepriveitofthe mostimportanteconomicbases and strongly influence the Balkan countries regarding their participation in the war; or to the north of Brest-Litovsk with the task of defeating the main forces of the German Army in East Prussiaandmasterthelatest."Itshouldbenotedthat,settingouttwooptionsfortheuseofthe Red Army, the document's authors point out that it is the "southwest" option is essential. It is also interesting rationale for this conclusion: "The blow our forces in the direction of Krakow, Bratislava, cutting off Germany from Balkan countries, it is of utmost political importance. In addition,theimpactinthisareawillbeheldonslightlymorepreparedinthedefenseagainstthe formerPoland." The overall objective of the Red Army in the West has been formulated as follows: "1. Active

defenseisfirmlycoverourbordersduringthestaging;2.Inconjunctionwiththeleftflankofthe

Western Front army forces of the Southwestern Front inflict a decisive defeat on the Lublin-Sandomierz enemy troops and get out on the river. Wisla. Later on strike in the general direction of Kielce, Krakow and get out on the river. Pilica and the upper reaches of. Oder; 3. During the operation firmly cover the border of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia; 4. Active actions of the North-Western and Western Fronts tie down most of the German forces to the northofBrest-LitovskinEastPrussia,durablecoveringwithMinskandPskovdirections." Relevant tasks and received fronts. North-Western Front (8th, 11th army, 23 divisions and 2

brigades)weresettasks:"1.DefenseofthecoastoftheBalticSea,togetherwiththeBalticFleet

topreventthe landing of amphibious assaultforces; 2. Firmly cover Minsk andPskov directions, and in any case prevent the German invasion of our territory; 3. In order to reduce the front 11-th army and its employment more favorable starting position for the offensive during the

staginginconjunctionwiththe3rdArmyoftheWesternFronttoseizetheareaofSejny,Suwalki

and get to the front Shitkemen, Filipovo, copepods; 4. staging kick in the general direction of Insterburg,Allenstein,togetherwiththeWesternFronttiedownGermanforcesinEastPrussia."

[58,59]

WesternFront(3rd,10th,13th,4tharmy,42divisionsand4brigades)wasgiventhetask"firmly

coveringthe Minsk direction,forstagingasimultaneousattackfrom the North-WesternFrontin the general direction of Allenstein, tie down German forces, focusing in East Prussia. With the transferofArmyof theSouthwesternFrontoffensivepunchleftflankof thearmyinthegeneral direction of Ivangorod promote the South-Western Front Lublin break the enemy's forces and developingfurthersurgeryonRadom,providingactionSouthwesternFrontfromthenorth."

South-WesternFront(5th,19th,6th,12th,18th,9thmechanizedcavalryarmy,96divisionsand5

teams)receivedthemission"firmlycoveringtheborderofBessarabiaandNorthernBukovina,by concentrating forces in cooperation with the 4th army of the Western front inflict a decisive defeatontheLublin-Sandomierzenemytroopsandgetoutonthe river.Wisla.Lateronstrikein thedirectionofKielce,KrakowandPetrokov,seizetheKielcePetrokovandgotop.Pilicaandthe upperreachesof.Oder". Themainobjectivesof the"northern"versionofthe deploymentofSoviettroopshadtobe:"1.

DurablecoverfordirectionsonMinskandPskovduringthestaging.2.Applicationofthedecisive

defeat of the main forces of the German army,concentrated in East Prussia, and the capture of the latter. 3. Subsidiary blow from Lviv not only durable cover Western Ukraine, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, but also to defeat the enemy grouping in the Lublin district, Hrubieszow Tomas."Developersdocumentstressedthat"the defeatofthe GermansinEastPrussiaandthe capture of the last has the exclusive economic and, above all, the political significance for Germany,which will inevitably affect the whole future course of the struggle against Germany." However, "there are fears that the struggle on this front could lead to protracted battles, will connect our main strength and will not give a reliable and rapid effect, which in turn will make the inevitable and accelerate the performance of the Balkan countries into the war against us." Themainfrontsoftheproblemremainedthesameasinthepreviousversionoftheplan. Weallowedourselvestosuchalengthyquotation,becausethismaterialdemonstratesthelackof any connection with the actions of the Red Army, the possible actions of the enemy, as mentioned above. The document clearly emerges the real scenario of the beginning of the war, formedthebasisofoperationalplanning:theRedArmyconductsconcentrationanddeployment

ontheWesterntheater,leadingbothprivateoffensives,theconcentrationcompletionservesasa signaltotransitiontoageneraloffensivealongtheentirefrontfromtheBaltictotheCarpathians with the application of the main strike on southern Poland. The German troops, as in the first version of the plan, designated by the term "focusing" and, therefore, the initiative of the outbreak of war will come entirely from the Soviet side, which begins and ends the first deployment of troops in theater. This conclusion is supported by direct reference in the document, in the case of the concentration of the main forces in the North-West direction, "on the condition of the railways in full compliance with the traffic plan, the day of transition to a general offensive should be set 25 days from the start of mobilization, that is. e. The 20th day

fromthebeginningofstaging"{54}.Thatis,thetransitiontotheoffensiveisnotconnectedwith

thesituationatthefront,andwiththecompletionoftheconcentrationoftheRedArmy. The widespread opinion that the Soviet Union was waiting for the enemy attack, and only then planned offensive, does not consider that in this case, the strategic initiative would actually voluntarily surrendered into the hands of the enemy, and the Soviet troops would be staged in obviously unfavorable conditions. [60.61] Moreover he that the transition from defense to offense, so simple in the abstract, is a complex process that requires careful and thorough preparation, which should begin with the four equipment lines of defense for 150 km in depth. Butnothingofthekindbeforethewarhasnotbeendone,andisunlikelytoseriouslydefendthe thesis that the Red Army could successfully defend themselves on unprepared terrain and even the sudden attack of the enemy, which is generally not provided by Soviet planes. After all, "it was thought to reflect the aggression by reference to the principal strategic directions (front) offensive operations" {55} . In addition, it is unclear why it is necessary to plan offensive operationsunlesstroopstobedefenseagainstattackingenemy.Afterall,nooneknowshowthe situationatthefrontinthecourseofdefensiveoperations,whereourtroopswillbeinwhatthey are able to, etc. Besides waiting for the enemy attack does not allow for a timely mobilization, whichconsequentlymakesitimpossibletoimplementalltheseplans. In terms of the March 11, 1940 was finally fixed the refusal of the "northern" version as "deploymentof the mainforces of the Red Army in the Westwith the groupof the mainforces against East Prussia and to Warsaw direction raises serious concerns that the struggle on this frontcanresult toprotracted battles,"and focused onthe further working out of the" southern "version.Thisdocumentnotedthat"themostprofitableisthedeploymentofourmainforcesto the south of the district. Pripyat, so that the powerful blows to Lublin, Radom and Krakow put yourself first strategic goal: to break the main forces of the Germans, and the first stage of the warcutoffGermanyfromBalkancountries,todepriveitofthe mostimportanteconomicbases andstrongly influence the Balkan countries regarding their participation in the war againstus. " AspointedoutbySNMikhalev,inthisregard,"thestrategicoffensiveoftheSoviettroopsinthe western theater had a clear design. The plan called for it: 1) a strong (probably active. - MM ) defense pin down the enemy forces on the flanks of the areas Memel, Ostroleka and along the borders with Hungary and Romania; 2) The main forces of the Southwestern Front, in collaborationwiththeleftwingoftheWesternFrontstrikewithaview tothe decisivedefeatof Lublin-Radomsko-Sandomierz enemy forces, seize Krakow and Warsaw and to go to the front

Warsaw,Lodz,Oppeln"{56}."AfurtherstrategicobjectiveforthemainforcesoftheRedArmy,

dependingonthesituationcanbedelivered-thedevelopmentofoperationsthroughPoznań to Berlin,oractionsinthesouth-westofPragueandVienna,orhitthenorthatTorunandDanzigto

bypassEastPrussia"{57}.

Now,thankstothestudyofSNMikhalev,wehavetheopportunitytofamiliarizethemselveswith the problems of the Western and South-Western fronts on the plan. Western Front "was to hit the left wing in the general direction of Siedlce, Radom promote South-Western Front in defeating the enemy in the Lublinregion, and toensure that action on the main line to put the auxiliary blow in the direction of Warsaw, possess it and" make a defense "on p. Narev. The immediate task is to master the front areas of Siedlce, Lukow and the seizure of crossings over the river. Wisla. In the future, meaning the action in the direction of Radom Lublin to encircle enemyforcesincooperationwiththeSouth-WesternFront." South-Western Front was tasked with "concentric blow right wing armies in collaboration with the Western Front, to encircle and destroy the enemy's main grouping of east river. Wisla with simultaneous removal of the mobile action group (two mechanized corps) in the West Bank. Wisla for mastering Kielce. The main forces of the front at the end of the defeat of the Lublin group on the tenth day of the operation to be ready to force the district. Wisla. [62.63] At the sametimetheleftwingofthemaingroupsinthestrikedirectionofKrakowand,buildingonthe success of mobile forces groups (four mechanized corps), on the eighth day of the operation to seizeKrakow,onthetenthdayoftheoperationthemainforceofthisgroupbringtotheareaof

Miechow,Cracow,Container"{58}.

The above material clearly indicates the continuation of mining the offensive operations of the

Soviettroops.Opinionexpressedintheliteraturethat"fromMarch11,1941,theplanisthemost

accurate final expression of generally accepted views and most accurately reflects the personal position of Stalin," may be taken only in part. Indeed, this document sets out the essence of "conventionalwisdom"oftheSovietleadershipatthebeginningofthewar,buthewasnotfinal, becausethe process of thedevelopmentof Soviet operationalplancontinued.Versionthat"the basis of the document defensive strategy was based on the" {59} , has no basis. The fact that it was clearly stated: "The advent 12.b start" {60} . The exact start date of onset is known to be determinedbythe partythatintendstohaveinitiatedthebeginning ofhostilities.However,this deadlinewasnotsustained,butitsappearanceinthedocumentisverytelling,aswellasthefact that it is the only instrument of Soviet military planning, which is published in the latest documentarycollectionintheextraction. ClarificationofthetasksoftheSoviettroopsfounditsfurtherdevelopmentinadocumentdated 15 May 1941 For the first time openly and clearly formulated the idea that the Red Army is to "forestalltheenemytodeployandattacktheGermanarmyatthemomentwhenitwillbeinthe stageofdeploymentandnotevenhavetimetoorganizethefrontandtheinteractionofforces." Thisidea,aswehaveseenabove,inalatentformwaspresentinallpreviousversionsoftheplan. Naturally, the developers of the document say about the possibility of German attack on the USSRonlytentatively. The troops of the Red Army's task was to attack the German army,for which "the first strategic objective actions of the Red Army put - the defeat of the main forces of the German army deployed south of the line Brest - Deblin and access to the 30 th day of operation on the front Ostroleka, p. Narev,Lovich, Lodz, Kreizburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. Follow the strategic goal to have theonsetof theKatowicedistrictinthenorthernor north-westerlydirectiontodefeatthelarge forceof the center and the north wing of the German frontand to seize the territory of former PolandandEastPrussia.Theimmediatetask-todefeattheGermanarmyeastoftheriver.Wisla

Krakowanddirection,getoffatppNarev,Vistulaandcapturingthe Katowicearea,forwhich:a) the main attack forces of the Southwestern Front strike in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, cutting off Germany from its southern allies; b) secondary attack the left wing of the Western Front strike in the direction of Siedlce, Deblin with the aim snare the Warsaw group and seize Warsaw,andpromote South-Western Front in defeating the enemy ofLublin groups; c) conduct anactivedefense againstFinland,EastPrussia,Hungary andRomania,andbe preparedtostrike againstRomaniainafavorableenvironment. Thus, the Red Army begins offensive operations from the front Chizhov, Lutowiska forces 152

divisionsagainst100German.Onothersectionsofthestateborderprovidesanactivedefense."

Theterm"activedefense"shouldnotbemisleading,sinceitmeansthecombinationofdefensive andoffensive operations. Since the document hasrepeatedly stressed thatit was the Red Army will be the initiator of hostilities, the term is most likely hiding private offensive to snare the enemy. The fronts have received the following tasks. Northern Front (14th, 7th, 23th Army,21 Division) was to ensure the defense of [64.65] "Mr. Leningrad, the port of Murmansk, the Kirov railways and,together with the Baltic Navy toensureour completedominationinthe watersofthe Gulf of Finland. " At the same time the Northern Fleet is to promote the 14th Army of the Front "in the capture of Petsamo", and the Baltic Fleet, "to promote the land forces on the coast of the Gulf of Finland and on the peninsula of Hanko, providing them with flank", the first day of the war totransfer one infantry division from EstoniatoHankoandto be prepared for a landing on

theAlandIslands{61}.Thus,itisclearlyontheoffensiveoftheSoviettroopsinFinland.

Northwestern Front (8th, 11th, 27th Army, 23 Division) had "a stubborn defense durable cover Rigaand Vilna areas, not allowing the enemy's invasionof EastPrussia; the defense of the west coast and the islands of Saaremaa and Dago prevent amphibious landings of the enemy. " However,the directive Commissar Defense Command Baltic Special Military District on May 14, 1941 provided that: "Under favorable conditions, all the defending troops and reserves of Army andcountytobepreparedontheordersoftheHighCommandtodeliveraswiftkick." Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th army, 45 divisions) was "stubborn defense on the front of Druskininkai, Ostroleka firmly cover Lidskoe Bialystok and direction; with the transition of the armies of the Southwestern Front offensive punch left front wing in the general direction of WarsawandSiedlce, Radom break Warsawgroupingandcapturing Warsaw,incooperation with theSouth-WesternFrontsplitLublin-Radomenemygrouping,togetoutontheriver.Vistulaand movablepartsmasterRadom". South-Western Front (5-th, 20 th, 6 th, 26 th, 21 th, 12 th, 18 th, 9 th Army, 122 Division) had immediateobjectives:"a)aconcentricblowarmies ofthefrontoftherightwingtoencircleand destroythe mainenemygroupingeastof the river.Wisla inthe Lublinregion; b) simultaneously blow from Sieniawa front, Przemysl, Lutowiska smash the enemy forces at the Cracow and Sandomierz, Elets directions and seize the Krakow, Katowice, Kielce, referring to further attack from the area in the north or north-westerly direction to defeat the large force Northern the front wing of the enemy and the capture of the former territory of Poland and East Prussia; c) firmly defend the state border with Hungary andRomania, and be prepared tospray concentric attacks against Romania from Czernowitz and Kishinev areas with the immediate goal to defeat thenorthern[ernoe]wingoftheRomanianArmyandreachthelinep.MoldovaIasi." Thus,asrightlypointedSNMikhalev,May's"planisasomewhattransformedthedevelopmentof

theideaslaiddownearlier"intheMarchplan{62},andtheachievementofimmediatestrategic

objectives intended to provide offensive operations, particularly of the South-West direction, which unfolded over half of all divisions, intended for action in the West. To provide a strong initial attack against the enemy main force planned to deploy in the armies ofthe firstechelon, whichincludesmostofthemovablejoints. An important problem of entry of the Red Army in the war was a matter of covering the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of troops. The plans cover the western border districts were developed in May - June 1941 on the basis of the People's Commissar of Defense

directivesMay5CommandandWSMDKOVO,May6-OdVO,andonMay14-LVOandPribOVO

{63}.Theplannedgroupoftroopsonthewesternborderdistrictscoverincluded15armies,the

composition of which was allocated 107 divisions and 2 brigades, remained 51 Division and the disposal of the High Command in reserve fronts - 8 divisions. According to VA Anfilova, BN Petrova and VA Semidetko, this group was more suited to attack than to defend {64} , [66,67] which could not but affect in case of enemy attack, because, as rightly pointed out MA Gareev, "Soviettroopsdisadvantageaggravatedbythefactthatthetroopsofthebordermilitarydistricts

hadnoproblemsonthedefensiveoperations,butonlytocoverthedeploymentofforces"{65}.

Putting these plans into operation did not match the enemy's attack. For example, in terms of coveringPribOVOnotedthat"thepurposeofintelligence-fromthefirstdayofthewartoreveal the intentions of the enemy, his group and terms of readiness to move to the offensive" {66} . Thus,commissioningofthecoverplansarenotdependentontheactionsoftheenemy,andthe decision of the Soviet command. According to the just opinion MA Gareeva, "on the eve of the war at some time had been lost sight of the important fact that in case of the outbreak of

hostilities and the political, and can not come to the military only because of their own desires and intentions, without considering that the enemy will seek to do everything and when it is convenient and profitable to him "{67}, and" the idea of the indispensable transfer of war since

its inception into enemy territory

so fascinated by some senior military staff, that the

possibility of militaryaction onits territory ispracticallyexcluded.Of course, this hasanegative impact on the preparation of not only defense, but also in the whole theater of military

operationsinthedepthsofitsterritory,"{68}.

This conclusion is confirmed by the documents published on the plans cover does not provide

serious opposition concentration of Soviet troops from the enemy.Thus, the full deployment of

forcesinthebordercountiesinthebandstookcoverunderplansto15days,which,ofcourse,it

wouldbeextremelydifficultattheoffensiveopponent.Moreover,theattackoftheenemyforces ofthefirstechelonwereunabletotaketheir defenseontheborderstrip.Asrightlypointedout VP Screamers, "a characteristic feature of the cover plans was that they came from such an option the outbreak of war and create an environment in which will be possible without interference from the potential enemy advance to the border, take the designated cover band,

readytorepelanattack,holdmobilization

afeatureofallmilitaryplanscoverwastheirlackof

evaluationofthepossibleactionsoftheenemy,inthefirstembodimentofthesuddentransition

totheoffensiveofsuperiorenemyforces

it was assumed that in the areas of

Theessenceoftacticalmaneuverwastoensurethat

the need to quickly pack up and go out to the border

concentrationwillbegiventimeforthefinalpreparationsforthefight,"{69}.

Ifcoverforthetroopsreallypreparedtorepelenemyattacks,thenitwouldhave"meant-MAon fair view Gareeva - that border military districts must be carefully designed repel the enemy's

invasionplans,ie,plansfordefensiveoperations,asareflectionattackbysuperiorenemyforces cannot be done casually,just as an interim task.This requires the maintenance of a number of long fierce defensive battles and operations. If there were such plans, in accordance with them quite differently, namely taking into account the defensive problems have arranged grouping of forcesandmeansofthedistricts,inadifferentwaytobuildthemanagementandseparationwas carriedoutinventories andother resourcesmobilization.Ready torepelaggressionalsoclaimed to have not only developed plans of operations, but also fully prepared for the operation, includinglogistically,tobemasteredcommandersandstaffs.Itisobviousthatincaseofasudden attack of the enemy did not have time for additional training for such operations. But this was

notdoneinthebordermilitarydistricts"{70}.

Since the strategic plan and the deployment of the first plan of strategic operations have been calculated [68,69] the full mobilization of the Red Army, they were closely linked to the mobilization plan. Since April 1940 began development of a new mobilization plan, which was February 12, 1941 approved by the government. Mobilization deployment of the Red Army on the MP-41 plan (the official name of "Mobplan number 23") would lead to the creation of a wartime army.Totalplanned to drill 8 front and29 armymanagement, 62 rifle, 29 motorized, 4 cavalry and 5 airborne and 8 air corps, 177 infantry,19th mountaininfantry,2 infantry,61 tank,

31motorized,13cavalryand79aircraftdivisions,3infantry,10artilleryanti-tankbrigadesand72

artillery regiments RGC, as well as the appropriate number of rear units. After mobilizing the strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR was to be 8.9 million people, the troops should have been106.7thousand.Gunsandmortars,upto37thousand.Tanks,22,2thous. Warplanes,10.7

thousand.Armoredvehicles,about91thousand.tractorsand595thousand.cars.

Most of these troops have already been formed or finished forming, since the mobilization

deploymentofthesystemadoptedinthesummerof1939,thenumberofpartsandconnections

broughttothelevelofwar,whichsimplifiestheprocessofmobilization,itreducedthetimeand had to contribute to a high level of combat capability of troops mobilized. Home "feature of military construction in these years was that held concealed mobilization deployment of the armed forces" {71} . Only in the second half of 1940 - the first half of 1941, in addition to 29 mechanized corps, five airborne corps and 10 PTABR, it was formed 86 rifle divisions, 16 departments and 18 rifle corps controls armies. After analyzing more than 30 indicators of materialsupportofthemobilizationdeploymentoftheArmedForcesoftheUSSR,GIGerasimov concludedthat"neverbeforehasourarmywasnotwellstaffed,providedthematerialmeans,as in the prewar period. Of course, it was not without flaws, but the main types of equipment, ammunition and stocks of the Red Army was not worse provided than at the time of his victoriousoperationsinthesecondhalfofthewar.Theavailableinventorysystemandensurethe mobilization of the army deployment, much higher than the army of Nazi Germany in the numberofweaponsandmilitaryequipment,mostlyprovidedbyothermaterielinanamountto effectivelyconductcombatoperationsintheinitialperiodofwar.Lesionsoftheinitialperioddue

tothefactthatthearmydidnothavetimetodeploy"{72}.

AccordingtotheMP-41plan,themobilizationoftheRedArmytoproducepoeshelonnoprovided

withinonemonth.Dependingonthesituation,themobilizationwasplannedtobeheldinpublic

orinsecret,thelatterhasbeendevelopedindetail.Armyborderdistrictsmobilizationended2-4

daysofmobilization,otherforces-8-15hours,andsparepartsandstationaryhospitals-at16-30

hours.AirForcemobilizationwascompletedby3-4hours,andthecombatunitsandservethem

rears brought to combat readiness within 2-4 hours after the start of mobilization. Air Defense

Troopsotmobilizovyvalisintwoechelons.Thefirsthadaconstantwillingnessto2hours,andthe

second deployed for 1 - 2 days of mobilization. The deployment of the newly formed units

providedtocompletethe3-5day.Thus,ofthe303divisionsoftheRedArmyhad172fullterms

ofreadinessfor2-4hours,60divisions-for4-5hours,andtherest-on6-10daymobilization.All

other combat units, rear and front-line military schools otmobilizovyvalis 8-15 hours. Full mobilization of the armed forces envisaged in the 15 to 30 hours, but the bulk of the troops

deployedabout10-15hours{73}.[70,71]

By the summer of 1941 the Red Army was a gigantic military instrument, which gave the Soviet leadership confidence in the success of the attack on Germany. In 1939-1941 gg. It was carried outhugeworkonimprovementoftheSovietArmedForces.Accordingly,increasedandthedirect military expenditures, which are growth in 1938-1940 years. almost 2 times higher than the overall growth in spending {74} . In the years following happened reallocation of budget expenditures: in 1938 the national economy (including industry) consumed 41.7% (19%), and

18.7%ondefense,thenthefiguresin1939amountedtorespectively39.4%(20.3%)and25.6%in

1940 andg.- 33.4% (16.4%) and32.6% {75} . If weconsider the totalcost of the Armed Forces,

the NKVD,the military-industrial Commissariats, General Directorate of State Material Reserves, theGeneralDirectorateofCivilAviationandotherparamilitaryorganizations,theoverallshareof military spending in 1940, the costs will reach 52% of budget expenditures, or 24 , 6% of the nationalincome{76}.In1940,formilitarypurposesitwasspent26% of industrialproducts(for

example,thefigureintheUSwas10.8%,andinGermanyin1939-thefirstwaryear-23%){77}.

The annual increase in military production in 1938-1940 gg. It was 39%, three times (!), surpassing the increase in total industrial production {78} . Accordingly, the share of military

productsinthegrossindustrialoutput(inpricesof1926-27)hasincreasedfrom8.7%in1937to

18.7%in1940andto22.5%inthefirsthalfof1941{79}.Inthefirsthalfof1941,Sovietindustry

produced 100% 87% tanks and combat aircraft of new types of completing the transition to production of only these samples {80} . Total for 1939 - the first half of 1941, the troops have

receivedfromtheindustry92,492gunsandmortars,7448tanksand19,458combataircraft{81}.

Ammunition productiononly inthe firsthalf of1941 increased by66.4%, asadopted onJune 6,

themobilizationplanforthesecondhalfof1941and1942providedforitsfurthergrowth{82}.

After the XVIII party conference (15 - 20 February 1941), defense industry enterprises began to

betranslatedintothemodeofwar{83}.June6,1941Stalinsignedanumberofdecrees,under

which industrial Commissariats were to carry out the activities that allowed "all enterprises

prepare

ismine.-MM).

ThedevelopmentoftheSovietArmedForces,1939-1941.{85}

On01/01/1939 On22.06.1941In%to1939 Personnel(thous.) 2485 5774 232.4 divisions 131.5 316.5 240.7 Gunsandmortars 55790 117581 210.7 Tanks 21110 25784 122.1 warplanes 7714 18759 242.3 The Soviet Armed Forces, whose growth is shown in Table 1, were superior to the army of any other country in the number of military equipment. True, the Soviet leadership overestimated

forapossibletransitionfrom1July1941toworkonmobilizationplan"{84}(emphasis

the fighting capacity of the Red Army. However, available in Russian historiography {86} allegations of low combat capability of the Red Army in 1941, seem to be insufficiently

substantiated. Actually,there is still not developed a methodology and scientific criteria are not formulated to address the problem. By themselves, references to the bad start of the Great Patriotic War does not explain anything. Especially since the Soviet troops to the June 22, 1941 did not have time to complete the concentration and deployment, to mobilize and have been captured by the German surprise attack, which also negatively affected their combat capability

{87}.Inourview,thequestionofarealcombatcapabilityoftheRedArmyontheeveofthewar

stillawaitsitsresearchers.[72,73]

Meanwhile, as the cooling of the Soviet-German relations in the autumn of 1940, Soviet propaganda organs began secret training to work in a future war with Germany, and conduct anti-fascist propaganda. In the spring of 1941, he remembers who lived before the war in KhabarovskAFRahr,"thepeoplebegantobringtolecturesontheinternationalsituationdosage

criticismatGermany

walk among the people" {88} . Similar sentiments were reflected in the cited blog Vishnevsky whorecordedJanuary 31,1941:"The position oftheUSSR waitandsee,we,ifappropriate,and

willbeabletothrowtheirweightonthescalesofwar

hemakesthe following entry: "Decide the comingmonths.Wecome toacritical pointin Soviet

history.Youfeelallthisisclear."FinallyonApril14:"Thetruthgetsout.InterimAgreementwith

Hitlerisburstingattheseams"{89}.

At the same time on the political instruction of the troopsneeded to place increasing emphasis

on studying the military-political situation in Europe, the disclosure of the aggressive nature of

imperialismandaggressivepolicyofGermany.April30,1941inthewesternborderdistrictswere

sentadirectiveofthe Main Directorateof politicalpropagandaletter (GUPP) Red Army"Results of inspections of political studies", which noted that "soldiers and junior commanders insufficiently explained that the Second World War both belligerents underway for a new

redivision of the world

explainedthattheextensionofthesecondworldwarposesadirectmilitarythreattoourcountry,

"{90}.

The turning point in the preparation of Soviet propaganda to action in the new conditions was

the speech of Stalin's May 5, 1941 to the graduates of military academies {91} . It is a kind of keynote speech Stalin delivered [74] The next day, after the Politburo decision on his appointment as chairman of the CPC of the USSR, made a lasting impression on the audience, whoareunanimousinthefactthatsheworeanti-Germancharacter.Inadditiontothedetection ofaggressiveactionsofGermanyinEurope,Stalinwasdirectlyassignedtoittheresponsibilityfor theoutbreak ofWorldWarII.Giventhatintheautumnof1939intheUSSR iswidely promoted the idea that "warmongers" are England and France, it was clearly voicing the new course. The Secretary of the ExecutiveCommitteeof the Comintern, Dimitrovnoted inhisdiary: "Our policy ofpeaceandsecurityisatthesametime,thepolicyofpreparingforwar.Nodefensewithoutan offensive.Itisnecessarytoeducateinthespiritofthearmyoffensive.Wemustprepareforwar." Wisniewski praised this speech more emotional: "We are of great significance. We begin the

ideologicalandpracticalapproach

[ ]

time,"{92}.

Front - our trek to the West. Ahead of opportunities of which we have dreamed for a long

WearetalkingabouttheglobalfightHitlerthencalculated.

Atthesametime,rumorsofimpendingwarwithGermanyandbeganto

Resitprobablycomingsummer."April9

Germany

transferred to gains and conquests

it is not enough

I remember listening to this speech NG Lyashenko, in it the Soviet leader "described the international situation, said the treaty of 1939 that the Soviet Union condemned the aggressive

actions of Germany

Molotov and the Foreign Office will be able to delay the beginning of the war two or three months - it is our happiness. "Go to the troops, - concluded his speech by Stalin, - take all measures to enhance their combat readiness." It is interesting to compare the recollection of memoriesfromthethenpositionofChiefofGeneralStaffGeneraloftheArmyGKZhukova.Just over a month later, the military asked Stalin to allow the troops to bring the western border districts to full combat readiness. In rejecting that request, the chief explained that "for the conduct of major war with us Germans, firstly, we need oil, they must first conquer it, and secondly,they need toeliminate the Western Front,toland [75] in England or to enter intothe world. " Formore convincingStalin wenttothe mapand showing the Middle East,said: "That's wherethey(theGermans)willgo." Since Stalin was not afraid of the German attack in 1941, the question naturally arises: what is "inevitable" war he was going to delay for two or three months? As recalled forty years later, Molotov, in the spring of 1941 in Moscow understand that if England is destroyed, then the

SovietUnionin1942-1943."Iamwaitingfortheordeal."Therefore,itshouldnotgiveGermanya

pretext for an attack, to gain time, to have time to "do what was planned." Anticipating the inevitable aggression, the Soviet leaders "to prepare for its reflection of steel in advance. Otherwise, why do we still in the month of May it was necessary to shift the country from the depths in the western border military districts, a total of seven armies? It's silischa great! Why carry out a secret mobilization of eight hundred thousand conscripts and move up to the boundariesoftheir reservedivisionsaspartofthemilitarydistricts?"AtthesametimeMolotov himself acknowledges thatthe term German attack" didnot know exactly,"but the troopshave focus. Naturally,the question arises, what will happen after the Red Army will be developed on thewesternbordersoftheUSSR,despitethefactthatitisnotclearwhethertheattackGermany in1941 atall? "Timelost,-concludesMolotov.-Aheadofour Hitler! "(Emphasismine-.ML/.)

{93}.

Changing the orientation of Soviet propaganda it was clearly stated by Stalin May 5, 1941 at a banquet in the Kremlin after the solemn meeting on the occasion of the release of cadets of militaryschoolswasproclaimedatoasttoStalin'speacefulforeignpolicy.Inresponsetoit,Stalin took the floor."Let me makea correction -he said.- A peaceful foreign policy secured peace in ourcountry.Peacepolicyisagoodthing.Wehavethetimetopursuealineofdefense-aslong as no re-equipped our army is not an army supplied with modern means of warfare. And now, when we have reconstructed our army, saturated with technology for the modern battlefield, when we become strong - now we have to move from the defensive to the offensive. Through thedefenseofourcountry,weareobligedtoactinanoffensivemanner.FromDefensetogotoa military policy of offensive action. Weneed to rebuild our education, our propaganda, agitation andourpressinanoffensivemanner.TheRedArmyisamodernarmy,andamodernarmy-the

armyoffensive"{94}.

ThisisStalin'sspeechwastakenasthebasisforthepreparationofanumberofpolicydocuments. In May 1941, the Red Army was GUPP a draft directive "On the tasks of political propaganda in theRedArmyinthenear future",which afteranumber of revisionswereapprovedonJune20, GVS{95} . Simultaneously,on the instructions of the CentralCommittee of the CPSU secretaries

Then Stalin said that the war with Hitler was inevitable, and if the VM

(b) AA Zhdanov and AS Shcherbakova in the Office of Propaganda, a draft directive "On the propaganda tasks for the near future" {96} . The project did not satisfy the secretaries of the CentralCommittee, andinearly June heShcherbakov wasanew draftdirective "Onthe current

propagandatasks"{97}.Inmid-May1941agroupoflecturersGUPPforclosedmilitaryaudiences,

areport"ModerninternationalsituationandforeignpolicyoftheSovietUnion"{98}.Inaddition,

youshouldpayattentiontothespeechontheinternationalsituation,MIKalininatthepartyand Komsomolmeetingof workersofthe SupremeSovietof theUSSR onMay20, andthe deviceto the graduates of the Military-Political Academy. IN AND. Lenin June 5 as well as the speech of

Zhdanov'smovieworkersmeetingintheCentralCommitteeoftheCPSU(b)15May1941{99}.

The restructuring of propaganda with the objective to "educate personnel in the offensive and militantspirit,inthespiritoftheinevitableclashoftheSovietUnionandthecapitalistworld,and constant readiness to go to a crushing offensive" has begun in accordance with the decision of the domestic hot water from May 14, 1941 The next day, the troops were sent directive "on political lessons from the Red Army [76.77] and junior commanders of the Red Army in the summer of 1941", which stated that "on the just and unjust wars is sometimes given such an interpretation: if the first country attacked another, and leads an offensive war , this war is

considered unjust, and vice versa, if the country was attacked and only defended, such a war is supposed tobe considered fair.It concludes that the Red Army will conduct only defensive war, forgetting the truth that every war, which will lead the Soviet Union, the war will be fair. " The draftdirective"OnPoliticalPropagandaproblemsintheRedArmyinthenearfuture,"notedthat "the entire staff of the Red Army must be imbued with the knowledge that increased political, economic and military power of the Soviet Union allows us to carry out an offensive foreign

policy,decisivelyeliminatingthehotbedsofwaritsborders,expandingitsterritory"{100}.

AsmentionedinthedirectivesoftheCentralCommitteeoftheCPSUproject(b)"Onthecurrent problemsofpropaganda,""USSRliveinacapitalistenvironment.Theclashbetweentheworldof socialism and the world of capitalism is inevitable. Proceeding from the inevitability of the collision - our world's first socialist state is obliged to every day, stubbornly and persistently preparefordecisivebattleswiththecapitalistenvironmentinordertogetoutofthesefightsthe winner,andthusensurethe finalvictory ofsocialism. Theforeignpolicy ofthe SovietUnionhas

nothingtodowithnot"pacifism",withthedesiretoachievepeaceatanycost"{101}.

"The contradiction between the socialist world and the world of capitalism is the most acute contradictionsofourera,-notedinthereport"Currentinternationalsituationandforeignpolicy of the Soviet Union ", prepared in mid-May 1941 a group of lecturers GUPP for closed military audiences. - The foreign policy of the USSR proceeds from the indisputable proposition that a clashbetweentheworldofsocialismandtheworldofcapitalismisinevitable.Themainobjective of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union - its special means to provide all the necessary prerequisitesforavictorioussolutiontothequestion"whoiswho"intheinternationalscale.We are far from indifferent to what conditions will the inevitable confrontation between the USSR and the capitalist encirclement. We are vitally interested in the fact that these conditions were mostfavorableforus. The main success of the Leninist-Stalinist foreign policy of the world consists in the fact that because of it has already managed to delay the war between the imperialist countries and the

SovietUnion,inthefirstplace,beforeourcountrydefeatedsocialism

as the imperialist powers themselves at loggerheads with each other because of world

and,secondly,tothefact

thus,theLeninist-Stalinistpolicyofpeacehavesuccessfullysolvedthechallengesit

faces.Itwouldbewrong,however,toregardourpeacefulpolicyaseternalandunchanging.This is - a temporary policy, which makes it necessary to build up sufficient strength against the capitalist encirclement. Now we have gained such strength and entered a new period of aggressiveforeignpolicyoftheUSSR,whichhasgreatandimportantduties tous.[ ]Thereisa

possibility that the Soviet Union would be forced, by virtue of the prevailing situation, take the

initiative to offensive military action. [

theSovietUnionmustbereadyforanysurprisesandaccidentsandkeepourpowderdryagainst every imperialist state, despite the existence of pacts and agreements with the State. " In analyzing the prospects for the next global capitalism should be based on the growth of the

"revolutionary crisis", while clearly "emerges the role of the USSR as an armed stronghold of

world socialist revolution. [

[78.79] Soviet Union against the individual imperialist countries that threaten our security in a situation where there are no revolutionary situation in capitalist countries. But in this and in another case, the Soviet Union can go on the offensive against the imperialist powers in the cause of victorious socialism, completing the greatest mission entrusted by history the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants to destroy constantly threatening us capitalist

encirclement"{102}.

SpeakingMay20,1941inthepartyandKomsomolmeetingofworkersoftheSupremeSovietof

the device with a speech on the international situation, MI Kalinin said: "If you are Marxists, if youstudythehistoryoftheparty,thenyoushouldunderstandthatthisisthebasicideaof ​ ​ theMarxisttheory-atgreathumanconflictswithinthemaximumbenefitforcommunism."June 5 speech to the graduates of the Military-Political Academy. IN AND. Lenin, he formulated this idea more succinctly: "after the war a time when you can expand communism". "Leninism teaches - Shcherbakov wrote - that the country of socialism, using the current favorable internationalenvironment,andshouldbeobligedtotaketheinitiativetooffensivemilitaryaction againstthecapitalistenvironmentinordertoexpandthefrontofsocialism. For the time being the Soviet Union could not proceed to such actions because of military weakness. But now that the military weakness of the thing of the past. Relying on its military power, using the favorable conditions - the Soviet Union liberated the Western Ukraine and WesternBelorussia,Bessarabiaback,helpedthe workingpeople of Lithuania,LatviaandEstonia toorganizetheSovietregime.""If,ofcourse,attachedtoFinland,thesituationhasbeenfurther

improvedintermsofstrategy,"-openlydeclaredMay20Kalinin{103}."Thus,capitalismhadto

make room, and the front of socialism expanded. The international situation is extremely deteriorated, the military threat toour country closer than ever.In these circumstances, Lenin's slogan "defend our land in a foreign land" may at any time apply to the action ", - he warned

Shcherbakov{104}.

It is, of course, does not rule out that there may be offensive

The modern, extremely tense international situation,

domination

]

]

Buthowtoassess"apeace-lovingpolicyoftheUSSR"inthethesestotheKalininspeechofMay 20, 1941 .- "The Bolsheviks - not pacifists. They have always been opposed to only unjust, predatory and imperialist wars. But they have always been, are and will stand for the fair, the revolutionary, national liberation wars. While not win socialism worldwide, or at least in the principalcapitalistcountries,aslongasthoseareinevitable,andotherwar.Thecapitalistworldis fullofegregiousabominations,whichcanonlybedestroyedwithahotironholywar. Wecannotinstinctivelyrevelintheworld-itleadstothetransformationofpeopleinthevulgar

pacifist.[ ]Ifwereallywantpeace-notunsteady,notshort-term,notasamomentofthewar, and durable and reliable - that is why we must go all out to prepare for war. We should not prepareforsuchawar,whichisnow-becauseit'snotawar,butspillikins-andforsuchawar,in which the capitalists will not stop before any, the most diabolic means in the struggle for existence.Toimagineatleastaroughideaaboutthewar,itissufficienttorecall,forexample,the

warwithFinland.Here'stoawarwemustprepare"{105}.

These ideas resonate with the note by the Chief Commissioner GUPP Army 1st Rank AI Zaporozhets Politburo member name AA Zhdanov, dated February 22, 1941, containing "some considerationsaboutmilitarypropagandaamongthepopulation",whichisclearly defined,"that our party and the Soviet government are not fighting for peace for the sake of peace, and the peace slogan associated with the interests of socialism, with the task of ensuring public Soviet

interest"{106}.[80,81]

Allthisonceagainconfirmsthefactthattheso-called"peace-lovingforeignpolicyoftheUSSR"is nothing more than a propaganda campaign, under the cover of which the Soviet leadership sought to ensure the most favorable conditions for the "smashing of capitalism" by military means. These conditions, according to the documents cited, was to create a military-industrial complexcapableofprovidingtheoffensiveoftheRedArmy,andintheeventofwarbetweenthe othergreatpowers.Undertheseconditions,itwaspossibleunderthecoverofslogansaboutthe "peace-lovingSovietUnion"tostartthe"exportofrevolution"inEurope,thefirststageofwhich

wastheexpansionoftheSovietUnioninthe1939-1940biennium.Therelativeeasewithwhich

wereannexedtheseterritories,contributedtotheformationamongthecommandersoftheRed Army offensive spirit combat. To maintain it in the spring of 1941, it was reissued brochure MV

Frunze"UnifiedMilitaryDoctrineandtheRedArmy"{107},whichsetoutthetasksoftheSoviet

troopsinthespiritoftheoffensivedoctrine. However,the Soviet leadershiprealizedthattheoffensiveof the RedArmy,underthe banner of socialchangecouldleadtotheunityofthecapitaliststatesintoasingleanti-Sovietbloc.Itisno

coincidencesincetheendof1940,directivestoforeigncommunistpartiesECCIbegantodepart

from the guidelines of the class, highlighting the national targets. It is no coincidence, in our opinion, and the intention of Stalin expressed their April 20, 1941, to dissolve the Comintern, which would allow better disguise the influence of the USSR to foreign Communist Party and

would contribute to the expansion of their social base. Stalin believed that "it is important that they (foreign Communist Party -. MM ) infiltrated his people and concentrated on their own special problems", after which the decision will be to re-establish an international communist organization. Unfortunately, so far it is not known when exactly it was planned to dissolve the Comintern. Already in the first hours of the war, Stalin pointed out the need to remove the question of social revolution, and to focus on the promotion of domestic war {108} . This very slogan was borrowed from the work of VI Lenin's "The main task of the day", which stated that

"Russia is now

a national rise to the Great Patriotic War", which "is a war for a socialist

fatherland, socialism as a fatherland, for the Soviet Republic as a contingent of the world army

socialism"andleads"totheinternationalsocialistrevolution"{109}.Itislikelythatitwasunder

thissloganandplannedtowagewarwithGermany,butnottheonethatstarted. Itis interesting tonote thatthe question of anew extension of the "frontofsocialism" gotit in

May-June1941.AsstatedonMay15,ZhdanovatameetingoffilmworkersintheCPSU(b),"if

the circumstances allow us, wewill continue toexpand the frontsocialism " {110} .However,in

1941, to expand the "socialist front" further to the West could only crush Germany, which, accordingtotheSovietleadership,wasthemainopponentoftheSovietUnion.Forthispurpose, itwaswillingtoquiteaserioustool-theRedArmy,whichinthe autumnof1939,wasawarded

theepithet"thearmy-liberator"{111}.

"TheSovietUnionisnowstrongerthaneverbefore,andtomorrowwillbeevenstronger,-stated in the draft directive GUPP. - The Red Army and the Soviet people, defending our country, are obligedtoactinanoffensivemanner,tomovefromthedefense,whencircumstancessorequire,

a military policy of offensive action. " According to the authors of the report of the Office of CrimePrevention,"thepresentinternationalsituationisextremelytense.Waritself cametothe bordersofourcountry.Every dayandhouroftheimperialistsmightattacktheSovietUnion,we

mustbe prepared to warntheir offensive actions. [

that the defensive strategy against the superior motorized units (Germany -. MM ) [82,83] no success did not give and ended in defeat. Therefore, against Germany need to apply the same offensive strategy, backed by a powerful technique (emphasis mine -. MM ). The task of all commandpersonneloftheRedArmy-tostudytheexperienceofmodernwarfare,andtouseit inthepreparationofoursoldiers.AllstudyallarmsoftheRedArmyshouldbeimpregnatedwith anoffensivespirit." "TheGermanarmyhasnotfacedanopponentofequalvalue,equaltoherbothinthenumberof troops,aswellasontheirtechnicalequipmentandcombattraining.Meanwhile,suchacollision is not far off." It is interesting to note that the Head Office of the Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) GF Alexander made to the proposal following note: "A

sortofwordingcannotbetolerated.Thiswouldmeanbluffenemy"{112}.

Similar considerations in policy documents of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), together with dataon directmilitary preparationstoattack the Red Army,whichwill bediscussed below,

clearlydemonstratetheintentionoftheSovietleadershiptomakethesummerof1941anattack

onGermany.Suchideas,ofcourse,hadtobekeptinstrictconfidence,whichexplainstheabove note of the Office of the Chief of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee. In this context understandable sharply negative reaction of the CPSU (b) the publication of May 21,

1941inthe"KomsomolskayaPravda"articleregimentalCommissionerJ.Bakanova"Thedoctrine

ofLenin-Stalin'swar"inwhichafewgentlewaysetoutsomeideasoftheabovedocumentsfor the Suppression of pacifism, preparing young people for service in the army, strengthening the defensepowerandcombatoffensivespiritoftheSovietpeople,theconstantpreparationforwar, because only the destruction of capitalism will lead to a world without wars, and until that happens,theBolshevikswereinfavorofprogressive,justwars. Although the article was written in quite general terms and did not mention Germany as an enemy, it became a subject of discussion at the highest party add. The Politburo of the ruling, dedicatedtothepublication,pointedouttheneedfortightercontrolsonthepartofthearticles on foreign policy topics Propaganda and agitation, and directly responsible of its appearance in the newspaper were withdrawnfrom work {113} .The only thing thatwasallowedinthe press, there were vague hints "Truth" on the possibility of "any surprises" in the current international situation.Meanwhile,the troopsbegantodemonstratetheanti-fascistfilmsandsimultaneously planned a series of publications in the anti-German spirit in all major publications {114} . Strict masking mode extends even tothe Comintern, which was denied publication appeals to May 1, 1941 with a detailed analysis of the international situation as it "could open our enemy card"

]

The experience of military action showed

{115}.Ingeneral,inApril-June1941,theSovietleadershipledsocautiousforeignpolicy{116},

it gave occasion to a number of authors to speak of appeasing Germany {117} . However, the knownmaterialsoftodaydoesnotsupportthisversion. Ofparticularvalueattachedtothematerialsoftheaboveitisthattheyareproducedatthelevel and under the order of the top Soviet military and political leadership, minimizing amateur functionaries middle managers. Prepared at the initiative of the "top", these materials give a fairlycompletepictureofthedevelopmentoftheviewsoftheSovietleadershipinthewayofthe

Soviet Union entered the war against Germany; that the Soviet side was not going to give the enemy the initiative of the outbreak of hostilities. In addition, we should not forget that these plans do not remain on paper, as gradually gaining momentum the process of preparing their implementation. Especially clearly this can be seen in the operational plan of 15 May 1941, which the Red Army andhadguidedatthebeginningofthewar.Afterthepresentationoftheoverallobjectivesofthe fronts it reads as follows: "In order to ensure the implementation of the above [84,85] above purpose,thefollowingactivitiesnecessarytoadvance,withoutwhichitisimpossibletoapplying asurpriseattackontheenemy(underlinedbyme.-MM)asthefromtheairandontheground:

1.tomakethehiddenmobilizationoftroopsundertheguiseoftrainingexercisesastock;

2. under the guise of access to the camp to make a hidden concentration of troops near the

westernborder,primarilytoconcentrateallArmyReserveCommand;

3. covertly focus on aviation airfields in remote districts, and now begin to deploy the aircraft's

rear;

4. gradually under the guise of training fees and logistical exercise to deploy the rear and base

hospital. " The military leadership requested "to allow the consistent implementation of the hiddenandconcealedmobilizationfocusingfirstofallArmyReserveCommandandAirForce." Alltheproposedmeasuresareimplementedimmediately. According to paragraph 1. Once March 8, 1941 was approved by the Decree SNK, according to which the envisaged produce latent mobilization of reserve military service under the guise of "large training exercises." The implementation of these measures at the end of May- beginning of June 1941 enabled the urge 805.2 thousand people (24% of assigned personnel of the mobilization plan) This made it possible to strengthen the 99 divisions in the western border

districts,andpulledoutoftheinteriordistricts:21Divisionwasreducedto14thousandpeople;.

Division72-upto12thousandpeople,and6divisions-.To11thousandpeopleduringthestate

of war inthe 14483 person At the same time supplemented bythe personnel of the units and

formations of other arms and troops were 26,620 horses. Quite ironically commenting on the mention of this in the press, Wisniewski noted in his diary: [86] "Advanced in the" Red Star "- information about the mobilization of a number of classes of replacement (" hundreds of

thousands").Printedasalittlearticleaboutstudyingspare.Modestly

According to paragraph 2. In the period from 13 to 22 May 1941 begins the extension to the

westernborderofthecompoundsoffourarmies(16th,19th,21thand22th)andispreparing

tonominatethreemorearmies(20th,24thand28th),whohadtofinishtheconcentrationby10

July.Thesearmies,uniting77divisions,madeupofthesecondstrategicechelon."Thisrelocation

ofthe interior districts,infact,wasthebeginning ofthe strategicconcentrationof Soviettroops in the theaters of operations. The nomination was made in compliance with the strictest concealment measures, with great caution, gradually, without increasing the normal railway

"{118}.

operation chart " {119} . 12-16 June 1941 the General Staff ordered the headquarters of the westerndistrictsstartintheguise ofdisciplineandchangeof dislocationsummercampshidden extensionforcesofthesecondechelonarmiesandreservesthewesternbordermilitarydistricts

(of114divisions),whichweretotakebyJuly1,theareasofconcentrationin20-80kmfromthe

border. This, incidentally, refutes the common assertion that "all preparations were stopped on

topofawarontheground"{120}.

Underagendaitem3.Forinformationabouttheconcentrationofairisverystingy.Nevertheless,

it is known that on May I, 1941 in the western military districts there were 57 destroyers, 48 bomber, reconnaissance and 7 5 Attack Aviation Regiment, which numbered 6,980 aircraft. By June1,cameanother2assaultregiment,andthenumberofaircrafthasincreased to7009,and

by22Juneinthewesterndistrictstherewere64destroyers,50bomber,reconnaissance7and9

assault regiments, in which there were 7628 aircraft. Data on the deployment of long-range aviation connections are not available, we only know that by 22 June 1941 at the Western theater of war had four long-range bomber corps and one long-range division, in which there

were1346aircraft.[87]

On April 10, 1941 by the decision of SNK and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) began the

transition to the new system of aviation logistics, autonomous from the Air Force combatant units.Thissystemprovidesthefreedomofmaneuverofcombattroops,liberatingthemfromthe relocation of its rear followed him, kept constant readiness to receive the aircraft and ensure

theircombatactivity.ThetransitiontothissystemwastobecompletedbyJuly1,1941{121}.

Underitem4onthedeploymentoftherearpartsofthehospital,andnodatawasnotpublished

until 22 June. On the eve of war, the rear portion held by downsizing and had to be deployed:

Army - 5 - 7 th day, the front-line - on the 15th day of mobilization. It is known that 41% of stationarystorehousesoftheRedArmywasinthewesterndistricts,manyofthemwerelocated in the 200-kilometer border zone. Accumulated significant reserves in these warehouses. As

pointedoutbyAGFerrets,"districtwarehouses,withdesigncapacityof91205carswereloaded

on93,415cars.Inaddition,intheopenairkept14,400wagonsofammunitiondistrictsand4370

wagons materiel and weapons. " In June 1941, the General Staff proposed to transfer to the

WesternDistricthasmorethan100thousand.T.Offuel.AccordingtotheGeneralStaffdirective

number 560944 of June 1,1941,all border districts hadtosubmit anapplication onJuly 10 "on

the required amount of food and fodder

Pastukhovsky was preparing "to ensure deep offensive operations." According to the study, the state of the rear of the Red Army, "with a depth of tactical offensive operation to 250 km, the pace of the 15 km per day,and the timely restoration of the railways had all the possibilities to

ensureholdingofthefirstoperationreservescreatedinpeacetimeinthearmyrear"{122}.

In Stalin's view, the war should prepare not only militarily, but also politically. Explaining this

pointinthespeechofMay5,1941,hestatedthat"politicallyprepareawar-itmeanstohavea

sufficient number of reliable allies and neutral countries." Therefore, in preparation for the war withGermany,theSovietleadershiptookanumberofdiplomaticstepsagainstBritainandtheUS inorder toappear astheir allies andhinder the possibility of ending the Anglo-German war.On London's position in Moscow, it was known that there are interested in the introduction of the USSR into the war, as they hoped to alleviate their situation. There is no real support for the Soviet Union inthe war against GermanyinLondon havenointention of considering anywarin theeastofEuropeasarespite.Washington,too,wasinterestedintheclashofGermanyandthe

in the 1st month of war." All this, according to GP

SovietUnionthatwouldsignificantlyreducedtheGermanthreattotheUnitedStates.Ofcourse, MoscowwasmoreinterestedinBritain'sposition,butalsowiththeUnitedStatesdidnotintend toaggravaterelations.Basedontheirowncalculations,London,WashingtonandMoscowinJune 1941, began to take greater account of the likelihood of the need to establish specific cooperation in the war against Germany. In April 1941, the normalization of Soviet-French relations, which was interrupted in the middle of June, the French side due to the efforts of

rumorsaboutapossiblewarwithGermany,theSovietUnion{123}.

In addition, the Soviet leadership was to establish contacts with Eastern European countries occupied by Germany. Since the second half of 1940 began contacts with the Polish emigre Government for cooperation in the war against Germany, was conducted zabroska agents in occupied Poland for anti-fascistwork, accordingtothe decision of the Politburoof the CPSU (b) of 4 June 1941, the staffing of the Poles and persons knowing Polish, 238 th Infantry division,

whichwastobecompletedbyJuly1,{124}.

Sincethesecondhalfof1940begantoestablishclandestinecontactswiththeCzechoslovakexile

government of Eduard Benes. Until the German invasion took place [88.89] highly secret from boththeGermansandtheBritishonthenegotiationsoncooperationintelligenceincaseofwar with Germany, the Soviet Union. The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is increasingly spreadingpro-Sovietandpro-Russiansentiment,widenedactivitiesHRC,whichintheautumnof 1940, at the insistence of Moscow begins to depart from the promotion of social change, highlighting the slogan of national liberation. The Czechoslovak Communist Party even spoke about cooperation with E. Benes, though previously rejected any cooperation with bourgeois

circles{125}.

Although it was the Soviet government was the initiator of the rupture of diplomatic relations

withYugoslavia,theSoviet-Yugoslavcompletelyseveredcontactswerenot.SinceMay20,1941in

an interview with the Yugoslav military attache, report it to American diplomats, chief of the GeneralStaffof theRedArmy,ArmyGeneralZhukovsaidthat"the Councilwillbesome timeto fight with Germany and are awaiting entry into the war the United States and the Soviet government trusts in England and suspects thatHess's mission aims to turn the war againstthe

SovietUnion"{126}.Accordingly,for2andJune18,1941theSovietsbegantoestablishcontacts

withtheYugoslavemigregovernmentinLondon{127}.

On the eve of the war with Germany, the Soviet leadership was trying to break away from her

EastEuropeanallies.AttheendofMay1941MoscowbroughttotheattentionoftheRomanian

government,that"isreadytosolvealltheterritorialissueswithRomaniaandtakingintoaccount the specific wishes regarding the audit [boundaries], when Romania joined the Soviet policy of peace", ie out of the Tripartite Pact. May 30, 1941, Stalin took the Finnish ambassador to Moscow and started talking about the friendly Soviet-Finnish relations, which he intended to

reinforcethesupplyof20thousand.Tonsofgrain{128}.Buttheseattemptshavefailedbecause

inFinland,andinRomaniatoowellremembertheSoviet"friendship"in1939-1940.Preparations

for war in Europe required to secure Soviet Far East border.Knowing about Japan preparing for warwithBritainandtheUnitedStatesanditsinterestintheneutralityoftheSovietUnionduring thewarinthePacific,theSovietleadershipwenttosigntheSoviet-Japanesetreatyofneutrality

onApril13,1941{129}.Inturn,theSovietUnionwasinterestedindivertingattentionfromthe

UKandtheUSandEuropeanissuesinJapanonneutralityduringthedefeatofGermanyandthe "liberation" of European capitalism. Thus, Soviet-Japanese treaty was supposed to provide the

SovietleadershipafreehandinEurope.

IftheSovietGovernmentreallylookingforwardtotheGermanoffensiveinthesummerof1941

in the Middle East, it is clear the meaning carried out in May 1941, the Soviet-German consultations on the Middle East, which led the Soviet ambassador in Ankara SA on behalf of their governmentsVinogradovandGermanAmbassador vonPapen.During thenegotiations the Soviet side stressed the readiness to consider German interests in the region {130} . Thus, the Soviet Union has demonstrated that it will not interfere with the actions of the German, who were on hand Moscow, as any German offensive in the region, vo-pervyh, would put almost insurmountablebarriertothepossiblecollusionofLondonandBerlin,vo-vtoryh,afieldwouldbe the most capable forces of the Wehrmacht from Eastern Europe, which, of course, would facilitate the advance of the Red Army. With this approach become apparent actions of Soviet

diplomacyduringtheanti-BritishuprisinginIraqthatledtotheestablishmentof12May1941of

diplomaticandeconomicrelationswith thepro-Germangovernmentof R. Gailani:thatMoscow onceagaindemonstratedhisloyaltytoBerlin,lullingthevigilanceofHitler. The same purpose is, in our opinion, to achieve the planned direct Soviet-German negotiations, which strongly proposed by the Soviet side from the middle [91] June 1941 The well-known

statementbyTASSon13June,atjusttheopinionofsomeresearchers,itwasaninvitationtothe

new Germany conversation. As you know, Germany did not react to this statement, so June 18, Molotov informed Berlin about wanting to come for new negotiations. Even in the evening on June 21 in an interview with the German Ambassador von Schulenburg Molotov did not lose

hopeinthepossibilityofnegotiationstoclarifytheSoviet-Germanrelations{131}.

Asarule,thesearetheactionsofMoscowasjustificationthesis"aboutthetotalisolationofthe Soviet leadership from reality" {132} . But if you look at those of its action on the other hand, they will be completely logical and reasonable. In preparation for an attack on Germany, the Sovietleadershipcouldnotthinkaboutthepropagandajustificationofhisstep.Whynotassume that the Soviet-German talks were needed Moscow not for the success or tightening, and, vo-pervyhtodisguiserecentmilitarypreparationsandvo-vtoryhfortheir failurethatwouldgive Moscowagoodexcusetostarthostilities.Thisassumptionisreinforcedbysimilaractionsofthe Soviet Union against their western neighbors in 1939-1940. Of course, only further study of Soviet documents the eve of the war will allow to confirm or reject this hypothesis, which is expressedonthebasisofknownmaterialsasahypothesis. Of course, the basic process, allow us to speak of the completion of preparations for the implementation of the plan on May 15, 1941, it is a strategic concentration and deployment of theRedArmy.As iswellknown,"the lastsixmonthspriortothebeginning ofthewarhasbeen linkeddirectlywith thelatentstrategicdeploymentoftroops,whichwastomakethefinalstage

ofpreparationforwar."ButfromApril1941startafull-scaleprocessfocusingonfutureselected

forthe theater of warwith Germany,247 divisions, constituting 81.5% of available forcesofthe Red Army, which numbered after mobilization to more than 6 million. Man, 62 thousand. Guns and mortars, more than 15 thousand. tanks and up to 12 thousand. airplanes. Strategic expansionwasdueto"thedesiretoforestalltheiropponentsinthedeploymentofarmedforces for the first attack by larger forces and seizing the strategic initiative from the beginning of hostilities." It is clear that these measures were carried out in secrecy and comprehensive disinformation campaign against the German leadership, which, in particular taught that the

maineffortsoftheSoviettroopsincaseofwarwillbedirectedtoEastPrussia{133}.

Naturally, all these arrangements gave rise to rumors of impending war with Germany, which

havebeenrecorded,"competentauthorities"inthemiddleofMay1941ThirdNGOManagement

(Special sections) repeatedly informed the Chief of the Office of Crime Prevention "unhealthy politicalsentimentsandanti-Sovietstatements"inthepopulationcountryandthesoldiersofthe RedArmy'swesternregions.AccordingtoanemployeeofamilitaryhospitalSorokin,"thearrival oftheSovietgeneralsinRivnespeaksforthefactthatRussiawillsoonbeatwarwithGermany." "Soviet troops began to vigorously toss in Rivne, obviously preparing for war with Germany", -

says the former employee of the military hospital Visht. Electrician military hospital Becker also felt that time "in Rivne arrived many Red Army generals, will soon be a war with Germany." AccordingtothecadetcoursejuniorcommandersZhukov,"thehighcommandcamenotjustfor

exercise,andforthebeginningofthewarwithGermany.""Wehavearrived60generals,andasif

theywereallonthegame.Well,whatcouldbethegamewheneveryoneistalkingabouthowto sow and go to fight with the Germans. Although the Government and engaged in deceptive denials,butmostneedtounderstandthattherewillbewar,"-sayssurgeonDvornikov.According to junior sergeant Amelkina, "The Soviet Union is reinforced [92,93] preparations for war with Germany,sothegeneralsandarrivedinRivne"."Theysaythatgeneralsgatheredinthedoctrine, butwedonotbelievethisisbecausesomanygatheredinthehighercommandProskurovbefore the attack on Poland"- said Lieutenant Tsaberyaby.Radinkov Red Army marching as part of the

75thInfantryDivisionintheforestsouthofBrest,hebelievedthat"weareatwarandwedonot

sayanything."June2Wisniewskinotesinhisdiary:"Theconcentrationoftroops.Preparationof

therelevantliterature.Inparts-anti-fascistfilms

Since the strategic concentration and deployment of forces is the final stage of preparation for war,ofparticular interestisthequestionofdeterminingthe possible periodof theSoviet attack onGermany.Indomestichistoriographybegantobe discussed thisissue with the publicationof the notorious work Suvorov "Icebreaker", which refers to "exact" date of the planned Soviet attack on Germany - July 6, 1941, in fact unfounded. The motivation of the author is reduced

mainlytothefactthattheJuly6,1941wasaSunday,andStalinandZhukovsupposedlylovedto

attack on Sunday {135} . But this can hardly be takenseriously.Not supports the assumption of the author and driven a quote from the book "The initial period of the war," meaning that it is distorted.Inthisbook itissaid that"the fascistGermancommand(rather than"Germantroops

"asSuvorov-.MM)literallyinthelasttwoweeksbeforethewar(ie,8to22June,insteadof"for

twoweeks,"asin"Icebreaker."-MM)abletopre-emptourtroopstocompletethedeployment, therebycreatingfavorableconditionsfortheseizureofthestrategicinitiativeinthebeginningof the war" {136} . And this quote Suvorov given twice, once right, and the second - a distorted

{137}.

Asnotedabove,initiallytocompletepreparationsforwarwithGermanywasplannedforJune12,

1941 It seems no accident Defense Commissar Order number 138 of 15 March 1941, bring into forcethe "Regulationonthepersonalaccountof lossesandburialof deceasedpersonnelof the Red Armyin time ofwar,"he demanded" toMay 1,1941 toprovide the troopswith medallions

andsupplementarysheetsforthewartime"{138}.However,asyouknow,onJune12nohostile

action against Germany was not taken by the Soviet Union. Unequivocally to answer a question about the reasons for the transfer of this period, due to the state of the source base is not possible.Wecanonlymakesomesuggestionsinthisregard."Idonotrememberallthemotives

ofthecancellationofsuchadecision-recalledMolotov40yearslater.-ButIthinkthatherethe

Ifeelanewevent"{134}.

main role played by the flight to England, Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess at the party. NKVD intelligencereportedtousthatHessonbehalfofHitlerofferedtoBritaintomakepeaceandtake

partinamilitarycampaignagainsttheSovietUnion

themselves went to war against Germany, having moved his troops in Europe, while England

wouldimmediately beentered intoanalliance with Germany

be alone in the face of the capitalist world

Anglo-Germanwar,theKremlinconsidereditnecessarytopostponetheattackonGermany.Just received information about the failure of the Hess mission and making sure to continue to Anglo-Germanmilitary operationsintheEastern Mediterranean,inMoscow,apparently decided

nottopostponetheimplementationoftheplans.Asalreadymentioned,May24,1941inStalin's

officeintheKremlinheldatopsecretmeetingofmilitaryandpoliticalleadership,which,perhaps, has been resolved the issue of the new term of completion of military preparations. Unfortunately, in such a serious issue, we have to limit ourselves to this working hypothesis, whichhasyettoconfirmordenybasedontheattractionofnew,asyetinaccessibledocuments.

[94,95]

Wasthereanyplannedtheexactdate?Onlyacomprehensivestudydocumentsthatreflecthow militaryplanningandcarryingoutthepreparationofoffensivemeasureswillallowtogiveafinal answertothisquestion.However,thewell-knownhistoriansdateoftheseeventsdonotexclude that, nevertheless, this date has been determined. According to VN Kiselev VD Daniel and PN Bobylev, the Red Army offensive was possible in July 1941 {140} . The available documents reflectingtheprocessofpreparingtheRedArmyforthewar,indicatedthatmostofthemeasures to increase the combat readiness of the troops of the western border districts was to be

completedbyJuly1,1941.Bythatdateitwasplannedtocompletetheformationofalldeployed

in these districts parts; arm armored regiments mechanized corps, which did not have tanks, artillery, anti-tank; to complete the transition to a new organization of aviation logistics, autonomous from the combat units; focus districts troops in the border areas; camouflage airfieldsandmilitaryequipment. Atthesametimeconcludedwithconcentrationanddeploymentofthesecondstrategicechelon of the Red Army.So, the troops of the 21st Army finished concentration by 2 July,22 th Army -

July3,the20thArmy-by5July,the19thArmy-July7,16th,24thand28-armies-by10July.

Basedonthefactthat"theenemyforestalledSoviettroopsinthedeploymentofabout25days,"

complete concentrationand deploymentof the Red Armyon the Western theater of operations wastobecompletedby15July1941.ByJuly5shouldcompleteorganizationoffalseairfields in the 500- kilometer border zone. By 15 July it was planned to complete the construction of defense facilities in Kiev and concealment of warehouses, workshops and other military installations in the border zone, as well as to put all the available weapons in the fortified

structuresbuiltonthenewboundary{141}.Thus,itfollowsfromwell-knownmaterials,theRed

ArmywastocompletepreparationsforanoffensivenotearlierJuly15,1941,however,toclarify

thequestionofthescheduleddateofaSovietattackonGermanyrequiresfurtherresearchwith theassistanceofanewdocumentarymaterial. AvailablematerialsallowassumesequencecompletestheproductionoftheSoviettroopstothe war.Rather,July 1, 1941 troops of the western districts would have received an order to put in place plans to cover in the country has begun to mobilize the latent, andthe completion of the deployment tothe July 15 target groups of the Red Army on the Western theater of operations

Ifwewereatthistime(myitalics-.MM)

andnot

justEngland. Wecould

" {139} Fearing a possible termination of the

would allow the Soviet Union at any time after start fighting against Germany. Inability to complete secrecy of Soviet military preparations did not allow long delay blow to Germany, otherwise they would have known about the German side. Therefore, the completion of the concentrationanddeploymentoftheRedArmyonthewesternborderoftheUSSRwastoserve as a signal for an immediate attack on Germany. Only in this case would be able to keep those preparationsinsecretandtaketheenemybysurprise. However,analyzing the training of the Soviet Union towar with Germany,we should remember that we examine the work in progress. Therefore, conclusions about the real intentions of the Sovietleadershiparelargelyconjectural.Afterall,asfarasweknow,despitethepreparationsfor

warwithGermany,theKremlinuntil22June1941andhasnotmadeadecisionabouttheuseof

military force to defend its interests. Of course, further declassification and introduction into scientific circulation materials last months before the German attack probably will more accuratelyreconstructtheSovietleadershipoftheplannedaction.However,itislikelythatsome

aspectsoftheproblemtogetadefiniteanswerwillneverbepossible.[96,97]

In view of the foregoing, the question is not whether the German attack onthe Soviet Union in caseof"preventivewar",asclaimedbytheGermanpropaganda.Asapreventivewar-a"military actiontakentoanticipateenemyaction,readytoattackorhavealreadystartedsuch,byhisown offensive" {142} , it is possible only in the case when carrying out their side knows about the intentions of the enemy.However,the German documents show that inBerlin the Soviet Union perceivedonlyasanabstractpotentialthreat,andthepreparationofthe"EasternMarch"brand was not associated with a sense of "imminent danger posed by the Red Army" {143} . The German command knew about the transfer of additional forces in the western districts of the USSR, but regards these actions as a defensive reaction to the deployment of the Wehrmacht discovered. The grouping of the Red Army was evaluated as a defense, and no major offensives

bytheSovietUnioninthesummerof1941wasnotsupposedto{144}.Thereforesupportersof

thethesisof"preventivewar"againsttheSovietUnioninGermanyfallintoanawkwardsituation, trying toprovethatHitler haddecided todisrupt the Soviet attack,on the preparationof which heknewnothingallotment. Unfortunately, the Soviet intelligence was unable to provide evidence to the Kremlin that Germanyinsummer 1941 attack onthe USSR.The Soviet leadershipwasawareof the presence of a fairly large group of Wehrmacht at the western borders of the USSR, but not feared imminent German attack, considering that Germany is associated with England by war, will continuethe offensiveintheMiddle Eastandtry tolandontheBritishIsles,andwillnotstarta

warontwofront{145}.SinceneitherGermanynortheSovietUnionisnotexpectedtoattackthe

enemy in the summer of 1941, hence the thesis of the "preventive" action does not apply to anyone of them. In this case, the version of "preventive war" in general has nothing to do with historical science, but is purely a propaganda thesis of Hitler to justify German aggression. As a result of the fact that in its calculations the parties proceeded from the different timing of the war,theGermancommandbyvirtueofarandomsetofcircumstancescouldforestalltheSoviet troopsinthecompletionofthedeployment,therebycreatingfavorableconditionsfortheseizure of the strategic initiative in the beginning of the war. As a result, the Red Army, completing a concentration, and deployment in the theater, was taken by surprise, and at the time of the German invasion was not ready for any immediate action - either defensive or even more

offensivethatthemostnegativeimpactonthefightingin1941.

In the summer of 1941 the Soviet Union there was a favorable opportunity to strike a sudden blowto Germany,constrainedby the war with England, andgetatleast abenevolentneutrality inLondonandWashington.CorrectlynotinggrowingcrisisinSoviet-Germanrelations,theSoviet leadership believed that before the final break is still time for diplomatic maneuvers, and to complete military preparations. Unfortunately, not being able to properly assess the threat of GermanattackandthefearoftheAnglo-GermancompromiseStalinatleastamonthpostponed the completion of military preparations to strike in Germany, which, as we now know, was the

only chance to thwart the German invasion. Perhaps this decision "is one of the main historical mistakes of Stalin" {146} , missed an opportunity to defeat the most powerful European power, and coming on the Atlantic coast, to eliminate the age-old Western threat to our country. As a result, the German leadership could begin June 22, 1941 implementation of the "Barbarossa"

planandtheSovietUnionhad3yearstowagewaronitsterritory,whichledtoenormoushuman

andmateriallosses.

Thus,bothGermanyandtheSovietUnionwellpreparedforwar,andsincethebeginningof1941

thisprocesscamein[98.99]finalstage,whichmadethebeginningoftheSoviet-Germanwarwas

inevitable in 1941, no matter who it initiated. Originally intended to complete the Wehrmacht

militarypreparationsbyMay16,andtheRedArmy-toJune12,1941thenpostponedtheattack

Berlin,movingitto22June,amonthlaterdidthesame,Moscow,defininganewtentativedate-

July 15, 1941 How now we know, the two sides in their calculations proceeded from the assumptionthatthewarwouldstartontheirowninitiative.Unfortunately,whatisknowntoday, it was a mystery in 1941, and the Soviet leadership made a fatal miscalculation. The sudden German attack on the USSR, June 22, 1941 and the first failure at the front in the Soviet leadership had a stunning impact. Most vividly I outlined the situation in his memoirs, the then People's Commissar of the Navy NG Kuznetsov, noting that "the state machine, directed along the rails improbability attack Hitler was forced to stop, through a period of confusion and then turn 180 degrees. The consequences of this have to fixon the goatthe cost ofgreat sacrifice "

{147}.

VladimirNevezhin{148}

StrategicplansofStalinontheeveofJune22,1941.

(Asaresultof"unplanneddiscussion"Russianhistorians)

For a long time in the historiography of the prevailing belief that Stalin on the eve of the

German-Sovietwar,until22June1941,preparedexclusivelyfordefense,butitdidnoteffectively

and as a result it turned out to be the victim of a sudden and treacherous attack of Hitler. The FuhrerwaspresentedasanactiveparticipantintheGreatGame,whichwascarriedoutwhilein theinternationalarena,andtheSovietleader-asapassivevictimofhisdeceit. Thisviewdidnotexplainthereasonsfortheunprecedentedtragedyinthehistoryofthesummer of 1941, the Soviet Union collapsed and its peoples, fell down in shock party,state and military leadership, which led to huge human, material and territorial losses, a retreat of the Red Army, the transition to flight. But any attempt to analyze those reasons beyond the stereotypes that

havebeenmadeintheSovietUnion,immediatelysuppressedby{149}.

By shielding from the press of the communist ideology, as well as the expansion of the source

base research, create conditions for a more impartial study of the problem. Among Russian

historiansdevelopedcontroversy[109]abouttheeventsoftheeveoftheGerman-SovietWarof

1941-1945., Based mainly on new, previously unknown documents entered into scientific

circulation.Itbeganwiththepublication,MIMeltyuhova{150},whichcausedawideresonance

{151} . Articles have been published by other authors, which in varying degrees, addressed the

questionofthestrategicplansofStalinontheeveofJune22,1941.Themostsignificantofthem

werereprintedinRussiaandabroad{152}.Onfurtherenlargementdebatesuggestsareflection

on the problem pagesof monographic {153} and dissertation research{154} ,the emergence of

documentarypublicationsonthetopiccalled{155}.

The achievement of mutual understanding between the opponents, even resting on the same factual material often hamper not only the political views or commitment to a particular scientific school, but too emotional perception of historical facts and definitions, which they operateinthecourseofdebate.Aclearproofofthisistheinterpretationofthehistoriansofthe term "preventive war." Due to the vagaries of perception there was a lot of misunderstandings

anddisagreementsinthedebateabouttheeventsofMay-June1941

Theterm"preventivewar"wasactivelyusedbyHitlerandGoebbels'propaganda.Motivesofthe Fuhrer, to start a war against the USSR, different tasks: it was sheer aggression. Office as Goebbels was intended to justify an aggressive armed action of the Nazi leadership, and why resortedtotheintroductionofapurelypropagandisticbogey"preventivewar." In modern conflict management issue "precautionary" considered in sufficient detail. In a situationofmaturinganddevelopmentoftheconflict(forexample,betweenthetwopowers,as inthe case ofGermany andtheSoviet Union) asitoccursnaturally increase the feeling thatthe otherpartyhasalotoffreedominchoosingtheiractions.Therefore,ownsharesareperceivedas [110] prevention, response, forced,due to careful andinsidiously planned provocation potential

enemy{156}.

Accordingtomostresearchers,"preventivewar"-anoperationtoanticipateenemyaction,ready to realize their political goals through military means. However, the prevailing trend was the transfer of this concept in the sphere of ideological confrontation. It all comes down to proving that using the thesis of "preventive war" in their propaganda, the Nazis sought not only to withdraw from Germany, but also to shift the Soviet Union responsible for between the two powersbeganfighting. Historiographical situation has worsened after the publication of works of Suvorov (alias VB Rezun - an employee of the GRU of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, defected to England), wheretheideaofthepreparationoftheUSSRcarriedoutanattackonGermany(Stalinistversion

of"preventivewar"),whichallegedlyscheduledforJuly6,1941{157}.

However, Russian historians have noted that Suvorov (VB Rezun) weak uses documentary base,

biasedquotesmemoirs,whichinitselfrequirescarefulanalysisofsource{158},distortsthefacts,

arbitrarily interpret events {159} . Western scholars also presented large claims against the authorof"Icebreaker" {160}.Forexample,theGermanhistorianB.Bonvechtookthebook toa well-defined genre of literature, which can be seen the desire to withdraw from Germany, the

blamefortheattackontheSovietUnion{161}.

Inthefirsthalfofthe90s."Antisuvorovskyboom"reacheditsclimax.However,opponentsofVB

Rezun in the heat of debate, ignore the simple things. Bringing more and more evidence of the realHitler'splanstoattacktheSovietUnion,theywittinglyorunwittinglyreinforcethe"Suvorov"

position.Afterall,basedontheinterpretationofthehistoriographyof"preventivewar",onecan

not cometothe obvious conclusionthat Stalinhadno less thanthe Fuhrer,the groundsfor the

outbreakofhostilities.[111]

Youcanonly jointheopinionofthose whoconsider itnecessarytoclarify the terminology used in the debate about the events of 1939-1941. For example, the German scholar B. Pietro-Enker pointed to the vagueness of the conceptual apparatus, which is why you can not use the term

'preventivewar'"inrelationtosomeparticularcases"{162}.ColleaguesPietro-Enker(B.Wegner,

G.-G.Nolte,H.Yubersher,J.Foerster)insolidaritywithherinthismatter{163}.

Also noteworthy is the conclusion MI Meltyuhova scientific irrelevance of the debate about the "preventive war", because, as a rule, it all comes down to "search party, the first to start preparing for an attack. Some (most of them) put the blame on Hitler, others, including the

authorof"Icebreaker"-Stalin{164}.

Meanwhile,theRussianresearcherobjective,unbiasedtrying tounderstandalltheintricaciesof Stalin's foreign policy plans on the eve of June 22, 1941, to revise established views in

Goebbels, Hitler's "pseudo-historians

fromtheThames"(V.Suvorov),itcanbecalleda"victimofpropaganda,""revisionist"oraccused

ofviolatingthe"ethicsofscientificcontroversy",whichalreadyhaveconcreteexamples{165}.

SuchmoralandpsychologicalpressureisnotconducivetothedisclosureofthetrueroleofStalin in the events of the vestibule of the Soviet-German war. The dictator, who had a vast army, relying on the power of the Soviet economy sverhmilitarizirovannoy giant party-political propaganda machine continues to be portrayed in the historiography as a hesitant and even cowardlyfigure,supposedlywaitingobedientlyattackbyHitler.

However,in1938,speakingtothepropagandistsofMoscowandLeningrad,Stalinexplainedthat

historiography, at risk of being ostracized for apology

the Bolsheviks were not pacifists, and in some cases, may themselves become the aggressor {166} . The draft Field Manual of the Red Army in 1939, in its versions 1940 and 1941 gg., The

mainprioritywasgiventooffensivemilitaryaction{167}.Theterm"offensivewar"wasrecorded

in the documents of the ideological May and June 1941, were preparing propaganda agencies (the Office of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the General

DirectorateofthepoliticalpropagandaoftheRedArmy,andothers.){168}.

However,it shouldberecalledthatatitscore,documentedinvarious versionsofthe draftField Manual of the Red Army, 1939-1941, had a defensive orientation, and set the task to protect against external aggression:. "If the enemy forces war upon us, Red Army will be the most aggressiveofeverattackingarmies.Thewarwewageanoffensivebytransferringittotheenemy

"{169}.Consequently,theinstallationinsomewaydifferentfromthepropagandaslogansofthe

late30's- Thebeginningofthe40s,hasitsrootsinthe20s,andnotzeroinginonthefactthatit

was the USSR the first attack of its potential enemy. In this context, the concept of "offensive war", inscribed in the draft Field Manual of the Red Army, it is difficult to unambiguously interpretedasasynonymfor"attack".

But some authors seem to deliberately confuse the conceptual apparatus, preferring to use the

term "preventivewar" appeared, asalready noted,in Goebbels' propaganda.Thus, according to

MI Frolov, researchers who use the term "offensive war", they mean "the preparation of a

pre-emptivestrikebytheSovietUniontoGermany

OV Vishlev previously ranked as (by the way, quite wrongly) to the "historians of the Russian

Academy of Science" that took "in one form or another," the legend of the "preventive war"

orattack"{170}.

{171}, in fact, says: "The desire to prove the existence of the Soviet Union" offensive 'intentions with respect to Germany is an old thesis about the justification of "preventive war" of Nazi

GermanyagainsttheSovietUnion"{172}.[112.113]

AN Mertsalov and LA Mertsalova, criticized OV Vishleva - supposedly committed to the idea of "preventive war", - wrote: "The state does not allow sources are now assert that at the first opportunity, he (Stalin) would attack Germany; does not, however, reject this assumption " (Emphasis mine. - VN ). Referring to the fact that the version of "preventive war" received "extremelyconservativeandneo-fascisthistoriographyjournalism"Mertsalovasay:"Someofthe wordsanddeedsofStalinandhisgroup(sic!)Makethisversionplausible"(emphasisadded-.V.)

{173}.

During ongoing for several decades, debate about the content of Stalin's speeches to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army in the Kremlin, May 5, 1941, the participants operated by various historical sources on the subject, expressing sometimes oppositeopinionsdonotcoincideandmakingconclusionsaboutStalin's"scenario"oftheSoviet -Germanwarpresentedinthesestatements. By the mid-90s. in the research literature there are three main versions of the content of what wassaidbyStalinintheproductionofthemilitaryacademiesoftheRedArmy. First, Stalin's speeches on 5 May 1941 was "announced" the intention of the Soviet leader to achieve some "compromise" between the USSR and Germany, to delay the inevitable military confrontation. Second , within the meaning radically different from the previous one. The Soviet leader, speaking to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, allegedly stated unequivocally on the preparation of the Soviet Union attack on Germany, scheduled for August

1941Thisversionwas,inparticular,hasbeenadoptedbytheGermanhistorianJ.Hoffmann,and

Suvorov. Thethirdversionisakindof synthesizedversionsoftwooftheaboveandareasfollows.Stalin,

of5May1941wasallegedlywarnedthatGermany"inthenearfuture"willbeabletoattackthe

Soviet Union, but the Red [114] The Army is still not strong enough to cope with the Germans. Hencetheneedbyallmeans,especiallydiplomatic,todelaytheir attackontheSoviet Union.In case of success of such tactics in and out of armed conflict until 1942 did not exclude the possibilityoftakingtheinitiativeoftheUSSRwaragainstGermany. Russian historians have entered into the debate about the content of Stalin's remarks May 5,

1941atatimewhenculminatedaccusatorycampaignagainstSuvorovandotherWesternwriters

on the preparation of an offensive war to the USSR, among them - the German historian I. Hoffman. This circumstance is largely influenced by the nature of some of the views expressed duringthediscussion. Especially vigorously refuted the information about the contents of Stalin's speeches presented Hoffman.HehasusedthemfoundinGermanarchivesmaterialsinterrogationscommandersand politicalofficersoftheRedArmy,capturedbytheGermansafterthewarbetweenGermanyand theSovietUnion,whoattendedthereleaseofthemilitary"academics"intheKremlin.ANandLA Mertsalovaaskthefollowingquestions:"What(.Allocatedbytheauthors-VN)mayknowthese officers andeven generals about the true intentions of Stalin,how true their words recorded in the Nazi concentration camps?" {174} Of course, you should agree, that the testimony of Soviet prisonersofwar(eveniftheywereeyewitnessesthemselvesheardStalinsaidatthecelebrations

intheKremlinontheoccasionofthereleaseoftheRedArmymilitaryacademies)arefinalizedin writingbyrepresentativesof theGermanand,of course,interpretedonthe basisofthe current political situation then {175} . Even the German side during the war of 1941-1945. It did not reach a conclusion about the degree of objectivity of evidence {176} . In any case, consider the materials of interrogations andinterviews [115] isnecessary only after acomparison with other availabledocumentsandmaterialsandthoroughsourceanalysis. But AN and LA Mertsalova during the discussion with J. Hoffman went even to deny their own statements made before the start of the dispute. In the book of Russian authors, published in

1992,concluded:"OntheoffensiveintentionsoftheRedArmy("beattheenemyonitsterritory

") in the Soviet Union in the 30's - early 40-ies. We talked constantly and loudly. Again it is

stressedStalininaspeechbeforegraduatesofthemilitaryacademiesoftheRedArmyon5May

1941"{177}(emphasisadded-.V.)."Academics"Fromthisquotationitfollowsthattheauthors

knew the contents of Stalin's statements addressed to the military. Meanwhile, in his article in

1994,theyhavedeniedthethesisaboutthepresenceoftheleaderoftheSovietoffensiveplans

ontheeveofJune22,1941ThereMertsalovaputforwardanunprecedentedindictmentagainst

Hoffman,whoallegedlyoperatedthe"allegedintentionsofStalin,hisspeechofMay5,1941the

contentsofwhichscienceisunfortunatelyunknown"{178}.

ItappearsthatinthiscasethereasonforthisambivalenceintheconclusionsMertsalovarelating tothesameevent,iscertainlyexcessivedesire"toconvict"disagreeableGermanhistorian.

In1995-1998.repeatedlypublishedinRussianshorthandStalin'sspeechtext,toastingtheleader

andhisremarksatareception(banquet)ontheoccasionofthereleaseofwar"academics".She was found in the former Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CentralCommitteeandallegedlybelongedtothePeople'sCommissariatofDefenseemployeeKV

Semenov{179}.

A critical analysis of these three major versions of the content of Stalin's speeches to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army,based on short record and other sources, led to the conclusion that, in the first place, none of these versions can not be fully used in scientific research. Secondly, introduced by the end of the 90s. in turn sources, fixing Stalin's remarks May 5, 1941, does not give grounds to assert that Stalin said at the time about the

intentiontoattackGermany{180}.

Since Stalin's remark at a banquet in the Kremlin called to move from "defense" to "military policy of offensive operations",which wasbased on amodern, technical re-equipment and well equipped Red Army entered the debate in a more specific direction. The question about the meaning of what was said by the Bolshevik leader for seven weeks before the start of the Soviet-German armed conflict, based on the availability of these new sources in historiography was formulated quite specific: whether contained in Stalin's speeches call to prepare for an offensivewar? Inthisregard,itisnotquitecorrectconclusionOVVishlevaaboutthecontentofthecontroversy

surroundingStalin'sspeechMay5,1941g.:"Thedebategoeson:saidordidnotsayStalinabout

his intention to start a war against Germany?" {181} himself Vishlev, of course, it must understandthatStalinasasophisticatedpoliticianisunlikelywhetherhecoulddoinpublic(even among the elite Red Army) declare their intention tostart a war againstGermany.But for some reason, the historian concluded directly corresponds to the unproven assertion Rezun about

Stalin'sspeechMay5,1941"fullhall,-writesV.Suvorov-Stalininasecret(emphasisSuvorov-.

VN)speechspeaksofawarofaggressionagainstGermany,whichwillstartin1942

After the introduction of the scientific revolution of sources about the contents of Stalin's remarkstothegraduatesofthemilitaryacademiesoftheRedArmytorefertothefactthatthey were "unknown to science," it has become indecent. The main watershed in the debate on this

issueprovedtherecognition(ornon)Stalin'sintentionstoprepareforanoffensivewar.[116.117]

But here, in the way of an objective study of such an important and fundamental issue arose subjective obstacles - misunderstanding or unwillingness to admit the obvious significance of

Stalin'sspeechesMay5,1941

For example, LA Bezymenskii sought to prove that the call of the leader of the need to educate the Red Army in an offensive spirit, made at the issue of "military academics" was only propaganda unit. Bezymenskii advised not to dismiss "boastful statements about Stalin's

offensivepoweroftheRedArmy,"becausethelatterwassupposedly"greathoaxer"{183}.Such

calculations, given the very skeptical attitude to the scientific integrity of the LA Bezymenski

amongforeign{184},andamongtheRussianauthorsof{185},cannotbutcauseconcern.

GAKumanevandEE Shkliar,ontheone hand,quiterightly pointedtothecorrectness ofStalin's commitment to an offensive war in the concrete conditions of 1941, as this commitment, "determinedbythe needtoselectthe beststrategic plan"of warfare.Ontheother hand,when analyzing the content of Stalin's speeches have the impression that it is a "pre-planned

well planned disinformation." For,

according to them, it is difficult to explain otherwise made at the solemn meeting and a reception (banquet) in the Kremlin, Stalin's "revelations" about the reorganization of the Red

Armyand"preparingherinanoffensivespirit",whichalsomade"usingspecificnumbers"{186}.

NP Shuranov among the main events of May 5, 1941, and called Stalin's speech in the Kremlin, which, in his opinion, as well as other events of that day (the conversation the German ambassador in Moscow, F. Schulenburg with the Soviet ambassador in Berlin VG Dekanozov , spetsdonesenie chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate [118] FI Golikov), identified "the absolute inevitability of a further stage in the development of European, and international

relations"{187}.

PBGrechukhinbelievesStalinspeechon5May1941,alongwithanon-aggressionpactbetween

theUSSRandGermany,awatershedinthestatepolicyofthethenSovietleadership{188}.

Thus, in spite of the introduction to the scientific revolution of archival records of Stalin's speeches to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, their content was interpreted by historians in different ways. In many ways, this fact was due to the lack of a comprehensivestudyofallavailablesourcesofresearchers. By the mid-90s. along with archival publications about the content of Stalin's speeches at the celebrations in honor of graduates of military academies were introduced into scientific circulation previously unknown testimonies of participants in these celebrations, as well as contemporaryevents(NGKuznetsov,GeorgyZhukov,A.Muratov,NVG.Lyashenko,GMDimitrov, VV Vishnevsky, Frenkel Dzhugashvili). There was a fairly representative body of sources on the topic. As already noted, an attempt was made on the basis of the named sources and historiography achieve more thoroughly analyze the content of the "mystery" of speech and no lessmysteriousreplicaoftheBolshevikleader,soundedjustbeforetheGerman-Sovietwar. The analysis led tothe following conclusions: May 5, 1941, Stalin made it clear that Germany is regarded as a potential military adversary and the Soviet Union should move from a policy of

information leak" of "artfully prepared at the highest level

"{182}.

peace "to the military policy of offensive actions" and propaganda must be reconstructed in an offensivemanner.Stalin'sspeechtothegraduatesofthemilitaryacademieswerefullofpositive epithets against the Red Army, which, according to the leader, completed the process of organizational restructuring, modernization and technical [119] re-equipment with the latest means of struggle. It turned out, finally, that the greatest value as a source of Stalin's remarks May 5, 1941 purchase, when viewed in close connection with the propaganda materials of the

CPSU(b),theUPACPSU(b)andGUPPSC,belongingtotheMay-June1941.{189}.

But it is the "continuity link" between the content of the texts of Stalin's speeches and propaganda directives projects ready with orientation on them tothe CentralCommittee of the

CPSU(b)andGUPPKAinMayiyune1941city,anddonotwanttoseesomeoftheauthors.

Meanwhileevidentfromthesedocuments,asembodiedindicationoftheleaderofthetransition "to the military policy of offensive action." Their analysis enables us to understand that on the

eveof22June1941inSovietpropagandahasbeenaturnaround,andshebegantorebuildunder

thesloganof"aggressivewar".Inouropinion,inthepropagandaoftheSovietpaperscarriedthe idea of the need to thoroughly prepare for war, in any environment act "offensive manner"

{190}.

These conclusions are shared by some Russian and foreign researchers {191} . So, B. Bonvech agree with us that "on the basis of the obvious changes in the Soviet propaganda since Stalin's speech on 5 May 1941 can not be concluded that the Soviet Union definitely wanted to attack Germany.""Becauseofthechangesinthepromotion-developstheideaofaGermanresearcher -canreallyconcludethefollowing:Stalinwantedtopreparethecountry,andespeciallythearmy,

tothefactthattheSovietUnioncouldtakeoverfromtheGermanmilitaryinitiative"{192}.

According to O. Vishleva, discussions around the development of speech of the leader is proof that her version, propagated by western, primarily German, istorikami- "revisionists" (on May 5 sounded from the lips of Stalin call to attack Germany), allegedly received support "from a numberofRussianresearchers."Thisstatementlookslikeakindofdevelopmentputforwardby Vishlevym the thesis accordingtowhich domestic authorsbegan tostudy the said issue, not on thebasisoftheidentifiednewdocuments,andguidedbysome"instructions"(!)FromtheWest,

includingthosecontainedinthepublicationoftheGerman"revisionist"I.Hoffman{193}.

Whatdoyouthink,VPPopov,Stalin'sstatementabouttheneedtomove"fromthedefensiveto the offensive" indicative of one thing: until catastrophic leader had no doubt the Red Army defeatsthe summer and autumnof 1941 in the correctness of Soviet military doctrine, which is based on the idea of "retaliation" and were put Soviet deep battle, "Barrier" defense questions

{194}.

Finally,youcanread inthe new Russian multi-volumeon the history ofthe GreatPatriotic War:

"In a speech May 5, 1941 in the Kremlin, Stalin to the graduates of the military academies, in

essence,urgedthemnottobelievetheofficialpropaganda(sic!),Andtoprepareforwar"{195}.

All thisindicates the need foradditional, morein-depthstudyof the contentandsignificanceof Stalin's speeches May 5, 1941, taking into account not only all the available sources, but also in theprevailingversionsofopinionsandhistoriography. In historiography suggests that in the spring of 1941 Stalin least wanted to put "pre-emptive strike" in Germany, as was after the Soviet-Finnish (Winter) War of 1939-1940. "A clear view of the low combat power of the Red Army" {196} . Meanwhile, the preparation of a "preemptive strike"isnotassimpleasitmayseem,haslongandstormydebaterevolvesarounditwithinthe

"unplanneddiscussion". In1993,thefirstVD Danilov{197} ,andthen-YAGorkov{198} publishedapreviously unknown document - "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of Soviet forces in case of warwith Germanyanditsallies", preparedbytheGeneralStaffof theRedArmyinthefirsthalf of May 1941 The uniqueness of this document, [120,121] as referred to We met before {199} , doubtless because it was addressed to Stalin personally,as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (the official designation of this message was received May 6, 1941), and most importantly -containa proposalfora preemptivestrikehas not yethadtime toconcentratefor anattackonUSSRGermantroops. Turning to the circumstances of occurrence of the development genshtabovskie, MA Gareev

stressed: "The appearance of such a document in May 1941 is not accidental, and he could not be born only on the initiative of the General Staff. Indeed, the political leadership 'offensive mood "took place. In this spirit it was couched Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies, May 5, 1941 " {200} . The publisher of the document VD Danilov noted that any initiativeinthefieldofmilitaryandstrategicplanning,otherthanStalin,"couldberegardedasa

groupactionagainstthe"partyline",ie,Stalin,withalltheconsequences"{201}.

In an interview with historian VA Anfilovu GK Zhukov, seemingly put all points of the «i» in the matterofthecircumstancesofoccurrenceoftheMayplanoftheGeneralStaffoftheRedArmy in 1941, "The idea to prevent the attack of Germany, - stressed GK Zhukov - now we have to Timoshenko(CommissarofDefenceofthe USSR-.V.)inconnectionwithStalin'sspeechMay5, 1941 to the graduates of the military academies, in which he spoke of the possibility to act offensively."ThespecifictaskforadirectivewassettoMajorGeneralAMVasilevsky,thedeputy

chiefofGeneralStaff,OperationsManagement.May15,1941,thisdirectivewouldbesubmitted

totheChiefoftheGeneralStaffandthePeople'sCommissarofDefence.TimoshenkoandZhukov, thedocumentisnotsigned,anddecidedtoreportthecontentofthepre-developmentofStalin

personally{202}.

Since the publication of "Considerations

Staliniststrategy onthe eve of the warin 1941 -1945.Russian historians were divided intotwo camps, and representatives of each of them have expressed a completely opposite meaning arguments,consideringthematterindispute.

One group of researchers (most of them) emphasizes the formal signs "Considerations

GeneralStaffoftheRedArmyonMay15,1941,tryingtodownplaytheirsignificance.Typicalwas

theassertionthat,sincenowrittenmarkingsonthedocument,Stalindidnot,andtalkaboutthe incarnation genshtabovskie development in practice there is no point. The lack of resolution of StalinisseenasproofoffailureoftheleaderofthedevelopmentproposedAMVasilevskyandNF

Vatutin,behindwhichstoodSKTimoshenkoandGKZhukov{203}.

Proponents of this view do more categorical conclusions {204} . However, some of them sometimesfallintoconflict.Forexample,VAAnfilovinitiallyreportedthataboutStalin'sreaction tothe proposaloftheSoviet topmilitaryleadershipofapreemptivestrikeagainstGermanyany documentary material in the archives were found. Then the historian, contrary to previous conclusion, expressed confidence that the proposed May 15, 1941 Timoshenko and Zhukov

"operationalplan"leader"didnotapprove"{205}.

Youcanmeetandweightedgrades.Oneoftheauthorsofanewmulti-volumepublicationonthe history of the Great Patriotic War - NM Ramanichev specifies the following important fact: first,

" tense debate about their practical relevance in the

" the

the Soviet military theory of the late 30's - early 40-ies. It demanded that the commanders of marginalactivity;secondly,statutesaimedattheneedtoattacktheenemywhereverhemaybe. HenceRamanichevdrewtheconclusionthattheintentionofthePeople'sCommissarofDefence andChiefofGeneralStaffoftheRedArmytoturntothecountry'stopleadershipwithaproposal forapreemptivestrikeitseems"logical".

But, in his opinion, the "pre-emption" is not planned in advance and the supply of it, "was the result of actions of the German command to create his group [122,123] invasion." He does not write directly about the disapprovalof the GeneralStaff of the Red Army Stalin development of

15May1941,however,hebelievesthatthemakeanattemptto"testthereaction"theleaderon

the idea of pre-emptive strike Timoshenko and Zhukov received "unequivocal answer in rather harshterms,"theessenceofwhichwastochargetheseniormilitaryleadershipinthe"aspiration

toprovokeHitlertoattack"ontheSovietUnion{206}.

Another group of researchers, on the contrary, points to the practical significance of

"Considerations

thorough analysis of genshtabovskie development and concluded that it is an action document

{207}.ThisconclusionissharedbytheBVSokolov{208}.

Proponents of this view point to the ambiguity and evasiveness of the position of the publisher

"Considerations

Red Army has not yetunfolded German troopspromised significant benefits, but on the other - the Soviet side denied preparation for its implementation. Meanwhile, as has been repeatedly

emphasized,identifiedGor'kovdocumentspokeforitself{209}.

The research literature is widely believed, according to which in the General Staff of the Red

ArmywereontheeveofJune22,1941,alternativeplansofwar,aimedatboththedefenseand

theoffensive{210}.However,itdoesnotholdwater.EvenYAGorkov,featuringextremecaution

" on May 15, 1941 as the basic

document,emphasized: "The importance ofit is difficulttooverestimate,because it is with him

weenteredtheGreatPatrioticWar"{211}.Unequivocallyexpresseditsattitudetothisissue,NM

Ramanichev "adopted by the Soviet military command procedure for the development plan of the war did not provide the degree of reality and effectiveness of planning that ensure consistency,adopted in Germany.If severaloptions, and then on the basis of their final set was developedin the Wehrmacht,the Red Armynonexistent alternatives " {212} (emphasis added -. V.). Indeed, the idea of "pre-emptive strike", as reflected in the documents of the Soviet strategic planning in October 1940 -. May 1941 years, had no alternative. It was just suggested, for example, the chief of staff of the Baltic Special Military District Lieutenant-General PS Maple at the meeting of the supreme commandof the Red Army atthe end of December 1940 With the introductionofthescientificrevolutioninthemeetingmaterials,itwaspossibletoprovethisfact documented.PSMaplesraisedthequestionof"organizingaspecialkindofoffensiveoperations" of the initial period of the war, calling them "operations invasion" aimed at pre-emptive strike against the enemy, the army is "not finished yet and concentration are not ready to deploy"

{213}.

in their judgments about the significance of "Considerations

" JA Gor, which, on the one hand, recognized that pre-emptive strike by the

".

In the works of PN Bobylev, VD Danilov, MI Meltyuhova undertaken a

Strategy Games, conducted by the General Staff of the Red Army at the beginning of January 1941, as shown by PN Bobylev allowed to specify the possibility of conducting offensive

operationsoftheRedArmyintheNorth-WestandSouth-Westdirections{214}.

Apparently, after the meeting of the end of December 1940 and the beginning of the game on the cards in January 1941 offensive ideas became prevalentin the strategic development of the General Staff of the Red Army. This trend is reflected in "the amended plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East" (11 March 1941)

",

withtheresultthatcametolight"Considerations

Hence,the ideaofpre-emptivestrikeagainstGermanywasnot an"improvisation" leadershipof

theGeneralStaffoftheRedArmy.AndevenmoresotheprojectinMay1941theplanwasnota

"hastily formulated, ten days" as it [124.125] tries to portray VP Popov {217} . Its development canbetracedacertainevolution,anditisatallstageswascontrolledbyStalinpersonally. Numerous documentaries, which are based on the researchers in the study of Stalin's strategic plans in May and June 1941, were published on the pages of the press organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation - "Military History Magazine". However,in some cases, these publications made significant reductions and even distorted the original documents. This "feature" was revealed, for example, MA Gareyev in the publication "the amended plan for the

strategicdeploymentoftheArmedForcesoftheSovietUnionintheWestandEast"{218}.

" the General Staff of 15 May

It should be recalled that in the publication of "Considerations

{215}.ItisbasedontheguidanceofStalin'sRedArmyGeneralStaffreworked"Adjustedplan

"onMay15,1941{216}.

1941 in this magazine, as well as in subsequent reprints were "omitted" the most important, in our opinion, the accompanying printed materials, which are included as an integral part in the

strategicdevelopmentof:1)thedeploymentoftroopsonthecircuitmapscaleof1:1,000,000;2)

deployment scheme to cover 3 card; 3) the ratio of the scheme of Soviet and German armed

forces;4)card-basedRedArmyAirForce.

Onthepagesof"MilitaryHistoryMagazine"wereplacedtextsoperationalplansforthewestern

borderdistrictsofMay-June1941{219}.Intheprefacetothe"Noteonthecover-upofthestate

border on the territory of the Leningrad Military District" publishers, in particular, he stressed:

"Duetothe largevolumeofdocumentsprintedinthereduction. Readersarepresentedwith its basic provisions most clearly highlights the defensive nature (emphasis added -. VN ) objectives

ofthetroopscommandoftheLeningradMilitaryDistrict"{220}.

Thesecommentswillsurely makeyouthink aboutacertainbiasoftheirauthors.Notbychance

publishedarchivalmaterialson

the preparation of the western border military districts to cover-up their territories, despite the definitepurpose publications(.Emphasismine-VN),allisencouragedtofurtherthesearchfor an answer to the question of whether the Soviet troops were preparing to conduct offensive

operationsinthesecondhalfofthe30's-early40-iesagainstNaziGermany,"thisletter'sauthor

has rightly pointed out on the assumption that the publishers confusing the concepts of" aggression "and"offensive "(as already stressed,this kindof"confusion "isalso characteristic of someoftheparticipants'unplanneddiscussion").Inhisopinion,therewasnothingreprehensible in the fact that the Soviet leadership allowed for the defense along with the possibility of pre-emptive strike. He showed an example published "Military-historical magazine" plans cover the state border of the western military districts presence of a tendency to defeat the enemy's

activeoffensiveactions{221}.

inoneofthelettersinthe"JournalofMilitaryHistory"stated:"

VD Daniel drew attention to the bias supply materials operational planning eve of the Soviet-German war in this journal, believing that such publications appear as an attempt to "global revival of lies", which took place in the Soviet historiography in covering the events of

1939-1941.{222}.

Unfortunately, the practice of playing the most important documents relating to the pre-war period, with significant cuts, reducing the value of scientific sources, not been eliminated yet. It

featuresandproducersofdocumentarycollection"1941"{223}.

CausesofRedArmydefeatsthesummerof1941intheresearchliteraturehavebeenconsidered

in the context of the presence of the Soviet leadership offensive plans. But if, for example, AG Kumanev and EE Shkliar argued that the direct link between adherence to the concept of offensivewarandfailuretocross-borderbattletheRedArmycannotbetraced,otherhistorians

haveexpressedtheoppositeopinion.VDDanilov[126,127]explainsthefailureofthesummerof

1941 Stalin's shortsightedness. Chief, ordered the preparation of a pre-emptive strike, did not expectthattheenemywillovertakehimandhewillstrikeamonstrousforce,andasaresult-the Red Army was not ready either to defend or to attack {224} . With Danilov identify themselves and other authors {225} , although some of them are characterized by a tendency to

indiscriminatechargesbyStalinorwithoutcause{226}.

Thanks to the introduction in the scientific revolution of new documents concerning the preparationofthe USSR for apreemptive strike,began tospeak,andthe more radicalopinions. Recognizing the right of Stalin first start fighting, some authors declare: Stalin such actions and such a development would allow not only the defeat of fascism, but to save at least 20 million

lives.{227}.

Undoubtedly deserves attention withdrawal of VD Daniel on cross-cutting theme of training Soviet preemptive strike in 1941 and the need for its comprehensive analysis, which would involve not only historians, but also political scientists, philosophers, lawyers, economists,

militarytheorists{228}.

Readingthebook"Icebreaker"and"M-Day"ViktorSuvorov

By an irony of life politicized history puts us took such blindness that does not need to be a historian to know the truth. It should not be a professional in order to overturn the habitual dogma.Youneedtobealonehermittogetridofthepressureoutweighinganyscalesalwaysto thesameboredomcontemporaryopinions. Thus was born more to the story, but the spark of truth, for which then will be inciting the footnotes and citations, documents and memories. And, having finished reading on the list of sourcesused,weunderstandthatthisisnotjustabook,ahistoricalwork-onemorestep,dueto theauthor'sability tobringuscloser totheelusive topof truth whichseekstoknowandwhich never enters the historian, not able to experience, explore and describe all the twists superhumandesign. Among the red tape and the trivial ideas and people whose books you never tell them apart if throwing up cover pages of written volumes, the work of Viktor Suvorov "Icebreaker" and

"Day-M"-anoutstandingphenomenon.[133]

And precisely because the author of these books never nothing will convince a large army of professionalhistorians,Iamwritingtheselinesinthehistoryofdefense,indefenseofthetruth, indefenseoftheauthor'sbookssoextraordinary.Iwritewithgratitudeandwithzealashimself for a long time, even before, as in the "Russian idea" articles began to appear Suvorov, I

concluded that, "of course," Stalin himself was going to attack Hitler. Only this can explain his

behaviorin1939-1941(infact,inthepast).

Where to start? In 1974 I wrote a term paper on the first weeks of the war. My supervisor EE Shkliar praised it as "written in the spirit of Nekrich" put "four" and filed a report to the appropriatedean's office.IrealizedthatIwasgoingintherightdirection,andshowedthe work of a friend of my father's children's writer Victor Vazhdaevu. He also was unhappy with "biased selectionof factsandsources,"andtoldmetheanecdote ofthetime: "Beforethe warthereon the Soviet-German border Soviet and German officers. The first asks the second: - Why is the focusonourborderastheGermantroops? Thesecondanswers:YestheyaretootiredontheWesternFrontandspannedhereonvacation. Bytheway,whythisfocusonourborderasSoviettroops? AndthattheGermansoldiersnothingpreventedtherest,-meetsaSovietofficer." So I learned about the concentration of Soviet troops on the border with Germany. From anecdote.Thus beganmy"Icebreaker" and"Day-M." Tenyears later,inthe US, Irealized that in June 1941 toexplainwithout ahistory of the German-Bolshevik relations during the FirstWorld

War.Afterreadingnow"Icebreaker"(p.18):"ForthepurposesandspiritoftheBrestpeace-this

isatesttheMolotov-RibbentropPact.CalculationofLeninin1918andStalin'scalculationin1939

"- and I was amazed and touched. The author, who has seen this relationship,

understand,andeverythingelse. As the author,engaged inthe Brestpeace, I,of course, haveanycommentson the introductory chapters of the book "Icebreaker". But at least we Suvorov speak the same language. And

different - with all the others. At the signing of the Brest peace settlement Lenin was deeper. "ThedefeatofGermanywasalreadyclose,-writesV.Suvorov-asLeninconcludespeace,under

whichRussiarenouncesitsrightstotheroleofawinner

million square kilometers of the most fertile land and abundant industrial areas of the country and even pays a contribution in gold. Why ?! "(" Icebreaker ", p. 17). A Suvorov: that the war continuedandGermanyhadexhausteditselfanditsWesternalliesasmuchaspossible. Itisdifficultnottoagree,withtheonlycaveatthatsuchanassertioniscontrarytoconventional wisdomaboutthedesireofLeninassoonaspossibletoignitetherevolutionaryconflagrationin Germany.Oneoftwothings:eithertoacceleratetherevolutioninGermanyanddidnotsignthe Brest peace, and to conduct an open (the position of Bukharin and other Left Communists) or undeclared (the position of "neither peace nor war," Trotsky) war or substantially eliminate the East front sign an armistice with Germany and help the German government - let us not forget the epithets: reactionary, imperialist, militarist - keep the front of the West against Russia's formerallies. Leninchosethe latter.Andheisnot,the signatureofthe chairmanoftheSNK,rippedtheBrest peace,andstandinginoppositiontotheentirepolicyoftheSovietLeninBrestasset-theCentral ExecutiveCommittee,signedbySverdlov,Leninhadalreadypushedbackinthefightforpowerin

thecriticalmonthsofthesecondhalfof1918.IfnotfortheactualremovalofLenin'spartyaffairs

withoutafight.LeningivesGermanya

is the same

in the summer of 1918 (it was due to his extremely unpopular policy of Brest), Brest-Litovsk, possibly never would have been broken by the Soviet government. [134.135] And the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 have not been considered by us likea jerk, but only as a smooth transition from theBrestagreementforanew,moreequitable.

OnecanhardlyagreewithTrotsky(1936),towhichSuvorovagreethat"withoutStalinwouldnot

have been Hitler." Without demeaning and unacceptable conditions for Germany's Treaty of VersailleswithouttheBolshevikthreathangingoverEurope,inGermany-yes!-Therewouldbe noHitler.Inthissense,forthevictoryofNationalSocialisminGermany,Stalin,apparently,isless liablethanthepublicfiguresofFrance,BelgiumandEngland.Trotskyhimselfconstantpreaching abouttheinevitabilityofthevictoryoftheCommunistrevolutioninGermanyhadHitlertohelpa lot more than all the others. Are well-known facts about the now Soviet-German cooperation between1922 and1941 (which is alwaysdeniedby bothparties). Here is whathe wrote,giving out state secrets, Trotsky, March 5, 1938 in the article "The Secret alliance with Germany," published in the "New York Times": "Since the overthrow of the Hohenzollern [Soviet] governmentsoughtadefensiveagreementwithGermany-againsttheEntenteandtheTreatyof Versailles. However, the Social Democrats, who played at that time in Germany, the first violin, wasafraidofanalliancewithMoscow,pinningtheirhopesonLondonandespeciallyWashington. On the contrary, the Reichswehr officers, despite the political hatred of communism, believed necessary diplomatic and military cooperation with the Soviet republic. Since the Entente countries are not in a hurry to meet the aspirations of social democracy, the "Moscow" orientationReichswehrbegantoexertinfluenceonthegovernmentsector.Thehighpointofthis period was the conclusion of Rapallo agreement on establishment of friendly relations between

SovietRussiaandGermany(17Apr.1922).

War Department, headed by I stood, started in 1921, to the reorganization and rearmament of the Red Army, which is a martial law passed on peacefully. It is interested in improving military technology,we could at the time towait for promoting only from Germany.On the other hand, the Reichswehr, the Treaty of Versailles deprived of development opportunities, particularly in the area of ​ ​ heavy artillery, aviation and chemistry naturally sought to use Soviet military industry as an experimental field for military equipment. The band of German concessions in Soviet Russia wasopenedback inthatperiod, when Iwascompletely absorbed in the CivilWar. Themostimportantofthemaccordingtohisability,orrather,forHopeisaconcession"Junkers" aviation company. Around these concessions rotated a certain number of officers. In turn, the individual members of the Red Army visited Germany, where he got acquainted with the organizationofthe Reichswehr andthe part of the Germanmilitary "secrets"thatthey showed. All this work was done, of course, under the cloak of secrecy,as head of the German sword of Damocles hung Versailles obligations. Officially, the Berlin government has not taken in this matternopart,evenasitdidnotknowaboutit:theformalresponsibilitylayontheReichswehr, ontheonehand,andtheRedArmy-ontheother.Allnegotiationsandpracticalstepsweremade in strict confidence. But it was mainly a secret from the French government as the most direct opponent.Themystery,ofcourse,didnotlastlong.AgencyoftheEntente,especiallytheFrench, easily foundnearMoscowhasanaircraftfactory "Junkers"andsomeother enterprises.InParis, we gave to our cooperation with Germany, of course, an exaggerated importance. Serious development is not received, since neither the Germans nor we did not have the capital. In addition,themutualdistrustwastoogreat.However,duetotheReichswehrpoludruzhestvennye

preservedandlater,after1923,whenKrestinskiybecameambassadorinBerlin.

On the part of Moscow, this policy was not carried out by me personally and by the Soviet government asa whole, rather [135.137] say it the nerve center,ie, Politburo.Stalin wasall the time a member of the Politburo, and, as shown by all his subsequent behavior, up until 1934, whenHitler rejected the outstretchedhandof Moscow,Stalinwasthe mostpersistentadvocate

ofcooperationwiththeReichswehrandtheGermangeneral. Observation of the German military was carried out through concessions Rosengoltz as a representativeoftheheadofthemilitarydepartment.Becauseofthedangeroftheintroduction of military espionage Dzerzhinsky, the head of the GPU, in collaboration with the same Rozengoltsconductedsurveillanceforconcessionsonitspart. The secret archives of the War Department and the GPU should have been, of course, save the documentin which cooperationwith the Reichswehr said inavery cautious andsecret terms

"It is interesting material on this subject can be found in foreign archives, in particular, in the collection of B. J. Nicholas at the Hoover institution. Here is what he wrote and Menshevik economistNVValentine-WolskiinalettertoRAAbramovich,oneoftheMenshevikleadersofthe party: "Arriving in the summer of 1927 in Lipetsk, to my great surprise, he found it full of Germansand in the sky above him as muchflying airplanes, as Ihave not seen atthis time and Moscow.In Lipetsk were arsenals and aerogary Germans protected the GPU. All the inhabitants were aware of this, but no one dared to talk about - such GPU arrested. At the cemetery in

] When,

Lipetsk was a corner with monuments in honor of the victims of German aviators. [

coming from Lipetsk (I have been there a mud bath) and visiting Rykov, in a conversation with

him,IspokeGermanaviatorsin Lipetsk,hedryly interruptedme, saying:"I'm sorry,thiswill not

tellyou"(crate.591,p.14.LetterVolskyVolsky-RAAbramovichonJan28.1958,p.4-6).Already

about 1924 the connection between the headquarters of the Red Army and Bendelshtrasse carriedoutthroughtheRedArmycommandersofhighrank(TukhachevskyandBerzin)andback through the German officers, who shuttled between Berlin and Moscow "with service instructions" (crate. 508, p. 44 . Erich Wolenberg. Erich Vollenberg BI Nikolaev. Letter from

HamburgtoCaliforniaonApr20,.1965Trans.fromGerman.).

ValentinealsosaidAbramovich,thatsince1924,"Junkers"builtintheUSSRandthattheaircraft

in Samara plant for production of poison gases was built. Abramovich was also aware of the Soviet-German military cooperation. Here is what he said Valentinov: "On this I have a very extensive material based on more than 225 books, reports, articles, etc. German and others. Press.ItbeganbackintheCivilWar,whenChicherinwasatnightintheGermanembassytothe "heir" von Mirbach Helferich and offered him a tacit military agreement for a joint struggle [together] with the Germans, Balts and Finns against the British in the Murmansk and

Arkhangelsk.ItwasinJuly-August1918,tocontinuethiscooperationuptoHitlerandHitler.The

and whatyou are reporting is now in

initial period [was] about 1926 .; now out of disputes [

the letter of Lipetsk and Trotsky (the so-called town near Samara, which has the chemical gas plant for the Germans -. YF ). On these chemical grenades thundered the whole of Germany, when German Social-Democrats persuaded Hamburg movers to drop a few boxes of the Soviet ship and across the promenade in front of many people scattered fans with a suffocating gases with the RSFSR mark. Then btsg question in Parliament, public debate, and the incident was hardly extinguished "(crate. 591, p. 14. Letter from R. Abramovich NV Valentinov-Wolski. Feb 4.

1958,p.2).

Much has been said about this after the Second World War, when abroad turned out a large number of former Soviet citizens captured or interned by the Germans during the war. One of theseemigrants,L.Trenin,wrote:"The beginning ofGermaninfluencemustbeconsideredfrom 1922, when the Soviet regime between Germany and was concluded a secret agreement on

armamentandtechnicalequipment[138,139]oftheRedArmy.Fromaneconomicpointofview,

]

this agreement has brought some benefit to Germany, because of the chemical and military aviation stocks remaining after the Great War, and to be destroyed, it subsided to the Soviet

In the second half of 1922 the German aviation experts - officers of the

Reichswehr -arrived inMoscow,signedacontractfor5 yearsandfoundedinFili,near Moscow, theaircraftfactory.AlltechnicalequipmentwasbroughtfromGermany.Operatingandtechnical

staff was also the first time a German. Also in 1922 the first Russian-German aviation company "Derulyuft" was founded, which has established the first line Moscow - Koenigsberg. At the beginning of 1923, another group of German officers Chemical was founded in the 12 km from Moscow,betweenthemountains.Lyubertsyandmountains.Lublinmilitarychemicalsmallplant. First time here worked only a few dozen people, including senior staff. These were the only Germans.Thisplantaloneisnochemicalproductsarenotproduced,andtheproblemitwasonly in the equipment of mines, artillery shells and chemical poisonous smoky drafts chloropicrin, adamsiteand other toxicsubstances, imported from Germany.The plant also produced the test ofthesemines,shells,grenades,andgasandwaves.Allthistookplaceinthefutureofscientific

testchemicallandfill.[

two large chemical plant. [

] one of the

When in 1925 these plants were ready,the Bolsheviks decided to

ownchemicalfootageandbuilt

government. [ ]

]Gradually,theBolshevikscreatedtheir

]

liquidate the German chemical plant. Since the contract was valid until 1927, [

nightsofautumnSeptember1925theysetfiretothefactoryandthehouseofGermansserving

inPodosinki(17kmfromMoscowtoKazanRailway).Fromtheplantwasoneshedwithchemical

products, and a house burned to the ground. After that, the Bolsheviks were accused of

sabotaging the Germans. [

another German team of aviation specialists "(crate. 295, p. 23. P. Trenin." The Germans and RussianAviakhim."Cuttingfromthenewspaper). Around about the same article reported unnamed Nicholas archive: "As a result of very hard work and painstaking semi-official representatives of the Reichswehr (since 1922) in the USSR

there are now decent stocks of German property and the entire military-industrial organization (officially" Voenveda SOEs ") by the means of the German Reichswehr and with his direct

technical control. [

improvement of the English type of tanks, setting to the proper level of military aviation and chemicalbusiness.InthefieldofmarineReichswehrhadworkedintheimprovementoftechnical

diving"(crate.14,n.1.TheReichswehrandtheComintern.Nodateandnoauthor,pp.1,3).For

military cooperation should have a political and even ideological convergence. The fight against the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (Rhineland) in early 1923 was presented just as the action of the Comintern. On illegal work have been abandoned to Soviet agents. At the same time they discussed the "plans of battle Russian-German forces with French imperialism on the

RhineandthesupplyoftheReichswehrandtheGermannationalistsSovietgrenades"(crate.629,

p.3.SuhomlinV.Theringbetrayal.BetrayalTrotsky,Stalin,Bukharin,Chinese,English,etc.-.Will

Russia,1926,p131)

Disagreements on the Soviet-German relations were one of the causes of the conflict between StalinandBukharin."InthepositionofBukharinhadahugeimpactforeignpolicyissues-wrote Nicholas. - It is on them, he broke with Stalin, Bukharin in 1926 came to the conclusion that Germany has ceased to be a country in semi-colonial status. Remember Bukharin article in "Pravda" in 1926-1927 gg., He argued, [140,141] that after Locarno Germany ceased to be a countrytoexploit?Afterall,itis-againstStalin.Stalinclungtothealliancewith theReichswehr

]

Shortly thereafter,was ejected from the aircraft factory in Fili and

]

The Reichswehr cared mainly about artillery and machine-gun Red Army:

Bredow-Schleicher. Ludwig Reis, who was killed in 1937 in Switzerland, received the Order of Lenin for the factthathe wasinearly 1928 established a secretrelationshipwith the leadersof

theGermanNavalIntelligence.FromthatmomentbeginsapurelyStalinistsecretgameAgentur-

twice underground. In a conversation with Bukharin, Kamenev meet her allusions to Stalin's

refusaltosubjectshahtintsevpunishmentsforrelationswiththeGermans"(crate476,paragraph

34. Letter Nicholas from October 6, 1965,1;

October2nd.1961,p.1).

NikolaevmentionedtheconversationwithKamenevBukharintookplaceinJuly1928.Justatthis

time,inMay-July,Moscowhostedthetrialof"wreckersintheDonbass"-theso-called"Shakhty affair". The case was fabricated. Five of the accused were sentenced to death, the others - to various terms of imprisonment. The defendants were accused of including spying for Germany. AndStalin'sproposaldoesnotgivethedeathpenalty,whichinsistedintheend,Bukharinandhis supporters,wasseenasflirtingwithGermany. "I am impressed by your argument that Stalin was pro-German sympathies - Nikolaev wrote a former Communist, then known sovietologist Louis Fischer. - I understand that he would welcome closer cooperation with the Reichswehr. It was in the Leninist tradition began, as I

understand it, in 1919, which means that Trotsky and Chicherin, of course, seen in the benefit. After Stalin waited a year Hitler came to power in January 1933. I was in the same year in Moscow.

[ ]

the Polish-Japanese simultaneous attack against the USSR. For this reason, mainly, the CER was sold to Manchukuo (Japanese) in 1935. Of course, Stalin wanted to direct Hitler's expansion to theWest.ButtheGermanmilitaryworkinSpainisnotdamagedHitler.Itwasawaytotrainthe armedforces.ThepurposeoftheStalinistpolicyinSpain,inmyopinion,wastoforceFranceand England toabandonthe foreignpolicy of appeasementof Hitler andMussolini,andgetthem to take the path of active resistance. Munich showed that this attempt ended in failure. Chamberlain,DaladierandRooseveltdidnotgoagainstHitler.ButduringthistimeStalinthrough thecleaningmadesurethatitwascompletelyfreetoactinforeignanddomesticpolicy.And,of course,heisnowbacktohisgoal:collaborationwiththeNazis. Ithink thatthe dateprior tothe Nazi-Soviet agreementof August23,1939,is April1, 1939, the

day the British guarantees to Poland. [

Moscow has always feared foreign invasion. In 1934 Radek toldme thatStalin was afraidof

Crate472, p.32 Letter Nicholas I.M. Berger on

]

The negotiations with France and Britain were open.

NegotiationswithGermany-amystery.IfStalinwantedtoreachanagreement withBritainand France, he would have done exactly the opposite way: would conduct open negotiations with

HitlertoittoputpressureontheWesttoextractmoreconcessions.ButtheWesthadnothingto give. They could not give the Baltic States, and an agreement with the West,the war meantfor theSoviet Union,while theagreementwith Hitler meantthe absenceof warforsometime and imperialistexpansion-justwhatStalinwanted.

We disagree that [

to seriously Stalin conducted a policy of collective security. I believe that

Litvinov wasserious andthathecouldnot actagainst the willof Stalinin thisquestion. But this policy has failed on the Rhine, in Spain and everywhere. And Stalin abandoned it and turned to Hitler"(crate.479,p.13.Letterfrom LouisFisher(LouisFischer) NikolaevonJanuary 26th.1966 Trans.FromEnglish.).

Nicholassaid,"Slutsky,thechiefoftheNKVDinotdelagivinginstructionsKrivitsky,in1935said:"

Know that we are with Germany anyway, but collusion. " [142.143] And the true foreign policy

]

was [

]

through Slutsky. The latter then told Krivitsky: "Remember that your reports carefully

read Stalin himself." [

moreover,alargeconspiracytostruggleagainsttheAnglo-Saxons.Hewasastaunchsupporterof hauskhoferovskogovariantof geopolitics,Haushofer himself in Stalinhadsent secret reports for manyyears. And Molotov knew,he said, when in his speech before the Supreme Council ofthe signing of the treaty with Hitler spoke of the genius Stalin's providence. Of course, when Hitler openly led the anti-Soviet policy, Stalin could not act against him, but he always played, not to makeit impossible todealinthe future. Itwashisstruggle forSoviet-Hitler pact"(crate. 479, p.

13.LetterNicholasLouisFischer4Feb.1966,p.1).

"Itoldyouinoneofourconversations,thatthedecisiontocometotermswithHitler,Stalinwas in April 1936, when it became clear that France against Hitler she would not go. Now I crept seriesofdatainthisarea.[ ]Bytheway,didyouknowthattheapartmentWilhelmIIinDoorne wasastrongholdofthe work ofStalin'sagents? WhatsecretpamphletagainstHitler,writtenby

MathildeLudendorff,KrivitskywasreproducedanddistributedWilliam'swife?Itwasin1936-in

1938 the generals who visited Doorn, were arrested. Krivitsky was convinced that they gave to

Hitler,Stalin"(crate.479,p.13.LetterNicholasFischeronDecember14.1965,p.2).

ItisappropriatetogobacktothebooksV.SuvorovandaskwhetherHitlerandStalinweregoing toabidebytheagreement.Andwhenitisthefirstandtheseconddecidedtobreak. UnconditionalmeritofSuvorovisthattheydateoftheStalin'sdecisiontoinitiatemilitaryaction against Germany was named: August 19, 1939 - the day of the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.This mayseem paradoxical,but the only waytoexplainallthe subsequent behaviorofStalin,andwhichdedicateshisbooksV.Suvorov. In terms of the position of Hitler's mysteries there. It can be argued that the fundamental decision to break with Stalin he took during Molotov's visit to Berlin in late 1940. Molotov demanded from the Germans then the consent of the Soviet occupation of Romania, Bulgaria, FinlandandtheStraits.Hitlerrespondedwithdecisiverefusalandsignedadirectivetoattackthe USSR. Beforethe war,inthe 1938/39 financialyear,Germanyhas spent onarms 15% of their national income - the same as England. Hitler did not want to arm themselves at the expense of the welfareoftheGermanpeople.Inaddition,itcouldleadtoadropinpopularity. In the Soviet Union for defense spending in the first three years of the third five-year plan was

officiallytook26.4%ofallbudgetallocations,andin1940thispercentagewasequalto32.6.And

in1941,itplannedtospendondefense43.4%ofbudgetallocations.

These dry figures lead us to the conclusion that the Soviet government was preparing for war. However,until 19 August 1939, Germany was not the main enemyof the Soviet Union's foreign

policy.ThisenemywasJapan,andStalin'spolicytowardtheChineseRevolution1926-1927years

isprimarilyconcernedwiththeage-oldSoviet-Japaneseconflict. The refusal of the Soviet government from the open intervention in the Chinese revolution, on which so insisted "Left Opposition" of Trotsky, was another "Brest agreement." All developed under the scheme 1918, only inplace of Lenin, Stalin wason the site of Bukharin - Trotsky.Like the Left Communists in 1918, the Left Opposition urged party activists that the policy of the Soviet Government with regard to the Chinese revolution will inevitably lead to its defeat. Like Lenin in 1918, Stalin did not want to take risks, because they understand that the active intervention in Chinese affairs will lead to conflict with the [144,145] Japan and the USSR to it

]

Stalin himself always dreamed of conspiring with Germany, and,

wasnotready.StalinsacrificedtherevolutioninChina,asLenindonatedrevolutioninGermany-

for respite. The Chinese revolution has really ended in defeat, but the time has been won, and the first serious conflict with Japan broke out only in 1938, when the Soviet state was much stronger.

Alreadyin1937,beganthecreationofastrongindustrialbaseintheUrals,theFarEast,Siberia,

Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Today, this fact leads to the proof of the foresight of the Soviet government, almost foresaw not only a war with Germany, but also the evacuation of industry, carried out during the war. Meanwhile, at the end of the 1930s the main enemy of the Soviet

Union'sforeignpolicywasJapan.ItwasinSeptember1937,SoviettroopsweresenttoMongolia.

Somewhat earlier, in the summer of 1937, the Japanese began to seize China. In July they had occupied Beijing in November - Shanghai, in December - Nanjing. By October 1938 they had occupiedalargepartofChinawithmajorindustrialcentersandmajorrailwaylines. Historianspointout thatJapan's foreignpolicy goalsweretocapture the SovietFar East.During 1936-1938 years on the Soviet-Far Eastern border occurred 35 major military clashes with the Japanesearmy,themostseriousofwhichwasacollisionattheendofJuly1938intheareaof

LakeKhasan. Only asa resultof fiercebattles thatlasteduntil9 August1938, Soviet territory was cleared from the Japanese. In May 1939, Japan launched a war against Mongolia (and indirectly-againsttheUSSR).MilitaryactiononKhalkhinGoallastedfourmonthsandendedonly

afterthesigningoftheRibbentrop-MolotovinAugust1939duetomoreandMediationHitler.

Thus,the creationofasecondeconomicbaseoftheUSSRintheeastofthecountry inanycase wasnotcausedbytheexpectationofwarwithGermany,butonlyadesiretomoveclosertothe industrialbasepotentialfront-FarEast. The establishment of the Soviet Union, the second economic base, much less worried about

Hitler.Directive 21oftheSupremeCommand(the"PlanBarbarossa")includedavictoryover theSovietUnion"duringtheshortcampaignbeforethewarwillbeoveragainstEngland."Butdo not after the Soviet historians repeat that Hitler lost, as it does not take into account "the ideologicalfactor"-thecourageoftheRedArmy.Wecansaywithcertaintythatonlyiswhathe leftout.ThereportoftheGermanGeneralStaff"OnthepoliticalandmoralstabilityoftheSoviet

UnionandofthecombatpoweroftheRedArmy"dated1January1941,interalia,itstated:"The

armed forces of the Soviet Union, apparently,must be rebuilton a newbasis, especially inview

oftheexperienceoftheFinnishwar.FromtheBolshevikmegalomania to the scrupulous individual training officers and enlisted personnel

discipline (the abolition of the Institute of Commissioners, the introduction of the officer and

).

sergeant ranks, generals uniforms, saluting improvementoftheRedArmyinallareasoflife

All these measures should ensure a gradual DonotchangeRussiannationalcharacter:the

TheRedArmyreturned become much stricter

heaviness, schematic, fear of taking their own decisions, to liability.Commanders at all levels in thenearfuturewillnotbeevenabletoquicklycommandthelargemoderncompoundsandtheir elements. And now,in the near future, they are unlikely to conduct major offensive operations, useoffavorableconditionsforrapidstrikes,totakethe initiativewithinthe overallcommandof

thetask

particularlyintheareaofinteractionofallthearmedforces,massofthesoldiersdidnotrespond; a single soldier will often [146.147] lacking own initiative. In defense, especially prepared in advance, the Red Army would be hardy and resistant, able to achieve good results. Ability to withstand defeat and provide passive resistance to the pressure of the enemy were particularly

Thetroopswillfightbravely.Buttherequirementsofmodernoffensiveengagement,

characteristic of Russian nature. The strength of the Red Army lies in the large number of weapons, unassuming, and hardened soldier's courage. The natural ally of the army are the expanses of the country and off-road. The weakness lies in the slowness of commanders of all degrees of attachment to the scheme insufficient for modern conditions of education, fear of responsibilityandalackoftangiblethroughouttheirorganization."

ThefirstdaysofthewartheGermanswereformucheasierthananticipatedtheirplans.June22,

1941ChiefofGeneralStaff,GeneralHalderwroteinhisofficialblog:"Theoffensiveofourtroops,

apparently,was allover the frontof the complete tactical surprise. Border bridges over the Bug and other rivers throughout our troops captured without a fight, and in complete safety.About our utter surprise attack by the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the parts were taken by surpriseinthebarracks,planeswereontheground,coveredwithatarpaulin,andadvancedunits, suddenlyattackedourtroops,commandrequestedthattheydo.Youcanexpectanevengreater influence on the surprise element of the course of events as a result of rapid progress pieces, which are now everywhere have the opportunity to complete. Naval Command also reported that the enemy was apparently caught by surprise. In recent days, it is completely passively watchingalltheactivitiescarriedoutbyus,andisnowconcentratingitsnavalforcesintheports, obviouslyforfearofmines

The Air Force reported that our air force destroyed 800 enemy aircraft. [148] Our aircraft could

underminelosslessapproachestoLeningradfromthesea.Germanlossesarestill10airplanes.

The command "South" army group to report that our patrols, unopposed, crossed the Prut Bridgesinourhands

After the initial "tetanus", caused by the

suddenness of the attack, the enemy went into action nomanualactionsbytroopsfromthehigherheadquarters

due to its slowness in the near future do not in a position to organize a rapid counter our

offensive

Stalin.KhrushchevtestifiesinhismemoirsthatStalinhaddeserted,throwingthereins.Theother membersofthegovernment,especiallyMolotovandBeria,tryingatallcoststosettlewithHitler started "conflict". As noted in his diary Halder, "they turned to Japan to represent Russia's interests on the political and economic relations between Russia and Germany, and are lively talksontheradiowiththeGermanMinistryofForeignAffairs." The negotiationswerenotsuccessful.Inhisvictory,Hitler wassurejusthowStalininhisdefeat. In autumn1941, the German government hasdecided tocurtailits military industry.October 3, 1941, Hitler said: "We are so provided all advance, I in the midst of the battle can stop further productionofweaponsinlargeindustries,forIknowthatnowthereisnoenemy,wewouldnot beabletocrushwiththehelpoftheexistingstockofweapons". Human Germany reserves by September 1941, on the merits, has not been affected by serious mobilization, [149] while in June 1941, the number of German soldiers came to 7.254 million people. While the Soviet government for the first day of the war mobilization order for military service 1905-1918 yearsof birth, the German army after the attack on the Soviet Union didnot produceadditionalmobilizations. Nothinghaschanged,andafterthedefeatatMoscow,withtheexceptionoftheJanuaryorderof

Hitlerin1942ontheredistributionofbudgetallocationswithinthemilitary.Itreducesthecostof

the most expensive type of weapons - military ships - and increased military spending of the

Protection of the border has been generally weak

along sections of the frontwas almost ItseemsthattheRussiancommand

there is no organized resistance "Hitler would be satisfied. It was otherwise with

Army. OnlyafterthedefeatatStalingrad,HitlerbegantoapproachthewarwiththeSovietUnionmore seriously.January 13, 1943 the so-called total mobilization was declared in Germany.But it was

nottomobilizeitself,andtoregisterfortheworkofmilitarymenaged16to65andwomenaged

17 to 45 years old. However, despite the serious situation on the fronts of Germany, women's

workinGermanindustryuntil1944isalmostunused,aswellaschildren,asitwasbelievedthat

itcorrupts familyandhasabadeffectonthe moraleof the menwho wereinthe army.Female and child labor in Germany, partially offset by labor of foreign workers and prisoners of war, which in the spring of 1943, there were 6,259,900 people in the German industry. Thus, if the Sovietindustryfromthefirsttothelastdayofthewarworkedforwearandallable-bodiedmen were mobilized into the army, and unhealthy, teenagers and the elderly - in the militia, only to Germany in 1943-1944, under the influence of the defeat at Stalingrad and the Allied bombing Germancities,hasbecomeaseriousconcernforthewar. The German military industry has achieved its best performance in the days when the greatest

scopebroughtbombardmentallies-inJuly1944.Then,inthesecondhalfof1944,thesizeofthe

German army, despite the many losses at the front, in general, has been brought to 9.4 million peoplewithoutwork.

Afterthesummerof1944becauseofthebombingandthelossofterritoriestherewasadecline

intheGermanwarindustry.YetinMarch1945,GermanyproducedmorearmsthaninJune1941,

whenHitlerstartedthewaragainsttheSovietUnion. InoneofhisspeechesStalincalledwarcompetitionsystemsinwhichthesocialistsystemproved its advantages over National Socialist. The Soviet system, of course, was more totalitarian. In termsofmobilizationforthe frontorintherearofthework shewaswilling togomuchfurther National Socialist. At the very beginning of the war in the Soviet Union a peaceful sector of the industry, including the food, was reduced to nothing. Even under German occupation Poles mobilizedtoworkinthefactories,fedbetterthantheSovietrear. Even though it is difficult imaginable voltage, which experienced the Soviet economy and the Soviet people, the war still would not have been won without the economic help of allies, particularlytheUnitedStates.TheissueofthisaidtheSoviethistoriographysilenced.Amongthe thousands of books about the Second World War, no one specifically dedicated to this topic. Meanwhile,assistancewasessential.

EnglandbegandeliveriestotheSovietUnioninAugust1941.Onlyinthelastquarteritdelivered

669aircraft,487tanks,330tankettes.Armsandstrategicrawmaterialsto41milliondollars.Put

theSovietUnioninthefirstmonthsoftheSoviet-Germanwar,theUnitedStates.Atthe timeof the German occupation of largeparts of the Europeanterritory of the USSR andthe evacuation ofindustryandtransferitonawarfootingtheSovietUnionarmsactuallyproduced.Inthislight,

theimportanceoftheinitialsupplyofalliesbecomesapparent.[150.151]

October 30, 1941, ie before the Battle of Moscow,when the Soviet Union was in a catastrophic situation, the US has provided the Soviet government an interest-free loan of 1 billion. dollars,

then,onNovember7,extendedtotheSovietUnionactionontheLend-LeaseAct,passedbythe

USCongress ofthelawMarch11, 1941.Finally,inFebruary 1942the USdoubleditsloantothe

Sovietgovernment,bringingitto2billion.Dollars.(AmountsloansneverbeenpaidbytheSoviet

government.)Duringthewar,viaMurmansk,Arkhangelsk,VladivostokandIranareAmericaand

BritainwastakentotheSovietUnion18700airplanes,10,800tanks,9,600guns,2.6milliontons

ofoil,44,600metalmachines,1860locomotives,11,300platforms,morethan500000tonnesof

non-ferrous metals, more than 172 000 tonnes of cables and wires. The total amount of US aid

alonehasleft9.5billion.Dollars.EvenCanadahasimportedintheUSSRin1942-1944gg.355ths.

Tons of cargo, including tanks (1188), armored personnel carriers (842), trucks (2568), shells

(827,000).TheprideoftheSovietarmytank"T-34",wasmadeofBritisharmor.TheSovietarmy

was eatingAmerican and Canadian bread andthe famous American stew.From neutralSweden were in the USSR machines, presses, cranes, power equipment and steel products. From

Mongolia,duringthewartheSovietUnionhadbrought700000headofcattle,4.9millionheads

ofsmallcattleand400,000horses.

12% of all aircraft and 10% of all tanks in the Red Army was delivered allies. But if most of the tanksandaircraftisstillmadeintheSovietUnion(althoughthealliesofimportedrawmaterials), itisonekindoftechnologytheAlliessuppliedfully-roadtransport.TheUnitedStatesputinthe

USSR52000375000jeepsandtrucks.NoguidanceontheproductionoftheSovietUnionduring

thewarofitsowntrucksandcarsinhistoricliterature.WithoutAmericantrucksandMongolian horses,theRedArmywouldhavebeentotallyparalyzed. The scale of the allied aid will be even greater when you consider that about 15% of all cargo shipped from the United States and Great Britain in the USSR, was destroyed by the Germans before arriving at their destination. The greatest losses were in March-April 1942, when the Luftwaffeand U-boats had been sunk a quarter of all vessels to follow the northern route. As a result of those sent in 1942 only in 1550-1650 it was delivered to the Soviet Union in 2505 aircraft. Soviet historians have done this only the conclusion that the loss of transportation can not"justifythesystematicunderperformancesuppliesalliesintheUSSR"(Historyofthesocialist

economyoftheUSSR.T.5,Moscow,1978,p.545).Eventhenallieswereguilty!

Knowingthis,youcandeterminenotonlytheerrorsofHitler,butalsoStalin'smistakes.Fromthe standpoint of the competition system,the Soviet system,of course, proved its complete failure.

Despitealltheeffortsmadeintheperiodof1939-1941,andaftertheGermanattack,theSoviet

industrywasunabletorecoverfromthelossessufferedinthefirstmonthsoftheSoviet-German war. It is obvious that the war with Germany, to which the Soviet government was prepared at least from 19 August 1939, would not have been won without the economic help of allies and, most importantly, without the US military intervention. In this sense, we have to draw conclusions about the economic weaknesses of the Soviet system in comparison with the German. To study the problems of the initial period of the Second World War Suvorov did more than all SovietandWesternhistoriography.Hefoundanswerstomanyplaguingusfordecadesquestions. He pretty much explained and explained, of course, correct. The merit of his invaluable. And all the time I catchmyself wishing to heap praise on the author.But precisely because Suvorov set out to turn the historiography [152.153] on the issue of the initial period of the Second World War,itisnecessarytodwellonthefactthatmosthinderanyseriousreader. Thefirst,andIthinkthemostimportant-istheabsenceofreferencestothesources.According to the rules of the genre - and the book Suvorov written in the genre of historical work - these linksarerequired.Meanwhile,theyareveryselective.Andtheirabsenceforthebulkofthebook makesitimpossibletoimplementthemaingoaloftheauthor:toconvincenotonlytheordinary reader,butaboveallhistoriansthattheforeignpolicyoftheSovietgovernment,andinparticular

theeventsof1941shouldbeevaluateddifferently.

Another obvious drawback books Suvorov is their excessive emotionality or, as we would say, their journalistic style. It is because the book Suvorov historic, not journalists, they must have been written differently. Suvorov and his books will have to form new generations of historians views on the topics raised by them. And for this you need a calm and confident attacking style rather than myriad otstrelivanie in the defense of the vast Soviet historiography on the issue of theSecondWorldWar.

Inconclusion,afewwordsonanotherdatesetSuvorov:July6,1941,the"bottom-M."Giventhe

author's argument in favor of this very serious dates. And yet here we probably can not do withouttheadditionalinformation,whichisnot.Maybewecanhelpisnowinaccessiblearchives. Maybe it will be known minutes of the meeting of the Political Bureau June 21, 1941. As a historian, I am inclined to believe that Suvorov rights. If it turns out that the "M-Day" was

nominatedfor13or20ofJuly,itis,afterall,isnotsoimportant.Suvorovopenedawholelayerof

our history for us. This is his greatest achievement. In his footsteps, I'm sure, will now other -

tenth. Viktor Suvorov

adjusting, supplementing and clarifying. They will be the second, third wasthefirst.

YuriFelshtinsky

Tenyearslater.

HistoricalconceptionofViktorSuvorov

Ten years ago the editors of "Russian ideas" showed true courage, began publishing a series of articles by Viktor Suvorov, then became a regular contributor to the newspaper. Changing the existing world - a complex and slow. The starting position of Viktor Suvorov was extremely difficult. The chances of success are very small. Recognized today all the author was not commonplace historian, a defector.He took up the theme of a dangerous and politically,and in the scientific sense. On the question of the German attack on the USSR June 22, 1941, as it seemed,ithadlongsincebeenputallpointsover«i». ThatmajesticmeritofViktorSuvorovtoday-tenyearslater. I am often in Moscow in recent years. There was in those weeks when left millionth edition of "Icebreaker". It sold on every street corner.Apparently,all one million sold since then cameout and new reissues. At a time when the circulation of the historical books fell to the limit, one millioncopiesofthebookwasnotjustagreatedition.Itwassomethingbeyondsensation. Paying tribute to the author, "RM" in one of the rooms gave a series of materials devoted to Suvorov.In addition to the Suvorov,were accompanying laudatory address in Suvorov article by M. Heller and A. Goryanina. It was [155] is very nice to see and read. But for the same reasons strangetomewasthepublicationofyetanotherletter-W.Wechsler("RM», 4081),itisnot thatthewriter doesnotagreewith theviews andtheconceptofSuvorov.Inthefirstparagraph ofB.Wexleradmits thatnotread"Icebreaker".Apparently,notread"Day-M."Ifso,itisunlikely that,Wexler worth hurry toexpresstheir opinioninaletter to"RM". This isextremely illandin relationtoSuvorov,andinrelationtothereadersof"RM". Truthisnotdetermined byareferendum.Freedom of speechdoes notmeanthat"the Republic of Moldova" shall publish any views. The point of view expressed by V. Veksler, has long been

known.Morethan50yearswehaveonlythisandinspirestheentireSovietandforeignhistorians.

TorefuteSuvorov,today,asinthebestoftheStalinyears,commissionedabookwritten:against

a brave man, a true historian, who was not afraid to go against the tide, refused to sing in the generalchorus. Alreadyonecuriosity wouldhavetomakecriticswonderSuvorov,carefulreading,listentowhat he says and writes this man - with an unusual destiny, with stunning intuition, with an extraordinary capacity for work. What is faith in the justice of its cause should have to in 1985 single-handedlypenetratereinforcedconcreteheadofSoviethistorians-thelastcarinthetrain of"perestroika".Tobefair:alreadychokedinpublicitypoliticiansandstatesmen,journalistsand writers.A historical revision "Politizdat" until 1990, was afraid to publish Trotsky; a collection of Soviet-German documents on the years 1939-1941, illegally printed in Vilnius 100,000th edition

in1989,hasbeenbannedforsaleinMoscow(andreleasedin"MoscowWorker"Onlytwoyears

later). IhatetopointouteventodaythenamesofmanyofthebooksthatwerepublishedintheSoviet historiography"perestroika" years. Let us not therefore rely on the fact that the tribe tempered hurry to rebuild and in his view of the topic described by Suvorov. Especially because this is a question more and emotional for the war generation; difficult to accept almost unbelievable:

kakoy-to defector without specific historical formation, without issued to him for salary, two smallbooks,likeamagician, took it and rewrotethe entire history ofthe Soviet-German war of

1941-1945,whilethousandsandthousandsofpeoplefordecades,theSovietUnionandabroad,

studied,investigatedthematteranddidnotseethatthekingis-naked. History-Scienceinsanelysimple.Itallfitstogetherlikeinacrossword.Notconvergeendsonlyin one case: if the historian made a mistake. In the 70s, when I was a student at the Faculty of HistoryinMoscow,didnotfitinmymindthe phrase,then itisquiteprogressive,explainingthe mistakesoftheSovietArmyinthefirstperiodofthewar,"StalinbelievedHitler." Stalin believed Hitler believed that Hitler would not attack. He believed in the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. I do not fit those two words in my student's head: "Stalin believed." No, neveranythingthismandidnotbelieve.ButHitlersuddenlybelieved? Itriedtofindtheanswer.Ihavefoundsomeanswers.Andyetunderstandthatthereis,itisnotit cannotbethatsomethingdoesnotaddup.InexplicablybehaviorMolotovatthetalksinBerlin. Inexplicable behavior of Stalin in the first half of 1941. Inexplicably unprecedented in the entire historyoftheworldincreasethecountry'smilitarybudgetinthelastpre-waryears:accordingto officialfigures(whichcanonlybeunderestimated),thefirstthreeyearsofthethirdfive-yearplan

fordefensewent26.4%ofallbudgetallocationsin1940-32.6%in1941godu-43.4%.Germany

andEnglandatthistimeisspentondefenseabout15% ofthe budget.Toexplainallthisphrase thatStalindidnotbelieveinthepossibilityofaGermanattack? The negative reviews on the books D. Volkogonova Suvorov [156.167] states that in the Soviet archivesdocumentsonthepreparationofanattackonStalinGermanywerefound.Thisisavery valuable witness. But with all due respect should be to the AD Volkogonov, it seems to me to note that we can not talk about the search for the Soviet version of "Directive number 21". As planned Soviet invasion of the Baltic states? To Poland? In Romania? As the war began with Finland? In none of these cases, the emphasis was not on the surprise. The suddenness is important for those planning to win a little blood. This problem has never been to the Soviet army.Importantvictorywasnotalittleblood,andatanycost. ItisobviousthatthewarwithGermanywouldnotstartwithasurpriseattack,andwithdulland boring Molotov discharge diplomatic conflict. Obviously, the self-appointed Stalin to the post of

ChairmanoftheCPCof5May1941(May6,reportedbythenewspaper)couldonlybecausedby

theplannedlarge-scaleforeignoperation.Butwhat? Despite the danger of analogies, let us remember another date: 1914. When Russia announced mobilizationinGermanyandAustria-Hungary,itbecameclearthatthewarstarted."Barbarossa" therewasaplanintheSovietUnion.AccordingtoIgorBunich,tothegreatchagrinofhistorians that worketh not footnotes, the plan was called "Operation" Storm ", it was presented to Stalin

May15,1941andapprovedbythe16th.Thebasisofthe"Storm"wasputtoawiderdocument

"mobilization plan" 1941 (MT-41). If properly understood I. Bunich, these materials are to be found in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defence, 15A Fund, op. 2154, d. 4.

ImplementationoftheMP-41isdescribedonpp.199-287ofthecase.

In the book of Bunich, forthcoming in a noticeable rush, repeatedly missing quotation marks, which prevents the reader to determine the boundary between the text and the document I.

Bunich. But, of course, the thorny issue of the planned War I. Stalin Bunich still brings clarity. HereisalongquotationfromthebookofI.Bunich"Operation"Storm",or anerrorinthethird decimal place. Historical Chronicle ", the second book (published" The Shape ", St. Petersburg,

1994. Signed print November 10, 1994 Circulation - 50 thousand copies, with 555-558

May 1941 finalized the plan "Operation" Storm ", the final edited and submitted to Stalin May 15th. It is this plan thatis stored in the red-sealed envelope with the inscription "To be opened

upon receipt of the" Storm "signal and gave the semi-official name for this operation. Officially, however, as usual in the Soviet administrative procedures, the document was labeled as the "PlanforthestrategicdeploymentofforcesoftheSovietUnionincaseofwarwithGermanyand itsallies."TheplanwasdrawnupundertheleadershipofGeneralsZhukovandVasilevskyVatutin. He had a "top secret" and "Only the person" and is addressed directly to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade Stalin, indicating that this instance to its approval is unique. Unlike the previous ones, this latest version of the "Storm", which was supposed to act, was drafted in the first place, taking into account the implementation of mobilization plans (MT-41) and, secondly, it is completely absent "novorech" anyone unnecessary preamble type: "If the

SovietUnionwasattacked

Allformulationsweresimple,clearandunambiguous.TheyclearlytracedlastStalinindicatethat

"itistimetofinishwiththesedefensivecalls." Thepreambleoftheplanandtheplanstatedthat"toensureitsimplementationofthefollowing measures necessary to advance, which are indispensable for the applicationof a surprise attack ontheenemyfromtheairandontheground:

1. Perform covert mobilizationof troopsunder the guise of training exercises stock -holds 80%.

[158,159]

2. Under the guise of access to the camp to make a hidden concentration of troops near the

westernborder,primarilytoconcentrateallArmyReserveCommand-isperformed.

3.Hiddenfocusonairfieldsinremotedistrictsandnowbeginthedeploymentofaviationlogistics

-Vol.75%.

4. Gradually, under the guise of training fees and logistical exercise to deploy the rear and

hospitalbase-isperformed.

"ThefirststrategicobjectiveactionsoftheRedArmy-saidfurtherplan-toputthedefeatofthe

mainforcesoftheGermanarmydeployedsouthofthelineBrest-Deblin

)," 16

"etc.

Followstrategicaim

to have: the onset of the Katowice district in the northern or north-westerly direction todefeat the large force the center and the north wing of the German front and to seize the territory of formerPolandandEastPrussia. The immediate task - to defeat the German army east of the river. Wisla Krakow and at the directionof,forwhich:a)themainattackforcesoftheSouthwesternFrontstrikeinthedirection of Krakow, Katowice, cutting off Germany from allies; b) secondary attack the left wing of the WesternFrontstrikeinthedirectionofSiedlce,DeblinwiththeaimsnaretheWarsawgroupand the capture of Warsaw, as well as to promote South-Western Front in defeating the enemy of Lublin groups; c) conduct an active defense against Finland, Hungary and Romania, and be preparedtostrikeagainstRomaniaatfavorableconditions III.Basedonthisconceptofstrategicdeployment,providesthefollowinggroupingoftheArmed ForcesoftheUSSR.

1.TheArmyoftheRedArmyinthecomposition-198cd,61TD,13cd-just303divisionsand74

artillery regiments RGC, distributed as follows: a) the main forces in the composition of 163 cd,

58 TD, 30 ppm and 7 cd (of 258 divisions) and 53 artillery regiments RGC have in the West,

amongthem:in[160]theNorthern,North-Western,WesternandSouth-Westernfronts-136cd,

44 TD,23 ppm, 7 cd (of 210 divisions) and 53 artillery regiment GSC; in the reserve of the High

Command of the Southwestern andWestern Fronts-27 cd,14 TD,7 GPa(total48 divisions); b)

the remaining force, consisting of 35 cd, 3 TD ,, 1 ppm, 6 cd (total 45 divisions) and 21 ap GDH appointedforthedefenseoftheFarEast,southernandnorthernbordersoftheUSSR

IV.ThecompositionandtasksdeployedonthefrontsoftheWest(Map1:1million).

Northern Front (PVO) - 3 Army, a part of - 15 shooting, 4 armored and 2 motorized divisions, a total of 21 divisions, 18 regiments of aviation and the Northern Navy, with the main tasks - Defence Leningrad, the port of Murmansk, Kirov railways and, together with the Baltic Navy to

ensureourcompletedominationinthewatersoftheGulfofFinland

North-Western Front - three armies, consisting of 17 infantry divisions, 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions, a total of 23 divisions and 13 aviation regiments, with the objectives of: after the transition to the offensive of the Western Front of troops, interacting with the Baltic Navy,start offensiveinthe direction ofTilsit-Koenigsberg, covering with the stubborn defense ofRigaand Vilnaareas.

FrontHQ-Panevezhio.

WesternFront-fourarmies,composedof31infantry,tank8,4and2motorizedcavalrydivisions,

atotalof45divisionsand21aviationregiment.

Objectives: the transition armies of the Southwestern Front offensive, the left wing of the front kickinthegeneraldirectionofWarsawandSiedlce-Radom,Warsawbeatgroupingandcapture of Warsaw; in collaboration with the South-Western Front split Lublin-Radom enemy grouping, enter the r.Visla and movable parts master Radom. Right front wing, interacting with the troops

oftheNorth-WesternFront,cut[161]mainenemyforcesfromEastPrussiaandcrosstheVistula

initslowerreaches.TheboundaryofDenmarkdoesnotproceedwithoutfurthernotice. FrontHQ-Baranovichi.

South-WesternFront-eightarmies,composedof74infantrydivisions,28tank,15motorizedand

5 cavalry divisions, a total of 122 divisions and 91 Regiment of Aviation, with its immediate objectives: a) concentric blow armies of the right wing of the front surround and destroy the main group enemy to the east district. Wisla in the Lublin region; b) simultaneously blow from

frontHQ-Pargolovo.

the front Sieniawa, Przemysl, Lutowiska defeat the enemy forces at Cracow and Sandomierz, KielcedirectionsandseizetheKrakow,Katowice,Kielce,referringtofurtherattackfromthearea tothenorthandnorth-westdirectionstodefeatthebigforcesthenorthernwingofthefrontof the enemy and the capture of the former territory of Poland and transfer combat operations to theterritoryofGermanyitselftotherapidonsetofBerlin;c)[ ]tobereadytosprayconcentric attacksagainstRomania.OfCzernowitzandKishinevareaswiththeimmediategoaltodefeatthe northernwingoftheRomanianArmyandreachthelinep.MoldovaIasi." ThedocumentwassignedbyTimoshenkoandZhukov. I. Bunich indicates thatZhukov tried his best topush forthe earliest possible start dates for the operation "Storm", that is definitely ahead of Germany,which is the concentration of troops on the Soviet-German border was well known. But, obviously, Stalin hoped to strike at the rear of theGermanarmyafterthelandingoftheGermantroopsoftheBritishIsles.Areasontobelieve thatthelandingwilltakeplace,Stalinhad.TheGermanmilitaryoperationsinYugoslavia,Greece andCreteinAprilandMay1941couldnotbeinterpretedotherwise thanaspreparationforthe landingoftheBritishIsles.Thisisevidencedbyanotherdocument,showninthebookofBunich (from 591-592.) "People's Commissariat of Defense Top Secret. The special folder. The General Staff of the Red Army 11 June 1941 Military councils L IN, PribOVO, WSMD, KOVO, OdVO 7 copies. Just for the information of the military council. The transmission by radio and wire communicationcannotbe! According to the information received through intelligence and government channels, in the period from 4 to 10 July 1941, German troops will take large-scale military operations against England,includingthelandingoftheBritishIsleslargeforcesofairandsealandings.

In this regard, it may be necessary to conduct activities of a military nature to protect the state interestsoftheUSSRinthelightofthechangedmilitaryandpoliticalsituationinEurope. Theheadquartersofmilitarydistricts(fronts)andsubordinatearmyandcorpsheadquartersby July 1, 1941 to be prepared to conduct offensive operations, completing the corresponding

commandandstaffgames

People'sCommissarofDefenceoftheUSSRMarshalTimoshenko. ChiefofGeneralStaffoftheRedArmy,ArmyGeneralZhukov. MemberoftheGeneralSecretaryoftheCentralMilitaryCounciloftheCPSU(b)Zhdanov." Since I. Bunich footnote gives very rarely use this opportunity to quote another passage, and wheresuchareference is given(with the 598-599.): "OnJune 12, 1941 in the district-the fronts

flew directive to start moving troops to their original positions on the deployment plan . The divisions at full strength, with control block and the body part moved to the west, to complete the deployment, as ordered earlier by 1 July. Everything was done according to the procedure that has been worked out for a long time. Mobilization was carried out under the guise of training [162.163] fees deployment - under the guise of the camp fees. Nevertheless troops

offeredonlymoveatnight,tomarchfor40kilometers.

"June 12 - said in the documents - the command of the border counties under the guise of training exercises and changes in deployment summer camps launched a covert deployment of

troopsisalreadythesecondechelon"(CAMD,f.16A,d842op2951,132-133l

Asprovidedbyacunningplan"Storm."

Onthesameday,June12,intheSouth-WesternFrontadditionallytransmitted32ndRifleCorps,

Noothereventswithoutaspecialorderisnotcarriedout.

).

the5thMechanizedCorpsandthe57thSeparateTankDivision.

ItcomesinmotionandtheWesternFront(Rec.IN).

"Immediately,uponreceiptoftheCommissarofthedirectiveof12June,initiatedthenomination

of the 2nd (100 and161 cq), 47 th(55,121,143 cq), 21 (17, 37, 50 cd) and44th (64 and108 sd) riflecorpsoftherearareasclosertothestateborderonthedeploymentplan." GiantarmythroughoutavastfrontfromtheBaltictotheBlackseasstirredbysecretlyturningon thestartingpositions. TheywereattheturnoftheriversZapadnayaDvina-DneprthreateninglydeployedArmysecond echelon. 22-th armyorderedtocompletethe deploymentnolater thanJuly3,the 20thArmy-5July,19

th-July7th,16th,21st,24thand28tharmies-notlaterthanJuly10.

Not later than 1 July ordered to complete deployment and take their starting positions for the

offensive12armiesofthefirstechelon-27th,11th,8th,3rd,4th,10th,13th,5th,6th,12th,

26th,9thand18th.(NotcountingthethreearmiesoftheNorthernFront,temporarily"Storm"

are according to plan on the defensive along the Finnish border.) 5 more armies are in the ReserveCommandandsecondarysectionsoftheborder. This power of the world has not known since the days of Genghis Khan's campaigns! "From today's perspective, we are accustomed to look at the 22 June 1941 as the biggest mistake of Hitler. It is obvious that with the publication of works of Viktor Suvorov has to reconsider this aspect of the history of the Second World War. Now it is clear that preventive offensive of the German army started against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, was the most brilliant military stepHitler,thehighestpointinhismilitarycareer.However,conceivedbytheSovietgovernment operation was so large-scale thatbreak its offensive spirit could not even the greatest defeat of the summer and autumn of 1941. Soviet troops were still logged in Berlin and adopted the CommunistsystemofgovernmentinEasternEurope.Onlyithappenedfouryearslater.Andsince the victory was important, not the price, the exact number of millions of victims did not count.

[164]

TwobooksaboutStalin'sWars

Withthewarshouldbefought,ofcourse,byallmeansatourdisposal,asitisthemisfortuneof

mankind. [ ]

made20yearsagoerrors,declarewarasafatalinevitabilityinlifetogether.

GeneralWladyslawSikorski,1935{231}

Himself course of the historical process ofrevolutionary working class will be forcedto move to attackwhenthefavorableenvironmentforthis. Weareverysorrythatwecannotprovethesincerityofourneighborsourpeacefulmood.

MikhailFrunze{232}.

Towar,andsomeone-yourownmother. Folkwisdom. Discussion on the roleof the USSR in the initial phaseof the Second World War,opening out at

theendofthe80booksSuvorov"Icebreaker",almostcompleted.Ifbefore2000itwascustomary

to argue about whether Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany in 1941 or not, now it

remainsonlytoargueabouttheapproximatetimingoftheattack-July6,or,say,15July1941.

It's only been two decades since World War II, and only some states, forgetting

In2000inMoscow,abookhistorianMichaelMeltyuhova"LostChanceStalin"{233}oftheSoviet

attempt to take over Europe in 1939-1941. Interestingly, the publication of this work has generated virtually no debate -the author does not argue. After the release of this book, those whodoubtedthatsuchanattemptwasmadetonolongerdoubt.Notbelievedinitdoesnothelp to believe, perhaps, no, let's plan produced with the signature of Stalin, or any other similar document. This study - the best of those that went on this issue, not only in Russia but also abroad - so tightly in Russian archives did not work any unbiased foreign researchers. Other works of post-Sovietperioddidnotreachthelevelofthebookunderreview,eitherbecauseofthesmaller professionalauthors,eitherbecauseoftheworstsourcebasecausedbythesecrecyoftheSoviet

archives. Selected publications of very high quality focused on very narrow issues of the period under review. In this same monograph Meltyukhov skillfully combines the completeness of the studywithdetailedstudyofkeyissues.Thematerialinthebookisperfectlyorganized-askillnot availableallgoodanalysts. Some links to collections of documents, memoirs, journal and newspaper articles, monographs, archives,etc.inthebook,thereareoverathousand. We consider the pre-war situation in Europe and worldwide, economic relations, political tensions.Describeindetailthediplomaticstruggle20-30-ies.,Forweeksanddaysofthe prewar eventspaintedin1939 Withreference tothe filesshowsthe titanicarsenals of Soviet weapons, thenumberofRedArmytroopsoftheNKVDandRedNavy. Some detail, using the new [166.167] documents studied the Soviet-Polish war of 1939, the Finnishcampaignof 1939-1940.,Sovietoccupationofthe Balticcountries andBessarabia.These

actionsclearlyidentifiedMeltyuhovaaggressionandannexation(p.444).

In detail considered Soviet military planning of 1940-1941. The map shows the plans of Soviet attacksonRomanianandGerman-occupiedPoland. Meltyuhova conclusion is clear: the Soviet invasion was planned for the summer of 1941,

presumablyonJuly15th.Originallytheyplannedtoinflictablowon12June,butduetoreasons

notentirelyclarifiedtheattackwaspostponed. As for the very urgentproblem of preventive war,on the basis of diverse documentary material authorconcludes:sinceneitherHitlernorStalindidnotknowabouttheimminentaggressionof the other side, all the talk of "pre-emptive strike" groundless. From the point of view of Meltyuhova,bothsidespreparedpureaggression. Perhapstheoutputvalueinthelightofthisworkisthatfromnowon,donotreadthisbook,has

no Russian historian will not be able tosay: "Iknow the history of the Second WorldWar

additiontothemeritsofthebooknoteandcontroversialmoments. Controversial thesis Meltyuhova on military and political unity of the Soviet people in the

beginningoftheSecondWorldWarandtheSoviet-Germanwar.Especiallywiththat.450-453are

numerousstatements inhabitants of the Soviet Union after 22June 1941 thatthe warprovoked

or unleashed by the Soviet Union, it was Soviet planes bombed Soviet cities. I wonder in what other country in the world at the moment so trust their own government that bombs were expectingfromhimratherthanfromtheenemy?

Insome passages,notablythe desireofthe authortojustifytheaggressionof theUSSR:"

the

Soviet-Finnishtalksendedinfailure,andtheSovietleadershipwasaproblemof"savingface".Or ought to recognize the impossibility affect Finland, which could negatively (sic -! AG ) affect the

" In

behavioroftheBalticStatesandtheSovietUniontomakeanobjectofridiculeintheworldpress, orforcetheFinnstoaccepttheSovietUnionisagreatpowerandtoaccepttheSovietproposals. ItisclearthatthedemonstrativeintransigenceFinlandanddeployedintheworldpresscampaign

supportingitspositiondidnotleaveMoscownochoicebutwar"(p.174).

So,inordernottohitthefrontoftheFinnsobstinatefaceinthedirt,theSovietUnionjusthadto pourthebloodoftheKarelianIsthmus. Further, Meltyukhov does not conduct fundamental differences between public systems of England, France, USA, Germany, Japan, Italy, and somehow does not take into account the specificsoftheSovietUnion,simplyattributingallthesecountriesenmasseintothecategoryof "great powers." As clearly shown by the following quote: "To make this assertion failure (. Is a direct correlation of the USSR's foreign policy of ideology and state system - AG), suffice it to recall such well-known figures of world history as Thutmose III of, Ashurbanipal, Ramses II Nebuchadnezzar II of, Cyrus II, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Trajan, Attila, Charlemagne, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, etc. None of them is not only a member of the Communist Party,but was not even familiar with any communist, which, however, did not prevent them to create a

greatempire"(11-.12).

The author does not take into account that Genghis Khan conquered not conducted in China "kochevnizatsiyu"AlexandertheGreatdidnotplantoincludeVietnamintheorbitofHellenism, andthemostdaringideasAssurbanipalandRamsesIIIdidnotincludeinterventioninAngolaora mandatoryworld"faraonizatsiya". From the published statements of the political leaders of the USSR, military leaders and educators on how and why it is necessary to capture the entire Earth without a trace, you can

createmorethanonevolumeofinterestingreadingmaterial.[168.169]

In studies sovietologists, political scientists, historians and economists (for example, Michael Universal)canbefoundquitesimpleandlogicalproofofthefactthattheSovietsystemhadonly one chance to survive: in the case of the "Sovietization" of the planet. And the leaders of the Soviet Union is well aware, repeatedly saying: "Either they are - we are, or we - them." The external policy of the state is an organic continuation as an ideology and political system of the Soviet Union, and it is difficult to determine what was in this case stronger incentive boundless Sovietexpansion. ThereforeMeltyukhovclearlydoesnotseefundamentaldifferencesbetweentheRussianEmpire andtheSovietUnion,foreignpolicygoalswhichputsitselfatrandom,oftencarriedoutbydirect historical continuity between Russia and the Council. According Meltyuhova, the foreign policy interests of the USSR consisted of restoring a great power status. (Imagine the following scene:

Trotsky,LeninandStalinandMolotovgatherandsay:.".ItisnecessarytoreturntotheUSSRthe status of the Russian Empire - without this the Russian people hard For this we use the idea of communism")quotingstatementsofSovietpoliticians,theauthor(inspiteofLenin,Stalin,K °) comestothefollowingconclusion,itdoesnotconfirmed:"Inthiscase,theideologicaldogmaof the"worldrevolution"turned outtobecloselyrelatedtothenationalandstateinterestsof the

SovietUnion

This definition of the interests of the Soviet Union a little strange. The concept of "national interest" does not apply to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Perhaps more accurately be called their anti-national-state. I do not quite like that. Pre-Revolutionary Russian lawyers understand by the word "state" only lawful state that bears the legal nature or because of

"(p419)

tradition or because of legitimationby the people. More St. Augustine (354-430 gg.) Wrote that thestate,deprivedofjustice,thereisnotnothinglikeagangofrobbers.Thatis,theinterestsof theUSSRandthestateanamedifficult. Especially since the gangster nature of the board can be seen in the words and deeds of the Soviet leadership: "Perhaps no one symbolizes the terrorist bases of the Soviet regime as Stalin himself. His early career as a professional revolutionary, including the long-term involvement in questionable activities in the Caucasus, has left a strong imprint on his style of leadership. Despiteallattemptstohideitspast,itwasmanifestedinpathologicalhispersonalityandactions. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt said that, although he expected to see at the head of the SovietstategentlemenintheKremlinhefoundtheformerCaucasianbandit.Incarryingouttheir fantastic plans for the formation of life and the top minds Stalin relied on the help of his subordinates, whose experience, ideology and psychology could fully realize all its aspirations underStalinism,whichwasinneedoftheirhelpfrombelow.AndStalin,thetypicalrevolutionary new type of owner who turned almost absolute power, was able to "successfully" complete an unprecedentedexperimentofbuildingcomplexoftherepressivesystembasedonstateterrorism

"{234}.

Next, in a completely Marxist spirit the author tries to explain the causes of the Second World War. The book is really the world economy is discussed in detail in the period 1918-1939 gg., The contradictions between the superpowers. And science is very useful attempt to prove that the warhasarisenbecauseoftheeconomiccontradictionsbetweenthedifferentstates.Becausethis attempt failed completely, even though that was undertaken this level scientists as Meltyukhov. The book concludes that the war has arisen because of the economic contradictions, but the authorisinnowayconfirmed.Thelevelofevidenceaboutthefollowing:Americacompetewith

England,soGermanyinvadedPoland.[170.171]

More than just think the idea that the war was the result of efforts to realization of the crazy ideasofafewdictatorsandtheircliques. Withallthescientificpositivismresearchersseemstrangetohiscontinuedregretoverthefailure of the Soviet leadership, army and intelligence (pp. 298.301, 306, 323, 324,510,511, etc.). Perhaps it would be better if the Red Army launched an invasion in 1941, the first? And a scattering of bones Russian, and not only Russian, the soldiers would have been generously littered with not only the space "from Stalingrad to Berlin," Eurasia and Africa, the islands of Oceania,AustraliaandevenAmerica. The author, like many journalists, writers and academics, confounds and confuses the two concepts: world domination (whatHitler wanted) and world dominion (fixedidea leaders ofthe USSR). Regret the failed world revolution seen in this quote: "In the case of complete coverage of the Earth's socialist system would be fully implemented as articulated in the European liberal tradition, the task of creating a unified state of humanity. This, in turn, allows you to create a

sufficientlystablesocialsystemandwouldprovidegreatopportunitiesfordevelopment"(p.506).

Aglobalwebofconcentrationcamps,famines,cropfailuresanddeficitsnotonlyinthefertile(as in the USSR), but also in all other parts of the world, of course, would give just unlimited possibilities for human development. And, perhaps, it is a picture of the Europeans dreamed of

liberals. Philosopher-Solidarists Roman Redlich writes that: " the experience of the Soviet-Chinese relationsclearly showsthat,if communism took possession of the whole world, the danger of a thermonuclear conflict would become even more acute, and the over-exploitation of nature is

evenmoreirresponsible,"{235}.

Soitisunlikelytoregretwhatwasandwhatis.Couldbeworse.Ordonot.

***

A year after the publication of the first book Meltyukhov, through the work of "Lost Chance of Stalin",writeyournameinsilverlettersthelatestRussianhistoriography,seeminglypleasedwith

theneweditionofthereader-"Soviet-Polishwar"{236}.ForhalfacenturytheSovietUnionand

Russiaonthisissuewasnotasingleworthwhilemonograph,whichisunfortunate.Thequestion isreallyimportant,butbecauseoftheideologicaldictatesoftheSovieteraisnotdeveloped.And theappearanceofsuchabook,itwouldseem,canonlybewelcomed. Inpublishingthesummarytoamodestmonographitstatesthat"thehistorianwasabletotakea hardlookattheSoviet-Polishrelationsintheirdynamics." Unfortunately,atthistimeIhavenotMeltyukhovobjectivestudy. Let'sstartwiththesimplest-withtheasymmetryintheuseofterminology.

.Thus,describingtheactionsofthepartiesinconflict1918-1920biennium,theauthorusesthe

followingterminology:Kiev,MinskandBaranovichiRedArmy"free"(20,49,70,etc ),Or"takes". Poles also in the monograph of the city and the territory "captured" and "occupy" (with 20,24,26,28,etc ),Butinsomecases-"hold." Soviet - brutality cases of Polish troops and once repeatedly described. In the latter case, the supporting information for something taken from the official communiqué of the Polish. It is obviousthatsuchasymmetry cannotbeexplainedbyignorancewhensubmittingthematerial- nooneeasytotakeoff theshelf "RedCavalry" Babelor the"RedTerror"Melgunov andprovide the relevant information about what is happening "liberators" in the occupied territory. In the terminologyMeltyuhovaevenUkrainiansfromPetlyuraconnections"capture"theirownWestern UkrainiancitiesandtheRedArmythecity"free". Description of the collision course is not the nature of the research and compilation. In the

assessmentofactionsfightersopposingarmiesagainpresent[172,173]subjectivity.Adjectivesof

the author are: the Red Army fight "courageously", "firmness", "hard", "fierce", "heroic", "skill"

(47, 59, etc ).

Poles also in the description of the author just fight like machines, not showing

any courage or cowardice - generally no human feelings. Only found in the book by the author reviews Meltyuhova description Poles qualities that we can refer to human characteristics -

"vindictivevandalism"(62.).

From the research, we learn about the complexities of the Red Army with supplies, rears and communicationsofanysuchdifficultiesthePolishArmythereisnodata. AboutArmydetachmentsinPolandMeltyukhovmentions,althoughtheyexistedinareallyshort time,acriticalperiodofthewar,aswellasthoseoftheRedArmy-no,althoughtheretheywere distributedthroughouttheCivilWar. The author does not hide his regret over the fact that the Red Army has been unsuccessful

campaignagainstandbeyondtheVistula(p.79).

In general, just at Capek: "They are monstrous anti-aircraft guns fired at by our brave pilots,

peacefullybombingtheirfilthycity". The methodology used by the author, but in some cases can be considered scientific. In some cases the description of the events and phenomena is simply abstract character, usually the author's assessment is inseparable from the narration of facts. A number of evaluations of the activities and motivations of the Polish side, sounding as presented by the prosecution

Meltyuhovagenerallynotsupportedbyreferencestosourcesandliterature(pp.20,24,26,etc.).

Thismayseemsurprising,becauseinthebook"LostChanceofStalin's"methodMeltyuhovawas aclassic: thefactof its versatile historiographicalevaluation,considerationof differentpointsof view,relyingonthedocuments,theconclusion,supportedbytherelevantreference.Inthesame book under review positivist approach (facts first - then the theory and evaluation) - a rare exception. Themoststrikingexampleofone-sidedpresentationoffactsandtheirsilence:inthedescription of the Soviet-Polish campaign in 1920 not only cited, but no mention of the famous order

number1423WesternFrontonJuly2,1920"corpseWhitePoland"and"happinessonbayonets

for working people. " But the order is one of the key documents describing the essence of the war,theaimsandobjectivesoftheparties. Thebook provides anecdotalinformationtakenfromthe Sovietliteratureof massdestructionin

theRedArmyprisonersof1919-1922.inPolishcaptivity-theyallegedlykilled60thousandfrom

136 thousand (with 104.). Probably, it was simple to use appropriate Polish literature and documentarypublicationsonthesubject,whicharequitedifferentfigures. Declaration of the Soviet Government in the book always served as the real motives of actions and orders of the apex of the RCP (b). Poles in the same book, on the contrary, almost always duplicitous and treacherous, constantly cover their imperialist ambitions lengthy beautiful statements.Nowalmostallresearchershavetheopportunitytocomparetheforeignpropaganda and diplomatic maneuvers of the Bolsheviks with their real intentions in 1918-1920. It must be emphasizedthatforeignpolicyisnotalietosomespecificfeatureoftheCommunists:"AllStates aremasked,"tolivewith wolves-wolfhowl "(Stalin,1938). Itisthereforevery strangethatthis "error" was not applied to foreign policy actions and statements of Lenin and Trotsky's supporters. Probably, subjectivity and one-sidedness of the author's estimates are caused by including a

perfectfailurehistoriographicalresearchbase.Thetotalnumberof898references,ofwhichonly

29 booksin Polish.Hence,forexample,andMeltyuhovaregret that "the losses of the parties in the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, there is no data." According to approximate estimates of Polish

historians,[174,175]irretrievablelossofthePolishsidemadein1920112thousandpeoplewere

killed.{237}(nowthewordoftheRussianresearchers.)Inwritingthebookdidnotuseliterature

in Ukrainian and Belarusian languages, that is unacceptable: the regions served as a place of directhostilities,andtheobjectofWarsawclaimsandredMoscow. Not enough researchers confirmedthe thesis thatthe initiative ofthe Soviet-Polish warof 1920 came from Warsaw - the fight was really over disputed territory that each side was ready to assert military force in one case - until the destruction of the Polish national and attempts to unleashtheworldrevolution. Edition, on the one hand, is incomplete, the other - has a lot of related information indirectly related to the subject study. Reading the name "Soviet-Polish war. The military and political confrontation 1918-1939 gg. ", You can expect to find in a detailed analysis of military planning

duringthe interwaryears,astheone orthe otherside, politiciansandmilitary plansinMoscow and Warsaw, with respect to each other and the disputed territories, political and theoretical developments party propaganda support of certain actions really mutually hostile states. This bookisnot.NotinthebookandtheanalysisoftheCominternpolicytowardsPoland,describing the Soviet intelligence activities in the Second Polish Republic and the Polish intelligence in the

USSR,thePolishCommunistspositionsin1918-1939gg.onthemostimportantissuesofbilateral

relations.ThereisatleastabriefdescriptionofthesituationinEasternEuropepeopledirectlyon bothsidesoftheconfrontationline.(Theissueismorethansignificant-bothlivedcitizensofthe Commonwealth and the USSR on both sides of the Polish-Soviet border, in what were the similaritiesanddifferencesintheirposition?)Butforsomereason,byleapsandboundswiththe details described in [176] military campaign of the Wehrmacht in Poland, Sudeten crisis and Warsaw'spositionontheCzech-GermanandPolish-Czechborderland. Perhaps the most important and, of course, a positive side of the research, its scientific innovationismore detailedthan inthe previous book Meltyuhova,considerationof the military part of the Soviet-Polish campaign in 1939 (in Meltyuhova terminology - "peacekeeping operation" (408) In writing this section, the author used previously unavailable archival documentsfromtheSovietarchives,however,foradetaileddescriptionoftheSoviet-Polishwar of 1939 should be concluded, clearly does not hold water:. " I do not correspond to reality

assertionthattheRedArmyhelpedtheWehrmachtdefeatofPoland"(p.403).itisclearthatby

September 17 the Polish forces were largely defeated by the Wehrmacht, and organized defensive front will not be further expected. However, the completion of the operation would requireaconsiderableeffortonthepartoftheNazisasammunitionfromtheGermansbysome major types arms coming to an end, and communications were extended. in addition, the possibility of the resistance movement in the occupied territories were in a war on one front is incomparablybetter.Itisdifficulttosomehowquantify,butcannotignoretheshockthatpeople received the Second Polish Republic from the events of the second half of September 1939 - it wasessential,however,werenotcountedviaBerlin.ItisimportanttorememberthatPolandhas

notceasedtoexistwiththeSeptember28,1939-itwasonlyoccupied.Functioninggovernment

in exile, thousands of Poles fought against the Germans on the Allied side. The Soviet Union made a contribution here and - instead of leaving on the Western Front, tens of thousands of soldiers of the Polish Army forcibly deported deep into the Soviet Union, and the thousands of

officerswereshotinthespringof1940.[177]

Objectively,itwasdirectassistancetotheGermansinthedefeatoftheireasternneighbor. In describing the events of September-October 1939 he referred to the tens of thousands of refugees from being under Nazi occupation "governor-general" in the USSR, and refugees from the Soviet Union - supposedly only ten Poles (367.). In fact, in September-October 1939, thousands of people streamed through the Soviet-German border in both directions. From 28 September 1939 to 22 June 1941 of the Western Ukraine and Western Belarus ran tens of

thousandsof{238}.

Similarly biased brief description of the Sovietization of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Evaluation of "happiness" of the population is on selected documents, recollections of the

communistKonstantinSimonov,andobviouslyfalsifiedresultsofthe"election"of1939and1940

served as the opinion of the people (p. 381-384, 408-413). The notion that in 1939-1941 gg. Polish minority in the new lands not infringe on their rights, it is absolutely wrong. Numerous

independentfromeachotherevidence,aswellasstudiesofbothRussianandforeignauthorssay that the methods of oppression of Poles were diverse: from the direct ethnic discrimination in employment, sections of land, repression and "elections" to the authorities to abuse personal dignity and direct repression {239} . Although, of course, proper discrimination is not reached suchproportionsasinthe"GeneralGovernment"underHitler. Strikingtheauthor'sfateosadnikov-Polishpeasants,formermembersofthePolishArmy,settled in 1920-1930-ies in Western Ukraine and Byelorussia and the Vilna region. Ostensibly their deportationtoSiberia andCentralAsia hasbeenaboon forthemselves osadnikovas backaway

fromtheblowofthelocalpopulation(p.415).Itisabsolutelyoverlookedthatthereisnoethnic

conflictinainternationalistSoviettotalitariansystemsimplycouldnotbe. The conflict broke out under the Nazis in 1943-1944 and quickly stopped with a secondary appearanceintheregionoftheRedArmyandtheSovietsecretpolice. Wecannotsaythatcompletelywrong,butcertainlyalsoquestionablethesisthatnationalismin the occupied territories was suppressed and not encouraged. In a special study of the Polish historian Bogdan Musialya on the basis of various weight, especially documentary, material concludes that inter-ethnic relations that were in the region and during the Second Republic is not too warm during Soviet rule deteriorated completely, which served as one of the causes of

theriversbloodspilledintheformerEasternPolandin1941-1949gg.{240}.

In the book there is a statement that can be interpreted either as a crude factual error or as a half-truth tothe point of falsification. USSR allegedly wanted to "support the national liberation

movementoftheBelarusianandUkrainianpopulationinPoland"(p.113).Inthefirsthalfofthe

1920s, the Soviet Uniondidsupport certainpolitical circles ofthe Western Ukraineand Belarus, aswellascontributedtothepro-Sovietsabotageandguerrillawarfareinwhatwastheneastern

Poland{241}.SupportCominternlocalCommunistsdidnotstop,andatcertainperiodsin1930.

Can we call the national liberation movement of these - a moot point. However, all the people, who spokefor the real, full independence of Belarus or Ukraine,to which the long arm reaches peoplewithcoolheads,orsenttoplacesnotsoremote,oreveninanotherworld. In the second book, the author develops a hard and emotionally at least controversial idea of defendingthe communistgovernment of Russia's national interests,the continuity of the Soviet UnionfromRussia,oreventheidentityofthesetwophenomena.Thisis,unfortunately,generally quiteacommonpointofviewinmodernhistoriography,recentlyreceivedanunexpectedofficial

support.[178.179]

MichaelWeller

IcebreakerSuvorov.

Afterthe"Icebreaker"thehistoryoftheSecondWorldWarinitspresentformdoesnotexist.

We sat for a liter bottle: Colonel, a journalist, a military historian and writer. Each preferred to mindhisown,sothattheauthor'sremarksafterthedirectspeechismeaningless,"whohesaid" and"whathesaid"mixedinokroshka.All-strategists. -Afterall,nothing fundamentallynewSuvorovsaid.Iremember,asastudent,Ireadthe"Notes of the deputy chief of the General Staff," General Shtemenko. The sixties, the Soviet memoirs, military censorship, all right. And: September 39th, the liberation of the Western Ukraine and WesternBelarus.WewenttoPoland.Wegoatnight"Ehmke"tothedestination.Itseems,have goneastray.Stop:begintounderstandthemap.Gettinglost-notworthit.Weareafraidtodrop

inforademarcationlinetotheGermans. Aha,Ithink:howso?A?YettherearefightswiththeGermansagainstthe Polesinsomeplaces. Even we Germans are not met, we did not agree. Still no joint Soviet-German victory parade in Brestwasnot.Ademarcationline-already!! So-previouslyheld?So-beforethemeetingagreed,thattowhom?So-theborderwascarried out in advance? So - it was, perhaps, a preliminary conspiracy, secret protocols to the pact

"Molotov-Ribbentrop?"Andsowehavedeniedthem![181]

PiercedColonelGeneralShtemenko.Prohlopalimilitarycensorship.Aw,Snap!Wesharewiththe

GermanstoPolandbefore1September.

That'swhenIhadheardandwas-wejustliketheGermans,toseizeeverythingtheycould.And tobelievetheofficialversionisnotpossible.

- My dear, well, as it was possible and to believe that the official Soviet version? All Baltic

rememberedverywellhowa40-yearoccurredthe"revolution"and"invited"theRedArmy.You

takeathickvolumeof"SovietEstonia",revealsthesection"History",flippinguntil1940-andyou

eat the pill: a veteran recalls: "We knew that the revolution will soon"! Do not "cooked", not "fighting" and "know"! And at the same time as the time these three revolutions have taken place! And here is a photo of a happy meeting with the population poproshennymi liberators:

liquidchainsonthesidewalks,andtheonlyonequartermissing,andahandfulofactivistsatthe head of the tank with a banner. And very clearly: normal occupation, covered by a fig leaf for decency. Tolie-needaheadlikeahorse:large.Besuretogetoutallsortsofabsurditiesout.

- Why did Stalin until recently forbade surrender Kiev? Because of all the laws of war the

Germans could not take it !!! Upcoming should have a threefold numerical superiority over the

defending-it'sthelawold.Oneinthegroundvrylsya,areasighted,stockhoarding-anotherban on him in the open field, vulnerable to all types of fire exposure. So the advantage species was near Kiev us, the defenders! There were more, not them! So what? ! Fritz echoed us to

smithereens

Stalinthatthetroopslikealot-alittlehelp. And immediately the question: to fuck is to collect as many troops and what they have been taught?Ifourlarger,andtheycannotdefendthemselves-whysomanyofthem andwhatthey cando?

- Wait a minute. To be fair. Suvorov - man rested. In the see only Soviet aggression. Up to the

point of absurdity comes. Here he wrote forcefully about the "BT", "tank aggressor." Yeah I understood? Aggression already at the design engineering level. And about the "tank-defender" haveyoueverheard?!PeacefulSoviettankwithagunforself-defense,yeah. YesTank-any-isbasicallyanoffensiveweapon,breakarms,breakingthedefense,theoffensive. AndSuvorovknowsit.Butitdoesnothelpjuggling:see-allthatwasinSovietmilitarywassolely foraggression. - A heavy bombers? Like, was built we were thousands of "Pe-8" and could one raid collapse in the German rear-five thousand tons of TNT, is five megatons, it is a nuclear bomb - and Khan Germany and suppressed we first response bombardment of German power, and doomed to failureGermanaggression:that'sthebestdefenseweapon!ButStalinrefusedstrategicbombers - was not expecting an attack, he wanted to attack, and all funds invested in the aircraft attack, escorthisinvadingarmy.

Zhukovhasalreadyevenknowthatwecannotfight,andnotallcametoComrade

Well,firstly,inthefive-tonbombofTNTnorfivetons.Themainbodyweightisonstalistogoiron. Andinanyexplosivebombweighsonlyasmallerpart.Of20% strength.Sodonotincurtierfive kilotonsathousandmachines,butonlyone.Butitis-atrifle. But secondly, for the war allies rivet 30,000 (thirty thousand!) Four-engined strategic heavy bombers. But "vybombit" Germany from war, could not. Pre-war "Douai doctrine" has not

justifieditself.Soouronethousand,nothingwouldbedecided,andStalin,itturnsout,wasright. Third: the rights he was not from an excess of aggressiveness and a lack of facilities, materials andenginesforallmilitaryprograms.Fivethousandofrequiredengines(becauseitwasthefifth inthefuselagefortheboostinthehighplacesintheotherfour)atefighterandbombertactical

aviation,theneedforwhichwassharper,moreinsistently.[182.183]

- Suvorov general - principle perpendicular. Seeking lie around, refutes all allegations that were

before him, and runs all the time in delirium itself. This is one of the well-established versions:

before the war destroyed their command staff, so fighting is worse and losses carried over. No,

saidSuvorov!HerereadthediariesofGoebbelsfromspring'45:"Poorourgenerals,thatRussian

generalsarebetter."WouldtheGermanshadshotbeforethewar,ComradeStalin,fourthousand mediocrities in the general's uniform - you look, and they would have found a better generals, Suvorovsaid.

First,thebaddancergeneralsprevented.Sofar,then,inthe41th-42thGermangeneralswere

beatenandchasedsuperiorenemy-theyweregoodGoebbels.Andwheninthe45thcouldnot

hold back many times superior enemy - have become poor. It is necessary to find somebody to blameforthedefeat!NotverysameNazielitepoliticallylostthewar! And secondly - well, there was the Germans four thousand generals. Not Russia. All the commandersofdivisions,corps,groups,their alternates, staffunits -andhalf as manygenerals, not typed. It would have to shoot all the colonels and even grab. It's a big loss for us, that Suvorovwasnotbornbeforeanddidnotworkbeforethewar,Hitler'schiefadviser.

- Previously,it was written that we had at the beginning of the war equipment was worse than

the German? So he tries to argue that the German was worse was bad and stupid. Originality! Surprise!Creatingscandalsrevolutionhistory,attractingmassesofreaders!Yes,he'sashowman frommilitaryhistory.Zhirinovskyfortyone! Here sverhpushka "Dora" shelling Sevastopol. Yes, we can assume that the cost of its creation, transportation and protection have not justified. However, the famous 30th battery, it still destroyed: the thickness of the shells have been armor and concrete and destroyed the towers and dungeons. Suvorov is obviously knows, but silent. But another says. Firstly, the shot at the map, artillery targets have not seen such shooting may not be accurate, it is not effective firing on the squares: obaldui these Germans! Suvorov play the fool that does not know about the shootingindirectfire,andaboutartkorrektirovschikahartrazvedchikahandsoon:thathehadnot heardofAhazartillery. Second, and of shells some "Dora" and "Karl" was not confused even when hit! Here is the testimony,that in the book of memoirs written a huge hole into the ground with a diameter in diameterandroundsupersnaryadacavedownstairs:leftbackandthewholestrengthofthegap. Well, a miracle, not an intelligence officer! This type of break is called "camouflet" - when a projectile,especiallywithexplosivefuse,delayedbycoolhingedtrajectoryentersdeeplyintosoft or sandy soil, blanking gap. This may be a semidesyatipyatimillimetrovoy howitzer with a large angle of elevation when the projectile hit the soft grass or peat, for instance. For the "Dora"

peckingthree-tonconcretefortifiedlandmines,gettingintothesoftearth-stillamiss,andthere is no need to throw away the top land carriage. But if it enters the strengthening and recessed into the ground barrier - Khan's three-meter concrete bunker with a hood, hidden five meters undertheground.AndheknowsitperfectlySuvorov-simplycannotbemaintained,sothatyour linedoesnotbend. ItisapitythatsuchdistortionofcausepeopletodoubtatallthoughtfulinallthatSuvorovwrote. From the point of view of the serious military historians, Suvorov generally operates some randomspeculation.Reliable,documentedandprovenfactshedoesnot,thatimaginesinitssole discretion. Ah, from the standpoint of military historians? And who are the Soviet military historians?

Salaried officials who lead story for a salary in line received orders and ideological setting. How doyouwant-write,so sure!What wehadless andtechniquewasworse. [184.185] Orthatwe had less, but the technique was better, but the treacherous attack took us by surprise. Or that

Germanlossesweregreater.Orequaltoours.Orourmorethanthreetimes.Thesamepeople-

wrote one thing after another, and for all the titles and awards received. Parasites and demagogues!

Hmmm, came several thick books refuting Suvorov, but the interest in them has disappeared instantly, and continues to read Suvorov. Oproverzhentsev little book something cheap at all. DearSirs,historicalandliterarycomrades!Aspartofthefindingofsunspotsanycriticwillgivea hundredpointsDoberman,sniffingdrugtrafficker.Theverysubjectofourconversationisalready evidencethatthetheoryofSuvorovestablishedandsolidifiedinspace-time,likeamountain,on whichclimberscanclimbandeventodriveithooks.Releaseofvertically-that'swhatmattersin science. To pick the facts can any clerk. Collect them in a mosaic and dumbfound the world for thefirsttimewhathesawthepicture-that'swhatdistinguishesthescientistfrompodmetalyfor thescientificpart.Today,allsmart,andhalfoftheseintelligentdissent.AndIwent"ice-breaker" forthefirsttime-thatsomepeoplemouthsporaskryval:huffing,puffing,andarguesosoonand there is nothing. Well, the classic evolution of recognition: first - "! What a nonsense", then - "something, in fact, there is," and finally - "but who does not know it." It is easy to be knowledgeableandunderstandwhenyouexplainonthefingers.Oh,howallSuvorovsimpleand evenprimitive!Herearejustsomereasonbeforeit'sallanybodyinuniformdidnottakeapicture. Andhalfacenturygroans:oh,whatafooltrustingStalinwas,andhowlittlewehad,andwewere

poorlyarmedinfrontoftheGermansteelavalanche

That's what I tell you, historians say, doctor of historical sciences can become, in essence, any

elementaryeducatedandintelligentperson.ButtheofficerAnalystresidencyMainIntelligence-

it's elite. Withhis demandmuchtougher,huh?And the responsibility it cooler,right? And tobe

able to analyze it on a post is necessary. And vlamyvanie officer in the GRU residency fiefdom quiet historians - it's like in the old Canadian professional hockey players scattered enthusiasts. Well,bytheway,thecriesofmediocrity-loserRezun.Thekidwithoutahairypawmissileentered the elite reconnaissance. Suvorov can refute much. Podtasovschik, visionary, debater,

nonconformist,whateveryoucallit

trying to place the most compelling Suvorov get, silent. Answer: why in June 41 th, we cleared the border bridges ?! If you are ready to attack - it is logical, clear, correct. But no, no other explanationissimplyno!!!Whybeforethewarbegantoliquidatelongbyguerrillabasesintheir forests ?! Army increase - and the possibility of destroying the guerrilla movement. This is

!

Butthemainthing-is,anditisundeniable!Opponentsare

preparationforwhat?!Whywasitinabundancemapsalienterritory-buttherewasnocardon its own territory? It provides for a defensive war ?! Why is pre-prepared and replicated war

posters,conversation,evenasong?!Sowhattoprepare?Bythewar?Butwewerenotprepared forthedefense?Andforwhat?Yeah Stalin rightly believed that Hitler was not suicidal, get involved in a war on two fronts - a clear defeat. But England was much like a beneficial knock Germany from the Soviet Union - and let draineachother.How canyoubelievethe warningsofChurchill,faceextremely concerned? But

Hitlerdecidedthatthefirstattack-theonlychance,thelessereviliftheUnionistohitthefirst-

end fast and imminent. All logical. Throw.Sample Suvorov cranberries - "Aquarium". A book for thosewhodonotknowanythingaboutthearmyandtheSovietUnion.Forwesternfoolsandhot to lovers. "If [186.187] Hazard senior group shall first of all cipher kill and destroy the notes." Suchinformation isall a long time not toclassify.And then inthe case of danger,the firstthing wouldbetokillaseniorcryptographergroup. Yes,thisisnotadocument.Thisarmyromance.Butbecauseofhermanyandmanyhavelearned thefirsttime.EvenabbreviationGRUneverheardbefore! - And yet, and yet. Suvorov made the first and only successful and vseobemnuyu attempt to understand and explain what happened and why to June 22, 41-year. No other theory can not withstand criticism. His - explains it. If this is true - why no one else is telling the truth, which, thoughwouldbeliketobetrue?Thinkaboutityourself:ofcourse,itwastrue,guys.Justfooling usforalongtime,foulbrains. As for his monomania - all bark knit in one line - this is psychology. This is typical for all the people that have developed in the world and let a new and powerful idea. The idea captures them,andalltheitemstheyalreadyseeinitslight.Thewholeworldistheirpermanentinterests above all from the standpoint of their overvalued ideas. Anything is possible, they treat in her favor and support. Here excesses are inevitable. Both Darwin and Marx, and Freud - all this suffering. This is normal. The bends and then went out and brought corrected followers and izuchateli. But what about the main this is a frequent seine caught everything that is possible. That,alongwithsmallfishandtrashraking. PourinthelastoftherenegadeRezun.Traitorsweremanyandgreatneshkurnayaideahassofar onlylikeone.Themanisnotsopoorlypaidforhisgloryandgrandmother.

PactMolotov-Ribbentrop:66YearsLater.

WhatweretheplansofStalinontheeveoftheGreatPatrioticWarof1939-1941.?

Fall1991communistruleinRussiahascausedintensedebateoverwhether,howshouldthepast,

which at the time was so famously stamped Soviet historiography under the dictation of the CPSU. With partial opening of Soviet archives - civil, military and secret police - the contents of the Orwellian "memory hole in", which in the times of Stalin's fit so much historical truth, begin to exhume. The result was that in recent years the Russian historical science embraced universal revisionism.Inthisprocess,almostnostonewasleftunturned. One of the biggest gaps in Soviet history is a question regarding the intentions and plans of Joseph Stalin during and after the signing of the Soviet-German [189] agreements and secret protocols drawn up by Berlin and Moscow in August and September 1939. As well as issues

relatingtothestrategyofStalinontheeveoftheGermanattackinJune1941

One of the trends in historiography, which we here call "defensive", adheres to the traditional line that dominated the historical works in the USSR and abroad until recently. This line states thatStalin's military policy from 1939 untilthe German invasion of the Soviet Unionon 22 June

1941waslargelydefensive.Thatis,Stalinadheredtonon-offensivestrategyagainstGermanyand

any other capitalist state - a potential enemy.Stalin was only trying to protect the Soviet Union fromtheWorldWarII,predictedbyMarxism-Leninismas"inevitable",aslongasitwaspossible. Thus, the Soviets would have had time to strengthen its defenses in anticipation of the coming globalconflict,inwhichtheywouldbeinvolvedsoonerorlater. According to this trend, including such "defensive" steps were Soviet territorial acquisitions of 1939-1940, includes half of Poland, all the Baltic States, part of Finland, and Northern Bukovina andBessarabia.Named"oboronnikami""bufferzone",theseterritorieswereallegedlytheresult of a deliberate Soviet expansionist policy. Rather, they were in addition to the protective measures taken by Stalin wisely in anticipation of a German invasion. The fact that they have becomepartoftheSovietUnion,itisconsideredinappropriatetodiscuss. InsidiousGermanattackwastoStalin,accordingto"oboronniki"unpleasantsurprise.Itexposed Soviet Russia in the role of the ugly and humiliating easy victim. It turned out that Stalin committedafolly,trustingtoHitler,evenwhenthelatterbeganovertpreparationsforanattack

ontheSovietwesternbordersofthespringof1941.

They allege that Stalin had simply ignored all the warnings of the attack received by Roosevelt, Churchillandfromtheirownforeignagents,someofwhichhaveevenpredictedtheexactdateof the invasion. Stalin had reason not to trust western politicians, these two-faced "Munich peacekeepers",whoareknowntohaveabandonedseriousSovietproposalsforthedevelopment ofcollective security guaranteesagainsttheexpansionism of theAxis. Andallthattimeplanned todestroytheSovietUnion. Incontrasttothispositioninthedebate,"offensive"trendinhistoriographyclaimsthatStalinall the time preparing their own offensive war- primarily against Germany and, inthe end, against allthe"capitalist-imperialist"ofEurope. Thisisconfirmedbythestatements,secretorpublic,madebyleadingofficialsanditsownSoviet defensivepreparationandstrategy.InthefirstplaceweshouldmentionStalin'ssecretspeechto

thegraduatesofthemilitaryacademies,May5,1941,maturedinanoffensivespirit,thetwothat

followedthisspeechoffieldmanualsfortheRedArmy,issuedbeforeJune1941andbasedsolely

ontheoffensive,notthedefensiveprinciplesaswellasanimportantmilitary-strategicdocument, addressed to Stalin and prepared by high-ranking military officials (Vasilevsky, Zhukov and Timoshenko),anddatedMay15,1941Allofthemsupportedtheideaof ​ ​ awarofconquest. "Oboronniki"believe thatthereisnoevidence thatStalineversawthelastdocument.However, the question arises: Would the generals dare to give such recommendations to Stalin, who had recentlymadeabloodypurgetheofficercorpsoftheRedArmy,iftheoffensiveprinciplesdonot

matchhisownviews?[190.191]

Speakingofideology,therevisionistsrefertoLenin's"ReportoftheWorld"onNovember8,1917.

Soviet leader then called Western "toiling and exploited masses" to put an end to the participation of their nations in the First World War and following the Soviet example, to "liberate" themselves from "all forms of slavery and exploitation." Socialist "new order", Lenin continued,"is not boundby the agreements." Weare"lit the torch ofthe world revolution," he wroteinthe first draftof the Programme after 1917, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Tipswill"carrytherevolutioninthemostadvancedcountries,andingeneraltoallcountries."In aspeechonMarch7,1918,Leninsaid:"Thehistory ofstepsforwardonthebasisofthewarsof liberation." These principles were never forgotten. Revisionists "Offensive" to notice that with the establishment of the Communist International in 1919, the dream of universal facilitate Sovietization, which Lenin had cherished for so long, had finally been realized. Soon Soviet diplomacyhasgoneon"twopaths".Perhapsthebestanalogyforadouble,ifnottwo-faced,the natureof Sovietforeignpolicy andbehavior inthe internationalarenawouldbeaniceberg.The visible part consisted of "legal" diplomacy and talking about "peaceful coexistence" (later renamed"peacefulcoexistence")inordertogaintimeandmisleading"deaf,dumbandblind"an enemyofSovietpowerandtheincreaseworldwide.Indirectly"legaldiplomacy"atthesametime contributedtotheglobalsearchfortherevolutionarycausefortheSovietizationoftheworld. Largeunderwaterpartofanicebergcomposedofinternationalsubversionthroughlegaland/or illegalorganizationsCommunistpartiesaroundtheworld.Theseforcesimpregnatedallsectorsof society in certain capitalist countries or the third world countries were using Stalin's later statement 1952 international "shock brigades". As armed elements of the Marxist-Leninist

"internationalism", they were focused on the preparation of [192] the victory of socialism Soviet-style through the armed seizure of power and partisan actions contributed to Soviet interests by means of pacifist propagandaand direct sabotage within specific countries (such as

Britain,FranceandUnitedStatesduringtheSoviet-German"honeymoon"of1939-1941).Orthey

wereinhiding,waitingforthemomenttotakeontheorderoftheMoscowcenterpartinactions in case of war in the name of socialism. In times of peace, they prepared the ground for the Sovietizationofcertaincountriesor regions.As itturnedoutaccordingtoRussiansources,huge investmentsweremadeinsuchoperations. Istoriki- "Offensive" of the opinion that Stalin was really counting on the war. The revolution could be "exported to Connick bayonets", as a publicly declared Soviet representatives and militaryhawksinthecongressesoftheCominterninthetwentiesandthirties.Stalinencouraged the German expansionism against France, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and the UK. At the sametime,StalinplannedtostartawarofaggressionagainstGermany,whichwasscheduledto begin, or to July 1941 (the minority view), or, at the latest by mid-1942. The Red Army would havesweptthroughEurope,bringingtogethertheinsurgentmassesandcarryingaredflagtothe West. The same Russian historians note that in 1939 and 1940-1941, the next few Stalin's assistants, suchasMolotov,Zhdanov,Mehlis,Shcherbakovconfidentlytalkabout"expandingthebordersof

socialism"onthewingsof"imminent"futurewar{243}.

In the five years before the Second World War, Stalin spoke ominously: "The war, of course,

wouldunleashrevolutionandjeopardizetheveryexistenceofcapitalism

Molotov, admitted in his memoirs that he wrote in the 70 years, being retired, that one of his

goals was "to expand as much as possible, the boundaries of the Fatherland." [193] He added:

"We coped with this bad." In other words, a "buffer" would turn direct annexation, he contributedtotheexpansionoftheboundariesandthepoweroftheSovietUnion. "Oboronniki" in response to this claim that such a revolutionary-sounding phrases coming from thetopSovietleaderswerenomorethanemptyboasting.SovietizationofEurope,theysay,was anairlock,ideologicalposturingandshowingoff.

"{244}.

Theyargue,"Offensive".ThemainpurposeoftheGreatSovietstrategywasdrawnfromthewar favor. Lenin made the prediction, then polished by Stalin, that in the future there will be two typesof war:1) inter-imperialistand2) the imperialist warsof aggressionagainstthe USSR. The first type of war was inevitable and naturally occurring, they said, because it was linked to the "last stage of imperialism", in which the amplifying "contradictions" between capitalist states would inevitably turned around wars. The second type of war, "anti-Soviet" was also inevitable foraslongasitwasnotdestroyedby"capitalistencirclement." Sinceallthesewarsarepushingforrevolution(proletariansopposetheimperialistwarsinwhich thecapitalistoppressorsuseworkersascannonfodder),theSovietsmadesensetoaggravatethe "inter-imperialist contradictions," as muchas possible, while atthe same time preparing forthe second type of war, which, according to Marxism-Leninism, have grown into a global "war of liberation" for all workers. Tactics contradictions that come up with Lenin and Stalin, and managedtobringtolifetheSovietdiplomacywasaimedatprovokingJapanintoconflictwiththe UnitedStates,the Europeancapitalist countries toset upagainsttheUS andtheir own-against each other. (This policy has been re-used after years under Brezhnev in order to sow discord

withinNATO.)Documentedbytheteachingandopen[194]itssecretactivityofSovietpolicyand

globalsubversion,whichpracticedtheComintern,thevariousstatementsmadebyStalinandhis seniorassistants. One may ask how far been willing to go Stalin in an effort to contribute to the outbreak of the Second World War (given that it was his own plan) to implement a clearly stated goal of the Soviet world domination? As mentioned Beria's assistant Paul Sudoplatov, a key period in the

practicalimplementationofSovietexpansionistaimswastheAugust-September1939.

Thequestionis:Isthisthelong-awaitedidealsituationwas,wheretheuseofdualdiplomacyand liberating, "revolutionary" catalyst War could jointly realize the Soviet expansionist plans in this uniquemomentinhistory,suitable?"Oboronniki"rejectsuchaninterpretation. Regarding the gambit of collective security in the mid-thirties, prescribed by Stalin supposedly "moderate", the so-called"pro-Western" People's Commissar for Foreign AffairsMaxim Litvinov, the revisionists "Offensive" insist that it was just a diversion from the dictator to frighten GermanyandspurhertomakeadealwithMoscow,onlyasimulationrallyingrankswithWestern capitaliststates. In fact, Stalin immediately stopped all negotiations with other Western countries, as soon as begintoworkadealwiththeNazis. Ishould addthat adecade of experience ofthe Soviet-German cooperationin the twenties and early thirties, was accompanied by a period of extensive bilateral trade. German economic assistance to the industrialization of Soviet Russia under Stalin was in fact in some ways more significant than that of [195] from the United States, despite the assistance of the latter in the constructionofrailways,damsandDnepropetrovskSoviettractorandtextilemills. Between 1921 and 1938, Germany exported to Russia more than two billion dollars in

commodities,whiletheUS-1.4billion.AfterHitlercametopower,theNKVDbegantocooperate

with the German Gestapo.(Article in the post-Soviet weekly "Arguments and Facts" toacquaint the reader with documents on Soviet invention of a certain Dr. Berg - the gas chamber in the form of four-wheeled vehicle used for the extermination of people. NKVD also gave Heinrich HimmlerschemesofanimpressivenetworkofSovietlaborcamps(Gulag),precursoroftheNazi "death camps" Auschwitz and Buchenwald.) a little later, according to the secret protocols and

other agreements in August-September 1939, the Soviet raw materials (oil, grain, cotton, chromium, iron, etc., more than 3 million tons by special agreement in 1940) was sent to Germanywithpunctualprecision.ThesesupplieswereusedinthewaragainsttheWesternAllies.

TipscomplywithagreementsonthesesuppliesuptotheJune22,1941,despitethefactthatthe

Germans,fortheirpart,wereretreatingfromthem. "Oboronniki", on the contrary, insist that, regardless of the contacts with Germany, Stalin was determinedtoseriously towardscollectivesecurity.However,itissuspectedthattheBritishand the French were not so serious. Moreover, it seems that he believed that the policy of appeasement,whichwould eventuallyturn intoananti-Soviet alliance with the countries ofthe Axis, was more likely solution to London and Paris, than consent to a serious agreement on collective security with the Soviet Union (this assumes, however, that Stalin did not follow the planof "divide andrule",against whichthere isconvincingevidence). Donotindicated whether the flight of Hitler's aide Rudolf Hess to England in May 1941 that Britain was interested in makingadealwithHitler? Then,Stalinreasoned,itwouldbebesttostick astarontheGerman guncrushingaction. Sudoplatovinhismemoirs,alsotalksabouttheparamountimportanceofStalin'sdealwithHitler against the background of the revolutionary Soviet expansionism. He writes: "The idea of promotionoftopcommunistrevolutionworldwidewasasmokescreenideologicalnature,aimed toapprovetheSovietUnionasasuperpower,affectingalleventsintheworld.Althoughoriginally the concept was ideological, it gradually became a real political course. This possibility has openedbefore our country for the firsttime after the signing of the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact. Fornow,bothconfirmedthesecretprotocols,oneoftheleadingnationsoftheworldrecognized the international interests of the Soviet Union and its natural desire to expand its borders "

{245}.

AccordingtoColonelGrigoryTokaev,officerandemployeeoftheRedArmyoftheSovietmilitary administrationinoccupiedEastGermanyattheendofthewar,thetrusteeoftheNKVDofStalin andLavrentyBeriaAssistantDeputyGeneralIvanSerov,theSovietshopedtowartospeedupthe promotionoftheSovietizationoftheWest.Itwasapointofview,hesaid,itiswidelysupported inthehigherechelonsofthecivilandmilitarypowerintheKremlin. Other well-informed ex-Soviet military officers and civilian officials who have come to the West before,duringorafterWorldWarII,madesimilarstatements. It makes sense to also mention the background of the Soviet-German friendship. After the First WorldWar,GermanywasconsideredbyLenin,andlaterStalin,asthehostofEurope,sorry"lack" of power. Therefore, it was malleable to the Soviet proposals of friendship. In addition, Russia was not a party to the Treaty of Versailles and in fact acted against him. The Council considers that [196.197] inter-imperialist struggle has entered a new phase due to the humiliating treaty that brought Germany and its working class into poverty. Due to the German-Soviet Rapallo Treaty in 1922 and the other agreements, Soviet Russia soon perceptibly moved closer to Germany. "Oboronniki" believe that the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership would remain largely a bystander being played out to the world-historical events in a unique time. Later, perhaps, the SovietUnionwouldusethesituationfortheirownpurposes,butdefinitelywouldnotaggressive participantinWorldWarII.USSRandwouldnot,asStalinsaid,"pullthechestnutsoutofthefire" for the capitalist countries. First of all, the Soviet Union would try to stay out of the expanding

conflictaslongaspossible. Atthesametime,"defensive"linedoesnotincludethefactthatStalinisopenlydeclaredsomeof hisaideswantedtocapitalistcountries,democraticorfascist,mutuallydestroyedthemselvesina fightthatwouldhavepavedthewayfora"revolution"intheSovietstyle."Oboronniki"alsodoes not take into account the tactic is clearly protected by Lenin and Stalin, according to which the tips as possible encourage the "contradiction" between the competing forces of capitalist countriestotheextentthatincitedthemtothefratricidalwar. Inaddition,accordingtotheNazi-SoviettreatiesandprotocolsorunilateralstepsbytheSovietin 1940 the Soviets acquired a "buffer zone", including, inter alia, the Baltic states, Bessarabia and NorthernBukovina.ThisareahasbeendesignedtoprovidetheSovietsacertainamountofspace and time to build their defenses. As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 winter Tips received by the Finnish further "protection" in the form of geo-strategic areas on its northern border.Later,StalindemandedallBukovina,butinnegotiationswiththeGermansagreedtothe union with the northern part only. These acquisitions are not considered "oboronnikami" as a direct expansion. Strange, but they also do not see the connection between the acquisitions of 1939-1940, and the creation of the "Soviet bloc" Central and Eastern European countries after theSecondWorldWar. Istoriki-"Offensive"believe thatthe invasionof June22, 1941 Hitler seizedbysurprise potential invaderStalin.Arroganceandself-confidenceoftheSovietdictatorinhisrelationshipwithHitler was deprived of his sober look at what is happening. "Oboronniki" argue that this line is a "pro-Nazi" and not supported by evidence. They notice that Hitler and his generals were quite disingenuous when he says that the operation "Barbarossa" wascarried out only because Stalin wasplanninganattackonGermany.

WhathappenedimmediatelybeforeJune22,1941?Whatkindofmilitarydefensiveoroffensive

measures taken Stalin really? The answer to this question could shed light on the plans of the SovietdictatorforGermany. Taking into account the offensive of the Red Army immediately before June 22, 1941, avtory- "Offensive", including several modern Russian military historians support the view that the militarizationoftheStalinistSovietUnionandthehugevolumeofdefenseproductsproducedin theprevioustwoWorldwarfive-yearplansweresubjecttoclearlyoffensivemilitarystrategyand testified about one thing: there was a long-term plan for the preparation of an offensive war. Kokoshin, a former deputy defense minister, top military adviser to President Yeltsin and the Security Council Secretary,in his book "The Army and Politics," published in 1995, briefly spoke

aboutitthisway:"TheoffensivenatureofSovietmilitarystrategywasquiteobvious."[198.199]

Stalin'ssecretspeechMay5,1941tothegraduatesofthemilitaryacademies-anotherexample

ofthesame.Fullverbatimtextofspeechdoesnotexist,butitisassembledpiecebypieceonthe basisofafewremainingoptionsdrawnupaccordingtotherecollectionsofwitnessesstatements. They are analyzed in the collection of essays edited by the Russian Academician Yuri Afanasiev "The Other War. 1939-1945. " This publication reproduces the three versions of the text of Stalin'sspeech. InhisspeechintheGrandKremlinPalaceinjustafewweeksbeforetheGermaninvasion,Stalin has completely changed both their and Molotov approval of 1939-1940. that Britain and France were the main "instigators of a new war." As Stalin said, is now Germany has become a major "warmonger." He also said that there should be an end to notions of "German invincibility." It's

time to prepare for aggressive war. Immediately after Stalin's speech reception for graduates, academics was organized, which is said to witnesses, Stalin developed the ideas of his speech; "TheSecretaryGeneral,inthefirstplace,spokeabouttheneedtogototheactivitiesoftheRed Army from defense to" a military policy of offensive operations ", and secondly, to rebuild the

propagandacampaign,printing,alleducation"inanoffensivespirit"{246}.

Further explanation of Stalin's instructions were given in the following days and weeks in the business papers such senior officials as Molotov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Shcherbakov (who was responsible for military indoctrination), and General Alexander Vasilevsky andNikolai Vatutin. In his speech reaming Stalin and the subsequent reception of these officials and senior military officers, always referring to Stalin, touted "military policy of offensive action." Then I remembered Lenin's statement: any war waged by the Soviet Union against capitalist forces, "a justwar,regardlessofwhichsidestartedthewar." (This statement was repeated word for word in Soviet military literature in the era of thermonuclear weaponsanddetente.) "Offensive"line saysthatthiswar,which wasplannedby the Soviets,who hadtheir owntacticsblitzkrieg "by Tukhachevsky" wouldlead the RedArmy in Europeasaliberator,asprophesiedLenin.TherevolutionwouldbebroughttotheWestatatime whenadefeatedGermanywasinruins,andparalyzedFrance,BritainandAmericawerefarinthe confrontation with the red, mostly Eurasia. Thus it would be compensated for the humiliation

sufferedtheUSSR(andStalinpersonally)fromfailuresintheSoviet-Polishwarof1920.

With regard to the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 the protagonists of the Soviet offensive theory quoted recently published a transcript of the speech of Lenin, begins: "I ask to write smaller, it

doesnotgetintoprint."InthisspeechLeninin1920hepredictedthattheSovietizationofPoland,

theRedArmycouldstayrightontheGermanborder.Inthiscase,itcouldthenbegin"aggressive war"againsttheWest,ultimatelybringing"liberationwar"throughoutEurope. "Offensive" direction, in addition, discusses the question of whether Stalin's acquisition of the necessary "buffer zones" in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet agreement quite so innocent. After all, Stalin drew a dangerous Soviet border to the German borders - borders that once the WehrmachtwouldhavetocrossintheattackagainsttheSoviets.PerhapsStalinhadplannedfor it to happen quite a different way? Namely - Stalin moved forward to implement its strategy of doingtheunexpected,aggressivewaragainstGermany? It is noteworthy that Stalin did not begin immediately to strengthen the defense in the newly acquired territories in the West, say the authors. When along the former (until 1939) the old Soviet border fortifications were dismantled, it has not been established, no new "Stalin Line".

[200.201]

Thus, instead of being guided by the policy of defense in the newly acquired territories of the Baltic States, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, as well as Ukraine and Belarus, Stalin, as the "offensive" trend in historiography, he turned it mainly troops ready to attack. They consisted mainlyofairbornetroopsandmechanizeddivisions.Thesepartshavebeentrainedandequipped tocarry out rapid, offensive strokes and deep penetration into the enemy's rear.This tactic was used during military exercises under the supervision of Zhukov held in the Soviet Union in the years 1940- 1941. Zhukov has applied this tactic in fact in combat against the Japanese in the

Halkin-Gol(Mongolia)inAugust-September1939,whereheledtheSovietforces.

Historians variously estimate the conclusions that have been made by Stalin and his generals of these lessons. "Oboronniki" insist that the conclusions were largely defensive in nature;

"Offensive"alsobelievethattheywereoffensive. Insupport of"Offensive" refer toanimportant document,dated May 15, 1941: "Considerations

on the plan for the strategic deployment of forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies." It was built in the form of a memorandum, entitled "Chairman of the CouncilofPeople'sCommissars,ComradeStalin."The documentwaswrittenbyDeputy Chief of General Staff General Vasilevsky. Did Stalin read the strategy document - it is unknown.

" reproduced completely in the book Afanasyeva. The dispute relating to the

passage read: "Given that Germany is currently holding its army mobilized, deployed with the rears,ithastheabilitytoprevent(underlinedinthetext-.LU)havetodeployandstrikeswiftly. To prevent this, I consider it necessary in any case not to give action initiative of the German command, to pre-empt (underlined in the text -. AU ) enemy to deploy and attack the German armyatthemomentwhenitwillbeinthedeploymentstageanddidnothavetimeevenarrange

thefrontandtheinteractionofarms"{247}.

At the same time, according to "offensive" direction, the Soviets built at the forefront in the frontiermilitaryairfieldsthatcouldbeusedfortacticalandstrategicairattackthatwouldsubtly capture the Germans by surprise. At the same time they were very vulnerable and were destroyedby German troopsin the first place after the attack, which began on Sundayat 3 am,

June22,1941.SignificantlyandthatallSovietlatestequipmentandbesttrainedsoldiers-infact

two-thirds of all members of the Red Army at the time - were deployed in the western border areas. The Soviet Armed Forces have grown by 250 percentinjust twoyears. Between 1939 and 1941 the number of Soviet Armed Forces grew from less than two million to more than five million,

andwithlessthan100divisionstomorethan300.

Duetothefactthatthe Wehrmachtattackedthe RedArmysuddenly,thankstoStalin'sdemand thattheRedArmyimmediately-and,ashappenedinmanycases,premature-startedtoconduct a counter-offensive, the Soviet losses were staggering. For the "offensive" direction, this fact is furtherproofoftheintentionsoftheRedArmyoffensive. ThisisalsoillustratedbytheabsenceofthemilitarydoctrineofStalin'stacticaland/orstrategic retreat. Thanks to the deployment of troops, the Red Army was unprepared for the blitzkrieg, which began in a peaceful Sunday. On the first day of the German attack only some western regions lost 738 aircraft, most of which were destroyed on the ground. In the first few hours of

thewartheGermansachievedcompleteairsuperiorityovermorethanthreethousand[202.203]

kilometersfront,killinganaverageof1,200aircraftperday.Barelytwoweeksaftertheattack,it

seemedthattheGermantroopsareontheirwaytovictoryinthewar. According to the calculations of modern US military analysts, after six months of war, the total Soviet losses were equivalent to 229 divisions. German losses in men, by comparison, averaged less than half of the Soviet losses. By November 1942 the Soviets lost in killed, wounded and captured prisoners over 11 million people in relation to the German 4 million. It should be remembered that the latter were an offensive war, and the traditional legal battle says that attackingsidelosesmanymoresoldiersthandefending-aboutthreetoonecalculation. The controversy over the fact that Stalin planned in 1939- 1941 years, is more than just an academicexercise. TodayRussianstudentshaveattheir disposal severaloptionsfornewhistory textbooks. Author of this article has analyzed some of them and found that most of the communistpropagandaabouttheeventsofinternalandforeignpolicyofLenin'stime,Stalinand

"Considerations

theirsuccessorshadthem eliminatedfrom1917to1991.Yetsomepartofitstillremains.Inthe nameofhistoricaltruthandthecondemnationofthecommunistpastisabsolutelynecessaryto fillthe"whitespots"inSoviethistory.

VLDoroshenko{248},K.Pavlova,R.ChRaak

Notamyth:Stalin'sspeechAugust19,1939

"

ViktorSuvorov,"Icebreaker"(Moscow,1992,p.53).

28 and 29 November 1939, during the French newspapers published news agency Havas,which

wasasummaryofthespeechIVStalin,deliveredatameetingofthePolitburooftheCPSU(b)19

August of the same year. The message appeared in newspapers such as «Le Figaro», «Le Petit Journal»,«LeJournal»,«LeTemps»,«L'Actionfranaise»andothers.Ofthesepublications,itwas immediately reported to Stalin. His refutation of "On the false news agency Havas" newspaper

"Pravda"publishedon30November(doc.Number1).

ForStalin,August19, 1939 wasanextremely busyday,entirely relatedtothe Germanquestion. Tradeandcredit agreementbetween the USSR andGermany wassigned on this day{249} . The same day, the Soviet ambassador in Germany, GA. Astakhov, has withdrawn from Berlin on August 16, it has been replaced by an unknown AA Shkvartsevym {250} . Molotov August 19 twicemetwiththeAmbassadorofGermanyinRussiaF.Schulenburgandeventuallyhandedhim the Soviet draft treaty (Covenant) of non-aggression for examination in Berlin and the decision aboutthevisitofGermanForeignMinisterRibbentroptoMoscowtosignthefinalcontractterms { 251} . Schulenburg himself was convinced that Stalin decided to enter into a contract with a

secretadditionalprotocolwasAugust19{252}.

After this, the story of Stalin's speech.Without wishing topresenthistoriographyof the issue in general,werefertotherecentpublicationbythetime-articleSZCasesof"Stalin'sspeech,which was not." The author begins with a literature review article by E. Yekkelya "On an imaginary speech of Stalin August 19, 1939" {253} , and examines in detail the Russian historiography, undertaken including TS Bushuyeva in 1994, the first publication of the speech in the "New World» (number 12), the first special seminar on this question (Novosibirsk, Russia, April 16, 1995), followed by the recognition and non-recognition of this fact, both in Russia and abroad . Shuffledoesnotholditselfinassessmentsofthosehistorianswhorecognizedtheaccuracyofthe French posts. According to him, "it is the lack of professionalism and has become the breeding ground, which brings together Western and Russian adherents of the authenticity of" Stalin's speech"hunttoreview thegenesis andthegeneralconceptof theSecondWorldWar,although for different reasons," {254} . Moreover, it was them he blames the growth of apologetic literature about Stalin: "Every attributed to Stalin the act that are not confirmed, will inevitably cause a chain reaction psevdooproverzheny, calling into question the already proven facts and arming again intensified neo-Stalinists new arguments for the rehabilitation of the criminal

regimeanditsleader"{255}.

As Yekkelhappened does notbelieve inthe authenticity of the speechof Stalin.Article Yekkelya at the time to "freeze" the interest in Stalin's speech nearly 36 years. Shuffle by publishing his article,hehopes.asimilarresult-nottoput"intoquestiontheoverallconceptofthehistoryof the Second World War, not only which found confirmation in a large quantity of documents of

TheagencyHavasrevealedtheinnermostintentionsofStalin."

different levels, but most importantly, reflected the chain actually occurred interrelated events

thatmakeuptheoverallpictureoftheSecondWorldWar"{256}.

Hardly,however,hemanagedtoputanendtothisstory.

I.Shuffleconvincedoftheexistenceof"oneprimaryororiginaltextcirculatedbyNovember28,

1939 Havas agency, and then published in the« Revue de Droit International de Sciences DiplomatiquesetPolitiques »,andits modifiedversion,it wasnotlater than23 December1940 g.atthedisposalofintelligenceandcounterintelligenceattheVichygovernment,ietheversion

"Stalin'sspeech",whichwaslaterfoundinMoscow"{257}.Infact,textmessagesHavasAgency

published 28-November 29 French newspapers and then reprinted in the «Revue de Droit

International

whichreceivedtheagency.ItisinterestingtocomparethistextwithwhatobtainedinGenevaon November 28, the German news agency «Auslandische Nachrichtenagenturen». German

translation was finished at 11 o'clock of the same day. Shuffle mentions the existence of the Germantext,butislimitedonly bythe remark that"senttotheEmbassyinMoscowTextHavas posts a request to inform about the reaction to it in the official circles of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs[Germany]on 29 November,as well as payattentionto the Commissariaton the desirability of an appropriate response to the Soviet press " {258} . Meanwhile, the German translationoftheHavasmessagesarediscrepancies withthepublishedcopyoftheFrench,who happened to use as the source ( "one primary or initial") option {259} . The following is a translation agency Havas posts (Doc. Number 2), published in «the Revue de [206.207] Droit

International,

"withadditionsanddiscrepanciesexistingin

theGermancopies(doc.number4).TheFrenchtextisgiveninthetransfercase(inordernotto

complicatetheanalysisunlessabsolutelynecessary,though,inprinciple,itispossibletoachieve moreaccurateandconsistenttranslationofthedocument). Crucial to justify his negative attitude happened to the speech of Stalin existing text is the following argument: "Researchers arenot awareof any documentsor evidence thateven inthe slightest degree to authenticate, containing, among other things, a large attributed to Stalin

speechAugust19,1939numberofincorrectandfranklyabsurdregulations"{260}.Infact,there

aredocuments.Andtothemainonesandeventdrawn-tointerprettheprovisionsoftheHavas agency message. Obviously, the researcher professionals supposed to draw from this the necessaryconclusions. The communication agency Havas, issued November 28, 1939, are given all the basic provisions of the secret additional protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939 (Doc. Number 5). Publication in the press, almost immediately, the content of the collusion between StalinandHitler,which the Soviet government denied the 50 years, and is adirect confirmation oftheauthenticityofmessagesHavasagency. SecretAdditionalProtocolincludesabriefpreamble,fourpoints,specifyingthetimeandplaceof detentionandthesignaturesoftheparties.Thepreamblesays"onthedelimitationofspheresof mutualinterestsinEasternEurope",whichisrepresentedinthecentralpartoftheHavasagency message,inparticular,inthe phrase "if