1. KMU v.

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NEDA

FACTS:
-

President GMA issued EO 420 which required all government agencies and GOCCs to streamline and
harmonize their ID systems.
The purpose of the uniform ID data collection and ID format is to reduce cost, achieve efficiency and
reliability, and ensure compatibility and provide convenience to the people served by the government
entities.

Prior to the issuance of EO 420, various government entities -- like the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayors
Office, LTO and PRC -- had already been recording data and issuing ID cards as part of their functions.
The data they collected and recorded were, however, disparate; and the IDs they issued, dissimilar.

Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and other respondents assailed this EO for being a usurpation of legislative
powers by the president and that it infringes the citizens right to privacy.

ISSUE:
WON EO 420 is constitutional
HELD:
YES.
-

EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the presidents constitutional power of control
over government entities in the executive department, as well as the presidents constitutional duty to
ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; thus said EO is not a usurpation of legislative power

Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The President
may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department
to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1987 Consti, the
President could direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public

The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing
legislation. Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the executive branch of government
and does not extend to the judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420
does not apply to the judiciary; or to the Comelec which, under existing laws, is also authorized to issue
voters ID cards. This fact only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system, because
legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that will be compulsory for all branches of
government.

Furthermore, it is not usurpation of legislative power because the act of issuing ID cards and the
collection of some necessary information to imprint in them do not require legislation.
What needs legislation are the following:
o First, when the implementation of that system requires a special appropriation (because there is
none existing for the purpose)
o Second, when the system is compulsory for all branches of the government, including the
independent constitutional commissions, as well as for all citizens whether or not they have any
use for the ID card
o Third, when the system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond those

routinely or usually required for the purpose

READ NERDS RULING!!

2. DRILON v. LIM
FACTS:
- The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code 1
which provides for the procedure for the approval and effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue
Measures. It also vests upon the Secretary of Justice the duty to determine the legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures that are raised on appeal.
- Pursuant to Sec 187, the Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer)
declared the Manila Revenue Code null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
- The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the constitutionality of the ordinance.
- It, however, declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the
power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.
- The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified
true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
ISSUE:
WON Sec 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
HELD:
NO.
- Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment
of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue
Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. What he found only
was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
o An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
- Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That section allowed the
Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee
levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the
exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or
limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere
supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of
Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is

1 Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings.

The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue

measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to
the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction.

unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain
ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These
grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no publication of the
ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog)
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove
such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which
to gather and present to him all the evidence.

3. NATIONAL ARTIST ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
- RA 7356 was enacted and it created the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
- It also gave it an extensive mandate over the development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino
national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage.
- The CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote, develop and
protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino
artists, the two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award.
- When they were deliberating on who should be the National Artist, they came up with the final list,
containing the names of 4 candidates, namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
- CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the President.
- Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural
groups and individuals strongly endorsing Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Masa and Jose Moreno.
- The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited resource persons to
validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.
- Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was
issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued
declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to
the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.
- The petitioners questioned the proclamation declaring Guidote-alvares, Caparas, Masa and Moreno as
National Artists since they were not among those persons recommended by NCCA and CCP Board of
Trustees. They claim that the NCCA and CCP has the exlusive jurisdiction to select who will be
conferred the order of national artist. It is also them who is tasked to set the standard for entry into that
select group
- Hence, the President (GMA) gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous
screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for
those of the Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the Presidents discretion to name National
Artists is not absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the
absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
ISSUE:
WON there was grave abuse of discretion committed by former PGMA.
HELD:
- The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or endorsement, which is
essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made."

The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in
accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best
construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power.
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with the
conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive issuances were institutionalized by two laws,
namely, Presidential Decree No. 208 and Republic Act No. 7356.
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order
of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have the force and effect
of law. And until set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including the
President himself/herself as chief executor of laws.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence of his/her
duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the matter of the Order of
National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This
means that the President could not have considered conferment of the Order of National Artists on any
person not considered and recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper import
of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the
President on the conferment of the Order of National Artists."
Applying this to the instant case, the former President could not have properly considered respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA
and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous screening process
be rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under
relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to
guide its deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and undertake any and all
necessary measures in that regard will also become meaningless.

4. LANSANG v. GARCIA
FACTS:
- During the miting de avance of the Liberal Party where they intended to discuss the presentation of its
candidates for the general elections, two grenades were thrown, thus killing 8 people and injuring many
- As a result thereof, Marcos, then president, issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
- Lansang et. al were invited by the Philippine Constabulary headed by Garcia to undergo investigation
and interrogation. After which, they were apprehended and detained on reasonable belief that they
participated in the crime of rebellion, and that their continued detention is justified because of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ.
- Lansang et. al questioned the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. They claim that the
suspension does not meet the constitutional requirements.
- Lansang et. al further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations because:
o (a) that there is no rebellion;
o (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts;
o (c) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public
safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
o (d) In the first whereas clause of the Proclamation, the actual existence referred to was the
existence of conspiracy and intent to rise in arms and not an actual uprising which constitutes
rebellion or insurrection.
- Respondents argue that the suspension is valid since public safety so requires it. Furthermore, the
President has undertaken the necessary steps in order to ensure that the rights of those persons
detained are not impaired or hampered, such as:

No warrantless arrest shall be made. Warrant should be authorized in writhing by the Sec. of
National Defense
o Authority to arrest may be exercised only by certain officers and that there shall be no mass
arrests
o The Constabulary shall establish the appropriate action groups to prevent and or check any
abuses
Respondents further claim that the proclamation is conclusive upon the courts as upheld in the case of
Barcelon v. Baker and which was reiterated in the case Montegro v. Castaneda.
Subsequently, several PDs were issued which thus lifted the suspension in several areas of the
Philippines.
o

ISSUE:
WON the proclamation of suspension is conclusive upon courts (WON the PP is reviewable by the SC).
HELD:
There is only a presumption but it is not conclusive. In short, the power of the President to suspend the
privilege of the writ is not absolute.
- The SC departed from its ruling in the case of Barcelon v. Baker (which was reiterated in the case
Montegro v. Castaneda) that the authority to decide whether there is a need to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus belongs to the President, and that his decision upon the same is final and
conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.
- In this case, majority of the members of the Court agreed that the Supreme Court may inquire on the
existence of the factual bases for the issuance of the proclamations suspending the privilege of the writ
in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases.
- Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege of the writ is not absolute (under the BOR, Sec 15
thereof, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion when public safety requires it. From this, it can be gleaned that the general rule is that no
suspension of the privilege should be made, and that the exception to the same is the existence of an
invasion or rebellion and that public safety so requires that the privilege be suspended).
- The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to be a wide-scale event, it may be
declared even if it only involves a small part of the country. The president decision to suspend the writ
was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available courses to suppress rebellion. First,
to call out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and lastly to declare martial law.
- Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on the matter, including two closed-door
sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of
the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually
a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as
claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
o New Peoples Army (NPA) which adheres to the Maoist concept of protracted peoples war
conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and had taken part in other violent incidentsit
resulted to several casualties. In 1970, its records of violent incidents was about the same, but
the NPA casualties more than doubled.
o Such existence of the NPA is proof per se of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering
that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized Communist Party of the Phil.
Such announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and
may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of
belligerency, even before the actual commencement of hostilities.
5. DAVID v. ARROYO
FACTS:

President Arroyo issued PP 1017 (to be implemented by General Order No. 5) declaring a state of
national emergency. She directed the members of the PNP and AFP to suppress acts of lawless
violence and acts of terrorism in the country.
She claims that the principal cause for such declaration is because of an attempt in her life by the
Magdalo members and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, Randolf David the head of a rally group (KMU) proceeded to rally. He was thus
arrested without a warrant.
Similarly, the Daily Tribune and other known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) were raided without a
warrant, and anti-GMA articles and write-ups were confiscated and seized.
As such, they assailed the validity of the PP on the ground that it constitutes unlawful searches and
seizure, and that it violates freedom of speech and assembly.

ISSUE:
WON PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
- The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It
is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP.
Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part
and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way:
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
- The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5.
- A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo DDay, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements
from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group
of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
- Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent
or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
- On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017.
- The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion.
- The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare Martial Law.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And
such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

- Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated
Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested
in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is
similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081).
The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1,
Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
- This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate decrees.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction;
the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not
come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must
be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of
the calling out power of the president by the president.
6. AMPATUAN v PUNO
FACTS:
- The day after the Maguindanao Massacre, GMA issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed
the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.
- Three days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the
President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term

transfer used in AO 273 was amended to delegate, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the
DILG).
Petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM
officials claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy. They alleged
that the Presidents proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMMs autonomy as these issuances
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and to seize the regional
governments powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical
violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM
constitutes an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked that
Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
(1) WON GMA invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Suultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
(2) WON GMA had factual bases for her actions
HELD:
(1) NO. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.
And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the
same.
(2) While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above
power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of
the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of
the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that
such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents
judgment.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places
and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual
bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress
reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to
take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and
dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.