From the originator

The debate over the books of Viktor Suvorov lasts from the beginning of the 90s. Strictly speaking,
this debate is not about Suvorov, and Stalin. They are in a concentrated form and identify the
main outstanding issue throughout Soviet history - which sought Stalin, breaking and crippling
the country and the people, building a personal, unique and nothing on a similar system of
government? For what happened all that happened during his rule? What was its purpose?
Options substantive reply can be only two. First - flattering to the Soviet past. Second annihilating.
The first response of many generations of Soviet people are learning, from kindergarten. It states:
the USSR has consistently fought for peace. Stalin did not try to start a world war. Pact of 1939
and the seizure by agreement with Hitler areas of several European countries were forced to a
defensive step. Stalin for an attack on Germany in 1941 is not prepared, he prepared for the
defense and for this purpose brought to the border all the Red Army. But to defend themselves
somehow failed, and the army, which for the attack was not prepared, but also on the defensive
for some reason was not ready, was killed in the summer of 1941 as a result of the treacherous
aggression of Germany. [5]
The second answer for the first time in its entirety in his books gave Viktor Suvorov. It goes like
this: Stalin deliberately, from the first moment of arrival to the sole power in the late 20s began
to prepare the conquest of Europe. His goal was - to militarize the country and provoke a world
war, to join it in the most convenient time and remain in the end the only winner. The
provocation of the war was a success in 1939 on Europe culmination of a Soviet attack was to
come for the summer of 1941, but Stalin was wrong in the timing and allowed Hitler to attack
first.
Sometimes there is a third option - Stalin about anything did not think, nor to defend or to attack
not prepared, no plans had not, and the troops moved back and forth aimlessly. But consider the
option seriously idiot Stalin does not make sense.
The scientific debate about Stalin's policies on both sides of a lot of people involved, but the
name of Viktor Suvorov remains at the center of controversy. Around it is not possible, although
the Suvorov in direct discussions does not take part. Viktor Suvorov first formulated the problem,
dot the i and brought a lot of evidence of their innocence of the Stalinist conception of history.
And he put his adversaries to have to not only refute his arguments in favor of the version of
"Stalin aggressor", but consistently argue alternative - the thesis of the "Stalin-peacemaker".
Altogether in 2005, about two dozen books against Viktor Suvorov in Russia. Most of them are
directed against him personally. This vilification "Rezun traitor", the authors of which, even at a
stretch can not be regarded as discussants in the scientific debate. Attempts to disprove the
concept of Suvorov's more or less correct ways so far none have failed.
The situation was extremely uncomfortable for his opponents. Virtually all connected
"antisuvorovskaya" activity has been reduced to little success challenging the secondary and
tertiary parts of his books, stuffed all the way arguments. Main counterarguments, that is
evidence that Stalin was an attack on Europe in general, and Germany in particular, in 1941, is not
ready, but, on the contrary, was preparing the defense, no one gave. And it seems that in nature
do not exist.
Line up the consistent protection of an alternative embodiment of Soviet history, too, so far no

one dared. To this should prove that Stalin not only in principle are not prepared to take over
Europe, but also that his external, internal, economic and cultural policies have been some other,
yet unknown purpose. Today we know a lot about Stalin, to claim with certainty - this version can
not be proved.
It remains Suvorov's version of Soviet history, but accept it interferes a lot. First of all it means a
revision - "audit" - established and canonized postwar political correctness looks at the history of
the Second World War. In that part of it which deals with the role of the Soviet Union. Changing
the status of the Stalinist Soviet Union to the "sacrifice and liberator" for the status of "the
executioner and the aggressor" is difficult for even people who do not feel sympathy for Stalinism.
Even if they are experts in the history of the USSR. And even more so if they are - the Soviet
experts in the military history of the Soviet Union.
However, in the West, for example in Germany, the scientific establishment is very irritated
responds to Suvorov's book. The cause of irritation is directly opposed to Russian motives
"antirevizionistov". Recent protect the noble reputation of the USSR in World War II.
German researchers (not all, but many) are afraid of unexpected whitewash Hitler's reputation.
The logic here is simple and strangely absurd. It means that the attack was justified and
preventive If Suvorov rights and Hitler attacked Stalin ahead only a few weeks. So Hitler was right.
The logic of the absurd, because a single word, [6,7] justifying Hitler books Suvorov not. Hitler is
Hitler. The motives of his conduct, his morals and his policy does not depend on whether Stalin
was going to attack him or not. Hitler suspected of sympathizing with the Soviet Union and so it is
impossible. And internally - "preventive" - the German attack on the Soviet Union in the summer
of 1941, and not in another, more convenient time can not justify Hitler. For what reason? Do not
be attacked in 1941 m, would attack at another time. In general, it is unclear why the reputation
of Hitler, has unleashed (with Stalin), World War II, committed aggression against many countries
and established the Nazi regime on the part of Europe in general may depend on, attacked it on
its ally on aggression proactively or simply because that this very wanted.
But the reputation of Stalin and the Soviet Union, in contrast to Hitler's reputation, very much
depends on the answer to the question, was an attack "preventive" or not Hitler. In the first case,
Stalin - an aggressor, though not completely held in the second - almost innocent victim.
The intensity of emotions very strongly hinders peaceful research and discussion turns around
the theory of Viktor Suvorov in permanent public scandal in itself worthy of study from a
sociological and psychological points of view.
In discussions of Russian historians on the causes and nature of the Second World War, there is
one interesting point. Both parties operate secondary or indirect materials. Key archival
documents there. Specifically, it is believed that no matter how.
In the book, MI Meltyuhova "Lost Chance of Stalin" - basic research on the prehistory of the
Second World War - in the chapter "The Soviet military planning in 1940 -. 1941" of 122
references, only seven - in the archives of documents (the Russian State Military Archive and
RGASPI). That's all that was available to the researcher. Meltyukhov writes: "... A comprehensive
study of all of these materials, together constitute the Soviet operational plan provides an
organized deployment and entry into fighting the Red Army in accordance with the objectives of
the first strategic operations, is still, unfortunately, impossible. In the meantime, we have to
restrict ourselves to the available texts of the four memos on the name of IV Stalin and VM
Molotov, containing the basic ideas of military plans ... " {2} .

In the published journal visitors Kremlin Stalin's office can easily find out what Zhukov, since his
appointment as chief of the General Staff of January 2, 1941 and before June 21 was in Stalin's
Kremlin office 33 times. On average, every 5 days. Only in June - 10 times. Not the slightest
information about what they're doing, no. Although you can easily guess that it is the military
planning.
Meltyukhov: "... In particular the military preparations of the USSR occupied the key position of
the General Staff of the military planners still contains, unfortunately, a significant amount of"
white spots ", which is associated with the preservation of confidentiality of the relevant
documents, 1939-1941. Now domestic historiography has quite a solid picture of stroke
production documents at the strategic level of military planning, but their content, as well as
communication with the planning at the level of military regions still remain poorly understood "
{3} .
In other words, it is well known, exactly where all documents relating to the pre-war military
planning. It is easy to calculate the people to whom these documents are available, which can
admire them at least every day. This file officers of the General Staff and the Presidential Archive,
the former Politburo archive. Oh, and their bosses. That is the most important opponents of
Suvorov's conception. But other scholars generally already guess how it took place the
development of these documents, but do not know anything about their contents ... [8,9]
It turns out that somewhere very close are virtually inaccessible to the ton of research papers key documents, the publication of which would instantly explain the situation and answer all
questions. A discussion takes place only around a few accidentally dropped from a folder and
from the context. At the same time there are people on duty all well aware - the keepers of the
secret archives. But they do not participate in the discussions. And maybe involved, but their
information is kept secret.
It is clear that there is no benefit for their theories from the possession of the secrets of the
archives of General Staff of the Russian state-owned military historians can not remove,
otherwise it would long ago enthusiastically declassified. The only thing they can do - to conceal
information, not allowing it to their opponents.
This situation gives an exotic fight these people with the "revisionists" additional farcical nature.
"Revisionists" easier. Documents documents but the actual processes, seized the entire country,
it is impossible to hide. A study processes can be completely successful without the secret
archives.
Strictly speaking, from a scientific point of view, the dispute is over. The fact that Stalin was
preparing an attack on Germany in the summer of 1941 clearly demonstrated Meltyuhova M., V.
Nevezhin, Pavlov and a number of other researchers. It proved independently and at a different
material.
There is no evidence that Stalin was preparing to in 1941, not to aggression in the West, and to
the defense, no one found.
But the debate about Stalin's prewar plans and books of Viktor Suvorov will long haunt the public
consciousness.
The idea of this collection is the first to collect under one cover article "revisionists", ie
people whose research disproves official Soviet (and post) thesis of amicable Stalin's Soviet
Union.
Not all authors fully agree with Viktor Suvorov, not all for one reason or another would be willing

to call themselves his supporters. What unites them, we think, a serious, impartial, independent
of ideological and political preferences relevant to the discussion topic. [10]
Viktor Suvorov
"Military Science" Soviet-style
It's not even mathematics and arithmetic.
Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister
( "Red Star" March 4, 2005)
Honored Test Pilot, Hero of the Soviet Union Shcherbakov crushed me playfully. Once I casually
mentioned a German fighter Me-209 was then that he gave me, and sealed to the wall: it was not
such an aircraft! And then the whole pack of screamers, all together in the kennel Troekurov
grabbed me: it was not! Hooray! "Icebreaker" is refuted!
The board "Icebreaker" revelatory all new books are hitting. As torpedoes. Account books
refuting after the third decade has passed. A number of articles defies account. In each new book
I stigmatize and shame. Honored Test Pilot gave much food my critics. And everyone repeats:
here you us about the Me-209 lying, and this aircraft was not simple! How can you believe
"Icebreaker", if you're talking about stuff?
I caught up on little things. It would seem, well, what's the difference, there was a plane or not?
The evidence of my system Me-209 is not included. Nothing. Just once (only once!), Along with a
lot of facts I have named this unfortunate Me-209. Suppose it was not. Suppose wrong. What
from this change? But no. Word not a sparrow. Do not loosen, do not get out. Once smooching in
such trifles, gleefully announced criticism, how can you believe all your theory? Once one is told,
answer me!
The answer is: I do not get confused in the details! Shybko competent experts have found a lot of
mistakes in my books. In a lot of nagging and comments, I just do not react. Because for all and
do not answer. And it seems, since I do not argue with the screamers means I have nothing to
object. And I do not answer a lot of the comments for other reasons. Just because the vast
majority of the comments and attacks - is silly. It seems that about the Me-209. Before you
condemn me in ignorance, honored test pilot just had to look through the corresponding guides,
magazines and books. I think that the distinguished test pilot it would be interesting to learn
something about aviation. Is not it? The "Icebreaker" - talking about the Second World War, more
precisely, its beginning. So, at the start of World War II, the Me-209 is not just there, he was the
most famous aircraft in the world.
The race in those years was for the range for the height of the load. But the main - for speed.
Both Hitler and Stalin the utmost attention is paid to the speed of the aircraft. And April 26, 1939,
shortly after the day Adolf Hitler's birthday, a test pilot Fritz Wendel as a gift for the Fuehrer
Me-209 set a world speed record of 755.138 km / h. On planet Earth, Wendel became the man
who moved the fastest. Prior to September 1, 1939 his record was not beaten. I emphasize that
we are on the official world speed record.
If any man in the street does not know about Yuri Gagarin and the ship "Vostok", then there is
nothing to worry about. If about Gagarin and "East" had never heard of a cosmonaut, then this is
serious. But while he is silent, too tolerant. It is terrible when a cosmonaut suddenly rush
furiously to prove that there was never, and Gagarin was not "the East." And not just a close
circle of friends to prove to be, and will strike the bells for the whole world. [12,13]

It behaves so honored test pilot who does not know the fundamentals of the history of world
aviation, which is not only heard of Wendel and the Me-209, but also rushed to the
"Military-Historical Journal" deny their existence. Awful is not that well-deserved test that does
not know, but that does not realize its neznaystva. Hideously shy ignorance is only the ignorance
of the militant. And it is very unfortunate that the study of the military history of the state of the
Russian head of people with the same outlook in the field of aviation, like the distinguished test
pilot. If not worse. Scientists comrades of the "Military History Magazine" honored tester might
suggest: not a shame. But for some reason they did not do this. And over us laughing the whole
world. "Voennoistorichesky magazine" enters the main libraries of all civilized countries. And the
peoples of panic: if the trust Russian advanced weapons militant ignorant, then we must be ready
for any eventuality.
And in our country at the opening of a citizen Shcherbakova not responded no. Received
"Military History Magazine" is not inundated with denials and protests. Vice versa. He gathered a
whole horde of official Kremlin experts who repeated the test of revelation as the main argument
that refutes "Icebreaker".
But do not hesitate to remember that the Me-209 at one time was studied in detail by Soviet
aircraft designer. It flew our glorious test pilots, among them SP Suprun. Those were other people.
They knew the aircraft, they loved it.
How does a top secret German aircraft could be studied by our designers and pilots? It's very
simple. Stalin, I repeat, paid special attention to the speed of the aircraft. So I went and ordered
the purchase in Germany 36 12 types of new aircraft. Could not the great leader to pass by the
car that flies faster than anyone in the [14] world. A naive Hitler is known to be trusted Stalin. He
took and sold the best aircraft. Among them is the Me-209.
Tests of the latest German aircraft carried out under Moscow in the Flight Test Institute, which
now bears the name of an outstanding test pilot Gromov. I wonder if the citizen heard
Shcherbakov ever about Gromov, and this institute? Or too rush furiously to deny their existence?
But a different kind of examples.
Marshal Konev Ivan Stepanovich has struck the world by stating that the German tank "Tiger"
was armed with a 100 mm gun (Forty-fifth. M .: Military Publishing, 1966. S. 123). Since the
fracture Stalingrad, the Red Army was advancing, and the most terrible beast that met in her way
- "Tiger." This predator was able to stop the avalanche of Red Army armor, sometimes very
powerful and numerous. To fight it, he had to know what his strength and what is weakness.
Every soldier at the front was required to remember the basic tactical and technical data "Tiger".
The first and the main characteristic of the tank, as well as any other weapon - the ability to kill.
The war veteran was especially important to memorize, to whom and at what distances this
animal is dangerous, that is, - Characteristics of his gun. And they start with caliber. Every soldier
hammered into his head: 88 mm. And every sergeant. And the officer. And general. A commander
of the front on the main strategic direction of the war, Marshal IS Konev did not know. And if so,
it would be silent for a while. Why I undertook to write his memoirs?
I objected: lest he wrote it!
Do not argue. I myself know that he was not writing. Question another: why he did not read? Is
Marshal was not interested at least skim own memories?
And another question: how the nonsense went through a check of the Institute of Military
History of the Ministry of Defence and the [15] Military History Department of the General Staff?

And as the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense could this be printed? But this is
not a typo. On the same page as the people who were writing memoirs of Marshal Konev,
stunned progressive mankind the discovery: "Royal Tigers" were even more powerful. " Because
it was in the story about the "Tiger" was mentioned only one of his characteristics - caliber guns,
the phrase "King Tiger" is perceived in the sense that it stood a weapon yet larger caliber.
However, any normal person, which independently examines the war, knows that "King Tiger"
was a weapon of the same caliber - 88 mm. On the previous page, an outstanding commander
slew news readers that T-26 was a Soviet tank fleet. In other words, the people who wrote the
memoirs of Marshal Konev, had no idea not only of the German tanks, in particular - of the most
powerful, but also the Soviet tanks, in particular - on the most popular on June 22, 1941. But any
student who is interested in the history of war knows that the maximum speed T-26 - 30 km / h.
It is only three examples of two pages. But all the books Marshal Konev consist only of such
examples. All this translated into foreign languages is fun and excitement to the masses of
readers. And we have it does not respond to anybody. According to the memoirs of Konev 40
readers' conferences held in all military academies and schools, and no one is outraged, does not
protest, does not refute the scribbling of articles, books and dissertations. But the level of
ignorance in his memoirs Zhukov much higher than in the memoirs Konev. But my many critics
(including the distinguished test pilots) that did not seem to notice. Ignorance breeds new and
the foundations of a more profound ignorance.
And here's the result. In April 2005 - a grand conference: stripes, epaulets, academic titles,
presentations, discussions, champagne. With the landmark speech by the Deputy Minister of
Defence, Chief of the Armed Forces of weapons Army General A. Moscow. And not in the horror
that smacked gibberish, and that no one objected. General of the Army of Moscow, for example,
told that two years before the German attack on the Soviet Union in the Soviet Union "125 new
divisions were formed." It is deducted from the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. Interest General of
the Army is clear. He was ordered to lie, that our country to war was not prepared. Or are willing
to carelessly. But the Soviet Union was preparing. And seriously enough. And he could be the
next speaker, Deputy Air Force Commander Colonel General Alexander Nagovicyn, argue, not for
two years, but only since the beginning of June 1940 to the beginning of June 1941, ie, for one
year, 79 new aircraft divisions were formed only a part of the Air Force. But Deputy Air Force
Commander Colonel-General in matters of aviation Nagovitsin understands not very much,
because no objection. And someone from the audience might add: in the same year, 61 Panzer
Division was formed. Total for one year only - 140 alone aviation and armored divisions. But most
of all formed infantry divisions. And motorized. The airborne troops formed a new team (it's
smaller divisions) and the body (this is more divisions), but divisions as such was not. But this
does not mean that it is necessary to VDV discounted. And besides - the NKVD division.
General of the Army of Moscow - Zhukovsky thinker caliber. He did not just speaks and thinks like
Zhukov, but he does it with amazing accuracy, down to the commas.
Marshal Zhukov: "From January 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army has received more than
seven thousand tanks. In 1941, the industry has been able to give about 5.5 thousand tanks of all
types. As for KB and T-34, the beginning of the war factories have released 1861 tank "("
Memories and Reflections ". 1969, p 205).
General of the Army of Moscow: "From January 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army has
received more than seven thousand tanks. In 1941, the industry has been able to give [16,17]

about 5.5 thousand tanks. With regard to new types of tanks KB and T-34, the beginning of the
war factories have released 1861 tank "(" Red Star ", 13 April 2005).
These figures have long been refuted. I recommend General of Moscow and all those who
applauded him, "Statistical Yearbook 1, issued by the Ministry of Defence in 1994: KB tanks
on 21 June was 711, T-34 - just 1400. So the T-34 and KB was not 1861, 2111. Reference and the
good that indicates who, when and how many tanks released, which the plant, when, to whom
and how much shipped. The figures from the "Statistical Yearbook" justified and confirmed
historical data, and the data Zhukov, Moscow sucked out of nowhere.
Next Gen. Moscow announced that during the war the Soviet industry produced 490,000 pieces
of artillery ...
Background is as follows: in the 60-ies of XX century, this figure was an official and a textbook. It
was her Zhukov wrote in his "most truthful book about the war." In 1974, Zhukov died, and the
figure in the meantime announced another: during the war, Soviet industry produced not
490,000 guns and mortars of all calibers, and 825 thousand. The difference, as we see, much 335 thousand barrels. A third of a million. Also, the numbers of production aircraft have been
revised, tanks and other weapons. New tsifir entered in "Soviet Military Encyclopedia." And
under it was signed by Marshal AA Grechko, Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet SG Gorshkov, Air
Chief Marshal PS Kutahya, army generals AA Epishev JV. Ivanov, NV Ogarkov, IG Pawlowski, IE
Shavrov, IN Shkadov, a platoon Colonel-General, and a half legion of academicians, professors and
doctors.
What would you do to the dead Zhukov? Can it be so wrong to insist on clearly understated
figures, shove him someone the enemy's hand? Of course not! Dead Victory Marshal
immediately resolutely corrected his mistake. And that did not have all sorts of unwanted
conversations explained in snosochke: tsifir And this is taken not from the ceiling, and transcribed
by me from the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" which came out two years after my death.
Trouble General of the Army of Moscow that he thinks the first edition of the memoirs of Zhukov.
But the time is coming. There is no dispute, at the time the first edition of "Memories and
Reflections" was the most truthful book about the war. But it lasted very long. Until such time,
until the second edition, which completely refutes the first. And then came the third edition,
which has denied the first two. There are new facts and new interpretations of history, new
documents and figures, in accordance with this change, and looks Zhukov. General of the Army of
Moscow did not understand a simple truth: "Memories and Reflections" - the basis of all bases.
But it is not necessary to refer to the first edition came to hand, but only the fact that at the
moment is the last. Currently there is the thirteenth edition. All previous editions - complete
nonsense. Dead Zhukov twelve previous editions of his memoirs denied. It was only the
thirteenth may be considered the most truthful book about the war. Dead Zhukov has kept pace
with the times, but a living general of Moscow for the fast-changing views of Marshal of the
Victory has not kept pace.
And sitting in the hall of the big officials, clap their hands. They are one hell: that 490,000 guns
and mortars that 825 thousand. Interestingly, when their personal income it comes, just as they
care about the difference in the 335,000?
Meanwhile, the Central Authority of the Ministry of Defense has made it clear: during the war,
"the front was 300 thousand guns" ( "Red Star", 7 May 2005).
The same paper in the same issue said, "we gave the front 96 thousand tanks, 108 000 aircraft,

about two million artillery shells and mortars of various calibers for war workers of the home
front."
I understand that the Minister of Defence can not know the intricacies of military affairs. But then
he is not subtlety! In my opinion, [18,19] the defense minister should read the central military
newspaper. I assume that the minister does not understand green guns. Forgivable. But let
imagines some other green items. I wonder whether the citizen is able to minister to tell the
difference: three hundred thousand or two million?
If someone said earlier, we thought so, but now believe otherwise. But no. Different figures side
by side in peaceful coexistence mode: and 300 thousand guns and mortars, and 490 thousand
and 825 thousand, and "two million".
The most amazing thing that we are talking about the official figures, pronounces the whole
world faces a very responsible (I mean their positions, but not acts). The discord in the official
aircraft and tank stats are not as impressive, but also interesting. Here, too, peacefully cohabit
officially announced by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff are very different figures.
They are declared not only in the same year, but, as we have seen, in the same day, in the same
newspaper. However, on different pages. Combat aircraft of the Soviet Union produced 108 000
during the war. Maybe 112 thousand. Or 134 thousand. Or 136. Or 137 000. Everyone can choose
for themselves any digit. And each will be correct. And each has an official confirmation of the
Ministry of Defense.
Tanks and self-propelled guns based on them were produced 96 thousand. Or 102 thousand. Or
108.2 thousand.
Against the background of a pair of these examples, every man can imagine what is happening in
other areas of the Russian military-historical science. For example, in the matter of casualties in
the war. It is easy to calculate how many divisions of the Red Army on the eve of the war. Today,
every student, using open sources, is able to personally make a list of all the divisions, indicating
the location, subordination, the composition and the name of the commander. And Defense
Minister, his deputies, commanders and all subordinate structures, which are in the hands of all
[20] secret and top secret files, it can not. They do not know the number of Soviet divisions on
June 22, 1941, even approximately.
It is easy to calculate how many tanks, guns, aircraft industry produced before the war and during
the war. For all the statements lies in the archives. For, on Stalin's orders, since October 1938,
each night, each director of military factory personally reported to Moscow for the
implementation of the daily plan. For cheating - execution. Buffalo can not, because he was the
customer - the army. Industry, for example, reported for the delivery of hundreds of tanks and
army received ninety. Where are the others? So: with all the statistical data of the RF Ministry of
Defense still confidently operates in the same day, the data that the Army received 300 thousand
guns and at the same time - "almost two million guns." Think about what is happening in the field
of counting human losses, which account goes on tens of millions, where statistics confusing,
inconsistent, unreliable, if not not carried out during the fighting?
The paradox is this: the most ignorant generals of the world gathered at the Ministry of Defense
and the General Staff of Russia, and by the fierce struggle for the truth of history leads us. These
same generals.
Nowhere in the world battle against the falsifiers of the history of World War II is not carried out
with such fury, with such scope and ferocity, like in our country. Flipping magazines overseas

military history - very rarely polkovnichek any favors ... And we have! And we have to fight weight
lifted. We have a phalanx of generals rod, smashing and crushing ohalnikov angry articles and
speeches. What the generals there. We have to fight thrown innumerable forces. Let us bow our
heads to the power: the General Staff! Academy of Sciences! Academy of Military Sciences! And
along with them - institutions of all kinds and calibers, the press, radio, television, the legions of
invisible Front fighters on the web tear each and every mask. The State Duma has not gone away,
the MPs [21] expressed clearly and emphatically: counterfeiters - a fight! Tampering will not pass!
Defend the truth of history! The law!
Yes there were academicians and generals! What was the people's elected representatives and
engineers of human souls! We have to fight the falsifiers of history of the war raised the Armed
Forces. We vigilant authorities attended to this problem. Yes, we have the head of
government ... ... Not only have we raised himself Supreme Commander of punishing sword of
truth in his willingness to bring down on the head of any scoundrel who dares engage in
name-calling. The scope of the fight is such and such passions that unbeknownst to themselves
fighters of the holy and just cause has become a national idea of a new, free, democratic
Russia. The wise men in dusty textbooks looking idea, and she suddenly shone above their heads.
We reappeared Great Goal, and it is to keep our bright past of denigration. Great Goal is good
because it is close. The total is only write new desyatitomnik! Another conference to collect! To
compose a comprehensive program of patriotic education! And billions for its implementation
does not regret! Book intelligible order dashing writer! The film shoot to promote a yes! Expand
the document archive, and let them pripechatat bastards to the wall of shame!
And at the same time Great Goal - unattainable. How many conferences no wires, no escape
from the fact that: Stalin cannibals and thugs, and destroyed tens of millions of its own citizens,
no one, no freedom could not give. Just because there was no reason to kill them freedom in
their country and then carry her neighboring nations. It was not confusing them with one hand to
drive his men behind bars and barbed wire, and the other - to tear the shackles with neighboring
nations. There is no need, they were to keep their men in the collective farms, and to reward
foreign tillers of land and the right to free creative management. No desyatitomniki not be able
to prove to anyone that the communist hordes of slaves, driven by machine-gun fire in the back
of defensive squads could be liberators. Could not! And they were not. Just because it did not
have no idea about freedom. Just because the result of the defeat of Germany was an
unprecedented increase in vertuhaysko-stukacheskoy authorities in their own country. And no
matter how much publish popular articles and books, not to cover up the fact that Stalin went to
war ally of Hitler, with Europe divided and tormented. Do not dodge us from the past, do not
wash out blood-spattered uniforms conquerors do not repaint their joyful tone: in 1941 the main
Red Army forces entered the war in the occupied territories torn and conquered the neighboring
countries and end the war occupation in 1945, which is plotted in perpetuity time.
So Great Goal - crushing counterfeiters - and close, and fundamentally unattainable. As a carrot
on a string in front of the muzzle ass. That's the beauty lies. Fight for the truth of history can be
forever. Fighters for the idea of guaranteed the Corn-oil positions, honors, airtime and more
billions on patriotic education. I assume, small vrazhenka proudly gaze: how many generals work
provided! Citizens of the generals, why, I'm your benefactor! Were it not for me, as you will not
fall into despair! And so - no despair: award, awards, circulation, hospitable symposia and
lifetime guarantee against unemployment.

There is another reason that will not allow combat counterfeiters history of the Second World
War, the iron fist of the state ideology. It consists in the fact that the main fighters against
counterfeiting are both major counterfeiters. We opened to all that: the theft fight thieves, but
not small, and pivot; with corrupt officials - most of them are corrupt; and the truth of history to
protect those who put it on a post pervert. Colonel-General DA Volkogonov, for example, was the
principal military historian. A little earlier - the head of department of special propaganda
Glavpura, [22.23] that is, chief liar Soviet Army. 40 years Volkogonov taught Marxism-Leninism,
and then he was thrown into military history. It was believed, once the ideologically grounded on
all four legs, he and the cards in your hand.
And Volkogonova before and after our military historical science is not refueled strategists and
propagandists and bawlers. Lieutenant-General PA Zhilin, for example. It is you and the doctor of
sciences and professor, and corresponding member, and every winner of awards. And before you
head the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR, this learned man
held a high position of vice-rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central
Committee, ie courses Marxist verbiage.
Military history in our country takes place in the category of agitation and propaganda. In normal
countries, military history - lady and the mother of all military sciences, and we have it - charmer
ideological brothel. Under the leadership of Telpuhovskaya, ilina, Volkogonova in our country,
entire generations grew up completely ignorant generals and marshals. Examples - see above. A
Story of War at each new stage of history appears in a completely new, diverse, but always seductive form. Our history of war instantly change their appearance according to the desires of
each new customer lustful.
Stalin understood that the true history of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany can
not write. Too much history that came out ugly and indecent. It remained either silent or lie
immensely, infinitely and indefinitely. Stalin chose silence. When it attempts to write a history of
the war not taken. Instead, there was a collection of speeches by Comrade Stalin: "Brothers and
sisters ... I am addressing you, my friends!" And that's all.
But after Stalin climbed to the throne once the whole gang leaders - collective leadership. By the
fall of 1957 after a continuous series of violent massacres at the helm were two. Here they,
Zhukov and Khrushchev, and decided to write a history of the war, knowing in advance that you
can not tell the truth. September 12, 1957, work began on the capital five-volume "History of the
Great Patriotic War." This great work was to approve the centuries the simple truth: in spite of
the Supreme Commander won his deputy ...
Three weeks after the start of work left Zhukov on a visit to Yugoslavia, on this, his reign ended,
respectively, and completed work on a grand historical research. Instead of the failed five-volume
six-volume started to leave after three years, and the main character there was already different.
But someone managed to slip - even before the overthrow of Zhukov release work, pleasing to
the greatest strategist of all time. September 24, 1957 was signed in the print book, "Tank
Battles" German General Mellenthin, editor - Hero of the Soviet Union Lt. Gen. armored forces
AP Panfilov. In this book provided an assessment of the Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army:
"It is impossible to describe all that happened between the Vistula and the Oder in the first
months of 1945. Europe did not know anything like this since the time of the death of the Roman
Empire. "
Actually, because of this quote book translated and published. Objected - voiced phrase. In

recognition of broken Hitler's generals, the troops in this operation Zhukov and Konev
demonstrated a level of military art of Europe knew in the last fifteen hundred years. In this
phrase quite clearly stated that the final phase of the war leadership talent Soviet marshals and
generals reached such a level of prosperity and with which no comparison Bonaparte with
Kutuzov and Cromwell or Frederick with Turenne and Conde. The phrase flattering. Already 8
October 1957 Zhukov, speaking to the dictator of Yugoslavia, it was first read. He voiced like to
express our latter-day adherents of belles-lettres.
And yet relaxed strategist among the Yugoslav and Albanian comrades who committed the
Kremlin godfather tolkovische [24,25] and kicked the great commander of his gang. Zhukov went
home useless pensioner. He was immediately summoned to disassemble and made everything
they thought about it. The strategist, beating their breasts, fawned and degrading, and to prove
their merit repeated quote: "It is impossible to describe ... Europe is not known since the time of
death ..."
This quote Zhukov repeated many times each year. Here, for example, an excerpt from a letter to
Khrushchev dated April 18, 1964. "Vistula-Oder operation, as you know, is one of the greatest
operations. Soviet forces held it brilliantly, and this has earned universal admiration. Even
enemies - and they were forced to admit ... "And Georgy victorious as the ace of trumps out of
the sleeve, tossed on the table quote that Europe did not know anything like this since the time
of the death of the Roman Empire ...
Following Zhukov, this quote decades hammering our generals, marshals and academics.
Vistula-Oder operation is considered the top martial arts and especially proud of our military
leadership. It does not take a year to official military works dozens of times did not hear: "... since
the time of the death of the Roman Empire" ... And just who these words are not repeated! As
soon as it comes to outstanding military achievements, remember Mellenthin: "It is impossible to
describe ..." That's the new millennium in the yard. And the Red Army's long gone, and the Chief
of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General of the Army Yu Baluyevsky described
the grand Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army General German words: "It is impossible to
describe ... Europe did not know anything like it since the days of ..." ( "Red Star", 7 May 2005).
Everything seems to be great. Broken Hitlerite recognizes an incredibly high level of strategic skill
of the high command of the Red Army in the final stage of the war, in particular - Zhukov and
Konev, who at the time commanded the troops of the two fronts on the main strategic direction
of the war. Why not repeat such flattering for our military pride words? [27]
Yes, because it is not praise and accusation.
In the original German and in all translations it is not about the brilliant victories of the Red Army:
"It was a tragedy of unprecedented scale. In the old German states - East Prussia, Pomerania and
Silesia - Russian showed bestial cruelty. It is impossible to describe all that has happened
between the Vistula and the Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe did not know anything like
this since the time of the death of the Roman Empire. "
Immediately after the war, aspiring Hitlerite accused the Red Army in barbarism, vandalism and
aimless in the mass murder of people and property, theft, robbery, rape, looting. Our generals
and marshals or should respond to the charges, or shut up. But the Hero of the Soviet Union Lt.
Gen. armored forces AP Panfilov for the sake of the greatest strategist of all time, like the small
Schuler, shrugged card. The Russian translation of the word on animal cruelty have fallen, and the
prosecution has become a national anthem. And half a century, we console ourselves with false

praise, which is created by using dexterous hands and long scissors. For half a century, no officer,
no general, no marshal, professor, academician and not bothered to read the book in the original
or translated into any language other than Russian. Nobody sees no hypocrisy. I will say more.
Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army General Baluyevsky have not read this book, and in
Russian. And there is proof of that. Once upon a time, 30 years ago, someone mistakenly wrote
the name of a German general - A. Mellenthin. So it stuck. Quote Mellenthin referents do not
rewrite the book, and each other. The guys who wrote the article, General Baluyevsky wrote so A. Mellenthin. This is proof that the citation be deducted from another article or report. For if
they copied the quote from the book, albeit fake, I would have written - FV von Mellenthin.
Objected that in this case, the General of the Army Yuri Baluyevsky just a victim of cheaters, lied
and ignoramuses, who [28] ran the half-century ago, our science, which, in 1957, to the delight of
the greatest generals of all time, released a falsified translation Mellenthin books sculpting of
worthless material candy.
To this objection: Army General Baluyevsky have to know that was a Soviet military-historical
science during the reign of the outstanding generals Zhukov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov.
Therefore, taking a high post of the chief of the General Staff, he was obliged to order the
verification of the correct transfer of all military books published in our country. And while this
book is such a test is not passed, it should refrain from public quotation. At least, not checking all
the books you can check out the original only the quotes that the General himself decided to
repeat in his article.
I do not insist that every one of our General, Marshal, professor and academician read in the
original military books in foreign languages. But I can not be considered a normal situation when
over half a century, thousands of times the highest level strategists like clockwork repeated
nauseam teeth on one quote, and neither one of them did not bother to read the book in the
original or translated into any language other than Russian. And on her tongue is Russian, as can
be seen, not read by anyone who put on a post.
The situation is very simple: we are the only country in the world in which the story of the
Second World War at the state level is not studied. Over 60 years of hard work of the Military
Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of
Defence, set of chairs in military academies and schools do not even bother to count our
divisions. They do not represent even approximately, how many and what weapons the army was
on the eve of the German invasion and how many received during the war. It would pardonably if
they kept a certain line. Then it would be clear - people are wrong and misguided. But no. Our
strategy is called at the same time 300 thousand guns, and 490 thousand and 825 thousand, and
two million. I think that even a drunk moron could figure out: there is something wrong. Only one
of these numbers may be correct. But all four at the same time can not be correct. But our
Moscow-Baluyevsky strategy on mental effort is not able to.
If so, it begs a simple solution: to forbid any of Remarks by Russian officials on issues related to
the history of the Second World War, to withdraw from sale and illiterate libraries all memoirs of
Soviet generals, admirals and marshals. When will be put in elementary order in the
military-historical science that will be collected, processed and verified by the most basic
information about the war, then the ban will be removed. Otherwise, the defense minister, his
direct and immediate superiors and his subordinates look silly way in the eyes of the world.
What do the top leaders of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff? They are doing exactly

the opposite to what the situation requires. They encourage grandiose conference ignorant,
disorderly generals, admirals and academicians from military history. The results of these
gatherings are widely published, showing the world the incredible degree neznaystva and
outrageous irresponsibility of senior officers of the Russian army. Such ignorance of military
Europe is not known since the time of the death of the Roman Empire.
In the Soviet Union it raged military-historical barbarism. After the collapse of communism, the
Russian state has done nothing to fight against this evil. On the contrary, the state is ignorance
implants.
Beginning in 1917, of our people systematically knocked interest in history in general and military
history in particular. And yet it is impossible to comprehend modern military science, not
studying constantly and persistently experience of past centuries and millennia, as well as
impossible to grasp the integral calculus without knowing arithmetic. Russia lost [29] the XX-th
century. He squandered. Proshlyapil. Stalin expressed himself on this score, and even steeper.
And one of the main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the
upcoming Russia - military savagery of higher strategic and political leadership.
The worst thing is that ignorance of the basic foundations of military science and military history
in particular, are not afraid of anyone and does not disturb. A knowledge seems strange and
suspicious. Citizens of criticism, expose me, reprove and refute. But do not forget our strategists,
on the shoulder straps which are shining stars of the first magnitude. If I made a mistake, there is
nothing to worry about. It will not hurt anyone. But their careless and irresponsible attitude to
military history and its public statements reflected light gives an equally irresponsible attitude to
the implementation of the direct duties. But in their hands the fate of Russia.
Strange thing: against the "Icebreaker" is already written 32 books, protected by several dozen
doctoral theses. And what I do not only accuses, and what only did not find fault. But for some
reason no one wants to notice broneboynozubodrobitelnogo ignorance of our generals,
multiplied by a megaton-class carelessness!
The validity of any theory is measured by its explanatory power. My theory explains a lot of what
was once defied explanation. Read the "Icebreaker" and you'll find the answers even to the
questions that are not addressed in my books. My opponents do not need me either expose or
condemn. They need to find another - a simple, clear, logical explanation for what happened in
1941. Until they come up with other theories do not, "Icebreaker" will continue its triumphal
voyage.
Michael Meltyukhov {4}
The threshold of the Great Patriotic War of 1939-1941 .: becoming a great power
Since the late 1980s, the military and political events on the eve of the Great Patriotic War
became the subject of lively debate in the Russian historiography, in which the scientific
circulation a large number of new, recently classified documents was introduced, there were
many studies, more objectively covering the period of national history . As a result, now it is
obvious that established during the Soviet period, the concept of event 1939 - 1941 years. It
requires substantial upgrading. First of all, we should abandon the Soviet-inspired propaganda
absolutely fantastic ideas about a pathological love of peace the Soviet Union, due to which there
was a pretty original picture in historiography. If all the other States in its international policy
guided by their own interests, the Soviet Union was engaged only in that demonstrated his love

of peace and fought for peace. In principle, of course, recognized that the Soviet Union also has
its own interests, but they are always so vaguely described that to understand the motives of
Soviet foreign policy was virtually impossible.
Consideration of the international situation in the framework of the historical and political
analysis of international relations systems shows that the Soviet leadership in the early 1920s.
faced with a difficult, but quite a traditional problem. During the Revolution and the Civil War,
Soviet Russia has lost an empire conquered by the Russian position on the international arena
and in the territory of Eastern Europe. In terms of its influence in Europe, the country was thrown
back 200 years into the past. In these circumstances, the Soviet leadership could either agree
with the regional status of the Soviet Union, or re-start the fight for a return to the club of great
powers. Having opted for the second alternative, the Soviet leadership has adopted the concept
of "world revolution", combines a new ideology and traditional foreign policy objectives to
strengthen the country's influence in the world. The strategic goal of Moscow's foreign policy has
become a global reorganization of the system of international relations, making it the main
opponents of Britain, France and their allies.
In 1920-ies. The Soviet Union managed to achieve diplomatic recognition, but attempts to
strengthen its position in Europe and the Far East did not give significant results. In addition, the
end of the events of the 1920s. highlighted a number of internal problems of the USSR, limited
the foreign policy activity of the country. Therefore, during the global economic crisis it has been
successfully used in the whole Soviet leadership for the beginning of radical economic
modernization based on the latest technological achievements of the West.
In 1930-ies. the international situation has changed significantly in connection with the beginning
of a series of open struggle of the great powers for the revision of the Versailles-Washington
system. Focusing on the inevitability of the emergence of a new inter-imperialist conflict, the
Soviet Union sought to prevent the consolidation of the other great powers, rightly perceiving it
as a major threat to their interests. The Soviet leadership cleverly used the official diplomatic
channels, the possibility of illegal Comintern, social propaganda pacifist ideas, anti-fascism,
assistance to some victims of the aggressors to create the image of the main fighter for peace
and social progress. The struggle for "collective security" has become Moscow's foreign-policy
tactics, aimed at the USSR weight gain in international affairs and to prevent the consolidation of
the other great powers, without their participation. But the events of 1938 demonstrated that
the USSR was not only still far from being able to become an equal subject of European policy,
but is still considered by European great powers as an object of their policy. Under these
conditions, only a new aggravation of the crisis in Europe allowed the USSR to return to politics as
a great power.
This contributed to Moscow's aspirations that during the political crises of the 1930s.
Versailles-Washington system in Europe and the Far East was almost destroyed, which could not
but lead to another confrontation between the great powers. In this sense, we can say that World
War II was a natural phenomenon in the period of change of the system of international relations
and could hardly be prevented, since the unevenness of economic development led to a change
in the balance of forces great powers, each of which to some extent was interested in the
reorganization of the Versailles-Washington system of international relations. Germany, the
United States and the Soviet Union sought to complete the reconstruction of the system of
international relations, Britain and France were ready for some changes that do not affect their

leading position in the world, Italy and Japan have tried to expand its influence at the regional
level. The Second World War was a reflection of the clash of interests of the great powers in the
conditions of the collapse of the Versailles-Washington system and just like the previous conflicts
between the great powers, was of the imperialist character, supplemented [32,33] the liberation
struggle of the occupied countries and territories. Thus, we consider the Second World War as a
collection of wars between the great powers themselves and other countries to expand their
influence and redrawing of boundaries, established in 1919 - 1922 gg.
Break Germany Munich Agreement (the occupation of 15 March 1939 the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, the declaration of independence), the occupation of Germany Memel (Klaipeda) on
March 22, and Italy Albania (7 April) marked the beginning of the pre-war political crisis. Naturally,
in these circumstances, every great power, hoped to exploit the situation for their own benefit.
Britain and France sought to steer Germany's eastward expansion, which would lead to a clash
with the USSR, Germany, and their mutual weakening and would strengthen the position of
London and Paris on the world stage. Naturally, Moscow was not smiling as a "sacrificial lamb",
and the Soviet leadership did everything to avert the threat of a possible involvement in the
European war, which was to weaken Germany, England and France. This, in turn, would allow the
Soviet Union to occupy the position of a kind of arbiter, which depends on the outcome of the
war, and to maximize its influence on the continent. For its part, Germany, realizing the
impossibility of the simultaneous collision with a coalition of major powers, relied on local
operation against Poland, which would improve its strategic position to continue the struggle for
hegemony in Europe with England, France and the USSR. Italy tried to get new concessions from
England and France as a result of a conflict with Germany, but she was in no hurry to fight. The
United States needed a war in Europe, to eliminate the possibility of Anglo-German alliance,
England finally take place in the world and to weaken the Soviet Union that would allow them to
become a major world power. Japan, taking advantage of employment other great powers in
Europe, intended to end the war on their own terms in China to get the consent of the United
States to strengthen the influence of the Japanese in the Far East, and under favorable conditions
to participate in the war against the Soviet Union.
During the political crisis of 1939 it had the two military-political blocs in Europe: the
Anglo-French and German and Italian, each of whom was interested in an agreement with the
USSR. For its part, Moscow had the opportunity to choose with whom and on what terms to
negotiate it, and used it as much as possible, balancing between the military-political blocs.
International relations of spring - summer 1939 in Europe were a tangle of diplomatic activities of
the great powers, each of which sought to achieve their own goals. Events developing in parallel
in several ways: going undercover and overt Anglo-Franco-Soviet and Anglo-German and
Soviet-German talks, there was clearance of the Anglo-French-Polish and German-Italian coalition.
Moscow in its calculation was based on the fact that the outbreak of war in Europe - as in the
participation of the USSR in the Anglo-French bloc, and in maintaining their neutrality - opened
up new prospects for the strengthening of Soviet influence in the continent. The alliance with
Britain and France would make Moscow an equal partner with all the ensuing consequences, and
the preservation of the Soviet Union's neutrality in terms of weakening both the warring parties
allow him to occupy the position of a kind of arbiter, which depends on the outcome of the war.
Based on such calculations, the Soviet foreign policy was defined.
Continuing to operate within the framework of "collective security" of the concept, the Soviet

leadership tried to make an alliance with Britain and France. However bad the
Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, showed that London and Paris is not ready for equal
partnership with Moscow, and the threat of the Anglo-German agreement forced the Soviet
Union more than pay attention to the German proposals for the normalization of bilateral
relations. Signed August 23, 1939 the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was the considerable
success of Soviet diplomacy. [34,35] the Soviet Union managed to stay out of the European war,
while receiving significant free hand in Eastern Europe and greater room for maneuver between
warring factions in their own interests. Thanks to an agreement with Germany, the Soviet Union
for the first time in its history has received recognition of its interests in Eastern Europe on the
part of one of the great European powers. In 1939, Europe was split into three military-political
camps: English-French, German-Italian, and Soviet, each of which sought to achieve their own
goals, which could not but lead to war.
However, it should be remembered that there are no real territorial changes or occupation "areas
of interest" of the Soviet-German treaty is not provided {5} . Unfortunately, now knowing future
events, some researchers are inclined to believe that Hitler and Stalin had already, on the night of
Aug. 24, we knew in advance what will happen in the next 38 days. Naturally, in reality it was not.
In general, the situation is the end of August 1939 was so confusing that politicians and diplomats
of all countries, including the Soviet Union, tried to sign the most vague agreement, which,
depending on the circumstances could be interpreted as anything. Moreover, 24 August, no one
knew whether there will be any German-Polish war, or will reach a compromise, as it was in 1938.
In this situation, the use in the secret additional protocol to the agreement on non-aggression,
the term "territorial and political rearrangement" Eastern Europe could be interpreted as a
version of the new Munich, that is, would allow Moscow to declare their interests on a possible
international conference. And the concept of "sphere of interest" in general can be interpreted as
anything {6} . In any case, the Soviet-German pact was an agreement, designed for any situation.
Of course, Moscow was interested in defending its interests, including at the expense of others,
but it is, in fact, is an axiom of the foreign policy strategy of any state. Why only the Soviet Union
such actions put the blame?
An important problem historiography event 1939 is a question of the relationship of the
Soviet-German pact with the beginning of World War II. In this regard, the views of the
researchers divided. Many authors have followed the western historiography, which is based on
the position of the English manual, formulated by August 30, 1939, that "the fate of war and
peace is now in the hands of the Soviet Union" and its intervention can prevent a war {7} , it is
believed that the pact contributed to the beginning of the Second world war {8} . For others, the
pact had no effect at the beginning of the German-Polish war (World War II and too), as it had
been planned as far back as April 1939 {9} . RA Medvedev even believes that the pact made
Britain and France declare war on Germany {10} , does not, however, arguing this thesis. To give a
reasoned answer to this is probably the most important question should be made to consider the
events from 23 August to 1 September in Europe.
In the August 1939 issue of clarifying the position of England and the Soviet Union in case of war
in Poland came to Germany in the decisive phase. August 2-3 Germany actively probed Moscow,
August 7 - London, August 10 - Moscow, 11 August - London, 14-15 August - Moscow. August 21
London were invited to August 23 for talks Goring, and Moscow - to sign the Ribbentrop
non-aggression pact. And the Soviet Union, and Britain said yes! Based on the need first of all to

sign an agreement with the USSR on August 22, Hitler canceled the flight Goering, although it
was reported in London on August 24 only. Meanwhile, English manual, fear derail visit Goering
banned mobilization. Selection of Hitler can be explained by several factors. First, the German
command was sure, [36.37] that the Wehrmacht was able to defeat Poland, even if it is
supported by Britain and France. While the performance of the USSR on the side of anti-German
coalition meant disaster. Secondly, the agreement with Moscow was to localize the
German-Polish war, to keep England and France to intervene and give Germany the opportunity
to confront the likely economic blockade of the Western powers. Thirdly, the important role
played and the subjective element: England too often went to the German concessions in Berlin,
apparently, to some extent got used to it. USSR, on the contrary, was too unyielding, and
expressed Moscow's readiness for an agreement should be used without delay. In addition, it
would be completely buried and so not too successful Anglo-Franco-Soviet military negotiations.
August 22, Hitler again spoke to the military. Having described the general political situation, he
concluded that the situation is favorable for Germany, England and France, the intervention in
the German-Polish conflict is unlikely, they will not be able to help Poland and the Soviet Union
with the contract will be signed, which will also reduce the threat of an economic blockade of
Germany. In these circumstances, is to risk defeat of Poland, at the same time restraining the
West. This should quickly defeat the Polish army as "the destruction of Poland is in the
foreground, even if the war starts in the West" {11} . Busy localization campaign in Poland, Hitler
considered "a contract (with the Soviet Union) as a reasonable deal. In relation to Stalin, of
course, we must always be alert, but at the moment he (Hitler) sees the pact with Stalin on the
off chance of England from the conflict with Poland " {12} . Confident that he succeeds, Hitler in
the morning on 23 August, when Ribbentrop even flew to Moscow, he gave the order to attack
Poland at 4.30 am on 26 August.
August 23, France said it will support Poland, but the Supreme Council of National Defence
decided that any military action against Germany would be taken, if she did not attack France.
The same day, Hitler was given a letter of Chamberlain, in which London informs that in case of
war England will support Poland, but at the same time demonstrated a willingness to terms with
Germany. In England still expected to visit Goering, and only on August 24, it became clear that
he would not come. On the same day, Germany notified Poland that an obstacle to the
settlement of the conflict are the British guarantee. Fearing that Warsaw will make concessions
and rapprochement with Berlin, England August 25 signed an agreement with Poland on mutual
aid, but military agreement has been concluded. On the same day, Germany informed the UK
that 'after the decision of the Polish problem "it will offer a comprehensive agreement and
cooperation of the world up to guarantee the existence and support of the British Empire {13} .
But the evening of August 25th in Berlin, became aware of the Anglo-Polish agreement, and Italy,
which had previously expressed concerns about the threat of a world war, is known for refusing
to participate in war. All this has led to the fact that 20 hours was ordered to abolish the attack on
Poland, and managed to keep the army at the last moment {14} .
August 26 Western allies have recommended Poland to order the troops to refrain from an
armed response to German provocation. The next day, London and Paris offered to Warsaw to
organize the mutual exchange of the population of Germany. However, in Poland we have been
assured that "to date Hitler took another decision to go to war ... in any case there will be
nothing decisive in the near future" {15} . Britain and France also still were not sure that Germany

will dare to fight. August 26 in England instead of 300 thousand. Reservists were called only 35
thousand., As it was believed that the Anglo-Polish agreement will keep Germany from war. On
the same day from London to Berlin received information that England would not intervene in
the event of a German attack on Poland or declare war, but war is not {16} . [38,39] August 28
Britain has refused the German proposal to guarantee the empire, advising Berlin to start direct
negotiations with Warsaw. If Germany will go to a peaceful settlement, Britain agreed to consider
at a future conference, the general problems of Anglo-German relations. London Berlin again
warned that in case of war England will support Poland, but has promised to work on the Poles in
favor of negotiations with Germany.
At the same time Poland was recommended to speed up the negotiations with Germany. London
also asked Mussolini to Hitler hinted that "if the resolution of the current crisis limited the return
of Danzig and parts of the" corridor "of Germany, it seems to us, can be found within a
reasonable period of time, a solution without war" {17} . Naturally, Warsaw was not supposed to
know about it. If the German-Polish "negotiations led to an agreement on what counts the British
government, it would open the way for a broad agreement between Germany and England" {18} .
On the afternoon of August 28, Hitler set a tentative date of September 1 attack. Using the British
proposals on the negotiations, the German government has decided to require "Danzig
connection, pass through the Polish corridor and referendum [similarly carried out in the Saar
region]. England may accept our conditions. Poland, apparently, no. Split {19} . August 29,
Germany has agreed to direct talks with Poland on the transmission conditions of Danzig,
plebiscite in the "Polish Corridor" and the guarantee of the new frontiers of Poland, Germany,
Italy, Britain, France and the USSR. The arrival of the Polish negotiator expected on 30 August. By
submitting these proposals England, Hitler hoped, "he hammered the wedge between England,
France and Poland" {20} . On the same day Berlin informed Moscow about the proposals in
England for the settlement of the German-Polish conflict, and that Germany, as a condition put
the preservation of the contract with the USSR, the alliance with Italy and would not participate
in an international conference without the participation of the Soviet Union, with which should
be addressed all the issues of Eastern Europe {21} .
August 30 England reaffirmed their agreement to work on Poland, provided that the war will not
stop, and Germany anti-Polish campaign in the press. In this case, London agree to the convening
of an international conference in the future. On this day, the Wehrmacht still had not received
the order to attack Poland because there was the possibility that England will make concessions
and then attack will be delayed until "there will be no war at all," September 2, and in this case,
since "the arrival of Poles in Berlin submission = " {22} . August 30 England received accurate
information about the German proposals on the settlement of the Polish problem. However,
London did not notify Warsaw on these proposals, and, hoping to further delay the war, in the
night of 31 August informed Berlin on approval of direct German-Polish negotiations that were to
begin after a while. Early in the morning of August 31, Hitler signed a directive number 1,
according to which the attack on Poland was scheduled to begin at 4:45 AM September 1, 1939
Only day August 31 the German proposals for a settlement of the crisis were transferred to
Poland, England with a recommendation to respond positively to them and accelerate
negotiations with Germany .
At 12:00 on August 31 Warsaw London said that it is ready to negotiate with Berlin, provided that
Germany and Poland mutually guarantee the non-use of force, can the situation in Danzig, and

England in the negotiations will be to provide support to the Polish side. However, the Polish
Ambassador in Berlin had been ordered to play for time because in Warsaw still believed that
"Hitler did not dare to start a war. Hitler only plays on the nerves and pulls strings to the extreme
" {23} . As a result, 18.00 Ribbentrop in an interview with the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, noted
the absence of Polish emergency commissioner and refused to negotiate. At 21.15 - 21.45
Germany officially handed over its proposals referred Poland to the ambassadors of Britain,
France and the United States and said that Warsaw has refused to negotiate. At the same time,
the German radio reported on these proposals to resolve the crisis and about the Polish
provocations on the border. The same day, Italy has offered Germany's mediation in resolving the
crisis, but it refused, Britain and France advised that there will be war {24} .1 September
Germany invaded Poland, and the European crisis escalated into a war, which came on
September 3 England and France.
Thus, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was not the detonator of the war in Europe.
Instead of honest performance of its allied obligations to Poland, Britain and France continue to
seek an agreement with Germany, which naturally gave rise to confidence in Berlin in
non-interference of the Western allies in a possible German-Polish war. In fact it was diplomatic
games in London and Paris have pushed Germany into war with Poland. However, now the most
unexpected way this turned out to be guilty in the Soviet Union. In September 1939, Britain and
France had a great opportunity rather quickly to crush Germany, but, as you know, for various
reasons it did not happen. After the defeat of Poland in Germany had a chance to wage war on
one front, and that it was successfully used in 1940-1941.
Another fantastic version of the accusations against the Soviet Union put forward the Suvorov,
which indicates that "the exact day when Stalin began the Second World War - is of 19 August
1939". This conclusion can be explained very simply: "the beginning of a secret mobilization was
the actual entry into World War II. Stalin understood this and deliberately ordered the secret
mobilization of August 19, 1939. From that day war was already impossible to stop in any
scenario, " {25} .
In formulating such a categorical conclusion, Suvorov leaves the reader in the dark, why the
"beginning of a secret mobilization was the actual entry" into the war? The entire military history
of mankind shows that the actual entry into the war is either its formal declaration, or immediate
start of hostilities. No other action of the parties entering into a war are not. Secret mobilization,
of course, is preparing to join the war, but the war can not start (it solves the political leadership),
and then, as a rule, should be demobilized. An example of this development is the "Czechoslovak
crisis" in September 1938, when a number of countries, including the USSR, conducted a partial
or total mobilization, but the crisis had been "settled" the Munich Agreement, and no war arose.
Why, on the assumption that the Soviet Government June 26, 1938 decided to carry out
mobilization measures in the event of war in Europe, do not announce this date "exact" day,
"when Stalin began the Second World War?"
Even if you take the point of view of Suvorov, and even then it is not clear why the actions of the
USSR are the beginning of the Second World War? After all, Germany has started a secret
mobilization of more August 16, 1939, first in East Prussia, and from 18 August premobilization
events spread throughout the country, giving rise August 25, a total secret mobilization of the
Wehrmacht. On August 24, 1939 conducted covert partial mobilization and France. However,
there is no escaping from the fact that it was an attack by Germany on Poland to start the Second

World War. Thus, the thesis Suvorov that World War II began, Stalin, is a blatant lie.
Equally unsubstantiated assertion and Suvorov that Stalin ordered the secret mobilization of
August 19, 1939 Some researchers in this release as a confirmation result in the so-called "Stalin's
speech," supposedly uttered the day before the members of the Politburo {26} . However, as
convincingly demonstrated SZ Happens, this "document" is a falsification of the French secret
services {27} . [42,43] As you know, August 19, the Soviet government agreed to the visit of
German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 26-27 for the conclusion of a
nonaggression pact. Events in the Red Army to transfer infantry divisions deployed in ordinary
three-division started in accordance with the decisions of the Chief Military Council (WAN) of the
Red Army on 15 and 21 July and orders of People's Commissar of Defence of 15 August and 1
September 1939 the Politburo of the CPSU (b) approved a "plan of reorganization of land forces
of the Red Army in the years 1939-1940." {28} . Indeed, on August 30 in the Soviet press
appeared rebuttal TASS, according to which "in view of the worsening situation in the eastern
part of Europe and in view of the possibility of all sorts of surprises Soviet command decided to
enhance the strength of the garrisons of the western borders of the USSR." However, only late in
the evening September 6, 1939 the order was given to start the hidden mobilization in Leningrad,
Kalinin, Moscow, Kiev and Belorussian special, Orel and Kharkov military districts, which covered
more than 2.6 million. Military reserve {29} .
England and France in the passive position of the Second World War enabled the Soviet Union to
step up its foreign policy in Eastern Europe and to start auditing the western borders imposed by
him in 1920-1921 gg. In the fall of the Soviet Union in 1939, the summer of 1940 entered
Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia, Karelian Isthmus, Ladoga Karelia, the Baltic states,
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, a total area of 452 thousand sq. m. km and with a
population of 23 million. man. As a result, the western border was moved away from the vital
centers of the country and new opportunities for the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces
were created. This greatly improved the strategic position and strengthen the defense capability
of the Soviet Union. Thus, successfully maneuvering between the two warring blocs, the Soviet
leadership was able to significantly expand the territory of the Soviet Union, returning control
over strategic regions, most of which previously belonged to the Russian Empire and was lost
during the Civil War as a result of external aggression. Therefore, the events of 1939-1940. We
were in a certain sense, the Soviet revenge for the defeat in the Civil War. In addition, the merger
became a precedent, to which the Soviet leadership could be invoked in solving the problems of
postwar Europe. In international legal terms, all these areas have been secured in the USSR
contracts 1945-1947 gg.
Did the Soviet Union have been actions against Poland, Finland, the Baltic countries and Romania
aggression? According to the Convention on the definition of aggression in 1933, it was proposed
by the Soviet side, the aggressor admitted he who commits "a declaration of war to another state;
invasion of its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war on the territory of another
State; attack its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war on the territory,
vessels or aircraft of another State; a naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;
support provided by the armed gangs, who, being educated in its territory to invade the territory
of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the requirement of the state, subjected to invasion,
to take in its own territory all possible measures to deprive those bands of all assistance or
protection " . Moreover, the convention expressly stipulated that "no consideration of political,

military, economic or other considerations may serve as a justification for aggression" (including
internal structure, and its shortcomings, disturbances caused by the strikes, revolutions,
counter-revolutions or civil war, violation of other state interests ; breaking of diplomatic and
economic relations, economic and financial blockade, disputes, including territorial and border
incidents) {30} . [44,45]
Based on the content of the convention, it turns out that the Soviet Union has committed
aggression against Poland and Finland. However, in relation to the Baltic States and Romania,
countries about any aggression, there was no question, because the entry of Soviet troops into
the territory of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was preceded by
diplomatic negotiations, culminating in the agreement of the Baltic and Romanian governments
to the Soviet way to solve problems in bilateral relations . Not to mention the fact that the use of
the term "Soviet aggression" to the occupied Romanian territory of Bessarabia impossible. As
rightly noted by A. Taylor, "the rights of Russia in the Baltic states and eastern Poland (and even
more so of Bessarabia -. MM ) were much more reasonable compared to the United States rights
to New Mexico" {31} . In this sense, it is impossible not to join the opinion of NM Karamzin: "Let
the foreigners condemned the partition of Poland: we have taken their toll," {32} . As a result, the
Soviet Union was able to re-combine the political and geopolitical boundaries between
"Western" and "Russian" civilizations, as is already the case in the late XVIII century {33} .
The Soviet leadership, as well as management of the other great powers, endeavored to achieve
their own goals, considering the Second World War as a unique opportunity to implement the
ideas of "world revolution". Not by chance still October 1, 1938 at a meeting of propagandists in
Moscow and Leningrad IV Stalin explained that "there are times when the Bolsheviks themselves
will attack if a just war, if the situation is right, if the conditions are favorable, start to attack
themselves. They are not against the attack, not against all war. What we shout about defense this veil, the veil. All states are masked " {34} .
Interesting assessment of the events of 1939-1941. found in only recently has become available
to researchers Blog writer VV Vishnevsky, [46] although not involved in the development of the
most important military and political decisions, but nevertheless, by virtue of their job
responsibilities and political functions knowledgeable about the mood of the "top", who had the
opportunity to receive reliable, extensive and diverse information about the activities of the
Soviet leadership , on preparations for war. Assessing the Soviet-German non-aggression pact,
the writer on 1 September 1939 puts in his diary: "The USSR has won a free hand, while. [...]
Today, we take the initiative, do not back down, and stepping ... Diplomacy Berlin is clear: they
want our neutrality and then the punishment of the USSR; we want them bogged down in the
war and then deal with them. " Passing the common sentiment: "We will beat Hitler in a year,"
Wisniewski said that "this is the most likely option. [...] For the Soviet Union it's time outside
world performances. [...] Just guess how the rest of the game, it's hard. But one thing is clear: the
world will once again redraw. In this war, we will try to keep to the end of your winning positions.
To attract a number of countries. Gradually, where kindness, where force. This is a new chapter in
the history of the party and the country. The Soviet Union began an active foreign policy of the
world " {35} .
Assessing the outbreak of war in Europe, Stalin in a conversation with the leadership of the
Comintern, September 7, 1939 stated that "the war is between two groups of capitalist countries
(rich and poor in respect of colonies, raw materials, etc.) for the redivision of the world for

dominance over the world! We do not mind that they fought hard and weakened each other. Not
bad, if the hands of Germany will be shaken position of the richest capitalist countries (especially
England). Hitler himself did not understand and did not want to, upsets and undermines the
capitalist system ... We can maneuver to push one side against the other, to better got torn.
Non-Aggression Pact to some extent helps Germany. The next point - to push the other side "
{36} . This is Stalin's statement does not remain secret, and November 10, 1939 Head of the
Political Administration of the Red Army Army Commissar 1st Rank LZ Mehlis at a meeting [47]
The writers said that "Germany does, in general, a useful thing, shaking the British Empire. The
destruction it will lead to the total collapse of capitalism - it is clear, " {37} .
Similar ideas were expressed in an interview the President of the CPC and the People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania V. Crewe-Mickevicius on the night of July 3, 1940 in Moscow. "Now
- said Molotov, his companion - we are convinced more than ever has that genius Lenin was not
wrong, assuring us that the Second World War will allow us to gain power in the whole of Europe,
as the First World War made it possible to seize power in Russia. Today we support Germany, but
just enough to keep her from accepting the proposals of the world as long as the hungry masses
of the warring nations do not give up their illusions and do not rise against their leaders. Then
the German bourgeoisie to agree with his enemy, the bourgeoisie allied states, so that the joint
efforts to suppress the insurgent proletariat. But at this point we will come to him for help, we
will come with fresh forces, well trained, and in Western Europe ... will the decisive battle
between the proletariat and the decaying bourgeoisie, which will decide the fate of all of Europe
" {38} .
February 10, 1941 this idea in a slightly different wording and got Vishnevsky blog: "We use the
old method of" divide and rule ". We are out of the war, something to pay for it, get a lot. We
carry trade relations with different countries, use their equipment, something useful gain and for
the army and for the navy and others. Helping to make war the same in Germany, feeding her,
"portions", at a minimum. Does not prevent the imperialists wage war for another year, two [...].
Wait till they weaken. Next - act as umpire, "broker", etc. " {39} .
In the spring of 1940 it is still in the narrow, but quite high classrooms became louder voices on
the need for a more active policy. The tone of these statements asked Stalin himself. Speaking at
a meeting of the commission DHW Red Army April 21, 1940, he proposed to "radically transform
our military ideology. [...] We must educate their chain of command in the spirit of active defense,
including and offensive. It is necessary to popularize these ideas under the safety slogans, to
protect our country, our borders " {40} .
The commission DHW on military ideology of May 10, with a keynote speech made by the head
of the Political Administration of the Red Army Army Commissar 1st Rank LZ Mehlis, who claimed
that "the Red Army, like any army, there is a tool of war. All personnel of the Red Army should be
brought up in a time of peace, on the basis of a common goal - to prepare for war. Our war with
the capitalist world is a just war, progressive. The Red Army will be active, achieving complete
crushing and the defeat of the enemy, leaving the fighting into enemy territory ... We are talking
about an active action of the victorious proletariat and working people of the capitalist countries
against the bourgeoisie, of such an active action when initiated just war will make our state and
its Red Army ". At the plenary session of the commission on May 13-14, 1940, expressed similar
ideas and other participants. In particular, the commander of the Leningrad Military District,

commander of the 2nd rank KA Meretskov said that "our army is preparing to attack, and the
attack we need to defend. It is absolutely right ... We must ensure that our country is not a
defender, but the onset of ... Our army is there to ensure that our state, our country, and to
ensure this, it is necessary to crush, smash the enemy, and for this it is necessary to attack " {41} .
The ideas have been presented to 25 June as the directives on the convened on the initiative of
the newspaper "Red Star", the journal "Banner" and the defense committee of the Union of
Soviet Writers Writers meeting developing military issues. [48,49] The chief editor of "Red Star"
EA Boltin follows instructed "engineers of human souls": "The doctrine of the Red Army - is
offensive doctrine emanating from known Voroshilov phrase" beat the enemy on its territory. "
This provision remains in force today. We must be prepared, if need be, the first to strike a blow,
not only to respond blow for blow. " Ought to get rid of sentiments like: "We will defend
ourselves and to fight is not useful" and "to educate people to understand that the Red Army is
an instrument of war, rather than an instrument of peace. It is necessary to educate people so
that any future war with the capitalist state will be a fair war, no matter who started this war. "
But so far not had to speak openly about the future of Germany as an enemy, as "politically it's
bad." Due to the complex international situation Boltin advised to write about the foreign policy
of the USSR "impressive, straight, frank, but very carefully and quietly." "Why must we have to
right to say who our future enemy?" - He asked, offering to seek such forms of propaganda,
which "would allow ... to achieve the desired effect and at the same time comply with the
external decorum", that "neither the one nor others not to offend and not to tease the " {42} .
With the growth of Germany's military successes growing tension in Soviet-German relations.
Both sides saw each other as enemies and were prepared to fight for supremacy in Europe. The
turning point was the Soviet-German negotiations in Berlin in November 1940 {43} , which
revealed the real components of the Soviet-German conflict. Most important interests of both
countries have faced in the Balkans, in Finland and in the Middle East. If it was not possible in
1939 Berlin made concessions to Moscow, which was able to autumn 1940, mainly to implement
the agreements reached, since the end of 1940 the expansionist ambitions of Germany and the
Soviet Union came into conflict and to resolve them on the basis of a compromise that
demonstrated the negotiations in November 1940 after the victory over France, Germany
considered itself hegemonic in Europe and was not going to make concessions. For its part, the
Soviet Union, is quite easy to join the new territories, consider Finland, the Balkans and the Black
Sea straits to those regions where it has a preferential interest, and also did not concede. In
principle, the Soviet leadership did not exclude the possibility of continuing cooperation with
Germany. However, the German government did not want to go into new concessions to Moscow,
regarding the USSR as a weak enemy, defeat which does not require much effort.
The war between Germany and the USSR was generated by the struggle for supremacy in Europe,
it also accelerated the collision of Soviet and German interests on specific political issues. Since
November 1940 the Soviet-German relations have entered a new phase - the phase of immediate
preparation for war. A kind of "litmus test" real intentions of Germany was for the Soviet
leadership situation around Bulgaria in November 1940 - March 1941 In spite of the direct
application of the Moscow Soviet interests, Germany ignored them, having achieved Bulgaria's
accession to the Tripartite Pact. Apparently, this is clearly shown to the Soviet leadership that its
interests are not recognized in Europe, Berlin, and the preparation of war with Germany entered
the final stage.

Introduction In recent years, the scientific revolution, Soviet diplomatic and military documents,
1939-1941. It shows that no foreign policy zigzags not interfere with the Soviet leadership to
consider Germany as a potential enemy, and carefully prepare for war. With the emergence of
the Soviet-German border in October 1939, the General Staff of the Red Army began to develop a
plan in case of war with Germany {44} . Special intensity this process acquired from the second
half of March 1940, and in 1940-1941. we developed five options for the operational plan for the
use of the Red Army in case of war. This, of course, does not exclude the presence of other job
options that are still available to researchers, which complicates analysis of the production of
these documents. [50,51]
At the same time we should not forget that the published documents although it played an
important role in Soviet military planning, but do not exhaust it. Firstly, these documents had a
number of applications, graphical and textual nature, detailed the content. Secondly, in addition,
had a note on the procedure for the strategic deployment of the armed forces (the problem of
fronts and fleets) with the application card and PivotTable distribution of military units, aircraft
and parts RGC on the fronts and armies; strategic transport plan for the concentration of armed
forces in the theater of operations; covering strategic deployment plans; plan unit Logistics and
material support of the army; Communications plans, military communications, defense and
other documents. A comprehensive study of all of these materials is still, unfortunately,
impossible. In the meantime, we have to restrict ourselves to the available texts of the four
memos on the name of IV Stalin and VM Molotov, containing the basic ideas of military plans
{45} .
Before proceeding to the analysis of these documents, it should at least briefly on the history of
their development process. The document tentatively entitled "Considerations on the
foundations of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and
East to 1940 -. 1941" started to be developed since the establishment of the Soviet-German
border, according to the agreement of 28 September 1939 the first version of the plan was
prepared by end July 1940 city has two complementary versions about the fate of the document
in the literature. Some authors believe that the change in the Soviet Union's western borders in
August 1940 and the formation of new units of the Red Army has required substantial revision of
the document. In the opinion of others, the plan was reported to the People's Commissar of
Defense Marshal SK Tymoshenko, who did not approve of it, because he believed in it too much
importance is attached to enemy troops located to the north of Warsaw and East Prussia, and
insisted on a careful study of options when the main forces of the enemy would be deployed to
the south of Warsaw {46} .
Be that as it may, the new version of the plan has been prepared by 18 September, which took
into account the possibility of using the main forces of the Red Army, depending on the situation
in the North-West and South-West directions. These deployments of Soviet troops called in the
historiography respectively "north" and "south". This feature of the plan was a kind of tradition of
the Soviet General Staff, since 1921 - years. Western theater of military operations (TVD) divided
almost exactly in the middle of the Pripyat River. Since September 1939, the river flows entirely in
the USSR, but the habit is this line extrapolated further west, divided the theater into two main
areas. October 5, the version of the plan was reported to Stalin and Molotov. During the
discussion of the General Staff was instructed to finalize the deployment plan with an even
stronger part of the main groups in the South-Western Front. As a result, it was planned to

increase the number of troops of the Southwestern Front to 31.25% by divisions, 300% Tank
Brigade and Regiment 59% {47} .
October 14 revised "southern" version of the plan has been approved as the core, but it has been
decided to rework and "northern" option. The development of both local variants planned to be
completed by May 1, 1941 In this way the Soviet armed forces have received a valid document,
on which conducted a more detailed military planning. The General Staff summoned military
commanders, members of military councils and chiefs of staff of military districts for the
development of operational documents, which immediately approved by the People's Commissar
of Defence. Besides this document, the Soviet leadership were presented the plans of combat
operations against Finland, Romania and Turkey, [52,53] which, according to its developers, the
entire operational plan gave the necessary completeness and flexibility made it possible to
operate depending on the military-political situation {48 } . Unfortunately, most of these
documents are still classified and are unlikely historians will soon be able to explore them.
However, the development of military plans on this was not the end. The military leadership has
sought to comprehensively evaluate the two choices of the Red Army, laid down in the
operational plan. To resolve the "northern" and "southern" options 2-6 and 8-11 January 1941 in
the General Staff conducted two operational-strategic games. In the first game played out
offensive of the Red Army in the North-West direction (East Prussia), and the second - in the
South-West (South Poland, Hungary and Romania). The defensive operations of the initial period
of the war on the games do not lose, for the secrecy of the main design plan for a quest party
simply noted that "blue" attack, but they rejected the border and even to the line of the Vistula
in the South-West direction and Dunajec in the territory Poland and with these lines was already
game. On the territory of East Prussia offensive "red" bogged down, and the Southwest, they
have made significant progress, which led to the abandonment of the "northern" variant actions
of the Red Army. Thus, the main focus of the Soviet attack southern Poland was determined {49} .
The processing of documents of an operational plan based on the experience of the January
games headed by new Chief of General Staff General of the Army GK Zhukov. According to the
"Plan of development of operational plans" were required to specify the documents on the
"southern" version to the 22 March, and on the "northern" variant - to March 8, 1941
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether this task is accomplished, for prepared for the March 11,
1941 , a new version of the plan finally secured the rejection of the "northern" variant and
refocused the main efforts of the troops in the South-West direction {50} . The fate of this option
plan is disagreement in the literature, as some authors believe that "the updated in March 1941
the course was not given the plan" {51} . However, in the absence of access to other documents,
military planning, and without analyzing the still secret military plans counties solution to this
question is impossible.
Be that as it may, the work on the refinement of the operational plan continued, and to 15 May
1941 has been developed another option. In order to discuss the situation and problems of the
Western frontier districts arising from this plan, May 24, 1941 in the Kremlin held a meeting
recently took over as head of Stalin's government and his deputy Molotov Commissar of Defence,
Chief of General Staff, the commanders of the troops, members of military councils and
commanders Air Baltic (PribOVO), West (WSMD) and Kiev (KOVO) special, Leningrad (LVO) and
Odessa (OdVO) military districts. In June, the refinement of the document continued. June 13
Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General NF Vatutin has prepared a certificate of deployment of

the Armed Forces of the USSR in the West theater, specifies the composition of the troops and
their distribution fronts. At the same time I worked over the idea of creating another front - the
South, which was created according to the decision of the Politburo of the CPSU (b) on June 21,
1941 {52} .
Such is the general picture of the progress of the Soviet strategic planning, 1939-1941. We must
now apply directly to the analysis of the content available {53} materials.
The first part of the document was devoted to consideration of the armed forces and the possible
actions of potential enemies. As such, we figured Germany, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania,
Turkey and Japan, ie, almost all the neighbors of the USSR. Developers document assumes that
against the western borders of the Soviet Union, Germany, Finland, Hungary and Romania will be
able to expand from 240 to 270 divisions, more than 10 thousand. Tanks and from 12 to 15
thousand. Airplanes. In a document dated 15 May 1941, this part is given in the substantial
reduction of that is probably due to the fact that the document contains a plan of hostilities
essentially only against Germany. All these data were based on Soviet intelligence and the
particulars have been significantly overestimated.
Outlining the "probable opponents operational plans", the developers documents repeatedly
stressed that "the documentary evidence of the operational plans of potential enemies both in
the West and in the East, the General Staff of the Red Army did not have." And further, outlining
only the most probable assumptions in this respect.
The intentions of Germany were evaluated in terms of the July 1940 follows. Expanding the main
forces north of the mouth of the river San, she is from East Prussia cause "a major impact on the
Riga to Kovno, Vilna and then to Minsk". At the same time supporting the blows are applied in
Belarus from Brest to Minsk, and from the south of Poland with the aim of mastering the
Western Ukraine. According to this embodiment, for the main attack will be concentrated up to
130 divisions, and the remaining 50 will operate in the south. However, it does not exclude the
reverse option, when the main attack will be applied in Ukraine, and to the north unfold auxiliary
actions. In this case Wehrmacht be deployed in inverse proportion. It is assumed the offensive
from the territory of Romania Zhmerinka and from Finland on the Karelian Isthmus, and later in
the Kandalaksha and Petrozavodsk.
Having outlined both options German actions, the document makes the following conclusion:
"The main and most politically advantageous for Germany, and consequently, the most probable
is the 1st version of its actions, ie the deployment of the main forces of the German army to the
north of the mouth of the river. San ". [56]
In the course of further processing of the document in the text were made only partial changes
on the direction of development of the German offensive operations and deploy forces. Much
more important are the changes in the evaluation of the main choices of the German armed
forces. If it remains unchanged, in terms of the March 11, 1941 it was thought that the main blow
of the Wehrmacht will be done in Ukraine and in the Baltic States and Belarus will be applied to
support strikes, however, the northern version is not entirely in terms of the September 18, 1940
excluded. Document on May 15, 1941 has come from the probability of only the southern
direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht.
Thus, the estimate of the enemy's intentions except for the possible direction of the main attack
has not changed significantly. However, it should be noted that in the absence of concrete data
about the real plans of Germany, such estimates are based solely on the configuration of the

Soviet-German border. Nor is it clear why the authors of the documents completely rule out the
possibility the main attack of the Wehrmacht in Belarus and on what basis it was concluded by
them on the north or south directions of the main attacks of the enemy. In the analysis of these
sections of documents constantly have the feeling that their authors are engaged in mere
guessing, but if they are really prepared to repel the attacks of the enemy, it is the exact
definition of his intentions was to be the main task of the Soviet General Staff.
Planning the operational use of the Red Army, the authors of the documents carefully worked out
issues of its strategic deployment. Military planning documents allow us to trace the dynamics of
strengthening the Western theater, which was supposed to identify the main forces of the Soviet
troops. According to the July 1940 plan for action in the West it was allocated 68.7% of cash
forces ground troops; for the September plan - 68.9%; March 1941 plan involves the allocation of
83.5%, in May - 85.1%, while the June documents - 79.2%. [57]
What tasks were assigned to these troops? According to a document of July 1940, "the main task
of our troops is defeating the German forces concentrated in East Prussia and in the area of
Warsaw; auxiliary blow to defeat the enemy groupings in the region of Ivangorod [Deblin], Lublin,
Hrubieszow, Tomaszow, Sandomierz. " Accordingly, the troops of the Northwestern Front (8th,
11th army, 37 divisions and 2 brigades) task was - "focusing on attacking the opponent with the
ultimate objective, together with the Western Front to defeat his group in East Prussia and
master the latest."
Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th army, 51 divisions and 4 brigades) had to "hit the north
district. Bug in the general direction of Allenstein, together with the armies of the North-Western
Front inflict a decisive defeat of the German army, focusing in East Prussia, to learn the latest and
enter the lower reaches of. Wisla. At the same time the army left flank kick in the general
direction of Ivangorod [Deblin], together with the armies of the Southwestern Front to defeat
Ivangorod-Lublin enemy troops and also go out on the river. Vistula ".
Before the troops of the Southwestern Front (5th, 6th, 12th, 18th, 9th army, mechanized cavalry
group, 57 divisions and 4 brigades) task was to "active defense in the Carpathian Mountains and
the border with Romania cover Western Ukraine and Bessarabia, simultaneously blow from the
front-Great Bridges, Rava-Russian, Sieniawa in the general direction of Lublin, together with the
army left flank of the Western front to defeat Ivangorod-Lublin enemy troops, go out and gain a
foothold on the middle reaches of the river. Vistula ".
According to the plan of 18 September 1940, "the main force of the Red Army in the West,
depending on the situation, or can be deployed south of Brest-Litovsk, to a powerful blow in the
direction of Lublin and Krakow and then to Breslau (Bratislav) (. sic - MM ) in the first stage of the
war cut off Germany from Balkan countries, to deprive it of the most important economic bases
and strongly influence the Balkan countries regarding their participation in the war; or to the
north of Brest-Litovsk with the task of defeating the main forces of the German Army in East
Prussia and master the latest. " It should be noted that, setting out two options for the use of the
Red Army, the document's authors point out that it is the "southwest" option is essential. It is
also interesting rationale for this conclusion: "The blow our forces in the direction of Krakow,
Bratislava, cutting off Germany from Balkan countries, it is of utmost political importance. In
addition, the impact in this area will be held on slightly more prepared in the defense against the
former Poland. "
The overall objective of the Red Army in the West has been formulated as follows: "1. Active

defense is firmly cover our borders during the staging; 2. In conjunction with the left flank of the
Western Front army forces of the Southwestern Front inflict a decisive defeat on the
Lublin-Sandomierz enemy troops and get out on the river. Wisla. Later on strike in the general
direction of Kielce, Krakow and get out on the river. Pilica and the upper reaches of. Oder; 3.
During the operation firmly cover the border of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia; 4. Active
actions of the North-Western and Western Fronts tie down most of the German forces to the
north of Brest-Litovsk in East Prussia, durable covering with Minsk and Pskov directions. "
Relevant tasks and received fronts. North-Western Front (8th, 11th army, 23 divisions and 2
brigades) were set tasks: "1. Defense of the coast of the Baltic Sea, together with the Baltic Fleet
to prevent the landing of amphibious assault forces; 2. Firmly cover Minsk and Pskov directions,
and in any case prevent the German invasion of our territory; 3. In order to reduce the front
11-th army and its employment more favorable starting position for the offensive during the
staging in conjunction with the 3rd Army of the Western Front to seize the area of Sejny, Suwalki
and get to the front Shitkemen, Filipovo, copepods; 4. staging kick in the general direction of
Insterburg, Allenstein, together with the Western Front tie down German forces in East Prussia. "
[58,59]
Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th army, 42 divisions and 4 brigades) was given the task "firmly
covering the Minsk direction, for staging a simultaneous attack from the North-Western Front in
the general direction of Allenstein, tie down German forces, focusing in East Prussia. With the
transfer of Army of the Southwestern Front offensive punch left flank of the army in the general
direction of Ivangorod promote the South-Western Front Lublin break the enemy's forces and
developing further surgery on Radom, providing action Southwestern Front from the north. "
South-Western Front (5th, 19th, 6th, 12th, 18th, 9th mechanized cavalry army, 96 divisions and 5
teams) received the mission "firmly covering the border of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, by
concentrating forces in cooperation with the 4th army of the Western front inflict a decisive
defeat on the Lublin-Sandomierz enemy troops and get out on the river. Wisla. Later on strike in
the direction of Kielce, Krakow and Petrokov, seize the Kielce Petrokov and go to p. Pilica and the
upper reaches of. Oder".
The main objectives of the "northern" version of the deployment of Soviet troops had to be: "1.
Durable cover for directions on Minsk and Pskov during the staging. 2. Application of the decisive
defeat of the main forces of the German army, concentrated in East Prussia, and the capture of
the latter. 3. Subsidiary blow from Lviv not only durable cover Western Ukraine, Bessarabia and
Northern Bukovina, but also to defeat the enemy grouping in the Lublin district, Hrubieszow
Tomas. " Developers document stressed that "the defeat of the Germans in East Prussia and the
capture of the last has the exclusive economic and, above all, the political significance for
Germany, which will inevitably affect the whole future course of the struggle against Germany."
However, "there are fears that the struggle on this front could lead to protracted battles, will
connect our main strength and will not give a reliable and rapid effect, which in turn will make
the inevitable and accelerate the performance of the Balkan countries into the war against us."
The main fronts of the problem remained the same as in the previous version of the plan.
We allowed ourselves to such a lengthy quotation, because this material demonstrates the lack of
any connection with the actions of the Red Army, the possible actions of the enemy, as
mentioned above. The document clearly emerges the real scenario of the beginning of the war,
formed the basis of operational planning: the Red Army conducts concentration and deployment

on the Western theater, leading both private offensives, the concentration completion serves as a
signal to transition to a general offensive along the entire front from the Baltic to the Carpathians
with the application of the main strike on southern Poland. The German troops, as in the first
version of the plan, designated by the term "focusing" and, therefore, the initiative of the
outbreak of war will come entirely from the Soviet side, which begins and ends the first
deployment of troops in theater. This conclusion is supported by direct reference in the
document, in the case of the concentration of the main forces in the North-West direction, "on
the condition of the railways in full compliance with the traffic plan, the day of transition to a
general offensive should be set 25 days from the start of mobilization, that is. e. The 20th day
from the beginning of staging " {54} . That is, the transition to the offensive is not connected with
the situation at the front, and with the completion of the concentration of the Red Army.
The widespread opinion that the Soviet Union was waiting for the enemy attack, and only then
planned offensive, does not consider that in this case, the strategic initiative would actually
voluntarily surrendered into the hands of the enemy, and the Soviet troops would be staged in
obviously unfavorable conditions. [60.61] Moreover he that the transition from defense to
offense, so simple in the abstract, is a complex process that requires careful and thorough
preparation, which should begin with the four equipment lines of defense for 150 km in depth.
But nothing of the kind before the war has not been done, and is unlikely to seriously defend the
thesis that the Red Army could successfully defend themselves on unprepared terrain and even
the sudden attack of the enemy, which is generally not provided by Soviet planes. After all, "it
was thought to reflect the aggression by reference to the principal strategic directions (front)
offensive operations" {55} . In addition, it is unclear why it is necessary to plan offensive
operations unless troops to be defense against attacking enemy. After all, no one knows how the
situation at the front in the course of defensive operations, where our troops will be in what they
are able to, etc. Besides waiting for the enemy attack does not allow for a timely mobilization,
which consequently makes it impossible to implement all these plans.
In terms of the March 11, 1940 was finally fixed the refusal of the "northern" version as
"deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in the West with the group of the main forces
against East Prussia and to Warsaw direction raises serious concerns that the struggle on this
front can result to protracted battles, "and focused on the further working out of the" southern
"version. This document noted that "the most profitable is the deployment of our main forces to
the south of the district. Pripyat, so that the powerful blows to Lublin, Radom and Krakow put
yourself first strategic goal: to break the main forces of the Germans, and the first stage of the
war cut off Germany from Balkan countries, to deprive it of the most important economic bases
and strongly influence the Balkan countries regarding their participation in the war against us. "
As pointed out by SN Mikhalev, in this regard, "the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops in the
western theater had a clear design. The plan called for it: 1) a strong (probably active. - MM )
defense pin down the enemy forces on the flanks of the areas Memel, Ostroleka and along the
borders with Hungary and Romania; 2) The main forces of the Southwestern Front, in
collaboration with the left wing of the Western Front strike with a view to the decisive defeat of
Lublin-Radomsko-Sandomierz enemy forces, seize Krakow and Warsaw and to go to the front
Warsaw, Lodz, Oppeln " {56} . "A further strategic objective for the main forces of the Red Army,
depending on the situation can be delivered - the development of operations through Pozna to
Berlin, or actions in the south-west of Prague and Vienna, or hit the north at Torun and Danzig to

bypass East Prussia" { 57} .

Now, thanks to the study of SN Mikhalev, we have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with
the problems of the Western and South-Western fronts on the plan. Western Front "was to hit
the left wing in the general direction of Siedlce, Radom promote South-Western Front in
defeating the enemy in the Lublin region, and to ensure that action on the main line to put the
auxiliary blow in the direction of Warsaw, possess it and" make a defense "on p. Narev. The
immediate task is to master the front areas of Siedlce, Lukow and the seizure of crossings over
the river. Wisla. In the future, meaning the action in the direction of Radom Lublin to encircle
enemy forces in cooperation with the South-Western Front. "
South-Western Front was tasked with "concentric blow right wing armies in collaboration with
the Western Front, to encircle and destroy the enemy's main grouping of east river. Wisla with
simultaneous removal of the mobile action group (two mechanized corps) in the West Bank.
Wisla for mastering Kielce. The main forces of the front at the end of the defeat of the Lublin
group on the tenth day of the operation to be ready to force the district. Wisla. [62.63] At the
same time the left wing of the main groups in the strike direction of Krakow and, building on the
success of mobile forces groups (four mechanized corps), on the eighth day of the operation to
seize Krakow, on the tenth day of the operation the main force of this group bring to the area of
Miechow, Cracow, Container " {58} .
The above material clearly indicates the continuation of mining the offensive operations of the
Soviet troops. Opinion expressed in the literature that "from March 11, 1941, the plan is the most
accurate final expression of generally accepted views and most accurately reflects the personal
position of Stalin," may be taken only in part. Indeed, this document sets out the essence of
"conventional wisdom" of the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war, but he was not final,
because the process of the development of Soviet operational plan continued. Version that "the
basis of the document defensive strategy was based on the" {59} , has no basis. The fact that it
was clearly stated: "The advent 12.b start" {60} . The exact start date of onset is known to be
determined by the party that intends to have initiated the beginning of hostilities. However, this
deadline was not sustained, but its appearance in the document is very telling, as well as the fact
that it is the only instrument of Soviet military planning, which is published in the latest
documentary collection in the extraction.
Clarification of the tasks of the Soviet troops found its further development in a document dated
15 May 1941 For the first time openly and clearly formulated the idea that the Red Army is to
"forestall the enemy to deploy and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the
stage of deployment and not even have time to organize the front and the interaction of forces. "
This idea, as we have seen above, in a latent form was present in all previous versions of the plan.
Naturally, the developers of the document say about the possibility of German attack on the
USSR only tentatively.
The troops of the Red Army's task was to attack the German army, for which "the first strategic
objective actions of the Red Army put - the defeat of the main forces of the German army
deployed south of the line Brest - Deblin and access to the 30 th day of operation on the front
Ostroleka, p. Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Kreizburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. Follow the strategic goal to have
the onset of the Katowice district in the northern or north-westerly direction to defeat the large
force of the center and the north wing of the German front and to seize the territory of former
Poland and East Prussia. The immediate task - to defeat the German army east of the river. Wisla

Krakow and direction, get off at pp Narev, Vistula and capturing the Katowice area, for which: a)
the main attack forces of the Southwestern Front strike in the direction of Krakow, Katowice,
cutting off Germany from its southern allies; b) secondary attack the left wing of the Western
Front strike in the direction of Siedlce, Deblin with the aim snare the Warsaw group and seize
Warsaw, and promote South-Western Front in defeating the enemy of Lublin groups; c) conduct
an active defense against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary and Romania, and be prepared to strike
against Romania in a favorable environment.
Thus, the Red Army begins offensive operations from the front Chizhov, Lutowiska forces 152
divisions against 100 German. On other sections of the state border provides an active defense. "
The term "active defense" should not be misleading, since it means the combination of defensive
and offensive operations. Since the document has repeatedly stressed that it was the Red Army
will be the initiator of hostilities, the term is most likely hiding private offensive to snare the
enemy.
The fronts have received the following tasks. Northern Front (14th, 7th, 23th Army, 21 Division)
was to ensure the defense of [64.65] "Mr. Leningrad, the port of Murmansk, the Kirov railways
and, together with the Baltic Navy to ensure our complete domination in the waters of the Gulf
of Finland. " At the same time the Northern Fleet is to promote the 14th Army of the Front "in
the capture of Petsamo", and the Baltic Fleet, "to promote the land forces on the coast of the
Gulf of Finland and on the peninsula of Hanko, providing them with flank", the first day of the
war to transfer one infantry division from Estonia to Hanko and to be prepared for a landing on
the Aland Islands {61} . Thus, it is clearly on the offensive of the Soviet troops in Finland.
Northwestern Front (8th, 11th, 27th Army, 23 Division) had "a stubborn defense durable cover
Riga and Vilna areas, not allowing the enemy's invasion of East Prussia; the defense of the west
coast and the islands of Saaremaa and Dago prevent amphibious landings of the enemy. "
However, the directive Commissar Defense Command Baltic Special Military District on May 14,
1941 provided that: "Under favorable conditions, all the defending troops and reserves of Army
and county to be prepared on the orders of the High Command to deliver a swift kick."
Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th army, 45 divisions) was "stubborn defense on the front of
Druskininkai, Ostroleka firmly cover Lidskoe Bialystok and direction; with the transition of the
armies of the Southwestern Front offensive punch left front wing in the general direction of
Warsaw and Siedlce, Radom break Warsaw grouping and capturing Warsaw, in cooperation with
the South-Western Front split Lublin-Radom enemy grouping, to get out on the river. Vistula and
movable parts master Radom ".
South-Western Front (5-th, 20 th, 6 th, 26 th, 21 th, 12 th, 18 th, 9 th Army, 122 Division) had
immediate objectives: "a) a concentric blow armies of the front of the right wing to encircle and
destroy the main enemy grouping east of the river. Wisla in the Lublin region; b) simultaneously
blow from Sieniawa front, Przemysl, Lutowiska smash the enemy forces at the Cracow and
Sandomierz, Elets directions and seize the Krakow, Katowice, Kielce, referring to further attack
from the area in the north or north-westerly direction to defeat the large force Northern the
front wing of the enemy and the capture of the former territory of Poland and East Prussia; c)
firmly defend the state border with Hungary and Romania, and be prepared to spray concentric
attacks against Romania from Czernowitz and Kishinev areas with the immediate goal to defeat
the northern [ernoe] wing of the Romanian Army and reach the line p. Moldova Iasi. "
Thus, as rightly pointed SN Mikhalev, May's "plan is a somewhat transformed the development of

the ideas laid down earlier" in the March plan {62} , and the achievement of immediate strategic
objectives intended to provide offensive operations, particularly of the South-West direction,
which unfolded over half of all divisions, intended for action in the West. To provide a strong
initial attack against the enemy main force planned to deploy in the armies of the first echelon,
which includes most of the movable joints.
An important problem of entry of the Red Army in the war was a matter of covering the
mobilization, concentration, and deployment of troops. The plans cover the western border
districts were developed in May - June 1941 on the basis of the People's Commissar of Defense
directives May 5 Command and WSMD KOVO, May 6 - OdVO, and on May 14 - LVO and PribOVO
{63} . The planned group of troops on the western border districts cover included 15 armies, the
composition of which was allocated 107 divisions and 2 brigades, remained 51 Division and the
disposal of the High Command in reserve fronts - 8 divisions. According to VA Anfilova, BN
Petrova and VA Semidetko, this group was more suited to attack than to defend {64} , [66,67]
which could not but affect in case of enemy attack, because, as rightly pointed out MA Gareev,
"Soviet troops disadvantage aggravated by the fact that the troops of the border military districts
had no problems on the defensive operations, but only to cover the deployment of forces" {65} .
Putting these plans into operation did not match the enemy's attack. For example, in terms of
covering PribOVO noted that "the purpose of intelligence - from the first day of the war to reveal
the intentions of the enemy, his group and terms of readiness to move to the offensive" {66} .
Thus, commissioning of the cover plans are not dependent on the actions of the enemy, and the
decision of the Soviet command. According to the just opinion MA Gareeva, "on the eve of the
war at some time had been lost sight of the important fact that in case of the outbreak of
hostilities and the political, and can not come to the military only because of their own desires
and intentions, without considering that the enemy will seek to do everything and when it is
convenient and profitable to him "{67}, and" the idea of the indispensable transfer of war since
its inception into enemy territory ... so fascinated by some senior military staff, that the
possibility of military action on its territory is practically excluded. Of course, this has a negative
impact on the preparation of not only defense, but also in the whole theater of military
operations in the depths of its territory, " {68} .
This conclusion is confirmed by the documents published on the plans cover does not provide
serious opposition concentration of Soviet troops from the enemy. Thus, the full deployment of
forces in the border counties in the bands took cover under plans to 15 days, which, of course, it
would be extremely difficult at the offensive opponent. Moreover, the attack of the enemy forces
of the first echelon were unable to take their defense on the border strip. As rightly pointed out
VP Screamers, "a characteristic feature of the cover plans was that they came from such an
option the outbreak of war and create an environment in which will be possible without
interference from the potential enemy advance to the border, take the designated cover band,
ready to repel an attack, hold mobilization .. . a feature of all military plans cover was their lack of
evaluation of the possible actions of the enemy, in the first embodiment of the sudden transition
to the offensive of superior enemy forces ... The essence of tactical maneuver was to ensure that
the need to quickly pack up and go out to the border ... it was assumed that in the areas of
concentration will be given time for the final preparations for the fight, " {69} .
If cover for the troops really prepared to repel enemy attacks, then it would have "meant - MA on
fair view Gareeva - that border military districts must be carefully designed repel the enemy's

invasion plans, ie, plans for defensive operations, as a reflection attack by superior enemy forces
can not be done casually, just as an interim task. This requires the maintenance of a number of
long fierce defensive battles and operations. If there were such plans, in accordance with them
quite differently, namely taking into account the defensive problems have arranged grouping of
forces and means of the districts, in a different way to build the management and separation was
carried out inventories and other resources mobilization. Ready to repel aggression also claimed
to have not only developed plans of operations, but also fully prepared for the operation,
including logistically, to be mastered commanders and staffs. It is obvious that in case of a sudden
attack of the enemy did not have time for additional training for such operations. But this was
not done in the border military districts " {70} .
Since the strategic plan and the deployment of the first plan of strategic operations have been
calculated [68,69] the full mobilization of the Red Army, they were closely linked to the
mobilization plan. Since April 1940 began development of a new mobilization plan, which was
February 12, 1941 approved by the government. Mobilization deployment of the Red Army on
the MP-41 plan (the official name of "Mobplan number 23") would lead to the creation of a
wartime army. Total planned to drill 8 front and 29 army management, 62 rifle, 29 motorized, 4
cavalry and 5 airborne and 8 air corps, 177 infantry, 19th mountain infantry, 2 infantry, 61 tank,
31 motorized, 13 cavalry and 79 aircraft divisions, 3 infantry, 10 artillery anti-tank brigades and 72
artillery regiments RGC, as well as the appropriate number of rear units. After mobilizing the
strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR was to be 8.9 million people, the troops should have
been 106.7 thousand. Guns and mortars, up to 37 thousand. Tanks, 22,2 thous. Warplanes, 10.7
thousand. Armored vehicles, about 91 thousand. tractors and 595 thousand. cars.
Most of these troops have already been formed or finished forming, since the mobilization
deployment of the system adopted in the summer of 1939, the number of parts and connections
brought to the level of war, which simplifies the process of mobilization, it reduced the time and
had to contribute to a high level of combat capability of troops mobilized. Home "feature of
military construction in these years was that held concealed mobilization deployment of the
armed forces" {71} . Only in the second half of 1940 - the first half of 1941, in addition to 29
mechanized corps, five airborne corps and 10 PTABR, it was formed 86 rifle divisions, 16
departments and 18 rifle corps controls armies. After analyzing more than 30 indicators of
material support of the mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR, GI Gerasimov
concluded that "never before has our army was not well staffed, provided the material means, as
in the prewar period. Of course, it was not without flaws, but the main types of equipment,
ammunition and stocks of the Red Army was not worse provided than at the time of his
victorious operations in the second half of the war. The available inventory system and ensure the
mobilization of the army deployment, much higher than the army of Nazi Germany in the
number of weapons and military equipment, mostly provided by other materiel in an amount to
effectively conduct combat operations in the initial period of war. Lesions of the initial period due
to the fact that the army did not have time to deploy " {72} .
According to the MP-41 plan, the mobilization of the Red Army to produce poeshelonno provided
within one month. Depending on the situation, the mobilization was planned to be held in public
or in secret, the latter has been developed in detail. Army border districts mobilization ended 2-4
days of mobilization, other forces - 8-15 hours, and spare parts and stationary hospitals - at 16-30
hours. Air Force mobilization was completed by 3-4 hours, and the combat units and serve them

rears brought to combat readiness within 2-4 hours after the start of mobilization. Air Defense
Troops otmobilizovyvalis in two echelons. The first had a constant willingness to 2 hours, and the
second deployed for 1 - 2 days of mobilization. The deployment of the newly formed units
provided to complete the 3-5 day. Thus, of the 303 divisions of the Red Army had 172 full terms
of readiness for 2-4 hours, 60 divisions - for 4-5 hours, and the rest - on 6-10 day mobilization. All
other combat units, rear and front-line military schools otmobilizovyvalis 8-15 hours. Full
mobilization of the armed forces envisaged in the 15 to 30 hours, but the bulk of the troops
deployed about 10-15 hours {73} . [70,71]
By the summer of 1941 the Red Army was a gigantic military instrument, which gave the Soviet
leadership confidence in the success of the attack on Germany. In 1939-1941 gg. It was carried
out huge work on improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces. Accordingly, increased and the direct
military expenditures, which are growth in 1938-1940 years. almost 2 times higher than the
overall growth in spending {74} . In the years following happened reallocation of budget
expenditures: in 1938 the national economy (including industry) consumed 41.7% (19%), and
18.7% on defense, then the figures in 1939 amounted to respectively 39.4% (20.3%) and 25.6% in
1940 and g. - 33.4% (16.4%) and 32.6% {75} . If we consider the total cost of the Armed Forces,
the NKVD, the military-industrial Commissariats, General Directorate of State Material Reserves,
the General Directorate of Civil Aviation and other paramilitary organizations, the overall share of
military spending in 1940, the costs will reach 52% of budget expenditures, or 24 , 6% of the
national income {76} . In 1940, for military purposes it was spent 26% of industrial products (for
example, the figure in the US was 10.8%, and in Germany in 1939 - the first war year - 23%) {77} .
The annual increase in military production in 1938-1940 gg. It was 39%, three times (!),
surpassing the increase in total industrial production {78} . Accordingly, the share of military
products in the gross industrial output (in prices of 1926-27) has increased from 8.7% in 1937 to
18.7% in 1940 and to 22.5% in the first half of 1941 { 79} . In the first half of 1941, Soviet industry
produced 100% 87% tanks and combat aircraft of new types of completing the transition to
production of only these samples {80} . Total for 1939 - the first half of 1941, the troops have
received from the industry 92,492 guns and mortars, 7448 tanks and 19,458 combat aircraft {81} .
Ammunition production only in the first half of 1941 increased by 66.4%, as adopted on June 6,
the mobilization plan for the second half of 1941 and 1942 provided for its further growth {82} .
After the XVIII party conference (15 - 20 February 1941), defense industry enterprises began to
be translated into the mode of war {83} . June 6, 1941 Stalin signed a number of decrees, under
which industrial Commissariats were to carry out the activities that allowed "all enterprises
prepare ... for a possible transition from 1 July 1941 to work on mobilization plan" {84} (emphasis
is mine. - MM ).
The development of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1939-1941. {85}
On 01/01/1939
On 22.06.1941In% to 1939
Personnel (thous.) 2485
5774
232.4
divisions 131.5
316.5
240.7
Guns and mortars 55790 117581 210.7
Tanks
21110 25784 122.1
warplanes
7714
18759 242.3
The Soviet Armed Forces, whose growth is shown in Table 1, were superior to the army of any
other country in the number of military equipment. True, the Soviet leadership overestimated

the fighting capacity of the Red Army. However, available in Russian historiography {86}
allegations of low combat capability of the Red Army in 1941, seem to be insufficiently
substantiated. Actually, there is still not developed a methodology and scientific criteria are not
formulated to address the problem. By themselves, references to the bad start of the Great
Patriotic War does not explain anything. Especially since the Soviet troops to the June 22, 1941
did not have time to complete the concentration and deployment, to mobilize and have been
captured by the German surprise attack, which also negatively affected their combat capability
{87} . In our view, the question of a real combat capability of the Red Army on the eve of the war
still awaits its researchers. [72,73]
Meanwhile, as the cooling of the Soviet-German relations in the autumn of 1940, Soviet
propaganda organs began secret training to work in a future war with Germany, and conduct
anti-fascist propaganda. In the spring of 1941, he remembers who lived before the war in
Khabarovsk AF Rahr, "the people began to bring to lectures on the international situation dosage
criticism at Germany ... At the same time, rumors of impending war with Germany and began to
walk among the people" {88} . Similar sentiments were reflected in the cited blog Vishnevsky
who recorded January 31, 1941: "The position of the USSR wait and see, we, if appropriate, and
will be able to throw their weight on the scales of war ... Resit probably coming summer." April 9
he makes the following entry: "Decide the coming months. We come to a critical point in Soviet
history. You feel all this is clear. " Finally on April 14: "The truth gets out. Interim Agreement with
Hitler is bursting at the seams " {89} .
At the same time on the political instruction of the troops needed to place increasing emphasis
on studying the military-political situation in Europe, the disclosure of the aggressive nature of
imperialism and aggressive policy of Germany. April 30, 1941 in the western border districts were
sent a directive of the Main Directorate of political propaganda letter (GUPP) Red Army "Results
of inspections of political studies", which noted that "soldiers and junior commanders
insufficiently explained that the Second World War both belligerents underway for a new
redivision of the world ... Germany ... transferred to gains and conquests ... it is not enough
explained that the extension of the second world war poses a direct military threat to our country,
" {90} .
The turning point in the preparation of Soviet propaganda to action in the new conditions was
the speech of Stalin's May 5, 1941 to the graduates of military academies {91} . It is a kind of
keynote speech Stalin delivered [74] The next day, after the Politburo decision on his
appointment as chairman of the CPC of the USSR, made a lasting impression on the audience,
who are unanimous in the fact that she wore anti-German character. In addition to the detection
of aggressive actions of Germany in Europe, Stalin was directly assigned to it the responsibility for
the outbreak of World War II. Given that in the autumn of 1939 in the USSR is widely promoted
the idea that "warmongers" are England and France, it was clearly voicing the new course. The
Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Dimitrov noted in his diary: "Our policy
of peace and security is at the same time, the policy of preparing for war. No defense without an
offensive. It is necessary to educate in the spirit of the army offensive. We must prepare for war. "
Wisniewski praised this speech more emotional: "We are of great significance. We begin the
ideological and practical approach ... We are talking about the global fight Hitler then calculated.
[...] Front - our trek to the West. Ahead of opportunities of which we have dreamed for a long
time, " {92} .

I remember listening to this speech NG Lyashenko, in it the Soviet leader "described the
international situation, said the treaty of 1939 that the Soviet Union condemned the aggressive
actions of Germany ... Then Stalin said that the war with Hitler was inevitable, and if the VM
Molotov and the Foreign Office will be able to delay the beginning of the war two or three
months - it is our happiness. "Go to the troops, - concluded his speech by Stalin, - take all
measures to enhance their combat readiness." It is interesting to compare the recollection of
memories from the then position of Chief of General Staff General of the Army GK Zhukova. Just
over a month later, the military asked Stalin to allow the troops to bring the western border
districts to full combat readiness. In rejecting that request, the chief explained that "for the
conduct of major war with us Germans, firstly, we need oil, they must first conquer it, and
secondly, they need to eliminate the Western Front, to land [75] in England or to enter into the
world. " For more convincing Stalin went to the map and showing the Middle East, said: "That's
where they (the Germans) will go."
Since Stalin was not afraid of the German attack in 1941, the question naturally arises: what is
"inevitable" war he was going to delay for two or three months? As recalled forty years later,
Molotov, in the spring of 1941 in Moscow understand that if England is destroyed, then the
Soviet Union in 1942-1943. "I am waiting for the ordeal." Therefore, it should not give Germany a
pretext for an attack, to gain time, to have time to "do what was planned." Anticipating the
inevitable aggression, the Soviet leaders "to prepare for its reflection of steel in advance.
Otherwise, why do we still in the month of May it was necessary to shift the country from the
depths in the western border military districts, a total of seven armies? It's silischa great! Why
carry out a secret mobilization of eight hundred thousand conscripts and move up to the
boundaries of their reserve divisions as part of the military districts? "At the same time Molotov
himself acknowledges that the term German attack" did not know exactly, "but the troops have
focus. Naturally, the question arises, what will happen after the Red Army will be developed on
the western borders of the USSR, despite the fact that it is not clear whether the attack Germany
in 1941 at all? "Time lost, - concludes Molotov. - Ahead of our Hitler! " (Emphasis mine -. ML /.)
{93} .
Changing the orientation of Soviet propaganda it was clearly stated by Stalin May 5, 1941 at a
banquet in the Kremlin after the solemn meeting on the occasion of the release of cadets of
military schools was proclaimed a toast to Stalin's peaceful foreign policy. In response to it, Stalin
took the floor. "Let me make a correction - he said. - A peaceful foreign policy secured peace in
our country. Peace policy is a good thing. We have the time to pursue a line of defense - as long
as no re-equipped our army is not an army supplied with modern means of warfare. And now,
when we have reconstructed our army, saturated with technology for the modern battlefield,
when we become strong - now we have to move from the defensive to the offensive. Through
the defense of our country, we are obliged to act in an offensive manner. From Defense to go to a
military policy of offensive action. We need to rebuild our education, our propaganda, agitation
and our press in an offensive manner. The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army - the
army offensive " {94} .
This is Stalin's speech was taken as the basis for the preparation of a number of policy documents.
In May 1941, the Red Army was GUPP a draft directive "On the tasks of political propaganda in
the Red Army in the near future", which after a number of revisions were approved on June 20,
GVS {95} . Simultaneously, on the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU secretaries

(b) AA Zhdanov and AS Shcherbakova in the Office of Propaganda, a draft directive "On the
propaganda tasks for the near future" {96} . The project did not satisfy the secretaries of the
Central Committee, and in early June he Shcherbakov was a new draft directive "On the current
propaganda tasks" {97} . In mid-May 1941 a group of lecturers GUPP for closed military audiences,
a report "Modern international situation and foreign policy of the Soviet Union" {98} . In addition,
you should pay attention to the speech on the international situation, MI Kalinin at the party and
Komsomol meeting of workers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 20, and the device to
the graduates of the Military-Political Academy. IN AND. Lenin June 5 as well as the speech of
Zhdanov's movie workers meeting in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 15 May 1941 {99} .
The restructuring of propaganda with the objective to "educate personnel in the offensive and
militant spirit, in the spirit of the inevitable clash of the Soviet Union and the capitalist world, and
constant readiness to go to a crushing offensive" has begun in accordance with the decision of
the domestic hot water from May 14, 1941 The next day, the troops were sent directive "on
political lessons from the Red Army [76.77] and junior commanders of the Red Army in the
summer of 1941", which stated that "on the just and unjust wars is sometimes given such an
interpretation: if the first country attacked another, and leads an offensive war , this war is
considered unjust, and vice versa, if the country was attacked and only defended, such a war is
supposed to be considered fair. It concludes that the Red Army will conduct only defensive war,
forgetting the truth that every war, which will lead the Soviet Union, the war will be fair. " The
draft directive "On Political Propaganda problems in the Red Army in the near future," noted that
"the entire staff of the Red Army must be imbued with the knowledge that increased political,
economic and military power of the Soviet Union allows us to carry out an offensive foreign
policy, decisively eliminating the hotbeds of war its borders, expanding its territory " {100} .
As mentioned in the directives of the Central Committee of the CPSU project (b) "On the current
problems of propaganda," "USSR live in a capitalist environment. The clash between the world of
socialism and the world of capitalism is inevitable. Proceeding from the inevitability of the
collision - our world's first socialist state is obliged to every day, stubbornly and persistently
prepare for decisive battles with the capitalist environment in order to get out of these fights the
winner, and thus ensure the final victory of socialism. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union has
nothing to do with not "pacifism", with the desire to achieve peace at any cost " {101} .
"The contradiction between the socialist world and the world of capitalism is the most acute
contradictions of our era, - noted in the report" Current international situation and foreign policy
of the Soviet Union ", prepared in mid-May 1941 a group of lecturers GUPP for closed military
audiences. - The foreign policy of the USSR proceeds from the indisputable proposition that a
clash between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism is inevitable. The main objective
of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union - its special means to provide all the necessary
prerequisites for a victorious solution to the question "who is who" in the international scale. We
are far from indifferent to what conditions will the inevitable confrontation between the USSR
and the capitalist encirclement. We are vitally interested in the fact that these conditions were
most favorable for us.
The main success of the Leninist-Stalinist foreign policy of the world consists in the fact that
because of it has already managed to delay the war between the imperialist countries and the
Soviet Union, in the first place, before our country defeated socialism ... and, secondly, to the fact
as the imperialist powers themselves at loggerheads with each other because of world

domination ... thus, the Leninist-Stalinist policy of peace have successfully solved the challenges it
faces. It would be wrong, however, to regard our peaceful policy as eternal and unchanging. This
is - a temporary policy, which makes it necessary to build up sufficient strength against the
capitalist encirclement. Now we have gained such strength and entered a new period of
aggressive foreign policy of the USSR, which has great and important duties to us. [...] There is a
possibility that the Soviet Union would be forced, by virtue of the prevailing situation, take the
initiative to offensive military action. [...] The modern, extremely tense international situation,
the Soviet Union must be ready for any surprises and accidents and keep our powder dry against
every imperialist state, despite the existence of pacts and agreements with the State. " In
analyzing the prospects for the next global capitalism should be based on the growth of the
"revolutionary crisis", while clearly "emerges the role of the USSR as an armed stronghold of
world socialist revolution. [...] It is, of course, does not rule out that there may be offensive
[78.79] Soviet Union against the individual imperialist countries that threaten our security in a
situation where there are no revolutionary situation in capitalist countries. But in this and in
another case, the Soviet Union can go on the offensive against the imperialist powers in the
cause of victorious socialism, completing the greatest mission entrusted by history the world's
first socialist state of workers and peasants to destroy constantly threatening us capitalist
encirclement "{102}.
Speaking May 20, 1941 in the party and Komsomol meeting of workers of the Supreme Soviet of
the device with a speech on the international situation, MI Kalinin said: "If you are Marxists, if
you study the history of the party, then you should understand that this is the basic idea of
the Marxist theory - at great human conflicts within the maximum benefit for communism." June
5 speech to the graduates of the Military-Political Academy. IN AND. Lenin, he formulated this
idea more succinctly: "after the war a time when you can expand communism". "Leninism
teaches - Shcherbakov wrote - that the country of socialism, using the current favorable
international environment, and should be obliged to take the initiative to offensive military action
against the capitalist environment in order to expand the front of socialism.
For the time being the Soviet Union could not proceed to such actions because of military
weakness. But now that the military weakness of the thing of the past. Relying on its military
power, using the favorable conditions - the Soviet Union liberated the Western Ukraine and
Western Belorussia, Bessarabia back, helped the working people of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
to organize the Soviet regime. " "If, of course, attached to Finland, the situation has been further
improved in terms of strategy," - openly declared May 20 Kalinin {103} . "Thus, capitalism had to
make room, and the front of socialism expanded. The international situation is extremely
deteriorated, the military threat to our country closer than ever. In these circumstances, Lenin's
slogan "defend our land in a foreign land" may at any time apply to the action ", - he warned
Shcherbakov {104} .
But how to assess "a peace-loving policy of the USSR" in the theses to the Kalinin speech of May
20, 1941 .- "The Bolsheviks - not pacifists. They have always been opposed to only unjust,
predatory and imperialist wars. But they have always been, are and will stand for the fair, the
revolutionary, national liberation wars. While not win socialism worldwide, or at least in the
principal capitalist countries, as long as those are inevitable, and other war. The capitalist world is
full of egregious abominations, which can only be destroyed with a hot iron holy war.
We can not instinctively revel in the world - it leads to the transformation of people in the vulgar

pacifist. [...] If we really want peace - not unsteady, not short-term, not as a moment of the war,
and durable and reliable - that is why we must go all out to prepare for war. We should not
prepare for such a war, which is now - because it's not a war, but spillikins - and for such a war, in
which the capitalists will not stop before any, the most diabolic means in the struggle for
existence. To imagine at least a rough idea about the war, it is sufficient to recall, for example, the
war with Finland. Here's to a war we must prepare " {105} .
These ideas resonate with the note by the Chief Commissioner GUPP Army 1st Rank AI
Zaporozhets Politburo member name AA Zhdanov, dated February 22, 1941, containing "some
considerations about military propaganda among the population", which is clearly defined, "that
our party and the Soviet government are not fighting for peace for the sake of peace, and the
peace slogan associated with the interests of socialism, with the task of ensuring public Soviet
interest " {106} . [80,81]
All this once again confirms the fact that the so-called "peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR" is
nothing more than a propaganda campaign, under the cover of which the Soviet leadership
sought to ensure the most favorable conditions for the "smashing of capitalism" by military
means. These conditions, according to the documents cited, was to create a military-industrial
complex capable of providing the offensive of the Red Army, and in the event of war between the
other great powers. Under these conditions, it was possible under the cover of slogans about the
"peace-loving Soviet Union" to start the "export of revolution" in Europe, the first stage of which
was the expansion of the Soviet Union in the 1939- 1940 biennium. The relative ease with which
were annexed these territories, contributed to the formation among the commanders of the Red
Army offensive spirit combat. To maintain it in the spring of 1941, it was reissued brochure MV
Frunze "Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army" {107} , which set out the tasks of the Soviet
troops in the spirit of the offensive doctrine.
However, the Soviet leadership realized that the offensive of the Red Army, under the banner of
social change could lead to the unity of the capitalist states into a single anti-Soviet bloc. It is no
coincidence since the end of 1940, directives to foreign communist parties ECCI began to depart
from the guidelines of the class, highlighting the national targets. It is no coincidence, in our
opinion, and the intention of Stalin expressed their April 20, 1941, to dissolve the Comintern,
which would allow better disguise the influence of the USSR to foreign Communist Party and
would contribute to the expansion of their social base. Stalin believed that "it is important that
they (foreign Communist Party -. MM ) infiltrated his people and concentrated on their own
special problems", after which the decision will be to re-establish an international communist
organization. Unfortunately, so far it is not known when exactly it was planned to dissolve the
Comintern. Already in the first hours of the war, Stalin pointed out the need to remove the
question of social revolution, and to focus on the promotion of domestic war {108} . This very
slogan was borrowed from the work of VI Lenin's "The main task of the day", which stated that
"Russia is now ... a national rise to the Great Patriotic War", which "is a war for a socialist
fatherland, socialism as a fatherland, for the Soviet Republic as a contingent of the world army
socialism "and leads" to the international socialist revolution " {109} . It is likely that it was under
this slogan and planned to wage war with Germany, but not the one that started.
It is interesting to note that the question of a new extension of the "front of socialism" got it in
May - June 1941. As stated on May 15, Zhdanov at a meeting of film workers in the CPSU (b), "if
the circumstances allow us, we will continue to expand the front socialism " {110} . However, in

1941, to expand the "socialist front" further to the West could only crush Germany, which,
according to the Soviet leadership, was the main opponent of the Soviet Union. For this purpose,
it was willing to quite a serious tool - the Red Army, which in the autumn of 1939, was awarded
the epithet "the army-liberator" {111} .
"The Soviet Union is now stronger than ever before, and tomorrow will be even stronger, - stated
in the draft directive GUPP. - The Red Army and the Soviet people, defending our country, are
obliged to act in an offensive manner, to move from the defense, when circumstances so require,
a military policy of offensive action. " According to the authors of the report of the Office of
Crime Prevention, "the present international situation is extremely tense. War itself came to the
borders of our country. Every day and hour of the imperialists might attack the Soviet Union, we
must be prepared to warn their offensive actions. [...] The experience of military action showed
that the defensive strategy against the superior motorized units (Germany -. MM ) [82,83] no
success did not give and ended in defeat. Therefore, against Germany need to apply the same
offensive strategy, backed by a powerful technique (emphasis mine -. MM ). The task of all
command personnel of the Red Army - to study the experience of modern warfare, and to use it
in the preparation of our soldiers. All study all arms of the Red Army should be impregnated with
an offensive spirit. "
"The German army has not faced an opponent of equal value, equal to her both in the number of
troops, as well as on their technical equipment and combat training. Meanwhile, such a collision
is not far off. " It is interesting to note that the Head Office of the Propaganda and Agitation of
the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) GF Alexander made to the proposal following note: "A
sort of wording can not be tolerated. This would mean bluff enemy " {112} .
Similar considerations in policy documents of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), together
with data on direct military preparations to attack the Red Army, which will be discussed below,
clearly demonstrate the intention of the Soviet leadership to make the summer of 1941 an attack
on Germany. Such ideas, of course, had to be kept in strict confidence, which explains the above
note of the Office of the Chief of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee. In this
context understandable sharply negative reaction of the CPSU (b) the publication of May 21,
1941 in the "Komsomolskaya Pravda" article regimental Commissioner J. Bakanova "The doctrine
of Lenin - Stalin's war" in which a few gentle way set out some ideas of the above documents for
the Suppression of pacifism, preparing young people for service in the army, strengthening the
defense power and combat offensive spirit of the Soviet people, the constant preparation for war,
because only the destruction of capitalism will lead to a world without wars, and until that
happens, the Bolsheviks were in favor of progressive, just wars .
Although the article was written in quite general terms and did not mention Germany as an
enemy, it became a subject of discussion at the highest party add. The Politburo of the ruling,
dedicated to the publication, pointed out the need for tighter controls on the part of the articles
on foreign policy topics Propaganda and agitation, and directly responsible of its appearance in
the newspaper were withdrawn from work {113} . The only thing that was allowed in the press,
there were vague hints "Truth" on the possibility of "any surprises" in the current international
situation. Meanwhile, the troops began to demonstrate the anti-fascist films and simultaneously
planned a series of publications in the anti-German spirit in all major publications {114} . Strict
masking mode extends even to the Comintern, which was denied publication appeals to May 1,
1941 with a detailed analysis of the international situation as it "could open our enemy card"

{115} . In general, in April - June 1941, the Soviet leadership led so cautious foreign policy {116} ,
it gave occasion to a number of authors to speak of appeasing Germany {117} . However, the
known materials of today does not support this version.
Of particular value attached to the materials of the above it is that they are produced at the level
and under the order of the top Soviet military and political leadership, minimizing amateur
functionaries middle managers. Prepared at the initiative of the "top", these materials give a
fairly complete picture of the development of the views of the Soviet leadership in the way of the
Soviet Union entered the war against Germany; that the Soviet side was not going to give the
enemy the initiative of the outbreak of hostilities. In addition, we should not forget that these
plans do not remain on paper, as gradually gaining momentum the process of preparing their
implementation.
Especially clearly this can be seen in the operational plan of 15 May 1941, which the Red Army
and had guided at the beginning of the war. After the presentation of the overall objectives of the
fronts it reads as follows: "In order to ensure the implementation of the above [84,85] above
purpose, the following activities necessary to advance, without which it is impossible to applying
a surprise attack on the enemy (underlined by me. - MM ) as the from the air and on the ground:
1. to make the hidden mobilization of troops under the guise of training exercises a stock;
2. under the guise of access to the camp to make a hidden concentration of troops near the
western border, primarily to concentrate all Army Reserve Command;
3. covertly focus on aviation airfields in remote districts, and now begin to deploy the aircraft's
rear;
4. gradually under the guise of training fees and logistical exercise to deploy the rear and base
hospital. " The military leadership requested "to allow the consistent implementation of the
hidden and concealed mobilization focusing first of all Army Reserve Command and Air Force."
All the proposed measures are implemented immediately.
According to paragraph 1. Once March 8, 1941 was approved by the Decree SNK, according to
which the envisaged produce latent mobilization of reserve military service under the guise of
"large training exercises." The implementation of these measures at the end of May - beginning
of June 1941 enabled the urge 805.2 thousand people (24% of assigned personnel of the
mobilization plan).. This made it possible to strengthen the 99 divisions in the western border
districts, and pulled out of the interior districts: 21 Division was reduced to 14 thousand people;.
Division 72 - up to 12 thousand people, and 6 divisions -. To 11 thousand people during the state
of war in the 14483 person.. At the same time supplemented by the personnel of the units and
formations of other arms and troops were 26,620 horses. Quite ironically commenting on the
mention of this in the press, Wisniewski noted in his diary: [86] "Advanced in the" Red Star "information about the mobilization of a number of classes of replacement (" hundreds of
thousands "). Printed as a little article about studying spare. Modestly ... " {118} .
According to paragraph 2. In the period from 13 to 22 May 1941 begins the extension to the
western border of the compounds of four armies (16 th, 19 th, 21 th and 22 th) and is preparing
to nominate three more armies (20th, 24 th and 28 th), who had to finish the concentration by 10
July. These armies, uniting 77 divisions, made up of the second strategic echelon. "This relocation
of the interior districts, in fact, was the beginning of the strategic concentration of Soviet troops
in the theaters of operations. The nomination was made in compliance with the strictest
concealment measures, with great caution, gradually, without increasing the normal railway

operation chart " {119} . 12-16 June 1941 the General Staff ordered the headquarters of the
western districts start in the guise of discipline and change of dislocation summer camps hidden
extension forces of the second echelon armies and reserves the western border military districts
(of 114 divisions), which were to take by July 1, the areas of concentration in 20-80 km from the
border. This, incidentally, refutes the common assertion that "all preparations were stopped on
top of a war on the ground" {120} .
Under agenda item 3. For information about the concentration of air is very stingy. Nevertheless,
it is known that on May I, 1941 in the western military districts there were 57 destroyers, 48
bomber, reconnaissance and 7 5 Attack Aviation Regiment, which numbered 6,980 aircraft. By
June 1, came another 2 assault regiment, and the number of aircraft has increased to 7009, and
by 22 June in the western districts there were 64 destroyers, 50 bomber, reconnaissance 7 and 9
assault regiments, in which there were 7628 aircraft. Data on the deployment of long-range
aviation connections are not available, we only know that by 22 June 1941 at the Western
theater of war had four long-range bomber corps and one long-range division, in which there
were 1346 aircraft. [87]
On April 10, 1941 by the decision of SNK and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) began the
transition to the new system of aviation logistics, autonomous from the Air Force combatant
units. This system provides the freedom of maneuver of combat troops, liberating them from the
relocation of its rear followed him, kept constant readiness to receive the aircraft and ensure
their combat activity. The transition to this system was to be completed by July 1, 1941 {121} .
Under item 4 on the deployment of the rear parts of the hospital, and no data was not published
until 22 June. On the eve of war, the rear portion held by downsizing and had to be deployed:
Army - 5 - 7 th day, the front-line - on the 15th day of mobilization. It is known that 41% of
stationary storehouses of the Red Army was in the western districts, many of them were located
in the 200-kilometer border zone. Accumulated significant reserves in these warehouses. As
pointed out by AG Ferrets, "district warehouses, with design capacity of 91 205 cars were loaded
on 93,415 cars. In addition, in the open air kept 14,400 wagons of ammunition districts and 4370
wagons materiel and weapons. " In June 1941, the General Staff proposed to transfer to the
Western District has more than 100 thousand. T. Of fuel. According to the General Staff directive
number 560944 of June 1, 1941, all border districts had to submit an application on July 10 "on
the required amount of food and fodder ... in the 1st month of war." All this, according to GP
Pastukhovsky was preparing "to ensure deep offensive operations." According to the study, the
state of the rear of the Red Army, "with a depth of tactical offensive operation to 250 km, the
pace of the 15 km per day, and the timely restoration of the railways had all the possibilities to
ensure holding of the first operation reserves created in peacetime in the army rear" {122} .
In Stalin's view, the war should prepare not only militarily, but also politically. Explaining this
point in the speech of May 5, 1941, he stated that "politically prepare a war - it means to have a
sufficient number of reliable allies and neutral countries." Therefore, in preparation for the war
with Germany, the Soviet leadership took a number of diplomatic steps against Britain and the US
in order to appear as their allies and hinder the possibility of ending the Anglo-German war. On
London's position in Moscow, it was known that there are interested in the introduction of the
USSR into the war, as they hoped to alleviate their situation. There is no real support for the
Soviet Union in the war against Germany in London have no intention of considering any war in
the east of Europe as a respite. Washington, too, was interested in the clash of Germany and the

Soviet Union that would significantly reduced the German threat to the United States. Of course,
Moscow was more interested in Britain's position, but also with the United States did not intend
to aggravate relations. Based on their own calculations, London, Washington and Moscow in June
1941, began to take greater account of the likelihood of the need to establish specific
cooperation in the war against Germany. In April 1941, the normalization of Soviet-French
relations, which was interrupted in the middle of June, the French side due to the efforts of
rumors about a possible war with Germany, the Soviet Union {123} .
In addition, the Soviet leadership was to establish contacts with Eastern European countries
occupied by Germany. Since the second half of 1940 began contacts with the Polish emigre
Government for cooperation in the war against Germany, was conducted zabroska agents in
occupied Poland for anti-fascist work, according to the decision of the Politburo of the CPSU (b)
of 4 June 1941, the staffing of the Poles and persons knowing Polish, 238 th Infantry division,
which was to be completed by July 1, {124} .
Since the second half of 1940 began to establish clandestine contacts with the Czechoslovak exile
government of Eduard Benes. Until the German invasion took place [88.89] highly secret from
both the Germans and the British on the negotiations on cooperation intelligence in case of war
with Germany, the Soviet Union. The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is increasingly
spreading pro-Soviet and pro-Russian sentiment, widened activities HRC, which in the autumn of
1940, at the insistence of Moscow begins to depart from the promotion of social change,
highlighting the slogan of national liberation. The Czechoslovak Communist Party even spoke
about cooperation with E. Benes, though previously rejected any cooperation with bourgeois
circles {125} .
Although it was the Soviet government was the initiator of the rupture of diplomatic relations
with Yugoslavia, the Soviet-Yugoslav completely severed contacts were not. Since May 20, 1941 in
an interview with the Yugoslav military attache, report it to American diplomats, chief of the
General Staff of the Red Army, Army General Zhukov said that "the Council will be some time to
fight with Germany and are awaiting entry into the war the United States and the Soviet
government trusts in England and suspects that Hess's mission aims to turn the war against the
Soviet Union " {126} . Accordingly, for 2 and June 18, 1941 the Soviets began to establish contacts
with the Yugoslav emigre government in London {127} .
On the eve of the war with Germany, the Soviet leadership was trying to break away from her
East European allies. At the end of May 1941 Moscow brought to the attention of the Romanian
government, that "is ready to solve all the territorial issues with Romania and taking into account
the specific wishes regarding the audit [boundaries], when Romania joined the Soviet policy of
peace", ie out of the Tripartite Pact. May 30, 1941, Stalin took the Finnish ambassador to
Moscow and started talking about the friendly Soviet-Finnish relations, which he intended to
reinforce the supply of 20 thousand. Tons of grain {128} . But these attempts have failed because
in Finland, and in Romania too well remember the Soviet "friendship" in 1939-1940. Preparations
for war in Europe required to secure Soviet Far East border. Knowing about Japan preparing for
war with Britain and the United States and its interest in the neutrality of the Soviet Union during
the war in the Pacific, the Soviet leadership went to sign the Soviet-Japanese treaty of neutrality
on April 13, 1941 {129} . In turn, the Soviet Union was interested in diverting attention from the
UK and the US and European issues in Japan on neutrality during the defeat of Germany and the
"liberation" of European capitalism. Thus, Soviet-Japanese treaty was supposed to provide the

Soviet leadership a free hand in Europe.

If the Soviet Government really looking forward to the German offensive in the summer of 1941
in the Middle East, it is clear the meaning carried out in May 1941, the Soviet-German
consultations on the Middle East, which led the Soviet ambassador in Ankara SA on behalf of
their governments Vinogradov and German Ambassador von Papen. During the negotiations the
Soviet side stressed the readiness to consider German interests in the region {130} . Thus, the
Soviet Union has demonstrated that it will not interfere with the actions of the German, who
were on hand Moscow, as any German offensive in the region, vo-pervyh, would put almost
insurmountable barrier to the possible collusion of London and Berlin, vo-vtoryh, afield would be
the most capable forces of the Wehrmacht from Eastern Europe, which, of course, would
facilitate the advance of the Red Army. With this approach become apparent actions of Soviet
diplomacy during the anti-British uprising in Iraq that led to the establishment of 12 May 1941 of
diplomatic and economic relations with the pro-German government of R. Gailani: that Moscow
once again demonstrated his loyalty to Berlin, lulling the vigilance of Hitler.
The same purpose is, in our opinion, to achieve the planned direct Soviet-German negotiations,
which strongly proposed by the Soviet side from the middle [91] June 1941 The well-known
statement by TASS on 13 June, at just the opinion of some researchers, it was an invitation to the
new Germany conversation. As you know, Germany did not react to this statement, so June 18,
Molotov informed Berlin about wanting to come for new negotiations. Even in the evening on
June 21 in an interview with the German Ambassador von Schulenburg Molotov did not lose
hope in the possibility of negotiations to clarify the Soviet-German relations {131} .
As a rule, these are the actions of Moscow as justification thesis "about the total isolation of the
Soviet leadership from reality" {132} . But if you look at those of its action on the other hand,
they will be completely logical and reasonable. In preparation for an attack on Germany, the
Soviet leadership could not think about the propaganda justification of his step. Why not assume
that the Soviet-German talks were needed Moscow not for the success or tightening, and,
vo-pervyh to disguise recent military preparations and vo-vtoryh for their failure that would give
Moscow a good excuse to start hostilities. This assumption is reinforced by similar actions of the
Soviet Union against their western neighbors in 1939-1940. Of course, only further study of
Soviet documents the eve of the war will allow to confirm or reject this hypothesis, which is
expressed on the basis of known materials as a hypothesis.
Of course, the basic process, allow us to speak of the completion of preparations for the
implementation of the plan on May 15, 1941, it is a strategic concentration and deployment of
the Red Army. As is well known, "the last six months prior to the beginning of the war has been
linked directly with the latent strategic deployment of troops, which was to make the final stage
of preparation for war." But from April 1941 start a full-scale process focusing on future selected
for the theater of war with Germany, 247 divisions, constituting 81.5% of available forces of the
Red Army, which numbered after mobilization to more than 6 million. Man, 62 thousand. Guns
and mortars, more than 15 thousand. tanks and up to 12 thousand. airplanes. Strategic
expansion was due to "the desire to forestall their opponents in the deployment of armed forces
for the first attack by larger forces and seizing the strategic initiative from the beginning of
hostilities." It is clear that these measures were carried out in secrecy and comprehensive
disinformation campaign against the German leadership, which, in particular taught that the
main efforts of the Soviet troops in case of war will be directed to East Prussia {133} .

Naturally, all these arrangements gave rise to rumors of impending war with Germany, which
have been recorded, "competent authorities" in the middle of May 1941 Third NGO Management
(Special sections) repeatedly informed the Chief of the Office of Crime Prevention "unhealthy
political sentiments and anti-Soviet statements" in the population country and the soldiers of the
Red Army's western regions. According to an employee of a military hospital Sorokin, "the arrival
of the Soviet generals in Rivne speaks for the fact that Russia will soon be at war with Germany."
"Soviet troops began to vigorously toss in Rivne, obviously preparing for war with Germany", says the former employee of the military hospital Visht. Electrician military hospital Becker also
felt that time "in Rivne arrived many Red Army generals, will soon be a war with Germany."
According to the cadet course junior commanders Zhukov, "the high command came not just for
exercise, and for the beginning of the war with Germany." "We have arrived 60 generals, and as if
they were all on the game. Well, what could be the game when everyone is talking about how to
sow and go to fight with the Germans. Although the Government and engaged in deceptive
denials, but most need to understand that there will be war, "- says surgeon Dvornikov. According
to junior sergeant Amelkina, "The Soviet Union is reinforced [92,93] preparations for war with
Germany, so the generals and arrived in Rivne". "They say that generals gathered in the doctrine,
but we do not believe this is because so many gathered in the higher command Proskurov before
the attack on Poland" - said Lieutenant Tsaberyaby. Radinkov Red Army marching as part of the
75th Infantry Division in the forest south of Brest, he believed that "we are at war and we do not
say anything." June 2 Wisniewski notes in his diary: "The concentration of troops. Preparation of
the relevant literature. In parts - anti-fascist films ... I feel a new event " {134} .
Since the strategic concentration and deployment of forces is the final stage of preparation for
war, of particular interest is the question of determining the possible period of the Soviet attack
on Germany. In domestic historiography began to be discussed this issue with the publication of
the notorious work Suvorov "Icebreaker", which refers to "exact" date of the planned Soviet
attack on Germany - July 6, 1941, in fact unfounded. The motivation of the author is reduced
mainly to the fact that the July 6, 1941 was a Sunday, and Stalin and Zhukov supposedly loved to
attack on Sunday {135} . But this can hardly be taken seriously. Not supports the assumption of
the author and driven a quote from the book "The initial period of the war," meaning that it is
distorted. In this book it is said that "the fascist German command (rather than" German troops
"as Suvorov -. MM ) literally in the last two weeks before the war (ie, 8 to 22 June, instead of" for
two weeks, "as in" Icebreaker. "- MM ) able to pre-empt our troops to complete the deployment,
thereby creating favorable conditions for the seizure of the strategic initiative in the beginning of
the war" {136} . And this quote Suvorov given twice, once right, and the second - a distorted
{137} .
As noted above, initially to complete preparations for war with Germany was planned for June 12,
1941 It seems no accident Defense Commissar Order number 138 of 15 March 1941, bring into
force the "Regulation on the personal account of losses and burial of deceased personnel of the
Red Army in time of war, "he demanded" to May 1, 1941 to provide the troops with medallions
and supplementary sheets for the wartime " {138} . However, as you know, on June 12 no hostile
action against Germany was not taken by the Soviet Union. Unequivocally to answer a question
about the reasons for the transfer of this period, due to the state of the source base is not
possible. We can only make some suggestions in this regard. "I do not remember all the motives
of the cancellation of such a decision - recalled Molotov 40 years later. - But I think that here the

main role played by the flight to England, Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess at the party. NKVD
intelligence reported to us that Hess on behalf of Hitler offered to Britain to make peace and take
part in a military campaign against the Soviet Union ... If we were at this time (my italics -. MM )
themselves went to war against Germany, having moved his troops in Europe, while England
would immediately be entered into an alliance with Germany ... and not just England. We could
be alone in the face of the capitalist world ... " {139} Fearing a possible termination of the
Anglo-German war, the Kremlin considered it necessary to postpone the attack on Germany. Just
received information about the failure of the Hess mission and making sure to continue to
Anglo-German military operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, in Moscow, apparently decided
not to postpone the implementation of the plans. As already mentioned, May 24, 1941 in Stalin's
office in the Kremlin held a top secret meeting of military and political leadership, which, perhaps,
has been resolved the issue of the new term of completion of military preparations.
Unfortunately, in such a serious issue, we have to limit ourselves to this working hypothesis,
which has yet to confirm or deny based on the attraction of new, as yet inaccessible documents.
[94,95]
Was there any planned the exact date? Only a comprehensive study documents that reflect how
military planning and carrying out the preparation of offensive measures will allow to give a final
answer to this question. However, the well-known historians date of these events do not exclude
that, nevertheless, this date has been determined. According to VN Kiselev VD Daniel and PN
Bobylev, the Red Army offensive was possible in July 1941 {140} . The available documents
reflecting the process of preparing the Red Army for the war, indicated that most of the measures
to increase the combat readiness of the troops of the western border districts was to be
completed by July 1, 1941. By that date it was planned to complete the formation of all deployed
in these districts parts; arm armored regiments mechanized corps, which did not have tanks,
artillery, anti-tank; to complete the transition to a new organization of aviation logistics,
autonomous from the combat units; focus districts troops in the border areas; camouflage
airfields and military equipment.
At the same time concluded with concentration and deployment of the second strategic echelon
of the Red Army. So, the troops of the 21st Army finished concentration by 2 July, 22 th Army July 3, the 20th Army - by 5 July, the 19th Army - July 7, 16 th, 24 th and 28- armies - by 10 July.
Based on the fact that "the enemy forestalled Soviet troops in the deployment of about 25 days,"
complete concentration and deployment of the Red Army on the Western theater of operations
was to be completed by 15 July 1941. By July 5 should complete organization of false airfields in
the 500- kilometer border zone. By 15 July it was planned to complete the construction of
defense facilities in Kiev and concealment of warehouses, workshops and other military
installations in the border zone, as well as to put all the available weapons in the fortified
structures built on the new boundary {141} . Thus, it follows from well-known materials, the Red
Army was to complete preparations for an offensive not earlier July 15, 1941 , however, to clarify
the question of the scheduled date of a Soviet attack on Germany requires further research with
the assistance of a new documentary material.
Available materials allow assume sequence completes the production of the Soviet troops to the
war. Rather, July 1, 1941 troops of the western districts would have received an order to put in
place plans to cover in the country has begun to mobilize the latent, and the completion of the
deployment to the July 15 target groups of the Red Army on the Western theater of operations

would allow the Soviet Union at any time after start fighting against Germany. Inability to
complete secrecy of Soviet military preparations did not allow long delay blow to Germany,
otherwise they would have known about the German side. Therefore, the completion of the
concentration and deployment of the Red Army on the western border of the USSR was to serve
as a signal for an immediate attack on Germany. Only in this case would be able to keep those
preparations in secret and take the enemy by surprise.
However, analyzing the training of the Soviet Union to war with Germany, we should remember
that we examine the work in progress. Therefore, conclusions about the real intentions of the
Soviet leadership are largely conjectural. After all, as far as we know, despite the preparations for
war with Germany, the Kremlin until 22 June 1941 and has not made a decision about the use of
military force to defend its interests. Of course, further declassification and introduction into
scientific circulation materials last months before the German attack probably will more
accurately reconstruct the Soviet leadership of the planned action. However, it is likely that some
aspects of the problem to get a definite answer will never be possible. [96,97]
In view of the foregoing, the question is not whether the German attack on the Soviet Union in
case of "preventive war", as claimed by the German propaganda. As a preventive war - a "military
action taken to anticipate enemy action, ready to attack or have already started such, by his own
offensive" {142} , it is possible only in the case when carrying out their side knows about the
intentions of the enemy. However, the German documents show that in Berlin the Soviet Union
perceived only as an abstract potential threat, and the preparation of the "Eastern March" brand
was not associated with a sense of "imminent danger posed by the Red Army" {143} . The
German command knew about the transfer of additional forces in the western districts of the
USSR, but regards these actions as a defensive reaction to the deployment of the Wehrmacht
discovered. The grouping of the Red Army was evaluated as a defense, and no major offensives
by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 was not supposed to {144} . Therefore supporters of
the thesis of "preventive war" against the Soviet Union in Germany fall into an awkward situation,
trying to prove that Hitler had decided to disrupt the Soviet attack, on the preparation of which
he knew nothing allotment.
Unfortunately, the Soviet intelligence was unable to provide evidence to the Kremlin that
Germany in summer 1941 attack on the USSR. The Soviet leadership was aware of the presence
of a fairly large group of Wehrmacht at the western borders of the USSR, but not feared
imminent German attack, considering that Germany is associated with England by war, will
continue the offensive in the Middle East and try to land on the British Isles, and will not start a
war on two front {145} . Since neither Germany nor the Soviet Union is not expected to attack the
enemy in the summer of 1941, hence the thesis of the "preventive" action does not apply to
anyone of them. In this case, the version of "preventive war" in general has nothing to do with
historical science, but is purely a propaganda thesis of Hitler to justify German aggression. As a
result of the fact that in its calculations the parties proceeded from the different timing of the
war, the German command by virtue of a random set of circumstances could forestall the Soviet
troops in the completion of the deployment, thereby creating favorable conditions for the seizure
of the strategic initiative in the beginning of the war. As a result, the Red Army, completing a
concentration, and deployment in the theater, was taken by surprise, and at the time of the
German invasion was not ready for any immediate action - either defensive or even more
offensive that the most negative impact on the fighting in 1941 .

In the summer of 1941 the Soviet Union there was a favorable opportunity to strike a sudden
blow to Germany, constrained by the war with England, and get at least a benevolent neutrality
in London and Washington. Correctly noting growing crisis in Soviet-German relations, the Soviet
leadership believed that before the final break is still time for diplomatic maneuvers, and to
complete military preparations. Unfortunately, not being able to properly assess the threat of
German attack and the fear of the Anglo-German compromise Stalin at least a month postponed
the completion of military preparations to strike in Germany, which, as we now know, was the
only chance to thwart the German invasion. Perhaps this decision "is one of the main historical
mistakes of Stalin" {146} , missed an opportunity to defeat the most powerful European power,
and coming on the Atlantic coast, to eliminate the age-old Western threat to our country. As a
result, the German leadership could begin June 22, 1941 implementation of the "Barbarossa"
plan and the Soviet Union had 3 years to wage war on its territory, which led to enormous human
and material losses.
Thus, both Germany and the Soviet Union well prepared for war, and since the beginning of 1941
this process came in [98.99] final stage, which made the beginning of the Soviet-German war was
inevitable in 1941, no matter who it initiated. Originally intended to complete the Wehrmacht
military preparations by May 16, and the Red Army - to June 12, 1941 then postponed the attack
Berlin, moving it to 22 June, a month later did the same, Moscow, defining a new tentative date July 15, 1941 How now we know, the two sides in their calculations proceeded from the
assumption that the war would start on their own initiative. Unfortunately, what is known today,
it was a mystery in 1941, and the Soviet leadership made a fatal miscalculation. The sudden
German attack on the USSR, June 22, 1941 and the first failure at the front in the Soviet
leadership had a stunning impact. Most vividly I outlined the situation in his memoirs, the then
People's Commissar of the Navy NG Kuznetsov, noting that "the state machine, directed along
the rails improbability attack Hitler was forced to stop, through a period of confusion and then
turn 180 degrees. The consequences of this have to fix on the go at the cost of great sacrifice "
{147} .

Vladimir Nevezhin {148}

Strategic plans of Stalin on the eve of June 22, 1941.
(As a result of "unplanned discussion" Russian historians)
For a long time in the historiography of the prevailing belief that Stalin on the eve of the
German-Soviet war, until 22 June 1941, prepared exclusively for defense, but it did not effectively
and as a result it turned out to be the victim of a sudden and treacherous attack of Hitler. The
Fuhrer was presented as an active participant in the Great Game, which was carried out while in
the international arena, and the Soviet leader - as a passive victim of his deceit.
This view did not explain the reasons for the unprecedented tragedy in the history of the summer
of 1941, the Soviet Union collapsed and its peoples, fell down in shock party, state and military
leadership, which led to huge human, material and territorial losses, a retreat of the Red Army,
the transition to flight. But any attempt to analyze those reasons beyond the stereotypes that
have been made in the Soviet Union, immediately suppressed by {149} .
By shielding from the press of the communist ideology, as well as the expansion of the source

base research, create conditions for a more impartial study of the problem. Among Russian
historians developed controversy [109] about the events of the eve of the German-Soviet War of
1941-1945., Based mainly on new, previously unknown documents entered into scientific
circulation. It began with the publication, MI Meltyuhova {150} , which caused a wide resonance
{151} . Articles have been published by other authors, which in varying degrees, addressed the
question of the strategic plans of Stalin on the eve of June 22, 1941. The most significant of them
were reprinted in Russia and abroad {152} . On further enlargement debate suggests a reflection
on the problem pages of monographic {153} and dissertation research {154} , the emergence of
documentary publications on the topic called {155} .
The achievement of mutual understanding between the opponents, even resting on the same
factual material often hamper not only the political views or commitment to a particular
scientific school, but too emotional perception of historical facts and definitions, which they
operate in the course of debate. A clear proof of this is the interpretation of the historians of the
term "preventive war." Due to the vagaries of perception there was a lot of misunderstandings
and disagreements in the debate about the events of May-June 1941
The term "preventive war" was actively used by Hitler and Goebbels' propaganda. Motives of the
Fuhrer, to start a war against the USSR, different tasks: it was sheer aggression. Office as
Goebbels was intended to justify an aggressive armed action of the Nazi leadership, and why
resorted to the introduction of a purely propagandistic bogey "preventive war."
In modern conflict management issue "precautionary" considered in sufficient detail. In a
situation of maturing and development of the conflict (for example, between the two powers, as
in the case of Germany and the Soviet Union) as it occurs naturally increase the feeling that the
other party has a lot of freedom in choosing their actions. Therefore, own shares are perceived as
[110] prevention, response, forced, due to careful and insidiously planned provocation potential
enemy {156} .
According to most researchers, "preventive war" - an operation to anticipate enemy action, ready
to realize their political goals through military means. However, the prevailing trend was the
transfer of this concept in the sphere of ideological confrontation. It all comes down to proving
that using the thesis of "preventive war" in their propaganda, the Nazis sought not only to
withdraw from Germany, but also to shift the Soviet Union responsible for between the two
powers began fighting.
Historiographical situation has worsened after the publication of works of Suvorov (alias VB
Rezun - an employee of the GRU of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, defected to England),
where the idea of the preparation of the USSR carried out an attack on Germany (Stalinist version
of "preventive war"), which allegedly scheduled for July 6, 1941 {157} .
However, Russian historians have noted that Suvorov (VB Rezun) weak uses documentary base,
biased quotes memoirs, which in itself requires careful analysis of source {158} , distorts the facts,
arbitrarily interpret events {159} . Western scholars also presented large claims against the
author of "Icebreaker" {160} . For example, the German historian B. Bonvech took the book to a
well-defined genre of literature, which can be seen the desire to withdraw from Germany, the
blame for the attack on the Soviet Union {161} .
In the first half of the 90s. "Antisuvorovsky boom" reached its climax. However, opponents of VB
Rezun in the heat of debate, ignore the simple things. Bringing more and more evidence of the
real Hitler's plans to attack the Soviet Union, they wittingly or unwittingly reinforce the "Suvorov"

position. After all, based on the interpretation of the historiography of "preventive war", one can
not come to the obvious conclusion that Stalin had no less than the Fuhrer, the grounds for the
outbreak of hostilities. [111]
You can only join the opinion of those who consider it necessary to clarify the terminology used
in the debate about the events of 1939-1941. For example, the German scholar B. Pietro-Enker
pointed to the vagueness of the conceptual apparatus, which is why you can not use the term
'preventive war' "in relation to some particular cases" {162} . Colleagues Pietro-Enker (B. Wegner,
G.-G. Nolte, H. Yubersher, J. Foerster) in solidarity with her in this matter {163} .
Also noteworthy is the conclusion MI Meltyuhova scientific irrelevance of the debate about the
"preventive war", because, as a rule, it all comes down to "search party, the first to start
preparing for an attack. Some (most of them) put the blame on Hitler, others, including the
author of "Icebreaker" - Stalin {164} .
Meanwhile, the Russian researcher objective, unbiased trying to understand all the intricacies of
Stalin's foreign policy plans on the eve of June 22, 1941, to revise established views in
historiography, at risk of being ostracized for apology ... Goebbels, Hitler's "pseudo-historians
from the Thames" (V. Suvorov), it can be called a "victim of propaganda," "revisionist" or accused
of violating the "ethics of scientific controversy", which already have concrete examples {165} .
Such moral and psychological pressure is not conducive to the disclosure of the true role of Stalin
in the events of the vestibule of the Soviet-German war. The dictator, who had a vast army,
relying on the power of the Soviet economy sverhmilitarizirovannoy giant party-political
propaganda machine continues to be portrayed in the historiography as a hesitant and even
cowardly figure, supposedly waiting obediently attack by Hitler.
However, in 1938, speaking to the propagandists of Moscow and Leningrad, Stalin explained that
the Bolsheviks were not pacifists, and in some cases, may themselves become the aggressor
{166} . The draft Field Manual of the Red Army in 1939, in its versions 1940 and 1941 gg., The
main priority was given to offensive military action {167} . The term "offensive war" was recorded
in the documents of the ideological May and June 1941, were preparing propaganda agencies
(the Office of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the General
Directorate of the political propaganda of the Red Army, and others.) {168} .
However, it should be recalled that at its core, documented in various versions of the draft Field
Manual of the Red Army, 1939-1941, had a defensive orientation, and set the task to protect
against external aggression:. "If the enemy forces war upon us, Red Army will be the most
aggressive of ever attacking armies. The war we wage an offensive by transferring it to the enemy
" {169} . Consequently, the installation in some way different from the propaganda slogans of the
late 30's -.. The beginning of the 40s, has its roots in the 20s, and not zeroing in on the fact that it
was the USSR the first attack of its potential enemy. In this context, the concept of "offensive
war", inscribed in the draft Field Manual of the Red Army, it is difficult to unambiguously
interpreted as a synonym for "attack".
But some authors seem to deliberately confuse the conceptual apparatus, preferring to use the
term "preventive war" appeared, as already noted, in Goebbels' propaganda. Thus, according to
MI Frolov, researchers who use the term "offensive war", they mean "the preparation of a
pre-emptive strike by the Soviet Union to Germany ... or attack" {170} .
OV Vishlev previously ranked as (by the way, quite wrongly) to the "historians of the Russian
Academy of Science" that took "in one form or another," the legend of the "preventive war"

{171}, in fact, says: "The desire to prove the existence of the Soviet Union" offensive 'intentions
with respect to Germany is an old thesis about the justification of "preventive war" of Nazi
Germany against the Soviet Union " {172} . [112.113]
AN Mertsalov and LA Mertsalova, criticized OV Vishleva - supposedly committed to the idea of
"preventive war", - wrote: "The state does not allow sources are now assert that at the first
opportunity, he (Stalin) would attack Germany; does not, however, reject this assumption "
(Emphasis mine. - VN ). Referring to the fact that the version of "preventive war" received
"extremely conservative and neo-fascist historiography journalism" Mertsalova say: "Some of the
words and deeds of Stalin and his group (sic!) Make this version plausible" (emphasis added -. V. )
{173} .
During ongoing for several decades, debate about the content of Stalin's speeches to the
graduates of the military academies of the Red Army in the Kremlin, May 5, 1941, the
participants operated by various historical sources on the subject, expressing sometimes
opposite opinions do not coincide and making conclusions about Stalin's "scenario" of the Soviet
-German war presented in these statements.
By the mid-90s. in the research literature there are three main versions of the content of what
was said by Stalin in the production of the military academies of the Red Army.
First, Stalin's speeches on 5 May 1941 was "announced" the intention of the Soviet leader to
achieve some "compromise" between the USSR and Germany, to delay the inevitable military
confrontation.
Second , within the meaning radically different from the previous one. The Soviet leader,
speaking to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, allegedly stated
unequivocally on the preparation of the Soviet Union attack on Germany, scheduled for August
1941 This version was, in particular, has been adopted by the German historian J. Hoffmann, and
Suvorov.
The third version is a kind of synthesized versions of two of the above and are as follows. Stalin,
of 5 May 1941 was allegedly warned that Germany "in the near future" will be able to attack the
Soviet Union, but the Red [114] The Army is still not strong enough to cope with the Germans.
Hence the need by all means, especially diplomatic, to delay their attack on the Soviet Union. In
case of success of such tactics in and out of armed conflict until 1942 did not exclude the
possibility of taking the initiative of the USSR war against Germany.
Russian historians have entered into the debate about the content of Stalin's remarks May 5,
1941 at a time when culminated accusatory campaign against Suvorov and other Western writers
on the preparation of an offensive war to the USSR, among them - the German historian I.
Hoffman. This circumstance is largely influenced by the nature of some of the views expressed
during the discussion.
Especially vigorously refuted the information about the contents of Stalin's speeches presented
Hoffman. He has used them found in German archives materials interrogations commanders and
political officers of the Red Army, captured by the Germans after the war between Germany and
the Soviet Union, who attended the release of the military "academics" in the Kremlin. AN and LA
Mertsalova ask the following questions: "What (. Allocated by the authors - VN ) may know these
officers and even generals about the true intentions of Stalin, how true their words recorded in
the Nazi concentration camps?" {174} Of course, you should agree, that the testimony of Soviet
prisoners of war (even if they were eyewitnesses themselves heard Stalin said at the celebrations

in the Kremlin on the occasion of the release of the Red Army military academies) are finalized in
writing by representatives of the German and, of course, interpreted on the basis of the current
political situation then {175} . Even the German side during the war of 1941-1945. It did not
reach a conclusion about the degree of objectivity of evidence {176} . In any case, consider the
materials of interrogations and interviews [115] is necessary only after a comparison with other
available documents and materials and thorough source analysis.
But AN and LA Mertsalova during the discussion with J. Hoffman went even to deny their own
statements made before the start of the dispute. In the book of Russian authors, published in
1992, concluded: "On the offensive intentions of the Red Army (" beat the enemy on its territory
") in the Soviet Union in the 30's - early 40-ies. We talked constantly and loudly. Again it is
stressed Stalin in a speech before graduates of the military academies of the Red Army on 5 May
1941 " {177} (emphasis added -. V. ). "Academics" From this quotation it follows that the authors
knew the contents of Stalin's statements addressed to the military. Meanwhile, in his article in
1994, they have denied the thesis about the presence of the leader of the Soviet offensive plans
on the eve of June 22, 1941 There Mertsalova put forward an unprecedented indictment against
Hoffman, who allegedly operated the "alleged intentions of Stalin, his speech of May 5, 1941 the
contents of which science is unfortunately unknown " {178} .
It appears that in this case the reason for this ambivalence in the conclusions Mertsalova relating
to the same event, is certainly excessive desire "to convict" disagreeable German historian.
In 1995-1998. repeatedly published in Russian shorthand Stalin's speech text, toasting the leader
and his remarks at a reception (banquet) on the occasion of the release of war "academics". She
was found in the former Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the
Central Committee and allegedly belonged to the People's Commissariat of Defense employee KV
Semenov {179} .
A critical analysis of these three major versions of the content of Stalin's speeches to the
graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, based on short record and other sources,
led to the conclusion that, in the first place, none of these versions can not be fully used in
scientific research. Secondly, introduced by the end of the 90s. in turn sources, fixing Stalin's
remarks May 5, 1941, does not give grounds to assert that Stalin said at the time about the
intention to attack Germany {180} .
Since Stalin's remark at a banquet in the Kremlin called to move from "defense" to "military
policy of offensive operations", which was based on a modern, technical re-equipment and well
equipped Red Army entered the debate in a more specific direction. The question about the
meaning of what was said by the Bolshevik leader for seven weeks before the start of the
Soviet-German armed conflict, based on the availability of these new sources in historiography
was formulated quite specific: whether contained in Stalin's speeches call to prepare for an
offensive war?
In this regard, it is not quite correct conclusion OV Vishleva about the content of the controversy
surrounding Stalin's speech May 5, 1941 g .: "The debate goes on: said or did not say Stalin about
his intention to start a war against Germany?" {181} himself Vishlev, of course, it must
understand that Stalin as a sophisticated politician is unlikely whether he could do in public (even
among the elite Red Army) declare their intention to start a war against Germany. But for some
reason, the historian concluded directly corresponds to the unproven assertion Rezun about
Stalin's speech May 5, 1941 "full hall, - writes V. Suvorov - Stalin in a secret (emphasis Suvorov -.

VN ) speech speaks of a war of aggression against Germany, which will start in 1942 ... " {182} .
After the introduction of the scientific revolution of sources about the contents of Stalin's
remarks to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army to refer to the fact that they
were "unknown to science," it has become indecent. The main watershed in the debate on this
issue proved the recognition (or non) Stalin's intentions to prepare for an offensive war. [116.117]
But here, in the way of an objective study of such an important and fundamental issue arose
subjective obstacles - misunderstanding or unwillingness to admit the obvious significance of
Stalin's speeches May 5, 1941
For example, LA Bezymenskii sought to prove that the call of the leader of the need to educate
the Red Army in an offensive spirit, made at the issue of "military academics" was only
propaganda unit. Bezymenskii advised not to dismiss "boastful statements about Stalin's
offensive power of the Red Army," because the latter was supposedly "great hoaxer" {183} . Such
calculations, given the very skeptical attitude to the scientific integrity of the LA Bezymenski
among foreign {184} , and among the Russian authors of {185} , can not but cause concern.
GA Kumanev and EE Shkliar, on the one hand, quite rightly pointed to the correctness of Stalin's
commitment to an offensive war in the concrete conditions of 1941, as this commitment,
"determined by the need to select the best strategic plan" of warfare. On the other hand, when
analyzing the content of Stalin's speeches have the impression that it is a "pre-planned
information leak" of "artfully prepared at the highest level ... well planned disinformation." For,
according to them, it is difficult to explain otherwise made at the solemn meeting and a
reception (banquet) in the Kremlin, Stalin's "revelations" about the reorganization of the Red
Army and "preparing her in an offensive spirit", which also made "using specific numbers" {186 } .
NP Shuranov among the main events of May 5, 1941, and called Stalin's speech in the Kremlin,
which, in his opinion, as well as other events of that day (the conversation the German
ambassador in Moscow, F. Schulenburg with the Soviet ambassador in Berlin VG Dekanozov ,
spetsdonesenie chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate [118] FI Golikov), identified "the
absolute inevitability of a further stage in the development of European, and international
relations" {187} .
PB Grechukhin believes Stalin speech on 5 May 1941, along with a non-aggression pact between
the USSR and Germany, a watershed in the state policy of the then Soviet leadership {188} .
Thus, in spite of the introduction to the scientific revolution of archival records of Stalin's
speeches to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, their content was
interpreted by historians in different ways. In many ways, this fact was due to the lack of a
comprehensive study of all available sources of researchers.
By the mid-90s. along with archival publications about the content of Stalin's speeches at the
celebrations in honor of graduates of military academies were introduced into scientific
circulation previously unknown testimonies of participants in these celebrations, as well as
contemporary events (NG Kuznetsov, Georgy Zhukov, A. Muratov, NV G. Lyashenko, GM Dimitrov,
VV Vishnevsky, Frenkel Dzhugashvili). There was a fairly representative body of sources on the
topic. As already noted, an attempt was made on the basis of the named sources and
historiography achieve more thoroughly analyze the content of the "mystery" of speech and no
less mysterious replica of the Bolshevik leader, sounded just before the German-Soviet war.
The analysis led to the following conclusions: May 5, 1941, Stalin made it clear that Germany is
regarded as a potential military adversary and the Soviet Union should move from a policy of

peace "to the military policy of offensive actions" and propaganda must be reconstructed in an
offensive manner. Stalin's speech to the graduates of the military academies were full of positive
epithets against the Red Army, which, according to the leader, completed the process of
organizational restructuring, modernization and technical [119] re-equipment with the latest
means of struggle. It turned out, finally, that the greatest value as a source of Stalin's remarks
May 5, 1941 purchase, when viewed in close connection with the propaganda materials of the
CPSU (b), the UPA CPSU (b) and GUPP SC, belonging to the May-June 1941 . {189} .
But it is the "continuity link" between the content of the texts of Stalin's speeches and
propaganda directives projects ready with orientation on them to the Central Committee of the
CPSU (b) and GUPPKA in May iyune1941 city, and do not want to see some of the authors.
Meanwhile evident from these documents, as embodied indication of the leader of the transition
"to the military policy of offensive action." Their analysis enables us to understand that on the
eve of 22 June 1941 in Soviet propaganda has been a turnaround, and she began to rebuild under
the slogan of "aggressive war". In our opinion, in the propaganda of the Soviet papers carried the
idea of the need to thoroughly prepare for war, in any environment act "offensive manner"
{190} .
These conclusions are shared by some Russian and foreign researchers {191} . So, B. Bonvech
agree with us that "on the basis of the obvious changes in the Soviet propaganda since Stalin's
speech on 5 May 1941 can not be concluded that the Soviet Union definitely wanted to attack
Germany." "Because of the changes in the promotion - develops the idea of a German researcher
- can really conclude the following: Stalin wanted to prepare the country, and especially the army,
to the fact that the Soviet Union could take over from the German military initiative" {192} .
According to O. Vishleva, discussions around the development of speech of the leader is proof
that her version, propagated by western, primarily German, istorikami- "revisionists" (on May 5
sounded from the lips of Stalin call to attack Germany), allegedly received support "from a
number of Russian researchers. " This statement looks like a kind of development put forward by
Vishlevym the thesis according to which domestic authors began to study the said issue, not on
the basis of the identified new documents, and guided by some "instructions" (!) From the West,
including those contained in the publication of the German "revisionist" I. Hoffman {193} .
What do you think, VP Popov, Stalin's statement about the need to move "from the defensive to
the offensive" indicative of one thing: until catastrophic leader had no doubt the Red Army
defeats the summer and autumn of 1941 in the correctness of Soviet military doctrine, which is
based on the idea of "retaliation" and were put Soviet deep battle, "Barrier" defense questions
{194} .
Finally, you can read in the new Russian multi-volume on the history of the Great Patriotic War:
"In a speech May 5, 1941 in the Kremlin, Stalin to the graduates of the military academies, in
essence, urged them not to believe the official propaganda (sic!), And to prepare for war" { 195} .
All this indicates the need for additional, more in-depth study of the content and significance of
Stalin's speeches May 5, 1941, taking into account not only all the available sources, but also in
the prevailing versions of opinions and historiography.
In historiography suggests that in the spring of 1941 Stalin least wanted to put "pre-emptive
strike" in Germany, as was after the Soviet-Finnish (Winter) War of 1939-1940. "A clear view of
the low combat power of the Red Army" {196} . Meanwhile, the preparation of a "preemptive
strike" is not as simple as it may seem, has long and stormy debate revolves around it within the

"unplanned discussion".
In 1993, the first VD Danilov {197} , and then - YA Gorkov {198} published a previously unknown
document - "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of Soviet forces in case of
war with Germany and its allies", prepared by the General Staff of the Red Army in the first half
of May 1941 The uniqueness of this document, [120,121] as referred to We met before {199} ,
doubtless because it was addressed to Stalin personally, as Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars (the official designation of this message was received May 6, 1941), and most
importantly - contain a proposal for a preemptive strike has not yet had time to concentrate for
an attack on USSR German troops.
Turning to the circumstances of occurrence of the development genshtabovskie, MA Gareev
stressed: "The appearance of such a document in May 1941 is not accidental, and he could not
be born only on the initiative of the General Staff. Indeed, the political leadership 'offensive
mood "took place. In this spirit it was couched Stalin's speech to the graduates of military
academies, May 5, 1941 " {200} . The publisher of the document VD Danilov noted that any
initiative in the field of military and strategic planning, other than Stalin, "could be regarded as a
group action against the" party line ", ie, Stalin, with all the consequences " {201} .
In an interview with historian VA Anfilovu GK Zhukov, seemingly put all points of the i in the
matter of the circumstances of occurrence of the May plan of the General Staff of the Red Army
in 1941, "The idea to prevent the attack of Germany, - stressed GK Zhukov - now we have to
Timoshenko (Commissar of Defence of the USSR -. V. ) in connection with Stalin's speech May 5,
1941 to the graduates of the military academies, in which he spoke of the possibility to act
offensively. " The specific task for a directive was set to Major General AM Vasilevsky, the deputy
chief of General Staff, Operations Management. May 15, 1941, this directive would be submitted
to the Chief of the General Staff and the People's Commissar of Defence. Timoshenko and Zhukov,
the document is not signed, and decided to report the content of the pre-development of Stalin
personally {202} .
Since the publication of "Considerations ..." tense debate about their practical relevance in the
Stalinist strategy on the eve of the war in 1941 - 1945. Russian historians were divided into two
camps, and representatives of each of them have expressed a completely opposite meaning
arguments, considering the matter in dispute.
One group of researchers (most of them) emphasizes the formal signs "Considerations ..." the
General Staff of the Red Army on May 15, 1941, trying to downplay their significance. Typical was
the assertion that, since no written markings on the document, Stalin did not, and talk about the
incarnation genshtabovskie development in practice there is no point. The lack of resolution of
Stalin is seen as proof of failure of the leader of the development proposed AM Vasilevsky and NF
Vatutin, behind which stood SK Timoshenko and GK Zhukov {203} .
Proponents of this view do more categorical conclusions {204} . However, some of them
sometimes fall into conflict. For example, VA Anfilov initially reported that about Stalin's reaction
to the proposal of the Soviet top military leadership of a preemptive strike against Germany any
documentary material in the archives were found. Then the historian, contrary to previous
conclusion, expressed confidence that the proposed May 15, 1941 Timoshenko and Zhukov
"operational plan" leader "did not approve" {205} .
You can meet and weighted grades. One of the authors of a new multi-volume publication on the
history of the Great Patriotic War - NM Ramanichev specifies the following important fact: first,

the Soviet military theory of the late 30's - early 40-ies. It demanded that the commanders of
marginal activity; secondly, statutes aimed at the need to attack the enemy wherever he may be.
Hence Ramanichev drew the conclusion that the intention of the People's Commissar of Defence
and Chief of General Staff of the Red Army to turn to the country's top leadership with a proposal
for a preemptive strike it seems "logical".
But, in his opinion, the "pre-emption" is not planned in advance and the supply of it, "was the
result of actions of the German command to create his group [122,123] invasion." He does not
write directly about the disapproval of the General Staff of the Red Army Stalin development of
15 May 1941, however, he believes that the make an attempt to "test the reaction" the leader on
the idea of pre-emptive strike Timoshenko and Zhukov received "unequivocal answer in rather
harsh terms," the essence of which was to charge the senior military leadership in the "aspiration
to provoke Hitler to attack" on the Soviet Union {206} .
Another group of researchers, on the contrary, points to the practical significance of
"Considerations ...". In the works of PN Bobylev, VD Danilov, MI Meltyuhova undertaken a
thorough analysis of genshtabovskie development and concluded that it is an action document
{207} . This conclusion is shared by the BV Sokolov {208} .
Proponents of this view point to the ambiguity and evasiveness of the position of the publisher
"Considerations ..." JA Gor, which, on the one hand, recognized that pre-emptive strike by the
Red Army has not yet unfolded German troops promised significant benefits, but on the other the Soviet side denied preparation for its implementation. Meanwhile, as has been repeatedly
emphasized, identified Gor'kov document spoke for itself {209} .
The research literature is widely believed, according to which in the General Staff of the Red
Army were on the eve of June 22, 1941, alternative plans of war, aimed at both the defense and
the offensive {210} . However, it does not hold water. Even YA Gorkov, featuring extreme caution
in their judgments about the significance of "Considerations ..." on May 15, 1941 as the basic
document, emphasized: "The importance of it is difficult to overestimate, because it is with him
we entered the Great Patriotic War" {211} . Unequivocally expressed its attitude to this issue, NM
Ramanichev "adopted by the Soviet military command procedure for the development plan of
the war did not provide the degree of reality and effectiveness of planning that ensure
consistency, adopted in Germany. If several options, and then on the basis of their final set was
developed in the Wehrmacht, the Red Army nonexistent alternatives " {212} (emphasis added -.
V. ).
Indeed, the idea of "pre-emptive strike", as reflected in the documents of the Soviet strategic
planning in October 1940 -. May 1941 years, had no alternative. It was just suggested, for
example, the chief of staff of the Baltic Special Military District Lieutenant-General PS Maple at
the meeting of the supreme command of the Red Army at the end of December 1940 With the
introduction of the scientific revolution in the meeting materials, it was possible to prove this fact
documented. PS Maples raised the question of "organizing a special kind of offensive operations"
of the initial period of the war, calling them "operations invasion" aimed at pre-emptive strike
against the enemy, the army is "not finished yet and concentration are not ready to deploy"
{213} .
Strategy Games, conducted by the General Staff of the Red Army at the beginning of January
1941, as shown by PN Bobylev allowed to specify the possibility of conducting offensive
operations of the Red Army in the North-West and South-West directions {214} .

Apparently, after the meeting of the end of December 1940 and the beginning of the game on
the cards in January 1941 offensive ideas became prevalent in the strategic development of the
General Staff of the Red Army. This trend is reflected in "the amended plan for the strategic
deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East" (11 March 1941)
{215} . It is based on the guidance of Stalin's Red Army General Staff reworked "Adjusted plan ...",
with the result that came to light "Considerations ..." on May 15, 1941 {216} .
Hence, the idea of pre-emptive strike against Germany was not an "improvisation" leadership of
the General Staff of the Red Army. And even more so the project in May 1941 the plan was not a
"hastily formulated, ten days" as it [124.125] tries to portray VP Popov {217} . Its development
can be traced a certain evolution, and it is at all stages was controlled by Stalin personally.
Numerous documentaries, which are based on the researchers in the study of Stalin's strategic
plans in May and June 1941, were published on the pages of the press organ of the Ministry of
Defense of the Russian Federation - "Military History Magazine". However, in some cases, these
publications made significant reductions and even distorted the original documents. This
"feature" was revealed, for example, MA Gareyev in the publication "the amended plan for the
strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East" {218} .
It should be recalled that in the publication of "Considerations ..." the General Staff of 15 May
1941 in this magazine, as well as in subsequent reprints were "omitted" the most important, in
our opinion, the accompanying printed materials, which are included as an integral part in the
strategic development of: 1) the deployment of troops on the circuit map scale of 1: 1,000,000; 2)
deployment scheme to cover 3 card; 3) the ratio of the scheme of Soviet and German armed
forces; 4) card-based Red Army Air Force.
On the pages of "Military History Magazine" were placed texts operational plans for the western
border districts of May-June 1941 {219} . In the preface to the "Note on the cover-up of the state
border on the territory of the Leningrad Military District" publishers, in particular, he stressed:
"Due to the large volume of documents printed in the reduction. Readers are presented with its
basic provisions most clearly highlights the defensive nature (emphasis added -. VN ) objectives
of the troops command of the Leningrad Military District " {220} .
These comments will surely make you think about a certain bias of their authors. Not by chance
in one of the letters in the "Journal of Military History" stated: "... published archival materials on
the preparation of the western border military districts to cover-up their territories, despite the
definite purpose publications (. Emphasis mine - VN ), all is encouraged to further the search for
an answer to the question of whether the Soviet troops were preparing to conduct offensive
operations in the second half of the 30's - early 40-ies against Nazi Germany, "this letter's author
has rightly pointed out on the assumption that the publishers confusing the concepts of"
aggression "and" offensive "(as already stressed, this kind of" confusion "is also characteristic of
some of the participants' unplanned discussion"). In his opinion, there was nothing reprehensible
in the fact that the Soviet leadership allowed for the defense along with the possibility of
pre-emptive strike. He showed an example published "Military-historical magazine" plans cover
the state border of the western military districts presence of a tendency to defeat the enemy's
active offensive actions {221} .
VD Daniel drew attention to the bias supply materials operational planning eve of the
Soviet-German war in this journal, believing that such publications appear as an attempt to
"global revival of lies", which took place in the Soviet historiography in covering the events of

1939-1941. {222} .
Unfortunately, the practice of playing the most important documents relating to the pre-war
period, with significant cuts, reducing the value of scientific sources, not been eliminated yet. It
features and producers of documentary collection "1941" {223} .
Causes of Red Army defeats the summer of 1941 in the research literature have been considered
in the context of the presence of the Soviet leadership offensive plans. But if, for example, AG
Kumanev and EE Shkliar argued that the direct link between adherence to the concept of
offensive war and failure to cross-border battle the Red Army can not be traced, other historians
have expressed the opposite opinion. VD Danilov [126,127] explains the failure of the summer of
1941 Stalin's shortsightedness. Chief, ordered the preparation of a pre-emptive strike, did not
expect that the enemy will overtake him and he will strike a monstrous force, and as a result - the
Red Army was not ready either to defend or to attack {224} . With Danilov identify themselves
and other authors {225} , although some of them are characterized by a tendency to
indiscriminate charges by Stalin or without cause {226} .
Thanks to the introduction in the scientific revolution of new documents concerning the
preparation of the USSR for a preemptive strike, began to speak, and the more radical opinions.
Recognizing the right of Stalin first start fighting, some authors declare: Stalin such actions and
such a development would allow not only the defeat of fascism, but to save at least 20 million
lives. {227} .
Undoubtedly deserves attention withdrawal of VD Daniel on cross-cutting theme of training
Soviet preemptive strike in 1941 and the need for its comprehensive analysis, which would
involve not only historians, but also political scientists, philosophers, lawyers, economists,
military theorists {228} .

Reading the book "Icebreaker" and "M-Day" Viktor Suvorov

By an irony of life politicized history puts us took such blindness that does not need to be a
historian to know the truth. It should not be a professional in order to overturn the habitual
dogma. You need to be a lone hermit to get rid of the pressure outweighing any scales always to
the same boredom contemporary opinions.
Thus was born more to the story, but the spark of truth, for which then will be inciting the
footnotes and citations, documents and memories. And, having finished reading on the list of
sources used, we understand that this is not just a book, a historical work - one more step, due to
the author's ability to bring us closer to the elusive top of truth which seeks to know and which
never enters the historian, not able to experience, explore and describe all the twists
superhuman design.
Among the red tape and the trivial ideas and people whose books you never tell them apart if
throwing up cover pages of written volumes, the work of Viktor Suvorov "Icebreaker" and
"Day-M" - an outstanding phenomenon. [133]
And precisely because the author of these books never nothing will convince a large army of
professional historians, I am writing these lines in the history of defense, in defense of the truth,
in defense of the author's books so extraordinary. I write with gratitude and with zeal as himself
for a long time, even before, as in the "Russian idea" articles began to appear Suvorov, I

concluded that, "of course," Stalin himself was going to attack Hitler. Only this can explain his
behavior in 1939-1941 (in fact, in the past).
Where to start? In 1974 I wrote a term paper on the first weeks of the war. My supervisor EE
Shkliar praised it as "written in the spirit of Nekrich" put "four" and filed a report to the
appropriate dean's office. I realized that I was going in the right direction, and showed the work
of a friend of my father's children's writer Victor Vazhdaevu. He also was unhappy with "biased
selection of facts and sources," and told me the anecdote of the time: "Before the war there on
the Soviet-German border Soviet and German officers. The first asks the second: - Why is the
focus on our border as the German troops?
The second answers: Yes they are too tired on the Western Front and spanned here on vacation.
By the way, why this focus on our border as Soviet troops?
And that the German soldiers nothing prevented the rest, - meets a Soviet officer. "
So I learned about the concentration of Soviet troops on the border with Germany. From
anecdote. Thus began my "Icebreaker" and "Day-M." Ten years later, in the US, I realized that in
June 1941 to explain without a history of the German-Bolshevik relations during the First World
War. After reading now "Icebreaker" (p. 18): "For the purposes and spirit of the Brest peace - this
is a test the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Calculation of Lenin in 1918 and Stalin's calculation in 1939
is the same ... "- and I was amazed and touched. The author, who has seen this relationship,
understand, and everything else.
As the author, engaged in the Brest peace, I, of course, have any comments on the introductory
chapters of the book "Icebreaker". But at least we Suvorov speak the same language. And
different - with all the others. At the signing of the Brest peace settlement Lenin was deeper.
"The defeat of Germany was already close, - writes V. Suvorov - as Lenin concludes peace, under
which Russia renounces its rights to the role of a winner ... without a fight. Lenin gives Germany a
million square kilometers of the most fertile land and abundant industrial areas of the country
and even pays a contribution in gold. Why ?! "(" Icebreaker ", p. 17). A Suvorov: that the war
continued and Germany had exhausted itself and its Western allies as much as possible.
It is difficult not to agree, with the only caveat that such an assertion is contrary to conventional
wisdom about the desire of Lenin as soon as possible to ignite the revolutionary conflagration in
Germany. One of two things: either to accelerate the revolution in Germany and did not sign the
Brest peace, and to conduct an open (the position of Bukharin and other Left Communists) or
undeclared (the position of "neither peace nor war," Trotsky) war or substantially eliminate the
East front sign an armistice with Germany and help the German government - let us not forget
the epithets: reactionary, imperialist, militarist - keep the front of the West against Russia's
former allies.
Lenin chose the latter. And he is not, the signature of the chairman of the SNK, ripped the Brest
peace, and standing in opposition to the entire policy of the Soviet Lenin Brest asset - the Central
Executive Committee, signed by Sverdlov, Lenin had already pushed back in the fight for power in
the critical months of the second half of 1918. If not for the actual removal of Lenin's party affairs
in the summer of 1918 (it was due to his extremely unpopular policy of Brest), Brest-Litovsk,
possibly never would have been broken by the Soviet government. [134.135] And the Rapallo
Treaty of 1922 have not been considered by us like a jerk, but only as a smooth transition from
the Brest agreement for a new, more equitable.
One can hardly agree with Trotsky (1936), to which Suvorov agree that "without Stalin would not

have been Hitler." Without demeaning and unacceptable conditions for Germany's Treaty of
Versailles without the Bolshevik threat hanging over Europe, in Germany - yes! - There would be
no Hitler. In this sense, for the victory of National Socialism in Germany, Stalin, apparently, is less
liable than the public figures of France, Belgium and England. Trotsky himself constant preaching
about the inevitability of the victory of the Communist revolution in Germany had Hitler to help a
lot more than all the others. Are well-known facts about the now Soviet-German cooperation
between 1922 and 1941 (which is always denied by both parties). Here is what he wrote, giving
out state secrets, Trotsky, March 5, 1938 in the article "The Secret alliance with Germany,"
published in the "New York Times": "Since the overthrow of the Hohenzollern [Soviet]
government sought a defensive agreement with Germany - against the Entente and the Treaty of
Versailles. However, the Social Democrats, who played at that time in Germany, the first violin,
was afraid of an alliance with Moscow, pinning their hopes on London and especially Washington.
On the contrary, the Reichswehr officers, despite the political hatred of communism, believed
necessary diplomatic and military cooperation with the Soviet republic. Since the Entente
countries are not in a hurry to meet the aspirations of social democracy, the "Moscow"
orientation Reichswehr began to exert influence on the government sector. The high point of this
period was the conclusion of Rapallo agreement on establishment of friendly relations between
Soviet Russia and Germany (17 Apr. 1922).
War Department, headed by I stood, started in 1921, to the reorganization and rearmament of
the Red Army, which is a martial law passed on peacefully. It is interested in improving military
technology, we could at the time to wait for promoting only from Germany. On the other hand,
the Reichswehr, the Treaty of Versailles deprived of development opportunities, particularly in
the area of heavy artillery, aviation and chemistry naturally sought to use Soviet military
industry as an experimental field for military equipment. The band of German concessions in
Soviet Russia was opened back in that period, when I was completely absorbed in the Civil War.
The most important of them according to his ability, or rather, for Hope is a concession "Junkers"
aviation company. Around these concessions rotated a certain number of officers. In turn, the
individual members of the Red Army visited Germany, where he got acquainted with the
organization of the Reichswehr and the part of the German military "secrets" that they showed.
All this work was done, of course, under the cloak of secrecy, as head of the German sword of
Damocles hung Versailles obligations. Officially, the Berlin government has not taken in this
matter no part, even as it did not know about it: the formal responsibility lay on the Reichswehr,
on the one hand, and the Red Army - on the other. All negotiations and practical steps were made
in strict confidence. But it was mainly a secret from the French government as the most direct
opponent. The mystery, of course, did not last long. Agency of the Entente, especially the French,
easily found near Moscow has an aircraft factory "Junkers" and some other enterprises. In Paris,
we gave to our cooperation with Germany, of course, an exaggerated importance. Serious
development is not received, since neither the Germans nor we did not have the capital. In
addition, the mutual distrust was too great. However, due to the Reichswehr poludruzhestvennye
preserved and later, after 1923, when Krestinskiy became ambassador in Berlin.
On the part of Moscow, this policy was not carried out by me personally and by the Soviet
government as a whole, rather [135.137] say it the nerve center, ie, Politburo. Stalin was all the
time a member of the Politburo, and, as shown by all his subsequent behavior, up until 1934,
when Hitler rejected the outstretched hand of Moscow, Stalin was the most persistent advocate

of cooperation with the Reichswehr and the German general.

Observation of the German military was carried out through concessions Rosengoltz as a
representative of the head of the military department. Because of the danger of the introduction
of military espionage Dzerzhinsky, the head of the GPU, in collaboration with the same
Rozengolts conducted surveillance for concessions on its part.
The secret archives of the War Department and the GPU should have been, of course, save the
document in which cooperation with the Reichswehr said in a very cautious and secret terms ...
"It is interesting material on this subject can be found in foreign archives, in particular, in the
collection of B. J. Nicholas at the Hoover institution. Here is what he wrote and Menshevik
economist NV Valentine-Wolski in a letter to RA Abramovich, one of the Menshevik leaders of the
party: "Arriving in the summer of 1927 in Lipetsk, to my great surprise, he found it full of
Germans and in the sky above him as much flying airplanes, as I have not seen at this time and
Moscow. In Lipetsk were arsenals and aerogary Germans protected the GPU. All the inhabitants
were aware of this, but no one dared to talk about - such GPU arrested. At the cemetery in
Lipetsk was a corner with monuments in honor of the victims of German aviators. [...] When,
coming from Lipetsk (I have been there a mud bath) and visiting Rykov, in a conversation with
him, I spoke German aviators in Lipetsk, he dryly interrupted me, saying: "I'm sorry, this will not
tell you "(crate. 591, p. 14. Letter Volsky Volsky-RA Abramovich on Jan 28. 1958, p. 4-6). Already
about 1924 the connection between the headquarters of the Red Army and Bendelshtrasse
carried out through the Red Army commanders of high rank (Tukhachevsky and Berzin) and back
through the German officers, who shuttled between Berlin and Moscow "with service
instructions" (crate. 508, p. 44 . Erich Wolenberg. Erich Vollenberg BI Nikolaev. Letter from
Hamburg to California on Apr 20,. 1965 Trans. from German.).
Valentine also said Abramovich, that since 1924, "Junkers" built in the USSR and that the aircraft
in Samara plant for production of poison gases was built. Abramovich was also aware of the
Soviet-German military cooperation. Here is what he said Valentinov: "On this I have a very
extensive material based on more than 225 books, reports, articles, etc. German and others.
Press. It began back in the Civil War, when Chicherin was at night in the German embassy to the
"heir" von Mirbach Helferich and offered him a tacit military agreement for a joint struggle
[together] with the Germans, Balts and Finns against the British in the Murmansk and
Arkhangelsk. It was in July-August 1918, to continue this cooperation up to Hitler and Hitler. The
initial period [was] about 1926 .; now out of disputes [...] and what you are reporting is now in
the letter of Lipetsk and Trotsky (the so-called town near Samara, which has the chemical gas
plant for the Germans -. YF ). On these chemical grenades thundered the whole of Germany,
when German Social-Democrats persuaded Hamburg movers to drop a few boxes of the Soviet
ship and across the promenade in front of many people scattered fans with a suffocating gases
with the RSFSR mark. Then btsg question in Parliament, public debate, and the incident was
hardly extinguished "(crate. 591, p. 14. Letter from R. Abramovich NV Valentinov-Wolski. Feb 4.
1958, p. 2).
Much has been said about this after the Second World War, when abroad turned out a large
number of former Soviet citizens captured or interned by the Germans during the war. One of
these emigrants, L. Trenin, wrote: "The beginning of German influence must be considered from
1922, when the Soviet regime between Germany and was concluded a secret agreement on
armament and technical equipment [138,139] of the Red Army. From an economic point of view,

this agreement has brought some benefit to Germany, because of the chemical and military
aviation stocks remaining after the Great War, and to be destroyed, it subsided to the Soviet
government. [...] In the second half of 1922 the German aviation experts - officers of the
Reichswehr - arrived in Moscow, signed a contract for 5 years and founded in Fili, near Moscow,
the aircraft factory. All technical equipment was brought from Germany. Operating and technical
staff was also the first time a German. Also in 1922 the first Russian-German aviation company
"Derulyuft" was founded, which has established the first line Moscow - Koenigsberg. At the
beginning of 1923, another group of German officers Chemical was founded in the 12 km from
Moscow, between the mountains. Lyubertsy and mountains. Lublin military chemical small plant.
First time here worked only a few dozen people, including senior staff. These were the only
Germans. This plant alone is no chemical products are not produced, and the problem it was only
in the equipment of mines, artillery shells and chemical poisonous smoky drafts chloropicrin,
adamsite and other toxic substances, imported from Germany. The plant also produced the test
of these mines, shells, grenades, and gas and waves. All this took place in the future of scientific
test chemical landfill. [...] Gradually, the Bolsheviks created their own chemical footage and built
two large chemical plant. [...] When in 1925 these plants were ready, the Bolsheviks decided to
liquidate the German chemical plant. Since the contract was valid until 1927, [...] one of the
nights of autumn September 1925 they set fire to the factory and the house of Germans serving
in Podosinki (17 km from Moscow to Kazan Railway). From the plant was one shed with chemical
products, and a house burned to the ground. After that, the Bolsheviks were accused of
sabotaging the Germans. [...] Shortly thereafter, was ejected from the aircraft factory in Fili and
another German team of aviation specialists "(crate. 295, p. 23. P. Trenin." The Germans and
Russian Aviakhim. "Cutting from the newspaper).
Around about the same article reported unnamed Nicholas archive: "As a result of very hard
work and painstaking semi-official representatives of the Reichswehr (since 1922) in the USSR
there are now decent stocks of German property and the entire military-industrial organization
(officially" Voenveda SOEs ") by the means of the German Reichswehr and with his direct
technical control. [...] The Reichswehr cared mainly about artillery and machine-gun Red Army:
improvement of the English type of tanks, setting to the proper level of military aviation and
chemical business. In the field of marine Reichswehr had worked in the improvement of technical
diving "(crate. 14, n. 1. The Reichswehr and the Comintern. No date and no author, pp. 1, 3). For
military cooperation should have a political and even ideological convergence. The fight against
the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (Rhineland) in early 1923 was presented just as the
action of the Comintern. On illegal work have been abandoned to Soviet agents. At the same
time they discussed the "plans of battle Russian-German forces with French imperialism on the
Rhine and the supply of the Reichswehr and the German nationalists Soviet grenades" (crate. 629,
p. 3. Suhomlin V. The ring betrayal. Betrayal Trotsky, Stalin, Bukharin, Chinese, English, etc. -. Will
Russia, 1926, p 131)..
Disagreements on the Soviet-German relations were one of the causes of the conflict between
Stalin and Bukharin. "In the position of Bukharin had a huge impact foreign policy issues - wrote
Nicholas. - It is on them, he broke with Stalin, Bukharin in 1926 came to the conclusion that
Germany has ceased to be a country in semi-colonial status. Remember Bukharin article in
"Pravda" in 1926-1927 gg., He argued, [140,141] that after Locarno Germany ceased to be a
country to exploit? After all, it is - against Stalin. Stalin clung to the alliance with the Reichswehr

Bredow-Schleicher. Ludwig Reis, who was killed in 1937 in Switzerland, received the Order of
Lenin for the fact that he was in early 1928 established a secret relationship with the leaders of
the German Naval Intelligence. From that moment begins a purely Stalinist secret game Agentur twice underground. In a conversation with Bukharin, Kamenev meet her allusions to Stalin's
refusal to subject shahtintsev punishments for relations with the Germans "(crate 476, paragraph
34. Letter Nicholas from October 6, 1965, 1;.... Crate 472, p. 32.. Letter Nicholas I. M. Berger on
October 2nd. 1961, p. 1).
Nikolaev mentioned the conversation with Kamenev Bukharin took place in July 1928. Just at this
time, in May - July, Moscow hosted the trial of "wreckers in the Donbass" - the so-called "Shakhty
affair". The case was fabricated. Five of the accused were sentenced to death, the others - to
various terms of imprisonment. The defendants were accused of including spying for Germany.
And Stalin's proposal does not give the death penalty, which insisted in the end, Bukharin and his
supporters, was seen as flirting with Germany.
"I am impressed by your argument that Stalin was pro-German sympathies - Nikolaev wrote a
former Communist, then known sovietologist Louis Fischer. - I understand that he would
welcome closer cooperation with the Reichswehr. It was in the Leninist tradition began, as I
understand it, in 1919, which means that Trotsky and Chicherin, of course, seen in the benefit.
After Stalin waited a year Hitler came to power in January 1933. I was in the same year in
Moscow.
[...] Moscow has always feared foreign invasion. In 1934 Radek told me that Stalin was afraid of
the Polish-Japanese simultaneous attack against the USSR. For this reason, mainly, the CER was
sold to Manchukuo (Japanese) in 1935. Of course, Stalin wanted to direct Hitler's expansion to
the West. But the German military work in Spain is not damaged Hitler. It was a way to train the
armed forces. The purpose of the Stalinist policy in Spain, in my opinion, was to force France and
England to abandon the foreign policy of appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini, and get them to
take the path of active resistance. Munich showed that this attempt ended in failure.
Chamberlain, Daladier and Roosevelt did not go against Hitler. But during this time Stalin through
the cleaning made sure that it was completely free to act in foreign and domestic policy. And, of
course, he is now back to his goal: collaboration with the Nazis.
I think that the date prior to the Nazi-Soviet agreement of August 23, 1939, is April 1, 1939, the
day the British guarantees to Poland. [...] The negotiations with France and Britain were open.
Negotiations with Germany - a mystery. If Stalin wanted to reach an agreement with Britain and
France, he would have done exactly the opposite way: would conduct open negotiations with
Hitler to it to put pressure on the West to extract more concessions. But the West had nothing to
give. They could not give the Baltic States, and an agreement with the West, the war meant for
the Soviet Union, while the agreement with Hitler meant the absence of war for some time and
imperialist expansion - just what Stalin wanted.
We disagree that [...] to seriously Stalin conducted a policy of collective security. I believe that
Litvinov was serious and that he could not act against the will of Stalin in this question. But this
policy has failed on the Rhine, in Spain and everywhere. And Stalin abandoned it and turned to
Hitler "(crate. 479, p. 13. Letter from Louis Fisher (Louis Fischer) Nikolaev on January 26th. 1966
Trans. From English.).
Nicholas said, "Slutsky, the chief of the NKVD inotdela giving instructions Krivitsky, in 1935 said:"
Know that we are with Germany anyway, but collusion. " [142.143] And the true foreign policy

was [...] through Slutsky. The latter then told Krivitsky: "Remember that your reports carefully
read Stalin himself." [...] Stalin himself always dreamed of conspiring with Germany, and,
moreover, a large conspiracy to struggle against the Anglo-Saxons. He was a staunch supporter of
hauskhoferovskogo variant of geopolitics, Haushofer himself in Stalin had sent secret reports for
many years. And Molotov knew, he said, when in his speech before the Supreme Council of the
signing of the treaty with Hitler spoke of the genius Stalin's providence. Of course, when Hitler
openly led the anti-Soviet policy, Stalin could not act against him, but he always played, not to
make it impossible to deal in the future. It was his struggle for Soviet-Hitler pact "(crate. 479, p.
13. Letter Nicholas Louis Fischer 4 Feb. 1966, p. 1).
"I told you in one of our conversations, that the decision to come to terms with Hitler, Stalin was
in April 1936, when it became clear that France against Hitler she would not go. Now I crept
series of data in this area. [...] By the way, did you know that the apartment Wilhelm II in Doorne
was a stronghold of the work of Stalin's agents? What secret pamphlet against Hitler, written by
Mathilde Ludendorff, Krivitsky was reproduced and distributed William's wife? It was in 1936 - in
1938 the generals who visited Doorn, were arrested. Krivitsky was convinced that they gave to
Hitler, Stalin "(crate. 479, p. 13. Letter Nicholas Fischer on December 14. 1965, p. 2).
It is appropriate to go back to the books V. Suvorov and ask whether Hitler and Stalin were going
to abide by the agreement. And when it is the first and the second decided to break.
Unconditional merit of Suvorov is that they date of the Stalin's decision to initiate military action
against Germany was named: August 19, 1939 - the day of the signing of the Soviet-German
non-aggression pact. This may seem paradoxical, but the only way to explain all the subsequent
behavior of Stalin, and which dedicates his books V. Suvorov.
In terms of the position of Hitler's mysteries there. It can be argued that the fundamental
decision to break with Stalin he took during Molotov's visit to Berlin in late 1940. Molotov
demanded from the Germans then the consent of the Soviet occupation of Romania, Bulgaria,
Finland and the Straits. Hitler responded with decisive refusal and signed a directive to attack the
USSR.
Before the war, in the 1938/39 financial year, Germany has spent on arms 15% of their national
income - the same as England. Hitler did not want to arm themselves at the expense of the
welfare of the German people. In addition, it could lead to a drop in popularity.
In the Soviet Union for defense spending in the first three years of the third five-year plan was
officially took 26.4% of all budget allocations, and in 1940 this percentage was equal to 32.6. And
in 1941, it planned to spend on defense 43.4% of budget allocations.
These dry figures lead us to the conclusion that the Soviet government was preparing for war.
However, until 19 August 1939, Germany was not the main enemy of the Soviet Union's foreign
policy. This enemy was Japan, and Stalin's policy toward the Chinese Revolution 1926-1927 years
is primarily concerned with the age-old Soviet-Japanese conflict.
The refusal of the Soviet government from the open intervention in the Chinese revolution, on
which so insisted "Left Opposition" of Trotsky, was another "Brest agreement." All developed
under the scheme 1918, only in place of Lenin, Stalin was on the site of Bukharin - Trotsky. Like
the Left Communists in 1918, the Left Opposition urged party activists that the policy of the
Soviet Government with regard to the Chinese revolution will inevitably lead to its defeat. Like
Lenin in 1918, Stalin did not want to take risks, because they understand that the active
intervention in Chinese affairs will lead to conflict with the [144,145] Japan and the USSR to it

was not ready. Stalin sacrificed the revolution in China, as Lenin donated revolution in Germany for respite. The Chinese revolution has really ended in defeat, but the time has been won, and
the first serious conflict with Japan broke out only in 1938, when the Soviet state was much
stronger.
Already in 1937, began the creation of a strong industrial base in the Urals, the Far East, Siberia,
Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Today, this fact leads to the proof of the foresight of the Soviet
government, almost foresaw not only a war with Germany, but also the evacuation of industry,
carried out during the war. Meanwhile, at the end of the 1930s the main enemy of the Soviet
Union's foreign policy was Japan. It was in September 1937, Soviet troops were sent to Mongolia.
Somewhat earlier, in the summer of 1937, the Japanese began to seize China. In July they had
occupied Beijing in November - Shanghai, in December - Nanjing. By October 1938 they had
occupied a large part of China with major industrial centers and major railway lines.
Historians point out that Japan's foreign policy goals were to capture the Soviet Far East. During
1936-1938 years on the Soviet-Far Eastern border occurred 35 major military clashes with the
Japanese army, the most serious of which was a collision at the end of July 1938 in the area of

Lake Khasan. Only as a result of fierce battles that lasted until 9 August 1938, Soviet territory
was cleared from the Japanese. In May 1939, Japan launched a war against Mongolia (and
indirectly - against the USSR). Military action on Khalkhin Goal lasted four months and ended only
after the signing of the Ribbentrop - Molotov in August 1939 due to more and Mediation Hitler.
Thus, the creation of a second economic base of the USSR in the east of the country in any case
was not caused by the expectation of war with Germany, but only a desire to move closer to the
industrial base potential front - Far East.
The establishment of the Soviet Union, the second economic base, much less worried about
Hitler. Directive 21 of the Supreme Command (the "Plan Barbarossa") included a victory over
the Soviet Union "during the short campaign before the war will be over against England." But do
not after the Soviet historians repeat that Hitler lost, as it does not take into account "the
ideological factor" - the courage of the Red Army. We can say with certainty that only is what he
left out. The report of the German General Staff "On the political and moral stability of the Soviet
Union and of the combat power of the Red Army" dated 1 January 1941, inter alia, it stated: "The
armed forces of the Soviet Union, apparently, must be rebuilt on a new basis, especially in view
of the experience of the Finnish war. From the Bolshevik megalomania ... The Red Army returned
to the scrupulous individual training officers and enlisted personnel ... become much stricter
discipline (the abolition of the Institute of Commissioners, the introduction of the officer and
sergeant ranks, generals uniforms, saluting ...). All these measures should ensure a gradual
improvement of the Red Army in all areas of life ... Do not change Russian national character: the
heaviness, schematic, fear of taking their own decisions, to liability. Commanders at all levels in
the near future will not be even able to quickly command the large modern compounds and their
elements. And now, in the near future, they are unlikely to conduct major offensive operations,
use of favorable conditions for rapid strikes, to take the initiative within the overall command of
the task. ... The troops will fight bravely. But the requirements of modern offensive engagement,
particularly in the area of interaction of all the armed forces, mass of the soldiers did not respond;
a single soldier will often [146.147] lacking own initiative. In defense, especially prepared in
advance, the Red Army would be hardy and resistant, able to achieve good results. Ability to
withstand defeat and provide passive resistance to the pressure of the enemy were particularly

characteristic of Russian nature. The strength of the Red Army lies in the large number of
weapons, unassuming, and hardened soldier's courage. The natural ally of the army are the
expanses of the country and off-road. The weakness lies in the slowness of commanders of all
degrees of attachment to the scheme insufficient for modern conditions of education, fear of
responsibility and a lack of tangible throughout their organization. "
The first days of the war the Germans were for much easier than anticipated their plans. June 22,
1941 Chief of General Staff, General Halder wrote in his official blog: "The offensive of our troops,
apparently, was all over the front of the complete tactical surprise. Border bridges over the Bug
and other rivers throughout our troops captured without a fight, and in complete safety. About
our utter surprise attack by the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the parts were taken by
surprise in the barracks, planes were on the ground, covered with a tarpaulin, and advanced units,
suddenly attacked our troops, command requested that they do. You can expect an even greater
influence on the surprise element of the course of events as a result of rapid progress pieces,
which are now everywhere have the opportunity to complete. Naval Command also reported
that the enemy was apparently caught by surprise. In recent days, it is completely passively
watching all the activities carried out by us, and is now concentrating its naval forces in the ports,
obviously for fear of mines ...
The Air Force reported that our air force destroyed 800 enemy aircraft. [148] Our aircraft could
undermine lossless approaches to Leningrad from the sea. German losses are still 10 airplanes.
The command "South" army group to report that our patrols, unopposed, crossed the Prut ...
Bridges in our hands ...
Protection of the border has been generally weak ... After the initial "tetanus", caused by the
suddenness of the attack, the enemy went into action ... along sections of the front was almost
no manual actions by troops from the higher headquarters ... It seems that the Russian command
due to its slowness in the near future do not in a position to organize a rapid counter our
offensive ... ... there is no organized resistance "Hitler would be satisfied. It was otherwise with
Stalin. Khrushchev testifies in his memoirs that Stalin had deserted, throwing the reins. The other
members of the government, especially Molotov and Beria, trying at all costs to settle with Hitler
started "conflict". As noted in his diary Halder, "they turned to Japan to represent Russia's
interests on the political and economic relations between Russia and Germany, and are lively
talks on the radio with the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs."
The negotiations were not successful. In his victory, Hitler was sure just how Stalin in his defeat.
In autumn 1941, the German government has decided to curtail its military industry. October 3,
1941, Hitler said: "We are so provided all advance, I in the midst of the battle can stop further
production of weapons in large industries, for I know that now there is no enemy, we would not
be able to crush with the help of the existing stock of weapons ".
Human Germany reserves by September 1941, on the merits, has not been affected by serious
mobilization, [149] while in June 1941, the number of German soldiers came to 7.254 million
people. While the Soviet government for the first day of the war mobilization order for military
service 1905-1918 years of birth, the German army after the attack on the Soviet Union did not
produce additional mobilizations.
Nothing has changed, and after the defeat at Moscow, with the exception of the January order of
Hitler in 1942 on the redistribution of budget allocations within the military. It reduces the cost of
the most expensive type of weapons - military ships - and increased military spending of the

Army.
Only after the defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler began to approach the war with the Soviet Union more
seriously. January 13, 1943 the so-called total mobilization was declared in Germany. But it was
not to mobilize itself, and to register for the work of military men aged 16 to 65 and women aged
17 to 45 years old. However, despite the serious situation on the fronts of Germany, women's
work in German industry until 1944 is almost unused, as well as children, as it was believed that
it corrupts family and has a bad effect on the morale of the men who were in the army. Female
and child labor in Germany, partially offset by labor of foreign workers and prisoners of war,
which in the spring of 1943, there were 6,259,900 people in the German industry. Thus, if the
Soviet industry from the first to the last day of the war worked for wear and all able-bodied men
were mobilized into the army, and unhealthy, teenagers and the elderly - in the militia, only to
Germany in 1943-1944, under the influence of the defeat at Stalingrad and the Allied bombing
German cities, has become a serious concern for the war.
The German military industry has achieved its best performance in the days when the greatest
scope brought bombardment allies - in July 1944. Then, in the second half of 1944, the size of the
German army, despite the many losses at the front, in general, has been brought to 9.4 million
people without work.
After the summer of 1944 because of the bombing and the loss of territories there was a decline
in the German war industry. Yet in March 1945, Germany produced more arms than in June 1941,
when Hitler started the war against the Soviet Union.
In one of his speeches Stalin called war competition systems in which the socialist system proved
its advantages over National Socialist. The Soviet system, of course, was more totalitarian. In
terms of mobilization for the front or in the rear of the work she was willing to go much further
National Socialist. At the very beginning of the war in the Soviet Union a peaceful sector of the
industry, including the food, was reduced to nothing. Even under German occupation Poles
mobilized to work in the factories, fed better than the Soviet rear.
Even though it is difficult imaginable voltage, which experienced the Soviet economy and the
Soviet people, the war still would not have been won without the economic help of allies,
particularly the United States. The issue of this aid the Soviet historiography silenced. Among the
thousands of books about the Second World War, no one specifically dedicated to this topic.
Meanwhile, assistance was essential.
England began deliveries to the Soviet Union in August 1941. Only in the last quarter it delivered
669 aircraft, 487 tanks, 330 tankettes. Arms and strategic raw materials to 41 million dollars. Put
the Soviet Union in the first months of the Soviet-German war, the United States. At the time of
the German occupation of large parts of the European territory of the USSR and the evacuation
of industry and transfer it on a war footing the Soviet Union arms actually produced. In this light,
the importance of the initial supply of allies becomes apparent. [150.151]
October 30, 1941, ie before the Battle of Moscow, when the Soviet Union was in a catastrophic
situation, the US has provided the Soviet government an interest-free loan of 1 billion. dollars,
then, on November 7, extended to the Soviet Union action on the Lend-Lease Act, passed by the
US Congress of the law March 11, 1941. Finally, in February 1942 the US doubled its loan to the
Soviet government, bringing it to 2 billion. Dollars. (Amounts loans never been paid by the Soviet
government.) During the war, via Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok and Iran are America and
Britain was taken to the Soviet Union 18 700 airplanes, 10,800 tanks, 9,600 guns, 2.6 million tons

of oil, 44,600 metal machines, 1860 locomotives, 11,300 platforms, more than 500 000 tonnes of
non-ferrous metals, more than 172 000 tonnes of cables and wires. The total amount of US aid
alone has left 9.5 billion. Dollars. Even Canada has imported in the USSR in 1942-1944 gg. 355 ths.
Tons of cargo, including tanks (1188), armored personnel carriers (842), trucks (2568), shells
(827,000). The pride of the Soviet army tank "T-34", was made of British armor. The Soviet army
was eating American and Canadian bread and the famous American stew. From neutral Sweden
were in the USSR machines, presses, cranes, power equipment and steel products. From
Mongolia, during the war the Soviet Union had brought 700 000 head of cattle, 4.9 million heads
of small cattle and 400,000 horses.
12% of all aircraft and 10% of all tanks in the Red Army was delivered allies. But if most of the
tanks and aircraft is still made in the Soviet Union (although the allies of imported raw materials),
it is one kind of technology the Allies supplied fully - road transport. The United States put in the
USSR 52 000 375 000 jeeps and trucks. No guidance on the production of the Soviet Union during
the war of its own trucks and cars in historic literature. Without American trucks and Mongolian
horses, the Red Army would have been totally paralyzed.
The scale of the allied aid will be even greater when you consider that about 15% of all cargo
shipped from the United States and Great Britain in the USSR, was destroyed by the Germans
before arriving at their destination. The greatest losses were in March-April 1942, when the
Luftwaffe and U-boats had been sunk a quarter of all vessels to follow the northern route. As a
result of those sent in 1942 only in 1550-1650 it was delivered to the Soviet Union in 2505
aircraft. Soviet historians have done this only the conclusion that the loss of transportation can
not "justify the systematic underperformance supplies allies in the USSR" (History of the socialist
economy of the USSR. T. 5, Moscow, 1978, p. 545). Even then allies were guilty!
Knowing this, you can determine not only the errors of Hitler, but also Stalin's mistakes. From the
standpoint of the competition system, the Soviet system, of course, proved its complete failure.
Despite all the efforts made in the period of 1939-1941, and after the German attack, the Soviet
industry was unable to recover from the losses suffered in the first months of the Soviet-German
war. It is obvious that the war with Germany, to which the Soviet government was prepared at
least from 19 August 1939, would not have been won without the economic help of allies and,
most importantly, without the US military intervention. In this sense, we have to draw
conclusions about the economic weaknesses of the Soviet system in comparison with the
German.
To study the problems of the initial period of the Second World War Suvorov did more than all
Soviet and Western historiography. He found answers to many plaguing us for decades questions.
He pretty much explained and explained, of course, correct. The merit of his invaluable. And all
the time I catch myself wishing to heap praise on the author. But precisely because Suvorov set
out to turn the historiography [152.153] on the issue of the initial period of the Second World
War, it is necessary to dwell on the fact that most hinder any serious reader.
The first, and I think the most important - is the absence of references to the sources. According
to the rules of the genre - and the book Suvorov written in the genre of historical work - these
links are required. Meanwhile, they are very selective. And their absence for the bulk of the book
makes it impossible to implement the main goal of the author: to convince not only the ordinary
reader, but above all historians that the foreign policy of the Soviet government, and in particular
the events of 1941 should be evaluated differently.

Another obvious drawback books Suvorov is their excessive emotionality or, as we would say,
their journalistic style. It is because the book Suvorov historic, not journalists, they must have
been written differently. Suvorov and his books will have to form new generations of historians
views on the topics raised by them. And for this you need a calm and confident attacking style
rather than myriad otstrelivanie in the defense of the vast Soviet historiography on the issue of
the Second World War.
In conclusion, a few words on another date set Suvorov: July 6, 1941, the "bottom-M." Given the
author's argument in favor of this very serious dates. And yet here we probably can not do
without the additional information, which is not. Maybe we can help is now inaccessible archives.
Maybe it will be known minutes of the meeting of the Political Bureau June 21, 1941. As a
historian, I am inclined to believe that Suvorov rights. If it turns out that the "M-Day" was
nominated for 13 or 20 of July, it is, after all, is not so important. Suvorov opened a whole layer of
our history for us. This is his greatest achievement. In his footsteps, I'm sure, will now other adjusting, supplementing and clarifying. They will be the second, third ... tenth. Viktor Suvorov
was the first.
Yuri Felshtinsky
Ten years later.
Historical conception of Viktor Suvorov
Ten years ago the editors of "Russian ideas" showed true courage, began publishing a series of
articles by Viktor Suvorov, then became a regular contributor to the newspaper. Changing the
existing world - a complex and slow. The starting position of Viktor Suvorov was extremely
difficult. The chances of success are very small. Recognized today all the author was not
commonplace historian, a defector. He took up the theme of a dangerous and politically, and in
the scientific sense. On the question of the German attack on the USSR June 22, 1941, as it
seemed, it had long since been put all points over i.
That majestic merit of Viktor Suvorov today - ten years later.
I am often in Moscow in recent years. There was in those weeks when left millionth edition of
"Icebreaker". It sold on every street corner. Apparently, all one million sold since then came out
and new reissues. At a time when the circulation of the historical books fell to the limit, one
million copies of the book was not just a great edition. It was something beyond sensation.
Paying tribute to the author, "RM" in one of the rooms gave a series of materials devoted to
Suvorov. In addition to the Suvorov, were accompanying laudatory address in Suvorov article by
M. Heller and A. Goryanina. It was [155] is very nice to see and read. But for the same reasons
strange to me was the publication of yet another letter - W. Wechsler ( "RM, 4081), it is not
that the writer does not agree with the views and the concept of Suvorov. In the first paragraph
of B. Wexler admits that not read "Icebreaker". Apparently, not read "Day-M." If so, it is unlikely
that, Wexler worth hurry to express their opinion in a letter to "RM". This is extremely ill and in
relation to Suvorov, and in relation to the readers of "RM".
Truth is not determined by a referendum. Freedom of speech does not mean that "the Republic
of Moldova" shall publish any views. The point of view expressed by V. Veksler, has long been
known. More than 50 years we have only this and inspires the entire Soviet and foreign historians.
To refute Suvorov, today, as in the best of the Stalin years, commissioned a book written: against

a brave man, a true historian, who was not afraid to go against the tide, refused to sing in the
general chorus.
Already one curiosity would have to make critics wonder Suvorov, careful reading, listen to what
he says and writes this man - with an unusual destiny, with stunning intuition, with an
extraordinary capacity for work. What is faith in the justice of its cause should have to in 1985
single-handedly penetrate reinforced concrete head of Soviet historians - the last car in the train
of "perestroika". To be fair: already choked in publicity politicians and statesmen, journalists and
writers. A historical revision "Politizdat" until 1990, was afraid to publish Trotsky; a collection of
Soviet-German documents on the years 1939-1941, illegally printed in Vilnius 100,000th edition
in 1989, has been banned for sale in Moscow (and released in "Moscow Worker" Only two years
later).
I hate to point out even today the names of many of the books that were published in the Soviet
historiography "perestroika" years. Let us not therefore rely on the fact that the tribe tempered
hurry to rebuild and in his view of the topic described by Suvorov. Especially because this is a
question more and emotional for the war generation; difficult to accept almost unbelievable:
kakoy-to defector without specific historical formation, without issued to him for salary, two
small books, like a magician, took it and rewrote the entire history of the Soviet-German war of
1941-1945, while thousands and thousands of people for decades, the Soviet Union and abroad,
studied, investigated the matter and did not see that the king is - naked.
History - Science insanely simple. It all fits together like in a crossword. Not converge ends only in
one case: if the historian made a mistake. In the 70s, when I was a student at the Faculty of
History in Moscow, did not fit in my mind the phrase, then it is quite progressive, explaining the
mistakes of the Soviet Army in the first period of the war, "Stalin believed Hitler."
Stalin believed Hitler believed that Hitler would not attack. He believed in the Soviet-German
non-aggression treaty. I do not fit those two words in my student's head: "Stalin believed." No,
never anything this man did not believe. But Hitler suddenly believed?
I tried to find the answer. I have found some answers. And yet understand that there is, it is not it
can not be that something does not add up. Inexplicably behavior Molotov at the talks in Berlin.
Inexplicable behavior of Stalin in the first half of 1941. Inexplicably unprecedented in the entire
history of the world increase the country's military budget in the last pre-war years: according to
official figures (which can only be underestimated), the first three years of the third five-year plan
for defense went 26.4% of all budget allocations in 1940 - 32.6 % in 1941 godu - 43.4%. Germany
and England at this time is spent on defense about 15% of the budget. To explain all this phrase
that Stalin did not believe in the possibility of a German attack?
The negative reviews on the books D. Volkogonova Suvorov [156.167] states that in the Soviet
archives documents on the preparation of an attack on Stalin Germany were found. This is a very
valuable witness. But with all due respect should be to the AD Volkogonov, it seems to me to
note that we can not talk about the search for the Soviet version of "Directive number 21". As
planned Soviet invasion of the Baltic states? To Poland? In Romania? As the war began with
Finland? In none of these cases, the emphasis was not on the surprise. The suddenness is
important for those planning to win a little blood. This problem has never been to the Soviet
army. Important victory was not a little blood, and at any cost.
It is obvious that the war with Germany would not start with a surprise attack, and with dull and
boring Molotov discharge diplomatic conflict. Obviously, the self-appointed Stalin to the post of

Chairman of the CPC of 5 May 1941 (May 6, reported by the newspaper) could only be caused by
the planned large-scale foreign operation. But what?
Despite the danger of analogies, let us remember another date: 1914. When Russia announced
mobilization in Germany and Austria-Hungary, it became clear that the war started. "Barbarossa"
there was a plan in the Soviet Union. According to Igor Bunich, to the great chagrin of historians
that worketh not footnotes, the plan was called "Operation" Storm ", it was presented to Stalin
May 15, 1941 and approved by the 16th. The basis of the "Storm" was put to a wider document
"mobilization plan" 1941 (MT-41). If properly understood I. Bunich, these materials are to be
found in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defence, 15A Fund, op. 2154, d. 4.
Implementation of the MP-41 is described on pp. 199- 287 of the case.
In the book of Bunich, forthcoming in a noticeable rush, repeatedly missing quotation marks,
which prevents the reader to determine the boundary between the text and the document I.
Bunich. But, of course, the thorny issue of the planned War I. Stalin Bunich still brings clarity.
Here is a long quotation from the book of I. Bunich "Operation" Storm ", or an error in the third
decimal place. Historical Chronicle ", the second book (published" The Shape ", St. Petersburg,
1994. Signed print November 10, 1994 Circulation - 50 thousand copies, with 555-558...)," 16
May 1941 finalized the plan "Operation" Storm ", the final edited and submitted to Stalin May
15th. It is this plan that is stored in the red-sealed envelope with the inscription "To be opened
upon receipt of the" Storm "signal and gave the semi-official name for this operation. Officially,
however, as usual in the Soviet administrative procedures, the document was labeled as the
"Plan for the strategic deployment of forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and
its allies." The plan was drawn up under the leadership of Generals Zhukov and Vasilevsky Vatutin.
He had a "top secret" and "Only the person" and is addressed directly to the Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars, Comrade Stalin, indicating that this instance to its approval is
unique.
Unlike the previous ones, this latest version of the "Storm", which was supposed to act, was
drafted in the first place, taking into account the implementation of mobilization plans (MT-41)
and, secondly, it is completely absent "novorech" anyone unnecessary preamble type: "If the
Soviet Union was attacked ..." etc.
All formulations were simple, clear and unambiguous. They clearly traced last Stalin indicate that
"it is time to finish with these defensive calls."
The preamble of the plan and the plan stated that "to ensure its implementation of the following
measures necessary to advance, which are indispensable for the application of a surprise attack
on the enemy from the air and on the ground:
1. Perform covert mobilization of troops under the guise of training exercises stock - holds 80%.
[158,159]
2. Under the guise of access to the camp to make a hidden concentration of troops near the
western border, primarily to concentrate all Army Reserve Command - is performed.
3. Hidden focus on airfields in remote districts and now begin the deployment of aviation logistics
- Vol. 75%.
4. Gradually, under the guise of training fees and logistical exercise to deploy the rear and
hospital base - is performed.
"The first strategic objective actions of the Red Army - said further plan - to put the defeat of the
main forces of the German army deployed south of the line Brest - Deblin ... Follow strategic aim

to have: the onset of the Katowice district in the northern or north-westerly direction to defeat
the large force the center and the north wing of the German front and to seize the territory of
former Poland and East Prussia.
The immediate task - to defeat the German army east of the river. Wisla Krakow and at the
direction of, for which: a) the main attack forces of the Southwestern Front strike in the direction
of Krakow, Katowice, cutting off Germany from allies; b) secondary attack the left wing of the
Western Front strike in the direction of Siedlce, Deblin with the aim snare the Warsaw group and
the capture of Warsaw, as well as to promote South-Western Front in defeating the enemy of
Lublin groups; c) conduct an active defense against Finland, Hungary and Romania, and be
prepared to strike against Romania at favorable conditions ...
III. Based on this concept of strategic deployment, provides the following grouping of the Armed
Forces of the USSR.
1. The Army of the Red Army in the composition - 198 cd, 61 TD, 13 cd - just 303 divisions and 74
artillery regiments RGC, distributed as follows: a) the main forces in the composition of 163 cd,
58 TD, 30 ppm and 7 cd (of 258 divisions) and 53 artillery regiments RGC have in the West,
among them: in [160] the Northern, North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts - 136 cd,
44 TD, 23 ppm, 7 cd (of 210 divisions) and 53 artillery regiment GSC; in the reserve of the High
Command of the Southwestern and Western Fronts - 27 cd, 14 TD, 7 GPa (total 48 divisions); b)
the remaining force, consisting of 35 cd, 3 TD ,, 1 ppm, 6 cd (total 45 divisions) and 21 ap GDH
appointed for the defense of the Far East, southern and northern borders of the USSR ...
IV. The composition and tasks deployed on the fronts of the West (Map 1: 1 million).
Northern Front (PVO) - 3 Army, a part of - 15 shooting, 4 armored and 2 motorized divisions, a
total of 21 divisions, 18 regiments of aviation and the Northern Navy, with the main tasks Defence Leningrad, the port of Murmansk, Kirov railways and, together with the Baltic Navy to
ensure our complete domination in the waters of the Gulf of Finland ... front HQ - Pargolovo.
North-Western Front - three armies, consisting of 17 infantry divisions, 4 tank, 2 motorized
divisions, a total of 23 divisions and 13 aviation regiments, with the objectives of: after the
transition to the offensive of the Western Front of troops, interacting with the Baltic Navy, start
offensive in the direction of Tilsit - Koenigsberg, covering with the stubborn defense of Riga and
Vilna areas.
Front HQ - Panevezhio.
Western Front - four armies, composed of 31 infantry, tank 8, 4 and 2 motorized cavalry divisions,
a total of 45 divisions and 21 aviation regiment.
Objectives: the transition armies of the Southwestern Front offensive, the left wing of the front
kick in the general direction of Warsaw and Siedlce - Radom, Warsaw beat grouping and capture
of Warsaw; in collaboration with the South-Western Front split Lublin-Radom enemy grouping,
enter the r.Visla and movable parts master Radom. Right front wing, interacting with the troops
of the North-Western Front, cut [161] main enemy forces from East Prussia and cross the Vistula
in its lower reaches. The boundary of Denmark does not proceed without further notice.
Front HQ - Baranovichi.
South-Western Front - eight armies, composed of 74 infantry divisions, 28 tank, 15 motorized and
5 cavalry divisions, a total of 122 divisions and 91 Regiment of Aviation, with its immediate
objectives: a) concentric blow armies of the right wing of the front surround and destroy the
main group enemy to the east district. Wisla in the Lublin region; b) simultaneously blow from

the front Sieniawa, Przemysl, Lutowiska defeat the enemy forces at Cracow and Sandomierz,
Kielce directions and seize the Krakow, Katowice, Kielce, referring to further attack from the area
to the north and north-west directions to defeat the big forces the northern wing of the front of
the enemy and the capture of the former territory of Poland and transfer combat operations to
the territory of Germany itself to the rapid onset of Berlin; c) [...] to be ready to spray concentric
attacks against Romania. Of Czernowitz and Kishinev areas with the immediate goal to defeat the
northern wing of the Romanian Army and reach the line p. Moldova Iasi. "
The document was signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov.
I. Bunich indicates that Zhukov tried his best to push for the earliest possible start dates for the
operation "Storm", that is definitely ahead of Germany, which is the concentration of troops on
the Soviet-German border was well known. But, obviously, Stalin hoped to strike at the rear of
the German army after the landing of the German troops of the British Isles. A reason to believe
that the landing will take place, Stalin had. The German military operations in Yugoslavia, Greece
and Crete in April and May 1941 could not be interpreted otherwise than as preparation for the
landing of the British Isles. This is evidenced by another document, shown in the book of Bunich
(from 591-592.) "People's Commissariat of Defense Top Secret. The special folder. The General
Staff of the Red Army 11 June 1941 Military councils L IN, PribOVO, WSMD, KOVO, OdVO 7
copies.
Just for the information of the military council. The transmission by radio and wire
communication can not be!
According to the information received through intelligence and government channels, in the
period from 4 to 10 July 1941, German troops will take large-scale military operations against
England, including the landing of the British Isles large forces of air and sea landings.
In this regard, it may be necessary to conduct activities of a military nature to protect the state
interests of the USSR in the light of the changed military and political situation in Europe.
... The headquarters of military districts (fronts) and subordinate army and corps headquarters by
July 1, 1941 to be prepared to conduct offensive operations, completing the corresponding
command and staff games ... No other events without a special order is not carried out.
People's Commissar of Defence of the USSR Marshal Timoshenko.
Chief of General Staff of the Red Army, Army General Zhukov.
Member of the General Secretary of the Central Military Council of the CPSU (b) Zhdanov. "
Since I. Bunich footnote gives very rarely use this opportunity to quote another passage, and
where such a reference is given (with the 598-599.): "On June 12, 1941 in the district-the fronts
flew directive to start moving troops to their original positions on the deployment plan . The
divisions at full strength, with control block and the body part moved to the west, to complete
the deployment, as ordered earlier by 1 July. Everything was done according to the procedure
that has been worked out for a long time. Mobilization was carried out under the guise of
training [162.163] fees deployment - under the guise of the camp fees. Nevertheless troops
offered only move at night, to march for 40 kilometers.
"June 12 - said in the documents - the command of the border counties under the guise of
training exercises and changes in deployment summer camps launched a covert deployment of
troops is already the second echelon" (CAMD, f.16A, d 842 op 2951, 132-133 l... ).
As provided by a cunning plan "Storm."
On the same day, June 12, in the South-Western Front additionally transmitted 32nd Rifle Corps,

the 5th Mechanized Corps and the 57th Separate Tank Division.
It comes in motion and the Western Front (Rec. IN).
"Immediately, upon receipt of the Commissar of the directive of 12 June, initiated the nomination
of the 2nd (100 and 161 cq), 47 th (55,121,143 cq), 21 (17, 37, 50 cd) and 44th (64 and 108 sd)
rifle corps of the rear areas closer to the state border on the deployment plan. "
Giant army throughout a vast front from the Baltic to the Black seas stirred by secretly turning on
the starting positions.
They were at the turn of the rivers Zapadnaya Dvina - Dnepr threateningly deployed Army second
echelon.
22-th army ordered to complete the deployment no later than July 3, the 20th Army - 5 July, 19
th - July 7th, 16th, 21st, 24th and 28th armies - not later than July 10.
Not later than 1 July ordered to complete deployment and take their starting positions for the
offensive 12 armies of the first echelon - 27 th, 11 th, 8 th, 3 rd, 4 th, 10 th, 13 th, 5 th, 6 th, 12 th,
26 th, 9 th and 18 th. (Not counting the three armies of the Northern Front, temporarily "Storm"
are according to plan on the defensive along the Finnish border.) 5 more armies are in the
Reserve Command and secondary sections of the border.
This power of the world has not known since the days of Genghis Khan's campaigns! "From
today's perspective, we are accustomed to look at the 22 June 1941 as the biggest mistake of
Hitler. It is obvious that with the publication of works of Viktor Suvorov has to reconsider this
aspect of the history of the Second World War. Now it is clear that preventive offensive of the
German army started against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, was the most brilliant military
step Hitler, the highest point in his military career. However, conceived by the Soviet government
operation was so large-scale that break its offensive spirit could not even the greatest defeat of
the summer and autumn of 1941. Soviet troops were still logged in Berlin and adopted the
Communist system of government in Eastern Europe. Only it happened four years later. And since
the victory was important, not the price, the exact number of millions of victims did not count.
[164]
Two books about Stalin's Wars
With the war should be fought, of course, by all means at our disposal, as it is the misfortune of
mankind. [...] It's only been two decades since World War II, and only some states, forgetting
made 20 years ago errors, declare war as a fatal inevitability in life together.
General Wladyslaw Sikorski, 1935 {231}
Himself course of the historical process of revolutionary working class will be forced to move to
attack when the favorable environment for this.
We are very sorry that we can not prove the sincerity of our neighbors our peaceful mood.
Mikhail Frunze {232} .
To war, and someone - your own mother.
Folk wisdom.
Discussion on the role of the USSR in the initial phase of the Second World War, opening out at
the end of the 80 books Suvorov "Icebreaker", almost completed. If before 2000 it was customary
to argue about whether Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany in 1941 or not, now it
remains only to argue about the approximate timing of the attack - July 6, or, say, 15 July 1941.

In 2000 in Moscow, a book historian Michael Meltyuhova "Lost Chance Stalin" {233} of the Soviet
attempt to take over Europe in 1939-1941. Interestingly, the publication of this work has
generated virtually no debate - the author does not argue. After the release of this book, those
who doubted that such an attempt was made to no longer doubt. Not believed in it does not help
to believe, perhaps, no, let's plan produced with the signature of Stalin, or any other similar
document.
This study - the best of those that went on this issue, not only in Russia but also abroad - so
tightly in Russian archives did not work any unbiased foreign researchers. Other works of
post-Soviet period did not reach the level of the book under review, either because of the smaller
professional authors, either because of the worst source base caused by the secrecy of the Soviet
archives. Selected publications of very high quality focused on very narrow issues of the period
under review. In this same monograph Meltyukhov skillfully combines the completeness of the
study with detailed study of key issues. The material in the book is perfectly organized - a skill not
available all good analysts.
Some links to collections of documents, memoirs, journal and newspaper articles, monographs,
archives, etc. in the book, there are over a thousand.
We consider the pre-war situation in Europe and worldwide, economic relations, political
tensions. Describe in detail the diplomatic struggle 20-30-ies., For weeks and days of the prewar
events painted in 1939 With reference to the files shows the titanic arsenals of Soviet weapons,
the number of Red Army troops of the NKVD and Red Navy.
Some detail, using the new [166.167] documents studied the Soviet-Polish war of 1939, the
Finnish campaign of 1939-1940., Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries and Bessarabia. These
actions clearly identified Meltyuhova aggression and annexation (p. 444).
In detail considered Soviet military planning of 1940-1941. The map shows the plans of Soviet
attacks on Romanian and German-occupied Poland.
Meltyuhova conclusion is clear: the Soviet invasion was planned for the summer of 1941,
presumably on July 15th. Originally they planned to inflict a blow on 12 June, but due to reasons
not entirely clarified the attack was postponed.
As for the very urgent problem of preventive war, on the basis of diverse documentary material
author concludes: since neither Hitler nor Stalin did not know about the imminent aggression of
the other side, all the talk of "pre-emptive strike" groundless. From the point of view of
Meltyuhova, both sides prepared pure aggression.
Perhaps the output value in the light of this work is that from now on, do not read this book, has
no Russian historian will not be able to say: "I know the history of the Second World War ..." In
addition to the merits of the book note and controversial moments.
Controversial thesis Meltyuhova on military and political unity of the Soviet people in the
beginning of the Second World War and the Soviet-German war. Especially with that. 450-453 are
numerous statements inhabitants of the Soviet Union after 22 June 1941 that the war provoked
or unleashed by the Soviet Union, it was Soviet planes bombed Soviet cities. I wonder in what
other country in the world at the moment so trust their own government that bombs were
expecting from him rather than from the enemy?
In some passages, notably the desire of the author to justify the aggression of the USSR: "... the
Soviet-Finnish talks ended in failure, and the Soviet leadership was a problem of" saving face ". Or
ought to recognize the impossibility affect Finland, which could negatively (sic -! AG ) affect the

behavior of the Baltic States and the Soviet Union to make an object of ridicule in the world press,
or force the Finns to accept the Soviet Union is a great power and to accept the Soviet proposals.
It is clear that the demonstrative intransigence Finland and deployed in the world press campaign
supporting its position did not leave Moscow no choice but war "(p. 174).
So, in order not to hit the front of the Finns obstinate face in the dirt, the Soviet Union just had to
pour the blood of the Karelian Isthmus.
Further, Meltyukhov does not conduct fundamental differences between public systems of
England, France, USA, Germany, Japan, Italy, and somehow does not take into account the
specifics of the Soviet Union, simply attributing all these countries en masse into the category of
"great powers." As clearly shown by the following quote: "To make this assertion failure (. Is a
direct correlation of the USSR's foreign policy of ideology and state system - AG), suffice it to
recall such well-known figures of world history as Thutmose III of, Ashurbanipal, Ramses II
Nebuchadnezzar II of, Cyrus II, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Trajan, Attila, Charlemagne,
Genghis Khan, Napoleon, etc. None of them is not only a member of the Communist Party, but
was not even familiar with any communist, which, however, did not prevent them to create a
great empire "(11 -. 12).
The author does not take into account that Genghis Khan conquered not conducted in China
"kochevnizatsiyu" Alexander the Great did not plan to include Vietnam in the orbit of Hellenism,
and the most daring ideas Assurbanipal and Ramses III did not include intervention in Angola or a
mandatory world "faraonizatsiya".
From the published statements of the political leaders of the USSR, military leaders and
educators on how and why it is necessary to capture the entire Earth without a trace, you can
create more than one volume of interesting reading material. [168.169]
In studies sovietologists, political scientists, historians and economists (for example, Michael
Universal) can be found quite simple and logical proof of the fact that the Soviet system had only
one chance to survive: in the case of the "Sovietization" of the planet. And the leaders of the
Soviet Union is well aware, repeatedly saying: "Either they are - we are, or we - them." The
external policy of the state is an organic continuation as an ideology and political system of the
Soviet Union, and it is difficult to determine what was in this case stronger incentive boundless
Soviet expansion.
Therefore Meltyukhov clearly does not see fundamental differences between the Russian Empire
and the Soviet Union, foreign policy goals which puts itself at random, often carried out by direct
historical continuity between Russia and the Council. According Meltyuhova, the foreign policy
interests of the USSR consisted of restoring a great power status. (Imagine the following scene:
Trotsky, Lenin and Stalin and Molotov gather and say:. ". It is necessary to return to the USSR the
status of the Russian Empire - without this the Russian people hard For this we use the idea of
communism") quoting statements of Soviet politicians, the author (in spite of Lenin, Stalin, K )
comes to the following conclusion, it does not confirmed: "In this case, the ideological dogma of
the" world revolution "turned out to be closely related to the national and state interests of the
Soviet Union ..." (p 419)..
This definition of the interests of the Soviet Union a little strange. The concept of "national
interest" does not apply to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Perhaps more accurately be
called their anti-national-state. I do not quite like that. Pre-Revolutionary Russian lawyers
understand by the word "state" only lawful state that bears the legal nature or because of

tradition or because of legitimation by the people. More St. Augustine (354-430 gg.) Wrote that
the state, deprived of justice, there is not nothing like a gang of robbers. That is, the interests of
the USSR and the state a name difficult.
Especially since the gangster nature of the board can be seen in the words and deeds of the
Soviet leadership: "Perhaps no one symbolizes the terrorist bases of the Soviet regime as Stalin
himself.
His early career as a professional revolutionary, including the long-term involvement in
questionable activities in the Caucasus, has left a strong imprint on his style of leadership.
Despite all attempts to hide its past, it was manifested in pathological his personality and actions.
US President Franklin D. Roosevelt said that, although he expected to see at the head of the
Soviet state gentlemen in the Kremlin he found the former Caucasian bandit. In carrying out their
fantastic plans for the formation of life and the top minds Stalin relied on the help of his
subordinates, whose experience, ideology and psychology could fully realize all its aspirations
under Stalinism, which was in need of their help from below. And Stalin, the typical revolutionary
new type of owner who turned almost absolute power, was able to "successfully" complete an
unprecedented experiment of building complex of the repressive system based on state terrorism
" {234} .
Next, in a completely Marxist spirit the author tries to explain the causes of the Second World
War.
The book is really the world economy is discussed in detail in the period 1918-1939 gg., The
contradictions between the superpowers. And science is very useful attempt to prove that the
war has arisen because of the economic contradictions between the different states. Because this
attempt failed completely, even though that was undertaken this level scientists as Meltyukhov.
The book concludes that the war has arisen because of the economic contradictions, but the
author is in no way confirmed. The level of evidence about the following: America compete with
England, so Germany invaded Poland. [170.171]
More than just think the idea that the war was the result of efforts to realization of the crazy
ideas of a few dictators and their cliques.
With all the scientific positivism researchers seem strange to his continued regret over the failure
of the Soviet leadership, army and intelligence (pp. 298.301, 306, 323, 324,510,511, etc.).
Perhaps it would be better if the Red Army launched an invasion in 1941, the first? And a
scattering of bones Russian, and not only Russian, the soldiers would have been generously
littered with not only the space "from Stalingrad to Berlin," Eurasia and Africa, the islands of
Oceania, Australia and even America.
The author, like many journalists, writers and academics, confounds and confuses the two
concepts: world domination (what Hitler wanted) and world dominion (fixed idea leaders of the
USSR).
Regret the failed world revolution seen in this quote: "In the case of complete coverage of the
Earth's socialist system would be fully implemented as articulated in the European liberal
tradition, the task of creating a unified state of humanity. This, in turn, allows you to create a
sufficiently stable social system and would provide great opportunities for development "(p. 506).
A global web of concentration camps, famines, crop failures and deficits not only in the fertile (as
in the USSR), but also in all other parts of the world, of course, would give just unlimited
possibilities for human development. And, perhaps, it is a picture of the Europeans dreamed of

liberals.
Philosopher-Solidarists Roman Redlich writes that: "... the experience of the Soviet-Chinese
relations clearly shows that, if communism took possession of the whole world, the danger of a
thermonuclear conflict would become even more acute, and the over-exploitation of nature is
even more irresponsible," { 235} .
So it is unlikely to regret what was and what is. Could be worse. Or do not.
***
A year after the publication of the first book Meltyukhov, through the work of "Lost Chance of
Stalin", write your name in silver letters the latest Russian historiography, seemingly pleased with
the new edition of the reader - "Soviet-Polish war" {236} . For half a century the Soviet Union and
Russia on this issue was not a single worthwhile monograph, which is unfortunate. The question
is really important, but because of the ideological dictates of the Soviet era is not developed. And
the appearance of such a book, it would seem, can only be welcomed.
In publishing the summary to a modest monograph it states that "the historian was able to take a
hard look at the Soviet-Polish relations in their dynamics."
Unfortunately, at this time I have not Meltyukhov objective study.
Let's start with the simplest - with the asymmetry in the use of terminology.
. Thus, describing the actions of the parties in conflict 1918- 1920 biennium, the author uses the
following terminology: Kiev, Minsk and Baranovichi Red Army "free" (20, 49,70, etc...), Or "takes".
Poles also in the monograph of the city and the territory "captured" and "occupy" (with
20,24,26,28, etc...), But in some cases - "hold."
Soviet - brutality cases of Polish troops and once repeatedly described. In the latter case, the
supporting information for something taken from the official communiqu of the Polish. It is
obvious that such asymmetry can not be explained by ignorance when submitting the material no one easy to take off the shelf "Red Cavalry" Babel or the "Red Terror" Melgunov and provide
the relevant information about what is happening "liberators" in the occupied territory. In the
terminology Meltyuhova even Ukrainians from Petlyura connections "capture" their own Western
Ukrainian cities and the Red Army the city "free".
Description of the collision course is not the nature of the research and compilation. In the
assessment of actions fighters opposing armies again present [172,173] subjectivity. Adjectives of
the author are: the Red Army fight "courageously", "firmness", "hard", "fierce", "heroic", "skill"
(47, 59, etc...). Poles also in the description of the author just fight like machines, not showing
any courage or cowardice - generally no human feelings. Only found in the book by the author
reviews Meltyuhova description Poles qualities that we can refer to human characteristics "vindictive vandalism" (62.).
From the research, we learn about the complexities of the Red Army with supplies, rears and
communications of any such difficulties the Polish Army there is no data.
About Army detachments in Poland Meltyukhov mentions, although they existed in a really short
time, a critical period of the war, as well as those of the Red Army - no, although there they were
distributed throughout the Civil War.
The author does not hide his regret over the fact that the Red Army has been unsuccessful
campaign against and beyond the Vistula (p. 79).
In general, just at Capek: "They are monstrous anti-aircraft guns fired at by our brave pilots,

peacefully bombing their filthy city".

The methodology used by the author, but in some cases can be considered scientific. In some
cases the description of the events and phenomena is simply abstract character, usually the
author's assessment is inseparable from the narration of facts. A number of evaluations of the
activities and motivations of the Polish side, sounding as presented by the prosecution
Meltyuhova generally not supported by references to sources and literature (pp. 20, 24, 26, etc.).
This may seem surprising, because in the book "Lost Chance of Stalin's" method Meltyuhova was
a classic: the fact of its versatile historiographical evaluation, consideration of different points of
view, relying on the documents, the conclusion, supported by the relevant reference. In the same
book under review positivist approach (facts first - then the theory and evaluation) - a rare
exception.
The most striking example of one-sided presentation of facts and their silence: in the description
of the Soviet-Polish campaign in 1920 not only cited, but no mention of the famous order
number 1423 Western Front on July 2, 1920 "corpse White Poland" and "happiness on bayonets
for working people. " But the order is one of the key documents describing the essence of the
war, the aims and objectives of the parties.
The book provides anecdotal information taken from the Soviet literature of mass destruction in
the Red Army prisoners of 1919-1922. in Polish captivity - they allegedly killed 60 thousand from
136 thousand (with 104.). Probably, it was simple to use appropriate Polish literature and
documentary publications on the subject, which are quite different figures.
Declaration of the Soviet Government in the book always served as the real motives of actions
and orders of the apex of the RCP (b). Poles in the same book, on the contrary, almost always
duplicitous and treacherous, constantly cover their imperialist ambitions lengthy beautiful
statements. Now almost all researchers have the opportunity to compare the foreign propaganda
and diplomatic maneuvers of the Bolsheviks with their real intentions in 1918-1920. It must be
emphasized that foreign policy is not a lie to some specific feature of the Communists: "All States
are masked," to live with wolves - wolf howl "(Stalin, 1938). It is therefore very strange that this
"error" was not applied to foreign policy actions and statements of Lenin and Trotsky's
supporters.
Probably, subjectivity and one-sidedness of the author's estimates are caused by including a
perfect failure historiographical research base. The total number of 898 references, of which only
29 books in Polish. Hence, for example, and Meltyuhova regret that "the losses of the parties in
the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, there is no data." According to approximate estimates of Polish
historians, [174,175] irretrievable loss of the Polish side made in 1920 112 thousand people were
killed. {237} (now the word of the Russian researchers.) In writing the book did not use literature
in Ukrainian and Belarusian languages, that is unacceptable: the regions served as a place of
direct hostilities, and the object of Warsaw claims and red Moscow.
Not enough researchers confirmed the thesis that the initiative of the Soviet-Polish war of 1920
came from Warsaw - the fight was really over disputed territory that each side was ready to
assert military force in one case - until the destruction of the Polish national and attempts to
unleash the world revolution .
Edition, on the one hand, is incomplete, the other - has a lot of related information indirectly
related to the subject study. Reading the name "Soviet-Polish war. The military and political
confrontation 1918-1939 gg. ", You can expect to find in a detailed analysis of military planning

during the interwar years, as the one or the other side, politicians and military plans in Moscow
and Warsaw, with respect to each other and the disputed territories, political and theoretical
developments party propaganda support of certain actions really mutually hostile states. This
book is not. Not in the book and the analysis of the Comintern policy towards Poland, describing
the Soviet intelligence activities in the Second Polish Republic and the Polish intelligence in the
USSR, the Polish Communists positions in 1918-1939 gg. on the most important issues of bilateral
relations. There is at least a brief description of the situation in Eastern Europe people directly on
both sides of the confrontation line. (The issue is more than significant - both lived citizens of the
Commonwealth and the USSR on both sides of the Polish-Soviet border, in what were the
similarities and differences in their position?) But for some reason, by leaps and bounds with the
details described in [176] military campaign of the Wehrmacht in Poland, Sudeten crisis and
Warsaw's position on the Czech-German and Polish-Czech borderland.
Perhaps the most important and, of course, a positive side of the research, its scientific
innovation is more detailed than in the previous book Meltyuhova, consideration of the military
part of the Soviet-Polish campaign in 1939 (in Meltyuhova terminology - "peacekeeping
operation" (408) In.. writing this section, the author used previously unavailable archival
documents from the Soviet archives, however, for a detailed description of the Soviet-Polish war
of 1939 should be concluded, clearly does not hold water:. "... I do not correspond to reality
assertion that the Red Army helped the Wehrmacht defeat of Poland" (p. 403). it is clear that by
September 17 the Polish forces were largely defeated by the Wehrmacht, and organized
defensive front will not be further expected. However, the completion of the operation would
require a considerable effort on the part of the Nazis as ammunition from the Germans by some
major types arms coming to an end, and communications were extended. in addition, the
possibility of the resistance movement in the occupied territories were in a war on one front is
incomparably better. It is difficult to somehow quantify, but can not ignore the shock that people
received the Second Polish Republic from the events of the second half of September 1939 - it
was essential, however, were not counted via Berlin. It is important to remember that Poland has
not ceased to exist with the September 28, 1939 - it was only occupied. Functioning government
in exile, thousands of Poles fought against the Germans on the Allied side. The Soviet Union
made a contribution here and - instead of leaving on the Western Front, tens of thousands of
soldiers of the Polish Army forcibly deported deep into the Soviet Union, and the thousands of
officers were shot in the spring of 1940. [177]
Objectively, it was direct assistance to the Germans in the defeat of their eastern neighbor.
In describing the events of September-October 1939 he referred to the tens of thousands of
refugees from being under Nazi occupation "governor-general" in the USSR, and refugees from
the Soviet Union - supposedly only ten Poles (367.). In fact, in September-October 1939,
thousands of people streamed through the Soviet-German border in both directions. From 28
September 1939 to 22 June 1941 of the Western Ukraine and Western Belarus ran tens of
thousands of {238} .
Similarly biased brief description of the Sovietization of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.
Evaluation of "happiness" of the population is on selected documents, recollections of the
communist Konstantin Simonov, and obviously falsified results of the "election" of 1939 and 1940
served as the opinion of the people (p. 381-384, 408-413). The notion that in 1939-1941 gg.
Polish minority in the new lands not infringe on their rights, it is absolutely wrong. Numerous

independent from each other evidence, as well as studies of both Russian and foreign authors say
that the methods of oppression of Poles were diverse: from the direct ethnic discrimination in
employment, sections of land, repression and "elections" to the authorities to abuse personal
dignity and direct repression {239} . Although, of course, proper discrimination is not reached
such proportions as in the "General Government" under Hitler.
Striking the author's fate osadnikov - Polish peasants, former members of the Polish Army, settled
in 1920-1930-ies in Western Ukraine and Byelorussia and the Vilna region. Ostensibly their
deportation to Siberia and Central Asia has been a boon for themselves osadnikov as back away
from the blow of the local population (p. 415). It is absolutely overlooked that there is no ethnic
conflict in a internationalist Soviet totalitarian system simply could not be.
The conflict broke out under the Nazis in 1943-1944 and quickly stopped with a secondary
appearance in the region of the Red Army and the Soviet secret police.
We can not say that completely wrong, but certainly also questionable thesis that nationalism in
the occupied territories was suppressed and not encouraged. In a special study of the Polish
historian Bogdan Musialya on the basis of various weight, especially documentary, material
concludes that inter-ethnic relations that were in the region and during the Second Republic is
not too warm during Soviet rule deteriorated completely, which served as one of the causes of
the rivers blood spilled in the former Eastern Poland in 1941-1949 gg. {240} .
In the book there is a statement that can be interpreted either as a crude factual error or as a
half-truth to the point of falsification. USSR allegedly wanted to "support the national liberation
movement of the Belarusian and Ukrainian population in Poland" (p. 113). In the first half of the
1920s, the Soviet Union did support certain political circles of the Western Ukraine and Belarus,
as well as contributed to the pro-Soviet sabotage and guerrilla warfare in what was then eastern
Poland {241} . Support Comintern local Communists did not stop, and at certain periods in 1930.
Can we call the national liberation movement of these - a moot point. However, all the people,
who spoke for the real, full independence of Belarus or Ukraine, to which the long arm reaches
people with cool heads, or sent to places not so remote, or even in another world.
In the second book, the author develops a hard and emotionally at least controversial idea of
defending the communist government of Russia's national interests, the continuity of the Soviet
Union from Russia, or even the identity of these two phenomena. This is, unfortunately, generally
quite a common point of view in modern historiography, recently received an unexpected official
support. [178.179]
Michael Weller
Icebreaker Suvorov.
After the "Icebreaker" the history of the Second World War in its present form does not exist.
We sat for a liter bottle: Colonel, a journalist, a military historian and writer. Each preferred to
mind his own, so that the author's remarks after the direct speech is meaningless, "who he said"
and "what he said" mixed in okroshka. All - strategists.
- After all, nothing fundamentally new Suvorov said. I remember, as a student, I read the "Notes
of the deputy chief of the General Staff," General Shtemenko. The sixties, the Soviet memoirs,
military censorship, all right. And: September 39th, the liberation of the Western Ukraine and
Western Belarus. We went to Poland. We go at night "Ehmke" to the destination. It seems, have
gone astray. Stop: begin to understand the map. Getting lost - not worth it. We are afraid to drop

in for a demarcation line to the Germans.

Aha, I think: how so? A? Yet there are fights with the Germans against the Poles in some places.
Even we Germans are not met, we did not agree. Still no joint Soviet-German victory parade in
Brest was not. A demarcation line - already !!
So - previously held? So - before the meeting agreed, that to whom? So - the border was carried
out in advance? So - it was, perhaps, a preliminary conspiracy, secret protocols to the pact
"Molotov - Ribbentrop?" And so we have denied them! [181]
Pierced Colonel General Shtemenko. Prohlopali military censorship. Aw, Snap! We share with the
Germans to Poland before 1 September.
That's when I had heard and was - we just like the Germans, to seize everything they could. And
to believe the official version is not possible.
- My dear, well, as it was possible and to believe that the official Soviet version? All Baltic
remembered very well how a 40-year occurred the "revolution" and "invited" the Red Army. You
take a thick volume of "Soviet Estonia", reveals the section "History", flipping until 1940 - and you
eat the pill: a veteran recalls: "We knew that the revolution will soon"! Do not "cooked", not
"fighting" and "know"! And at the same time as the time these three revolutions have taken
place! And here is a photo of a happy meeting with the population poproshennymi liberators:
liquid chains on the sidewalks, and the only one quarter missing, and a handful of activists at the
head of the tank with a banner. And very clearly: normal occupation, covered by a fig leaf for
decency.
To lie - need a head like a horse: large. Be sure to get out all sorts of absurdities out.
- Why did Stalin until recently forbade surrender Kiev? Because of all the laws of war the
Germans could not take it !!! Upcoming should have a threefold numerical superiority over the
defending - it's the law old. One in the ground vrylsya, area sighted, stock hoarding - another ban
on him in the open field, vulnerable to all types of fire exposure. So the advantage species was
near Kiev us, the defenders! There were more, not them! So what? ! Fritz echoed us to
smithereens .. Zhukov has already even know that we can not fight, and not all came to Comrade
Stalin that the troops like a lot - a little help.
And immediately the question: to fuck is to collect as many troops and what they have been
taught? If our larger, and they can not defend themselves - why so many of them and what they
can do?
- Wait a minute. To be fair. Suvorov - man rested. In the see only Soviet aggression. Up to the
point of absurdity comes. Here he wrote forcefully about the "BT", "tank aggressor." Yeah I
understood? Aggression already at the design engineering level. And about the "tank-defender"
have you ever heard ?! Peaceful Soviet tank with a gun for self-defense, yeah.
Yes Tank - any - is basically an offensive weapon, break arms, breaking the defense, the offensive.
And Suvorov knows it. But it does not help juggling: see - all that was in Soviet military was solely
for aggression.
- A heavy bombers? Like, was built we were thousands of "Pe-8" and could one raid collapse in
the German rear-five thousand tons of TNT, is five megatons, it is a nuclear bomb - and Khan
Germany and suppressed we first response bombardment of German power, and doomed to
failure German aggression: that's the best defense weapon! But Stalin refused strategic bombers
- was not expecting an attack, he wanted to attack, and all funds invested in the aircraft attack,
escort his invading army.

Well, firstly, in the five-ton bomb of TNT nor five tons. The main body weight is on stalistogo iron.
And in any explosive bomb weighs only a smaller part. Of 20% strength. So do not incur tier five
kilotons a thousand machines, but only one. But it is - a trifle.
But secondly, for the war allies rivet 30,000 (thirty thousand!) Four-engined strategic heavy
bombers. But "vybombit" Germany from war, could not. Pre-war "Douai doctrine" has not
justified itself. So our one thousand, nothing would be decided, and Stalin, it turns out, was right.
Third: the rights he was not from an excess of aggressiveness and a lack of facilities, materials
and engines for all military programs. Five thousand of required engines (because it was the fifth
in the fuselage for the boost in the high places in the other four) ate fighter and bomber tactical
aviation, the need for which was sharper, more insistently. [182.183]
- Suvorov general - principle perpendicular. Seeking lie around, refutes all allegations that were
before him, and runs all the time in delirium itself. This is one of the well-established versions:
before the war destroyed their command staff, so fighting is worse and losses carried over. No,
said Suvorov! Here read the diaries of Goebbels from spring '45: "Poor our generals, that Russian
generals are better." Would the Germans had shot before the war, Comrade Stalin, four thousand
mediocrities in the general's uniform - you look, and they would have found a better generals,
Suvorov said.
First, the bad dancer generals prevented. So far, then, in the 41 th - 42 th German generals were
beaten and chased superior enemy - they were good Goebbels. And when in the 45th could not
hold back many times superior enemy - have become poor. It is necessary to find somebody to
blame for the defeat! Not very same Nazi elite politically lost the war!
And secondly - well, there was the Germans four thousand generals. Not Russia. All the
commanders of divisions, corps, groups, their alternates, staff units - and half as many generals,
not typed. It would have to shoot all the colonels and even grab. It's a big loss for us, that
Suvorov was not born before and did not work before the war, Hitler's chief adviser.
- Previously, it was written that we had at the beginning of the war equipment was worse than
the German? So he tries to argue that the German was worse was bad and stupid. Originality!
Surprise! Creating scandals revolution history, attracting masses of readers! Yes, he's a showman
from military history. Zhirinovsky forty one! ..
Here sverhpushka "Dora" shelling Sevastopol. Yes, we can assume that the cost of its creation,
transportation and protection have not justified. However, the famous 30th battery, it still
destroyed: the thickness of the shells have been armor and concrete and destroyed the towers
and dungeons. Suvorov is obviously knows, but silent. But another says. Firstly, the shot at the
map, artillery targets have not seen such shooting may not be accurate, it is not effective firing
on the squares: obaldui these Germans! Suvorov play the fool that does not know about the
shooting indirect fire, and about artkorrektirovschikah artrazvedchikah and so on: that he had not
heard of Ahaz artillery.
Second, and of shells some "Dora" and "Karl" was not confused even when hit! Here is the
testimony, that in the book of memoirs written a huge hole into the ground with a diameter in
diameter and round supersnaryada cave downstairs: left back and the whole strength of the gap.
Well, a miracle, not an intelligence officer! This type of break is called "camouflet" - when a
projectile, especially with explosive fuse, delayed by cool hinged trajectory enters deeply into soft
or sandy soil, blanking gap. This may be a semidesyatipyatimillimetrovoy howitzer with a large
angle of elevation when the projectile hit the soft grass or peat, for instance. For the "Dora"

pecking three-ton concrete fortified land mines, getting into the soft earth - still a miss, and there
is no need to throw away the top land carriage. But if it enters the strengthening and recessed
into the ground barrier - Khan's three-meter concrete bunker with a hood, hidden five meters
under the ground. And he knows it perfectly Suvorov - simply can not be maintained, so that your
line does not bend.
It is a pity that such distortion of cause people to doubt at all thoughtful in all that Suvorov wrote.
From the point of view of the serious military historians, Suvorov generally operates some
random speculation. Reliable, documented and proven facts he does not, that imagines in its sole
discretion.
Ah, from the standpoint of military historians? And who are the Soviet military historians?
Salaried officials who lead story for a salary in line received orders and ideological setting. How
do you want - write, so sure! What we had less and technique was worse. [184.185] Or that we
had less, but the technique was better, but the treacherous attack took us by surprise. Or that
German losses were greater. Or equal to ours. Or our more than three times. The same people wrote one thing after another, and for all the titles and awards received. Parasites and
demagogues! ..
Hmmm, came several thick books refuting Suvorov, but the interest in them has disappeared
instantly, and continues to read Suvorov. Oproverzhentsev little book something cheap at all.
Dear Sirs, historical and literary comrades! As part of the finding of sunspots any critic will give a
hundred points Doberman, sniffing drug trafficker. The very subject of our conversation is already
evidence that the theory of Suvorov established and solidified in space-time, like a mountain, on
which climbers can climb and even to drive it hooks. Release of vertically - that's what matters in
science. To pick the facts can any clerk. Collect them in a mosaic and dumbfound the world for
the first time what he saw the picture - that's what distinguishes the scientist from podmetaly for
the scientific part. Today, all smart, and half of these intelligent dissent. And I went "ice-breaker"
for the first time - that some people mouths poraskryval: huffing, puffing, and argue so soon and
there is nothing. Well, the classic evolution of recognition: first - "! What a nonsense", then "something, in fact, there is," and finally - "but who does not know it." It is easy to be
knowledgeable and understand when you explain on the fingers. Oh, how all Suvorov simple and
even primitive! Here are just some reason before it's all anybody in uniform did not take a picture.
And half a century groans: oh, what a fool trusting Stalin was, and how little we had, and we were
poorly armed in front of the German steel avalanche ..!
That's what I tell you, historians say, doctor of historical sciences can become, in essence, any
elementary educated and intelligent person. But the officer Analyst residency Main Intelligence it's elite. With his demand much tougher, huh? And the responsibility it cooler, right? And to be
able to analyze it on a post is necessary. And vlamyvanie officer in the GRU residency fiefdom
quiet historians - it's like in the old Canadian professional hockey players scattered enthusiasts.
Well, by the way, the cries of mediocrity-loser Rezun. The kid without a hairy paw missile entered
the elite reconnaissance. Suvorov can refute much. Podtasovschik, visionary, debater,
nonconformist, whatever you call it ... But the main thing - is, and it is undeniable! Opponents are
trying to place the most compelling Suvorov get, silent. Answer: why in June 41 th, we cleared
the border bridges ?! If you are ready to attack - it is logical, clear, correct. But no, no other
explanation is simply no !!! Why before the war began to liquidate long by guerrilla bases in their
forests ?! Army increase - and the possibility of destroying the guerrilla movement. This is

preparation for what ?! Why was it in abundance maps alien territory - but there was no card on
its own territory? It provides for a defensive war ?! Why is pre-prepared and replicated war
posters, conversation, even a song ?! So what to prepare? By the war? But we were not prepared
for the defense? And for what? Yeah ...
Stalin rightly believed that Hitler was not suicidal, get involved in a war on two fronts - a clear
defeat. But England was much like a beneficial knock Germany from the Soviet Union - and let
drain each other. How can you believe the warnings of Churchill, face extremely concerned? But
Hitler decided that the first attack - the only chance, the lesser evil if the Union is to hit the first end fast and imminent. All logical. Throw. Sample Suvorov cranberries - "Aquarium". A book for
those who do not know anything about the army and the Soviet Union. For western fools and hot
to lovers. "If [186.187] Hazard senior group shall first of all cipher kill and destroy the notes."
Such information is all a long time not to classify. And then in the case of danger, the first thing
would be to kill a senior cryptographer group.
Yes, this is not a document. This army romance. But because of her many and many have learned
the first time. Even abbreviation GRU never heard before!
- And yet, and yet. Suvorov made the first and only successful and vseobemnuyu attempt to
understand and explain what happened and why to June 22, 41-year. No other theory can not
withstand criticism. His - explains it. If this is true - why no one else is telling the truth, which,
though would be like to be true? Think about it yourself: of course, it was true, guys. Just fooling
us for a long time, foul brains.
As for his monomania - all bark knit in one line - this is psychology. This is typical for all the
people that have developed in the world and let a new and powerful idea. The idea captures
them, and all the items they already see in its light. The whole world is their permanent interests
above all from the standpoint of their overvalued ideas. Anything is possible, they treat in her
favor and support. Here excesses are inevitable. Both Darwin and Marx, and Freud - all this
suffering. This is normal. The bends and then went out and brought corrected followers and
izuchateli. But what about the main this is a frequent seine caught everything that is possible.
That, along with small fish and trash raking.
Pour in the last of the renegade Rezun. Traitors were many and great neshkurnaya idea has so far
only like one. The man is not so poorly paid for his glory and grandmother.
Pact Molotov-Ribbentrop: 66 Years Later.
What were the plans of Stalin on the eve of the Great Patriotic War of 1939-1941.?
Fall 1991 communist rule in Russia has caused intense debate over whether, how should the past,
which at the time was so famously stamped Soviet historiography under the dictation of the
CPSU.
With partial opening of Soviet archives - civil, military and secret police - the contents of the
Orwellian "memory hole in", which in the times of Stalin's fit so much historical truth, begin to
exhume. The result was that in recent years the Russian historical science embraced universal
revisionism. In this process, almost no stone was left unturned.
One of the biggest gaps in Soviet history is a question regarding the intentions and plans of
Joseph Stalin during and after the signing of the Soviet-German [189] agreements and secret
protocols drawn up by Berlin and Moscow in August and September 1939. As well as issues
relating to the strategy of Stalin on the eve of the German attack in June 1941

One of the trends in historiography, which we here call "defensive", adheres to the traditional
line that dominated the historical works in the USSR and abroad until recently. This line states
that Stalin's military policy from 1939 until the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June
1941 was largely defensive. That is, Stalin adhered to non-offensive strategy against Germany and
any other capitalist state - a potential enemy. Stalin was only trying to protect the Soviet Union
from the World War II, predicted by Marxism-Leninism as "inevitable", as long as it was possible.
Thus, the Soviets would have had time to strengthen its defenses in anticipation of the coming
global conflict, in which they would be involved sooner or later.
According to this trend, including such "defensive" steps were Soviet territorial acquisitions of
1939-1940, includes half of Poland, all the Baltic States, part of Finland, and Northern Bukovina
and Bessarabia. Named "oboronnikami" "buffer zone", these territories were allegedly the result
of a deliberate Soviet expansionist policy. Rather, they were in addition to the protective
measures taken by Stalin wisely in anticipation of a German invasion. The fact that they have
become part of the Soviet Union, it is considered inappropriate to discuss.
Insidious German attack was to Stalin, according to "oboronniki" unpleasant surprise. It exposed
Soviet Russia in the role of the ugly and humiliating easy victim. It turned out that Stalin
committed a folly, trusting to Hitler, even when the latter began overt preparations for an attack
on the Soviet western borders of the spring of 1941.
They allege that Stalin had simply ignored all the warnings of the attack received by Roosevelt,
Churchill and from their own foreign agents, some of which have even predicted the exact date of
the invasion. Stalin had reason not to trust western politicians, these two-faced "Munich
peacekeepers", who are known to have abandoned serious Soviet proposals for the development
of collective security guarantees against the expansionism of the Axis. And all that time planned
to destroy the Soviet Union.
In contrast to this position in the debate, "offensive" trend in historiography claims that Stalin all
the time preparing their own offensive war - primarily against Germany and, in the end, against
all the "capitalist-imperialist" of Europe.
This is confirmed by the statements, secret or public, made by leading officials and its own Soviet
defensive preparation and strategy. In the first place we should mention Stalin's secret speech to
the graduates of the military academies, May 5, 1941, matured in an offensive spirit, the two that
followed this speech of field manuals for the Red Army, issued before June 1941 and based solely
on the offensive, not the defensive principles as well as an important military-strategic document,
addressed to Stalin and prepared by high-ranking military officials (Vasilevsky, Zhukov and
Timoshenko), and dated May 15, 1941 All of them supported the idea of a war of conquest.
"Oboronniki" believe that there is no evidence that Stalin ever saw the last document. However,
the question arises: Would the generals dare to give such recommendations to Stalin, who had
recently made a bloody purge the officer corps of the Red Army, if the offensive principles do not
match his own views? [190.191]
Speaking of ideology, the revisionists refer to Lenin's "Report of the World" on November 8, 1917.
Soviet leader then called Western "toiling and exploited masses" to put an end to the
participation of their nations in the First World War and following the Soviet example, to
"liberate" themselves from "all forms of slavery and exploitation." Socialist "new order", Lenin
continued, "is not bound by the agreements." We are "lit the torch of the world revolution," he
wrote in the first draft of the Programme after 1917, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Tips will "carry the revolution in the most advanced countries, and in general to all countries." In
a speech on March 7, 1918, Lenin said: "The history of steps forward on the basis of the wars of
liberation."
These principles were never forgotten. Revisionists "Offensive" to notice that with the
establishment of the Communist International in 1919, the dream of universal facilitate
Sovietization, which Lenin had cherished for so long, had finally been realized. Soon Soviet
diplomacy has gone on "two paths". Perhaps the best analogy for a double, if not two-faced, the
nature of Soviet foreign policy and behavior in the international arena would be an iceberg. The
visible part consisted of "legal" diplomacy and talking about "peaceful coexistence" (later
renamed "peaceful coexistence") in order to gain time and misleading "deaf, dumb and blind" an
enemy of Soviet power and the increase worldwide. Indirectly "legal diplomacy" at the same time
contributed to the global search for the revolutionary cause for the Sovietization of the world.
Large underwater part of an iceberg composed of international subversion through legal and / or
illegal organizations Communist parties around the world. These forces impregnated all sectors of
society in certain capitalist countries or the third world countries were using Stalin's later
statement 1952 international "shock brigades". As armed elements of the Marxist-Leninist
"internationalism", they were focused on the preparation of [192] the victory of socialism
Soviet-style through the armed seizure of power and partisan actions contributed to Soviet
interests by means of pacifist propaganda and direct sabotage within specific countries (such as
Britain, France and United States during the Soviet-German "honeymoon" of 1939-1941). Or they
were in hiding, waiting for the moment to take on the order of the Moscow center part in actions
in case of war in the name of socialism. In times of peace, they prepared the ground for the
Sovietization of certain countries or regions. As it turned out according to Russian sources, huge
investments were made in such operations.
Istoriki- "Offensive" of the opinion that Stalin was really counting on the war. The revolution
could be "exported to Connick bayonets", as a publicly declared Soviet representatives and
military hawks in the congresses of the Comintern in the twenties and thirties. Stalin encouraged
the German expansionism against France, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and the UK. At the
same time, Stalin planned to start a war of aggression against Germany, which was scheduled to
begin, or to July 1941 (the minority view), or, at the latest by mid-1942. The Red Army would
have swept through Europe, bringing together the insurgent masses and carrying a red flag to the
West.
The same Russian historians note that in 1939 and 1940-1941, the next few Stalin's assistants,
such as Molotov, Zhdanov, Mehlis, Shcherbakov confidently talk about "expanding the borders of
socialism" on the wings of "imminent" future war {243} .
In the five years before the Second World War, Stalin spoke ominously: "The war, of course,
would unleash revolution and jeopardize the very existence of capitalism ..." {244} .
Molotov, admitted in his memoirs that he wrote in the 70 years, being retired, that one of his
goals was "to expand as much as possible, the boundaries of the Fatherland." [193] He added:
"We coped with this bad." In other words, a "buffer" would turn direct annexation, he
contributed to the expansion of the boundaries and the power of the Soviet Union.
"Oboronniki" in response to this claim that such a revolutionary-sounding phrases coming from
the top Soviet leaders were no more than empty boasting. Sovietization of Europe, they say, was
an air lock, ideological posturing and showing off.

They argue, "Offensive". The main purpose of the Great Soviet strategy was drawn from the war
favor. Lenin made the prediction, then polished by Stalin, that in the future there will be two
types of war: 1) inter-imperialist and 2) the imperialist wars of aggression against the USSR. The
first type of war was inevitable and naturally occurring, they said, because it was linked to the
"last stage of imperialism", in which the amplifying "contradictions" between capitalist states
would inevitably turned around wars. The second type of war, "anti-Soviet" was also inevitable
for as long as it was not destroyed by "capitalist encirclement."
Since all these wars are pushing for revolution (proletarians oppose the imperialist wars in which
the capitalist oppressors use workers as cannon fodder), the Soviets made sense to aggravate the
"inter-imperialist contradictions," as much as possible, while at the same time preparing for the
second type of war, which, according to Marxism-Leninism, have grown into a global "war of
liberation" for all workers. Tactics contradictions that come up with Lenin and Stalin, and
managed to bring to life the Soviet diplomacy was aimed at provoking Japan into conflict with the
United States, the European capitalist countries to set up against the US and their own - against
each other. (This policy has been re-used after years under Brezhnev in order to sow discord
within NATO.) Documented by the teaching and open [194] its secret activity of Soviet policy and
global subversion, which practiced the Comintern, the various statements made by Stalin and his
senior assistants .
One may ask how far been willing to go Stalin in an effort to contribute to the outbreak of the
Second World War (given that it was his own plan) to implement a clearly stated goal of the
Soviet world domination? As mentioned Beria's assistant Paul Sudoplatov, a key period in the
practical implementation of Soviet expansionist aims was the August-September 1939.
The question is: Is this the long-awaited ideal situation was, where the use of dual diplomacy and
liberating, "revolutionary" catalyst War could jointly realize the Soviet expansionist plans in this
unique moment in history, suitable? "Oboronniki" reject such an interpretation.
Regarding the gambit of collective security in the mid-thirties, prescribed by Stalin supposedly
"moderate", the so-called "pro-Western" People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov,
the revisionists "Offensive" insist that it was just a diversion from the dictator to frighten
Germany and spur her to make a deal with Moscow, only a simulation rallying ranks with Western
capitalist states.
In fact, Stalin immediately stopped all negotiations with other Western countries, as soon as
begin to work a deal with the Nazis.
I should add that a decade of experience of the Soviet-German cooperation in the twenties and
early thirties, was accompanied by a period of extensive bilateral trade. German economic
assistance to the industrialization of Soviet Russia under Stalin was in fact in some ways more
significant than that of [195] from the United States, despite the assistance of the latter in the
construction of railways, dams and Dnepropetrovsk Soviet tractor and textile mills.
Between 1921 and 1938, Germany exported to Russia more than two billion dollars in
commodities, while the US - 1.4 billion. After Hitler came to power, the NKVD began to cooperate
with the German Gestapo. (Article in the post-Soviet weekly "Arguments and Facts" to acquaint
the reader with documents on Soviet invention of a certain Dr. Berg - the gas chamber in the
form of four-wheeled vehicle used for the extermination of people. NKVD also gave Heinrich
Himmler schemes of an impressive network of Soviet labor camps (Gulag ), precursor of the Nazi
"death camps" Auschwitz and Buchenwald.) a little later, according to the secret protocols and

other agreements in August-September 1939, the Soviet raw materials (oil, grain, cotton,
chromium, iron, etc., more than 3 million tons by special agreement in 1940) was sent to
Germany with punctual precision. These supplies were used in the war against the Western Allies.
Tips comply with agreements on these supplies up to the June 22, 1941, despite the fact that the
Germans, for their part, were retreating from them.
"Oboronniki", on the contrary, insist that, regardless of the contacts with Germany, Stalin was
determined to seriously towards collective security. However, it is suspected that the British and
the French were not so serious. Moreover, it seems that he believed that the policy of
appeasement, which would eventually turn into an anti-Soviet alliance with the countries of the
Axis, was more likely solution to London and Paris, than consent to a serious agreement on
collective security with the Soviet Union (this assumes, however, that Stalin did not follow the
plan of "divide and rule", against which there is convincing evidence). Do not indicated whether
the flight of Hitler's aide Rudolf Hess to England in May 1941 that Britain was interested in
making a deal with Hitler? Then, Stalin reasoned, it would be best to stick a star on the German
gun crushing action.
Sudoplatov in his memoirs, also talks about the paramount importance of Stalin's deal with Hitler
against the background of the revolutionary Soviet expansionism. He writes: "The idea of
promotion of top communist revolution worldwide was a smokescreen ideological nature, aimed
to approve the Soviet Union as a superpower, affecting all events in the world. Although originally
the concept was ideological, it gradually became a real political course. This possibility has
opened before our country for the first time after the signing of the Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact.
For now, both confirmed the secret protocols, one of the leading nations of the world recognized
the international interests of the Soviet Union and its natural desire to expand its borders "
{245} .
According to Colonel Grigory Tokaev, officer and employee of the Red Army of the Soviet military
administration in occupied East Germany at the end of the war, the trustee of the NKVD of Stalin
and Lavrenty Beria Assistant Deputy General Ivan Serov, the Soviets hoped to war to speed up the
promotion of the Sovietization of the West. It was a point of view, he said, it is widely supported
in the higher echelons of the civil and military power in the Kremlin.
Other well-informed ex-Soviet military officers and civilian officials who have come to the West
before, during or after World War II, made similar statements.
It makes sense to also mention the background of the Soviet-German friendship. After the First
World War, Germany was considered by Lenin, and later Stalin, as the host of Europe, sorry "lack"
of power. Therefore, it was malleable to the Soviet proposals of friendship. In addition, Russia
was not a party to the Treaty of Versailles and in fact acted against him. The Council considers
that [196.197] inter-imperialist struggle has entered a new phase due to the humiliating treaty
that brought Germany and its working class into poverty. Due to the German-Soviet Rapallo
Treaty in 1922 and the other agreements, Soviet Russia soon perceptibly moved closer to
Germany.
"Oboronniki" believe that the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership would remain largely a
bystander being played out to the world-historical events in a unique time. Later, perhaps, the
Soviet Union would use the situation for their own purposes, but definitely would not aggressive
participant in World War II. USSR and would not, as Stalin said, "pull the chestnuts out of the fire"
for the capitalist countries. First of all, the Soviet Union would try to stay out of the expanding

conflict as long as possible.

At the same time, "defensive" line does not include the fact that Stalin is openly declared some of
his aides wanted to capitalist countries, democratic or fascist, mutually destroyed themselves in a
fight that would have paved the way for a "revolution" in the Soviet style . "Oboronniki" also does
not take into account the tactic is clearly protected by Lenin and Stalin, according to which the
tips as possible encourage the "contradiction" between the competing forces of capitalist
countries to the extent that incited them to the fratricidal war.
In addition, according to the Nazi-Soviet treaties and protocols or unilateral steps by the Soviet in
1940 the Soviets acquired a "buffer zone", including, inter alia, the Baltic states, Bessarabia and
Northern Bukovina. This area has been designed to provide the Soviets a certain amount of space
and time to build their defenses. As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 winter Tips
received by the Finnish further "protection" in the form of geo-strategic areas on its northern
border. Later, Stalin demanded all Bukovina, but in negotiations with the Germans agreed to the
union with the northern part only. These acquisitions are not considered "oboronnikami" as a
direct expansion. Strange, but they also do not see the connection between the acquisitions of
1939-1940, and the creation of the "Soviet bloc" Central and Eastern European countries after
the Second World War.
Istoriki- "Offensive" believe that the invasion of June 22, 1941 Hitler seized by surprise potential
invader Stalin. Arrogance and self-confidence of the Soviet dictator in his relationship with Hitler
was deprived of his sober look at what is happening. "Oboronniki" argue that this line is a
"pro-Nazi" and not supported by evidence. They notice that Hitler and his generals were quite
disingenuous when he says that the operation "Barbarossa" was carried out only because Stalin
was planning an attack on Germany.
What happened immediately before June 22, 1941? What kind of military defensive or offensive
measures taken Stalin really? The answer to this question could shed light on the plans of the
Soviet dictator for Germany.
Taking into account the offensive of the Red Army immediately before June 22, 1941, avtory"Offensive", including several modern Russian military historians support the view that the
militarization of the Stalinist Soviet Union and the huge volume of defense products produced in
the previous two World war five-year plans were subject to clearly offensive military strategy and
testified about one thing: there was a long-term plan for the preparation of an offensive war.
Kokoshin, a former deputy defense minister, top military adviser to President Yeltsin and the
Security Council Secretary, in his book "The Army and Politics," published in 1995, briefly spoke
about it this way: "The offensive nature of Soviet military strategy was quite obvious." [198.199]
Stalin's secret speech May 5, 1941 to the graduates of the military academies - another example
of the same. Full verbatim text of speech does not exist, but it is assembled piece by piece on the
basis of a few remaining options drawn up according to the recollections of witnesses statements.
They are analyzed in the collection of essays edited by the Russian Academician Yuri Afanasiev
"The Other War. 1939-1945. " This publication reproduces the three versions of the text of
Stalin's speech.
In his speech in the Grand Kremlin Palace in just a few weeks before the German invasion, Stalin
has completely changed both their and Molotov approval of 1939-1940. that Britain and France
were the main "instigators of a new war." As Stalin said, is now Germany has become a major
"warmonger." He also said that there should be an end to notions of "German invincibility." It's

time to prepare for aggressive war. Immediately after Stalin's speech reception for graduates,
academics was organized, which is said to witnesses, Stalin developed the ideas of his speech;
"The Secretary General, in the first place, spoke about the need to go to the activities of the Red
Army from defense to" a military policy of offensive operations ", and secondly, to rebuild the
propaganda campaign, printing, all education" in an offensive spirit " {246} .
Further explanation of Stalin's instructions were given in the following days and weeks in the
business papers such senior officials as Molotov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Shcherbakov (who was
responsible for military indoctrination), and General Alexander Vasilevsky and Nikolai Vatutin. In
his speech reaming Stalin and the subsequent reception of these officials and senior military
officers, always referring to Stalin, touted "military policy of offensive action." Then I
remembered Lenin's statement: any war waged by the Soviet Union against capitalist forces, "a
just war, regardless of which side started the war."
(This statement was repeated word for word in Soviet military literature in the era of
thermonuclear weapons and detente.) "Offensive" line says that this war, which was planned by
the Soviets, who had their own tactics blitzkrieg "by Tukhachevsky" would lead the Red Army in
Europe as a liberator, as prophesied Lenin. The revolution would be brought to the West at a time
when a defeated Germany was in ruins, and paralyzed France, Britain and America were far in the
confrontation with the red, mostly Eurasia. Thus it would be compensated for the humiliation
suffered the USSR (and Stalin personally) from failures in the Soviet-Polish war of 1920.
With regard to the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 the protagonists of the Soviet offensive theory
quoted recently published a transcript of the speech of Lenin, begins: "I ask to write smaller, it
does not get into print." In this speech Lenin in 1920 he predicted that the Sovietization of Poland,
the Red Army could stay right on the German border. In this case, it could then begin "aggressive
war" against the West, ultimately bringing "liberation war" throughout Europe.
"Offensive" direction, in addition, discusses the question of whether Stalin's acquisition of the
necessary "buffer zones" in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet agreement quite so innocent. After
all, Stalin drew a dangerous Soviet border to the German borders - borders that once the
Wehrmacht would have to cross in the attack against the Soviets. Perhaps Stalin had planned for
it to happen quite a different way? Namely - Stalin moved forward to implement its strategy of
doing the unexpected, aggressive war against Germany?
It is noteworthy that Stalin did not begin immediately to strengthen the defense in the newly
acquired territories in the West, say the authors. When along the former (until 1939) the old
Soviet border fortifications were dismantled, it has not been established, no new "Stalin Line".
[200.201]
Thus, instead of being guided by the policy of defense in the newly acquired territories of the
Baltic States, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, as well as Ukraine and Belarus, Stalin, as the
"offensive" trend in historiography, he turned it mainly troops ready to attack. They consisted
mainly of airborne troops and mechanized divisions. These parts have been trained and equipped
to carry out rapid, offensive strokes and deep penetration into the enemy's rear. This tactic was
used during military exercises under the supervision of Zhukov held in the Soviet Union in the
years 1940- 1941. Zhukov has applied this tactic in fact in combat against the Japanese in the
Halkin-Gol (Mongolia) in August-September 1939, where he led the Soviet forces.
Historians variously estimate the conclusions that have been made by Stalin and his generals of
these lessons. "Oboronniki" insist that the conclusions were largely defensive in nature;

"Offensive" also believe that they were offensive.

In support of "Offensive" refer to an important document, dated May 15, 1941: "Considerations
on the plan for the strategic deployment of forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with
Germany and its allies." It was built in the form of a memorandum, entitled "Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars, Comrade Stalin." The document was written by Deputy Chief of
General Staff General Vasilevsky. Did Stalin read the strategy document - it is unknown.
"Considerations ..." reproduced completely in the book Afanasyeva. The dispute relating to the
passage read: "Given that Germany is currently holding its army mobilized, deployed with the
rears, it has the ability to prevent (underlined in the text -. LU ) have to deploy and strike swiftly.
To prevent this, I consider it necessary in any case not to give action initiative of the German
command, to pre-empt (underlined in the text -. AU ) enemy to deploy and attack the German
army at the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and did not have time even arrange
the front and the interaction of arms " {247} .
At the same time, according to "offensive" direction, the Soviets built at the forefront in the
frontier military airfields that could be used for tactical and strategic air attack that would subtly
capture the Germans by surprise. At the same time they were very vulnerable and were
destroyed by German troops in the first place after the attack, which began on Sunday at 3 am,
June 22, 1941. Significantly and that all Soviet latest equipment and best trained soldiers - in fact
two-thirds of all members of the Red Army at the time - were deployed in the western border
areas.
The Soviet Armed Forces have grown by 250 percent in just two years. Between 1939 and 1941
the number of Soviet Armed Forces grew from less than two million to more than five million,
and with less than 100 divisions to more than 300.
Due to the fact that the Wehrmacht attacked the Red Army suddenly, thanks to Stalin's demand
that the Red Army immediately - and, as happened in many cases, premature - started to conduct
a counter-offensive, the Soviet losses were staggering. For the "offensive" direction, this fact is
further proof of the intentions of the Red Army offensive.
This is also illustrated by the absence of the military doctrine of Stalin's tactical and / or strategic
retreat. Thanks to the deployment of troops, the Red Army was unprepared for the blitzkrieg,
which began in a peaceful Sunday. On the first day of the German attack only some western
regions lost 738 aircraft, most of which were destroyed on the ground. In the first few hours of
the war the Germans achieved complete air superiority over more than three thousand [202.203]
kilometers front, killing an average of 1,200 aircraft per day. Barely two weeks after the attack, it
seemed that the German troops are on their way to victory in the war.
According to the calculations of modern US military analysts, after six months of war, the total
Soviet losses were equivalent to 229 divisions. German losses in men, by comparison, averaged
less than half of the Soviet losses. By November 1942 the Soviets lost in killed, wounded and
captured prisoners over 11 million people in relation to the German 4 million. It should be
remembered that the latter were an offensive war, and the traditional legal battle says that
attacking side loses many more soldiers than defending - about three to one calculation.
The controversy over the fact that Stalin planned in 1939- 1941 years, is more than just an
academic exercise. Today Russian students have at their disposal several options for new history
textbooks. Author of this article has analyzed some of them and found that most of the
communist propaganda about the events of internal and foreign policy of Lenin's time, Stalin and

their successors had them eliminated from 1917 to 1991. Yet some part of it still remains. In the
name of historical truth and the condemnation of the communist past is absolutely necessary to
fill the "white spots" in Soviet history.
VL Doroshenko {248} , K. Pavlova, R. Ch Raak
Not a myth: Stalin's speech August 19, 1939
"... The agency Havas revealed the innermost intentions of Stalin."
Viktor Suvorov, "Icebreaker" (Moscow, 1992, p. 53).
28 and 29 November 1939, during the French newspapers published news agency Havas, which
was a summary of the speech IV Stalin, delivered at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU (b) 19
August of the same year. The message appeared in newspapers such as Le Figaro, Le Petit
Journal, Le Journal, Le Temps, L'Action franaise and others. Of these publications, it was
immediately reported to Stalin. His refutation of "On the false news agency Havas" newspaper
"Pravda" published on 30 November (doc. Number 1).
For Stalin, August 19, 1939 was an extremely busy day, entirely related to the German question.
Trade and credit agreement between the USSR and Germany was signed on this day {249} . The
same day, the Soviet ambassador in Germany, GA. Astakhov, has withdrawn from Berlin on
August 16, it has been replaced by an unknown AA Shkvartsevym {250} . Molotov August 19
twice met with the Ambassador of Germany in Russia F. Schulenburg and eventually handed him
the Soviet draft treaty (Covenant) of non-aggression for examination in Berlin and the decision
about the visit of German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Moscow to sign the final contract terms
{ 251} . Schulenburg himself was convinced that Stalin decided to enter into a contract with a
secret additional protocol was August 19 {252} .
After this, the story of Stalin's speech. Without wishing to present historiography of the issue in
general, we refer to the recent publication by the time - article SZ Cases of "Stalin's speech, which
was not." The author begins with a literature review article by E. Yekkelya "On an imaginary
speech of Stalin August 19, 1939" {253} , and examines in detail the Russian historiography,
undertaken including TS Bushuyeva in 1994, the first publication of the speech in the "New
World (number 12), the first special seminar on this question (Novosibirsk, Russia, April 16,
1995), followed by the recognition and non-recognition of this fact, both in Russia and abroad .
Shuffle does not hold itself in assessments of those historians who recognized the accuracy of the
French posts. According to him, "it is the lack of professionalism and has become the breeding
ground, which brings together Western and Russian adherents of the authenticity of" Stalin's
speech "hunt to review the genesis and the general concept of the Second World War, although
for different reasons," {254} . Moreover, it was them he blames the growth of apologetic
literature about Stalin: "Every attributed to Stalin the act that are not confirmed, will inevitably
cause a chain reaction psevdooproverzheny, calling into question the already proven facts and
arming again intensified neo-Stalinists new arguments for the rehabilitation of the criminal
regime and its leader " {255} .
As Yekkel happened does not believe in the authenticity of the speech of Stalin. Article Yekkelya
at the time to "freeze" the interest in Stalin's speech nearly 36 years. Shuffle by publishing his
article, he hopes. a similar result - not to put "into question the overall concept of the history of
the Second World War, not only which found confirmation in a large quantity of documents of

different levels, but most importantly, reflected the chain actually occurred interrelated events
that make up the overall picture of the Second World War" {256 } .
Hardly, however, he managed to put an end to this story.
I. Shuffle convinced of the existence of " one primary or original text circulated by November 28,
1939 Havas agency, and then published in the Revue de Droit International de Sciences
Diplomatiques et Politiques , and its modified version, it was not later than 23 December 1940
g . at the disposal of intelligence and counterintelligence at the Vichy government, ie the version
"Stalin's speech", which was later found in Moscow " {257} . In fact, text messages Havas Agency
published 28-November 29 French newspapers and then reprinted in the Revue de Droit
International ... (presumably from Le Temps newspaper), is an edited copy of the original text,
which received the agency. It is interesting to compare this text with what obtained in Geneva on
November 28, the German news agency Auslandische Nachrichtenagenturen. German
translation was finished at 11 o'clock of the same day. Shuffle mentions the existence of the
German text, but is limited only by the remark that "sent to the Embassy in Moscow Text Havas
posts a request to inform about the reaction to it in the official circles of the USSR Ministry of
Foreign Affairs [Germany] on 29 November, as well as pay attention to the Commissariat on the
desirability of an appropriate response to the Soviet press " {258} . Meanwhile, the German
translation of the Havas messages are discrepancies with the published copy of the French, who
happened to use as the source ( "one primary or initial") option {259} . The following is a
translation agency Havas posts (Doc. Number 2), published in the Revue de [206.207] Droit
International, ... (doc. Number 3), Russian translation of the text messages Havas agency on the
French copy of the Revue de Droit International ... "with additions and discrepancies existing in
the German copies (doc. number 4). The French text is given in the transfer case (in order not to
complicate the analysis unless absolutely necessary, though, in principle, it is possible to achieve
more accurate and consistent translation of the document).
Crucial to justify his negative attitude happened to the speech of Stalin existing text is the
following argument: "Researchers are not aware of any documents or evidence that even in the
slightest degree to authenticate, containing, among other things, a large attributed to Stalin
speech August 19, 1939 number of incorrect and frankly absurd regulations " {260} . In fact, there
are documents. And to the main ones and event drawn - to interpret the provisions of the Havas
agency message. Obviously, the researcher professionals supposed to draw from this the
necessary conclusions.
The communication agency Havas, issued November 28, 1939, are given all the basic provisions
of the secret additional protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939 (Doc.
Number 5). Publication in the press, almost immediately, the content of the collusion between
Stalin and Hitler, which the Soviet government denied the 50 years, and is a direct confirmation
of the authenticity of messages Havas agency.
Secret Additional Protocol includes a brief preamble, four points, specifying the time and place of
detention and the signatures of the parties. The preamble says "on the delimitation of spheres of
mutual interests in Eastern Europe", which is represented in the central part of the Havas agency
message, in particular, in the phrase "if we take you to the well-known German proposal on the
conclusion of her non-aggression pact."
The first paragraph of the secret additional protocol recorded: "In the event of a territorial and
political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of
interest of Germany and the USSR. At the same time the interests of Lithuania in the Vilna area is
recognized by both sides. " Accordingly, the Havas agency report said: "Germany will give us full
freedom of action in the three Baltic countries" (emphasis added. -Auto. ). Why three? Yes,
because in accordance with the understanding recorded in the secret protocol, Lithuania
belonged to the German sphere of interest, although considered independent. Do not trust Stalin,
Hitler thus covered by Lithuania East Prussia.
As you know, with regard to the Lithuanian secret additional protocol was implemented only in
part: Vilna area was transferred to Lithuania, but then Lithuania itself was handed to Stalin in
exchange for a number of Polish territories, when Hitler was convinced that Stalin had not
attacked him during the Polish campaign, which it was recorded in the next time the agreement
on friendship and border on September 28, 1939, but the understanding of political reality, as it
has developed ktomu time, the word "three" let. Therefore, further editing, it has been omitted,
although this word binds text agency Havas posts a secret additional protocol on August 23, 1939,
and allows the contents of the message dated the second half of August 1939.
It does not seem too shaky reasoning, based on one word, linking these two documents? It is not
the only one.
"2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish
state, the spheres of influence of Germany and USSR interests will be approximately by the line of
the rivers Narev, Vistula and San ". The relevant passage from the Havas agency message looks
like this: "In this case, Germany will give us part of Poland up to the outskirts of Warsaw,
including Ukrainian Galicia". On a geographical map shows that the overlap between the text
reproduced fragments of the absolute. However, it is again not implemented on the political map.
There is no need to go into the vicissitudes of military talks on 20 September, promotions and
branches of troops, first German and then Soviet; ultimately to the political moment the border
between the USSR and Germany was set on the river Bug, and the Red Army was not near
Warsaw in 1939. For those not familiar with the content of agreements observer of the time, this
meant that the Havas agency reported false information in hindsight, that looked really quite
absurd: common in late November-related information by 19 August, it was not justified either in
September or in November. , Said in a statement to historians as it serves as confirmation of the
date.
The third paragraph: "3. With regard to Southeastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes its
interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these
areas. " In the appropriate place in the text message Havas agency said: "It will not prevent the
return of Russian Bessarabia." Besides the obvious, we should add that the USSR proposed
ultimatum regarding Romania Bessarabia in February 1940, ie, after more than two months after
the distribution of posts Havas agency {261} .
Knowing this, event states: "At the same time," we "did not contain any new information (except
obviously absurd provisions), which would not be known in November 1939, any observer" {262}.
The last point of the secret additional protocol reads: "4. This protocol will be treated by both
parties as strictly secret. " After this incident, it surprised that Stalin's response to the Havas
agency message "bears the imprint of great annoyance of its author" {263} .
So, November 28, 1939 in France, which was at war with Germany, in the popular press was
published fair presentation of the secret additional protocol to the treaty of non-aggression

signed between the USSR and Germany, August 23, 1939 This report was first published in the US
1948 {264} . Stalin's response was immediate - the brochure "falsifiers of history" appeared at the
same time, in 1948.
III. As Yekkel happened artificially singles out the role of the journalist A. Ryuffe in this story. "It's
hard to say - he writes - whether Ryuffe author or co-author of the text attributed to Stalin, but
he could definitely know a lot about its origin ... It Ryuffe was involved in the publication of"
Stalin's speech and its variants " {265} . The reason for this, according to and Yekkelya, what
happened is that Ryuffe adhered pronounced anti-communist views.
However Ryuffe was just one of those who were involved in the publication of Stalin's speech
messages. Almost immediately after the announcement of the conclusion of the Soviet-German
treaty was the Kremlin to leak information about a radical change in Soviet policy. August 26,
1939 in London The Times has appeared, referring to the secret information of the USSR
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the message about the secret of Stalin's plan for the use
of the Covenant and followed him instructions to foreign communist parties.
On August 28, a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany Wermann E. (Ernst
Woermann) sent a report to the Gestapo, and later transferred to other higher institutions of the
Reich, citing an unnamed confidential source, who claimed that 1) the Soviet Union gave up its
former foreign policy; 2) deviated from the agreement with Britain and France, not to support
capitalism; 3) planned to stay out of the war, to enter into it, when other countries will weaken so
much that it could contribute to the social revolution there; 4) that the pact - it [210.211]
diplomatic and ideological victory over the Axis countries and their "distracting tricks" and 5) that
an additional reason for the pact was the refusal of Poland, Romania and the Baltic states by
military aid from the Soviet Union {266} . Sources of information in The Times Wermann and,
in all probability, were different.
A few days after the German attack on Poland, undertaken on 1 September 1939, two copies of
the instructions addressed to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Balkan parties,
were at the disposal of the Government of Romania. Thus, less than three weeks after the signing
of the pact and the secret protocol of the Romanian prime Eastern European section A. Calinescu
(Armand Calinescu) handed over these documents envoy Germany V. Fabricius (Wilhelm
Fabricius). He, in turn, forwarded them on September 10, in Ribbentrop's ministry and the
German embassy in Moscow {267} . At the same time A. Calinescu briefed with instructions and a
British envoy Sir R. Hoare (Reginald Hoare) {268} . September 8, 1939 the Swedish evening
newspaper Svenska Pressen, published in Helsinki, has published a message from Moscow,
which stated that "on August 22, the day before the signing of non-aggression agreement, in the
presence of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich Andreeva, Shvernik, Mikoyan, Beria,
Kalinin and others. circular was drawn to communist leaders not only in the USSR but also abroad
" {269} .
At the beginning of November in the western press has several publications on this topic.
November 1 the Paris newspaper Le Soir resulted in a message received from a defector from
the Stalinist environment N. Novikov, who claimed in September that it has the latest information
about what Stalin in his circle, presumably after the conclusion of the pact, said that " Hitler is
now in our hands ... we will take Poland to the wave of patriotism, while Germany will lead a
bloody struggle that cost her heavy losses in men and money ... Hitler, sooner or later will be
exhausted ... and then we'll to act according to our desires. "

November 2, the day after the publication of the revelations Novikov, Paris newspaper
L'Epoque published an editorial B. Lavergne (Bernard Lavergne). It shows that the author also
possessed information about Stalin's war plans, which then circulated in Europe, both in
journalism and in diplomatic circles, but treated it with skepticism. He wrote that Stalin is
counting on a prolonged war that depletes both sides. When this happens, the Soviet Union, it is
time to act. The article also spoke of Stalin's confidence that Germany is a nation, the most
susceptible to Bolshevisation.
On November 3, the British newspaper The Scotsman diplomatic agency correspondent has
published a brief description of the instructions sent out from Moscow to the Soviet embassy
abroad. Reporter does not have a source of information, but it is obvious that he was familiar
with the directive sent by the Balkan parties, which then turned out to be at the disposal of the
Romanian Premier Calinescu.
Thus, there were several reports about how Stalin's speech, and of the subsequent instructions.
This information not only possessed Ryuffe, but also other people who are not related to each
other. Of course, new facts complicate the study of this subject, but at the same time suggest
that different people in different countries, independently of one another, hardly engaged in a
common cause - the Stalinist falsification of speech.
IV. It happens, like other historians who share his point of view, as one of the main arguments
against the authenticity of the fact Stalin's speech arguing the absence of the Politburo meeting
August 19, 1939 Shuffle proved that there was an extended meeting of the Political Bureau,
which said the agency Havas. But no one has proved that the members of the Politburo did not
meet during the day. The fact that this has not fixed any of the Politburo protocols, nor in the
journal visitors Stalin's office - is not an argument. In the Stalinist practice of management
[212.213] Soviet Union could be a protocol without the Politburo and the Politburo without
protocol, and most importantly - could well be without Politburo Politburo. It is important that
they give away. Shuffle correctly drew attention to the fragment "if we take you to the famous
proposal of Germany": this piece refers to the five-informed leadership - Stalin, Molotov,
Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and do not enter into it Zhdanov and Beria {270} . According to
reports, they then take decisions on foreign policy are not fixed even in a "special folder"
Politburo. By the way, there is no trace, not only Stalin's speech, but generally no trace of
preparation for the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty on August 23, and the more secret
additional protocol to it.
V. Most of the article is devoted to the proof of the fact happened, that the leadership of the
Comintern did not know about the plans of Stalin aimed at a rapprochement with Berlin. Shuffle
comes from the belief that the leadership of the Comintern was regarded in the Kremlin, "as one
of the Soviet foreign policy tools" {271} . There is evidence of an opposite character, proving that
Stalin ignored the leadership of the Comintern, but enjoyed his name. Speaking of the Comintern,
Shuffle left-over the issue of such an invisible part of the Comintern, as the Communication
Service (CS), the successor to the International Communication Division (MLA) of the late 1920s early 1930s. It provides a connection to the majority of the Communist Parties, the Communist
International and the points of his residency in many countries around the world. After 1927 all
legal workers were replaced by people with foreign passports. To communicate with these
representatives of illegal Omsa, transfer of money, etc. appointed someone from the staff already
working in the embassy, the department performs tasks concurrently {272} . In this way it was

transferred to "appropriate instructions to the Communist Party abroad", which were discussed
in the Havas report. Even before the involvement of the Comintern in the discussion of these
issues, the Soviet embassy abroad sent some communist parties not only an explanation of the
Covenant, but also the specific instructions. Prepared, among other things, on behalf of the
Comintern, they had the following title:. "The official government statement, sent from Moscow
to the Soviet Union's diplomatic missions established in the Balkans" These guidelines were
developed before the appearance of any of the Comintern resolution establishing the Communist
parties of the position in relation to the Covenant. Let us recall the information in the newspaper
The Scotsman on November 3, 1939 that the "instruction" appeared in the Soviet Union's
diplomatic missions abroad for a few days after the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty.
Available at our disposal two copies of "instructions" are virtually identical, although one in
German and one in French. In the German copy is an indication that it is a translation from the
Romanian, in French - with the Bulgarian. These instructions, sent from Moscow, were the
Romanian Premier Calinescu, who in turn handed them over to the German envoy V. Fabricius. By
submitting them to Berlin, Fabricius, along with the opinion that this British disinformation, also
indicated that they came from the Soviet diplomatic missions {273} . Text "instructions" (doc.
Number 6) is translated from French. The instructions on the content of a very careful and most
are not specific guidelines and attempt to test the waters.
The report referred to the Havas agency DZ Manuilsky, who together with G. Dimitrov was
charged "under the personal leadership of Stalin develop appropriate instructions to the
Communist Party abroad." Shuffle gives information indicating that "the leadership of the
Comintern continued to act in the spirit of traditional systems, without having a clear idea of the
radical changes have taken place in the foreign policy of the Kremlin to date after August 23,"
{274} . There is reason to believe that it is in force in Soviet foreign policy pivot surprises
Manuilsky on Stalin's orders while leading a double game with the heads of [214,215] of foreign
communist parties. Based on conversations with J. Hernandez, Gottwald and B. Peak, Manuilsky
was aware of the steps of radical changes in foreign policy of the Kremlin, so in the days of the
pact, he said that "global capitalists to be the period of disasters", "if capitalists want to destroy
each other, it is necessary to allow them to it, "that" the war is over revolution "that" our goal is
to eliminate Poland "and that" we should do what at first glance seems absurd, "that is, in fact,
carefully expounded the provisions contained in the existing text we Stalinist speech {275} .
Dimitrov, Stalin took on September 7. Speaking of the conversation, which was attended by
Molotov and Zhdanov, event does not agree with the opinion of one of the authors of this article,
that "the content of the recording Dimitrov is consistent to what Stalin said August 19" {276} .
However, he recognizes that a call recording Dimitrov to Stalin "Stalin, there is a clear interest in a
large and protracted military conflict between the warring parties, the result of which should be
to their mutual weakening." Shuffle notes that "the really pivotal for Stalin thought is expressed
subtly, using almost" home "language" {277} .
Of course, on September 7, when the bulk of the planned has been done, Stalin behaved
differently than in the days before the signing of the Soviet-German treaty and the secret
additional protocol on 23 August. And here it is necessary to agree with the words of regret B.
Bonvecha (case leads them in his article) that "Russian historians today should know about Stalin,
the decision-making procedure on the Politburo, etc. much more "than Yekkel in 1950 {278} . It is
regrettable also that, as far as modern Russian historians still do not understand how Stalin and

still believe it "with the word"!

However, there are questions to which no answer now. Who transmitted the text of Stalin's
speech on 27 November Ryuffenu journalist? He himself said only the following: "For three weeks,
that is, from the beginning of November 1939 (. And in fact, as we see, even earlier - Ed.), Among
journalists and politicians cruised rumors of a top secret meeting of Politburo of the CPSU (b), to
take critical decision on the war. " Ryuffe "attempted to obtain more accurate information, writes happen - but they were unsuccessful. And suddenly I had the opportunity to get in touch
with a senior person whose awareness is not in doubt. This person, and provided all the
necessary information that Ryuffe recorded as accurately as possible " {279} . It is appropriate to
the assumption that the author of the administrative or customer of such a statement of Stalin's
speech in those conditions could only be Stalin himself. The purpose of dissemination of this text,
and followed the instructions communist parties of European countries was to destabilize the
situation in Europe. Neither confirm this assumption, nor deny it is impossible.
No one knows who intervened in the original text of Stalin's speech. The article Ryuffe "Two
documents," published July 12, 1941 {280} , and in his subsequent publications, in addition to the
text of Stalin's speech, caught in the disposal of the Havas agency, according to the second
document, which did not attract the attention of happened. It is Moscow's "instructions" of the
French and Belgian communist parties of November 25, 1939, published December 11 in the
L'Ordre national French newspaper. The newspaper published a seven-page document that is
almost completely, presenting it as a fake. It is this publication quoted Ryuffe July 12, 1941 g .:
"Guide was designed head of the [West - Europe], his deputy, General Secretary of the
Communist parties in France and Belgium. No one must know about this document, dated
November 25, the very existence of which had to be kept secret. "
This document, according to Ryuffe committed to being Stalin's spirit and Stalinist plan: "The
establishment of the Soviet system in all capitalist countries by [216.217] world revolution is the
main goal of Soviet foreign policy. The European war, which the capitalist countries are for their
own reasons, creates a unique and favorable circumstances and conditions for the emergence of
a world revolution ... We have arrived at our destination: all-out war without responsibility for it
in the eyes of the world and without it ... We we will help the Germans during the war in Europe,
so that they can resist as long as possible, but not to allow the victory of the German armies. We
will keep in our hands the possibility of resolving the situation (arbitration). " How the
Communist parties of the West, as we see, were developed later, when the Second World War
was already under way, and the basic idea of the future of the world revolution they set out more
clearly. The instructions also contain detailed instructions on how to provoke a revolutionary
situation in France, in particular, on the political and military espionage, on propaganda among
the masses and in the army, as well as on preparations for the seizure of power. Lyricist found TS
Bushuyeva in Moscow, not installed. HE. Ken and AI Rupasov based solely on the fact that one of
the variants of the recording of Stalin's speech appeared in the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff of
the French believe that the author was associated with the French secret services {281} . While it
is clear only that its originator was by this time (on the document, according to happen, there is
the date of 12/23/40) knew not only the Havas agency message with the text of the speech of
Stalin, and communist parties of the West instructions. That's why all the additions to the text of
the speech of Stalin, writes about what had happened, "published in 1941-1944., Concerned not
the Kremlin's geopolitical ambitions, but only revolutionizing Europe, mainly France, and the

Communist Party of the tasks in this regard." And the author of the text found in Moscow,
contrary to what had happened, not "too far, paying too much attention to revolutionizing the
future of Europe and the role of the PCF in this process" {282} . On the contrary, he briefly
outlined the essence of specific instructions, took nearly four pages of text, published in L'Ordre
national December 11, 1939.
Of course, the Havas agency message outlining the Stalin speech is not an authentic document.
This fact is emphasized by our opponents, focusing on not typical of Stalin's expressions, such as
the modus vivendi. In dealing with Stalin's speeches, we do not always have the original
document, written by Stalin himself. For example, in the case of his speech at the reception in the
Kremlin graduates of military academies of the Red Army May 5, 1941, too, there is an authentic
original document, because Stalin's speech was improvised. It exists in the records of a few
persons who were present at the reception. All entries in a certain extent different from each
other. In the book, VA Nevezhina "speech of Stalin's Table" is published eight different versions of
Stalin's speeches, but they nonetheless confirm the fact of speech and transmit its basic meaning
of {283} .
What follows from this? Havas agency report outlining Stalin's speech to the Politburo on 19
August 1939 - is part of a complex of information circulating in the West since the end of August,
1939, on Stalin's secret plans to use the pact with Hitler, and their instructions to the Communist
parties abroad. Ryuffe was only one of the persons involved in this story. The text of Stalin's
speech set out in the communication agency Havas and distributed by this agency on November
28 is consistent with the text of the secret additional protocol to the Soviet-German treaty of
August 23, 1939.
Now that really set the Stalinist foundation posts Havas agency, get to an incredible, namely
Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as Yugoslavia and Italy. The first three are mentioned in
the text in the very next sentence of Bessarabia. So, Stalin said about Bessarabia, as a
confirmation of the secret additional protocol requirement 1940 and the capture of the summer it's true, and the very next sentence - a falsification? And if Stalin's aggressive intentions were
confirmed by the war, it does not mean anything? As a result of the Second World War, it
[218.219] Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary have become a zone of influence of the Soviet Union
about 45 years, and with Yugoslavia there was a misfire, something similar misfire with Finland.
In 1995, Doroshenko said that the passage of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia "is a
claim to which Stalin appealed to Hitler or that he brought to its attention in this way," {284} .
Today it is clear that this passage in its origin is the same as the passage of Poland, the Baltic
countries and Bessarabia - all results of exploratory talks between the representatives of Stalin
and Hitler. The talks were continued Molotov in November 1940 in Berlin; there it was, and of
Bulgaria and Romania, and Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and even in Turkey and Greece, {285} .
In Russia, there is still no scientific concept of the Second World War. Today, both the government
and society cultivate the remnants of Soviet ideology, the question of Stalin's speech revealing his
aspirations in this war, is of fundamental importance. If we exclude the fact of speech Stalin
August 19, 1939 of history, it may be possible to argue that Stalin "wanted to ensure national
interests." As it happened writes, "to the fore geopolitical component of interest, seeing in
expanding the country's borders, ie in the expansion, the best way to ensure its security. Was
Stalin interested in the war? Sure, but ... not at all. According to his plan, which led to an
agreement with the Third Reich, and not with the Western powers, one of the Kremlin's priorities

lay in the fact that, using part of the European powers in a military conflict, annexing, "to seize",
countries classified in agreement with the Berlin to the "area of interest" of the USSR, and at the
same time as much as possible to stay out of the big war " {286} . In this case, Stalin's intentions
are limited to claims on territory formerly part of Russia, and thus, historically justified by its
national and state interests.
If you take into account the reality of Stalin's speech, the conclusion is inevitable that Hitler and
Stalin are equally responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War. Reference to the fact
that "even in the Nuremberg trials the protection of the accused did not consider it possible to
use the" Stalin's speech "19 August 1939" {287} , is unconvincing. At the Nuremberg trials has not
been used not only to this speech, but the fact of the execution of the NKVD of Polish officers in
Katyn. Unspoken consensus allies in the process in relation to Stalin, forced to shield partner, still
plays a negative role in the historiography, and not only in Russia but also in the West.
However, in Russia the matter is compounded by the fact that there still can not be separated
from the people of Stalin in World War II, still millions of sacrifice redeems his criminal policy.
Number 1. Stalin's refutation of
"false reports about the agency Havas"
The editor of "Pravda" turned to Comrade Stalin with the question. How does Comrade Stalin to
the post Havas agency on 'Stalin's speech, "which supposedly delivered to them" in the Politburo
on 19 August ", which was held ostensibly the idea that" war must continue as. longer possible to
drain the warring parties. "
Tov. Stalin sent the following reply: "This is a message the Havas agency, like many of his other
posts, is a lie. Of course, I can not know, in what is a lie fabricated kafeshantane. But no matter
how they lied gentlemen of the Havas agency, they can not deny the fact that: a) Germany
attacked France and England, and France and Britain attacked Germany, taking responsibility for
the present war; b) after the opening of hostilities Germany appealed to France and England with
peace proposals and the Soviet Union openly supported the peace proposals [220.221] Germany,
because he believed and continues to believe that a speedy end to the war would radically eased
the situation of all countries and peoples; c) the ruling circles of Britain and France rudely
dismissed as peace proposals of Germany and the Soviet Union's attempts to achieve an early
end of the war.
These are the facts.
What can oppose these facts kafeshantannye policy of the Havas agency? "
True. 30.XI.1939
Number 2. The German text of the Havas agency posts
AUSLNDISCHE NACHRICHTENAGENTUREN
Nr. A V24, Berlin, 28/11/39
abgeschl.l 1.00 Uhr
the E / Kg
HAVAS
28.11
Genf
Warum hat Sowjetrussland den Vertrag mit Deutschland unterzeichnet? Zeit langem schon fragt

sich die ffentliche Meinung der Welt, und sie fragt sich noch immer, welches die Beweggrnde
der Regierung der Sowjetunion gewesen sind, als sie am 19 Oktober die poltischen und
wirtschaftlichen Vertrge mit Deutschland unterzeichnete. Man wusste bisher noch nicht, unter
welchen Bedingungen S t and 1 in bei dieser Wendung seinen Politik die einm tige Zustimmung
des Polit-Bros erhalten hatte. Heute nun ist der Schleier gelftet. Aus Moskau, und zwar aus
durchaus zuverlssiger Quelle, hat man genaueste Meldungen ber den Verlauf der Sitzung
erhalte welche auf Ersuchen Stalins am 19. August um 10 Uhr abends stattgefunden hat, und
darber hinaus hat man genaue Einzelheiten ber die Rede in Erfahrung gebracht, die Stalin aus
diesem Anlass gehalten hat. Am 19 August abends waren die Mitglieder des Polit-Bros zu einer
dringenden und geheimen Sitzung zusammenberufen worden, an welcher die fhrenden Leiter
der Komintern, jedoch nur diejenigen der russischen Sektion, teilnahmen. Keiner der
auslndischen Kommunisten und nicht einmal der Generalsekretr der Komintern, D imit g of ff,
war zu dieser Sitzung eingeladen worden, die zu dem Zweck einberufen worden war, der brigens
aus der Tagesordnung nicht zu ersehen gewesen ist, einen Bericht Stalins entgegenzunehmen
Stalin ergriff sogleich das Wort. In seiner Rede fhrte er im wesentlichen folgendes aus: Krieg
oder Frieden, diese Frage ist in ein kritisches Stadium getreten. Ihre Lsung hngt ganz und gar
von der Haltung der Sowjetunion ab. Wir sind durchaus der berzeugung, dass wenn ein
Bndnisvertrag mit Frankreich und England geschlossen wird, Deutschland gen tigt ist, vor Polen
zur ckzuweichen und mit den Westm chten einen modus vivendi zu suchen. Auf diese Weise
kann der Krieg vermieden werden, und dann wird die sp tere Entwicklung der Dinge fr uns
einen gefhrlichen Charakter annehmen. Wenn wir hingegen den Ihnen bekannten Vorschlag
Deutschlands annehmen und mit Deutschland einen Nichtangriffspakt abschliessen, wird
Deutschland ganz bestimmt Polen angreifen, und dann wird eine Intervention Frankreichs und
Englands unvermeidlich. Unter diesen Umst nden haben wir grosse Aussichten, abseits des
Konfliktes zu bleiben, und knnen mit Vorteil abwarten, bis die Reihe an uns kommt. Dies aber ist
gerade, was unser Interesse erfordert. Unsere Wahl ist somit klar: wir mssen den deutschen
Vorschlag annehmen und die englisch-franzsische Delegation mit hflichem Bedauern nach
Hause schicken. Es ist nicht schwierig, den Vorteil zu erkennen, den wir aus diese Methode
ziehen werden.
Es steht fr uns fest, dass Polen zu Boden liegt, ehe England und Frankreich berhaupt nur in der
Lage sind, ihm zuhilfe zu kommen. In diesem Falle tritte Deutshchland uns einen Teil Polens bis an
die Grenze von Warschau ab und zwar einschliesslich Galiziens und der Ukraine. Deutschland l
sst uns ferner in den drei baltischen Staaten jede Handlungsfreiheit. Es widersetzt sich nicht einer
Rckehr Bessarabiens nach Russland. Ist bereit of Es, uns [222.223] Rumnien, Bulgarien und
Ungarn als Einflusszonen zuzugestehen. Es bleibt dann lediglich die Frage Jugoslawiens offen ,
deren Lsung von der von Italien einzunehmenden haltung abhngt. Sollte Italien an der Seite
Deutschlands bleiben, dann wrde Deutschland von Italien fordern, dass Jugoslawien zu seiner
Einflusszone gehrt, und es wrde darber hinaus auch von Jugoslawien einen Zugang zum
Adriatischen Meer erhalten. Wenn aber Italien nicht mit Deutschland geht, dann wird sich
Deutschland auf Kosten Italiens einen Zugang zur Adria verschaffen, und in diesem Falle wrde
Jugoslawien zu unserer Einflusszone gehren, dies zum mindesten fr den Fall, dass Deutschland
aus dem Kriege als Sieger hervorgeht. Wir mssen jedoch auch die Mglichkeit ins Auge fassen,
dass Deutschland aus dem Kriege als Sieger, ebensogut aber auch als Besiegter hervorgeht.
Prfen wir den fall einer deutschen Niederlage. England und Frankreich werden in diesem Falle

noch gengend stark sein, um Berlin zu besetzen und um ein sowjetisches Deutschland zu
vernichten, und wir wrden nicht in der Lage sein, einem solchen sowjetischen Deutschland
wirksam zuhilfe zu kommen. Es ist somit unser Bestreben, dass Deutschland den Krieg mglichst
lange aushalten kann, damit England und Frankreich ermdet und derart erschpft sind, dass sie
nicht mehr in der Lage sind, ein sowjetisches Deutschland zu Boden zu werfen. Aus dieser
berlegung ergibt sich unsere Haltung: Wir bleiben zwar neutral, doch stehen wir Deutschland
wirtschaftlich bei, indem wir ihm Rohstoffe und Lebensmittel liefern. Dabei versteht es sich
jedoch von selbst, dass unsere Hilfe eine gewisse Grenze nicht berschreiten darf, damit wir
unsere eigene wirtschaftliche Lage nicht kompromitieren und die Macht unserer Armee nicht
schw chen.
Gleichzeitig mssen wir eine allgemeine kommunistische Propaganda fhren und dies besonders
in dem franzsischenglischen Bloc und vor allem in Frankreich. Mssen uns darauf Wir gefasst
machen, dass unsere in Frankreich Partei des w hrend Krieges gezwungen ist, zu den Boden
legalen Verlassen und zu [224] einer heimlichen Ttigkeit berzugehen. Wir wissen, dass eine
solche Ttigkeit viel Geld kostet. Wir m ssen aber ohne Zaudern diese Opfer auf uns nehmen.
Wenn diese vorbereitende Arbeit mit Sorgfalt durchgefhrt wird , dann ist der Bestand eines
sowjetischen Deutschlands sichergestellt. Das kann dazu beitragen, auch Frankreich zu
sowjetisieren. Um zu diesem Ziele zu gelangen, mssen wir, wie ich eingangs ausgefhrt habe,
dafr sorgen, dass sich der Krieg mglichst in die Lnge zieht, und wir m ssen in diesem Sinne
die uns zur Verfgung stehenden Mittel anwenden. Prfen wir jetzt die zweite Hypothese, n
mlich die eines deutschen Sieges. Verschiedene vertreten die Ansicht, dass diese Mglichkeit fr
uns eine sehr ernste Gefahr bedeutet. In dieser Behauptung steckt ein Krnchen Wahrheit. Es
wre jedoch ein Irrtum, vollte man annehmen, dass diese Gefahr so nahe bevorsteht und dass sie
so gross ist, wie verschiedene sich einbilden. Wenn Deutschland aus dem Kriege siegreich
hervorgeht, dann ist es zu erm det, um sich in den nchsten 10 Jahren mit uns in einen
bewaffneten Konflikt einzulassen . Seine Hauptsorge wird sein das besiegte Frankreich und das
besiegte England zu berwachen, um sie daran zu hindern, sich wieder zu erheben. Daneben
wird ein siegreiches Deutschland ber gewaltige Kolonier verfgen. Die Ausbeutung dieser
Kolonien und ihre Anpassung an die deutschen Methoden werden Deutschland ebenfalls
jahrzehntelang besch ftigen. Es liegt auf der Hand, dass Deutschland zu sehr besch fgt sein
wird, um sich gegen uns zu wenden. Genossen, so schloss Stalin, ich habe Sie mit meiner
berlegungen vertraut gemacht. Ich wiederhole Ihnen, dass es in Ihrem Interessse liegt, wenn
zwischen Deutschland und dem englisch-franz sischen Block ein Krieg ausbricht. Fr uns kommt
es daraf an, dass dieser Krieg mglichst lange dauert damit beide Parteien sich erschpfen. Aus
diesen Grnden mssen wir den von Deutschland vorgeschlagenen Pakt annehmen und mssen
daran arbeiten, dass dieser Krieg, ist er einmal ausgebrochen, so lange wie mglich andauert. The
Zur [225] Gleichen mssen wir unsere Zeit Propagandaarbeit in den Staaten kriegf hrenden
intensivieren, damit der the Tag, an welchem der Krieg zu Ende Airport geht, bereit uns findet .
Die Rede Stalins, die mit Andacht angeh rt wurde, wurde in keiner Weise diskutiert. Nur zwei
Fragen wurden gestellt, aufweiche Stalin antwortete. Sein Vorschlag, den Nichtangriffspakt mit
Deutschland anzunehmen , wurde einstimmig gebilligt. Dann fasste das Polit-Bro den
Entschluss , den Prsidenten der Komintern, M anu 1 ski (sic -. Ed. ) Nfr, zu beauftragen, mit dem
Generalsekretr der Komintern, Dimitroff, unter der persnlichen Leitung Stalins die
Instruktionen auszuarbeiten, die der Kommunistischen Partei im Auslande gegeben werden

sollen .
Archiv des Ausw Politisches Rgen Amtes. Berlin (PAAA). Botschaft Moskau, 530. S.
202689-202693. A typewritten copy. In the text there are numerous underscore, exclamation
points and questions in the field. The word drei underlined twice. On the left margin of the
first page recording made by hand F. Schulenburg: "Saturday! Stalin had already decided in the
afternoon. It is important that 19.8 of the political decision was made. " On the left margin of the
second page: "From whom? Perhaps, from the Soviet Union! "
Number 3. Text messages published Havas agency
L'URSS aurait Pourquoi sign son is accord avec le Reich. L'agence Havas a re u de Moscou , via
Genve, d'une source qu'elle d clare absolument digne de foi, les renseignements suivants sur la
se ance que le Politbureau tint, a la demande de Staline, le 19 aot a 10 heures du soir, et a la
suite de laquelle l'URSS signa avec le Reich l'accord politique que l'on sait: le 19 ao t au soir, les
membres du Politbureau avaient t convoqu s d'urgence a une se ance te a laquelle secr
assistaient les principaux dirigeants du Komintern, mais seulement ceux de la [226] section called
russe. Aucun des communistes trangers, m me pas Dimitrov, secr taire g n rai du Komintern,
n'avait t invit a cette r union dont le but, qui n' tait pas indiqu dans l'ordre du jour, tait d
'entendre un rapport de Staline.
Celui-ci prit imm diatement la parole . L'essentiel de Voici son is discours: the La paix ou la
guerre. Cette question est entr e dans sa phase critique. Sa solution d pend enti rement de la
position que prendra l'Union sovitique. Nous sommes absolument convaincus que si nous
concluons un traitd'alliance avec la France et la Grande-Bretagne l'Allemagne se verra oblig e
de reculer devant la Pologne et de chercher un modus vivendi avec les puissances occidentales.
Cette fa on De, la guerre pourra Us tre vite an e, et, alors, le d veloppement ult - rieur de
cet of tat Us de choses prendra un caract the re dangereux pour nous.
Autre part D', si nous acceptions la proposition de l'Allemagne, que vous connaissez, de conclure
avec elle un Pacte de the non-agression, l'Allemagne attaquera certainement la Pologne, of el
l'Intervention dans cette guerre de l'Angleterre, et deviendra la France de in vitable. Ces
circonstances Dans, beaucoup de nous Aurons chances de rester the Us l'cart du conflit, et
nous pourrons attendre avantageusement notre tour. Pr cis ment of C'est ce qu'exige notre
int r t.
Ainsi notre choix est clair: nous devons accepter la proposition allemande et renvoyer dans leur
pays, avec un refus courtois, les missions anglo-fran aises.
Il n'est pas difficile de pr voir l' avantage que nous retirerions de cettefaon deprocder. Il est
vident, pour nous, que la Pologne sera anantie avant me me que l'Angleterre et la France soient
en mesure de venir son aide. Ce cas Dans, l'Allemagne nous ce de une partie de la Pologne
jusqu'aux abord de Varsovie - Galicie ukrainienne comprise.
L Allemagne nous laisse toute libert d'action dans les trois pays baltes. Elle ne s'oppose pas au
retour a la Russie de la Bessarabie. Elle est pr te nous cder, comme zone d'influence, la
Roumanie, la Bulgarie et la Hongrie. [227]
Reste la question de la Yougoslavie, dont la solution dpend de la position prise par l'Italie. Si
l'Italie demeure aux cots de l'Allemagne, celle-ci exigera que la Yougoslavie soit comprise dans
sa zone d'influence, et c'est aussi par la Yougoslavie qu'elle obtiendra l'accs la mer Adriatique,
Mais si l'Italie ne marche pas avec l'Allemagne, alors c'est aux dpens de l'Italie que l'Allemagne
aura accs a la mer Adriatique et, dans ce cas, la Yougoslavie passera dans notre sph re

d'influence.
Ceci dans l' ventualit OJJJ l'Allemagne sortirait victorieuse de la guerre.
Cependant, nous devons prvoir les possibilits qui rsulteront de la dfaite aussi bien que de la
victoire de l'Allemagne. Examinons le cas d'une dfaite allemande. Angleterre, et la of L'auront
France assez de force pour occuper Berlin, et l'dtruire A llemagne,, et nous ne The serions pas
en mesure the de venir en aide efficacement the celle-ci.
Donc, notre But est que l'Allemagne puisse mener la guerre le plus longtemps que Possible afin
l'Angleterre, et la France soient fatigu es, et the tel point puis Us es qu'elles ne The soient
en plus d'abattre of tat Us l'Allemagne .
De l notre position: tout en restant neutre, nous aidons l'Allemagne conomiquement en lui
fournissant matires premires et denres alimentaires; mais il va de soi que notre aide ne doit
pas d passer une certaine limite, afin de ne pas compromettre notre situation conomique et
de ne pas affaiblir la puissance de notre arme.
En mme temps, nous devons, de faon gnrale, mener une active propagande communiste, en
particulier dans le bloc anglo-franais, et tout spcialement en France. Nous devons nous
attendre que, dans ce pays, notre parti soit oblig, en temps de guerre, d'abandonner le terrain
lgal et de passer l'activitclandestine. Nous savons que cette activit exige beaucoup d' argent,
mais nous devons consentir sans h siter ces sacrifices. Si ce travail prparatoire est dment
excui, la se curit de l'Allemagne sera assure. Celle-ci pourra contribuer a la sovi tisation de
la France. [228] Examinons maintenant la deuxi me hypoth se, celle de la victoire allemande:
certains sont d'avis que cette ventualit reprsenteraitpour nous le plus Grave danger. Il ya dans
cette assertion une part de vrit, mais ce serait une erreur de penser que ce danger soit aussi
proche et aussi grand que certains l'imaginent.
Si l'Allemagne l'emporte, elle sortira de la guerre trop fatigu e pour nous faire la guerre pendant
la premi re d cennie. Ses principaux soucis seront de surveiller. L'Angleterre et la France
vaincues pour les emp cher de se relever.
D'autre part, l'Allemagne victorieuse disposera de vastes colonies; l'exploitation de celles-ci et
leur adaptation aux m thodes germaniques absorberont l'Allemagne galement pendant
plusieurs d cennies. Il est vident que l'Allemagne sera trop occupe ailleurs pour se tourner
contre nous.
Camarades, conclut Staline, je vous ai exposmes considrations. Je vous rp te qu'il est dans
votre intrt que la guerre clate entre le Reich et le bloc anglo-franais. Il est essentiel pour
nous que cette guerre dure le plus longtemps possible, pour que les deux parties s' puisent.
C'est pour ces raisons que nous devons accepter le pacte propos par l'Allemagne et travailler
ce que la guerre, une fois d clar e, se prolonge au maximum. En mme temps, nous devons
intensifier le travail conomique dans les pays belligrants, afin que nous soyons bien prpars
pour le moment OJJJ la guerre prendra fin.
Expos of of L' de Staline, Us cot religieusement, ne The fut suivi d'aucune discussion Other.
Questions seulement furent Deux pos es, de, et peu d'then importance, auxquelles Staline r
pondit. Sa proposition relative l'acceptation du pacte de non-agression avec le Reich fut adopt
e l'unanimit. Ensuite, Politbureau prit une le d Cision chargeant le Prsident du Komintern
Manouilski laborer d'avec le secr taire Dimitrov, et of sous la direction de lui-Staline m me, les
instructions appropries adonner au The parti communiste a / Vtranger.
Publ the Revue de Droit .: Internationa !, de Sciences Politiques, et Diplomatiques, Gen ve, 1939,

t. 17, num ro 3, juillet - septembre, p. 247 - 249.

[229]
Number 4. Russian translation published text messages Havas agency with additions and
discrepancies existing in the German copy
Why did Soviet Russia signed a contract with Germany? How long will ask the world community and it continues to ask - what grounds were the Soviet Union's government signed on 19 August
(in the text - on 19 October, which is an obvious mistake interpreter -. Ed. ) Political and economic
agreements with Germany. Until now it was not known under what conditions, Stalin received
the unanimous approval of the Political Bureau of rotation of its policy. Now the curtain is raised
{288} .
Why did the Soviet Union signed a pact with the Reich (this sentence begins the French text of
the message, it is omitted in the publication will happen -. Ed. ). The agency Havas received from
Moscow through Geneva from the source, which it regards as worthy of absolute trust, the
following information about a meeting of the Politburo, held on the initiative of Stalin, August 19
at 10 pm {289} , shortly after which the USSR signed the well-known political agreement with the
Reich: evening on August 19, members of the Politburo were urgently summoned to a secret
meeting, which was also attended by prominent leaders of the Comintern, but only those who
served in the Russian section. None of the foreign Communists, even Dimitrov - General
Secretary of the Communist International, was not invited to this meeting, the purpose of which
is not mentioned on the agenda was to hear the report of Stalin. Then followed the recording of
its main provisions: "Peace or war. This {290} question is entering a critical phase. His decision is
entirely independent of the position that the Soviet Union will take. We are absolutely convinced
that if we conclude a treaty of alliance with France and Great Britain, Germany will be forced to
withdraw from Poland and seek modus vivendi with the Western powers. Thus, the war will be
avoided, and then the subsequent development of events will take a dangerous character for us.
On the other hand, if the {291} we will make known to you the offer of Germany to conclude with
it a nonaggression pact, it would certainly attack on Poland, and then join Britain and France in
this war will be inevitable.
In such circumstances, we will have a good chance to stay away from conflict, and we can, being
in a better position to wait when it's our turn. It is required by our interests.
So our choice is clear: we must accept the German proposal, and the British and French
delegations to respond with a polite refusal and send them home.
It is easy to foresee the benefits that we extract, by acting in this way. For us it is clear that
Poland will be destroyed before England and France will be able to come to her aid. In this case,
Germany will give us part of Poland [208.209] up to the suburbs (the approaches in translation
happens -. Ed. ) Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia.
Germany will provide us with complete freedom of action in the three Baltic countries. It will not
prevent the return of Russian Bessarabia. It will be ready to give us as an influence zone Romania,
Bulgaria and Hungary.
The question remains of Yugoslavia, the solution of which depends on the position, which takes
Italy. If Italy will remain on the side of Germany, then the last {292} will require {293} to
Yugoslavia was part of its zone of influence, because it is through Yugoslavia she {294} will have
access to the Adriatic Sea. But if Italy does not go together with Germany, then it is at the
expense of Italy will receive access to the Adriatic Sea, and in this case Yugoslavia will pass into

our sphere of influence {295} .

All this case will Germany winner of war.
However, we must anticipate the consequences of defeat and victory in Germany. Consider the
option associated with the defeat of Germany {296} . In Britain and France {297} will be strong
enough to occupy Berlin and destroy the {298} Germany, which we are unlikely to provide
effective assistance to {299} .
Therefore, our goal is {300} is to Germany [230.231] as long as possible was able to fight a war to
extremely tired and exhausted, Britain and France were not able to defeat the {301} Germany.
Hence our position: remaining {302} neutral, we help Germany economically, providing it with
raw materials and food; However, {303} it goes without saying that our assistance should not go
over certain limits, so as not to harm our economy {304} and weaken the power of our army.
At the same time we must conduct active Communist propaganda especially in the Anglo-French
bloc and primarily in France. We must be prepared for the fact that in this country, our Party
during the war will be forced to terminate legal activities and go to illegal. We know that this
activity requires a lot of money, but we {305} should not hesitate to go for these victims. If this
preparatory work is carried out thoroughly, then the security of {306} Germany will be ensured
and it will be able to {307} contribute to the Sovietization of France {308} .
Let us now consider the second hypothesis associated with the victory of Germany.
Some believe that such an opportunity would present the greatest danger to us. This statement
has some truth, but the {309} would be a mistake to believe that the danger is so close and great
as some imagine it yourself.
If Germany wins, it will come out of the war too exhausted to fight with us in the next ten years.
Its main concern is the observation of the defeated England and France, to prevent them from
lifting.
On the other hand, Germany, the winner will have a huge colonies; their operation and
adaptation to German orders also take Germany for several decades. It is clear that Germany will
be too busy with others to turn against us.
Comrades, Stalin said in conclusion, I presented you my considerations. I repeat, it is in your best
interest to war broke out between the Reich {310} and the Anglo-French bloc. For us it is
important that this war lasted as long as possible, so that both sides have exhausted their
strength. It is for these reasons that we have to accept the pact proposed by Germany, and help
ensure that the {311} the war, if it will be announced, lasted as long as possible. At the same time,
we should strengthen the economic {312} work in the belligerent countries to be well prepared
for the time when the war will end. "
Report {313} Stalin listened with reverent attention, did not cause any discussions. It was given
only two minor {314} questions to which Stalin replied. His proposal to consent to the conclusion
of a nonaggression pact with the Reich {315} was adopted unanimously. Then, the Politburo
decided to entrust the Chairman of the Comintern, together with Manuilsky Secretary Dimitrov
under the personal leadership of Stalin develop appropriate instructions to the Communist Party
abroad.
Number 5. Secret additional protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
In signing the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the two sides discussed in a strictly confidential manner the
question of delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. This discussion led to

the following result:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic
States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the
boundary of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR. At the same time the interests of
Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by both parties.
2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish
state the spheres of influence of Germany and the Soviet Union would be approximately by the
rivers Narev line, Vistula and San. The question is whether in the interests of both parties
desirable [232.233] maintenance of an independent Polish state and what are the boundaries of
the State, can only be definitely determined in the course of further political development.
In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.
3. With regard to Southeastern Europe from the Soviet side emphasizes its interest in Bessarabia.
The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.
4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.
Moscow, August 23, 1939
For the Government of the USSR V. Molotov
For the Government of Germany Ribbentrop
Number 6. Official government instructions sent from Moscow to the Soviet Union's diplomatic
missions established in the Balkans {316}
The next official communication sent by the Comintern to all communist parties in Eastern
Europe.
1. Russia is aware that it is time to abandon the tactics adopted by the 7th Congress of the
Comintern, held in 1933 (sic -. Ed. ). It should be recognized that because of this tactic, our
Communist Party was able to form an alliance with the bourgeois democracies and to prevent
the development of fascism, which quickly spread. Also, thanks to this tactics, we were able to
prevent the establishment and triumph of fascism in France in 1933 (sic -. Ed. ).
2. The desire of France and England to bring the Soviet Union to the Front of reconciliation is
based on the calculation that is understandable to anyone. The two countries intend to destroy
the axis Rome - Berlin, widely using the strength of our country. This combination is very
disadvantageous for us. We were supposed to be helping to save the British and French
imperialism, that would constitute a violation of our principles. These principles are not in any
way rule out an interim agreement with our common enemy - fascism, while the agreement with
the bourgeoisie, would serve to strengthen capitalism, which is absolutely the opposite of our
principles.
3. Taking into account consideration of the USSR limited program that we will implement later.
Under this program, we are not interested in a war that could break out in Europe. We decided to
wait, and we intervene at the right moment. Revolutionary activity, continuously growing in all
countries under the leadership of the communist parties, prepare a fertile ground for our future
interventions. The Communist Party must use the difficulties that inevitably arise in this war,
started by the capitalist countries, and they will take the decisions necessary to establish the
dictatorship of the proletariat. The General Council of the Communist International considers
that such an assessment of the situation based on real favorable conditions for social revolution
in the near future.
4. We put you on notice that our agreement with the Axis should be regarded as won by our

diplomatic victory. At the same time it reduces the image of Germany. After the conclusion of our
pact with Germany in this country have refused any agitation against communism. We received
an official report fully convinces us that any anti-communist propaganda was actually banned.
From the report published by the British Communist Party, it follows that the working class of this
country is well aware of the purpose of the Covenant.
5. One of the reasons for the failure of the Anglo-French-Soviet pact and accelerate the
conclusion of Russian-German pact was unfavorable position of Poland, Romania and the Balkan
states (emphasis added There is a clear mistake of the French translation in German. [234.235]
translation - Baltic States . - years) in relation to Russia.. These states have refused military aid to
the Soviet Union and agreed to help in the event of war equipment. Rahl. R. 104355. S. 202600. A
typewritten copy of the German language; S. 202602. typewritten copy in French. Last published
in the book of M. Kornat .: Polska 1939 roku wobec paktu Ribbentrop - Molotov. Warsaw, 2002, p.
643 - 644
Pavlova IV {317}
The search for truth o the eve of the Second World War
No one on the floor, comrades, can not believe ...
Stalin
In Soviet historiography situation existed for many decades that the October Revolution was "a
great beginning of the world proletarian revolution; she pointed to all the nations of the world
the path to socialism. " However, it urged readers to the authors of the six-volume "History of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union," party "saw its mission is not" pushing ", not" exporting
revolution ", but rather to a practical example to convince the peoples of the socialist system
advantages" {318} .
In fact, everything was done exactly the opposite. However, in the first months or even years
after the October Revolution, the Bolshevik Party leaders made no secret of not only his faith in
the world revolution, but their actions aimed at its "boost". Not one VI Lenin lived in hope that
"as soon as we are strong enough to combat the whole of capitalism, [239] we immediately grab
him by the collar." Researcher LA Cohen summarized the statements and proposals of other
famous figures of the party at that time on this score: LD Trotsky, in 1919, proposed to create a
powerful cavalry corps to throw to India, because, in his opinion, the way to the West passed
through Afghanistan, Bengal and Punjab. NI Podvoisky belongs to saying that "one has to be put
into another so that it was impossible to say where one ends and war begins the revolution."
Offering create a General Staff III International, MN Tukhachevsky wrote in July 1920 .: "The war
can be ended only with the conquest of the world dictatorship of the proletariat." There are
other maxims: KB Radek: "We have always been in favor of a revolutionary war ... a bayonet - a
very significant thing necessary for the introduction of communism"; FE Dzerzhinsky: "We are
going to conquer the world, despite all the sacrifices that we still goin '; NI Bukharin: "The
workers' state, waging war, seeks to expand and strengthen the economic basis on which it arose,
that is, socialist relations of production (hence, by the way, is clear in principle the admissibility of
even offensive revolutionary socialist war)"; "The Civil War - minus, but it allows adjustment on a
new basis." In 1919 a book was published in Petrograd G. Borisova (alias economist and
philosopher IA Davydov) called "dictatorship of the proletariat", which was made a frank

admission: "No, not peace, but a sword carries the world dictatorship of the proletariat" { 319} .
After the defeat at Warsaw in 1920, Lenin became more cautious about their plans for the future
of the West Sovietization. Currently published previously unknown fragment of his speech at the
IX Party Conference September 22, 1920, where he, in particular, said: "I ask to write smaller, it
should not get in the press ..." {320} In this statement, as has already been noted in the literature,
reflected Lenin's Bolshevik plans for expansion to the West, including the deployment of the Red
Army along the German and Czechoslovak border, as well as his obsession with secrecy {321} .
Speaking about the plans of the Sovietization of Poland, Lenin opened the curtain on how the
decision was made "to use military force": "We formulated it is not in an official resolution
recorded in the minutes of the Central Committee and is the law for the party until the new
Congress. But together, we said that we should feel bayonets - not ripe if the social revolution of
the proletariat in Poland "(emphasis added -.? IP ). This was done in secret both from his own
party and the Comintern. "When was the Comintern Congress in July in Moscow - Lenin went
further - it was at a time when we were in the Central Committee of the matter. At the congress
of the Comintern to raise this question, we could not, because this Congress was to be opened "
{322} .
After the defeat at Warsaw intention of the party leadership remained the same. Chairman
Sibrevkoma IN Smirnov III Siberian Conference of the RCP (b) in February 1921, described his
conversation with Lenin, he held after it was found out that 40 thousand volunteers gathered in
Siberia for a trip to the Polish front, were not in demand:. ". ..Skazhi in the village, we still have to
break capitalist Europe and that these 40 thousand. must play a decisive role. And the Russian
Soviet rifle appears in Germany " {323} .
As for the principles of secrecy in foreign policy, they were not only fixed, but Stalin brought to its
logical conclusion. After the first unsuccessful attempts hopes for world revolution have not
disappeared, and action on it "pushing" is not stopped, but were deeply conspiratorial. As a
result, the truth about them was literally immured. Who really would dare to question the
approval of Stalin, when he in 1936 on the question of an American journalist Roy Howard,
"whether to leave the Soviet Union their plans and intentions to make world revolution?" Replied:
"There are plans and intentions we [240.241] had not been " {324} (emphasis added -. IP ). This
response is extremely characteristic of Stalin's personality. For those who did not know that such
plans existed, Stalin's response meant "not leave," he who asked at random, and received an
appropriate response. There is not even a double and excessive denial of equal worth and
self-exposure conventional wisdom joke! At the same time, this answer can be regarded as a
sophisticated enemy disorientation for internal use and expression of non-participation in the
policy, in which the West suspected the Soviet Union - for external use. In fact, it contained a
gross mockery of all those to whom this reply was intended.
Only with the beginning of radical political changes in the Soviet Union since the late 80s. truth
gradually began to come out, but the process was much more complicated than it seemed then.
"Key" that opens the way to the truth about Stalin's intentions to expand the "front of socialism"
is the truth about the eve of the war.
Immediately after the war on Stalin's orders, a special body in different documents of a named
differently: "Government Commission on the Nuremberg trials," "governmental commission on
the organization of the Court of Nuremberg", "Commission on the leadership of the Nuremberg
Trials." At the head of this top-secret committee with special purpose functions Stalin put

Wyszynski. Members of the Commission of the USSR Prosecutor Gorshenin been appointed
chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR Golyakov, USSR People's Commissar of Justice
Rychkov and three closest associates of Beria, Abakumov and his deputies, Kobulov, Merkulov.
The main objective of the Commission was that under no circumstances do not allow public
discussion of all aspects of Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941 years., First of all, the very
existence, let alone the content of the so-called secret protocols, complementary non-aggression
pact (23 August 1939) and the Treaty of friendship (28 September 1939). In order to ensure the
effectiveness of the investigation secret instructions of the commission, was sent to Nuremberg
and the investigative team of special purpose, headed by one of the most ferocious executioners
Beria Colonel MT Likhachev {325} . Stalin was afraid of public opinion in Europe and America to
be in Nuremberg on the same bench with Nazi war criminals. And he had good reason for such
fear. Therefore, Stalin did everything to prevent the Nuremberg trial discussion about the role of
the USSR in the outbreak of the Second World War. He succeeded - winner status allowed to
dictate terms.
November 26, 1945 Wyszynski Commission decided "... to adopt a list of issues that are not valid
for discussion at the court" {326} . Some of the defendants also attempted to point out the real
role of the USSR in the preparation of the Second World War did not change the overall situation.
So, Ribbentrop in his final statement said: "When I arrived in Moscow in 1939 to Stalin Marshal,
he discussed with me the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict in the
framework of the Briand - Kellogg, and made it clear that if he did not get half of Poland and the
Baltic countries are still without Lithuania, with the port of Libau, I can immediately fly back.
Keeping the war, apparently, was not considered there in 1939, a crime against peace ... "This
paragraph was not included in the Russian edition of the Nuremberg Trial {327} . The truth about
the eve of war were ordered to forget. Forget literally - Stalin forbade writing diaries and
memories of the war. Violation of the ban could cost lives. As far as direct accomplices of Stalin,
then forgetting it was in their own interest. The brightest evidence of this - F. Chueva
conversation with Molotov: "In the West persistently wrote that in 1939, together with the
contract signed a secret agreement ... [242.243]
- No.
- Did not have?
- Did not have. No, it is absurd.
- It is now, perhaps, we can talk about it.
- Of course, there are no secrets. In my opinion, deliberately spread rumors that somehow, so to
speak, stained. No, no, I think everything is still very clean and anything resembling such an
agreement could not be. I was standing very close to it, actually engaged in this business, I can
firmly say that it is certainly a fiction " {328} ..
Of course, Molotov "was very close to it" that conclusively confirmed by his signature under the
secret protocols and photography that captured him next to Stalin and Ribbentrop during the
signing of these documents. It is significant that after decades Molotov was unable to historical
self-esteem, otherwise its a deliberate lie to verbalize without intriganskih words "spreading
rumors", "stained" and the statement that "everything is still very clean", while there was a very
dirty, dirty prohibitive. All this once again convincingly indicates the moral characteristic of
Molotov as a political figure, who held the position of "second person" in the country at a crucial
moment of its history.

Lack of necessary documents (those that remained were deeply hidden in the secret archives),
the total world military historians, most of them lived under Stalin and the last war, brought up
by official propaganda, of course, led to the fact that they saw the war with the filing of Stalin.
It would not be exaggeration to say that in the period of the Khrushchev "thaw" historians do not
even allow the thought of the existence of secrets eve of the war, which was hidden by Stalin.
There was nothing like this and then AM Nekrich, author of the famous book "1941. 22nd of
June". He spoke very negatively about the "Legends of preventive war," which "artificially support
the West German neo-Nazis and some reactionary West German publicists and historians" {329} .
Any criticism of Stalin's actions are beyond the permitted time frame, causes immediate
disciplinary reaction. Nature of the dialogue that took place during the discussion of the book AM
Nekrich in the department of history of the Great Patriotic War the Institute of Marxism-Leninism
of the CPSU Central Committee February 16, 1966 between presided by Major General EA
Boltino and lecturer at the Moscow Historical Archives Institute, LP Petrovsky, who called Stalin's
criminal, "Comrade Petrovsky, in this room, from this podium, you need to choose an expression.
Are you a Communist?
- Yes.
- I have not heard that somewhere in the policy decisions of our party, binding on both of us, it
was said that Stalin - the perpetrator " {330} .
After displacement, NS Khrushchev from the post of the First Secretary of the CPSU criticism
"personality cult" of Stalin gradually came to naught. Over the next twenty years the
historiography of the Great Patriotic War has lost even that was achieved it after the XX Congress
of the CPSU. It is enough to compare at least a 6-volume "History of the Soviet Union's Great
Patriotic War 1941 - 1945." (Wiley, 1960 1965) with 12-volume "History of the Second World War,
1939- 1945" (Moscow, 1973-1982). It is recognized and military historians themselves. "We can
only regret - NG wrote Pavlenko - that time is lost, many of the participants and witnesses are
gone from us, and the most significant problems of the initial period of the war have to learn, in
fact, again " {331} .
Mountains of books about the war, accumulated by the beginning of perestroika, united by a
common concept of Stalinist eve of war, consisting of a set of immutable schemes and
stereotypes. Open any of these books, such as "The Great Patriotic War. Questions and Answers
"(Wiley, 1985):" ... The situation forced the USSR to conclude on August 23, 1939 a
non-aggression treaty with Germany, though Britain and France disruption Moscow talks this act
does not enter into the plans of Soviet diplomacy. [244.245]
... September 17th Red Army began the liberation campaign in Western Belarus and Western
Ukraine.
... November 30, 1939 is not the fault of the Soviet Union broke the Soviet-Finnish war ...
... June 22, 1941 Nazi Germany treacherously violated the non-aggression treaty, suddenly,
without a declaration of war, attacked the Soviet Union. "
Moreover, at the beginning of perestroika new knowledge on the eve of the war it made its way
with difficulty. The elders of the Soviet military historiography Kovalev and Oleg Rzheshevsky and
in 1989 considered it their duty to warn those who expressed 'point of view, is not enough critical
reproduce theses have long known anti-socialist propaganda stereotypes like the "direct
responsibility" of the USSR for the outbreak of the war ... " {332} .
Restructuring in the historiography of the eve of the war only began with the creation of the

CPSU Central Committee Commission on International Policy, headed by AN Yakovlev. Here are
some statements made at the meeting of the Commission March 28, 1989, bellicose statements
and helpless at the same time.
Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU V. Falin, "... In the
near time we will be faced with a whole avalanche of versions, are completely separated from
the actual facts, imposing - especially ignorant people, young people - a conclusion that the
Soviet Union was an accomplice in unleashing the Second World War, or at least contributed to
the fact that it took such a tragic turn, which we know from history and from our own
experience.
... Therefore, to treat indifferently to what is going on - and something similar is observed in our
country, - it is impossible. In this sharp dispute ally speaks the truth. But this truth must be
complete. No fakes and overlaps. "
Head of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR DA Volkogonov: "...
All the solutions that [246] adopted in 1939, including August, the September contract
determines the defensive strategy of the Soviet Union.
History in the end will justify the fact that the pact was signed on August 23, justify a forced,
albeit very dim morally step.
By supporting politically the need for signing the agreement of 23 August, we will at the same
time must denounce collusion which contradicted the Leninist principles of renunciation of secret
agreements. "
Director of the Institute of World History, USSR Academy of Sciences SA Chubarian: "... We have a
common concept related to the responsibility for the outbreak of World War II, which bears
Hitler's fascism. It does not require review of " {333} .
The outcome of the Commission AN Yakovlev reported to the II Congress of People's Deputies of
the USSR. According to the report of the Congress adopted a special resolution "On the political
and legal assessment of non-aggression from the 1939 Soviet-German treaty of the year", which
became the new leadership in highlighting the eve of the war by Soviet historians: "... the
Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR agrees with the Commission's opinion that a contract
with Germany nonaggression lay in a critical international situation, in a growing danger of
fascism aggression in Europe and Japanese militarism in Asia and has one of the purposes of the
Soviet Union to withdraw the threat of imminent war.
... Congress considers that the content of the treaty is not at variance with international law and
treaty practice of States accepted for such settlements. However, as in the contract, and in the
process of its ratification by hiding the fact that at the same time the contract was signed "secret
additional protocol", which delimit the "areas of interest" of the Contracting Parties from the
Baltic to the Black Sea, from Finland to Bessarabia.
... The Congress of People's Deputies condemns the signing of the "secret additional protocol" of
August 23, [247] , 1939, and other secret agreements with Germany. Congress recognizes the
secret protocols legally unsound and invalid from the moment of their signature ... " {334} AN
Commission Yakovlev did not go beyond the discussion and evaluation of the treaty as an
international legal instrument. The contract was not put in a historical context, and no
fundamental conclusions about the implications of the agreement has not been made at the time.
Yakovlev was limited to the observation that, "that Stalin and some of the people around him
even then could have imperial designs, alien to the principles of socialism," and "illusion, which,

apparently, gave himself up to Stalin after the conclusion of the agreements of 1939. Illusions are
not allowed to properly use the resulting peaceful respite ... " {335} .
Moreover, the Commission Yakovleva at that time did not know that the secret protocols of the
original stored in the archives of the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Speaking at the congress, Yakovlev said: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR there is a
memo that fixes the transfer in April 1946 of the original secret protocols of one of the assistants
to another Molotov: Smirnov - Podtserob Thus originals we were, and then they disappear ...
{336} "and at this time the secret protocols of the originals were not only found, but also known
to the Secretary General of the Central Committee. However, speaking at the Congress of
People's Deputies, MS Gorbachev assured that "all attempts to find the original secret agreement
did not succeed." Shortly after his speech, according to VI Boldin, "MS Gorbachev asked me
casually if I destroyed the protocol " {337} . Fortunately, this did not happen, and the publication
of the secret protocols of the originals was another major step towards the attainment of truth.
But how difficult was this way!
In discussions of that time on the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of political and legal
assessment of the expressed opinion that by signing this agreement, both countries share
responsibility for starting the Second World War. However, such views are automatically
precluded a Soviet historiography, virtually no argument. That point of view, MI Semiryaga,
author of the book "Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy": "Adoption of the equal responsibility of the
Soviet Union and Germany for the outbreak of the Second World War only because they existed,"
the same totalitarian regime "can not be considered conclusive. The primary responsibility for an
international crime still has a ruling elite of Nazi Germany. His share of the responsibility for the
Soviet leadership bears that signing a non-aggression treaty with Germany it created certain
conditions that contributed to the outbreak of war Hitler " {338} .
Position MI Semiryaga more radical than the position of historians, which represented AS Orlov.
Despite the obvious facts that he was still convinced that "the contract allowed the Soviet Union
to stay out of the military fire that swept Europe from September 1, and a secret protocol limited
the German expansion to the East line of the northern border of Lithuania and the rivers Narev,
Vistula and San, made it possible make the western border of the USSR in the 250-300 km to the
west. The agreement created the opportunity in peace to prepare for the inevitable battle against
fascism. " Next - the Red Army "entered into outside of Poland ..." and forces "had limited the
task to take under the protection of life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and
Western Belarus" {339} .
The relative peace among the Russian military historians destroyed the publication of books in
Russian Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), which has called into question the fact that the Soviet Union
has never and no one had been questioned. (His book "Icebreaker" is subtitled "Who started the
Second World War?".) His books he sought to prove that the main culprit and main instigator of
the Second World War - the Soviet Union. Using metaphorical turn, he called the day of the
actual entry of the USSR [248.249] into the war - August 19, 1939 Suvorov was able to calculate
that on this day a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, which has taken the
decision to start a secret mobilization. "Many historians - he writes - think first, Stalin decided to
sign peace with Hitler, and then decided to prepare a surprise attack on Germany. But the facts
discovered and confirmed to me that it was not two different solutions. Sign peace with Germany
and finally decide on the inevitable invasion of Germany - is one solution, the two parts of a

single plan. " And further: "So I think the war abroad August 19, after which in any case the
Second World War was to be held. And if Hitler had not started its September 1, 1939, Stalin
would have had to look for another opportunity or another artist who would push Europe and
the world into war. This is the essence of my little discoveries " {340} .
Suvorov did not lock in one year, 1939, and reviewed all the major events until the beginning of
World War II on 22 June 1941, linking them into one logical whole "secret mobilization was
completed by an attack on Germany and Romania, July 6, 1941. .. Secret mobilization was aimed
at preparing aggression. To not do anything the country's defense. Secret mobilization was so
enormous that failed to hide it. Hitler was only one and last chance - to save yourself a
preemptive strike. And June 22, 1941 Hitler - for two weeks - Stalin forestalled " {341} .
Publication of books Suvorov historians divided into two unequal groups. The vast majority historians with experience and names that are in the works "sanctified" Stalinist conception of
war. Working for many years under the auspices of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry
of Defence of the USSR, they could not take even a half of the truth about the war, which was the
domain of official publicity. This is evidenced by the failed attempt to prepare a new, 10-volume
"History of the Soviet people of the Great Patriotic War." But those military historians, who (as,
for example, AN and LA Mertsalov Mertsalova) sharply criticized Stalin and Stalinism of the
unwillingness of the Soviet troops to the beginning of the war, of incompetence and arbitrariness,
immorality and cruelty of {342} , were not ready to quietly discuss the concept of Suvorov.
This can be explained only by the fact that the concept of Suvorov broke not only the
well-established historiographical tradition, but also a blow to personal feelings and ideas about
the war. Moreover, many military historians as A. Mertsalov themselves were parties to it. This is
not just rejection, but also unwillingness to understand. Books Suvorov, in their opinion, do not
deserve the detailed reviews of military historians, because "with the" icebreakers "conjunctural
revision carried out the most important moments of national and world history," throws "a
shadow on the real historical facts, which for a long time, and from a scientific point of view
flawlessly (- IP ) set a world historiography " {343} .
With the spread of the influence of books Suvorov on the public consciousness in Russia
intensified, and their denial. By silencing these historians proceeded to abuse and implausible
allegations. They have branded it as "not a historian, not a memoirist, a traitor, an agent of
foreign intelligence services." It turns out that his book "written by different people, groups of
people more likely" participate Suvorov "is found only in certain literary devices, slang,
interjections" {344} .
Even so radically minded historian as DA Volkogonov, which was raised post-communist power in
a privileged position and had access to many secret documents, has not taken this concept {345} .
However, the article, which sets out its position on this issue in their own way significant. Firstly,
the fact that he admitted the fact, guessed Suvorov: August 19, 1939 is really a meeting of the
Politburo. But, as emphasized Volkogonov, "military question was only [250.251] as follows:" On
the postponement of the call in the Red Army of workers building the railway Akmolinsk - Kartaly
(by telegram Skvortsova). " That's all. No mention of the term "Thunderstorm" and so on. "
Secondly, the article is significant in that it exhibits a lack of understanding of the mechanism of
action of the Stalinist government. Volkogonov who received the right to print the "special
folder" Politburo pre-war and post-war period, and did not understand that the absence of the
Political Bureau of the minutes from the August 19, 1939 beers "special folders" any information

about the secret of Stalin's intentions attack on Germany, and the lack of Stalin and Zhukov's
signature on this, according to Volkogonova, "stark" document as "Considerations on the plan for
the strategic deployment of forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies"
as of May 15, 1941 (and not only this, tion on other important documents), - it is not an
argument, all the more crucial, in a dispute with Suvorov.
Unlike its venerable opponents Suvorov understood, although not specifically studied, the
mechanism of the power of the Stalinist regime, the basic principle of Stalin's activities in politics
- as much as possible not to leave documents, leave no trace, to surround the truth "battalions"
of lies.
Meaningful evidence of Soviet military leaders about how decisions were made on military
matters, have already been given above. If we are so little known people such as deputy chief of
the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Red Army, Major-General AM Vasilevsky,
who had a direct bearing on the development of operational plans before the war
( "Considerations on the strategic deployment plan ..." written by his own hand) {346} it is quite
logical to assume that the children know even less about the strategic intentions of Stalin,
moreover, often wondered about the "illogical" actions of its leadership. The historian VD Daniel
brought in his article is very characteristic testimony KK Rokossovsky, on the eve of the war was
released from prison and appointed commander of the 9th Mechanized Corps in the Kiev Special
Military District: "The ensuing from the headquarters district of orders troops to expel artillery to
landfills, located in the border zone, and other ridiculous to the specified conditions caused
complete confusion . By focusing our aircraft at forward airfields and location of the warehouse
under the Central Government in the front line, it was like a training jump forward, and the
location of the troops and the activities carried out in the army, he did not meet ... In any case, if
some plan and there was, it clearly does not meet the current situation to the beginning of the
war " {347} .
Thus, the claim that the Soviet Union was not prepared for a war against Germany in 1941 only
because of the absence of official "solutions at the beginning of the war by the Soviet political
leadership and the government, according to which the USSR was the first to set about preparing
for war, the first I would spend the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of troops on the
borders of the most advantageous "as it did YA Gor'kov at least prematurely. Moreover, in the
same article, he tells a very remarkable fact that in pre-war time operational plan "developed in a
single copy for approval was reported to only personally to Stalin and Molotov" {348} .
In Soviet times, historians ne.tolko had no access to classified material of the party and
government bodies, but also brought up on strict adherence to the principles of partisanship and
class approach. This involved following the interpretation of events, which was founded in the
sources themselves. As a result, in the writings of historians reproduced the ideology and logic of
the document. The main difficulty in overcoming the legacy of the Soviet historiography was to
learn how to open the true meaning of the events, which in their own way reflect the remaining
documents of the Soviet era - the secret and unclassified. It should be [252.253] to pay tribute to
Suvorov, proved himself in the book "Icebreaker" as historian spy who managed to uncover the
best kept secret Soviet military policy and history. He did this by relying mainly on published
Soviet sources, which have been compared to them, reinterpreted, cleansed of ideological
camouflage and markings.
It is noteworthy that at the conclusion of the training in 1939 - 1941 gg. active entry of the USSR

and other historians have come to the world conflict. First of all, we should mention the names of
J. Zamoyski (Poland) and J. Hoffman (Germany). Article J. Zamoyski "black hole", September 1939
- June 1941 (the issue of Soviet policy in the initial period of the conflict), "published in 1994, but
has been prepared much earlier to the international conference of historians in April 1990 in
Moscow {349} . After making sure that the actions of the Soviet Union in that period "does not fit
into some logical whole", not knowing many of the documents, in the following years published
in Russia, the author came to the conclusion that the following solutions demonstrate the
preparation of the Soviet Union to attack.
These are: 1. Assign GK Zhukov to the post of Chief of the General Staff as a winner on Khalkhinperfectly showed itself (though not uncritically) during the January-scale games. 2. Growing
replenish parts in the western districts, but not yet in a mobilization order. 3. A huge program of
military production and the Red Army re, the results of which have been implemented only in
1942 (taking into account the achievements of the German aviation). 4. The movement of the
armies of five (16, 19, 21, 22, 25 minutes) from the depths of the country to the West, but not in
the border zone, which is important from an operational perspective. 5. Create a strong
operational in Ukraine fist of 60 divisions with a tendency to further strengthen it. 6.
Reorganization of four infantry divisions of the Kiev district in the mountains (Ukraine is mostly
flat, and before it - the mining area at the junction of Czechoslovakia, Austria with access to a
central, vital regions in Germany - the direction of the famous World War I). In the Kiev District
was formed as Airborne Corps, non-defensive use of the tool. 7. Disarmament fortified areas on
the old border. 8. Widespread construction of airfields near the western border to supply massive
bombs that could mean their preparation for an attack. 9. The movement of the military
warehouses on the personal decision of Stalin to the west, which later turned out to be a big
mistake, but that is understandable and correct at the offensive variant of the planned operations.
(- In the text of articles 5 January 1941 10. Address by Stalin to the graduates of military
academies, May 5, 1941 IP ) that the war with Germany was inevitable and we must be ready for
it in 1942 and it is not possible only protective, but also a warning strike. May 11.6 Stalin became
the head of the government, which could mean many things, including a sharp turn in the
direction of concessions to Germany, but above all meant that the Soviet Union entering a period
of large and dangerous decisions - solutions designed for success.
J. Zamoyski also made an important point about the "silent sources," in which there is no
information about Stalin's strategic plans. In particular, it is focusing on transparency and gravitas
dots in his memoirs GK Zhukov - "Hitler ... in a hurry, and not without a reason ...". As a result,
Zamoyski was convinced that "Stalin is still in the period of Munich has taken a huge, dangerous,"
a long-term view, "the game is designed so that the Soviet Union, ie He says in this conflict the
final word ... " {350} .
In the same direction in their studies and moved historian J. Hoffman, who has worked for many
years at the Institute of Military History in Freiburg, who concluded that "Stalin made a pact
August 23, 1939 to start a war in Europe, in which he with September 17, 1939 took part as an
aggressor ... The military and political preparation of the Red Army to attack on Germany in the
spring of 1941 reached a climax of " {351} . [254,255]
The article Hoffman, published in the journal "History of Russia", provides further evidence of
aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union. First, he cites two very important facts: "The conclusion
of our agreement with Germany, - Commissariat reported July 1, 1940, Ambassador in Japan -

was dictated by the desire to start a war in Europe." And in a telegram to the Soviet ambassador
to Japan and China, June 14, 1940 g, said: "We would have gone to any agreement to provide a
clash between Japan and the United States."
Vo-vtoryh in interrogations of prisoners of war by Soviet officers, stored in the German archives,
he found confirmation of the fact that the actions of the Red Army on the border with Germany
before June 22, 1941 really were shrouded in mystery, the meaning of which is understood not
all.
Third, there are additional evidence of the existence of offensive plans of the Soviet side,
captured by the Germans. Thus, the former head of the Department of East European History
Mainz University, Prof. Dr. Gotthold Rohde, at the time the translator and Sonderfuhrer at the
headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division of the German, found June 23, 1941 in the
headquarters building of the Soviet 3rd Army in Grodno, he said in his diary, "a pile of maps of
East Prussia, perfectly printed in the scale of 1:50 000 ... All of East Prussia at a glance. Why - he
asked the question - the Red Army needed the whole hundreds of cards? "Then, in the
headquarters building of the Soviet 5th Army in Lutsk July 4, 1941 documents were found, among
them -" Plan of political support for military operations upon the occurrence of ". In addition, the
Germans were known leaflets, addressed to German soldiers have been found, in particular, the
troops of the 16th German Army on the first day of the war, June 22, 1941, in the village of Sakiai
in Lithuania. Thus, according to J. Hoffman, although the "Hitler did not have a clear idea of what
is really being prepared on the Soviet side ... it is his attack June 22, 1941 anticipated the attack
Stalin" {352} .
I must say that in the West view of the "pre-emptive" attack of Germany on the Soviet Union in
1941, the overwhelming majority of historians rejected without discussion. Weekly Die Zeit
(June 7, 1991) expressly called supporters of this version of "belated victims of the Nazi
propaganda" {353} . One gets the impression that Western historians, particularly German ones,
are most afraid of accusations of sympathizing with fascism, in neo-Nazi aspirations. These fears
are so great that they outweigh the desire for truth, which in its work should be guided by a
historian. Therefore, they are so aggressive in their criticism of the so-called revisionist historians
of the school, which include primarily Suvorov and Hoffman. Recently in this series it added one
more name - German historian W. Mather published his book "violation word. Hitler, Stalin and
World War II "(in another translation" Treachery ... "), which was subjected to devastating
criticism by another German historian - GA Jacobsen until the statement that "Maser showed
himself in this book insolvent as a historian." The arguments in his criticism are the same
categorical statements, as well as our opponents of this concept: "There is no indication, the
documents that testify to the fact that Stalin was political intention to attack in kakoy-to
particular day on Germany", and in general "there is no evidence that Stalin was going to attack
Germany in 1941". In addition, according to the GA Jacobsen, "The Red Army is still only going to
upgrade your tank and air forces" {354} .
Unfortunately, in this matter, not only Russian but also Western historians are guided primarily by
ideological motives. Thus, the Israeli historian G. Gorodetsky, the author of books published in
1995 and 1999. in Russian - "The Myth" Icebreaker "and" fatal delusion: Stalin and the German
attack on the Soviet Union ", - proclaiming his goal of" translation discussion of the way the
ideology of science on the rails, "Suvorov sees only the concept [256,257] " grand hoax ", which is
beneficial" for those who wanted to weaken the warming of the political climate, and in Germany

- to rehabilitate the Nazi regime " {355} . This statement reveals most openly ideologized works of
G. Gorodetsky. It would be more honest to admit that many Western historians are not ready for
a serious scientific debate on these issues as it did, for example, an American historian R.Ch. Raak
in the review of the book I. Hoffman "Stalin destructional War 1941-1945" {356} .
The attempts to justify Stalin's actions in the years 1939-1941. helpless, nave and, more
importantly, are contrary to logic. Perhaps Stalin would not wish themselves a better defender
than, for example, I. Flyayshhauer. Citing the fact more than half a meter (58 cm) signed by Stalin
on the map - annexed to the Soviet-German treaty of friendship and the border of September 28,
1939, it seeks to convince the reader that this is not "imperialist triumph in connection with the
signing of the secret protocol the pact of August 23, but rather a kind of discharge due to the fact
that the non-aggression pact brought to fruition. " Although it was not triumph, then there would
be a psychological discharge. Moreover, in the opinion of Flyayshhauer, "card not enshrines the
separation of half of Poland, and soon the Soviet rejection of much of eastern Poland in
compensation for Lithuania. Stalin then apparently preferred the military security of the
territorial expansion of the West " {357} . Subsequently Flyayshhauer I. and G. Gorodetsky even
tried to argue that the noun "offensive" in Russian means ... "defense" {358} .
It is noteworthy that the publication which appeared in Russia in the years on the subject documentary materials or articles of historians, guided by the desire to establish the truth - the
whole confirmed the concept of "Icebreaker". "Military History Magazine" (1991, 12, 1992,
number 1,2) carried out a partial publication version of the plan for the strategic deployment of
the Soviet Armed Forces, which were developed before the war by the General Staff and the
People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (1940, the plan - the basis for the preparation of
the plan of 18 September 1940, a plan by March 11, 1941 and in part a plan of 15 May 1941).
Anticipating the publication entitled "Soviet preemptive strike if ready?", Editorial Board
formulated its point of view: "In general, they are (. Materials - IP ) confirm that the Soviet Union,
making, according to Molotov (emphasis added -. IP), the choice in favor of "aggressive policy"
did not set aggressive goals, not to provoke Germany to "preventive war" {359} . However,
historians BN Petrov {360} and especially VN Kiselev, from which even the editors chose to
dissociate themselves note ( "We do not see the point of view of the author's uncontested"),
have come to different conclusions. According to Kiselev, "and the Wehrmacht and the Red Army
was preparing for an offensive. Strategic defense we have not planned, and it is generally
accepted. Defend were only covering forces to ensure the deployment of the main forces for the
offensive. According to the terms of concentration of reserves in the border military districts,
armies Reserve Command and deployment of front-line command posts, the Soviet offensive to
defeat the impending invasion of the aggressor could begin no earlier than July 1941 ... " {361} .
Colonel-General Yuri Gorkov one of the first in Russia published "Considerations on the plan for
the strategic deployment of forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies"
as of 15 May 1941 that dealt another blow to the previous Soviet historiography of war,
categorically denies the fact of a possible study General Staff of the Red Army's plan to attack
Germany. But Gorky did not agree with the conclusion of the Red Army, preparing to attack.
Furthermore, to strengthen the South-West direction he sees no strategic plan and
miscalculation. In his opinion, "the idea of the operational plan of the war reflects not offensive,
[258.259] but rather an umbrella doctrine. The troops under the cover of an umbrella within the
meaning of the doctrine should be tasked to cover the deployment of a strong defense of his

troops, to reveal the composition of the attacking forces of the enemy, to determine the direction
of the main shock and other tasks to update the main forces of its troops " {362} .
Meanwhile, it is an unbiased study of available documents eve of the war led to the appearance
of articles VD Daniel and MI Meltyuhova {363} . The main conclusion arrived at by Danilov, was
the recognition: "Ready to start a war devastating offensive, but missed a lot of questions of the
organization a reliable defense of the country. It is these "mistakes" and "failures" are explained
by major failures of our troops at the beginning of the war. "
With regard to article Meltyuhova, the decision on its publication was taken at a special meeting
of the editorial board of the magazine "National History", which is also manifested a sharp
rejection of the concept of the USSR preparation for an attack on Germany from YA historians
Polyakova VP Dimitrenko, VI Bovykina, VA Fedorov et al. {364} . Polyakov, despite the avalanche
of obvious facts, refused to recognize the Soviet Union's aggression action to join the Baltic States,
Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, Bessarabia and Meltyuhova accused of bias.
Dimitrenko was convinced that "the debate in the scientific journal Suvorov's book is simply
indecent."
However, the article was accepted for publication. Deputy chief editor MA Rahmatullin rightly
praised it as one of the first attempts an objective evaluation of books V. Suvorov. Meltyukhov
not only proved the fact the USSR was preparing to attack Germany, but also pointed out that the
plan of the war with Germany was approved October 14, 1940 and further clarified in the
documents dated March 11 and May 15, 1941 Nothing, in fact , did not change. "The most
important - he said - and in Germany, and the Soviet Union, these plans do not remain on paper,
and began to be implemented. Comparative analysis of the preparation of the parties to the [260]
War - still one of the directions of further research the eve of the war. But even on the basis of
known material today can be argued that this process went parallel with the beginning of 1941
has entered the final stage and in Germany, and the Soviet Union, which, by the way, once again
confirms the inevitability of the war began it in 1941,. - whoever initiated it " {365} .
As for a possible Soviet attack date, then, according to Meltyuhova, "no offensive of the Red
Army against Germany before July 15, 1941 have been impossible" {366} . Daniel, on the contrary,
believes that the most recent period of availability was July 2, 1941 {367} . Some time later he
called another date - "after about July 10, 1941" {368} .
Next Meltyukhov touching version of "preventive war" against the USSR Germany. He gave the
definition of preventive actions given by the German historian A. Hilgruberom. Preventive war - a
"military action taken to anticipate enemy action, ready to attack or have already started such, by
his own offensive." This requires first of all be aware of the intentions of the enemy. According
Meltyuhova, neither Germany nor the Soviet Union had not counted on the enemy's advance,
hence the thesis of the preventive action in this case does not apply. Moreover, he believes that
"the version of the preventive war in general has nothing to do with historical science, but is
purely a propaganda thesis to justify their actions" {369} .
The issue of preventive actions, in my opinion, is more complicated than it treats Meltyukhov,
and is not just propaganda. Hitler did not really have a clear idea of what was being prepared on
the Soviet side - we refer in this case to the authoritative opinion of J. Hoffman. He did not
imagine the scope of the training and did not know the date of the alleged assault. The Germans
did not know almost nothing about the systematic creation of armored formations in the USSR
for the purpose of conducting offensive operations, [261] at the beginning of the war for them

was a complete surprise encounter with many panzer divisions to which they suddenly came out.
But Hitler had a definite idea of the offensive military doctrine of the Soviet Union and Stalin's
political intentions. From counselor of the German Embassy in Moscow G. Hilger he knew about
Stalin's speech on 5 May 1941 to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, which
was clearly stated about the war with Germany soon {370} .
From a legal point of view, the German attack on the USSR, June 22, 1941, of course, is
aggression. Hitler's actions could be classified as preventive in the case if he had, defeating the
enemy army on the border, not rushed further into the country, capturing more and more
territory of the USSR. Since then, the military action on the part of Germany are clearly
aggression, and by the Soviet Union - Liberation War, World War II. However, the objective of
Hitler's attack on the USSR was preventive because it prevented a much more massive offensive
of the Red Army.
At the same time, it was recognized that the official Soviet historians, trying to prove the thesis of
the military-technical superiority of the Wehrmacht at the time of the attack on the Soviet Union,
had falsified the facts. Drive, for example, the number of German tanks and aircraft available at
the Eastern Front, and from the USSR only the number of new samples. It's not even the
falsification and outright forgery. As a result of the conviction of the absolute superiority of the
Wehrmacht firmly established not only in the Soviet historiography, but also in everyday
consciousness. Now even former editor was prepared according to the decision of the Politburo
on 13 August 1987 "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people" VA Zolotarev
admitted that the outbreak of war "only in tanks and planes, we surpassed the armed forces of
Germany, Japan, Italy, Romania and Finland, together, almost twice the" {371} .
At the same time the official historiography has confirmed that negotiations with Britain and
France in 1939 reached an impasse is not only the fault of these two countries, but also the fault
of the Soviet Union, "has not been proved that the ability of the Soviet Union negotiations with
Britain and France have been exhausted that without the consent of the Polish government to
miss the Red army troops through the territory of the Polish military convention with these
countries it has been ruled out though ... the only possibility of preventing war was the early
conclusion of a military and political alliance with Britain and France " {372} . At the same time
mentioned in Russian literature, that "there is still no comprehensive documentary film, which
would reflect a comprehensive reliability of the Soviet leadership position with respect to the
conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with London and Paris, have highlighted the deep-seated,
rather than external causes of failure of the negotiations and reorientation of the Moscow
agreement on Berlin " {373} .
And in the December issue of the journal "New World" of 1994 came the publication of Stalin's
speech, which he delivered on the day of the meeting of the Politburo of 19 August 1939 TS
Bushueva who found the text of the speech captured in the secret funds of the former USSR
special archive, assessed it as "definitely a historical document, so frankly exposing the aggressive
policy of the USSR." In her opinion, this is the question "was the basis of the position of the
Soviet side at the signing of her secret protocols with Nazi Germany on the European section"
{374} .
Record Stalin's speech at a meeting of the Politburo of 19 August 1939 was published earlier in
the West. Almost immediately, describing the speech acted as the French agency Havas, whose
publication Stalin called "lies" in an interview with the newspaper "Pravda" on November 30,

1939 We knew about Stalin's speech and some Western historians. The West German historian E.
Ekkel found them even published a record of Stalin's speech in one of the German magazine in
1958 {375} . The reaction of the Soviet military historians on this publication can be found in the
second volume of "History of World War II": [262.263]
"Falsification of very rough. Suffice it to say that Stalin attributed to such turns of speech and the
treatment that he never tried. In addition, in this Saturday, August 19, 1939, meeting of the
Politburo did not have " {376} . Falsification believes this speech and such a Stalinist tuned
Western historian as I. Flyayshhauer {377} .
In 1995 it was celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany and the end of
the Second World War in Russia. This anniversary was a year of numerous publications on the
subject, demonstrated not only the level of freedom, which reached the Russian historians, but
also how difficult truth about the eve of the war breaks out {378} .
Soviet history is full of secret crimes of power, but of all her secrets very dark and stored was
preparing a military offensive against Europe in 1941. This is the truth took a small part of
Russian historians.
As an example, a collision directly opposing views may be published unplanned discussion
"whether Stalin was preparing an offensive war against Hitler?" (M .: AIRO - XX, 1995). Along with
AV Articles Afanasyeva, S. Grigoriev, MG Nikolaev, SP Isaykina, AN and LA Mertsalova in the
collection, an alternative view of the events on the eve of the war - BN Petrov VN Kiselev VD
Danilov, MI Meltyuhova, VA Nevezhina. At the same time assigned to a number of obvious facts
supporters of pro-Stalin concepts were forced to at least admit that "the problem of the
relationship of the military doctrine with the technical policy in the USSR has always been a blind
spot for society ..." and that "in comparison with the West in we produced a negligible number of
books devoted to the topic " {379} .
The most radical conclusions contained in the article M. Nikitin, who is not accidentally hid under
a pseudonym (although very transparent). On the basis of the ideological document in May-June
1941 the author has come to the conclusion [264] that "the main purpose of the expansion of
the Soviet Union was the" front of socialism "to the maximum possible area, ideally the whole of
Europe. In Moscow's opinion, the situation is favorable for the implementation of this task. The
occupation of Germany, most of the continent, protracted, hopeless war, growing discontent of
the population of the occupied countries, spraying Wehrmacht forces on different fronts, near
the Sino-American conflict - all this made the Soviet leaders a unique opportunity to surprise
attack to defeat Germany and "liberate" Europe from the "decaying capitalism ". This goal was
dedicated to all the activities of the Soviet leadership in the 1939-1941 biennium.
Thus - according to the author - the Soviet leadership's intentions in May-June 1941, established
on the basis of historical documents that are significantly different from those that we presents
domestic historiography. Consequently, all wrong, and so the concept is not very slim history of
the Great Patriotic War, as it does not correspond to the known facts and documents. So now the
main task of national science is the creation of a new concept of the history of the Soviet period,
in general, and the events of 1939-1941. in particular " {380} .
However, the subsequent development of the historiographical situation has shown how far the
Russian historical science of having to admit this conclusion. In 1995, the conference took place,
including specifically dedicated to the eve of war in Russia. At an international conference in
Moscow, organized by the Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences in cooperation

with the Institute of Cummings Research in Russia and Eastern Europe at Tel Aviv University, "the
vast majority - nearly all - speakers refuted the version of Suvorov and others, questioning their
very method approach to the analysis of events " {381} . Members of the scientific seminar in
Novosibirsk, organized by the local community "Memorial", on the contrary, called for cleansing
history of ideological camouflage. One of the participants - VL Doroshenko [265] was made the
analysis of the speech of Stalin August 19, 1939, which conclusively proved that the text of this
speech, "with all possible distortions dates back to Stalin, and must be accepted as one of the
basic documents on the history of World War II," { 382} .
From foreign authors in the jubilee year, Russian historical journals favored those who advocated
a pro-Stalin concept {383} .
Of particular note in this context deserve two mounting article - Director of the Institute of World
History, Russian Academy of Sciences SA Chubaryan and Director of the Institute of Russian
History, AN Sakharov, who according to tradition, coming from the Soviet times, determined by
the possible limits of historical research, and objectively identified the difficulties that still need
to be overcome on the way to the truth. The main conclusion of the article Chubaryan boiled
down to the fact that "Stalin in those anxious months, afraid even to think about the attack of
Germany and the beginning of the war" {384} . However, already entered into scientific
circulation new factual material on the eve of the war could not determine the contradictory
nature of the article. On the one hand, noting the absence of the Politburo protocols discuss
important issues of foreign and domestic policy, the author agrees that "many of the questions
and have not been discussed at the Politburo decisions on them, apparently taken at the
meetings in a narrow composition or solely by Stalin" and on the other - directly touching the
"Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of forces of the Soviet Union in case of
war with Germany and its allies" as of May 15, 1941, it reaffirms that "there is no evidence that
the document was discussed elsewhere, just as there is no specific data on Stalin's reaction to it.
" In addition, repeated one of the basic provisions of the Soviet historiography, has repeatedly
refuted recently. In his opinion, "the Soviet Union did not have the forces and capabilities to the
outbreak of war with Germany" {385} . However, in the same issue of the journal General
Assembly. Kumanev admitted that "the beginning of the war the defense [266] Soviet industry as
a whole for the first time began to exceed in number, and in some areas of military production
and quality performance of Nazi Germany" {386} .
AN ARTICLE Sakharov's "War and Soviet diplomacy:. 1939-1945," more responsive to the
demands of time and takes into account the results of historiography, achieved in recent years.
Sakharov was officially recognized existing still desire to "build and strengthen public-ideological
myths, anathema those who are trying to break or at least about to find out the true meaning of
which took place in the late 30's - early 40's event's, save over them the veil state secrets, which
is totally unacceptable from the point of view of the historian " {387} . Next Sakharov
acknowledged Stalin's speech at a meeting of the Politburo of 19 August 1939, citing a passage
from it and citing the (admittedly dull!) On the December "New World" magazine for 1994 The
most important fact was the confirmation of the Academy of Sciences. Sakharov, unlike SA
Chubaryan, the thesis that "all the objective data, to mid-1941 superiority of forces in almost all
respects was on the side of the Soviet Union" {388} .
However, serious objections is general Sakharov objectivist approach to the assessment of Soviet
diplomacy in 1939-1941 gg .: "It was a pragmatic, globalist diplomacy rests on the principles of

continuity with the policies of the old Russia, and accompanied also by certain revolutionary
ideological calculations of the Bolshevik leadership. Protect and defend it, as it has done for many
years, Soviet historiography, or condemn and denounce it as, say, it is taking on their books V.
Suvorov, completely pointless. Morality has nothing to do with it. In politics, there are only
results - victory or defeat. Such it was, and Soviet policy and diplomacy of those years " {389} .
Avoid the moral evaluation of the actions of Stalin's power is not possible, but these attempts
always have the real implications and, as a rule, such an objectivist [267] approach leads to the
justification of the government's actions. Sakharov, he was determined, firstly, by the fact that
Soviet diplomacy, 1939-1941. they considered in isolation from provocative inherently Stalin's
diplomacy of the previous period, and secondly, he, like many other modern writers, did not
escape the influence of "charm" of Stalin's great power. Only against this background can be no
internal protest to take the final conclusion of the author: "... the Soviet leadership acted in the
spirit of the time, decisively, big, proactively. And the main miscalculation of Stalin and his guilt to
the Motherland were concluded at this stage, and in those conditions is not that the country is
not adequately prepared for the defense (it is up to her and did not prepare), and that the Soviet
leadership - both political and military - could not pinpoint the moment when the desire to delay
the war to bring their offensive forces at full readiness was impossible, and it did not take
emergency measures to mobilize the country and the army in a state of maximum alert.
Pre-emptive strike would have saved millions of lives our Homeland and may have led to much
earlier to the same political results to which a country devastated, hungry, cold, lost color of the
nation, came in 1945, hoisted the flag of victory over the Reichstag.
And the fact that this attack was not done, that the offensive doctrine, carefully developed by the
General Staff of the Red Army and began vigorously to take place in May-iyune1941 city, has not
been realized, perhaps, is one of the major mistakes of Stalin " {390} .
Certain results of historiography was the theme published in 1996 by the Russian State
Humanitarian University, edited by JN Afanasiev's book "The Other War: 1939-1945", which
brings together the contemporary authors, known for their new approaches to the study of not
only Eve, but the entire period of the Great Patriotic War [268] war. This book is mainly
pereopublikovany Article VD Danilov, MI Meltyuhova, VA Nevezhina, Y. Gor, AA Pechenkina and
others.
However, in the same year amid resurgent wave of apologetic literature about Stalin became
apparent retreat from the progress in covering the eve of the war. The symbol of this retreat was
the illustration of the publication Y. Gor and YN Semina "End of global deception. (Operational
plans for the western border military districts of 1941 testify: the USSR was not prepared for an
attack on Germany) " {391} . This poster during the war under the name "Red Army broom sweep
down evil!". Among this "evil" and the book Suvorov "Icebreaker".
Signs of retreat is actually a negative review of AF Vasileva of the book "The Other War: 19391945", published in 1997 in the journal "Questions of History" (number 7) and new publications
H. Gorodetsky. In response to the reprinting of Stalin's speech August 19, 1939 the German
weekly magazine Die Welt (12 July 1996) Gorodetsky once again called the speech falsification.
In complete contradiction with the known historical facts today he continues to insist that in the
days before the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, Stalin was
"more than ever adhered to its traditional defense policy", that he " has not put forward any
territorial claims, and only wanted to mutual German-Soviet Baltic immunity guarantees " {392} .

In the same vein, sustained book VJ Sipols "Secrets diplomatic. The eve of the Great Patriotic War.
1939-1941 "(Moscow, 1997) and a review of her AS Orlova, in which a very high score is
indicative of the fact that "permeates the book controversy with opportunistic interpretations of
history, 1939-1941, which in the wake of rampant criticism of Soviet history of the late 80's -. The
beginning of the 90s prevailed in the post-Soviet historiography". Indicative and objections Sipols
logic as well as supporting its [269] reviewer. It turns out that the idea of the secret protocols and
the section of "spheres of influence" first appeared not in the Soviet-German non-aggression
pact, and in the secret Anglo-German talks in English sentences USSR safeguards Baltic countries
{393} .
In the same year published a book VA Nevezhina "syndrome offensive war. Soviet propaganda on
the eve of "Holy War" of 1939-1941. ", Which is a systematic result of his previous studies. On the
basis of a large factual material Nevezhin concluded that "Stalin did not separate the national
interests of the ultimate strategic objective - the destruction of" capitalist encirclement. " At the
end of 30-ies of the Bolshevik leadership is not considered in itself "world revolution" as the main
instrument to achieve this goal. Mission crush hostile "bourgeois world" had to take on,
according to the Stalin, the Red Army " {394} .
Of particular interest is a chapter of the book "Stalin's speech May 5, 1941". It is not only Stalin's
speech to the graduates of the military academies, but his remarks and toasts at the banquet
held on the occasion. Original authentic text of Stalin's speech is unknown. At the disposal of the
researchers, there is only a record, not only speech, but also Stalin's statements made by
employees of People's Commissariat of Defense K. Semenov and identified in RGASPI. Currently,
the most complete publication prepared by AA Petchenkin {395} . So the accusation in 1994,
historians AN and L.A. Mertsalova against German historian J. Hoffmann that he operated
"alleged intentions of Stalin, his speech of May 5, 1941, the contents of which science,
unfortunately, is not known," devoid of any basis {396} . Nevezhin himself, completing the
chapter on Stalin's speeches, May 5, 1941, concludes that "for the immediate environment as
Stalin said while all the" leaders "at the grand [270] meeting and reception (banquet) was not a"
hoax " and "misinformation", and a direct guide to action " {397} .
However, the value of research Nevezhina reduce inconsistencies and contradictions of the
author's conclusions. You should not have to pay special attention to this fact, if it were not proof
denote retreat in historiography. It seems that Nevezhin afraid that it will put on a par with
Suvorov, whom he refers to the obvious prejudice, confusing, because many of the conclusions
and Nevezhina, and other advanced research of pre-war period, it prompted "Icebreaker". Not
noting the positive aspects of this book, Nevezhin immediately goes to her criticism in the worst
historiographical traditions: "... Russian historians, it was noted that Suvorov (VB Rezun) weak
uses documentary base, abusing speculation, tendentiously quoted memoir literature, which in
itself requires careful analysis of source, distorting the facts, arbitrarily interpret events. Western
scholars also presented large claims against the author of the book "Icebreaker". So, B. Bonvech
carried her to a well-defined genre of literature, which can be seen the desire to withdraw from
Germany, the blame for the attack on the Soviet Union " {398} . Donated in this context the
Western researchers who sided in its conclusions with Suvorov - Gilessenu G., W. Mather, E. Topi,
I. Hoffmann.
With the familiar prejudice Nevezhin also refers to the book "The Other War: 1939-1945."
According to him, JN Afanasiev unreasonably tried to put Stalin's speech on 5 May 1941 "on a par

with Stalin's speeches allegedly uttered at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU (b) August 19,
1939 and on the Supreme Military Council of 14 May 1941". A source on the basis of which was
made by the publication of Stalin's speech to the Politburo of 19 August 1939, adds further
Nevezhin, "requires critical [271] analysis." By making this addition, it is considered unnecessary
to mention, firstly, that the attention to the speech of Stalin August 19, 1939 attracted Suvorov,
secondly, that the record of the text of the speech was found in the Special Archive (now the
Center of Preservation of Historical -dokumentalnyh collections) TS Bushuyeva and published it in
the journal "New World" in 1994 ( 12), and third, that the analysis of this question has already
been made VL Doroshenko and published in the Proceedings of the scientific seminar dedicated
to the fiftieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, which took place in Novosibirsk, April
16, 1995, and then pereopublikovan in the book "The Other War: 1939-1945." In all this there is
no indication, not only in the main text of the book, but also in the attached "List of sources used
and literature."
As ingested Nevezhin verbal turn "allegedly spoken by" the same can be said about the speech of
Stalin on 5 May 1941 Authentic text of the speech is in both cases were found. In addition, all
Nevezhina design breaks, if we take the other record of Stalin's speech on 5 May 1941, which was
present in the Kremlin told at that time NG Lyashenko. Decades later, he was able to get
acquainted with the record of Stalin's speech text, sent from the Institute of Military History. The
resulting record, emphasizes Nevezhin, there was no war no word. As an eyewitness, NG
Lyaschenko concluded that "on it someone worked pretty" {399} . All this was quite in the spirit
of Stalin. It is no accident, he forbade the inclusion of recording a speech May 5, 1941, made by K.
Semenov, was supposed to be in the edition of the 14th volume of his writings.
This position Nevezhina could not determine the contradictions and vagueness of the conclusions
of his book. In the chapter on Stalin's speeches on 5 May 1941, he joins the conclusion that
"Stalin calls for the necessary restructuring of Soviet propaganda, made at a banquet in the
Kremlin on the occasion of the release of the Red Army military academies, it does not mean that
the Soviet Union was preparing in the summer of 1941 was to attack Germany " (emphasis added
-. IY ) {400} .
The book concludes with an epilogue by Professor Ruhr University (Germany) B. Bonvecha in
which he "explains" the reader position Nevezhina. It turns out that the emphasis on "offensive"
does not do internally "attack". Author of the book, according to Bonvecha, "often prone to some
dramatization, but in general it positively characterized by the fact that it based on obvious
changes in the Soviet war propaganda after Stalin's speeches 5 May 1941 does not output, that
the Soviet Union intended to specifically attack to Germany ... " {401} . Bonvech despite
Nevezhina study and others, I am still convinced that "Stalin scrupulously, and not only on the
basis of the defense considerations into account the public interest, taking into account and the
possibility of war with Germany. To what time it is the beginning of the war, it can not be
established, but most evidence points to 1942 " {402} .
On certain "delivery point" indicates a section written by MI Meltyuhova, in his book "Soviet
society: origin, evolution and history final. T. 1. From the armed insurrection in Petrograd until
the second superpower of the world "(M .: Russian State Humanitarian University, 1997). Unit
has an eloquent title - "The cries of the defense - this veil," which is a phrase of Stalin, he said to
them October 1, 1938 at a meeting of propagandists in Moscow and Leningrad, at the same time
recorded by the Secretary of the CC AA Zhdanov in his notebook. Characteristically, Zhdanov

singled out this phrase as a key, revealing the true representation of Stalin's foreign policy
mission of the Soviet state {403} . But, on the other hand, the analysis of the authors, which are
collected in the book "The Other War: 1939 - 1945" and in fact a debate on the topic, Meltyukhov
"Do Stalin offensive war ready" improperly reduced it to the following conclusion: "... the authors
challenge is not so much the probability (or need) a pre-emptive [272.273] attack the Soviet
Union, as the possibility of implementing it in 1941 (emphasis added -. IP ). In any case, the
comparison referred to articles published in a book and reflect on the face of the opposite point
of view, it is useful. This helps to better understand the causes and nature of the disaster, which
occurred in 1941 and which ultimately was organically linked with the nature of the Stalinist
regime " {404} .
The emphasis on the question of the possibility of the occurrence of the USSR in 1941 - is nothing
more than an attempt to divert the discussion from the Stalin determine the real action in
preparation for the war. The same tendency was clearly manifested at the meeting of Association
of Historians of World War II in December 1997, at which the special report was discussed MI
Meltyuhova {405} . On one flank was rapporteur and support his historian VA Nevezhin, and on
the other - the elders of our military historical science VA Anfilov, MA Gareev, Y. Gorkov, AS Orlov
OA . Rzheshevsky and others for whom "history - political science," and historian, in their opinion,
"must always be mindful of the interests of the state and take care of the sanity of generations
who have life" {406} . The discussion demonstrated that historians democratic direction or not
able to push any noticeable oust the pro-Communist direction of historians. The latter, while
maintaining its position in the institutional system of the post-Soviet science, went to revenge,
which itself has no scientific value. However, it has a serious impact on the further degradation of
the historical science in Russia and the impact on the development of a new generation of
historians. The processes that take place in the post-Soviet historical science, associated with the
general political processes in the country. Democracy has failed even in history, and could not
work out if the cash balance of power. If pro-revenge was even resistance on the part of world
historical science, but there was a paradoxical [274] situation - Western historians not only formal
contact with pro-communist historians, but also support them conceptually {407} . Russian
historians democratic direction will have to show not only patience, but also courage.
The publication in 1998, the International Foundation "Democracy" book "1941" documents (in 2
books) does not put the point in the historiography of the subject, according to the same LA
Bezymenskii, interviews with whom a significant title "The truth about the June 22" appeared
June 18, 1998 in the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda". In the collection of published
documents, which until recently were not available in these archives as the Archive of the
President, Foreign Policy Archives, Archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Central
Archive of the Russian Federation and other Federal Security Service. For all its undeniable
importance, these documents do not in themselves can give direct answers to questions. That is
what is in the interests of Stalin, who personally supervised the acquisition of its archive, is the
foundation of the Archive of the President today. That is why the "documentation, contained in
Stalin and Molotov's personal archives, is extremely important, but not an exhaustive source"
(emphasis added -. IP ) {408} . It is very indicative and the fundamental fact emerged in the
collection of training that, "in contrast to a mean of information about the possible political
rapprochement, the materials for the resumption of economic ties between the USSR and
Germany is very extensive ..." {409} . Stalin did not accidentally left in his archive materials is

mainly on economic cooperation with Germany, as if he knew the psychology brought up in the
country he created historians. And indeed I followed the conclusion: "Our assumption about the
proactive role of the economic factor still requires further study, but now it must be taken into
account when assessing the arguments of the" forced "nature of the agreements in 1939" {410} .
The instruments of the pre-war policy of Stalin's power, [275] have survived to our time, are
precisely the example of sources that cause "to abandon the illusion that the sources - a" window
"through which one can examine the historical life of people of other ages in its" pristine
"authenticity is a good wipe the window" {411} . Only from this array of sources left us to be able
to extract the kernel of truth, they will be compared with other analyzes, are integrated into the
overall context of events. Only then these sources "tell" us what Stalin wanted to hide. So the
conclusion seems premature collectors "1941" documents that "documents are published
completely refute speculation about the alleged preventive (to repel the impending Soviet
aggression) attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union" {412} . Especially that the situation in
the pre-war period, there can not be interpreted as straightforward in terms of "preventive" "nepreventivnoe (treacherous)" attack.
Whatever retreat in covering the eve of the war, the truth of it had already gone out. She made
clear not only external but internal policy of Stalin's power, aimed at the implementation of the
main goal. This goal is clearly articulated in Article ZS Belousova and DG Najafov, which can be
regarded as a landmark in the process of withdrawal of Russian modern historians from the lies
of the Soviet historiography: "Proletarian call for a" final and decisive battle "against capitalism
has become a guiding principle of the policy of the communist rulers of the Soviet state, was the
basis of their global strategy. So the idea of the destruction of the "old world" has become an end
in itself newborn socialist system, the meaning and justification of his existence, infecting the
aspiration for a "new world" the vast masses of the huge Eurasian country ... belief that the
dialectic of historical development will lead to the triumph of communism (as in the first
post-revolutionary years, this course of world events representing the Creator of the Russian
revolution the near future), resting on the dogma of class intransigence, and the inevitability of
war under capitalism, supposedly close of bringing the proletariat for the social revolution.
Erected to the rank of official policy rate for the victory of world communism has led to a global
framework of Soviet activity to create conditions for the widespread adoption of the new social
order " {413} .
However, the need for a historical assessment of this "bet on the victory of world communism"
marked a new discrepancy between historians eve of the war, which can be considered a
landmark. On the one hand, a democratic attitude, the essence of its stated DG Najafov. "Most
likely, - he writes - the Soviet leaders really believed in their revolutionary mission, putting an
equal sign between the interests of the socialist Soviet Union and the" native "(in Marxist
terminology) the interests of the peoples of other countries, meaning the right time to act as a
liberator of these peoples from the yoke of capitalism. In practice, the so-called proletarian
internationalism, the Soviet Union has been reduced to outright nationalism (in its Soviet
National Bolshevik version), while the core component of the Second World War from the
beginning was to protect freedom and democracy against totalitarianism offensive forces " {414} .
On the other hand, is a great-power, anti-Western stance, manifested in the book MI Meltyuhova
"Lost Chance of Stalin." This position deserves special attention, because it turned out to be a
supporter of the author, who has made very significant progress in the study of existing and

search for new materials on the topic. Meltyuhova we extended almost all the facts become
known in recent years, and to create a comprehensive study, followed by a return to the old
version of the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to the war is no longer possible. In the book it is
conclusively proven that by the summer of 1941 the Red Army was the largest army the world,
which had armed [276.277] a number of unique systems, military equipment, and that the army
was preparing for an attack. In 1940 - 1941 years. General Staff of the Red Army was developed
at least four versions of the operational plan, the content of which shows the preparation of a
offensive of the Soviet troops ... Especially clearly, this idea is expressed in the document of 15
May 1941 Total for the war with Germany of the available in the Red Army divisions 303 was
allocated to 247, which would be after the mobilization, there are over 6 million. man, 62
thousand. guns and mortars, 14,2 thous. tanks and 9.9 thousand. airplanes. Germany and its
allies, according to data cited in the book, did not have forces capable of inflicting a guaranteed
defeat of the Red Army. The superiority of the latter in the number of divisions was 2.3 times, on
staff 2.1 in guns and mortars in 2.4, 8.7 on the tanks and the aircraft 4.4 times {415} .
After the book Meltyuhova can no longer talk about the peace policy of the Soviet Union not only
on the eve of the war, but also in previous years. The book examines in detail the Soviet Union
action in Poland in September 1939, his "struggle for Scandinavian foothold", "build-up of the
Soviet military presence in the Baltic States", the struggle for the Balkans, the policy aimed at
weakening the position of England and France in Europe.
However, the debate can not be considered completed on the eve of the war. First, as rightly
pointed himself Meltyukhov, still classified many documents about the Red Army state plans
military action against Finland, Romania, Turkey, and most of the documents on the operational
training of troops, in particular the districts plans cover plans for the entire interwar period, etc.
But above all, there are no documents that allow you to "fully reconstruct the key
decision-making process by the Soviet leadership in the years 1939-1941.". Available resources
do not allow to not only answer the question about the reasons for the refusal of 12 June as the
date of the initial attack on Germany, but also to prove the thesis that "the Red Army was to
complete preparations for an offensive not earlier 15 on July 1941 city of" {416 } .
Second, is a serious objection Meltyuhova a common approach to the consideration of policy of
the USSR in 1939- 1941 years. Claiming the objective reconstruction of historical reality, to the
Soviet foreign policy "without blinders kakih-libo propaganda, but in terms of real interests, goals,
and capabilities of the Soviet Union", speaking out against moralizing tradition in our historical
literature and stating that in his study, we are not talking about justification or indictment of the
Soviet leadership, the spokesman Meltyukhov is great-and anti-Western position, which is typical
today for many members of the Russian intelligentsia, including historians. This position is
defined his research approach - it is completely on the side of Stalin, moreover, he regrets the
missed chance "to defeat the most powerful European power, and coming on the Atlantic coast,
to eliminate the age-old Western threat to our country." If Stalin was able to realize our plans,
then, according to Meltyuhova, "the Red Army could be in Berlin no later than 1942, which would
put under Moscow's control of a much larger area in Europe than it did in 1945. The defeat of
Germany Sovietization of Europe and allow Moscow to use its scientific and technical potential,
opened the way for "a just social reconstruction" European colonies in Asia and Africa ... " {417} .
No one would contest the right MI Meltyuhova speculate about the possible prospects of the
Sovietization of Europe over half a century ago, just as the reason the chairman of the Liberal

Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his successor, the deputy of the State Duma AV
Mitrofanov about the position of modern Russia towards the West, if not for one important fact.
This approach is in complete contradiction with the application of the author on the study
objective [278.279] problems. This contradiction can be illustrated by consideration of the
important question of the role of the USSR in the outbreak of the Second World War. Meltyukhov
actually lubricates the proactive role of the USSR in the preparation of the Soviet-German
non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, sets out the incorrect position of the USSR on the eve of
the arrival in Moscow Ribbentrop, bypasses the question of evaluating speech of Stalin on August
19 openly ignoring appeared on the subject of publication. Thanks to an agreement on 23 August,
said Meltyukhov, "the Soviet Union for the first time in its history has received recognition of its
interests in Eastern Europe by the great European powers," so "the Soviet-German
non-aggression pact can be regarded as a significant success of Soviet diplomacy, which could
beat the British diplomat and achieve its main goal - to stay out of the European war, while
receiving significant free hand in Eastern Europe, a wider space to maneuver between warring
factions in their own interests, and thus to lay the blame for the failure of the
Anglo-French-Soviet talks on London and Paris . Not in the interests of the Soviet leadership
would prevent war in Europe between the Anglo-French bloc and Germany, as soon as the war
had given him a real chance to significantly increase its influence on the continent ...
Non-Aggression Pact - he concluded - to provide not only the interests of the Soviet Union, but
also to the rear of Germany, making it easier for her to war in Europe " {418} . The key role of the
USSR in the beginning of the Second World War, isolated words I actually lies. However, this role
is camouflaged by geopolitical considerations Meltyuhova.
Thus, despite the obvious progress in the search for truth on the eve of the Great Patriotic War,
the creation of its objective history requires clarification of many more important points.
Following the concept of post-communist great power that protects the aggressive ambitions of
Stalin, not only leads to a distortion of the key light turns his policies, but can not give an answer
to this important question, why the Red Army, despite its multiple superiority, suffered such a
crushing defeat in 1941 The reasoning of the fatal miscalculation of the Soviet leadership and the
unwillingness of troops to the creation of a solid defensive front is not enough. Such questions do
not fit into this concept, because it is not a question of geopolitical plans of Stalin and of the
millions of the Red Army to the regime created by them.
The truth about the eve of the war will win its rightful place not only in historiography but also in
the public consciousness. Russian society is not ready to perceive this truth about the war, as
evidenced by his negative reaction to the documentary Vladimir Sinelnikov "The last myth" of
Viktor Suvorov and his book "Icebreaker". Still, there is hope that the May 9 in Russia ever
become not only the Day of the long-awaited peace that followed the bloody war, Memorial Day
on 27 million. Who died in the war, but also a reminder of our blindness about how shall not
build a relationship of government and society. [286]
asil Stanshov {419}
On the one hope for?
Years go by, children are less and less aware of the last war, parties and witnesses who were their
grandparents. Almost better understand the children in the Trojan War - perhaps because her
battle impressed them more than a documentary series on the Discovery World War II. But

both of them sounds like a fairy tale about Little Red Riding Hood or Snow White and her seven
dwarfs.
In Greek, it is a fairy tale mithos - myth. All that is told in Greek mythology, is a fairy tale.
Tales of gods and mortals, for their love and hate about their protracted wars and fleeting truce.
These tales were intended for humanity, which at that time was experiencing her childhood. Even
today, myths continue to capture us, we read them, listen to or watch, sympathize with the
"good" and hate the "bad". Tales ennobled life. Perhaps this is precisely the main objective was
the ancient Greek myth-makers.
Speaking of the Trojan War. Even a child knows where it started: the reason for the war was the
abduction of beautiful Helen. Well, if you missed the school lesson about the Trojan War, he
reminded all that later, in the theater. If we have not kept up on the idea, in Hollywood will stand
- join [288] gap in our knowledge. And we, in general, we remain convinced that the kidnapping
of the wife - a good reason to start a war. Well, can not a person does not take the side of the
Achaeans.
And if this war was announced just now, on our own, so to speak, the eyes, it did not hesitate a
minute and we would have walked as a man in vile campaign against the Trojans. It is, however, a
little deeper in the ancient Greek myths and quickly found out that Paris stole Helen, not because
she liked him very much, but rather to take revenge for the kidnapping of the other girls ... It
turns out that Homer did not show impartiality in the coverage of special the Trojan war!
And here's another example of the mythology. Returning home in Athens, the son of King Aegeus,
Theseus forgot to replace the black sails with white. It was agreed that in this way he had already
declared victory over the Minotaur in the Labyrinth. Crushed with grief father jumped into the
sea, which from that day called the Aegean. How sympathetic I once unhappy father ... until we
know that he is the son contributed to the murder of King Minos Androgeya. That's because this
Minos and demanded that the Athenians as a permanent tribute to redress: to send every nine
years seven boys and girls ... And I thought, I know Greek mythology!
In the same way, and I imagined that I know the truth about the attack of Nazi Germany on the
Soviet Union. It was hard to forget the dramatic beginning of the war on 22 June 1941. He sits in
the Kremlin, Stalin himself, Charlie Chaplin look, and suddenly - on you, Hitler unleashes war
against it. In no way provoked ...
Attackers met scattered handful of border guards and peasants, armed with rusty guns ... These
and similar pattern emerged and continue to emerge in the documentary and feature films,
poems, novels, plays ... They are imprinted in the consciousness of millions of people worldwide.
[289]
Newspapers, radio and television have urged and continue to urge that Hitler treacherously
threw himself on an unsuspecting Stalin nothing.
This myth subject to poets, writers, journalists, writers, painters, sculptors. They for their part are
told their conviction readers, listeners and viewers, among which there is, of course, and the
corresponding percentage of politicians. The politicians on the basis of their mythical ideas about
what happened before and during the Second World War are taking important government
decisions.
And suddenly comes into play, Viktor Suvorov! Writes "Icebreaker" and proves that Hitler
attacked Stalin in order to get ahead of his own attack. Evidence Suvorov did not rely on the
secret archive documents, and to open the Soviet press. He says: "The value of my sources is that

the criminals themselves talk about their crimes," - leads to the witnesses of Marx and Engels,
Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, as well as a great many Soviet marshals and generals. Suvorov simply
reminds us of the theory of permanent revolution, the idea of the victory of communism
throughout the world, etc. - All the things we were taught ...
Retell written Suvorov seems superfluous. It upsets the whole history of the Second World War.
Or rather, he puts it back on its feet, because until now it was just head down.
I would like to tell the author of "Icebreaker" is another proof, which may not be turned up to
him, and if they knew him, has not yet been used. Forty years ago, we learned - from Western
radio voices, of course - that the Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia defected to the West with
his son, taking with him the secret Soviet plans to seize Western Europe. Among them were even
ready samples of ration cards, familiar to us in Bulgaria, called "coupons". They were intended
population of such countries as France ... [290]
So gradually began to emerge from under the layers of red propaganda desire of the Soviet Army
to wash his foot bindings in the waves of the Atlantic Ocean ...
In general, Hitler with his mustache was not easy to arouse sympathy for someone else,
especially after the world became clear that he had done, including after Charlie Chapli ashamed
of his laughter ... But the fact that thanks to him, Western Europe managed to avert the threat of
communism and Stalin not to eat gruel, it is clear as day.
And, maybe, it is because of the fact that they are the soup is not gulped, western, and American
intellectuals, even those that do not define themselves leftists, do not know the truth about the
monstrous nature of Bolshevism, or rather - do not want, and know it. Their short-sightedness,
their blindness uses Russian army political commissars authorized to blur the consciousness of
people all over the world and thus to preserve intact monument communism. They will never
allow any comparison of communism with fascism, so that after a while he again, like Pushkin's
Stone Guest, empty again to conquer the planet. Therefore, the author of "Icebreaker" is
subjected to the hysterical ostracized by official Russian historians, so it is demoted from a scout
in the spy, and even in a traitor.
If the result of the impact of the books of the former Soviet spy was surprisingly similar to that
which occurs during excavations in different layers of Greek mythology, the consequences it
would have been confined literary and historical analysis.
But here is a question of a coherent strategy still existing system of ideas. There is, in spite of the
change of name, image and organizational forms of the carriers of these ideas. It is unacceptable
to keep the Soviet national anthem with the same music, entrusting old author just change the
text. It is unacceptable to keep the banners of regiments and divisions with the same hammers
and sickles on the [291] them. It is unacceptable to maintain an army of scientists who continue
to accumulate evidence that, in principle, communism - it is a great idea, but it is poorly
implemented ... So what, even hoarding, I would say some gullible priverzhenik democracy. But if
he had read the book by Viktor Suvorov, if he knows how Stalin had piled up on the
Soviet-German border mountains of soldiers' boots at the same time when his diplomats shook
hands amicably their Nazi counterparts, so it will not gullible.
And if the purpose of Greek myths is the ennoblement of humanity, the purpose of the myth of
the treacherous aggression exposed Stalin completely different - lulling humanity until the day of
the "M". This is the day when the Red Army was to invade Europe! Hitler ahead of this day only
for two weeks. Not again have to hope for some kind of corporal ?! Translation from Bulgarian

Meno Radeva
Viktor Suvorov as the "icebreaker." On a historical debate
The purpose of this article - to give Russian readers an overview of the discussions about the
books of Viktor Suvorov outside of Russia, and also to present available to the "West" themed
literature.
"Joseph Stalin was planning an attack on Germany in 1941" - a guideline books of Viktor Suvorov
(real name - Vladimir Rezun, GRU officer, who fled to England). This statement has the explosive
force and today above all in the countries of the former military adversaries - Russia and
Germany. In this debate on the prehistory of World War II, particularly concerning the
"Barbarossa" plan, today more relevant than ever. In Germany, they were resumed in a "battle of
historians' in Russian - with the release of the book Suvorov" Icebreaker ", as well as in
connection with the partial and temporary opening of the archives.
How to classify from today's point of view, the product {421} Suvorov? What is new, we will open
the declassified documents that were not available to Suvorov?
In recent years, become aware of numerous documents of the party, government, military and
kagebistskih archives {422} , which clearly confirms the thesis of Suvorov. The most important
without a doubt, belong to the military plans of the General Staff of the Red Army [293]
1940-1941. Later in this study we will touch upon the party propaganda and military materials.
Separately it will highlight the role of the Soviet Navy - topics which are still not dealt with
Suvorov.
An important role in the evaluation of the role of Stalin and the pre-war Soviet Union inevitably
plays an ideology. At the beginning of the Stalinist dictatorship of the Soviet Union he was forced
to avoid military conflict with the capitalist states. Stalin needed the respite to strengthen the
role of the Party and the establishment of an industrial base for the massive production of
armaments. With the introduction of five-year plans in the first place provided for the creation of
heavy industry and the arms industry, the most ruthless methods {423} . The labor force, released
by agriculture as a result of the bloody collectivization, literally absorbed many new industries in
the energy and heavy industry. Red Army Manual jealously monitored and controlled constantly
growing industrial might of the state.
Requirements of the Red Army to the industry in 1929 were excessive: was planned army of three
million people, two thousand aircraft (additional fifteen hundred reserve), 9350 artillery pieces
(additional 3400 smaller caliber), one and a half thousand tanks (additional reserve in the initial
stage war - three thousand pieces). It began "taking" of foreign models of tanks and aircraft, and
not only through official channels, but also through industrial espionage.
It will be seen that these figures weapons, whatever they may seem incredible to 1929 pale in
comparison with the planning and the reality of the forties.
To begin with Stalin had created an atmosphere of threats from the capitalist states to deal with
the real and imaginary "enemies" in the country. In the late 30-ies. throughout the Soviet Union
persecuted by "enemies of the people", "spies" and "saboteurs" to hide the economic failures, as
well as to further strengthen the power of Stalin. While this view was common: the Soviet Union
must be armed to an extent to be able to repel all conceivable enemy coalitions simultaneously.
This goal required by the industry to the lion's share of its industry was weapons, which led to
the decline and economic collapse.

However, in the mid 30s. Stalin felt strong enough to problems instead of purely defense
purposes in the event of an attack on the USSR industry and reorient the party to another goal offensive. Efforts to build armaments industry started to bear fruit. Across the country grew and
multiplied military factories, a large proportion of which was built with the technical assistance of
the capitalist countries. The rapid development of Soviet industry would be impossible without
Western machines and technology. For the preferred technology suppliers include Germany, the
United States and even Mussolini's Italy.
Even seemingly "peaceful" industries, such as tractor factories, was created with the purpose of
the production of weapons. "On the basis of tractors and cars on the tractor and automobile
factories tanks will be created as a" military version of "peaceful machines. Therefore, only the
power of these plants will depend on the quality mechanization of the army, "- said more June 14,
1932 {424} the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Egorov.
Indeed, automobile and tractor plants in Kharkov, Stalingrad, Leningrad and Chelyabinsk, built
with the participation of the Ford, served as the basis for the production of the tank before the
Second World War, {425} . Already before the war 50% of the capacity of these plants were used
for military purposes. In the late 30-ies. the number of battle tanks in the Soviet Union exceeded
the total number of tanks in Germany, France, Britain and the United States combined! [294.295]
Stalin did not forget about the Air Force. Relevant industry created systematically. In the West,
bought aircraft and aircraft engines, which are modeled on the Soviet Union built their own.
Stalin "taking" of modern machines was not associated with any ideological problems. They were
planning to buy both the Italian Duce and unloved in England. Meanwhile, in America, it acquired
a license for the manufacture of the famous aircraft DC-3 in the Soviet version - model Li-2.
Soviet pilots before the war of the summer abroad. For example, three bomber TB-3 in 1934
visited Rome. At the same time the Soviet military delegation was received by the Duce. Soviet
military were offered trips to factories producing planes {426} . In turn, the Italian military pilots
have been visits to the Soviet Union, in particular in Odessa.
The German aircraft had a good reputation, and the Soviet Union captured some specimens even
during the Spanish Civil War ( "Messerschmitt Bf-109B and Heinkel HE-111").
So talking about the lack of technical level of Soviet aircraft is not always necessary. Even though
many authors explain the luck of the German troops at the beginning of the war was the
technical superiority over the Soviet Union, Soviet experts come to different results. Here is what
the Soviet test pilot Suprun of seized car "Messerschmitt Bf-109B: The plane Messerschmidt
Bf- 109B with engine Jumo 210 on its tactical and technical data is below the high-speed fighters,
who are armed with military-air forces of the Red Army" {427} . Very similar sound assessment of
the aircraft "Heinkel He 111" test pilot Kabanov: "1. Heinkel He 111 aircraft inferior domestic cars
at speed. 2. The take-off speed, range and limit the height of the machine is significantly lower
requirements for twin-engine bomber " {428} .
After the conclusion of the pact between Stalin and Hitler collaboration with the German Air
Force has acquired an official character. Stalin ordered to compile a list of modern machinery and
motors that Germany could deliver him, and that he was interested. Thus, the USSR bought, for
example, the car Heinkel HE-100", which in 1938 in Germany was achieved the world record in
speed. This machine is in its aerodynamic data was probably the most advanced model of the
German before the war. But it has not adopted a German aircraft, and sold to the Soviet Union.
The aviation industry of the USSR, of course, learned a lot through this machine.

In 1939, the Soviet delegation, which included such well-known designers like Alexander Yakovlev,
and Nikolai Polikarpov, have been shown in Germany, almost all types of aircraft and the plants
on which they were made. Soviet test pilots could even try the latest car in the air.
Soviet designers and technicians used the aircraft delivered by Germany to improve their skills.
Only in 1940 in the German machines were trained more than 3,500 Soviet technicians. The
results of the training and test flights at German planes summarizes Sobolev as follows: "From
this it is clear that a new generation of Soviet warplanes in its basic parameters is not only lagging
behind the German, but superior to similar machines, eg for speed" {429} . The Council had
another problem - time to build full-scale production of new types of aircraft.
It is necessary to once again draw attention to the fact that the assessment of German aircraft in
the Soviet Union just before the outbreak of war is absolutely impossible to draw a conclusion on
the lower level Soviet aircraft. Thus, the Soviet leadership headed by Stalin in no case could not
feel terror before the German military equipment. On the contrary, the senior military and party
[296.297] leadership considered themselves quite capable to win an offensive war against
Germany. In the words of Professor Moudsli: "Contrary to the opinion of many historians today, I
would have argued this way: Stalin and the military high command believed that they could do
with Hitler from a position of their own strength, rather than weakness" {430} . The more that
the German tanks, as shown by the Soviet experts made them a very bad impression. Soviet
specialists simply could not believe that there really is not the best tank in Germany. Knowing
about the features and power of the newest types of Soviet tanks T-34 and KV-1, they could not
accept the German tanks as a serious opponent.
The appearance of the front of the Soviet battle tanks KV-1, named after Marshal Voroshilov,
acted as a shock to the German troops. Known episode from the memoirs of the Austrian
General Erhard Raus, which describes the appearance of a single tank KV-1, after the start of the
"Barbarossa" plan: KV-1 blocked the way to supply the German Sixth Panzer Division and blocked
it for almost two days. The attacks of German tanks, anti-tank guns caliber 50 mm, and even dive
bomber attacks were unsuccessful. Usually a very effective anti-aircraft guns 88 mm worked only
for a very short distance, and not just " {431} .
SPECIFICATIONS German and Soviet tanks in 1941
Germany the USSR
PzKpfw IIIPzKpfw IV
T-34/76 KV-1
Weight in ton 16.0 18.0 28.0 47.2
Frontal book, in mm
14.5 14.5 60 110
Caliber weapons, in mm 37 75 (37) 76.2 76.2
Engine power, l / s 230 230 500 600
Soviet tanks were on their technical capabilities are not just a German, or better than them, but
also greatly exceeded them quantitatively. While the Wehrmacht was armed with just 3,350
tanks of all types (next to the trophy 35-38-ton tanks "Skoda" worked numerous, completely
outdated Panzer II model and Panzer III), Stalin's arsenal looked about in such a way { 432} :
the Leningrad military District: 1977 tanks; Northwestern Front (Baltic Military District): 1 646
tanks; Western Front (special Western military district): 3345 tanks; South-Western Front (Special
Kiev Military District): 5894 tanks; Odessa Military District 1119 tanks.
For example, few of these figures it is clear how hopeless was supposed to be for the Germans

attack on Russia. Especially when you consider that there has not yet been given the figures for
the internal military districts (Moscow, the Caucasus, etc.).
We now turn to the subject, which even in the special literature is affected very little: a giant
Stalinist program for the creation of the fleet.
Tsarist Russia never played a big role as a maritime power. The vast continental empire has
focused on the arming of the Army. In any case, Russia did not have to protect the sea lanes on
which trade would have developed. In the USSR, maritime trade routes and played an important
role. Therefore, even the creation of a large fleet defense purposes was not necessary.
Nevertheless, Stalin developed ambitious plans to build ocean-going fleet. If Stalin's plans were
carried out, the Soviet Union would have had such a [299] navy, which would surpass the naval
forces of both traditional maritime nations - Britain and the United States combined! {433} In
1936, the Soviets began to probe in the United States the opportunity to buy a battleship. A man
who was tasked to negotiate, called Sam Karp, he was the brother of the wife of Vyacheslav
Molotov. Sam Karp was born in Russia, but he lived in America.
Stalin requested even before the American ambassador Steinhardt, to get permission to buy a
battleship of the US government. Before that Steinhardt when he was ambassador in Moscow
could not manage to meet with Stalin. In the end, after a long settling, President Roosevelt
agreed to the development and delivery of the battleship in the USSR. This work was engaged in
August 1937 the American company Gibbs & Cox." Except for one battleship, the Soviet Union
had to get more details and weapons for a second to collect it on their yards.
Plans Gibbs & Cox" were actually gigantic. Both ships were to be a displacement of not less than
66 000 tonnes (option A) or even 74,000 tonnes (option B). In comparison, the German battleship
"Bismarck" had a displacement of 42,000 tons {434} .
The Soviet Union was counting on technical assistance to Italy. For example, the class "Kirov"
cruiser's engine was made on the model, bought in Italy. Engines other ships of the same class
were to be built by an Italian license. In addition, drawings cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli
were bought in Italy.
Italian destroyers "Dardo" and "Baleno" served as a model for Soviet class destroyers "Furious"
(Project 7). Already in 1929, plans for a Soviet submarine class "Decembrists" were developed on
the Italian shipyard Cantieri Riuniti dell 'Adriatico.
Stalin approved a huge program to develop the Navy provided him Voroshilov September 7, 1937
In this program, the construction of at least eight battleships were provided (four - type B / 25
and the draft four - type A / 64 project), 10 heavy cruisers (Project 22) 22 cruiser (project 68), two
aircraft carriers (project 71), the top 20 destroyers, 144 destroyers, various minoukladchiki, mine
trawls, 85 large, 175 medium and 116 small submarines.
Construction program for 10 destroyers, eight battleships, 14 cruisers, and two aircraft carriers
were approved July 27, 1940
These are just two examples of the extensive Soviet naval construction program, clearly
demonstrating its tremendous volume. What meaning had this program for the continental
Soviet Union?
Such a program could not be defensive in nature, as for the protection of the coasts, it was too
big and too ambitiously conceived. If we were talking about following a defensive doctrine, it
would be necessary to design and build a completely different fleet.
The role of the Soviet Navy was predetermined offensive doctrine. Description of the role of the

navy in the "Interim Naval statute of 1937" ( "Provisional Rules 1937 Marine Service") begins with
offensive tasks: "Offensive battles on the high seas and in the airspace over the sea, besides, the
enemy's coast and near the enemy naval bases to achieve the operational objectives of war at
sea ... "Naval commanders were to conduct offensive operations to inflict a decisive defeat on the
enemy {435} .
Molotov, Stalin soon trustee, said February 14, 1938: "the mighty Soviet state needs of the
marine and ocean-going fleet, meeting the interests and worthy of his great goals" {436} .
Stalin's plans to build a fleet exceeded the capacity of the Soviet shipyards. So often as possible
descent [300.301] water vessels tighten. Ultimately, all of this gigantic arms program and could
not be completed in time to the "Barbarossa" operation started.
This brief excursion into the area of naval armaments should serve as yet another stroke in
the study of Stalin's intentions before World War II.
Another very controversial point in justifying expansionist Soviet Union, plans are Stalin's speech
at a meeting of the Politburo of 19 August 1939 and the graduates of the military academies,
May 5, 1941
The authenticity of the speech August 19, 1939 many historians questioned. In this speech, Stalin
prepares the higher leadership of the party to conclude a pact with the German Empire.
Unusually frank, that it can not comply with the concepts of the historians who have remained
faithful to the Soviet line.
Stalin openly admits that he intends to use the pact with Hitler, in order to draw the German
Empire in the war of attrition with Western countries. In this case, the Soviet Union itself will be
able to determine the time of its entry into the war, that is, he set a term of attack. Weakened
opponents then fall into the hands of Stalin as a "ripe fruit". Traditional historical science, of
course, can not use such a frank statement about Stalin's own plans. Historical version according
to which Adolf Hitler was the sole aggressor in the case of a genuine speech recognition Stalin
collapses.
However, whether it was Stalin really so extraordinary, as is commonly believed, or just not
available to us other similar documents from Stalin's closest entourage? In fact, we can bring a lot
of other evidence of Stalin's aggressive intentions.
One of the most important witnesses may be regarded as the leader of the Communist
International, the Bulgarian Georgi Dimitrov, whose diaries were found in one of Sofia archives.
Special attention should be recorded on September 7, 1939 {437} : "The war is between the two
groups of capitalist countries (rich and poor in respect of colonies, raw materials, etc.). Over the
division of the world, for world domination! We do not mind that they fought hard and
weakened each other. Not bad, if the hands of Germany was shaken position of the richest
capitalist countries (especially England). Hitler himself did not understand and did not want to,
shakes, undermines the capitalist system. <...> We can maneuver to push one side against the
other, to better got torn. Non-Aggression Pact to some extent helps Germany. The next step - to
push the other side. <...> What is wrong would be if as a result of the defeat of Poland, we have
extended the socialist system to new territory and population? " These diaries Dimitrov
completely correspond came to the West Stalin's speech text August 19, 1939! Witnesses Stalin's
statements were, in addition to Dimitrov, even Molotov and Zhdanov.
Referring now to Andrey Zhdanov, Stalin's overseer of ideology and art, the Secretary of the
Central Committee and Politburo member. Could there be such utterances of Stalin as listed in

the diary Dimitrova, unexpected for Zhdanov? In no event shall {438} .

A few years ago it became known the secret speech of Zhdanov in 1938 to the Central Committee
of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Prague {439} . Zhdanov said that although the duty of
every Communist - to fight the fascist aggressor, but at the same time the Communists must try
"with all the force generated by the use of the war economic and political crisis, to mobilize the
masses and to accelerate the decline of capitalism in Czechoslovakia." In their struggle against
Hitler, and later by the Communists against capitalism will be supported by the Red Army, which
will become "an important political factor in this conflict."
Another document sheds light on Stalin's political games. In the document, who has fallen into
the hands of the American [302.303] consul in Prague, tells about the journey of Czech
Communists in Moscow in 1939. The delegations were as follows explained the motives of the
Soviet pact Hitler-Stalin: "If the Soviet Union signed a pact with the Western countries, Germany
has never would not be able to go to war, the consequence of which would be the world
revolution, which we have been preparing ... Surrounded by Germany would never start a war ...
we can not allow that Germany had lost the war, because, if it falls under the control of the West
and Poland will be recreated, we will be cut off from the rest of Europe. The present war must
last as long as we want to ... Stay calm, because it had never occurred time, so favoring our
interests, as it is now " {440} .
Another quote from Comrade Zhdanov, this time one that was not intended for publication
speech in Leningrad, "the socialist government's policy is to use the contradictions between the
imperialists, in this case - military conflicts, to strengthen the positions of socialism, where only
seems to this opportunity " {441} .
But Zhdanov's statement in November 1940 .: "Our neutrality - this is an unusual neutrality. We
are fighting without acquiring territory (laughter). In order to maintain this neutrality is important
power ... We must be strong enough to protect the position of socialism as a diplomatic and
military means. " Then Zhdanov urges his listeners "not to lose a single day, not to lose a single
hour to improve military technology, military organization, with modern offensive experience
with all the methods and means of attack must be taken into account" {442} .
And that's just a few of the quotes that give expansionist aims of the Soviet Union under Stalin.
The reliability of Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies in the evening of 5 May
1941, too, has long been in doubt {443} . Later it became known, and the content of the speech,
including three toast that Stalin said at the subsequent banquet {444} . Stalin said that the
German Wehrmacht must no longer be regarded as invincible. He praised the Red Army, which
already consisted of 300 divisions, a third of which were mechanized. That these words he
finished his speech: "The Red Army - a modern army, and a modern army - an army offensive."
After Stalin's speech May 5, 1941 the propaganda became more outspoken and aggressive,
especially in the Red Army {445} . For example, the draft directive "On Political Propaganda
problems in the Red Army in the near future," contained, inter alia, the following wording: "All
forms of propaganda, agitation and education referred to a single goal: the political, moral and
military training personnel to conduct fair , offensive and destructional war ... "and finally, the
report" Current international situation and foreign policy of the USSR "(May 1941):" The German
army has not faced an opponent of equal value, equal to her both in the number of troops, and
in technical equipment and combat training. Meanwhile, such a collision is not far off. " And
further: "The experience of military action showed that the defensive strategy did not give any

success and ended in defeat. Therefore, against Germany need to apply the same offensive
strategy, backed by powerful technology. " The first quotation GF Alexandrov, head of the
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, made the following meaningful mark, "a sort
of wording can not be tolerated. It is meant to reveal the enemy cards. " Note to the second
quote: "The war with Germany."
I think there is no need to cite further quotes to make an unambiguous conclusion about the
Stalinist policy in 1941 [304.305]
Finally, we touch the offensive strategy of the Red Army and its military preparations {446}
against Germany in summer 1941
Even Viktor Suvorov defined the military preparations of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 as
the offensive. Airfields were located near the borders to be able to cause an unexpected blow for
Germany. At the beginning of the war it played a fatal role for the Air Force of Stalin. Hundreds of
planes were destroyed by German aircraft on the ground or try to take off.
It assesses the situation a well-known American historian EF Ziemke: "After the fatal error has
been made and the main forces of the red aircraft in anticipation of the offensive were deployed
near the border, it was almost completely destroyed on the ground and in the air before nightfall
June 22, 1941 and never fully recovered until the end of the war " {447} .
The same thing happened with concentrated in Lviv and the Bialystok bulge armored troops of
the Soviet Union. drums tank wedges Concentrated there are the Wehrmacht bypassed,
surrounded and destroyed.
For the defense of the German attack, these military preparations were completely unsuitable.
Thanks to them, the tank units were presented to the Germans for the destruction of both the
plate. But the Red Army and was prepared not to attack, and the implementation of a sudden a
deep blow to the German forces in German-occupied Poland. This is acknowledged even
Kokoshin (First Deputy Minister of Defense and former adviser to President Yeltsin for security),
and Major-General V. Lavrinov, the authors of the foreword to a book about the Soviet military
strategy. {448}
Evan Moudsli also comes to a similar conclusion {449} : "For planning 1940-1941. was offensive
doctrine of the Red Army, "" offensive Soviet doctrine meant not only that the Red Army forces
were pulled far ahead. This meant also that they are not concentrated in the region of the border
" {450} .
Soviet military plan on 15 May 1941 assumed attack on southern Poland from Ukraine to
Germany, to cut off from the oil region of Ploiesti. Therefore, strong Soviet armored units were
concentrated in the Ukraine {451} .
Military plan of 15 May 1941 can be regarded as the most sensational document the pre-war
time. Pyatnadtsatistranichny document entitled "Considerations on the plan for the strategic
deployment of Soviet forces in case of war with Germany and its allies," provides suggestions for
preventive strikes against Germany.
Appropriate wording reads: "To prevent this, I consider it necessary in any case does not give the
initiative of action to the German command, to forestall the enemy to deploy and attack the
German army at the moment when it will be in the stage of deployment and did not have time
yet to arrange the front and the interaction of birth troops. "
The plan was proposed by Stalin, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Timoshenko and Chief
of General Staff, General Zhukov's army. Written document hand General Vasilevsky, chief of the

planning department of the Soviet General Staff.

Although this plan has not been signed by Stalin, the activities proposed in it are enforced until
the beginning of the war. Stalin usually did not sign such documents in person, in the previous
war plans (for example, in November 1940 and on March 1941.) Also is not his signature.
These plans are not in any way have been not only the games of the General Staff, as some
experts argue willingly. For example, in a military plane in March 1941 can be found the note,
Lieutenant-General Nikolai Vatutin, "offensive start 12.6.". It is known that Vatutin was not just a
Lieutenant-General and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.
Also absurd opinion that offensive plans [306.307] have been developed without the knowledge
of Stalin or against his will. Decided to the General Staff in 1940-1941. on actuation of such a
far-reaching plan without the knowledge of Stalin or without his orders? Naturally, in Soviet
Union 1941 year, this was impossible. Those who insist on it, pretend that never had just ended
the bloody purges among the officer corps of the Red Army. Stalin would have thrown him
recalcitrant generals in the KGB cellars, without thinking for a second.
An interesting position in relation to theses Suvorov two well-known authors in the West Colonel David E. Glantz {452} (publisher of the magazine Journal of Slavic Military Studies) ,
and Gabriel Gorodetsky {453} (Tel Aviv University).
Although it is unlikely that someone has published more material on "plan" Barbarossa "than
David Glantz, in his books, there is virtually nothing for the Soviet military plans of 1940-1941. If
he mentions that, at best, one or two short paragraphs. He also persistently avoids quoting the
key documents on the Soviet military planning, although in other cases, publishes every detail
what you can imagine.
It looks and behaves Gabriel Gorodetsky. Gorodetsky not only does not recognize the authenticity
of the speech of Stalin August 19, 1939, but also considers the Soviet offensive plans for
1940-1941. completely harmless. He argues that these plans - in the best case, internal
documents of the General Staff, what is available at any General Staff of the world. Even Stalin's
occupation and annexation of Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia presented Gorodetsky as
a purely protective measure! Stalin's role in the division of Poland, it is also not particularly upset.
Expanding the boundaries of Germany, Hitler always looks the attack, the expansion of the
borders of the USSR Red Army, in Gorodetsky, pursued only defensive end.
One can only hope that the new documents from the former Soviet archives will be available in
the future will enable the next generation of historians to come to more balanced conclusions.
[310]
Dmitry Khmelnitsky
About skittish Stalin and the scientific and historical patriotism
Historical writings Suvorov doubly interesting - in themselves and in connection with the public
reaction to them, it is unusual for highly specialized research. The Russian reader, rapidly
responding to texts Suvorov, gives his own innermost thoughts about the native history. The
historian Suvorov can be right or wrong (in my opinion, right) - the judge of that, in the end, his
colleagues. Provocateur Suvorov makes people speak on the theme, more than painful for the
Soviet historical consciousness. For sociologists sovietologists disputes about Suvorov - bonanza.
Public discussions about the books Suvorov are almost always the same scenario. His key points,

such as the fact that the Stalinist policy of 30-ies. in principle, it was aimed at preparing a war of
aggression in Europe, or that preparations for an attack on Germany in summer 1941 actually
conducted and easily provable, do not become the subject of discussion. Refutes mostly
secondary and tertiary data Suvorov like tactical and technical data of different types of weapons,
minor (in the context of the theme) statistical calculations or just the terminology used them. But
refuted all this with a passion and with a desire to discredit the author, it is clear - do not care
[312] about the scientific accuracy makes people tick, and a deep, organic disagreement with the
very essence of his books - with his eye on the Soviet Union and Soviet history.
This - sociological! - Part of the problem raised by the books of Suvorov, is no less interesting and
important than the actual scientific and historical.
The first time I had to attend an open debate on Suvorov in Berlin in 1995. Former East German
professor read in emigrant club lecture on the Soviet-German diplomatic relations in the thirties.
Suvorov, he could not ignore. the public has shown himself just published the book "Day-M" and
spoke as follows: - written clearly, it is likely that from a military point of view, everything is as it
was preparing to Soviet aggression against Germany was really conducted. But he, a professor,
did not believe it until he did not show until Stalin signed an order to attack Germany.
It is, I suppose, in the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop believed obediently until the
competent government bodies for yourself is not admitted.
A host of the evening, a Soviet emigre professor, took the book, leafed through it and said with
disgust - well, what is it, citizens, science! Suvorov I have not read, but as a scientist I can say with
full responsibility - scientific books look different. The audience, mostly comprised of war
veterans and pensioners, was clearly pleased. These two points of view, correct in form but
Soviet in content and flawed in both form and content, is usually confined to the negative
criticism of Suvorov. Six months later, I was out of pure curiosity, he organized a discussion on the
books of Suvorov in the same club, and literally collided with a wave of hatred. Discussion of
players shaking with rage at the mere mention of the fact that the Soviet Union might want to
attack Germany. It seemed as if it was this rather obvious idea undermined the meaning of
existence and the national pride of the Soviet [313] people, and not the end of communism and
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Last, they survived quite easily. Speech was not on arguments.
Suvorov was an enemy that had to be shut, trample not hear ...
Some intelligent, but disagree readers blamed Suvorov unscientific style. In fact, it's a
compliment. If the main claim to multiple volumes, full of interesting facts and their
interpretation of the original, - the style, the author can celebrate. Interestingly, another book
written in the same genre - "The Gulag Archipelago" - unscientific style of wine is not imputed.
Quite the contrary. I think that the value of the books of Suvorov in the scientific sense is more
than the value of the "Gulag". With Solzhenitsyn nobody argued, even the KGB. He has not made
a scientific discovery. He outlined in detail the phenomenon that everyone who wanted to, and
so have guessed.
Suvorov made a discovery. He overturned the conventional (and in the USSR, and, oddly enough,
in the West), the concept of development of Soviet history. Undermined the work of hundreds of
these, having the "scientific style" scientists. And he did it temperamental, passionate,
sarcastically, literary fun - that is "unscientific." And simultaneously pulled out for everyone to
see a permanent phenomenon of post-Soviet consciousness: to reconcile with the idea that the
Soviet Union people were killed tens of millions, was easier than to recognize that the purpose of

these activities was easy to raunch - aggression against all and sundry. And there was no idealism.
Solzhenitsyn's sentence "Stalin - killer" accepted unconditionally. Sentence Suvorov "Stalin - the
aggressor" - it is impossible to digest. Psychologically, the reaction is understandable. If Stalin was
a murderer, we - the victim. If Stalin was the aggressor, we - partners.
***
A typical example of this approach is one of the first responses to the book Suvorov - Article
doctor of historical sciences, Professor Aron Chernyak "Eyes of the participant and historian,"
published in number 93 of the Israeli magazine "Twenty-Two" in 1994, shortly after the release of
the first two books Suvorov in Russian. Prof. Chernyak - a specialist in the history of artillery and
military industry veteran, passed the entire war from beginning to end. Logic and Methodology
dispute Chernyak typical of much discussion, the post-Soviet disturbing the public for more than
10 years.
Chernyak does not agree with Suvorov strongly believes his theory unproven and unscientific, but
the books themselves - a model of a hoax. And the first thing that angers Chernyak - this
terminology Suvorov, who believes the "Great Patriotic War" only an episode of the Second
World War, the Soviet Union aggressively started in 1939.
Chernyak wrote: "... if the author says that he destroys the" memory of the just war "," liberation
", what is it in the sight of Suvorov? It is clear - unfair, neosvoboditelnaya, predatory. But here
arises a sacramental, perhaps the most important question: who, then, tens of millions who died
at the front, the rear, the Nazi concentration camps - as they are now called? Defenders of their
homeland and the invaders? Heroes or criminals? .. What a war of aggression, which begins with
a strongly defensive of the protracted period? How is an invader from defending defending
enemy .. Suvorov arguments about the nature of the Great Patriotic War - is a model of moral
absurdity, and they make it a book deeply immoral - this output can not leave anywhere " {454} .
Wait, what does Suvorov? Is Suvorov first told us that the Soviet Union started the Second World
War along with the Third Reich invaded Poland, Finland and the Baltic states and that it was
preceded by a pact to share the world into spheres of influence of Germany and the Soviet Union?
What the Soviet Union forcibly established communist regimes in occupied countries of Eastern
Europe and supported their existence with the help of the Soviet Army, [314.315] periodically
staging armed intervention until 1990? If Prof. Chernyak heard about it the first time, his
reasoning about the immorality of books Suvorov - pure demagoguery.
The appeal to morality immediately turns the discussion of research into the ideological and
highlights the main problem created by Suvorov's books for several generations of Soviet people.
Memories of the noble role of the Soviet people in World War II - the only bright spot in the
history of the USSR. The only time in 70 years the Soviet people were allowed to resist the enemy
and hate him. Before and after the war, too, the population loss in the millions, but the killers in
the name of bodies and the party was supposed to love. And here for the first time there
appeared a real, not invented by an enemy alien and cruel hatred which did not have a crush.
Bright idea of the victory over fascism indirectly justify everything - all losses, military,
pre-war and post-war, slave labor, poverty, the Gulag. Therefore abandon it turned out to be
psychologically more difficult than say goodbye with the communist ideology.
Suvorov theory - whether it has been proved - deprives the mass of the people the moral
justification for the hardships of their lives. If he is right, they - not the saviors of the world from

fascism, and the aggressors. The fact that the Soviet people has been by the time the aggressor in
relation to Poland, Finland and the Baltic States, are not usually deposited in the consciousness.
Rhetorical question - who were the Soviet people in the war: the defenders and invaders - is
meaningless. They were consistently those and others.
One might ask a reasonable question - whether they were anti-fascists? Fascism is defined not
simply the position in the fight, it's a way of thinking and the rejection of state regimes of the
fascist type. That is anti-fascism - it is a struggle for democracy, and not vice versa. The Red Army
was a Stalinist, and therefore the anti-fascist by definition could not. The political aims of the
Soviet government and, consequently, the Red Army, were criminal, regardless of whether it is
attacked, defended and peacefully waited for the right moment. The goal was: to establish the
communist regime by force there, which will be able to reach. Invades Poland and the Baltic
States, defended by Germany, he crushed the resistance in Eastern European countries,
suppressed the uprising in Hungary, the same army, literally the same people.
Next Chernyak claim to Suvorov - methodological. He believes that once Suvorov himself said
that almost no use of archival materials and uses mostly open-Soviet materials, its books are
unscientific. The evidence lists several unused known Suvorov foreign editions of World War II.
This argument makes sense only if able to prove that the author of the material used is not
enough evidence for his theory, and criticism of the most well known archive material, contrary
to this theory.
Nothing like that here we do not see. The bulk of these facts Chernyak simply does not notice, as
own sources are not quoted. His arguments are of a general nature and habit, as a rule, have
already been shown, disassembled and disproved by Suvorov in his books, which Cherniak also
seems not to notice.
Archives of General Staff - the only place where Suvorov could find written evidence of his theory
- he and his supporters are not available. However, his opponents and only there can find
arguments in its favor. They can, but for some reason can not find, although the files are almost
in their hands.
Of course, Suvorov can not produce handwritten orders of Stalin or Zhukov on the preparation of
aggression, but it analyzes the process of preparing himself. And it is not difficult. The process is
there, and the evidence is abundant. Just the main unit Suvorov [316.317] argument - the key
evidence of the preparation of the Red Army to attack on Germany in the spring of 1941 - his
opponents are not trying to challenge.
Cling to detail, and, as a rule, very poorly. For example, Chernyak believes that if the plan of
attack on Germany existed, "the division commander, corps, armies and fronts, as well as the
commander of the fleet and military industry leaders ... had to know about this plan in detail, to
take an active part in preparation, or the plan would be doomed to failure. Hence the conclusion:
to keep secret plan of unleashing the Second World War is impossible; hence, such a plan does
not exist. "
Very convincing. First, why should the commanders at all levels had to know absolutely secret
strategic plan in all its details? It's like tell about it to journalists.
Completely in the plan of attack on Germany could be devoted to only a few major developers
headed by Stalin, Zhukov and Shaposhnikov. Until the subordinate commanders plan was brought
in the form of specific orders for relocation, etc. Nevertheless, it was clear to many on the nature
of these orders, that it is not an exercise. Suvorov leads many examples of what supposedly going

on maneuvers in the spring and summer of 1941, the officers suspected that to be a war. And
certainly not defensive. I will allow myself to repeat only one quotation, words of
Lieutenant-General Telegin: "Since it was assumed that the war would be fought on the territory
of the enemy, who were in the prewar period within the district warehouses mobilization
stockpile of weapons, equipment and ammunition were relocated to the border military
districts."
It's funny and it is characteristic that, according to the above said Chernyak about "the plan of
unleashing the Second World War," he said the start of World War II, the attack [318] Germany
on the Soviet Union rather than Germany and the Soviet Union to Poland. For Soviet historian it
is natural for the normal - strange.
Critique specific arguments Suvorov Prof. Chernyak pays very little space, and it is kind of strange.
Here Suvorov writes that before the war the Soviet tank building focuses mainly on the issue of
light, fast tanks BT This was the aggressor tank, designed for rapid breakthroughs on good roads,
which were then only in Germany.
Chernyak objection: "... that objective could have been achieved on one condition: if for no BT
will not shoot. The maximum thickness of its armor was 20 mm, that is, made its way with heavy
machine gun. " But if for breakthroughs in the enemy's rear BT, according to an authoritative
critic, was not fit, then to defend the more armor there is even more important. Why do it at all
let?
The same applies to aviation. Suvorov brings a lot of convincing facts that before the war the
focus was on the offensive bombers, which all turned out to be concentrated at the borders of
Germany, it is reasonable only if the occurrence of suicidal and in the defense. He describes the
gigantic scale of the training of military pilots in the two years before the war. There were so
many that they are no longer assigned to officer ranks, and training will be reduced from three
years to nine, six or even four months. That is, let dropouts, can only fly, bombed and return to
the airfield. dogfights News they were not taught, as the Soviet military doctrine assumed that
the enemy aviation will be suppressed at the beginning of the war on the ground.
Critic surprised last fact, and objects as follows: "... the majority of aircraft were obsolete. From
1939 to June 22, 1941 the army had 17,745 aircraft, but one new type - about 20 percent. "
Perhaps, but what type? Rights Suvorov or not? Dont clear.
Suvorov writes about the formation of the Soviet Union before the war with the [319] Germany
10 airborne corps, which is a clear proof of the aggressive military plans. Chernyak objection:
"Such housing could serve as a deterrent to attacking the enemy."
Why hold back this way? By the way, Suvorov and writes about the transformation of the
survivors after the attack the Germans landing parts in conventional infantry. Again Suvorov
logical.
It is clear that the professor gave Chernyak right to express such confidence in the conclusion of
the article, that the book Suvorov "can not withstand criticism qualified" and are "an example of
a hoax." To prove this he failed. As, however, and no one else.
In order to judge the integrity of the scientific discussion, not necessarily be an expert in this field.
I have a favorite book, "Transcript of the meeting of the August meeting of Agricultural Sciences
in 1949". It's a long time when the Soviet Union put an end to genetics. The party said if his word
only on the last day of the meeting. But the first three days, "Mendel-Morganists" vengeance and
were cut open with Lysenkoists. And no need to be a biologist, simply by the nature of the

arguments and methods of the dispute to determine who is conscientious, and who is not. Who
appeals to science, but who protects the "politically correct concept." Here the situation is
similar.
Handicap positions such critics Suvorov not only in counter-weakness, but in the absence of
alternative concept.
Suppose that Suvorov is not right and Stalin was not going to attack Germany in July 1941. Then
there are three possibilities:
1. Stalin was going to attack later, for example in 1942.
2. Stalin had no intention of attacking at all and prepared only for defense.
3. Stalin believed Hitler and not to the defense, even more so for the attack was not prepared,
and engaged in other problems. [320]
The first version of Suvorov to experience the "Icebreaker" and rejected the arguments.
Evidence that Stalin in 1941, was concerned about the defensive measures, so far not found any.
Apparently, they do not exist in nature. The version of the complete disinterest of Stalin in
military issues can not be considered for meaninglessness.
The last two versions in different combinations, we strongly indoctrinated with the last thirty
years. They were comfortable, as a politically painless explain the catastrophe of 1941. But relied
mainly on Soviet human faith in the truth of the written word. This effect can surprisingly long.
But now, when Suvorov founded and explained his concept of his opponents, too, required
arguments. It turned out that there is not only counter-arguments, but also the kontrkontseptsii.
That is the question, and what, in fact, engaged in Stalin before the war, if not preparing an attack
on Hitler and Europe, there is no answer. No. Instead - fierce clinging to the minor details and
pieces of the old ideology.
Prof. Chernyak through his teeth acknowledges the theoretical possibility of an attack on Stalin,
Hitler ever, but it does not say that the preparation for this was carried out. No claims he is also
that it is not carried out. He argues that the Soviet Union to the war was not ready because of the
repression of the military in the late thirties. The familiar argument, but unconvincing - if
repression did not prevent Stalin won the war after the terrible defeat of 41-year, how much
more would not hurt to win a much more favorable conditions - a surprise attack on Germany.
What was the real Stalin's plans and what the end of the thirties the Soviet Union was preparing to war, to defend, or to nothing prepared - this explains Prof. Chernyak. That does not prevent
him confidently say: "... Suvorov did not understand in the main Stalin not the true interests of
the country, and animal fear of their power led to them. [321] Stalin knew good story and very
much afraid of Hitler: understood that unprepared to start a war with them is extremely
dangerous ... "that Stalin was guided by" the true interests of the country, "Suvorov argued. On
the contrary, he argued the opposite - Stalin always guided only by their own interests
cannibalistic. Interestingly another - where did the myth of Stalin's pathological fear of Hitler, fear
prevented him from even to organize a defense? Historical evidence of this exists.
Article Chernyak - is a typical example of a pseudo-scientific and ideological in essence, a purely
Soviet books Suvorov criticism. Materials of this type are found in abundance in the press, and
further - the Internet. As editor of the historical department of a major newspaper, I got their
stacks. As a rule, the authors of such articles - older people, war or post-war, often with academic
degrees. Moves are not scientific interest and insulted patriotic feeling.
***

It is strongly opposed to the books of Suvorov gave the writer George Vladimov, the author of
great books, including the war. Vladimov published in the newspaper "Moscow News" (number 5,
1999) article, "Was that war World?". Irritation of the writer caused not so much the Suvorov as
he received support from others. In particular, the historian Yuriy Kagramanov that in a long
article about the Soviet foreign policy thinking, published in the "Continent" magazine {455} ,
using the findings of Suvorov of the aggressive motives of the Soviet Union's entry into World
War II as an undeniable and proven. Vladimov considers theory Suvorov curiosity and two
newspaper pages refutes it. Occupation quite dangerous.
In order to rebut Suvorov, it is necessary to prove that any of his information is incorrect, or that
the wrong analysis. And in any case, you should bring proof that in 1941 the Soviet Union was
preparing not to aggression and to defend. Vladimov affects only some of the conclusions of
Suvorov, not the key. Let us look at the arguments.
On a fairly minor Suvorov remark that, in preparation for the defense should not have to move in
1940 Nieman, defend better for the water barrier, Vladimov answers - technically yes, but there
are exceptions. For a long time he tells how at Stalingrad, Soviet troops were defending, with
behind the Volga, and won. All.
Do not read Suvorov remain convinced that this episode with the Neman was his only argument.
On painted Suvorov in two books picture multistage preparation for the attack - a huge
concentration of manpower, tanks and military airfields at the border, preparing bridgehead for
an attack on the Romanian oil fields and occupied by the Germans part of Poland, the urgent
formation of airborne corps, the redeployment of the border area military warehouses, etc. etc. Vladimov simply does not respond. As if he had not read.
Construction of pre-war light tank BT-A, which could throw off the track and racing on wheels on
motorways, then available only in Western Europe (by Suvorov - a proof of aggressive intent)
Vladimov explained simply - "aping". Say, I came up with the American tanks, but "we have it
licked, adopted and gentle care of European asphalt." Quite strange and insulting to Soviet
engineers and specialists of the General Staff of the reproach of idiocy. Somehow, over the
ill-fated motorway tanks often vainly cling Suvorova critics from among the outraged public. The
argument, of course, interesting and compelling, but it is not the key.
Bomber Command Long Range Vladimov not consider offensive weapon and gives the example
of when the Soviet troops at the beginning of the war receded and suddenly broken through
bombers bombed Berlin. Indeed, there was such a heroic and had no [322.323] no significance
for the defense case. Proper use of long-range bombers demonstrated at the end of the war the
Americans and British, snesya to the ground, many German cities.
Vladimov believes that the weapon, in principle, on the offensive and defensive does not share:
"... in fact, every weapon is universal - and therefore indifferent to the version of Suvorov". Of
course, you can chop nuts microscope, but it is hardly a sign of the universality of the microscope.
Logic defiantly unprofessional.
Giant superiority of Soviet airplanes Vladimov considers factors irrelevant and not talking about
aggressive Soviet intentions: "If the German pilot during the war hit by 352 aircraft, and our most
successful three times a hero - 62, will be compared, one more of them, who are the best? "Of
course, we will, if you do not solve that Stalin deliberately planned mass destruction of aircraft in
the defense.

Like many other critics of Suvorov, Vladimov reason is the lack of a formal order of the
preparation of an attack on Germany evidence of Stalin's non-aggressive intentions. The absence
of documents confirming the country's preparation for the defense of the criticism, however, do
not bother. But the arguments in favor of the massive preparations for the attack, which results in
an excess of Suvorov, Vladimov does not even mention.
Vladimov argues that Stalin even if wanted to, could not attack Germany before 1945. Why?
Because of the terror in the army in 1938. Suvorov this issue devoted an entire book, any
argument from which Vladimov does not mention nor deny.
Vladimov repeats the old Soviet thesis that the war on "sparsely populated Finland" shows the
weakness of the Red Army, not explaining why, deployed to prove the opposite is wrong Suvorov.
Critics have called this criticism is difficult. [324]
The most interesting thing in the article Vladimova - this is his assessment of the prewar Soviet
poems and songs. He flatly denies them bellicosity and aggressiveness.
"... A foreign land, we do not want a single inch, but will not give her an inch." Katyusha is asking
his "rock-eagle '? "Let him preserve the Motherland." And what we have in the propellers
breathing? "Calm our borders." And as our armor is there? "Armor is strong and our tanks are
fast", so that "plants work and work of collective cropland we protect." If you hear a threat, it is
"if in the land of our calm gush new wars" ... well, then we 'sing song military ", and then defense property," stand-feeding for their homeland. " So do not prepare the nation to invade
Outland. "
Alas, it was well prepared. In vain Vladimov believes that if preparing for aggression, they would
have called in the songs - "let's grab another's territory and enslaved neighboring peoples." Again
- Stalin unfounded suspicion of idiocy. It was also obvious propaganda principle - to pick up on
aggression, you need to call for protection. And in songs and speeches.
Seventeenth of September the thirty-ninth year, the day of the attack on Poland, Molotov called
for Soviet troops to defend half-brothers - Western Ukrainians and Belarusians. When fortieth
robbed Romanian Bessarabia, then defended suffered under foreign yoke-Moldovan brothers.
From aggressive Finland also just defended. Songs and poems have worked perfectly. Over the
year and a half after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact the Soviet Union had to attack all of its
European neighbors and the occupied territories with a population of 23 million people. The
Soviet people, in the meantime, and fifty years after the victory in the most confident that they
have entered into World War II 22 June 1941. For the Soviet military historians General Staff such
a position is natural. The fact that it shared Vladimov George, a serious writer and serial dissident
- amazing. [325]
Such claims to Suvorov theory only looks like a historical debate. As a rule, the moral conflict is
hiding behind them. There is a struggle not for historical truth and for the right to their historical
pride. Vladimov put it clearly - "leave our veterans with the consciousness that they defended
their homeland, not extravagant idea of their ruler."
You can leave. You can continue to talk about the Red Army soldiers as selfless liberators. This will
have to forget about the countless aggressions and crimes against humanity committed by the
Red Army and the Soviet regime. About the shooting of 24 000 Polish officers in the "peaceful"
summer of the fortieth year of the wild political terror in the territories liberated from the
Germans, about Sachsenhausen, turned into a part of the Gulag, a cannibalistic regimes in
Eastern Europe. About Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong and the Berlin Wall. We'll have to lie on.

The problem is that Vladimov and his supporters urge to cheat not only the elderly, veterans, out
of compassion, but in general all of patriotism. Spiritual nobility in this, unfortunately, no.
Another article against George Suvorov Vladimov published in 1999 in the newspaper "Russian
idea" {456} . Again Vladimova more than the Suvorov, irritate his supporters, in particular, Anatoly
Kopeikin, Timur Murzaev and writer, spoke in the same "Russian Thought" in support of Suvorov.
Suvorov and "cadets," the writer said professional heretics pure excitement putting upside down
long-established truth - "The Caspian Sea flows into the Volga, oats eat horses - that's the true
Suvorov."
In addition, they are also young cynics - "not softened before the Second World War participant
offense, when he proves that he is not their homeland defended, and aggressive criminal intent."
Last reproach - me personally. The answer is - Soften. Very sorry for the unfortunate, misguided
people. But razmyaknuv, can not be considered "a participant of WWII", the vast tanks
parliamentary movement in occupied Eastern Europe, anti-fascist and liberator. Because look at
things is not determined by age and the sensitivity and conscience and common sense. Because I
know that very few "participants of Great Patriotic War" would be softened to insult the
prisoners in Sachsenhausen 1945-1950 period. Or to hurt hundreds of thousands of his own
countrymen of displaced persons, with their help, sent to the Gulag in 1945. From this, their
more pathetic.
Before Vladimova against Suvorov at least emotionally, but more convincingly acted Naum
Korzhavin {457} . Soviet military patriotism in soldiers dissidents sometimes oddly coexists with
the conscious anti-Soviet. However, not all.
On a rhetorical question Vladimova "Do that war was a domestic" - back in 1981, said Viktor
Nekrasov: "For a just cause!" Was the name of a large book of Russian writer Vasily Grossman
Wake up ... it is now, Vasily, shivers went from b it over the body of one of the name. He is
intelligent, even wise, knew a lot of what we do not know, very truthful, even he thought that if
we fought for a just cause. The enemy will be defeated! Victory will be ours! But it is our proven
wrong. In this tragedy of my generation. And my, including ... "Okudzhava, too, as is well known, a
war veteran, told the" Literary Gazette "," Suvorov read with interest ... I can hardly doubt that
we are also preparing for the march of conquest, just ahead of us, and we were forced to defend
their country, " {458} .
Yuri Nagibin in the novel "Light at the end of the tunnel", wrote: "He (Stalin. -D.H. ) Miscalculated
with Hitler not because he firmly believed or was head over heels in love - it's good for [326.327]
satire, grotesque (Hitler Of course, I appealed to him, as he was Hitler), but because the case had
violated a precise calculation. Everything was done perfectly: he powdered brains Adolf treaty of
friendship, no delay Poland, every assistance battling Reich, at the same time ordered our
industry tanks on rubber tires - for smooth European roads and ground-attack aircraft without
rear cover - all just an attack on the instantaneous crushing hit. Crush Hitler and go like hot knife
through butter, has gutted his time friend and ally of Europe - that's what was Stalin's plan. He
did not have some pace, Hitler beat him on death " {459} .
"The strategy of our military leaders was to clog the German trunks Russian meat. Zhukov was a
butcher. It collapsed under the blows of the Anglo-American bombers of the German defense
industry, and the Germans surrendered. And until that happens, the battle at the front of the
stage two peoples grimacing heinous, bloody and vulgar buffoons: Hitler and Stalin. They played
up on the sidelines, two hard-boiled politician: Churchill and Roosevelt. And all the time there

was some disgusting bargain on the blood, on the lives of those who have survived, divided the
land, the people, led by the new boundary lines of the human heart and all the thick smoke
poured from gas furnaces. And then it turned out that the dispute was not between fascism and
the rest of humanity, and between the two fascist systems. Fascism was defeated, the victory of
fascism " {460} .
Yuri Nagibin written under the obvious influence of books Suvorov, is evident from the mention
of tanks with rubber tires. But the point here again is not convincing argument Suvorov, but in
the way of historical thinking. "Fascism won" Nagibina not compatible with call Vladimova leave
front-line veterans in the consciousness of its rightness. This is not scientific, not historical
conflict, and ideological. The war veteran Nagibin 11 years older dissident Vladimova, but get rid
of the Soviet education stamps him as Okudzhava, Viktor Nekrasov, and others - a little! Front-line soldiers, was easier.
This conflict does not solve the scientific arguments. Those who do not want to see them - do not
see.
There is no evidence that the Soviet Union in the late thirties in general, and in 1941 in particular
strenuously preparing for an aggressive war around us is full and no purely military scientific and
historical research. This training is in fact concerned not only the army, and the whole life of the
population powerless to limit militarized country.
Here is one example. When I was in the early 90's the first time got into the hands of "Icebreaker"
Suvorov, filled with references to the memoirs of soldiers, the first thought was - and where else
can you find such evidence? In Soviet times, almost no published conscientious memories of
pre-war times, and relatively honest among the most famous (if not the only) was a book by Ilya
Ehrenburg, "People, Years, Life". A fourth part, relating to the spring of 1941, and not believe my
eyes.
April 24, 1941 Ehrenburg calls Stalin. Praises the first published part of his novel "The Fall of
Paris" and inquires whether Ehrenburg is not going to show in the book of the German fascists.
Yes, he answers Ehrenburg going, but is afraid that the censorship did not miss. Stalin joked: "You
write, we'll try to push ..." On questions of family conversation gloomy Ehrenburg replied: "Soon
the war ..." And he adds: "... I knew that it was not in the literature, Stalin knows about this call
will say everywhere - to warn. "
So, in April 1941, Stalin personally told Ehrenburg that he was going to attack Germany, and he
will need a propaganda material. And even the term indicated in three months - about as much
time is needed to prepare for the publication and release of the book. And personally I called for
credibility - a careful mediator Ehrenburg [328.329] could not believe it, decide what the
provocation. What we are talking about the attack - definitely. Another variant of the Soviet
military doctrine of those years are not allowed.
And Ehrenburg gloom understandable. Perhaps after 22 June, in spite of the catastrophic
situation, relieved. So he did not have to be a troubadour aggression. God spared me. Still, to
denounce the aggressors decent person psychologically easier.
The main spring of 1941, Ehrenburg knew everything. And his knowledge of carried through his
life, with no one sharing directly. Perhaps he is hoping that the thoughtful reader and written
enough to guess. In vain I hoped. Interestingly, and how many of them still were, who knew?
***

For the historian of Stalinist architecture, what I am, the book Suvorov - a valuable and absolutely
consistent material, gluing together the still largely unclear picture of the mosaic and the Stalinist
culture and the Stalinist state. The leader was really a genius, he modeled his company carefully
and in every detail, never lose sight of the main goal. For this purpose worked engineers, generals,
architects, writers and directors.
In April 1941, the magazine "Architecture of the USSR" published materials of the architectural
competition, which was attended by all the leading architects of the USSR. The theme - "Building
for the panorama" Storm Perekopa ". Giant panorama dedicated to the Red Army's victory in
1920 (130x18 m), a group of artists was written from 1934 to 1941. It was the last major
architectural competition before the start of the Soviet-German war.
Maybe it is, of course, pure coincidence that it was in the spring of forty-one Stalin needed to
develop the architectural character of the Red Army's victories.
But I do not think so. [330]
Dmitry Khmelnitsky
Tanks for bread. The American roots of the Soviet military industry
"... We should not forget the fact that the rulers of present-day Russia, it is - sullied with the
blood low criminals, it is - a human scale, which took advantage of a favorable combination of
circumstances for her, seized by surprise the vast state, made a wild massacre of millions of
advanced intelligent people, virtually destroyed the intelligentsia, and now, for nearly ten years,
carries out the most cruel tyranny has ever known to the history. "
Try to guess the author of this passionate and it just anti-Soviet passages. Not Solzhenitsyn not
Avtorhanov not Orwell ... It was Hitler, "Mein Kampf" {461} .
Quote illustrates the characteristic feature of totalitarian ideology. About each other, the Nazis
and the Communists wrote, in general, the truth and lied in the first place to himself, about his
actions and intentions. Among the books published in Soviet times, can learn a lot about the
authentic Nazi Germany and its crimes and absolutely nothing truthful about the Soviet regime.
Approximately the same look and Nazi propaganda. Both sides pretended to be saviors of
mankind from a deadly enemy, and both were more or less correct only in the moral evaluation
of the enemy.
This was primarily the ideological danger of Nazi propaganda in the USSR. Crazy race theory could
hardly inspire any of the representatives of the "inferior races" outside the Reich, but to open the
eyes of Soviet citizens in native mode, it may well have. Therefore, no Nazi literature was not
available in the USSR, even scientists.
Only in one case, Soviet scientists have traditionally relied on the opinion of Hitler - when it came
to the causes of the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. On the obvious
question is, why Hitler, capture by 1941 half of Europe, mired in a prolonged and futile war with
England, for which loomed ominous prospect of imminent war with the United States, needed to
break a treaty of alliance with the USSR, and to open a second front in the east - this the question
should be the traditional answer: he himself wrote that the attack on Russia. Here and attacked.
Just this explanation and it is not necessary to believe in stride. Because in "Mein Kampf," Hitler
wrote not only that. And not quite so.
Hitler wrote his infamous book in the prison in 1923-1924,. after the failure of the coup. About
the coming victory if he could only dream of. Strictly speaking, his book - not propaganda

literature, and the theory of the party, which was in the future form the basis of a mass
movement. It is my sincere thoughts of the victim at the time of the defeat of the far-right
extremist policies of the fate of Germany.
The main goal of Germany is seen in his rejection of the struggle for colonies in favor of the
conquest of new lands in Europe: "While our state failed to ensure that each of his son for
centuries to come a sufficient amount of ground, you should not assume that our position firmly.
Never forget that the most sacred right is the right to own a sufficient amount of land that we
ourselves handle. Do not forget ever that the most sacred is the blood that we shed in the
struggle for land " {462} .
Hitler plans to wars of conquest, but for all aversion as the Bolshevik regime, and to move them
to the Western democracies not politically motivated, but purely materialistic - raised, however,
the level of high spiritual values. To conduct a war of conquest both in the West and in the East
for Germany is physically impossible. The war is possible only if the union or with the West
against the Soviet Union, either with the Soviet Union against the West. Both options are valid, if
the lead to success.
Hitler is considering options and in favor of the first - the alliance with the West against the Soviet
Union - for purely practical reasons: "From a purely military point of view, the war
German-Russian anti-Western Europe (or rather, in this case, against the rest of the world) would
have been a disaster for us. After all, the whole struggle is played out not in the Russian and in
German territory, and Germany would could not even count on any serious support from the
Russian ... " {463} Russia, according to Hitler - a weak, poorly armed ally. "Add to this the fact that
between Germany and Russia are located the Polish state, the whole being in the hands of France.
In case of war Germany-Russia against Western Europe, Russia, earlier than even send a single
soldier on the German front, it would have to withstand a victorious struggle with Poland. In such
a war would be the case in general is not so much in the army, but in the technical arsenal "
{464} .
The military alliance with the Soviet Union threatens to Germany, according to Hitler, World War
repetition. No less dangerous and alliance with Russia, does not pursue an immediate military
objectives: "Usually at this object, that the alliance with Russia should not even mean immediate
war or for a war we can get ready beforehand. No, it is not so! Union, which does not aim at war,
senseless and useless. Alliances are created only in order to fight ... One of two things: either the
German-Russian coalition would remain only on paper, and thus would have lost all value and
meaning for us; either such an alliance would stop and would be implemented only a piece of
paper, and then the rest of the world would inevitably be seen in this warning to ourselves. It is
naive to think that Britain and France in this case began to quietly wait for, say, ten years, while
the German-Russian alliance will make all the necessary technical preparations for the war. No, in
this case, the storm would burst over Germany at incredible speed " {465} .
And another, a minor, but important argument: "Modern Russian ruler completely no intention to
conclude an honest alliance with Germany, and especially on its implementation, if they have
concluded it" {466} .
Hitler concluded - contract with Russia against the West is pointless and dangerous, as "really
helpful and opens us to the large prospects Union would be only an alliance with England and
Italy" {467} . Such an alliance in Germany is advantageous: "I confess openly that even before the
war believed that Germany would have done much more correct if, abandoning the senseless

colonial policy, from the creation of the navy, and reinforce its world trade, it would have entered
into an alliance with England against Russia " {468} .
Thus, attempts to win the West futile due to lack of a strong ally, and the path is open to the East,
as a potential strong ally in the West has, and Russia is weak.
Summary: "We want to stop the eternal German striving to the south and west of Europe, and
particularly points a finger towards the territories located to the east. We finally tear to the
colonial and trade policy of the pre-war and consciously turn to the policy of winning new lands
in Europe. When we talk about the conquest of new lands in Europe, we can certainly be borne in
mind first of all only Russia and those border states that were subordinated to the " {469} .
[334.335]
If we consider only the last sentence, then yes, Soviet historians are right, Hitler himself predicted
his attack on Russia. If you know the whole complex of Hitler's reasoning, it turns out that
nothing like it is not predicted. In "Mein Kampf", he justified the need for an alliance with the
weak against the strong point. Selecting ally determined not by political or national sympathies,
and his ally, the military capabilities.
The attack on a strong Russia is not only without the support of the West, but also in a state of
war with him, in terms of the time of Hitler's "Mein Kampf" - madness. And history has confirmed
the correctness of this assessment. Then what could make him to take this step, but despair?
It should be borne in mind that Hitler started World War II in full compliance with their reasoning
since "Mein Kampf" - he concluded an alliance with a strong point. I changed only the balance of
power. The Soviet Union from a weak country without a own truck turned into a powerful
military force in the country with a poor population, and completely powerless, but armed to the
teeth.
And the West does not show the desire to support Germany in its bid to the East. The alliance
with the West against Russia turned out to be impossible, but an alliance with Russia against the
West became a seductive reality. Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact, signed in 1939, was a direct
implementation of the theoretical development of fifteen years ago Hitler. It was an alliance that
led to immediate victorious war for the conquest of Lebensraum. Moreover, the question of
Poland was quickly resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the parties.
The effect of this union has surpassed everything that Hitler could dream of in 1924. In the
summer of 1940 he was the owner of most of Europe. France defeated and captured, some of
the European countries occupied, part - reliable allies satellites. Living space for its development
of the German nation - through the roof.
In the west - is still resisting, but blockaded and isolated from the mainland of England.
And in the east - Stalin ...
Usually, when discussing the causes of the Second World War, everything revolves around Hitler's
intentions. Intention and its policy of Stalin partner remain in the shadows, as if the Soviet
Union's actions were only a mechanical reaction to the actions and plans of Hitler. Proposed
Hitler pact - concluded. He offered to divide Poland and the Baltic states - divided. So what is
next?
Stalin was, however, a look at developments in Europe. Very similar to Hitler. Only, unlike Hitler,
Stalin did not publish their secret plans in the millions.
In recent years there have been publications archival illustrating principles Stalinist thinking, and
hence the entire Soviet policy's thirties.

Second September 1935, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich and Molotov, "Kalinin said that the
Commissariat doubts the admissibility of the export of grain and other products from the USSR to
Italy because of the conflict in Abyssinia. I think that the Commissariat doubts stem from a
misunderstanding of the international situation. The conflict is not so much between Italy and
Abyssinia, as between Italy and France on the one hand, and Britain - on the other. Old Entente
no longer. Instead, add up the two Entente Entente Italy and France, on the one hand, and the
Triple Entente of Britain and Germany - on the other. The stronger will be the fight between the
two, the better for the USSR. We can sell grain and one and the other, so that they can fight. We
do not profitable to one of them now broke another. It is beneficial to have a fight was longer
possible, but no quick victory of one over the other " {470} .
This is a particular situation in 1935, but the thesis that Stalin inspires his colleagues, expresses
his basic views on European policy and the role in it [336.337] USSR. "It is beneficial to the fight
they had both longer possible, but no quick victory of one over the other." Why? Because there
the opportunity to intervene in a fight at a convenient moment, when all weakened.
Hence the question - which of the partners was more interested in violation of the Molotov Ribbentrop after the summer of 1940? Hitler seized in Europe, more than he could digest, and
stuck in a war in the West? Or Stalin, quickly exhausted by the time the potential for gains
stipulated Soviet-German pact in no way limited in their actions and start focusing on the
western border of the giant army?
The attack on Stalin promised to Hitler in 1941, losing the war alone against the whole world. Just
then, against which he warned in "Mein Kampf." The attack Stalin to Hitler to Stalin promised a
bright future conquests in Europe, with the support, at least at first, the Western coalition. With
that, of course, provided that Stalin was able to attack first.
On the German map depicting the location of the German and Soviet troops June 21, 1941, it can
be clearly seen - the situation is completely symmetrical. Both armies are concentrated in the
border projections, the two are ready to attack and are not concerned about the defense. In the
battle on the border of winning the one who hit the first ...
Sixteenth June 1941, Goebbels wrote in his diary: "Moscow wants to stay out of the war as long
as Europe does not get tired and do not bleed. That's when Stalin wanted to act. [...] Russia
would have attacked us if we were weak, and then we would have a war on two fronts, that we
do not allow this preventive action (plan "Barbarossa." - DH ). Only in this way we can guarantee
their rear " {471} .
Diary entry - not propaganda material. Goebbels and Hitler did it in such a way considered
Stalin's position. They just did not understand in time that she was such, and until the conclusion
of the pact. You can believe Khrushchev, who recalled how Stalin after signing the pact joyfully
exclaimed in a circle of associates: "deceived, deceived Hitler!" In 1924, Hitler described the
prospect of war against Western Europe in alliance with Russia, "Well, speak of Russia as a
serious technical factors did not account for the war. Universal motorization of the world in the
coming war will play a huge and crucial role, we can not oppose almost anything. Germany itself
in this important area shamefully behind. But in the case of such a war is of little of his would
have to still contain Russia. For Russia has not yet been a single plant of its own, which would be
able to really make, say, a real live truck. What would it be war? We have been subjected to
beatings simple " {472} .
In a speech Oct. 3, 1941, three months after the start of the German-Soviet war, Hitler said that

the captured Soviet territories were "nothing more than a single factory for the production of
weapons, built at the expense of the living standards of the population," and that he did not even
imagine how far gone preparation for war against the USSR, Germany and Europe {473} . Figures
destroyed or seized as a result of a surprise attack technique speak for themselves:. 18 thousand
tanks, 22 thousand guns, 14.5 thousand aircraft... Plus two and a half million prisoners {474} . It is
easy to understand the shock of Hitler, began his march to the East with three and a half
thousand tanks.
A natural question arises - where it all come from?
***
In 1929, the Soviet Union came to a senior representative of the company "Ford" Charles
Sorensen. Visiting the Putilov factory in Lenigrada, American was astonished to find that there
are available - and without a license! - Tractors "Fordson" under the name "Red Putilovets".
Without a license, but without much success. With the help of several Ford engineers at the plant
tried to play purchased and disassembled into parts American car. But technology secrets
individual parts could not be opened, and the quality of Soviet copies have been much worse
American original {475} .
Until the beginning of the thirties in the Soviet Union did not exist own tractor industry. And
hence the tank. After 12 years, to June 1941 ie., In the Red Army in service was 24 thousand.
Own production tanks.
The main thing is extremely mysterious and still totally unexplored role in this miracle played an
American company, named after its founder - Albert Kahn. That the man of the XX century
European history is largely owes that flowed this way and not otherwise.
Albert Kahn (1869-1942) is known in the history of architecture as one of the largest industrial
architects of the XX century, as the "architect of Ford." He was a specialist in the design of large
plants, especially automotive. Kahn developed work technology, allows you to design the most
complex plant for several months. And just as fast to build.
In the books, dedicated to the works of Caen, as a rule, very sparingly, on 2-3 pages, tells the
incredible story of Albert Kahn's cooperation with the Soviet government.
In April 1929 the company "Albert Kahn Inc.", Located in Detroit, has received an order from the
Soviet government for the design of the Stalingrad tractor (tank) factory. Negotiations were
conducted by the Soviet firm "Amtorg" - formally a private joint stock company, and in fact,
informal trade and diplomatic mission of the USSR and Soviet spy center in the Americas.
At that time, between the USSR and the United States did not exist [340] diplomatic relations.
The United States was the enemy of the Soviet Union. Plants that had design Kahn, were, in fact,
the military, and to hide it was extremely difficult.
The situation looked very ambiguous. With the economic crisis, Kang was keenly interested in the
orders of the Soviet Union, but was also interested in maximum privacy of its cooperation with
the Soviet partners.
Even after the Soviet epic Kahn, telling Detroit journalist Malcolm Bingeyu his doubts, concluded:
"... deep in my heart I was convinced that the Russian people - it does not matter under whose
rule - after centuries of tsarist repression is eligible for aid" . {476}
Kahn, undoubtedly cunning. That is what he was doing in Russia, "using people" can not be called
in any circumstances.

American John Scott spent five years at industrial construction sites of the Urals. The book
published in Stockholm in 1944, he wrote: "In 1940, Winston Churchill declared the British
people that he had nothing to expect but blood, sweat and tears. The country is at war, at war. [...]
However, the Soviet Union has since 1931 been in a state of war, and its people came sweat,
blood and tears. People are hurt and killed, women and children were freezing, millions starved
to death, thousands have come under military courts and were killed in the fighting campaign for
collectivization and industrialization. I would argue that in Russia the struggle for the production
of iron and steel has led to greater losses than the Battle of the Marne in the First World War.
During the thirties of the Russian people waged war - the industrial war " {477} .
This war was waged on the territory, prepared by Albert Kahn.
The firm Kahn designed between 1929 and 1932. 521 (according to other sources - 571) object.
This is primarily a tractor (ie tank) factories in Stalingrad, [341] Chelyabinsk, Kharkov, Tomsk;
aircraft manufacturing plant in Kramatorsk and Tomsk; automotive plants in Chelyabinsk, Moscow,
Stalingrad, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara; blacksmith shop in Chelyabinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov,
Kolomna, Lyuberetskaya, Magnitogorsk, Nizhny Tagil, Stalingrad; machine tool plant in Kaluga,
Novosibirsk, Upper Soldeu; mill in Moscow; Foundries in Chelyabinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov,
Kolomna, Lyuberetskaya, Magnitogorsk, Sormovo, Stalingrad; mechanical workshop in
Chelyabinsk, Lyuberetskaya, Podolsk, Stalingrad, Sverdlovsk; thermal power plant in Yakutsk; steel
and rolling mills in Kamenka, Kolomna, Kuznetsk, Magnitogorsk, Nizhny Tagil Verkhny Tagil,
Sormovo; Leningrad aluminum plant; Ural asbestos factory and many other {478} .
According to the list of objects clearly shows that Khan has designed (and rigged equipment)
almost the entire Soviet military industry.
These data are taken from Western sources. In the Soviet Union the list of objects of the first
Five-Year Plan had not been published, and the name of Kahn almost nobody knows. This is all
the more strange that "Albert Kahn Inc." - The only foreign architectural firm, designed for the
Soviet Union hundreds of completed projects.
For comparison - the activities of Western architects who built in the USSR & those years for one
building or even participating in the competitive design (Le Corbusier, Mendelsohn, Ernst May,
Hannes Meyer and OE) studied quite well both in the West and in the USSR.
In 1931, on the construction of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant visited American journalist GR
Knickerbocker. He wrote in his book "The threat of the red trade", dedicated to the first five-year
plan: "Standing in the middle of the fastest growing to the sky walls of the largest tractor world
factory, can not help recalling a phrase from" Izvestia ", the official organ of the Soviet
government, that" production of tanks and tractors have among themselves very much in
common. [342]
Even artillery, machine guns and cannons can successfully produce in civilian industrial
enterprises. " [...] According to the firm conviction that the Bolshevik pessimists are now under
construction in Chelyabinsk tractor factory it can almost instantly be redirected to military
purposes to reflect the expected attack of the capitalist world. The planned release of 50 000
ten-piece 60-strong caterpillar tractors a year, very much reminiscent of tanks, means that we are
talking about the production of one of the types of tanks " {479} .
There is no doubt that it is based on a program of construction of tractor factories, projected
Kahn, MN Tukhachevsky was appointed in 1931, the head of the Office of the Red Army, planned
to bring the number of standing in service in the Red Army tanks up to 40 thousand. Pieces of the

end of 1932 {480} . And in November 1930 believed that "tanks, usually coming in the 2nd and
3rd levels, can be somewhat smaller dimensions and greater rapidity ... It means that this tank
can be armored tractor." {481 } .
The implementation of such programs anticipated sharp decline in the standard of living of the
population of the USSR and the pre-emptive use of forced labor, as Kang could not know.
In 1931 Kahn employee of the firm engineer William X. Brass on his return to the US shared his
impressions of the work in the USSR with the journalist of the newspaper Detroit. He spoke
about the black market, the impossibility of leaving the country, about the wild judicial system of
secret police and the housing problem. And about what is most feared in the US - on the civil
industry in military transformation. Even more serious was the assumption of Brass that contract
Cana with the USSR included a paragraph on promoting the spread of communism in the United
States. Albert Kahn immediately issued a denial in the press, but doubts about the activity of the
firm in the USSR could not dispel the {482} . [343]
***
Construction of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant were manufactured in the United States, moved to
the Soviet Union and installed within six months. The next project was the purchase of a giant of
the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant. In February 1930 an agreement was signed with the company
"Qana", which became the main consultant of the Soviet government for industrial construction.
Kanu has been offered a package of orders for the construction of industrial enterprises, worth
two billion dollars. This is the equivalent of about $ 220 billion in 2004
All these projects were developed branch of the firm Kahn in Moscow under the leadership of his
brother Albert Kahn Kahn Moritz. This branch existed until 1932 and had a Russian name
"Gosproektstroy". It worked 25 American engineers and about 2.5 thousand. Soviet officials
{483} . At that time it was the largest architectural firm in the world. Through the
"Gosproektstroy" took a total of about 4 thousand. Soviet architects, engineers and technicians
{484} .
The Russian scientific and historical literature references to "Gosproektstroe" and its activities are
virtually absent. As, however, and any information about how, when and by whom was carried
out designing of the first Five-Year Plan.
Most likely, the firm Kahn developed not only the industry, but also the appropriate infrastructure.
We know that together with a draft of the Stalingrad tractor factory and delivered projects of
houses for workers {485} . At least at the beginning. Then it was considered unnecessary.
Posted Menzhinsky extremely interesting letter to Stalin on 14 February 1931: "Construction
Chelyabtraktorostroya is now in the following state: being widely housing, completely are not
tied to the timing of the plant coming into operation, while the construction of industrial plants
produced only preparatory work, and any shop within the year will not be ready.
In addition to the arrests, the unit of the Office of Construction cleaned 40 people. and measures
were taken to remove the building from the rest of the worthless item. Fully developed by the
project has not Chelyabtraktorostroya " {486} .
From the text it is clear that the construction is usually done, began with housing for workers
(perhaps ready projects firm Kahn). And that there was Stalin's order to halt the construction of
housing. Should build the plant itself, but not the houses, whose role had to play tents, dugouts,
or, at best, a barracks.

It is an interesting question about the sources of financing construction industry since the first
Five Year Plan.
Stalin wrote to Molotov in August 1930 g .: "Mikoyan says that harvesting and grow every day of
the export of grain 1 - 1.5 million pounds.. I think this is not enough. We must now raise [normal]
daily export of up to 3 - 4 million pounds at least.. Otherwise the risk to remain without our new
metallurgical and machine building (car factory, Chelyabzavod etc.) Factories ... In short, you need
to violently force the export of grain " {487} .
Both mentioned Stalin plant designed by Kahn. From the letter of the text it is clear that the
currency for the payment activities of Caen Stalin received by selling bread in the United States in
the midst of mass starvation in the USSR. You can with certainty claim that millions of victims of
the terrible famine of 1931 - 1933 gg. - Is the result of Stalin's aspirations as orders for the supply
of equipment can quickly pay for the objects designed in the first place by Albert Kahn.
The firm Albert Kahn played the role of coordinator between the customer and hundreds of
Soviet Western (initially [344.345] mostly American) companies supplying equipment and
advising the construction of individual objects. In fact, through a channel in the USSR tech
powerful stream of American and European military and industrial technology. Those thousands
of foreign experts, who in the early 30s worked in the Soviet Union, represented various Western
firms, which are mostly built and build factories, designed by Kahn.
In 1932 the contract with the company Albert Kahn Inc. has been broken, or rather, not
renewed. Trying Albert Kahn had not personally seek an extension of the success of the contract
in Moscow and employees of the company left Moscow.
This was due to the fact that in August 1931, Stalin found it more profitable orders for equipment
for all construction industries as possible to move from America to Europe.
Stalin, Kaganovich wrote August 25, 1931 g .: "In view of the currency difficulties and
unacceptable credit conditions in the United States to speak out against any new orders were on
America. I propose to prohibit giving new orders to America, to suspend any already started
negotiations on new orders and possibly break the already concluded contracts on old orders
transfer orders in Europe or at our own factories. I propose to make no exceptions to this rule for
any Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsstroya nor Harkovstroya, Dnieper, SYH and Avtostroya " {488} .
These are almost exclusively objects Kana (except the Dnieper).
In a letter dated September 11, 1931 Kaganovich informs Stalin: "It was found that 80-90% of
orders can be placed for Chelyabstroya in England" {489} . This meant the end of the
collaboration with Kahn. By this time Khan had served its purpose in the eyes of Stalin.
The Soviet system design as a whole has been reorganized along the lines of conveyor production
projects adopted in the firm Kahn {490} .
Designed and built a network of new industries, orders for manufacturing equipment generated
and can be transferred to any other Western firms, thousands of Soviet specialists have been
trained.
Objects designed by Kahn continued to be built, and represents a significant part of the plans for
the second and third five-year plans. But the first violin, in cooperation with the Soviet Union
began to play not American, and European, especially German, companies. In 1935 Soviet
industrial enterprises worked in 1719 Germans, 871 Austrian and only 308 Americans {491} (in
1931, when the plants were just beginning to be built, and Hitler had not yet come to power,
Americans were 172 people, the Germans -. 146 people ., the Austrians -. 13 people) {492} .

Amazingly, the years of close cooperation between the USSR with German and Austrian industry
fell just at a time of extreme political cooling between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. It
seems that this cooperation go unnoticed and Hitler's intelligence.
Anyway, in the book of memoirs of the famous German saboteur Skorzeny have such an episode.
In 1943, Skorzeny was ordered to prepare the sabotage of military factories in the Urals industrial
area. He quickly learned that the Soviet military industry in the Urals knows virtually nothing.
Something has learned, according to Skorzeny, only employees of German companies working
there. But the physical ability to cause some damage to the plants there the Germans have no
choice. As time.
Since 1932, the business contacts with the Soviet authorities did not renew Albert Kahn. Soviet
orders helped the company to survive the difficult years of the industrial crisis and inflation in the
United States, and then, when the crisis has passed, again take a leading position in the industrial
industry of the USA. [346.347]
Albert Kahn died in 1942. His widow received a letter of condolence from the famous
constructivist architect Victor Vesnina. That is avant-garde and constructivist Victor Vesnin (like
his more famous brother Alexander) was in the 20s. In the thirties the brothers led almost all
deeply secretive industrial construction in the USSR. We must assume that it Vesnins oversaw all
of the company Albert Kahn Soviet activity.
Albert Kahn firm still exists, and its founder, went down in history as the most significant and
progressive industrial architect of the XX century. That's just about his adventures Soviet few
people know. Although the interest they deserve.
***
Viktor Suvorov said the day of the actual entry of the USSR in World War II August 19, 1939,
when, according to his calculations, Stalin had ordered the mobilization of the secret: "From this
day forward, for any scenario, the war has been impossible to stop" {493} .
With no less justification can count the participation of the USSR in World War II from August 23,
1939 - Hitler - the day when Stalin pact was signed. And even more - from 17 September 1939 to
the Soviet attack on Poland, already attacked by then Germany from the west.
But all these events would be hardly possible, if in February, 1930 in Detroit, without any
publicity has not signed an agreement between the American architect Albert Kahn and
president Saul AMTORG armor.
Very much it is likely that not storge Kahn with Stalin in 1929, and he did not design the leader of
the world's largest tank factories, it may not be enough to Stalin's determination to conclude in
1939, the pact with Hitler, to jointly develop world war for the redivision of the world. [348]