Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, PATNA

Project on:Appeal under Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996

Submitted To: Prof. Hrishikesh Manu

(Faculty for Arbitration and Conciliation)
Submitted By: Sukirti Shikha
Roll No.
:
823
Semester : VI, 3rd Year

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The present project on the Appeal under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has
been able to get its final shape with the support and help of people from various quarters. My
sincere thanks go to all the members without whom the study could not have come to its
present state. I am proud to acknowledge gratitude to the individuals during my study and
without whom the study may not be completed. I have taken this opportunity to thank those
who genuinely helped me.
With immense pleasure, I express my deepest sense of gratitude to, Prof. Hrishikesh Manu
(Faculty for Arbitration and Conciliation, Chanakya National Law University for helping me
in my project. I am also thankful to the whole Chanakya National Law University family that
provided me all the material I required for the project. Not to forget thanking to my parents
without the co-operation of which completion of this project would not had been possible.
I have made every effort to acknowledge credits, but I apologies in advance for any omission
that may have inadvertently taken place.
Last but not least I would like to thank Almighty whose blessing helped me to complete the
project.

Contents

Introduction

Appeal : Analysis of S. 37 (1)

Review or Revision of an Award

Rules of Permanent Arbitral Institution on Appeals Against an Award

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

A. The Pre-1996 Position Prior to 1996, the arbitration law of the country
was governed by a 1940 Act. This Act was largely premised on mistrust of the
arbitral process and afforded multiple opportunities to litigants to approach the
court for intervention. Coupled with a sluggish judicial system, this led to delays
rendering arbitrations inefficient and unattractive. A telling comment on the
working of the old Act can be found in a 1981 judgment of the Supreme Court
where the judge (Justice DA Desai) in anguish remarked the way in which the
proceedings under the (1940) Act are conducted and without an exception
challenged in Courts, has made lawyers laugh and legal philosophers weep .
B. A New Act, A New Beginning India (in the good company of several other
nations) enacted its new Arbitration Act based on the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 2
and the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law 1976.3 This was in January 1996. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons to the Act made no bones of the inefficiency of the old legislation. It said
that the same had become outdated and there was need to have an Act more
responsive to contemporary requirements. It added: Our economic reforms may
not become fully effective if the law dealing with settlement of both domestic
and international commercial disputes remains out of tune. Amongst the main
objectives of the new Act (set out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons) are
to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process and to provide
that every final arbitral award is enforced in the same manner as if it were a
decree of the Court. This is how the Supreme Court dwelled on the new Act: To
attract the confidence of International Mercantile community and the growing
volume of Indias trade and commercial relationship with the rest of the world
after the new liberalization policy of the Government, Indian Parliament was
persuaded to enact the Arbitration & Conciliation Act of 1996 in UNCITRAL model
and therefore in interpreting any provisions of the 1996 Act Courts must not
ignore the objects and purpose of the enactment of 1996. A bare comparison of
different provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1940 with the provisions of
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 would unequivocally indicate that 1996 Act
limits intervention of Court with an arbitral process to the minimum. 4 C. The
Scheme of the Act The Act is a composite piece of legislation. It provides for
domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, enforcement of
foreign award and conciliation (the latter being based on the UNCITRAL
Conciliation Rules of 1980).
1 Guru Nanak Foundation v Ra an Singh & Sons 1981 (4) SCC 634.
2 General Assembly Resolution 40/72, adopted on 11 December 1985 (Model Law).
3 General Assembly Resolution 31/98, adopted on 15 December 1976 (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).
4 Konkan Railway Corporation v Mehul Construction Co 2000 (7) SCC 201.

The more significant provisions of the Act are to be found in Parts I and II thereof.
Part I contains the provisions for domestic and international commercial
arbitration. Any arbitration to be conducted in India would be governed by Part I,
irrespective of the nationalities of the parties. Part II provides for enforcement of
foreign awards. Part I is more comprehensive and contains extensive provisions
based on the Model Law. It provides, inter alia, for arbitrability of disputes, non
intervention by courts, composition of the arbitral tribunal, jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal, conduct of the arbitration proceedings, recourse against arbitral
awards and enforcement.
Part II, on the other hand, is largely restricted to enforcement of foreign awards
governed by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards5 or the Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 6
Part II is thus, (by its very nature) not a complete code. This led to judicial
innovation by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhatia International v Bulk
Trading.7 Here the Indian courts jurisdiction was invoked by a party seeking
interim measures of protection in relation to an arbitration under the Rules of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of
Arbitration8 to be conducted in Paris.
The provision for interim measure (s 9) was to be found in Part I alone (which
applies only to domestic arbitration). Hence, the court was faced with a situation
where there was no proprio vigore legal provision under which it could grant
interim measures of protection. Creatively interpreting the Act, the Supreme
Court held that the general provisions of Part I would apply also to offshore
arbitrations, unless the parties expressly or impliedly exclude applicability of the
same. Hence, by judicial innovation, the Supreme Court extended the general
provisions of Part I to foreign arbitrations as well. It may be stated that this was
premised on the assumption that the Indian courts would otherwise have
jurisdiction in relation to the matter (in the international sense). This became
clear in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Shreejee Traco (I) Pvt Ltd
v Paperline International Inc. 9 Here the courts assistance was sought for
appointing an arbitrator in a foreign arbitration. The power of appointment by the
court exists under s 11 of Part I of the Act (which applies to domestic arbitration
alone). The court declined to exercise jurisdiction. It found that the arbitration
was to be conducted in New York and that the law governing the arbitration
proceedings would be the law of seat of the arbitration. Hence, the extension of
Part I provisions to foreign arbitrations sanctified by Bhatia 10 would not be
resorted to in every case. The Indian courts would have to first determine if it has
jurisdiction, in the international sense.

5 New York, 10 June 1958 (New York Convention).

6 Geneva, 26 September 1927 (Geneva Convention).

7 2002 (4) SCC 105 (Bhatia).

8 Effective 1 January 1998 (ICC Rules).
9 2003 (9) SCC 79.
10 Supra, n 7.

Section 37.
Appealable orders.
(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised
by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:
(a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9;
(b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34.
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order granting of the arbitral tribunal:
(a) accepting the plea referred in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing
in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.
This section specifies the scope of appeal from the orders of the Court and the arbitral
tribunal. No period of time is, however specified for filing an appeal Presumably, the
provisions of Article 116 of the Schedule of Limitation Act, 1963 will apply der this It is
significant to note that sub-section (1) provides for appeals against orders and no I . T,ie
orders against which an appeal lies are specifically laid down in this sub-section and no other
orders are appealable. The a ..eal shall lie from the followin s (and from no others) of the
Court:
(a) granting or refusing to grant interim measure of protection under S___estion 9; (b) setting
aside or refusing to set aside an award under Section 34 (2),
Sub-section (2) lays down that an appeal shall also lie against the following orders of the
arbitral tribunal:
(a) an order upholding the objection of a party that the arbitral tribunal does not have
jurisdiction or it has exceeded of authority. [Sections 26 (2) and (3)1
(b) an order ,granting , or refusing to 'grant interim measure of protection under Section 17
(1) or 17(2).

It is evident from the phraseology used in Section 37 (2) (a) that it permits appeal only
against that order of the arbitral tribunal which has accepted the party's plea that the arbitral
tribunal does not have jurisdiction. But the section does not permit an appeal when the plea is
rejected.
Again, the arbitral tribunal has been conferred wide powers under Section 17 to take
decisions on interlocutory matters. When an objection is not accepted by a tribunal, there is
no appeal. But in that case, the award itself can be challenged under Section 34 and the order
made by the Court on an application under Section 34 is also appealable.11
Sub-section (3) provides that only one appeal iis permitted, and no second appeal shall lie
from the order passed in appeal under this section i.e., Section 37 of the Act. But an appeal
against the order sassed under section 37 may, however, be taken to the Supreme Court of
India.
Since the grounds on which an appeal shall lie against the order of the arbitral tribunal are
specific and limited, the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Gauranga La1, 12 held that
no appeal will lie on the ground of misconduct or corruption of arbitrator as this ground is not
included in this section 13 relating to appeal against the orders of the arbitral tribunal.
Similarly, the Apex Court in Neelkantha v. Superintending Engineer, 14 held that there is no
appeal from the decision of the arbitrator and the Court has no power to correct any error or
mistake in the arbitrator's verdict nor can it review the award.
The Supreme Court in Mulk Raj Chhabra & others v. New Kenji Worth Hotels Ltd. and
another,15 has held that an order impugned appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot be interfered with under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India.
In the case of M/s Archon & others v. M/s Sewda Construction Co. & Others(' the dispute
related to construction of a multi-storied building named 'Surya Enclave' at the cost Rs. 2.65
crores. It was alleged that respondents used sub-standard building material as well as substandard unskilled workers in the construction work. The respondents were asked to rectify
the defects and ascertain quality construction work failing which petitioners would terminate
the contract and take up the construction work themselves. Since respondents failed to
comply with the conditions, the site of Surya-Enclave was eventually taken over by
petitioners on 29.5.2004. Meanwhile the respondents moved the District Court, Kamrup,
Guwahati for interim measure of protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 against the termination order. The court granted ex-parte interim relief
to the respondent and ordered status quo restraining petitioners from interfering with the
construction work.

11. Union of India v. Kalinga Construction, AIR 1971 SC 1646; See also Food Corporation of India v. Thakur Shipping Co.,
AIR 1975 SC 469.

12. (1993) 3 SCC 1.

13. The provisions relating to appealable orders contained in Section 37 of the present Arbitration Act, 1996 were contained
in Section 39 of the old Act of 1940.
1 4. (1989) 1 Arb. LR 34 (SC).
15. AIR 2000 SC 1917.

In Krishna Bhagya Jal Nigam Ltd. V. G. Harishchandra &. Another ,16 was an agreement
dated 27-11-1993 between Jal respondent concerning the construction of Mulavad Lift
Irrigation Scheme. The contract was initially for 36 months which was subsequently extended
upto 31st December 2003. Clause 29 of the contract contained an arbitration clause any
dispute arising between the Executive Engineer and the Controller regarding the said
construction work shall first be referred to Chief Engineer having jurisdiction whose decision
shall be final and if contractor was not satisfied with the decision of the Chief Engineer he
may approach the law Court giving due written notice in this regard to Chief Engineer within
90 days.
When a dispute arose between the parties it was referred to Chief Engineer appointing him as
an arbitrator who refused to act as arbitrator vide dated 26-3-1998 on the ground that the
contract did not provide for arbitration. On Jal Nigam moving the High Court for
appointment of an arbitrator, the Court directed the Chief Engineer to act as arbitrator. The
contractor placed eleven claims before the arbitral tribunal while the Jal Nigam filed its
counter statements. The arbitrator gave its award on 25-6-2000 which was published on 1411-2000.
Aggrieved by the award, the Jal Nigam filed a petition under Section 34 (2) (v) for setting
aside the award before the Principal Civil Judge, Bijapur. The Court confirmed the award and
therefore, the Jal Nigam approached the High Court in appeal under Section 37 (1) (b) which
was dismissed on 28-1-2005. The contention of the Jal Nigam was that clause 29 of the
contract was not an arbitration clause and therefore, the proceedings before the arbitrator
were null and void due to lack of jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the appeal holding
that the plea of "no arbitration clause" was not raised by Jal Nigam in its written statement
advanced before the Civil Court. On the contrary, both the Courts below, on facts, have found
that Jal Nigam had consented to the arbitration proceedings held by the Chief Engineer and
participated in the arbitral proceeding. Hence the Nigam cannot now be allowed to contend
that clause 29 of the contract did not constitute an arbitration agreement. On appeal against
this order of the High Court, Jal Nigam approached the Supreme Court in appeal which held
that Jal Nigam cannot be allowed to contend at such a later stage that clause 29 of the
contract was not an arbitration clause. The Court therefore upheld the award passed by the
arbitrator except that the rate of interest awarded by arbitrator at 18% for pre-arbitration
period ant pendente lite period etc. was reduced to 9% since rates had been considerabt
reduced due to economic reforms in the country.

16. MR 2007 SC 817.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Court, an appeal was preferred b appellants under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It was alleged that though clause 23 of the said
construction agreement provided that in case of any dispute or difference, the parties, if they
so desire, will get it settled by arbitration, but there was no initiation of any arbitration
proceeding by the parties mutually nor any effective steps were taken to commence the
arbitral proceedings, hence there was no question of applicability of Section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act. That apart, since the matter related to construction of
building, which is determinable in terms of Section 14 (1) (c) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963, the provisions of interim relief contained in Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation
Act were not applicable in the instant case.
Allowing the appeal, the Guwahati High Court held that even if Section 9 of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act were applicable in the case, the alternative remedy was appeal under Section
37 of the Act. But that remedy not being adequate and efficacious in the given facts and
circumstances of the case, writ petition was maintainable. There being no arbitral
proceedings, there was no question of appeal under Section 37 of the Act in the instant case.
The High Court of Bombay in Yashwant N. Shah v. Unit Trust of India,17 has held that every
interlocutory order is not appealable under Section 37 as it cannot be regarded as judgment.
Only those interlocutory orders would be regarded as judgments, which affect vital and
valuable rights of the parties, and which result in serious injustice to the party concerned.
Whether inter-locutory order is a judgment for the purpose of Section 37
Whether any interlocutory order would be covered by the term 'judgment' will have to be
decided by the Court in the light of tests, observations and principles enunciated in the
rulings. The Supreme Court in its decision in T. V. Tuljaram Row v. M. K. R. V. Alagappa
Chettiar,18 observed that the considerations which must prevail with the Court in deciding
whether an interlocutory order should be treated as judgment and made appealable is the
presumption that any discretionary order which the trial Judge passes must be presumed to be
correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice. In
other words, an interlocutory order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of
finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceedings
or in the suit itself or in a part of proceedings.

17. (2001) CLA BL Supp. (Snr.) 28.

18. ILR 35 Mad. 1 (SC).

Review or Revision of an Award

As a matter of fact, no review is permitted against the orders made by the Court under
Section 9 or Section 34 of the Act, but some of the High Courts, particularly those of Punjab 19
and Bihar,20 have permitted review of such order.
As to the question whether a revision would lie against the order passed under section 37
(Section 29 of old Act), the Supreme Court has answered in the affirmative and held that a
revision application is maintainable.21 The court, inter alia, observed :
"The Act i,e., the Arbitration Act, does not contain any express bar against the exercise of the
revisional power does not mitigate against giving effect to provisions of the Arbitration Act.22
In its earlier decision in Hari Shank, v. Ran Girdhari Lai,23 also the Supreme Court had
occasion to determine the scope of revision against the order of an arbitral tribunal under
Section 39 of the old Act(now Section 37 of the Act of 1996) and held that a revision
application is maintainable.
However, the High Court of Patna in its decision that the case of Ashok Kolar Singh &
Others v. Santi Devi & others,24 has held that when remedy of appeal is provided under
Section 37 of the Act, revision petition under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would not be
maintainable.
Second Appeal [Section 37 (3)]
There is no provision for second appeal against the orders either of the court under subsection (1) or of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2). Thus when an award is challenged
in a court under Section 34 and the court passes an order either upholding or setting aside the
award, an appeal may be made against such order.

19. Ramchandra v. T. N. Corporation, (1989) Punj LR 199.

20. State of Bihar v. Khetan Brothers, AIR 1984 Pat 74.
21. Sfiyani Sunder v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 132.
22. Shyain Sunder v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 132.

23. AIR 1963 SC 698 see also Chagan Lal v. Municipal Corporation, (1977) 2 SCC 409.
24. AIR 2010 Pat 1.

But once the appeal is made, the decision of the Appellate Court shall be final and no second
appeal can be made.25 Even an appeal against an order of Single Judge Bench to a Division
Bench under the Letters Patent is barred by the provision of this section. 26 But sub-section (3)
provides that the restriction of second appeal shall not effect or take away any right to appeal
to the Supreme Court.27 Besides, Article 136 of the Constitution also empowers the Supreme
Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree or order passed or made by
any court or tribunal within the territory of India. But the Supreme Court generally declines
to exercise this State power in arbitration cases. Thus in Everest Co. Owners v. Madhya
Pradesh in Corporation,28 the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order of the Court
rejecting the application for stay of arbitral proceedings.
Thus it would appear that Section 37 bars a second appeal but not the revision. Therefore,
where a subordinate has refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, the High Court may
entertain a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. Such a
revision under Section 115 of CPC will to an interference in the arbitral process as
contemplated by section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
In National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. v. S t e me s Atkeingesellschaft, all the
counter claims made by appellant NTPC were referred to and dealt with by the Arbitral
Tribunal which had decided and held that those counter claims would not survive as they
were covered by decision or minutes of meeting dated 6/7th April, 2000 between the parties.
This could not be held to be a case of refusal to exercise jurisdiction by the Arbitral Tribunal
as it had already adjudicated that the claim was dead and non-maintainable. It was
undoubtedly an adjudication by Arbitral Tribunal On the merits of the claim and therefore the
aggrieved party (i.e., NTPC) could have recourse to Section 34 of the Act asking for setting
aside the award and not a fit case for filing direct appeal under Section 37 of the Act. The
Court made it clear that an appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 37 only lies if there is an
order passed under Sections 16 (2) and (3) of the Act. Sections 16 (2) and (3) deals with the
exercise of jurisdiction. The plea of jurisdiction was not raised by the appellant. The Arbitral
Tribunal had recorded its finding considering the counter-claim vis-a-vis minutes of meeting
dated 6/7th April, 2000 and therefore, there was no question of jurisdiction involved in the
case so as to enable the appellant to approach the High Court in appeal under Section 37 of
the Act.

25. AIR 2006 SC 3026.

26. Union of India v. Mohinder Supply, AIR 1962 SC 256.

27. Food Corporation of India v. G. E. Shipping, AIR 1988 SC 1198. .

28. AIR 1993 SC 840:see also Hindustan Tea Co. v. Shaslnkant, AIR 1987 SC 81.

Distinction Between Appeal and an Application

The Supreme Court brought out the distinction between an appeal and an application. Section
37 (2) of the Act provides for a statutory appeal whereas Section 42 provides for an
application. The Apex Court in M/s. Pandey Builders Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, held that
in case of appeal under Section 37 (2) the forum for appellate court must be determined with
reference to definition of 'Court' in Section 2 (1) (e) i.e., the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction in a district and includes a High Court. If a High Court does not exercise the
original civil jurisdiction, it would not be a 'Court' for the purpose of appeal under Section 37
(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
In M/s Manalal Prabhudayal v. Oriental Insurance Co., the appellant, a partnership firm
had a shop in Bhubneswar which was ransacked, looted and razed to the ground due to
communal riots in March 1991. It was insured with the Orient Insurance Co. Ltd. for Rs. 1.5
lakh. The appellant lodged a claim of Rs. 1,93,075/- on the basis of insured amount Rs. 1.5
lakh plus interest thereon @ 12 % which the Insurance Co. rejected and offered an amount of
Rs. 50,425/- as loss suffered by it. As appellant was not satisfied and the claim could not be
settled, parties invoked arbitration clause and the arbitrator passed an award dated June 13,
1999 allowing the claim of the appellant with 12% per annum as interest thereon.
When the proceedings had been initiated for making award a rule of the Court, the Insurance
Company filed an application for setting aside the award. After hearing the parties the Civil
Judge (Senior Division), Bhubneswar decreed the suit on October 9, 2002 in favour of the
appellant and directed the Insurance company to pay the amount to the appellant within three
months from the date of order. Being aggrieved by Court's order the respondent Insurance
Company approached the High Court in appeal which dismissed it and held the awaryd of
interest @ 12% per annum up to September 19, 1995 in consonance with law, but reduced the
same to 6% onwards September 19, 1995 till the amount is deposited in the Court.
The appellant moved an appeal against this reduction of interest from 12% to 6% by the
High Court. Having considered the rival contentions of the ) and parties, the Supreme Court
allowed the appeal and held that grant _of interest as to is the discretion of the Court and
there is no reason to interfere therein unless 37 of this discretion has been exercised
arbitrarily or capriciously. The Court also reiterated that arbitrator, in the absence of any
prohibition, has power to award interest, though it is not a 'Court' within the meaning of
Section 34 of CPC. Therefore, the award of the arbitrator which gave rise to these appeals an
cannot be held to be bad in law and, therefore, warranted no interference of the real Court.

Forum or Place of Appeal

An appeal under Section 37 shall lie if the Court is so authorised by law to hear appeals.
While deciding the place of appeal, the whole facts of the case i.e. the issue in dispute, its
nature, context and convenience of parties should be taken into consideration.29
The High Court of Calcutta in Vishwa Bharti v. Sarkar & Sarkar,30 held that in that
proceedings against an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act, an appeal would lie before
the High Court of proper jurisdiction and not in any other Court.
Rules of Permanent Arbitral Institution on Appeals Against an Award
The permanent Arbitral Institutions generally incorporate in their Rules, the provision for
appeal against the award made by the arbitral tribunal appointed by them to a higher official
such as President or some such other ex officio head of the institution. Some of the
permanent arbitral Institutions have made rules providing for an appeal even in international
commercial arbitration,31 One really wonders as to why the permanent arbitral institutions
should allow from decisions of an arbitral tribunal when it is not otherwise provide under the
Arbitration Act and High Court and Supreme Court authorised by law to hear appeal.
Limitation for Appeals
The limitation for appeal under Section 37 of the Act is governed by Article I lo of the
limitation Act, 1963. Where an appeal lies to the High Court, the limitation would be 90 days
from the date of decree or order, and if it lies to any other Court, it would be 30 days from the
date of decree or order. The Supreme Court in the case of Mulk. Raj Chopra v. New
Kenilworth Hotels Ltd.,32 held that if the order is appealable under Section 37 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it will not be allowed to be interfered with by a
special leave petition filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

29. Union of India v. Manipur Builders, AIR 1977 Gau. 5.

30, AIR 2008 (NOC) 1934 (Cal).

31. Subhash Agencies v. Bhilwara Synthetics, (1995) 1 Arb. LR 226 (SC), Delhi Hindustani Merchant Association was the
permanent arbitral Institution in this case v commercial arbitration awards. e en in international
32. AIR 2000 SC 1917.

Conclusion

Bibliography

Books
Dr N V Paranjape Arbitration and Concilliation Act
Avtar Singh Law of Arbitration and Concilliation

Links
http://lexarb.blogspot.in/2013/04/section-37-entertaing-appeal-against.html
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/325226/Civil+Law/BOMBAY+HIGH+COURT+ADINTER
IM+ORDERS+UNDER+SECTION+9+APPEALABLE+UNDER+SECTION+37+OF+THE
+ARBITRATION+ACT