EN BANC

[G.R. No. 9651. August 4, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINADOR GOMEZ JESUS, Defendant-Appellant.
Recaredo Ma Calvo for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Corpus for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS; POWER TO REGULATE PRACTICE. Held: Under the facts stated in the opinion, that
section 8 of Act No. 310 is not in conflict with any of the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and that the
state has general powers, first, to enact such laws, in relation to persons and property within its borders, as may
promote public health, public morals, and public safety, and the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants; and,
second, to make reasonable provision for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice of medicine
and surgery, and punishing those who attempt to engage therein in defiance of such provisions. This power of the
state is generally denominated the police power. No state can deprive itself of the right to exercise the general police
powers of a sovereignty. For a state to deprive itself or permit itself to be deprived of the right to enact laws to
promote the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, etc., would be to destroy the very purpose and objects of
the state. No legislature can bargain away the public health, the public safety, or the public morals. The people
themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. Governments are organized with a view to the preservation of these
things.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS TO REVOKE LICENSE. The law expressly confers upon the Board of
Medical Examiners the right to grant licenses to practice medicine and to revoke said licenses, under the conditions
mentioned in the law. The law is not invalid because it does not provide for an appeal from the decision of said Board
to the courts. In some respects the power exercised by the Board is quasi judicial; but it is not any more judicial than
the action of a board appointed to determine the qualifications of applicants for admission to the bar nor of a board
appointed to pass upon the qualifications of applicants to be admitted to the profession of teaching. The law is not
necessarily invalid, if it provides a remedy for those affected thereby, simply because it does not provide for an appeal
to the courts. Due process of law is not necessarily judicial process. It not infrequently happens that a full discharge of
the duties conferred upon boards and commissions or officers of a purely ministerial character requires them to
consider and to finally determine questions of a purely legal character. The Legislature may confer upon said persons
or boards the right to finally decide many questions affecting various interests of the people of the state. If a remedy is
granted the law will be valid, even though no appeal to the courts is provided.
3. APPEAL; RIGHT OF APPEAL. The right of appeal from the decisions of a court, tribunal, or board is a purely
statutory right; it is not an inherent right. The right to appeal was not at common law, and is not now, a necessary
element of due process of law.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J. :
On the 17th day of July, 1913, C. A. Sobral, assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, presented a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of said city, charging the defendant with the crime of practicing medicine
without a license, in violation of section 8 of Act No. 310 of the Philippine Commission. The complaint alleged:
"That in, during, and between the months of January, 1911 and June, 1913, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Dominador Gomez Jesus having been suspended from the practice of medicine on or about August 28,
1909, by the Board of Medical Examiners, in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of said Act No. 310, and while
his license as a physician and surgeon was revoked by the said Board of Medical Examiners. did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously treat, operate upon, prescribe, and advise for the physical ailments of one
Margarita Dolores and other persons, for a fee, and presented himself by means of signs, cards, advertisements, and
otherwise as a physician and surgeon, duly admitted, empowered, and allowed to practice medicine, in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, when in truth and in fact as the said Dominador Gomez Jesus well knew, he was not allowed
to practice medicine in any way in the city of Manila, or anywhere in the Philippine Islands, for a fee, and when, as he
well knew, the rendering of medical and surgical services by him to the said Margarita Dolores and other persons in
the city of Manila was for a fee, and not in a case of emergency, or in the administration of family remedies, or through
a call in consultation with other duly admitted physicians or surgeons."
On the 22d day of July, 1913, the defendant appeared and demurred to the complaint, upon the following
grounds:" (1) That the complaint was not in the form required by law; (2) that the facts stated in said complaint did not
constitute a crime; (3) that the complaint itself contains allegations which in truth would constitute a justification or
legal exemption for the accused."
After hearing the arguments for the defense and the prosecution on said demurrer, the Honorable Jose C.
Abreu, in a very interesting opinion in which he discusses fully said demurrer, reached the conclusion that the
complaint was sufficient, and overruled said demurrer.
On the 26th day of August, 1913, the defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The cause was
brought on for trial before the Honorable George N. Hurd, on the 9th of September, 1913.
After hearing the evidence, the said judge, in a very interesting and well-reasoned opinion, found the
defendant guilty as charged in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of failure to pay the same or any part thereof, and to pay the costs. From that sentence the defendant
appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:
"I. The court erred in declaring that the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 310 are not in conflict with the
provisions of the Philippine Bill enacted by the Congress of the United States on July 1, 1902.

"II. The court likewise erred in declaring to be valid and effective that portion of section 8 of Act No. 310 which
empowers the Board of Medical Examiners to revoke the certificate of a physician who may have been convicted of
any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct or for unprofessional conduct.
"III. The court likewise erred in considering to be final the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners revoking
the certificate of the herein defendant, notwithstanding the appeal carried to the Board of Health and not yet heard
and finally decided thereby as section 8 of Act No. 310 provides.
"IV. The court also erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the evidence adduced by the defense
tending to demonstrate that the defendants certificate as doctor of medicine represents a value greater than P600.
"V. The court likewise erred in holding that the "Hotel Quirurgico" is Doctor Gomez himself and that such
institution exists only to cloak the violation of the law by the defendant.
"VI. The court erred, finally, in sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P200 or, in default thereof, to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment and to pay the costs of the trial."
The facts disclosed by the record are as follows:
1. That some time prior to the 28th day of August, 1909, the defendant had been admitted, or had been
licensed, to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands.
2. That some time prior to the said 28th day of August, 1909, the defendant had been accused, arrested, tried,
and found guilty of a violation of the Opium Law.
3. That in the month of August, 1909, the defendant was cited to appear before the "Board of Medical
Examiners for the Philippine Islands," to show cause why his license to practice medicine should not be revoked, in
accordance with the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 310.
4. That on the date set, the Board proceeded to make an investigation of the question of the revocation of the
license of the defendant to practice medicine, based upon the fact that he had been theretofore convicted of an
"offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct."
5. That after the conclusion of said investigation, the Board reached the conclusion (a) that the defendant had
been guilty of an "offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct;" and (b) adopted a resolution revoking his
license to practice medicine.
6. That the defendant was duly notified of the action of said Board.
7. That later the defendant appealed to the Director of Health, which appeal was finally withdrawn by him.
8. That later, and after the license of the defendant to practice medicine had been revoked, he did practice
medicine in the Philippine Islands by treating, operating upon, prescribing for the physical ailments of various persons,
for which he charged a fee, and that said treating, operating, and prescribing medicine for said various persons were
not in cases of emergency, or in the administration of family remedies.
9. That the defendant is not a medical officer of the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United
States Marine Hospital Service, nor a physician or surgeon from other countries called in consultation, nor a medical
student, practicing medicine under the direct supervision of a preceptor who is a registered doctor of medicine.
Upon the foregoing facts, the lower court imposed the fine indicated above.
The appellant, in support of his first assignment of error, argues that section 8 of said Act No. 310 is in conflict
with the provisions of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), and is, therefore, void. Act No. 310, among
other things, provides:
1. (a) For the creation of "A Board of Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands." (b) That said Board shall
examine candidates desiring to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands, and to issue a certificate of registration to
such persons who are found to be qualified, in accordance with the provisions of said law, to practice medicine, etc.
2. That after the 1st of March, 1902, it shall be unlawful for any person to practice medicine, surgery, etc., in
any of its branches in the Philippine Islands, unless he hold such certificate of registration.
3. That said Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue such certificate of registration to any individual
convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct.
4. That said Board might revoke any certificate of registration theretofore granted to any person in case he
should be convicted of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct, or for unprofessional conduct.
5. That any person shall be regarded as practicing medicine, who shall treat, operate upon, prescribe, or
advise for any physical ailment of another for a fee, or who shall represent himself, by means of signs, cards,
advertisements, or otherwise, as a physician or surgeon.
6. That said law did not apply to the rendering of services in case of emergency or the administration of family
remedies, or to medical officers of the United States Army, of the United States Navy, or of the United States Marine
Hospital Service, or to a physician or surgeon of other countries called in consultation, or to a medical student,
practicing under the supervision of a preceptor who is a registered doctor of medicine.
It is the power of the Board of Medical Examiners to revoke a license, once granted, to which the appellant
especially directs his argument, in support of his contention that said Act is in conflict with the said Act of Congress.
Section 8 of Act No. 310 provides: "The Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue any of the certificates
provided for therein [in this Act] to an individual convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
immoral or dishonorable conduct. In case of such refusal, the reason therefor shall be stated to the applicant in writing.
The Board may also revoke any such certificate for like cause, or for unprofessional conduct, after due notice to the
person holding the certificate, and a hearing, subject to an appeal to the Board of Health for the Philippine Islands, the
decision of which shall be final."

That part of the Act of Congress upon which the appellant relies to show that Act No. 310 is void is paragraph 1
of section 5. Said paragraph reads as follows: "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws."
The appellant gives three reasons why section 8 of Act No. 310 is void. They are: (a) That the provisions of
section 8 of Act No. 310 deprive the herein defendant of his rights or property without due process of law. (b) That the
power to revoke the certificate of a doctor of medicine resides solely in the Courts of First Instance and the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands. (c) That the power granted to the Board of Medical Examiners to revoke the certificate
of a physician has been repealed by section 88 of the Philippine Bill.
While the assignments of error present various questions, the real questions presented are three:
1. The right of the state to require of those who desire to practice medicine and surgery, etc., certain
standards of morality and general and special scholarship, as a prerequisite to practice said professions.
2. The right of the state to revoke such a license, once granted; and
3. The right of the state to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or both, those who attempt to practice the
professions of medicine, surgery, etc., without a license, and in violation of the law.
The appellant argues, in support of his first assignment of error:
1. That section 8 of Act No. 310 is null and void because it deprives him of a right or of property, without due
process of law;
2. That the Board of Medical Examiners has no authority or right to revoke his license; that right, if any exists
at all, belongs to the courts;
3. That said section 8 has been repealed by section 88 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (The Philippine
Bill).
Generally speaking, with reference to the general and inherent power of the state, we think the following
propositions are so well established that they no longer admit of dispute or discussion:
1. The state has general power to enact such laws, in relation to persons and property within its borders, as
may promote public health, public morals, public safety, and the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants.
(New York City v. Miln, 11 Pet. (U. S.) , 102, 139; Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U. S.) , 283, 423; Slaughter House Cases, 16
Wall., 36, 62; Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S., 25; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623; Dent v. W. Virginia, 129 U. S., 114 (25 W.
Va., 1); Hawker v. N. Y., 170 U. S., 189; Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. Rep., 250.)
2. To make reasonable provision for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice of
medicine and surgery, and punishing those who attempt to engage therein in defiance of such provisions. (Dent v. W.
Virginia, 129 U. S., 114 (25 W. Va., 1); Hawker v. N. Y., 170 U. S., 189; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S., 505; State v.
Webster, 150 Ind., 607.)
This power of the state is generally denominated the police power. It has been held that the state cannot be
deprived of its right to exercise this power. The police power and the right to exercise it constitute the very foundation,
or at least one of the corner stones, of the state. For the state to deprive itself or permit itself to be deprived of the
right to enact laws to promote the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and promote public health, public
morals, and public safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and objects of the state. No legislature can bargain
away the public health, public safety, or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their
servants. Governments are organized with a view to the preservation of these things. They cannot deprive themselves
of the power to provide for them. (Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S., 814, 816.)
It has even been held that a constitutional prohibition upon State laws impairing the obligation of contracts
does not restrict the power of the State to protect the public health, public morals, or public safety, as the one or the
other may be involved in the execution, of such contracts. Rights and privileges arising from contracts with a State are
subject to regulations for the protection of the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, in the same
sense and to the same extent as are all contracts and all property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations.
(New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S., 650, 672.)
In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may, under certain conditions, become necessary to
deprive its citizens of property and of a right providing for the continuance of property, when the property or the
exercise of the right may tend to destroy the public health, the public morals, the public safety, and the general
welfare and prosperity of its inhabitants. For example, a tannery, a slaughterhouse, or a fertilizing establishment may
be located in such proximity to the residence portion of a city as to become a menace to the public health and the
welfare of the inhabitants. In such a case the discontinuance or the removal of such institutions may be ordered, under
the police power of the state, even though it amounts to depriving persons of their private property. (Slaughter House
Cases, 16 Wall., 36, 62; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S., 659.)
Mr. Chancellor Kent, in his valuable commentaries, in discussing the police power (2 Kents Commentaries,
340) says: "Unwholesome trades, slaughterhouses, operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the
application of steam power to the propelling of cars, the building with combustible materials, and the burial of the
dead may all be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general and rational principle
that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private interests must be made
subservient to the general interest of the community."
This power is called the police power of the state. (Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) , 53, 84.) The
police power is so extensive and so comprehensive that the courts have refused to give it an exact definition; neither
have they attempted to define its limitations. Upon the police power of the state depends the security of social order,

the life and health of the citizens, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of
private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. It extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the state. Persons and property are subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
(Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 27 Vt., 140, 149; New York City v. Miln, 11 Pet. (U. S.) , 102; Slaughter House Cases, 16
Wall., 36, 62.)
Neither will it be denied that the owner of a building, which, by reason of its decayed condition, becomes a
menace to public safety, may be ordered to destroy the same, and thus be deprived of his property. He may be
ordered to repair or destroy it. Private property, under the police power, may be destroyed to prevent the spread of a
conflagration in order to save lives and property. The existence of bawdy houses which tend to greatly affect the
morals of the people of a community may be destroyed or may be removed. A manufacturing plant, so located in a
thickly settled community as to greatly disturb the peace and comfort of the inhabitants, may be ordered closed or
removed. The state, under its police power, may regulate or prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
as a beverage within its borders. Such a law may destroy the established business of thousands of its inhabitants.
(Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623; License Cases, 5 How., 504.) If any state deems that the retailing or trafficking in
ardent spirits is injurious to its citizens and calculated to produce idleness, vice, or debauchery, there is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and restricting such traffic, or from prohibiting it
altogether, if it think proper. The state may even declare that buildings where intoxicating liquors are distilled or sold
shall be a nuisance and ordered destroyed. (Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.) The state may regulate its domestic
commerce, contracts, the transmission of estates, real and personal, and act upon all internal matters which relate to
its moral and political welfare. Over these subjects federal governments exercise no power. The acknowledged police
power of the state extends even to the destruction of property. A nuisance may be abated Everything prejudicial to the
health or morals of a city may be removed. (License Cases, 5 How., 504; Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S., 25, 33; Foster v.
Kansas, 112 U. S., 201, 206; Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. Rep., 250 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.)
The police power of the state extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and the protection of all property within its borders. Under the general police power of the state, persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restrictions and burdens in order to secure the general health, comfort, and
prosperity of all. This power, or the right to exercise it, as need may require, cannot be bargained away by the state.
(Case v. Board of Health, supra.) Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to ones own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the quiet enjoyment of the
same right by others. (Case v. Board of Health, supra; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S., 366, 395.)
It is as much for the interest of the state that public health should be preserved as that life should be made
secure. With this end in view, quarantine laws have been enacted in most, if not all, civilized states. Insane asylums,
public hospitals, institutions for the care and education of the blind have been established, and special measures taken
for the exclusion of infected cattle, rags, and decayed fruit. States have enacted laws limiting the hours during which
women and children shall be employed in factories. (Case v. Board of Health, supra.)
The present is not the first case which has been presented to the courts relating to the right of the state to
regulate the practice of medicine and surgery, and to define the conditions under which such practice may be
continued and to revoke the license granted to exercise such professions. Legislation or statutory regulations, similar
to the one which we are now discussing, have been adopted in practically every one of the States of the Union. The
constitutionality of such legislation has been questioned in practically all of the States where such legislation exists.
Such statutes have been uniformly sustained. (State v. Webster, 150 Ind., 607, 616; Dent v. W. Virginia, 25 W. Va., 1
(129 U. S., 114); Ex parte Frazer, 54 Cal., 94; Harding v. People, 10 Colo., 387; People v. Plue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill.,
370; State v. Mosher, 78 Iowa, 321; Iowa Eclectic Medical College v. Schrader, 87 Iowa, 659 (20 L. R. A., 355); Driscoll
v. Commonwealth, 93 Ky., 393; Hewitt v. Charier, 16 Pick. (Mass.) , 353; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S., 505; People v.
Phippin, 70 Mich., 6; State v. State Medical Examining Board, 32 Minn., 324; State v. Fleischer, 41 Minn., 69; State v.
District Court, 13 Mont., 370; Gee Wo v. State, 36 Neb., 241; State v. Van Doran, 109 N. C., 864; State v. Randolph, 23
Ore., 74.)
The constitutionality of similar legislation, regulating the practice of dentistry, has been presented in many of
the States, and has been sustained. (Wilkins v. State, 113 Ind., 514; Gosnel v. State, 52 Ark., 228; State v. Vandersluis,
42 Minn., 129; State v. Creditor, 44 Kansas, 565.)
So also have similar statutory regulations been sustained affecting the practice of pharmacy. (Hildreth v.
Crawford, 65 Iowa, 339; People v. Moorman, 86 Mich., 433; State v. Forcier, 65 N. H., 42.)
Various States have attempted to regulate by statute the trade of plumbing, of horseshoeing, as well as that of
engineering. Even the trade of barbering is subject to statutory regulation in some States, because it has relation to
the health of the people. (Singer v. State, 72 Md., 464; People v. Warden, 144 N. Y., 529; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S.,
465.)
Legislation analogous to that under discussion has also been adopted in various States relating to the practice
of the profession of law. The constitutionality of such legislation has been uniformly sustained. (State v. Gazlay, 5 Ohio,
14; Goldthwaite v. City Council, 50 Ala., 486; Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal., 293; Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal., 241.)
In every case, where the constitutionality of similar statutes has been questioned, it has been held that it is
within the power of the legislature to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect
the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.
The trade of plumbing vitally affects the health of the people. The lives of thousands of people may depend
upon the result of the work of an engineer. The property and life of citizens of the state may depend upon the advice of
a lawyer, and no profession or trade is more directly connected with the health and comfort of the people than that of
a physician and surgeon. The practice of medicine and surgery is a vocation which very nearly concerns the comfort,

health, and life of every person in the land. Physicians and surgeons have committed to their care most important
interests, and it is of a most imperious necessity that only persons possessing skill and knowledge shall be permitted
to practice medicine and surgery. For centuries the law has required physicians to possess and exercise skill and
learning. Courts have not hesitated to punish those who have caused damages for lack of such skill and learning. The
requirement of the Philippine Legislature that those who may engage in such professions shall be possessed of both
knowledge and skill before entering the same is no new principle of law. It is an exercise of the right of the state, under
its police power, which has been recognized for centuries. No one can doubt the great importance to the community
that health, life, and limb should be protected and not be left in the hands of ignorant pretenders, and that the
services of reputable, skilled, and learned men should be secured to them.
In the case of Dent v. W. Virginia (129 U. S., 114), the late Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen [of the United States] to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may
choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and conditions. This right
may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are
open to everyone on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and
great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the estate acquired in them
that is, the right to continue their prosecution is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily
taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. But there is no arbitrary deprivation
of such right when its exercise is not permitted because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the state for
the protection of society. The power (police power) of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people
authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure, or tend to secure, them against the
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has been the
practice of different States, from time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits (professions or trades) a certain degree
of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their possession being generally ascertained
upon an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma
or license from an institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which such
pursuits have to deal. . . . Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it than that of
medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and mysterious influences upon which health and life depend, and
requires not only a knowledge of the properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the human body in all its
complicated parts and their relation to each other, as well as their influence upon the mind. The physician must be
able to detect readily the presence of disease, and prescribe appropriate remedies for its removal. Everyone may have
occasion to consult him, but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he possesses.
Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his license, issued by authority competent to judge in that
respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due consideration, therefore, for the protection of society may
well induce the state to exclude from practice those who have not such a license, or who are found, upon examination,
not to be fully qualified. The same reasons which control in imposing conditions, upon compliance with which the
physician is allowed to practice in the first instance, may call for further conditions as new modes of treating disease
are discovered, or a more thorough acquaintance is obtained of the remedial properties of vegetables and mineral
substances, or a more accurate knowledge is acquired of the human system, and of the agencies by which it is
affected. . . . We perceive nothing in the statute which indicates an intention of the legislature to deprive one of any of
his rights. No one has a right to practice medicine without having the necessary qualifications of learning and skill; and
the statute only requires that whoever assumes, by offering to the community his services as a physician, that he
possesses such learning and skill, shall present evidence of it by a certificate or license from a body designated by the
state as competent to judge of his qualifications."
The appellant contends, however, that the Legislature exceeded its authority in conferring upon the Board of
Medical Examiners the right to revoke his license. He contends that the right to revoke it rests in the judicial
department of the Government; that the courts only are possessed of the right, if the right exists, to revoke his license
and to deprive him of his right to practice his profession of medicine and surgery. It will be remembered that the law
conferred upon the Board the right to grant the certificate, as well as the right to revoke it, subject to the right of
appeal to the Director of Health. While, in some respects, the power exercised by the Board is quasi judicial, the action
of the Board is not judicial, any more than the action of a board appointed to determine the qualifications of applicants
for admission to the bar, nor that of a board appointed to pass upon the qualifications of applicants to be admitted to
the profession of teaching. In many of the States of the Union, no one can engage in the trade of barbering, or
horseshoeing, without passing an examination before a board specially appointed for that purpose. States have
deemed it wiser to place such power and discretion in boards composed of men especially qualified, by reason of their
learning and scientific knowledge, rather than in the courts.
It is contended that the law provides no appeal from the decision of the Board to the courts, and is, for that
reason, null and void. A law is not necessarily invalid, if it provides a remedy for those affected thereby, simply because it does not provide for an appeal to the courts. Due process of law is not necessarily judicial process. (Murrays
Lessee v. Hoboken Land etc. Co., 18 How. (U. S.) , 372; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S.,
265, 289; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S., 71, 83; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S., 505.) Indeed, it not infrequently happens
that a full discharge of the duties conferred upon boards and commissions or officers of a purely ministerial character
requires them to consider and to finally determine questions of a purely legal character. The legislature may confer
upon persons, boards, officers, and commissions the right to finally decide many questions affecting various interests
of the people of the state. If a remedy is granted, the law will be valid, even though no appeal to the courts is
provided. The right of appeal is a purely statutory right; it is not an inherent right. The right to appeal was not at
common law, and is not now, a necessary element of due process of law. (McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S., 684, 687;
Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S., 505, 508.)

The objection that the statute confers judicial power upon the Board of Medical Examiners is not well founded.
The law provides for an appeal to the Director of Health. Many executive officers, even those who are regarded as
purely ministerial officers, act judicially in the determination of facts in the performance of their duties, and in so doing
"they do not exercise judicial power," as that phrase is commonly used, and as it is used in the Organic Act in
conferring judicial power upon specified courts. The powers conferred upon the Board of Medical Examiners are in no
wise different in character, in this respect, from those exercised by those of examiners of candidates to teach in our
public schools, or by tax assessors, or boards of equalization, in the determination for the purposes of taxation, the
value of property. The ascertainment and determination of the qualifications to practice medicine, by a board
appointed for that purpose, composed of experts, is not the exercise of a power which appropriately belongs to the
judicial department of the Government. The same is true with reference to the power conferred upon such a board to
revoke a license, for the reasons given in the law. (People v. Hasbrouck, 11 Utah, 291; Reetz v. Michigan 188 U. S., 505,
507.)
The appellant further argues and contends that the present law is repealed by section 88 of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. We think from the foregoing argument we have shown that there is nothing in said Act of
Congress which is inconsistent with the provisions of Act No. 310, under consideration, and that it is not repealed.
What has been said, we think, also answers the argument of the appellant in support of his second, third, and
fourth assignments of error. It may be well, however, to observe in relation to the third assignment that the appellant
cannot object to the decision of the Board, when he himself, after his appeal, voluntarily withdrew it.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error, the record shows, beyond question, that the appellant had
personally engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery, in clear contravention of the law, without being authorized
so to do. It is a matter of little importance whether the appellant practiced medicine and surgery as the "Hotel
Quirurgico" or not. The record shows that he personally and illegally engaged in the practice of medicine. The poor sick
patients who called him for medical assistance certainly did not believe or think that they were calling the "Hotel
Quirurgico." They believed that they were being treated by the Appellant. So ordered.
For all of the foregoing reasons the sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Arellano, C.J. Torres, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14078
March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832],
6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the
status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present
opinion This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power
of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a
people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the
facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "nonChristians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi
and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form
the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of
Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of
this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the
approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary
of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February
21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145
of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up
their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in
sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the
governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes
of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among
them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and
are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro
but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the
paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found
is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which
read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall refuse to
comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and
forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be
imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of
this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916;
section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the
Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper
category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the
uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the
authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI,
Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on
February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance
149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order
that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and
in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means most
convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and
other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of
glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a
desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and
not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of
all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which
gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of
this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents,
and governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal
with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would
not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would,
of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is
ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the
same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof
in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx
xxx
xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. lands,
and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their
live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall not
be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no
change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they
may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx
xxx
xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.

No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy,
president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a
change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for
private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the
change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion; if
there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be
a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios
but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine
others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on
January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646.
For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND
MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand
towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate
with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men;
and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and
mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness,
and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with
regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the
commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents,
governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation
of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who
are children of indiasand born among them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be affected
by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228,
229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less
advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral
part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience
and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in
the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that
may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the
non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government of
the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important
question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who
have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of
Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work
undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been
guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account the
prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and
obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in
the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for
civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all
the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the
unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the
provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the
meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the
inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as
well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the
following:
DECREE.

1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the common
law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the
customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be divided into three
classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home;
another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of
those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn
these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means
which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already
subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for
the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as
regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of
next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the
remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to
render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the
inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a
new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices
the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of
the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed
precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based upon
that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties
affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products
thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and
conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from
engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with
deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indios shall
be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever
convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by
this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots
the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families;
concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most
productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far
as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be
Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect,
and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from
contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those
who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the
authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in return,
have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which
place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be
distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and
provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the
peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April,
committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain
General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural
guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy
their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall
necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a
detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything conducive
to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my authorities,
local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most
effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of
each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of the
Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.

14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or
permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing
regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about due
compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for
dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines
was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by
section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained
undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted,
namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by
Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government
and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which
they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in
view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed
of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the
Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority
theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine
Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva
Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to
appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not
represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be
known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory
which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and
Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82,
the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act
No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of
settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and
Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission,
having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855,
1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela.
Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As
an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE
MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilization
to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from
among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That
the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act
Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments
in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized,
when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over
them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced
sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven,
inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such
township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby
expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the
enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last
named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent
practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be
found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of
the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine
Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau.
Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550,
1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These
terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422,
2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as
in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and
pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408,
sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a
religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians,
would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited
section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of
Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez,
"Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true
meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of
many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the
"territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar
recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine
Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that
"part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this
article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces.
The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These
are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government.
They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation.
Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians
and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of
1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The
reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular
province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of
the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term.
"The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these
people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward

Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the
Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of
the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906,
circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by
reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and
sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of nonChristian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to
determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property
prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban
[Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article
423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the
court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called nonChristians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites
prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an
uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a
second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the
legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary
of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under
the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was
circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally nonChristian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the
purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far
in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great
that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation
'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for
people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their
own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person
baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the
member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have
embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularly
organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to
which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion above
expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the
Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to
say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better classification
has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same
meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative
of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious
denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the
view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the
interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found
in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue
Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. The
Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form of
Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to
mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula
tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as
they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a
man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more
dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member
thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief,

but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one
occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he
was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs,
Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men
belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the
Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula
taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people
are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the
Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from
members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions
and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not
profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula
tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever
tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body politic, he
thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that community and from
and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him
as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should
apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration
of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty
and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is subject
to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his
maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life,
degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this
reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so
far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized
tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and
members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1,
promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by
Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of
Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the
opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel.
The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By
purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself
liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same
authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in question
remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make
themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the
constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would
include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply
refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed
residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which
live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized
life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on
the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation
employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.

The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657
(articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not
only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null
and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then
"Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and nonChristian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the
Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is:
"Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands,
prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is,
"Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to
culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903
divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas
de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that the
use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain
inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it
to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense today forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name
was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior
by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond
the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately
15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547,
have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United
States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the
so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States
Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of
the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of
pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as
that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The
Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress
passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the
Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought
by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into
agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118
U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then
proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of
which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the
Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who were
found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in the
Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they
asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other
nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any
part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which
this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a
purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were,
and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not
as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power
of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State
within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:

It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because
of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of
the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical
limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was
whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the
reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are
dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing,
the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special
protection, where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we
not the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians
tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed
to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and
protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to
overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not
subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs.
Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How.,
567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs.Gay [1898], 169
U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger
[1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs.
Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land
as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to
give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of
habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a
writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other
Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians
who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the
general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without
aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of
violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the
respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and
connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within
the limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the
request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to
arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused
the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The
second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for
a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In
discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly
tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the
purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government
almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an
extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It
is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The
decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the right
to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined
or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the Platte, has
the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.

3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the
respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and
have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not
trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof,
the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that
Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the
Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895],
70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even
admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians
have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation
as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their
own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United
States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and
that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system.
Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian
tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to
provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and
avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection
can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by
Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official
thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918],
248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of
the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of
the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this
"necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of
the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to
the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes
provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably
to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters
arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long
established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation
obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The
Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In
the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative
authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the
United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule.
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by
the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials
charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to
select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients,
says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal
as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result,

them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their
religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be understood to
mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the
Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated,
we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of
inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action.
We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious
differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the
Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],
118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty
by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right.
That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization,
which the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint;
the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from
injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not
do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own will. It is
only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly
freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.
On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each
one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under
the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of
his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with
which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human
government especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise
of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand."
(Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable
conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are
necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that
purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes
to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's
employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by
free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627;
Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114
Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint
by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general wellbeing. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural
rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural,
such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of

the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall
vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course
of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic
literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has
been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not
requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and
blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs,
or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs.California [1883],
110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its
operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it
shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It
varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which
is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States
Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in
said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by
adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed
the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a
condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of
broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter
under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next
must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the
farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and
to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See
Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain
liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill
Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the
on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that
mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign
police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise
of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the
Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government."
(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether
any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor
to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should
be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will
be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the
following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of
the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that
creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be

encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with
enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly
unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during
the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and
development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be expected.
But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade
the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to
educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring
life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make
depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people,
has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population
to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the
following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave their
wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabited
by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and the
extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote social
and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of
Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people.
These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the
benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild
habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the control
of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their
children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being
impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political
equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for
1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called nonChristians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in
civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes,
defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in
favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid,
and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having
in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and
non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino
people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of
civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working
out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we
have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate
neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands.
What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for
educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this
method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has
been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are
to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some cases,
and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection
for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is
not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the
equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which
citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree
of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in
enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops

and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes
are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before.
If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet,
unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard
and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are
engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not
bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these
people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a
rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being
deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx
xxx
xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law'
apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful
way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what
liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare
and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains
and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and
noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the
alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as
the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the
education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the
tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant
when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the
gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing
that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the
Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood
only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been
erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the
Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus
left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the
ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and
guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to
organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children
are being educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order
that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao
does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for
anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under penalty of
imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life,
do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants,
and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public
domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to
concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire
territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are
roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people
accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless
a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of
organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could
be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act

of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute
freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt,
this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined
as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed
Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law
would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would
endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for
a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of
oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper
the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of
the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed
the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now
to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the
Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to
some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular
degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a
along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two
branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady
requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process
of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to
the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of
the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200
Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that
comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of
the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing
conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public
welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is
wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as
sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been
in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days
to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of
nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to
be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own
good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the
part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for
which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances."
(Blinn vs.Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the
courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the
general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but
with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We
are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,
somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways,
respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D.
Aquino for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in
this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules
and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of
legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as
being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did
in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes
devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on is a
valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered
as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December
2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land
transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any
appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by
such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna
Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of
the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do
hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at
least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow
colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is
parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the
owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters
away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner
shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to
registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of
the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement
this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to
carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479
in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land
transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the
registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by
mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the
implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January
25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a preregistration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the
lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It
was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of
Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by
Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules
and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be
implemented provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied
with the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor
vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of
charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the
registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All
Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately.
9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and
Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an
early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as

the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"
11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police
power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with
arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of
car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per
set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being]
compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road
safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the
assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the
meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v.
Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced
in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the
respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The
Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise
ordered by this Court. 16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15,
1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically
deny the allegations and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner
owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its
subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of
Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its
Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and
undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided,
onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis and
for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented
himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of
constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the
police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was
unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a
citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are
Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and
which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and
dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and
the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive
quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the
outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in
such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although
the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v.
Erictathus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept
was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that
sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It
is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew,
'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the
great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where
it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past
may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.'
The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did
not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular
police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed
for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an
indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the
imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and
regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the
presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American
Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As
was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and
data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's
naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents'
because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rearend collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly
stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the
case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation
of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos
and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite
manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the
Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to
conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for
exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was
exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive
redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft
of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees
a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor
vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not
immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the
motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31
6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the
Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative
Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby.
All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of
this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device
so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and
administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral,
nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device
requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded
speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to
an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged
Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32
7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power,
the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to
its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It
bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or
expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation
and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.'
There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any

Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or
salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire
into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely
allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then
be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender
should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as
there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally
without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative
pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the
aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the
roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long
after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He
continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency
with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration.
The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards
posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said
Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment
of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this
Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at
war with the principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any
attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual
observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was
referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a
law wig not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal
protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that
success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
Aquino J., took no part.
Concepcion J., is on leave.
Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7995
May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of
Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative
enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power
and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the
disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the
field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures
designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation
may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail
trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor
of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless
their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3)
an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of
licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures
and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a
provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities
a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets
and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that
said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly
city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act
against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and
5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the
valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of
national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international
obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is
not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that
its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it
would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of
the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws.
What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the
province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be

clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and
the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its
sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a
modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we
cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive
world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police
power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due
process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our
Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies,
are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of
race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police
power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient
foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with
private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of
any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty
and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be
overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises
the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the
measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise
of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and
unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and
courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the
disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the
legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging
therein. The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society
itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the
dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more
than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into

existence. As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is
enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to
unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite
variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers
perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to
members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to
the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home
and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the
spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the
clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the
operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time
there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages;
now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the
beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural
produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent
neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community
takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and
dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all
articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not
only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware,
textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national
corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal foods and products
would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that
the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of
radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many
unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an
issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the
legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between
the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already
filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the
retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the
alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:
Assets Gross Sales
Year and Retailers
Nationality
No.-Establishments
Pesos Per cent Distribution
Pesos Per cent Distribution
1941:
Filipino .......... 106,671
200,323,138
55.82 174,181,924
51.74
Chinese ........... 15,356 118,348,692
32.98 148,813,239
44.21
Others ............ 1,646 40,187,090
11.20 13,630,239
4.05
1947:
Filipino .......... 111,107
208,658,946
65.05 279,583,333
57.03
Chinese ........... 13,774 106,156,218
33.56 205,701,134
41.96
Others ........... 354
8,761,260
.49
4,927,168
1.01
1948: (Census)
Filipino .......... 113,631
213,342,264
67.30 467,161,667
60.51
Chinese .......... 12,087 93,155,459
29.38 294,894,227
38.20
Others .......... 422
10,514,675
3.32
9,995,402
1.29
1949:
Filipino .......... 113,659
213,451,602
60.89 462,532,901
53.47
Chinese .......... 16,248 125,223,336
35.72 392,414,875
45.36
Others .......... 486
12,056,365
3.39
10,078,364
1.17
1951:
Filipino ......... 119,352
224,053,620
61.09 466,058,052
53.07
Chinese .......... 17,429 134,325,303
36.60 404,481,384
46.06
Others .......... 347
8,614,025
2.31
7,645,327
87
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
Year and Retailer's

Nationality
Item
Assets
(Pesos) Gross Sales
(Pesos)
1941:
Filipino .............................................
1,878 1,633
Chinese .............................................. 7,707 9,691
Others ............................................... 24,415 8,281
1947:
Filipino .............................................
1,878 2,516
Chinese ...........................................
7,707 14,934
Others ..............................................
24,749 13,919
1948: (Census)
Filipino .............................................
1,878 4,111
Chinese ............................................. 7,707 24,398
Others ..............................................
24,916 23,686
1949:
Filipino .............................................
1,878 4,069
Chinese .............................................. 7,707 24,152
Others ..............................................
24,807 20,737
1951:
Filipino .............................................
1,877 3,905
Chinese ............................................. 7,707 33,207
Others ............................................... 24,824 22,033
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark:
1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of
Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments
already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has
steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but
aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assests and gross sales which average between six and
seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien
invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing
out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely
engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the
Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's
target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our
Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution
categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on
page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or
comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the
Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of
the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the
constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the
Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not
desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability
and strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy.
Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the
government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in
the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political
freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only
against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic
field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen,
manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express
sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth
National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second
National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien
predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien
stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt
by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance
alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample
capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete
unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to
be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy and
of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed
completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the
aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article
offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating
it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article,
or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out
of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination.
Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which
courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general
feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and
intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they
have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and
enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and
prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn
Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price
control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9,
Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they
have secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and
demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their
demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax
laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and
the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public
officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter
of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The
present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential
source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of
harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate
the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance
or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds
his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential
enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the
product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of
the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately
been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the
national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State
insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law
deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth
or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim
or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and
consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting
them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and
countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers
and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it
may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to
national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes
are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest
in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very
important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret
manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the
ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and
disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and

fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the
retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in
the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a
legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and
real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may
disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the lawmaking power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class
are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act
transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not
curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of
discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable
basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic
Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law
sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical
nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question,
if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time
the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been
affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co.
vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a
condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of
the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature
did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as
ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign
interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its
constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade
to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the
Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in
the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming
houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an
extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the
shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting
trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the
United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect
has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra
distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding
themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this
whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply
because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of
protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking,
the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of
police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and
peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a
citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the
business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and
the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute
which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the
result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien
cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this
particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274
U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati
prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination
against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a
relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not

state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local
conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol,
124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington,
1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to
citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was
also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340
(Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude,
psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool,
billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of
Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the
reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way
affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission,
92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to
citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because there is no
public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate
justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons
of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally
as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which
imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void
because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from
the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the
distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared
invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism
and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed.
1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books
of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the
decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2)
that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of
their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public
benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something
indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring
powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared
invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which
attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In
State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was
declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not
naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact,
nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty
and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been
shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow
the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction
between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate
knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of
aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose
that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment
and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the
same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by
citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that
obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making
the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of
legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the
highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a
state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or,
when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a

proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied,
and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950,
957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police
power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the
legislature is to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it
affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302.,
1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate
the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is
whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an
arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals,
comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago
recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation
and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality
and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by
petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without
harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the
Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien,
thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the
occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of
crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and
circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious,
taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged
therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring
about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not
necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out
its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually
necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later
was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our
economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free
institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of
the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our
national security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less
legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and
domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of
foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due
process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due
process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise
of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue
now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it
abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter
because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and
American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus
in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision
limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in
Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail
trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.
Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the
Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the
radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its
people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy
commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of
legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger
and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature
has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the
occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded
associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the
deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied
to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court
will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The
Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is
in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul
the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked
as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not
unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that
the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices
will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate
replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from
foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within
the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is
misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and
prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of
Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or
the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec.
1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It
is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization"
and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader
term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated
in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an
actprohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being
properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts
usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of
prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in
connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So.
718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not
be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule
was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or
"prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be
included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or

"prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the
Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes,
under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in
the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise
the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be
claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the
prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons
affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that
the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter
of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We
find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights
contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be
inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners
from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also
claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not
discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S.
vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the
State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual
threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens
and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter
falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be
void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and
the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less
harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the
liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to
determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process
and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed
to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

OCTOBER TERM, 2002

LAWRENCE ET AL. v. TEXAS
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, FOURTEENTH DISTRICT
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In
our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside
the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The
instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.
I
The question before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.
In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in
response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes
Lawrence, resided. The right of the police to enter does not seem to have been questioned. The officers observed
Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody
over night, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace.
The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the
same sex (man)." App. to Pet. for Cert. 127a, 139a. The applicable state law is Tex. Penal Code Ann. 21.06(a) (2003).
It provides: "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the
same sex." The statute defines "[d]eviate sexual intercourse" as follows:
"(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or
"(B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." 21.01(1).
The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the
statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas
Constitution. Tex. Const., Art.1, 3a. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo
contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. App. to Pet. for Cert. 107a-110a.
The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal constitutional
arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the
case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. 41
S.W. 3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001). The majority opinion indicates that the Court of Appeals considered our decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case. Bowers then
being authoritative, this was proper.
We granted certiorari, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002), to consider three questions:
"1. Whether Petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law--which criminalizes
sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples--violate the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws?
"2. Whether Petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their
vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
"3. Whether Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), should be overruled?" Pet. for Cert. i.
The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual.
II
We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to
engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. For this inquiry we deem it necessary to reconsider the Court's holding in Bowers.
There are broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause in earlier cases,
including Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); but the most
pertinent beginning point is our decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
In Griswold the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting the use of drugs or devices of contraception and
counseling or aiding and abetting the use of contraceptives. The Court described the protected interest as a right to
privacy and placed emphasis on the marriage relation and the protected space of the marital bedroom. Id., at 485.
After Griswold it was established that the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends
beyond the marital relationship. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court invalidated a law prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons. The case was decided under the Equal Protection Clause, id., at
454; but with respect to unmarried persons, the Court went on to state the fundamental proposition that the law
impaired the exercise of their personal rights, ibid. It quoted from the statement of the Court of Appeals finding the law
to be in conflict with fundamental human rights, and it followed with this statement of its own:
"It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. . . . If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id., at
453.
The opinions in Griswold and Eisenstadt were part of the background for the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). As is well known, the case involved a challenge to the Texas law prohibiting abortions, but the laws of
other States were affected as well. Although the Court held the woman's rights were not absolute, her right to elect an
abortion did have real and substantial protection as an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process Clause. The Court
cited cases that protect spatial freedom and cases that go well beyond it. Roerecognized the right of a woman to make

certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the protection of liberty under the
Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.
In Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court confronted a New York law forbidding sale
or distribution of contraceptive devices to persons under 16 years of age. Although there was no single opinion for the
Court, the law was invalidated. Both Eisenstadtand Carey, as well as the holding and rationale in Roe, confirmed that
the reasoning of Griswold could not be confined to the protection of rights of married adults. This was the state of the
law with respect to some of the most relevant cases when the Court considered Bowers v. Hardwick.
The facts in Bowers had some similarities to the instant case. A police officer, whose right to enter seems not
to have been in question, observed Hardwick, in his own bedroom, engaging in intimate sexual conduct with another
adult male. The conduct was in violation of a Georgia statute making it a criminal offense to engage in sodomy. One
difference between the two cases is that the Georgia statute prohibited the conduct whether or not the participants
were of the same sex, while the Texas statute, as we have seen, applies only to participants of the same sex. Hardwick
was not prosecuted, but he brought an action in federal court to declare the state statute invalid. He alleged he was a
practicing homosexual and that the criminal prohibition violated rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution. The
Court, in an opinion by Justice White, sustained the Georgia law. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined the
opinion of the Court and filed separate, concurring opinions. Four Justices dissented. 478 U.S., at 199 (opinion of
Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 214 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and
Marshall, JJ.).
The Court began its substantive discussion in Bowers as follows: "The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of
the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." Id., at 190. That
statement, we now conclude, discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say
that the issue in Bowerswas simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a
particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for
us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.
Having misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented to it, and thus stating the claim to be whether
there is a fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy, the Bowers Court said: "Proscriptions against that
conduct have ancient roots." Id., at 192. In academic writings, and in many of the scholarly amicus briefs filed to assist
the Court in this case, there are fundamental criticisms of the historical premises relied upon by the majority and
concurring opin-ions in Bowers. Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae 16-17; Brief for American Civil Liberties Union
etal. as Amici Curiae 15-21; Brief for Professors of History et al. as Amici Curiae 3-10. We need not enter this debate in
the attempt to reach a definitive historical judgment, but the following considerations counsel against adopting the
definitive conclusions upon which Bowers placed such reliance.
At the outset it should be noted that there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at
homosexual conduct as a distinct matter. Beginning in colonial times there were prohibitions of sodomy derived from
the English criminal laws passed in the first instance by the Reformation Parliament of 1533. The English prohibition
was understood to include relations between men and women as well as relations between men and men. See, e.g.,
King v. Wiseman, 92 Eng. Rep. 774, 775 (K.B. 1718) (interpreting "mankind" in Act of 1533 as including women and
girls). Nineteenth-century commentators similarly read American sodomy, buggery, and crime-against-nature statutes
as criminalizing certain relations between men and women and between men and men. See, e.g., 2 J. Bishop, Criminal
Law 1028 (1858); 2 J. Chitty, Criminal Law 47-50 (5th Am. ed. 1847); R. Desty, A Compendium of American Criminal
Law 143 (1882); J. May, The Law of Crimes 203 (2d ed. 1893). The absence of legal prohibitions focusing on
homosexual conduct may be explained in part by noting that according to some scholars the concept of the
homosexual as a distinct category of person did not emerge until the late 19th century. See, e.g., J. Katz, The Invention
of Heterosexuality 10 (1995); J. D'Emilio & E. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America 121 (2d ed.
1997) ("The modern terms homosexuality and heterosexuality do not apply to an era that had not yet articulated these
distinctions"). Thus early American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to
prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally. This does not suggest approval of homosexual conduct. It does
tend to show that this particular form of conduct was not thought of as a separate category from like conduct between
heterosexual persons.
Laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private. A
substantial number of sodomy prosecutions and convictions for which there are surviving records were for predatory
acts against those who could not or did not consent, as in the case of a minor or the victim of an assault. As to these,
one purpose for the prohibitions was to ensure there would be no lack of coverage if a predator committed a sexual
assault that did not constitute rape as defined by the criminal law. Thus the model sodomy indictments presented in a
19th-century treatise, see 2 Chitty, supra, at 49, addressed the predatory acts of an adult man against a minor girl or
minor boy. Instead of targeting relations between consenting adults in private, 19th-century sodomy prosecutions

typically involved relations between men and minor girls or minor boys, relations between adults involving force,
relations between adults implicating disparity in status, or relations between men and animals.
To the extent that there were any prosecutions for the acts in question, 19th-century evidence rules imposed a
burden that would make a conviction more difficult to obtain even taking into account the problems always inherent in
prosecuting consensual acts committed in private. Under then-prevailing standards, a man could not be convicted of
sodomy based upon testimony of a consenting partner, because the partner was considered an accomplice. A
partner's testimony, however, was admissible if he or she had not consented to the act or was a minor, and therefore
incapable of consent. See, e.g., F. Wharton, Criminal Law 443 (2d ed. 1852); 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Law 512 (8th ed.
1880). The rule may explain in part the infrequency of these prosecutions. In all events that infrequency makes it
difficult to say that society approved of a rigorous and systematic punishment of the consensual acts committed in
private and by adults. The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon which the Bowers decision
placed such reliance is as consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an established
tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character.
The policy of punishing consenting adults for private acts was not much discussed in the early legal literature.
We can infer that one reason for this was the very private nature of the conduct. Despite the absence of prosecutions,
there may have been periods in which there was public criticism of homosexuals as such and an insistence that the
criminal laws be enforced to discourage their practices. But far from possessing "ancient roots," Bowers, 478 U.S., at
192, American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the 20th century. The reported
decisions concerning the prosecution of consensual, homosexual sodomy between adults for the years 1880-1995 are
not always clear in the details, but a significant number involved conduct in a public place. See Brief for American Civil
Liberties Union etal. as Amici Curiae 14-15, and n.18.
It was not until the 1970's that any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine
States have done so. See 1977 Ark. Gen. Acts no. 828; 1983 Kan. Sess. Laws p.652; 1974 Ky. Acts p.847; 1977 Mo.
Laws p.687; 1973 Mont. Laws p.1339; 1977 Nev. Stats. p.1632; 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch.591; 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch.
399; see also Postv. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (sodomy law invalidated as applied to different-sex
couples). Post-Bowers even some of these States did not adhere to the policy of suppressing homosexual conduct.
Over the course of the last decades, States with same-sex prohibitions have moved toward abolishing them. See, e.g.,
Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002); Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997); Campbell
v.Sundquist, 926 S.W. 2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); see also 1993
Nev. Stats. p. 518 (repealing Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.193).
In summary, the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the
concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very
least, are overstated.
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries
there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by
religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons
these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which
they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before
us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion for the Court in Bowers and further explained his views as follows:
"Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the
history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical
standards." 478 U.S., at 196. As with Justice White's assumptions about history, scholarship casts some doubt on the
sweeping nature of the statement by Chief Justice Burger as it pertains to private homosexual conduct between
consenting adults. See, e.g., Eskridge, Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. Ill. L.Rev. 631, 656. In all events we think
that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here. These references show an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex. "[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
This emerging recognition should have been apparent when Bowers was decided. In 1955 the American Law
Institute promulgated the Model Penal Code and made clear that it did not recommend or provide for "criminal
penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private." ALI, Model Penal Code 213.2, Comment 2, p.372
(1980). It justified its decision on three grounds: (1)The prohibitions undermined respect for the law by penalizing
conduct many people engaged in; (2) the statutes regulated private conduct not harmful to others; and (3) the laws
were arbitrarily enforced and thus invited the danger of blackmail. ALI, Model Penal Code, Commentary 277-280 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955). In 1961 Illinois changed its laws to conform to the Model Penal Code. Other States soon followed.
Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae 15-16.
In Bowers the Court referred to the fact that before 1961 all 50 States had outlawed sodomy, and that at the
time of the Court's decision 24 States and the District of Columbia had sodomy laws. 478 U.S., at 192-193. Justice
Powell pointed out that these prohibitions often were being ignored, however. Georgia, for instance, had not sought to
enforce its law for decades. Id., at 197-198, n.2 ("The history of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character
today of laws criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct").
The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards did not take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction. A committee
advising the British Parliament recommended in 1957 repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct. The Wolfenden

Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution (1963). Parliament enacted the substance
of those recommendations 10 years later. Sexual Offences Act 1967, 1.
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the European Court of Human Rights
considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today's case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he
was a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland
forbade him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his home had been searched, and he feared criminal
prosecution. The court held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention on
Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) 52. Authoritative in all countries that are
members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is at odds with the premise in
Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.
In our own constitutional system the deficiencies in Bowers became even more apparent in the years following
its announcement. The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are
reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. In those States where sodomy is
still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to
consenting adults acting in private. The State of Texas admitted in 1994 that as of that date it had not prosecuted
anyone under those circumstances. State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 943.
Two principal cases decided after Bowers cast its holding into even more doubt. In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court reaffirmed the substantive force of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause. The Casey decision again confirmed
that our laws and tradition afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education. Id., at 851. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in
making these choices, we stated as follows:
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State." Ibid.
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.
The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.
The second post-Bowers case of principal relevance is Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). There the Court
struck down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Romer
invalidated an amendment to Colorado's constitution which named as a solitary class persons who were homosexuals,
lesbians, or bisexual either by "orientation, conduct, practices or relationships," id., at 624 (internal quotation marks
omitted), and deprived them of protection under state antidiscrimination laws. We concluded that the provision was
"born of animosity toward the class of persons affected" and further that it had no rational relation to a legitimate
governmental purpose. Id., at 634.
As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and some amici contend that Romer
provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable
argument, but we con-clude the instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing validity. Were
we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be
valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. If
protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its
stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct
is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The central holding of Bowers has been brought in
question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual
persons.
The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. The offense, to be sure, is but a class C
misdemeanor, a minor offense in the Texas legal system. Still, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the
dignity of the persons charged. The petitioners will bear on their record the history of their criminal convictions. Just
this Term we rejected various challenges to state laws requiring the registration of sex offenders. Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84 (2003); Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). We are advised that if Texas convicted an
adult for private, consensual homosexual conduct under the statute here in question the convicted person would come
within the registration laws of a least four States were he or she to be subject to their jurisdiction. Pet. for Cert. 13, and
n.12 (citing Idaho Code 18-8301 to 18-8326 (Cum. Supp. 2002); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., 15:540-15:549 (West
2003); Miss. Code Ann. 45-33-21 to 45-33-57 (Lexis 2003); S.C. Code Ann. 23-3-400 to 23-3-490 (West 2002)).
This underscores the consequential nature of the punishment and the state-sponsored condemnation attendant to the
criminal prohibition. Furthermore, the Texas criminal conviction carries with it the other collateral consequences always
following a conviction, such as notations on job application forms, to mention but one example.
The foundations of Bowers have sustained serious erosion from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer.
When our precedent has been thus weakened, criticism from other sources is of greater significance. In the United
States criticism of Bowers has been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its reasoning in all respects, not just as
to its historical assumptions. See, e.g., C.Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution--A Firsthand Account 8184 (1991); R. Posner, Sex and Reason 341-350 (1992). The courts of five different States have declined to follow it in
interpreting provisions in their own state constitutions parallel to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002); Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24

(1998); Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App.
1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning
and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers
but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. See P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, 56
(Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988).
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to
engage in intimate, consensual conduct. See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12. The right the
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There
has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow
more legitimate or urgent.
The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the
stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Stare
decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to
the latest decision'") (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940))). In Casey we noted that when a Court is
asked to overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional liberty interest, individual or societal reliance on the
existence of that liberty cautions with particular strength against reversing course. 505 U.S., at 855-856; see also id.,
at 844 ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt"). The holding in Bowers, however, has not induced
detrimental reliance comparable to some instances where recognized individual rights are involved. Indeed, there has
been no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once
there are compelling reasons to do so. Bowersitself causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after its issuance
contradict its central holding.
The rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful analysis. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers JUSTICE
STEVENS came to these conclusions:
"Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a State
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second,
individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not
intended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons." 478 U.S.,
at 216 (footnotes and citations omitted).
JUSTICE STEVENS' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.
Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who
are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or
prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct
a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter." Casey, supra, at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They
did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5060
January 26, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or caused to
be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal
treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No.
1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30,
31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon
permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of
ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle
such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been
requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless such
animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for
food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him, and such record
shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly
know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is
issued and the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the record,
together with date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial treasurer,
who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner, together with date of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food at the
municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for
not less than one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained
in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in
a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large
cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is
urged that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor
the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2)
expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and
that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large
cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and examined apart
from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be
taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the
words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section
33; and the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting
merely the words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act,
and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter
construction is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the
recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides an
elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the
Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers
of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the
contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in possession, so as to
protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner
of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and
compulsory system of identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each
separate animal throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were
requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them

to be slaughtered, and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a
municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for
human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the
municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the
municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will readily
be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the brands and marks of
identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully
in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of
municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of
detection incident to the bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other
identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which
the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of
the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion,
therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the "killing for
food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition is clearly included in the
general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that
the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was expressly and specifically mentioned out of
superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the
municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local
ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same conclusion. One
of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for
agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. A construction which would limit the
prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving
unprohibited and unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the
purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it should be
rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction
which we have placed upon it, which tends to make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of
the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him
on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant
contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as
food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit "for
agricultural work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill
(Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the statute
constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the
compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But
whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications
understood, the language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where
the question involved was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying away by
any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that
the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just
and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as
would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit
condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and
interest of the community."
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao owners in
these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute; and that, without inquiring
what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts
from their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their
property, so that if the regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these
regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we are
satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in the
exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is no
more than "a just restrain of an injurious private use of the property, which the legislature had authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra)
was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the
right of eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be
so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of

their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social and conventional
rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and appropriate
private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition of
providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in
the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its boundaries or
prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a
"public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is
fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be determental to the public
welfare. And we think that an examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest
which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the
limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular provisions of the statute
under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and
"the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police power which every State possesses for the general public
welfare and which "reaches to every species of property within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had
threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy, eighty, and in
some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the principal
occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for
draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material
welfare of the country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of
the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many
millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the
arable rice lands of the country could easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The
drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of
the people, and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently
hopeless struggle for existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the immediate
needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the United States as a relief or
famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces where the need was most pressing,
and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands,
due in large measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural community
material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the work animals upon which
such a community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products of the
fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to increase the supply of these animals by
importation, but, as appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for the future depended largely on the
conservation of those animals which had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution
throughout the Islands where the need for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and applications of
preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved in some degree successful in
protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the gradual increase and redistribution of these
animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately
results in practically relieving those sections which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to five fold
or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted prove entirely successful,
the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall have more nearly
equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of
cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special law
penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by roving bands; and it must
be assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of
special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and
restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the
branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were
enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the
circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of
carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent
necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident
to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.

It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and records
of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the material welfare and future
prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept away the work
animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law under consideration, but that the very life and existence of
the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of
large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the
Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and
penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership
and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection
and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable
restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized
as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the
appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the
public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever
may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a
house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a
conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of
wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in
burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the
confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual
drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and
places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests
demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what
the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs.
Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of
the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;"
and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by
greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive
power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this
"general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no
question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are
concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may be exercised,
because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict with a similar exercise by
others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And there are other
cases where it becomes necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their
property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and
to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the interference or destruction. A
strong instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property of
individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other
great public calamity. Here the individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which
"knows no law." The establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages within which buildings
constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a
destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf
lines may also be established for the general good, even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building
out on soil which constitutes private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a
harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that effect
under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other persons. Such regulations are
only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the legislature have authority" to impose.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and
without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now become a public
nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds;
and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger
of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery purposes.

These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States clearly indicate
the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of the
statute in question being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine
Bill, which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law," a provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in
substance in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915
FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellees.
TRENT, J.:
The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies
from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described in
subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any sign,
signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or
may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance
of the preliminary injunction granted soon after the commencement of this action.
This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to two main questions; (1) that relating to the power of the
court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax complained of, and (2) that relating to the validity of those
provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, conferring power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to
remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a
nuisance.
The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the Government. The sections of Act
No. 2339, which bear directly upon the subject, are 139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the use of an injunction to
stay the collection of any internal revenue tax; the second provides a remedy for any wrong in connection with such
taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive, thereby precluding the remedy by injunction, which remedy is
claimed to be constitutional. The two sections, then, involve the right of a dissatisfied taxpayers to use an exceptional
remedy to test the validity of any tax or to determine any other question connected therewith, and the question
whether the remedy by injunction is exceptional.
Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual remedies. The origin and history of
the writ of injunction show that it has always been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as distinguished
from the common course of the law to redress evils after they have been consummated. No injunction issues as of
course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and when there is no adequate remedy at law. The Government
does, by section 139 and 140, take away the preventive remedy of injunction, if it ever existed, and leaves the
taxpayer, in a contest with it, the same ordinary remedial actions which prevail between citizen and citizen. The
Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, contends that there is no provisions of the paramount law which
prohibits such a course. While, on the other hand, counsel for plaintiffs urge that the two sections are unconstitutional
because (a) they attempt to deprive aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedy for the protection of their property,
thereby, in effect, depriving them of their property without due process of law, and (b) they attempt to diminish the
jurisdiction of the courts, as conferred upon them by Acts Nos. 136 and 190, which jurisdiction was ratified and
confirmed by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
In the first place, it has been suggested that section 139 does not apply to the tax in question because the
section, in speaking of a "tax," means only legal taxes; and that an illegal tax (the one complained of) is not a tax, and,
therefore, does not fall within the inhibition of the section, and may be restrained by injunction. There is no force in
this suggestion. The inhibition applies to all internal revenue taxes imposes, or authorized to be imposed, by Act No.
2339. (Snyder vs. Marks, 109 U.S., 189.) And, furthermore, the mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by virtue
of which it is imposed, is unconstitutional, does not authorize a court of equity to restrain its collection by injunction.
There must be a further showing that there are special circumstances which bring the case under some well
recognized head of equity jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or a cloud upon title to
real estate will result, and also that there is, as we have indicated, no adequate remedy at law. This is the settled law
in the United States, even in the absence of statutory enactments such as sections 139 and 140. (Hannewinkle vs.
Mayor, etc., of Georgetown, 82 U.S., 547; Indiana Mfg. Co. vs. Koehne, 188 U.S., 681; Ohio Tax cases, 232 U. S., 576,
587; Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. Co. vs. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S., 32; Shelton vs. Plat, 139 U.S., 591; State
Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., 575.) Therefore, this branch of the case must be controlled by sections 139 and 140,
unless the same be held unconstitutional, and consequently, null and void.
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the
constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty.
The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of
the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect
with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its
invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act
unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States,
the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be
irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body
by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt
the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. (6 Ruling Case Law, secs. 71, 72, and 73,
and cases cited therein.)
It is also the settled law in the United States that "due process of law" does not always require, in respect to
the Government, the same process that is required between citizens, though it generally implies and includes regular

allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some well settled course of judicial proceedings. The case
with which we are dealing is in point. A citizen's property, both real and personal, may be taken, and usually is taken,
by the government in payment of its taxes without any judicial proceedings whatever. In this country, as well as in the
United States, the officer charged with the collection of taxes is authorized to seize and sell the property of delinquent
taxpayers without applying to the courts for assistance, and the constitutionality of the law authorizing this procedure
never has been seriously questioned. (City of Philadelphia vs. [Diehl] The Collector, 5 Wall., 720; Nicholl vs. U.S., 7
Wall., 122, and cases cited.) This must necessarily be the course, because it is upon taxation that the Government
chiefly relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations, and it is of the utmost importance that the modes adopted
to enforce the collection of the taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little as possible. No
government could exist if every litigious man were permitted to delay the collection of its taxes. This principle of public
policy must be constantly borne in mind in determining cases such as the one under consideration.
With these principles to guide us, we will proceed to inquire whether there is any merit in the two propositions
insisted upon by counsel for the plaintiffs. Section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides: "That no law shall be enacted in said
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the law."
The origin and history of these provisions are well-known. They are found in substance in the Constitution of
the United States and in that of ever state in the Union.
Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, effective since 1867, provides that: "No suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court."
Section 139, with which we have been dealing, reads: "No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to
restrain the collection of any internal-revenue tax."
A comparison of these two sections show that they are essentially the same. Both expressly prohibit the
restraining of taxes by injunction. If the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly and definitely held that the
provisions of section 3224 do not violate the "due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" clauses in the
Constitution, we would be going too far to hold that section 139 violates those same provisions in the Philippine Bill.
That the Supreme Court of the United States has so held, cannot be doubted.
In Cheatham vs. United States (92 U.S., 85,89) which involved the validity of an income tax levied by an act of
Congress prior to the one in issue in the case of Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (157 U.S., 429) the court, through
Mr. Justice Miller, said: "If there existed in the courts, state or National, any general power of impeding or controlling
the collection of taxes, or relieving the hardship incident to taxation, the very existence of the government might be
placed in the power of a hostile judiciary. (Dows vs. The City of Chicago, 11 Wall., 108.) While a free course of
remonstrance and appeal is allowed within the departments before the money is finally exacted, the General
Government has wisely made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal revenue, a condition
precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom the tax is assessed. In the internal revenue branch it has
further prescribed that no such suit shall be brought until the remedy by appeal has been tried; and, if brought after
this, it must be within six months after the decision on the appeal. We regard this as a condition on which alone the
government consents to litigate the lawfulness of the original tax. It is not a hard condition. Few governments have
conceded such a right on any condition. If the compliance with this condition requires the party aggrieved to pay the
money, he must do it."
Again, in State Railroad Tax Cases (92 U.S., 575, 613), the court said: "That there might be no
misunderstanding of the universality of this principle, it was expressly enacted, in 1867, that "no suit for the purpose
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court." (Rev, Stat., sec. 3224.) And
though this was intended to apply alone to taxes levied by the United States, it shows the sense of Congress of the
evils to be feared if courts of justice could, in any case, interfere with the process of collecting taxes on which the
government depends for its continued existence. It is a wise policy. It is founded in the simple philosophy derived from
the experience of ages, that the payment of taxes has to be enforced by summary and stringent means against a
reluctant and often adverse sentiment; and to do this successfully, other instrumentalities and other modes of
procedure are necessary, than those which belong to courts of justice."
And again, in Snyder vs. Marks (109 U.S., 189), the court said: "The remedy of a suit to recover back the tax
after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden. The remedy so given is exclusive,
and no other remedy can be substituted for it. Such has been the current of decisions in the Circuit Courts of the
United States, and we are satisfied it is a correct view of the law."itc-a1f
In the consideration of the plaintiffs' second proposition, we will attempt to show (1) that the Philippine courts
never have had, since the American occupation, the power to restrain by injunction the collection of any tax imposed
by the Insular Government for its own purpose and benefit, and (2) that assuming that our courts had or have such
power, this power has not been diminished or curtailed by sections 139 and 140.
We will first review briefly the former and present systems of taxation. Upon the American occupation of the
Philippine, there was found a fairly complete system of taxation. This system was continued in force by the military
authorities, with but few changes, until the Civil Government assumed charge of the subject. The principal sources of
revenue under the Spanish regime were derived from customs receipts, the so-called industrial taxes, the urbana
taxes, the stamp tax, the personal cedula tax, and the sale of the public domain. The industrial and urbana taxes
constituted practically an income tax of some 5 per cent on the net income of persons engaged in industrial and
commercial pursuits and on the income of owners of improved city property. The sale of stamped paper and adhesive
stamp tax. The cedula tax was a graduated tax, ranging from nothing up to P37.50. The revenue derived from the sale
of the public domain was not considered a tax. The American authorities at once abolished the cedula tax, but later
restored it in a modified form, charging for each cedula twenty centavos, an amount which was supposed to be just
sufficient to cover the cost of issuance. The urbana tax was abolished by Act No. 223, effective September 6, 1901.

The "Municipal Code" (Act No. 82) and the Provincial Government Act (No. 83), both enacted in 1901, authorize
municipal councils and provincial boards to impose an ad valorem tax on real estate. The Municipal Code did not apply
to the city of Manila. This city was given a special charter (Act No. 183), effective August 30, 1901; Under this charter
the Municipal Board of Manila is authorized and empowered to impose taxes upon real estate and, like municipal
councils, to license and regulate certain occupations. Customs matters were completely reorganized by Act No. 355,
effective at the port of Manila on February 7, 1902, and at other ports in the Philippine Islands the day after the receipt
of a certified copy of the Act. The Internal Revenue Law of 1904 (Act No. 1189), repealed all existing laws, ordinances,
etc., imposing taxes upon the persons, objects, or occupations taxed under that act, and all industrial taxes and stamp
taxes imposed under the Spanish regime were eliminated, but the industrial tax was continued in force until January 1,
1905. This Internal Revenue Law did not take away from municipal councils, provincial boards, and the Municipal Board
of the city of Manila the power to impose taxes upon real estate. This Act (No. 1189), with its amendments, was
repealed by Act No. 2339, an act "revising and consolidating the laws relative to internal revenue."
Section 84 of Act No. 82 provides that "No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed
under this act until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against him, . . . ."
This inhibition was inserted in section 17 of Act No. 83 and applies to taxes imposed by provincial boards. The
inhibition was not inserted in the Manila Charter until the passage of Act No. 1793, effective October 12, 1907. Act No.
355 expressly makes the payment of the exactions claimed a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by
dissatisfied importers. Section 52 of Act No. 1189 provides "That no courts shall have authority to grant an injunction
restraining the collection of any taxes imposed by virtue of the provisions of this Act, but the remedy of the taxpayer
who claims that he is unjustly assessed or taxed shall be by payment under protest of the sum claimed from him by
the Collector of Internal Revenue and by action to recover back the sum claimed to have been illegally collected."
Sections 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339 contain, as we have indicated, the same prohibition and remedy. The
result is that the courts have been expressly forbidden, in every act creating or imposing taxes or imposts enacted by
the legislative body of the Philippines since the American occupation, to entertain any suit assailing the validity of any
tax or impost thus imposed until the tax shall have been paid under protest. The only taxes which have not been
brought within the express inhibition were those included in that part of the old Spanish system which completely
disappeared on or before January 1, 1905, and possibly the old customs duties which disappeared in February, 1902.
Section 56 of the Organic Act (No. 136), effective June 16, 1901, provides that "Courts of First Instance shall
have original jurisdiction:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. In all civil actions which involve the ... legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
7. Said courts and their judges, or any of them, shall have power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts, in the manner
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), effective October 1, 1901, which deals with the
subject of injunctions, are sections 162 to 172, inclusive. Injunctions, as here defined, are of two kinds; preliminary and
final. The former may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before final judgment, and
the latter at the termination of the trial as the relief or part of the relief prayed for (sec. 162). Any judge of the
Supreme Court may grant a preliminary injunction in any action pending in that court or in any Court of First Instance.
A preliminary injunction may also be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance in actions pending in his district
in which he has original jurisdiction (sec. 163). But such injunctions may be granted only when the complaint shows
facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded (sec. 166), and before a final or permanent injunction can be
granted, it must appear upon the trial of the action that the plaintiff is entitled to have commission or continuance of
the acts complained of perpetually restrained (sec. 171). These provisions authorize the institution in Courts of First
Instance of what are known as "injunction suits," the sole object of which is to obtain the issuance of a final injunction.
They also authorize the granting of injunctions as aiders in ordinary civil actions. We have defined in Davesa vs. Arbes
(13 Phil. Rep., 273), an injunction to be "A "special remedy" adopted in that code (Act 190) from American practice,
and originally borrowed from English legal procedure, which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a
court of equity, and limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is sought, to those cases where there is no "plain,
adequate, and complete remedy at law,"which will not be granted while the rights between the parties are
undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done,"which cannot be
compensated in damages . . .
By paragraph 2 of section 56 of Act No. 136, supra, and the provisions of the various subsequent Acts
heretofore mentioned, the Insular Government has consented to litigate with aggrieved persons the validity of any
original tax or impost imposed by it on condition that this be done in ordinary civil actions after the taxes or exactions
shall have been paid. But it is said that paragraph 2 confers original jurisdiction upon Courts of First Instance to hear
and determine "all civil actions" which involve the validity of any tax, impost or assessment, and that if the allinclusive words "all" and "any" be given their natural and unrestricted meaning, no action wherein that question is
involved can arise over which such courts do not have jurisdiction. (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44.) This is true.
But the term "civil actions" had its well defined meaning at the time the paragraph was enacted. The same legislative
body which enacted paragraph 2 on June 16, 1901, had, just a few months prior to that time, defined the only kind of
action in which the legality of any tax imposed by it might be assailed. (Sec. 84, Act 82, enacted January 31, 1901, and
sec. 17, Act No. 83, enacted February 6, 1901.) That kind of action being payment of the tax under protest and an
ordinary suit to recover and no other, there can be no doubt that Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over all such
actions. The subsequent legislation on the same subject shows clearly that the Commission, in enacting paragraph 2,
supra, did not intend to change or modify in any way section 84 of Act No. 82 and section 17 of Act No. 83, but, on the
contrary, it was intended that "civil actions," mentioned in said paragraph, should be understood to mean, in so far as

testing the legality of taxes were concerned, only those of the kind and character provided for in the two sections
above mentioned. It is also urged that the power to restrain by injunction the collection of taxes or imposts is conferred
upon Courts of First Instance by paragraph 7 of section 56, supra. This paragraph does empower those courts to grant
injunctions, both preliminary and final, in any civil action pending in their districts, provided always, that the complaint
shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded. Injunction suits, such as the one at bar, are "civil actions," but
of a special or extraordinary character. It cannot be said that the Commission intended to give a broader or different
meaning to the word "action," used in Chapter 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in connection with injunctions, than it
gave to the same word found in paragraph 2 of section 56 of the Organic Act. The Insular Government, in exercising
the power conferred upon it by the Congress of the United States, has declared that the citizens and residents of this
country shall pay certain specified taxes and imposts. The power to tax necessarily carries with it the power to collect
the taxes. This being true, the weight of authority supports the proposition that the Government may fix the conditions
upon which it will consent to litigate the validity of its original taxes. (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U.S., 69.)
We must, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 and 7 of section 56 of Act No. 136, construed in the light of the
prior and subsequent legislation to which we have referred, and the legislative and judicial history of the same subject
in the United States with which the Commission was familiar, do not empower Courts of firs Instance to interfere by
injunction with the collection of the taxes in question in this case.1awphil.net
If we are in error as to the scope of paragraph 2 and 7, supra, and the Commission did intend to confer the
power upon the courts to restrain the collection of taxes, it does not necessarily follow that this power or jurisdiction
has been taken away by section 139 of Act No. 2339, for the reason that all agree that an injunction will not issue in
any case if there is an adequate remedy at law. The very nature of the writ itself prevents its issuance under such
circumstances. Legislation forbidding the issuing of injunctions in such cases is unnecessary. So the only question to be
here determined is whether the remedy provided for in section 140 of Act No. 2339 is adequate. If it is, the writs which
form the basis of this appeal should not have been issued. If this is the correct view, the authority to issue injunctions
will not have been taken away by section 139, but rendered inoperative only by reason of an adequate remedy having
been made available.
The legislative body of the Philippine Islands has declared from the beginning (Act No. 82) that payment under
protest and suit to recover is an adequate remedy to test the legality of any tax or impost, and that this remedy is
exclusive. Can we say that the remedy is not adequate or that it is not exclusive, or both? The plaintiffs in the case at
bar are the first, in so far as we are aware, to question either the adequacy or exclusiveness of this remedy. We will
refer to a few cases in the United States where statutes similar to sections 139 and 140 have been construed and
applied.
In May, 1874, one Bloomstein presented a petition to the circuit court sitting in Nashville, Tennessee, stating
that his real and personal property had been assessed for state taxes in the year 1872 to the amount of $132.60; that
he tendered to the collector this amount in "funds receivable by law for such purposes;" and that the collector refused
to receive the same. He prayed for an alternative writ of mandamus to compel the collector to receive the bills in
payment for such taxes, or to show cause to the contrary. To this petition the collector, in his answer, set up the
defense that the petitioner's suit was expressly prohibited by the Act of the General Assembly of the State of
Tennessee, passed in 1873. The petition was dismissed and the relief prayed for refused. An appeal to the supreme
court of the State resulted in the affirmance of the judgment of the lower court. The case was then carried to the
Supreme Court of the United States (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U. S., 69), where the judgment was again affirmed.
The two sections of the Act of [March 21,] 1873, drawn in question in that cases, read as follows:
1. That in all cases in which an officer, charged by law with the collection of revenue due the State, shall
institute any proceeding, or take any steps for the collection of the same, alleged or claimed to be due by said officer
from any citizen, the party against whom the proceeding or step is taken shall, if he conceives the same to be unjust or
illegal, or against any statute or clause of the Constitution of the State, pay the same under protest; and, upon his
making said payment, the officer or collector shall pay such revenue into the State Treasury, giving notice at the time
of payment to the Comptroller that the same was paid under protest; and the party paying said revenue may, at any
time within thirty days after making said payment, and not longer thereafter, sue the said officer having collected said
sum, for the recovery thereof. And the same may be tried in any court having the jurisdiction of the amount and
parties; and, if it be determined that the same was wrongfully collected, as not being due from said party to the State,
for any reason going to the merits of the same, then the court trying the case may certify of record that the same was
wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded; and thereupon the Comptroller shall issue his warrant for the same, which
shall be paid in preference to other claims on the Treasury.
2. That there shall be no other remedy, in any case of the collection of revenue, or attempt to collect revenue
illegally, or attempt to collect revenue in funds only receivable by said officer under the law, the same being other or
different funds than such as the tax payer may tender, or claim the right to pay, than that above provided; and no writ
for the prevention of the collection of any revenue claimed, or to hinder or delay the collection of the same, shall in
anywise issue, either injunction, supersedeas, prohibition, or any other writ or process whatever; but in all cases in
which, for any reason, any person shall claim that the tax so collected was wrongfully or illegally collected, the remedy
for said party shall be as above provided, and in no other manner."
In discussing the adequacy of the remedy provided by the Tennessee Legislature, as above set forth, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the case just cited, said: "This remedy is simple and effective. A suit at law to
recover money unlawfully exacted is as speedy, as easily tried, and less complicated than a proceeding by mandamus.
... In revenue cases, whether arising upon its (United States) Internal Revenue Laws or those providing for the
collection of duties upon foreign imports, it (United States) adopts the rule prescribed by the State of Tennessee. It
requires the contestant to pay the amount as fixed by the Government, and gives him power to sue the collector, and
in such suit to test the legality of the tax. There is nothing illegal or even harsh in this. It is a wise and reasonable
precaution for the security of the Government."

Thomas C. Platt commenced an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Tennessee to restrain the collection of a license tax from the company which he represented. The defense was that
sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, supra, prohibited the bringing of that suit. This case also reached the Supreme
Court of the United States. (Shelton vs. Platt, 139 U. 591.) In speaking of the inhibitory provisions of sections 1 and 2 of
the Act of 1873, the court said: "This Act has been sanctioned and applied by the Courts of Tennessee. (Nashville
vs.Smith, 86 Tenn., 213; Louisville & N. R. Co. vs. State, 8 Heisk., 663, 804.) It is, as counsel observe, similar to the Act
of Congress forbidding suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes under the Internal
Revenue Laws, in respect to which this court held that the remedy by suit to recover back the tax after payment,
provided for by the Statute, was exclusive. (Snyder vs. Marks, of this character has been called for by the
embarrassments resulting from the improvident employment of the writ of injunction in arresting the collection of the
public revenue; and, even in its absence, the strong arm of the court of chancery ought not to be interposed in that
direction except where resort to that court is grounded upon the settled principles which govern its jurisdiction."
In Louisville & N.R. Co. vs. State (8 Heisk. [64 Tenn.], 663, 804), cited by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Shelton vs. Platt, supra, the court said: "It was urged that this statute (sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873,
supra) is unconstitutional and void, as it deprives the citizen of the remedy by certiorari, guaranteed by the organic
law."
By the 10th section of the sixth article of the Constitution, [Tennessee] it is provided that: "The judges or
justices of inferior courts of law and equity shall have power in all civil cases to issue writs of certiorari, to remove any
cause, or the transcript of the record thereof, from any inferior jurisdiction into such court of law, on sufficient cause,
supported by oath or affirmation."
The court held the act valid as not being in conflict with these provisions of the State constitution.
In Eddy vs. The Township of Lee (73 Mich., 123), the complainants sought to enjoin the collection of certain
taxes for the year 1886. The defendants, in support of their demurrer, insisted that the remedy by injunction had been
taken away by section 107 of the Act of 1885, which section reads as follows: "No injunction shall issue to stay
proceedings for the assessment or collection of taxes under this Act."
It was claimed by the complainants that the above quoted provisions of the Act of 1885 were unconstitutional
and void as being in conflict with article 6, sec. 8, of the Constitution, which provides that: "The circuit courts shall
have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by
law. ... They shall also have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and
other writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees."
Mr. Justice Champlin, speaking for the court, said: "I have no doubt that the Legislature has the constitutional
authority, where it has provided a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law to recover back taxes illegally
assessed and collected, to take away the remedy by injunction to restrain their collection."
Section 9 of the Philippine Bill reads in part as follows: "That the Supreme Court and the Courts of First
Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said
Government to change the practice and method of procedure."
It will be seen that this section has not taken away from the Philippine Government the power to change the
practice and method of procedure. If sections 139 and 140, considered together, and this must always be done, are
nothing more than a mode of procedure, then it would seem that the Legislature did not exceed its constitutional
authority in enacting them. Conceding for the moment that the duly authorized procedure for the determination of the
validity of any tax, impost, or assessment was by injunction suits and that this method was available to aggrieved
taxpayers prior to the passage of Act No. 2339, may the Legislature change this method of procedure? That the
Legislature has the power to do this, there can be no doubt, provided some other adequate remedy is substituted in
lieu thereof. In speaking of the modes of enforcing rights created by contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Tennessee vs. Sneed, supra, said: "The rule seems to be that in modes of proceedings and of forms to enforce the
contract the Legislature has the control, and may enlarge, limit or alter them, provided that it does not deny a remedy,
or so embarrass it with conditions and restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right."
In that case the petitioner urged that the Acts of 1873 were laws impairing the obligation of the contract
contained in the charter of the Bank of Tennessee, which contract was entered into with the State in 1838. It was
claimed that this was done by placing such impediments and obstructions in the way of its enforcement, thereby so
impairing the remedies as practically to render the obligation of no value. In disposing of this contention, the court
said: "If we assume that prior to 1873 the relator had authority to prosecute his claim against the State by mandamus,
and that by the statutes of that year the further use of that form was prohibited to him, the question remains. whether
an effectual remedy was left to him or provided for him. We think the regulation of the statute gave him an abundant
means of enforcing such right as he possessed. It provided that he might pay his claim to the collector under protest,
giving notice thereof to the Comptroller of the Treasury; that at any time within thirty days thereafter he might sue the
officer making the collection; that the case should be tried by any court having jurisdiction and, if found in favor of the
plaintiff on the merits, the court should certify that the same was wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded and the
Comptroller should thereupon issue his warrant therefor, which should be paid in preference to other claim on the
Treasury."
But great stress is laid upon the fact that the plaintiffs in the case under consideration are unable to pay the
taxes assessed against them and that if the law is enforced, they will be compelled to suspend business. This point
may be best answered by quoting from the case of Youngblood vs. Sexton (32 Mich., 406), wherein Judge Cooley,
speaking for the court, said: "But if this consideration is sufficient to justify the transfer of a controversy from a court of
law to a court of equity, then every controversy where money is demanded may be made the subject of equitable
cognizance. To enforce against a dealer a promissory note may in some cases as effectually break up his business as

to collect from him a tax of equal amount. This is not what is known to the law as irreparable injury. The courts have
never recognized the consequences of the mere enforcement of a money demand as falling within that category."
Certain specified sections of Act No. 2339 were amended by Act No. 2432, enacted December 23, 1914,
effective January 1, 1915, by imposing increased and additional taxes. Act No. 2432 was amended, were ratified by the
Congress of the United States on March 4, 1915. The opposition manifested against the taxes imposed by Acts Nos.
2339 and 2432 is a matter of local history. A great many business men thought the taxes thus imposed were too high.
If the collection of the new taxes on signs, signboards, and billboards may be restrained, we see no well-founded
reason why injunctions cannot be granted restraining the collection of all or at least a number of the other increased
taxes. The fact that this may be done, shows the wisdom of the Legislature in denying the use of the writ of injunction
to restrain the collection of any tax imposed by the Acts. When this was done, an equitable remedy was made
available to all dissatisfied taxpayers.
The question now arises whether, the case being one of which the court below had no jurisdiction, this court,
on appeal, shall proceed to express an opinion upon the validity of provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act
No. 2339, imposing the taxes complained of. As a general rule, an opinion on the merits of a controversy ought to be
declined when the court is powerless to give the relief demanded. But it is claimed that this case is, in many
particulars, exceptional. It is true that it has been argued on the merits, and there is no reason for any suggestion or
suspicion that it is not a bona fide controversy. The legal points involved in the merits have been presented with force,
clearness, and great ability by the learned counsel of both sides. If the law assailed were still in force, we would feel
that an opinion on its validity would be justifiable, but, as the amendment became effective on January 1, 1915, we
think it advisable to proceed no further with this branch of the case.
The next question arises in connection with the supplementary complaint, the object of which is to enjoin the
Collector of Internal Revenue from removing certain billboards, the property of the plaintiffs located upon private lands
in the Province of Rizal. The plaintiffs allege that the billboards here in question "in no sense constitute a nuisance and
are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons." The defendant
denies these allegations in his answer and claims that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British
and German Consuls, he "decided that the billboard complained of was and still is offensive to the sight, and is
otherwise a nuisance." The plaintiffs proved by Mr. Churchill that the "billboards were quite a distance from the road
and that they were strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter
which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community." The defendant presented no testimony upon
this point. In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned
were and still are offensive to the sight."
The pertinent provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339 read: "If after due investigation the
Collector of Internal Revenue shall decide that any sign, signboard, or billboard displayed or exposed to public view is
offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance, he may by summary order direct the removal of such sign, signboard,
or billboard, and if same is not removed within ten days after he has issued such order he my himself cause its
removal, and the sign, signboard, or billboard shall thereupon be forfeited to the Government, and the owner thereof
charged with the expenses of the removal so effected. When the sign, signboard, or billboard ordered to be removed
as herein provided shall not comply with the provisions of the general regulations of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
no rebate or refund shall be allowed for any portion of a year for which the tax may have been paid. Otherwise, the
Collector of Internal Revenue may in his discretion make a proportionate refund of the tax for the portion of the year
remaining for which the taxes were paid. An appeal may be had from the order of the Collector of Internal Revenue to
the Secretary of Finance and Justice whose decision thereon shall be final."
The Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, says: "The question which the case presents under this head
for determination, resolves itself into this inquiry: Is the suppression of advertising signs displayed or exposed to public
view, which are admittedly offensive to the sight, conducive to the public interest?"
And cunsel for the plaintiffs states the question thus: "We contend that that portion of section 100 of Act No.
2339, empowering the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if objectionable to the sight, is
unconstitutional, as constituting a deprivation of property without due process of law."
From the position taken by counsel for both sides, it is clear that our inquiry is limited to the question whether
the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government; for all
property is held subject to that power.
As a consequence of the foregoing, all discussion and authorities cited, which go to the power of the state to
authorize administrative officers to find, as a fact, that legitimate trades, callings, and businesses are, under certain
circumstances, statutory nuisances, and whether the procedure prescribed for this purpose is due process of law, are
foreign to the issue here presented.
There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at
the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly
foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would,
without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the
public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own views
for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature. In Munn vs. Illinois (94 U.S., 113), the United States
Supreme Court states the rule thus: "If no state of circumstances could exist to justify such statute, then we may
declare this one void because in excess of the legislative power of this state; but if it could, we must presume it did. Of
the propriety of legislative interference, within the scope of the legislative power, a legislature is the exclusive judge."
This rule very fully discussed and declared in Powell vs. Pennsylvania (127 U.S., 678) "oleo-margarine" case.
(See also Crowley vs. Christensen, 137 U.S., 86, 87; Camfield vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 518.) While the state may interfere
wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature

to determine, not only what the interest of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of
such interests; yet, its determination in these matters is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
courts. (Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U.S., 133.) Can it be said judicially that signs, signboards, and billboards, which are
admittedly offensive to the sight, are not with the category of things which interfere with the public safety, welfare,
and comfort, and therefore beyond the reach of the police power of the Philippine Government?
The numerous attempts which have been made to limit by definition the scope of the police power are only
interesting as illustrating its rapid extension within comparatively recent years to points heretofore deemed entirely
within the field of private liberty and property rights. Blackstone's definition of the police power was as follows: "The
due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well
governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neigborhood, and good
manners, to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." (Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 162.)
Chanceller Kent considered the police power the authority of the state "to regulate unwholesome trades,
slaughter houses, operations offensive to the senses." Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts defined it as follows: "The
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." (Com. vs. Alger, 7
Cush., 53.)
In the case of Butchers' Union Slaughter-house, etc. Co. vs. Crescent City Live Stock Landing, etc. Co. (111
U.S., 746), it was suggested that the public health and public morals are matters of legislative concern of which the
legislature cannot divest itself. (See State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash., 581, where these definitions are
collated.)
In Champer vs. Greencastle (138 Ind., 339), it was said: "The police power of the State, so far, has not received
a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe
regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do
not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law." (Quoted with approval in Hopkins vs. Richmond [Va., 1915], 86
S.E., 139.)
In Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. ([1911] 232 Pa., 141), it was said: "The police power of the state is difficult of
definition, but it has been held by the courts to be the right to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health,
protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which does not encroach on a like power vested in
congress or state legislatures by the federal constitution, or does not violate the provisions of the organic law; and it
has been expressly held that the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution was not designed to interfere with
the exercise of that power by the state."
In People vs. Brazee ([Mich., 1914], 149 N.W., 1053), it was said: "It [the police power] has for its object the
improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring
about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed
limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as
varying social conditions demand correction."
In 8 Cyc., 863, it is said: "Police power is the name given to that inherent sovereignty which it is the right and
duty of the government or its agents to exercise whenever public policy, in a broad sense, demands, for the benefit of
society at large, regulations to guard its morals, safety, health, order or to insure in any respect such economic
conditions as an advancing civilization of a high complex character requires." (As quoted with approval in Stettler
vs.O'Hara [1914], 69 Ore, 519.)
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has said in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U.S. [1911], 575:
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid
of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly
and immediately necessary to the public welfare."
This statement, recent as it is, has been quoted with approval by several courts. (Cunningham vs.
Northwestern Imp. Co. [1911], 44 Mont., 180; State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash., 581; McDavid vs. Bank
of Bay Minette [Ala., 1915], 69 Sou., 452; Hopkins vs. City of Richmond [Va., 1915], 86 S.E., 139; State vs. Philipps
[Miss. 1915], 67 Sou., 651.)
It was said in Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 85), per Shaw, C.J., that: "It is much easier to perceive and realize
the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise." In
Stone vs. Mississippi (101 U.S., 814), it was said: "Many attempts have been made in this court and elsewhere to
define the police power, but never with entire success. It is always easier to determine whether a particular case
comes within the general scope of the power, than to give an abstract definition of the power itself, which will be in all
respects accurate."
Other courts have held the same vow of efforts to evolve a satisfactory definition of the police power.
Manifestly, definitions which fail to anticipate cases properly within the scope of the police power are deficient. It is
necessary, therefore, to confine our discussion to the principle involved and determine whether the cases as they
come up are within that principle. The basic idea of civil polity in the United States is that government should interfere
with individual effort only to the extent necessary to preserve a healthy social and economic condition of the country.
State interference with the use of private property may be exercised in three ways. First, through the power of
taxation, second, through the power of eminent domain, and third, through the police power. Buy the first method it is
assumed that the individual receives the equivalent of the tax in the form of protection and benefit he receives from
the government as such. By the second method he receives the market value of the property taken from him. But
under the third method the benefits he derived are only such as may arise from the maintenance of a healthy
economic standard of society and is often referred to as damnum absque injuria. (Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. 232 Pa.,
141; Bemis vs. Guirl Drainage Co., 182 Ind., 36.) There was a time when state interference with the use of private

property under the guise of the police power was practically confined to the suppression of common nuisances. At the
present day, however, industry is organized along lines which make it possible for large combinations of capital to
profit at the expense of the socio-economic progress of the nation by controlling prices and dictating to industrial
workers wages and conditions of labor. Not only this but the universal use of mechanical contrivances by producers
and common carriers has enormously increased the toll of human life and limb in the production and distribution of
consumption goods. To the extent that these businesses affect not only the public health, safety, and morals, but also
the general social and economic life of the nation, it has been and will continue to be necessary for the state to
interfere by regulation. By so doing, it is true that the enjoyment of private property is interfered with in no small
degree and in ways that would have been considered entirely unnecessary in years gone by. The regulation of rates
charged by common carriers, for instance, or the limitation of hours of work in industrial establishments have only a
very indirect bearing upon the public health, safety, and morals, but do bear directly upon social and economic
conditions. To permit each individual unit of society to feel that his industry will bring a fair return; to see that his work
shall be done under conditions that will not either immediately or eventually ruin his health; to prevent the artificial
inflation of prices of the things which are necessary for his physical well being are matters which the individual is no
longer capable of attending to himself. It is within the province of the police power to render assistance to the people
to the extent that may be necessary to safeguard these rights. Hence, laws providing for the regulation of wages and
hours of labor of coal miners (Rail & River Coal Co. vs. Taylor, 234 U.S., 224); requiring payment of employees of
railroads and other industrial concerns in legal tender and requiring salaries to be paid semimonthly (Erie R.R. Co. vs.
Williams, 233 U.S., 685); providing a maximum number of hours of labor for women (Miller vs. Wilson, U.S. Sup. Ct.
[Feb. 23, 1915], Adv. Opns., p. 342); prohibiting child labor (Sturges & Burn vs. Beauchamp, 231 U.S., 320); restricting
the hours of labor in public laundries (In re Wong Wing, 167 Cal., 109); limiting hours of labor in industrial
establishment generally (State vs. Bunting, 71 Ore., 259); Sunday Closing Laws (State vs. Nicholls [Ore., 1915], 151
Pac., 473; People vs. C. Klinck Packing Co. [N.Y., 1915], 108 N. E., 278; Hiller vs. State [Md., 1914], 92 Atl., 842; State
vs. Penny, 42 Mont., 118; City of Springfield vs. Richter, 257 Ill., 578, 580; State vs. Hondros [S.C., 1915], 84 S.E., 781);
have all been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. Again, workmen's compensation laws have been quite
generally upheld. These statutes discard the common law theory that employers are not liable for industrial accidents
and make them responsible for all accidents resulting from trade risks, it being considered that such accidents are a
legitimate charge against production and that the employer by controlling the prices of his product may shift the
burden to the community. Laws requiring state banks to join in establishing a depositors' guarantee fund have also
been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U. S., 104), and Assaria State Bank vs.
Dolley (219 U.S., 121).
Offensive noises and smells have been for a long time considered susceptible of suppression in thickly
populated districts. Barring livery stables from such locations was approved of in Reinman vs. Little Rock (U.S. Sup. Ct.
[Apr. 5, 1915], U.S. Adv. Opns., p. 511). And a municipal ordinance was recently upheld (People vs. Ericsson, 263 Ill.,
368), which prohibited the location of garages within two hundred feet of any hospital, church, or school, or in any
block used exclusively for residential purposes, unless the consent of the majority of the property owners be obtained.
Such statutes as these are usually upheld on the theory of safeguarding the public health. But we apprehend that in
point of fact they have little bearing upon the health of the normal person, but a great deal to do with his physical
comfort and convenience and not a little to do with his peace of mind. Without entering into the realm of psychology,
we think it quite demonstrable that sight is as valuable to a human being as any of his other senses, and that the
proper ministration to this sense conduces as much to his contentment as the care bestowed upon the senses of
hearing or smell, and probably as much as both together. Objects may be offensive to the eye as well as to the nose or
ear. Man's esthetic feelings are constantly being appealed to through his sense of sight. Large investments have been
made in theaters and other forms of amusement, in paintings and spectacular displays, the success of which depends
in great part upon the appeal made through the sense of sight. Moving picture shows could not possible without the
sense of sight. Governments have spent millions on parks and boulevards and other forms of civic beauty, the first aim
of which is to appeal to the sense of sight. Why, then, should the Government not interpose to protect from annoyance
this most valuable of man's senses as readily as to protect him from offensive noises and smells?
The advertising industry is a legitimate one. It is at the same time a cause and an effect of the great industrial
age through which the world is now passing. Millions are spent each year in this manner to guide the consumer to the
articles which he needs. The sense of sight is the primary essential to advertising success. Billboard advertising, as it is
now conducted, is a comparatively recent form of advertising. It is conducted out of doors and along the arteries of
travel, and compels attention by the strategic locations of the boards, which obstruct the range of vision at points
where travelers are most likely to direct their eyes. Beautiful landscapes are marred or may not be seen at all by the
traveler because of the gaudy array of posters announcing a particular kind of breakfast food, or underwear, the
coming of a circus, an incomparable soap, nostrums or medicines for the curing of all the ills to which the flesh is heir,
etc. It is quite natural for people to protest against this indiscriminate and wholesale use of the landscape by
advertisers and the intrusion of tradesmen upon their hours of leisure and relaxation from work. Outdoor life must lose
much of its charm and pleasure if this form of advertising is permitted to continue unhampered until it converts the
streets and highways into veritable canyons through which the world must travel in going to work or in search of
outdoor pleasure.
The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon the use of private property as it does upon the
use of the channels of travel used by the general public. Suppose that the owner of private property, who so vigorously
objects to the restriction of this form of advertising, should require the advertiser to paste his posters upon the
billboards so that they would face the interior of the property instead of the exterior. Billboard advertising would die a
natural death if this were done, and its real dependency not upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the
unrestricted use of the public highways is at once apparent. Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole
value of the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence, we conceive that the regulation of billboards

and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the use of the streets and
other public thoroughfares.
We would not be understood as saying that billboard advertising is not a legitimate business any more than we
would say that a livery stable or an automobile garage is not. Even a billboard is more sightly than piles of rubbish or
an open sewer. But all these businesses are offensive to the senses under certain conditions.
It has been urged against ministering to the sense of sight that tastes are so diversified that there is no safe
standard of legislation in this direction. We answer in the language of the Supreme Court in Noble State Bank
vs.Haskell (219 U.S., 104), and which has already been adopted by several state courts (see supra), that "the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderating opinion" demands such legislation. The agitation against the
unrestrained development of the billboard business has produced results in nearly all the countries of Europe. (Ency.
Britannica, vol. 1, pp. 237-240.) Many drastic ordinances and state laws have been passed in the United States seeking
to make the business amenable to regulation. But their regulation in the United states is hampered by what we
conceive an unwarranted restriction upon the scope of the police power by the courts. If the police power may be
exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of
the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the
police power. A source of annoyance and irritation to the public does not minister to the comfort and convenience of
the public. And we are of the opinion that the prevailing sentiment is manifestly against the erection of billboards
which are offensive to the sight.
We do not consider that we are in conflict with the decision in Eubank vs. Richmond (226 U.S., 137), where a
municipal ordinance establishing a building line to which property owners must conform was held unconstitutional. As
we have pointed out, billboard advertising is not so much a use of private property as it is a use of the public
thoroughfares. It derives its value to the power solely because the posters are exposed to the public gaze. It may well
be that the state may not require private property owners to conform to a building line, but may prescribe the
conditions under which they shall make use of the adjoining streets and highways. Nor is the law in question to be held
invalid as denying equal protection of the laws. In Keokee Coke Co. vs. Taylor (234 U.S., 224), it was said: "It is more
pressed that the act discriminates unconstitutionally against certain classes. But while there are differences of opinion
as to the degree and kind of discrimination permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is established by repeated
decisions that a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be
most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up and enumerating other instances to which it might have been applied
equally well, so far as the court can see. That is for the legislature to judge unless the case is very clear."
But we have not overlooked the fact that we are not in harmony with the highest courts of a number of the
states in the American Union upon this point. Those courts being of the opinion that statutes which are prompted and
inspired by esthetic considerations merely, having for their sole purpose the promotion and gratification of the esthetic
sense, and not the promotion or protection of the public safety, the public peace and good order of society, must be
held invalid and contrary to constitutional provisions holding inviolate the rights of private property. Or, in other words,
the police power cannot interfere with private property rights for purely esthetic purposes. The courts, taking this view,
rest their decisions upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is disassociated entirely from any relation to the public
health, morals, comfort, or general welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of the state. But we are of the
opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to
the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but
carrying a well recognized principle to further application. (Fruend on Police Power, p. 166.)
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed upon the
merits, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR A REHEARING, JANUARY 24, 1916.
TRENT, J.:
Counsel for the plaintiffs call our attention to the case of Ex parte Young (209 U.S., 123); and say that they are
of the opinion that this case "is the absolutely determinative of the question of jurisdiction in injunctions of this kind."
We did not refer to this case in our former opinion because we were satisfied that the reasoning of the case is not
applicable to section 100 (b), 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339. The principles announced in the Young case are stated as
follows: "It may therefore be said that when the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment
so severe as to intimidate the company and its officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the
legislation, the result is the same as if the law in terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of
laws which deeply affect its rights.
It is urged that there is no principle upon which to base the claim that a person is entitled to disobey a statute
at least once, for the purpose of testing its validity without subjecting himself to the penalties for disobedience
provided by the statute in case it is valid. This is not an accurate statement of the case. Ordinarily a law creating
offenses in the nature of misdemeanors or felonies relates to a subject over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is
complete in any event. In these case, however, of the establishment of certain rates without any hearing, the validity
of such rates necessarily depends upon whether they are high enough to permit at least some return upon the
investment (how much it is not now necessary to state), and an inquiry as to that fact is a proper subject of judicial
investigation. If it turns out that the rates are too low for that purpose, then they are illegal. Now, to impose upon a
party interested the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of such a question (no prior hearing having ever been
given) only upon the condition that, if unsuccessful, he must suffer imprisonment and pay fines as provided in these
acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts, and thus prevent any hearing upon the question whether
the rates as provided by the acts are not too low, and therefore invalid. The distinction is obvious between a case
where the validity of the acts depends upon the existence of a fact which can be determined only after investigation of

a very complicated and technical character, and the ordinary case of a statute upon a subject requiring no such
investigation and over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event.
An examination of the sections of our Internal Revenue Law and of the circumstances under which and the
purposes for which they were enacted, will show that, unlike the statutes under consideration in the above cited case,
their enactment involved no attempt on the part of the Legislature to prevent dissatisfied taxpayers "from resorting to
the courts to test the validity of the legislation;" no effort to prevent any inquiry as to their validity. While section 139
does prevent the testing of the validity of subsection (b) of section 100 in injunction suits instituted for the purpose of
restraining the collection of internal revenue taxes, section 140 provides a complete remedy for that purpose. And
furthermore, the validity of subsection (b) does not depend upon "the existence of a fact which can be determined only
after investigation of a very complicated and technical character," but the jurisdiction of the Legislature over the
subject with which the subsection deals "is complete in any event." The judgment of the court in the Young case rests
upon the proposition that the aggrieved parties had no adequate remedy at law.
Neither did we overlook the case of General Oil Co. vs. Crain (209 U.S., 211), decided the same day and citing
Ex parte Young, supra. In that case the plaintiff was a Tennessee corporation, with its principal place of business in
Memphis, Tennessee. It was engaged in the manufacture and sale of coal oil, etc. Its wells and plant were located in
Pennsylvania and Ohio. Memphis was not only its place of business, at which place it sold oil to the residents of
Tennessee, but also a distributing point to which oils were shipped from Pennsylvania and Ohio and unloaded into
various tanks for the purpose of being forwarded to the Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi customers.
Notwithstanding the fact that the company separated its oils, which were designated to meet the requirements of the
orders from those States, from the oils for sale in Tennessee, the defendant insisted that he had a right, under the Act
of the Tennessee Legislature, approved April 21, 1899, to inspect all the oils unlocated in Memphis, whether for sale in
that State or not, and charge and collect for such inspection a regular fee of twenty-five cents per barrel. The
company, being advised that the defendant had no such right, instituted this action in the inferior States court for the
purpose of enjoining the defendant, upon the grounds stated in the bill, from inspecting or attempting to inspect its
oils. Upon trial, the preliminary injunction which had been granted at the commencement of the action, was continued
in force. Upon appeal, the supreme court of the State of Tennessee decided that the suit was one against the State and
reversed the judgment of the Chancellor. In the Supreme Court of the United States, where the case was reviewed
upon a writ of error, the contentions of the parties were stated by the court as follows: "It is contended by defendant in
error that this court is without jurisdiction because no matter sought to be litigated by plaintiff in error was determined
by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The court simply held, it is paid, that, under the laws of the State, it had no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit for any purpose. And it is insisted "hat this holding involved no Federal question, but
only the powers and jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Tennessee, in respect to which the Supreme Court of
Tennessee is the final arbiter."
Opposing these contentions, plaintiff in error urges that whether a suit is one against a State cannot depend
upon the declaration of a statute, but depends upon the essential nature ofthe suit, and that the Supreme Court
recognized that the statute "aded nothing to the axiomatic principle that the State, as a sovereign, is not subject to
suit save by its own consent."And it is hence insisted that the court by dismissing the bill gave effect to the law which
was attacked. It is further insisted that the bill undoubtedly present rights under the Constitution of the United States
and conditions which entitle plaintiff in error to an injunction for the protection of such rights, and that a statute of the
State which operates to deny such rights, or such relief, `is itself in conflict with the Constitution of the United States."
That statute of Tennessee, which the supreme court of that State construed and held to be prohibitory of the
suit, was an act passed February 28, 1873, which provides: "That no court in the State of Tennessee has, nor shall
hereafter have, any power, jurisdiction, or authority to entertain any suit against the State, or any officer acting by the
authority of the State, with a view to reach the State, its treasury, funds or property; and all such suits now pending, or
hereafter brought, shall be dismissed as to the State, or such officer, on motion, plea or demurrer of the law officer of
the State, or counsel employed by the State."
The Supreme Court of the United States, after reviewing many cases, said: "Necessarily, to give adequate
protection to constitutional rights a distinction must be made between valid and invalid state laws, as determining the
character of the suit against state officers. And the suit at bar illustrates the necessity. If a suit against state officer is
precluded in the national courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to
its courts, as it is contended in the case at bar that it may be, without power of review by this court, it must be evident
that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution; and the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of its operation. ... It being then the right
of a party to be protected against a law which violates a constitutional right, whether by its terms or the manner of its
enforcement, it is manifest that a decision which denies such protection gives effect to the law, and the decision is
reviewable by this court."
The court then proceeded to consider whether the law of 1899 would, if administered against the oils in
question, violate any constitutional right of the plaintiff and after finding and adjudging that the oils were not in
movement through the States, that they had reached the destination of their first shipment, and were held there, not
in necessary delay at means of transportation but for the business purposes and profit of the company, and resting its
judgment upon the taxing power of the State, affirmed the decree of the supreme court of the State of Tennessee.
From the foregoing it will be seen that the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed the case for want of
jurisdiction because the suit was one against the State, which was prohibited by the Tennessee Legislature. The
Supreme Court of the United States took jurisdiction of the controversy for the reasons above quoted and sustained
the Act of 1899 as a revenue law.
The case of Tennessee vs. Sneed (96 U.S., 69), and Shelton vs. Platt (139 U.S., 591), relied upon in our former
opinion, were not cited in General Oil Co. vs. Crain, supra, because the questions presented and the statutes under
consideration were entirely different. The Act approved March 31, 1873, expressly prohibits the courts from restraining

the collection of any tax, leaving the dissatisfied taxpayer to his exclusive remedy payment under protest and suit
to recover while the Act approved February 28, 1873, prohibits suits against the State.
In upholding the statute which authorizes the removal of signboards or billboards upon the sole ground that
they are offensive to the sight, we recognized the fact that we are not in harmony with various state courts in the
American Union. We have just examined the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois in the recent case
(October [December], 1914) of Thomas Cusack Co. vs. City of Chicago (267 Ill., 344), wherein the court upheld the
validity of a municipal ordinances, which reads as follows: "707. Frontage consents required. It shall be unlawful for
any person, firm or corporation to erect or construct any bill-board or sign-board in any block on any public street in
which one-half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for residence purposes, without first
obtaining the consent, in writing, of the owners or duly authorized agents of said owners owning a majority of the
frontage of the property, on both sides of the street, in the block in which such bill-board or sign-board is to be erected,
constructed or located. Such written consent shall be filed with the commissioner of buildings before a permit shall be
issued for the erection, construction or location of such bill-board or sign-board."
The evidence which the Illinois court relied upon was the danger of fires, the fact that billboards promote the
commission of various immoral and filthy acts by disorderly persons, and the inadequate police protection furnished to
residential districts. The last objection has no virtue unless one or the other of the other objections are valid. If the
billboard industry does, in fact, promote such municipal evils to noticeable extent, it seems a curious inconsistency
that a majority of the property owners on a given block may legalize the business. However, the decision is
undoubtedly a considerable advance over the views taken by other high courts in the United States and distinguishes
several Illinois decisions. It is an advance because it permits the suppression of billboards where they are undesirable.
The ordinance which the court approved will no doubt cause the virtual suppression of the business in the residential
districts. Hence, it is recognized that under certain circumstances billboards may be suppressed as an unlawful use of
private property. Logically, it would seem that the premise of fact relied upon is not very solid. Objections to the
billboard upon police, sanitary, and moral grounds have been, as pointed out by counsel for Churchill and Tait, duly
considered by numerous high courts in the United States, and, with one exception, have been rejected as without
foundation. The exception is the Supreme Court of Missouri, which advances practically the same line of reasoning as
has the Illinois court in this recent case. (St. Louis Gunning Advt. Co. vs. City of St. Louis, 137 S. W., 929.) In fact, the
Illinois court, in Haller Sign Works vs. Physical Culture Training School (249 Ill., 436), "distinguished" in the recent case,
said: "There is nothing inherently dangerous to the health or safety of the public in structures that are properly erected
for advertising purposes."
If a billboard is so constructed as to offer no room for objections on sanitary or moral grounds, it would seem
that the ordinance above quoted would have to be sustained upon the very grounds which we have advanced in
sustaining our own statute.
It might be well to note that billboard legislation in the United States is attempting to eradicate a business
which has already been firmly established. This business was allowed to expand unchecked until its very extent called
attention to its objectionable features. In the Philippine Islands such legislation has almost anticipated the business,
which is not yet of such proportions that it can be said to be fairly established. It may be that the courts in the United
States have committed themselves to a course of decisions with respect to billboard advertising, the full consequences
of which were not perceived for the reason that the development of the business has been so recent that the
objectionable features of it did not present themselves clearly to the courts nor to the people. We, in this country, have
the benefit of the experience of the people of the United States and may make our legislation preventive rather than
corrective. There are in this country, moreover, on every hand in those districts where Spanish civilization has held
sway for so many centuries, examples of architecture now belonging to a past age, and which are attractive not only
to the residents of the country but to visitors. If the billboard industry is permitted without constraint or control to hide
these historic sites from the passerby, the country will be less attractive to the tourist and the people will suffer a
district economic loss.
The motion for a rehearing is therefore denied.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent problems of the people.
But even when government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of
law. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private
road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not
be achieved at the expense of the rule of law. h Y
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of
Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December
22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice
reads: Court
"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic
"Dear President Lindo,
"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires
the Authority to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons,
Neptune Street shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996.
"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points of entry and exit on said street.
"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be extended by your association to the
MMDA personnel who will be directing traffic in the area.
"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of the President on the matter.
"Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman"[1]
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the
adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.Sppedsc
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136,
Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter
wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction.[2]
Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted
an ocular inspection of Neptune Street[3] and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the implementation of the MMDAs proposed action.[4]
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA
has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed of
as follows: Jurissc
"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001,
is SET ASIDE and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
"For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del Rosario in contempt is denied.[5]
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."[6]
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998. Hence, this recourse. Jksm
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
"I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO
PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF
SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF
THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET? Jlexj
IV
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE
AFFECTED BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?
V
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?"[7]
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private residential
subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a
national road open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen

(15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road
open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune
Street are guarded by iron gates. Edp mis
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent
of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is
traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and
welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated
cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[8] From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that
there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.[9]
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.[10] The power is plenary and its scope is
vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general
welfare.[11]
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.[12] It cannot be exercised
by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.[13] The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units.[14] Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.[15]
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs."[16] The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a
"body politic and corporate"[17]-- one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and
as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.[18] Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.[19] They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.[20]
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991.
This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz: Chief
"Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants."[21]
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body
of the provincial government is thesangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang
panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang
barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod
and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
[province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x x x."[22] The
same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants
thereon."[23]
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and
five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa,
Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and
Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924[24] in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region
placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA.[25]
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political
boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the
individual local government units comprising Metro Manila."[26] There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the
scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid
waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety.
The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the following: Lexjuris
"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies,
standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use
of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass
transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a
single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;"[27]
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following powers and functions: Esm
"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority.The MMDA shall:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for
the delivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with
national development objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide
services which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include the
packaging of projects and presentation to funding institutions; Esmsc
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific services
under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project
management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify
bottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to,
assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605
to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro
Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be
delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking
of delivery of basic services to the local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with
and consent of the local government unit concerned."Jurismis
The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units,
national government agencies, accredited peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private
sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of
agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services within
Metro Manila.[28]
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the
component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the president of
the Metro Manila Councilors League.[29] The Council is headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the President and
vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves
metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of
said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of
basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions are particularly
enumerated as follows: LEX
"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. (a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules and regulations deemed
necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of the Council to be effective during
the term of the succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the officers and personnel of the MMDA, and
approve the annual budget thereof for submission to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards for metro-wide application
governing the delivery of basic services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory fees, and impose and collect fines
and penalties." Jj sc
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these
is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects
to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of
the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of
road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under
this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single
ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. Ca-lrsc
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as
termed in the charter itself, a "development authority."[30] It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution
of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters."[31]
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court[32] where we upheld a
zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of
police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition,[33] while the second decision denied
reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals.[34]
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA and three residents of BelAir Village against other residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development
Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the
deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the prohibition on the setting up of commercial
and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners
alleged that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into
commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in
the full commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from
the residential section of the village.[35]
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No.
81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A
Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal Ordinance
was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated
as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent
thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone.[36]
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and the
commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter
wall on said street was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for security
reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale.
Scc-alr
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate exercise of police power.[37]
The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed
over the "deed restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the
demands of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the
Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village.[38] The same reason
was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the same village. The destruction of
the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the
perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its
summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal.[39]
Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved
zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the
proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent
BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply
relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and
convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within
the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as
an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of
the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter
possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater
Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13)
municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque, Marikina,
Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan.[40] Metropolitan Manila was
created as a response to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic
requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public services
rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently and economically if integrated
under a system of central planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the
eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform
measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State."[41]
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following powers: Calrs-pped
"Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.There is hereby created a public corporation, to be known as
the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue
and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and such other powers as are
necessary to carry out its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered by a Commission created under this
Decree."[42]
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) vested with
the following powers:

"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer programs and provide services common to the
area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend money and issue bonds, revenue
certificates, and other obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures should, however, continue to be operative
until otherwise modified or repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government and review appropriations for the
city and municipal units within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if found to be not in accordance
with the established policies of the Commission, without prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local
government units involved existing at the time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities and municipalities within
Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any violation thereof which shall not
exceed a fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire services of the city and municipal
governments in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct garbage collection and disposal in the
metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall direct traffic activities; Jjjuris
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities pertaining to essential services such as
transportation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, health and environmental services,
housing, park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social, economic and physical planning and
development of the area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the affairs of their respective local
governments and to propose to the President of the Philippines definite programs and policies for implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an annual report to the President of the
Philippines and to submit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary; and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the President of the Philippines." Sc jj
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering
programs providing services common to the area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes
and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its operation, and
at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the
power to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It
also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities
and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P. D. No. 824 further provided:
"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and thirteen municipalities in the
Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist in their present form except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The
members of the existing city and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon promulgation of this Decree,
and until December 31, 1975, become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby created for every city and
municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as may be determined
and chosen by the Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society as may be
appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Commission.
x x x.
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it
may adopt; Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution or measure shall become effective, until after its approval by
the Commission; and Provided further, that the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate
money and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the
Commission."
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the
members of the component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral
representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the
adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All
ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs approval.
Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass
ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC. Sce-dp
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative and
police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and
approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the autonomy of the local
government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided: Sj cj

"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein
provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy."
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the existing
National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao.[43] Section 11 of the same
Article X thus provided:
"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a
plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy
and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan
authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination."
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan political
subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the
cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive
and legislative assemblies.[44] Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the
President of the Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:
"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to
be composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area."[45]
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA.[46] It ought to be stressed,
however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMAs power was limited to the
"delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila."[47] The MMAs governing body, the
Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely
given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the
exercise of its rule-making power.[48]
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of
their respective political subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving
basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the
local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of
legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure
consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise
the local governments accordingly."[49]
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative
region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of
the affected local government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates
enacting its charter.
R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was introduced by several legislators led by
Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee
on Local Governments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee consultations
with the local government units in the National Capital Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA,[50]
and career officials of said agencies. When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments, the
following debate took place:
"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been debated a long time ago, you
know. Its a special we can create a special metropolitan political subdivision. Supreme
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the Constitution: barangay, municipality,
city, province, and we have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the Cordillera. So we have 6. Now.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the Autonomous Region, that is also
specifically mandated by the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats correct. But it is considered to be a political subdivision. What is the meaning of a
political subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own government, it has its own political personality, it has the
power to tax, and all governmental powers: police power and everything. All right. Authority is different; because it
does not have its own government. It is only a council, it is an organization of political subdivision, powers, no, which is
not imbued with any political power. Esmmis
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro Manila Development Authority, it is
purely coordinative. And it provides here that the council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of
the different basic services which have to be delivered to the constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective as a political subdivision. Kalookan
has its powers, as provided for and protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in
the exercise of that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are
forming an authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in order that the basic services can
be effectively coordinated. All right. justice
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to provide some funds, resources. But it
does not possess any political power. We do not elect the Governor. We do not have the power to tax. As a matter of
fact, I was trying to intimate to the author that it must have the power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All
right. It coordinates practically all these basic services so that the flow and the distribution of the basic services will be

continuous. Like traffic, we cannot deny that. Its before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace and
order, we cannot deny these. Its right on our face. We have to look for a solution. What would be the right solution? All
right, we envision that there should be a coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you do not want
to call it an authority, its alright. We may call it a council or maybe a management agency.
x x x."[51]
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the
Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs
functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bills presentation to
Congress. Thus: Ed-p
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think this was already approved
before, but it was reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no
objection to paragraph "f" And then next is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans,
programs and projects and issue ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes
of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does the MMDA because that takes the form of a local government unit, a
political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say that it has the policies, its very clear
that those policies must be followed. Otherwise, whats the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the
policies may be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case
really gives it more teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have the power to adopt
the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in the case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will
agree that that is the case now. Youve got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say
lets call it an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats very nice. I like that. However, there is a constitutional impediment. You are making this
MMDA a political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a plebiscite. That is what Im trying to
avoid. Ive been trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision,
once it is created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. Im trying to make this as administrative. Thats why we place the
Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there is .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise. Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules and regulations. That would be it
shall also be enforced. Jksm
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance
has a different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your Honor. sc
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions."[52]
The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of Representatives. The
explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national agency,
not a political government unit."[53] The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship speech of the Committee
on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the floor and no amendments introduced. The bill
was approved on second reading on the same day it was presented.[54]
When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made. These amendments, however,
did not affect the nature of the MMDA as originally conceived in the House of Representatives.[55]
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of
the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.[56] R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants
of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by
the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other
duties as may be assigned to him by the President,[57] whereas in local government units, the President merely
exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Newmiso
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the
MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune
Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so
ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic
condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once
sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and
pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our peoples productivity and the efficient delivery of goods
and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but
unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public

use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Sdjad
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39549 are affirmed. Sppedsc
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 122846
January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is
confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the
archetypal tension between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of
motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarlymotivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as prorated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred
constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present
petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision3
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled,
"An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is
reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best
interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly
concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less
than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may
be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same
meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon
conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not
exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a]
juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided,
further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall
automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this
measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City)
represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the
Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short
time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-inintervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels
and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and
operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General
of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to
withdraw as plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14,
1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January
22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the
enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing
that the Ordinance is constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as
the case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the
Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null
and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private
enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from
the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by
simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,19 where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected
through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for
certiorariand referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant
to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the
power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of
the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference
in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.24
First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes
the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless
reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the wellbeing of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of
Manila, liberty is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their petition and
Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that
the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of
establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However,
petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of
the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons'
equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm
from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of
standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation
by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the
Constitution.27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not
susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most
obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation,
and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine,
taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth
doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the
right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant
must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the
issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the
third party's ability to protect his or her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the
petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued

viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional
litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States
may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate
or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by
state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to
challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights
are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court
held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging
a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The
United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties
who seek access to their market or function."38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the
rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom
of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed
rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of
their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to
patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling,
but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of
Manila.40Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal
information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel,
hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to
public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns
and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate
was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the
localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public
morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle
case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have
been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and
regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting
out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore
its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The
awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our
nations legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for
illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees
to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the
political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection
questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they
exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another
form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate
many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third
political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious
and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous

and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching
constitutional questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty
serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the
guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on
government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process
concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary
government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in
progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally
awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality
though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to
achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State.
Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to
determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when
assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51
Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is
a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently,
two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or
restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been
articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process
cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.57
Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the
quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.61 The United States Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial access63and
interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon
is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most
deferential standard the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time
access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem
shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would
impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those
"trivial" yet fundamental freedoms which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of
their constitutional consequence that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as
integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of
what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under
a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by
them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila
v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he

has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65] In
accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It
said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a
Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations
omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The
City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery
and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and
thus became the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of
vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults
which is constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein
retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands
respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot
abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will
built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is
set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself
is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose
pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to
wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person
or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having
sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners
of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise
of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty
or property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police
power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this
Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by
patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places
where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no
classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without
exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home,76
and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city the Pearl of the Orient as a modern-day Sodom or
Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to
accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as
Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to
such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive
themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that
would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug

dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on
the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily
be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers
a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by
the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the
judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the
promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as
a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which
particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens
could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of
different interests.79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately
illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning
that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.80
Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions
between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong
distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our
democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is
moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and
protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the
Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take
the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that
prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may
often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing
more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student
shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The
petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again,
the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged
the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds
raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and
granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of
the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached
by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses
in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the
regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools,
by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools
in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of
medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical
schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other
countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability
of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to
the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it
upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases
is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed
with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the
regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of

the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients
may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from
the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is
true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's
ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated
or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common
good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may
prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but
on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated
promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for
others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that
"every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements. 6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those
who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more
reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to
operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are
not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people,
unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while
belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician
and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have
also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution:
one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the
NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify
in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably
better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be
outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers
who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the
student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be
"swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we
are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED,
with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 88265 December 21, 1989
SANTIAGO A. DEL ROSARIO, GEORGE G. GACULA, EDGARDO G. SANTOS, ALBANO S. SIBAL, ALBERTO C. REYES,
NONITO P. ARROYO, EMMANUEL F. TERENCIO, DOMINGO S. DE LEON, MODESTO O. LLAMAS, FARIDA U. ALONTO,
ZENAIDA A. FLOIRENDO, ISABEL A. MEJIA, LUZ P. MABANAG, RAMON H. RABAGO, JR., SAMUEL D. TROCIO and OSCAR M.
BRION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO R. BENGZON, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health, respondent.
Facundo T. Bautista for petitioners.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a class suit filed by officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in
the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, wherein this Court is asked to
declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act No. 6675), and
of the implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto, specifically:
(a) Section 6, Pars. (a) and (b) of the Generics Act which provide:
a) All government health agencies and their personnel as well as other government agencies shall use generic
terminology or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of
drugs and medicines.
b) All medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private practitioners, shall write prescriptions using the
generic name. The brand name may be included if so desired. (p. 6, Rollo.)
(b) Section 12, Pars. (b), (c) and (d) of the same law which provide:
b) For the second conviction, the penalty of file in the amount of not less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) but not
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) at the discretion of the court.
c) For the third conviction, the penalty of fine in the amount of not less than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not
exceeding ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and suspension of his license to practice his profession for thirty (30) days
at the discretion of the court.
d) For the fourth and subsequent convictions, the penalty of fine of not less than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and
suspension of his license to practice his profession for one year or longer at the discretion of the court. (pp. 6-7, Rollo.)
and
(c) Sections 4 and 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order No. 62, Series of 1989 dated March 9, 1989, of the respondent
Secretary of Health, which read as follows:
Section 4. Violative Erroneous, and Impossible Prescriptions.
4.1. Violative Prescriptions:
4.1.1 Where the generic name is not written;
4.1.2 Where the generic name is not legible and a brand name which is legible is written;
4.1.3 Where the brand name is indicated and instructions added, such as the phase 'No Substitution' which tend to
obstruct, hinder or prevent proper generic dispensing.
4.2 What to do with Violative Prescriptions.
Violative prescriptions shall not be filled. They shall be kept and reported by the pharmacist of the drug outlet or any
other interested party to the nearest DOH Officer for appropriate action. The pharmacist shall advise the prescriber of
the problem and/or instruct the customer to get the proper prescription.
4.3 Erroneous Prescriptions:
4.3.1 When the brand name precedes the generic name.
4.3.2 Where the generic name is the one in parenthesis.
4.3.3 Where the brand name in (sic) not in parenthesis.
4.3.4 Where more than one drug product is prescribed in one prescription form.
4.4 What to do with erroneous prescriptions.
Erroneous prescriptions shall be filled. Such prescriptions shall also be kept and reported by the pharmacist of the drug
outlet or any other interested party to the nearest DOH Office for appropriate action.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 7. Timetable of Implementation.
In order to give all affected parties adequate time for learning and adjustment, the implementation of these Rules and
Regulations shall be in three phases, as follows:
Phase 1 Education Drive ...
Phase 2 Monitoring of Compliance
xxx xxx xxx
Phase 3 Implementation.
Beginning September 1, 1989 the DOH and the other relevant agencies of government shall monitor compliance with
these Rules and Regulations and all violations shall be subject to the appropriate sanctions and penalties provided for
under these Rules and Regulations and the Generics Act of 1988. (pp. 7-9, Rollo.)
On March 15, 1989, the full text of Republic Act No. 6675 was published in two newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines. The law took effect on March 30, 1989, fifteen (15) days after its publication, as provided in Section 15
thereof.
Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order No. 62 was amended by Administrative Order No. 76 dated August 28, 1989
by postponing to January 1, 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in
Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order.

The petitioners allege that "as of this date, there is no breach or violation yet" of the law (p. 9, Rollo), which took effect
on March 30, 1989. However, as the penal provisions will only take effect on January 1, 1990, it would have been more
accurate to state that "as of this date, no breaches or violations of the law have been punished yet" (p. 9, Rollo).
The petition is captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which this Court does not exercise jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, we decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead.
The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged unequal treatment
of government physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and those in private practice on the other hand, in
the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are allegedly required to use only generic terminology in
their prescriptions, the latter may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic name. The
favored treatment of private doctors, dentists and veterinarians under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid class
legislation.
There is no merit in that argument for it proceeds from a misreading and misinterpretation of the letter and intent of
paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the Generics Act. Indeed, as explained by the public respondent:
... while paragraph (a) enumerates the government transactions ('Purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and
administering of drugs and medicines') where the sole use of generic terminology has been required, the 'prescription'
of drugs is further governed by paragraph (b). And the use of the word 'all' in the latter provision emphasizes the
absence of any distinction between government and private physicians. In other words, in prescribing drugs,
physicians, whether in government service or in private practice, are both governed by exactly the same rules, and
thus, are both authorized to include the brand name in their respective prescriptions. (p. 44, Rollo.)
Furthermore, it may be observed that while paragraph (a) refers to "all government health agencies, and their
personnel as well as other government agencies" (not necessarily physicians, dentists and veterinarians), paragraph
(b) refers to "all medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private practitioners."
Petitioners concede that the requirement for doctors, dentists, and veterinarians to use the generic terminology in
writing their prescriptions, followed by the brand name in parenthesis, is "well and good" (p. 12, Rollo). However, they
complain that under paragraph (d) of the law which reads:
(d) Drug outlets, including drugstores, hospital and non-hospital pharmacies and non-traditional outlets such as
supermarkets and stores, shall inform any buyer about any and all other drug products having the same generic name,
together with their corresponding prices so that the buyer may adequately exercise his option. Within one (1) year
after approval of this Act, the drug outlets referred to herein, shall post in conspicuous places in their establishments, a
list of drug products with the same generic name and their corresponding prices. (Annex A, p. 23, Rollo.)
the salesgirl at the drugstore counter is authorized to "substitute the prescribed medicine with another medicine
belonging to the same generic group." Since doctors are not allowed to instruct the druggist not to substitute the
prescription, or to "Dispense only as Prescribed" (per Sec. 4, Adm. Order No. 62), the petitioners argue that "the act of
prescribing the correct medicine for the patient becomes the act of the salesgirl at the drugstore counter, no longer
the act of the physician, dentist, or veterinarian" (p. 12, Rollo).
Here again, the petitioners have distorted the clear provisions of the law and the implementing administrative order.
For it is plain to see that neither paragraph (d) of Section 6 of the Generics Act, nor Section 4 of Administrative Order
No. 62, gives the salesgirl and/or druggist the discretion to substitute the doctor's prescription.
On the contrary, Section 4, par. 4.1, of Administrative Order No. 62 directs the pharmacist not to fill "violative
prescriptions" (where the generic name is not written, or illegibly written, and the prescription of a brand name is
accompanied by the doctor's instruction not to substitute it), as well as "impossible prescriptions" (par. 4.5). Even a
doctor's "erroneous" prescriptions "shall be filled," not substituted (par. 4.3, Adm. Order No. 62). And, Sections 3 and 5
of Adm. Order No. 63 enjoin the drug outlets not (to) favor or suggest" or "impose" a particular brand or product on the
customer. The administrative older provides:
In order to ensure the informed choice and use of drugs by the patient/ buyer, the drug outlet is required to:
3.1.1 Inform the patient/buyer of all available drug products generically equivalent to the one prescribed with their
corresponding prices. In so doing, the drug outlet shall not favor or suggest any particular product so that the
patient/buyer may fully and adequately exercise his option to choose (Sec. 3, Adm. Order No. 63 s. 1989).
xxx xxx xxx
The following acts or omissions are considered violations of these rules and regulations:
5.1 Imposing a particular brand or product on the buyer. ... (pp. 46-47, Rollo.)
The salesgirl at the drugstore counter, merely informs the customer, but does not determine (for she is incompetent to
do so) all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name, and their corresponding prices. That
information she may obtain from the list of drug products determined by the Bureau of Food and Drugs to have the
same generic name, or which are the chemical, biological, and therapeutic equivalent of the generic drug. All
drugstores or drug outlets are required by the law to post such list in a conspicuous place in their premises for the
information of the customers, for the choice of whether to buy the expensive brand name drug, or the less expensive
generic, should be exercised by the customer alone.
The purpose of the Generics Act is to carry out the policy of the State:
To promote, encourage and require the use of generic terminology in the importation, manufacture, distribution,
marketing, advertising and promotion, prescription and dispensing of drugs;
To ensure the adequate supply of drugs with generic names at the lowest possible cost and endeavor to make them
available for free to indigent patients;
To encourage the extensive use of drugs with generic names through a rational system of procurement and
distribution;
To emphasize the scientific basis for the use of drugs, in order that health professionals may become more aware and
cognizant of their therapeutic effectiveness; and

To promote drug safety by minimizing duplication in medications and/or use of drugs with potentially adverse drug
interactions. (pp. 3839, Rollo.)
or, as stated by the public respondent, "to promote and require the use of generic drug products that are
therapeutically equivalent to their brand-name counter-parts" (p. 39, Rollo) for "the therapeutic effect of a drug does
not depend on its 'brand' but on the 'active ingredients' which it contains." The medicine that cures is the "active
ingredient" of the drug, and not the brand name by which it has been baptized by the manufacturer.
The public respondent points out that the institution of generics in the Philippines will compel physicians to prescribe
drugs based on their therapeutic or "active ingredient," instead of their well-known brand names. Multiple medications
which may produce potentially adverse, even lethal, chemical reactions in the patient will thereby be avoided. Patients
with limited means will be able to buy generic drugs that cost less but possess the same active ingredients, dosage
form, and strength as brand names, many of which are priced beyond the reach of the common tao because the high
costs of advertising, packaging, royalties, and other inputs of production determine their pricing for the market.
The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the
constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11,
Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a
valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the
brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his
prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no substitution," the patient's option to
buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the
impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and
generally healthy minority.
There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract between a physician
and his patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A doctor may take in or
refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the
public respondent, no doctor has ever filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take
prescribed medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor ( p. 53, Rollo). In
any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact
laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the
community. This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held
subject to its fair exercise (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 495.)
Petitioners have also assailed Section 12, paragraphs b, c and d, of the Generics Act prescribing graduated penalties
(ranging from a reprimand to a fine of not less that P10,000 and the suspension of the physician's license to practice
his profession for one [1]) year or longer, at the discretion of the court) for violations of its provisions. Petitioners'
allegation that these penalties violate the constitutional guarantee against excessive fines and cruel and degrading
punishment, has no merit. Penal sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed. They are the "teeth" of the law.
Without them, the law would be toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on, for physicians, dentists and
veterinarians may freely ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of suspension or cancellation of the
physician's license is neither cruel, inhuman, or degrading. It is no different from the penalty of suspension or
disbarment that this Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or violate the laws and the Codes of
Professional and Judicial Conduct.
We hold that the Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health are
constitutional. In light of its beneficial provisions, we cannot heed the petitioners' plea to kill it aborning, i.e., before it
has had a chance to prove its value to our people as envisioned by its makers.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24693
July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitionersappellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and
adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the
president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was
sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and
to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged
that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen
(18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and
city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing
an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who
was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the
ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that
the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or
other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the
name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and
affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their
duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of
the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying
motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a
telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for
being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring
second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a
person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null
and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of
Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional
grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears
a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power
and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to
privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction
ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28,
1964, which reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go
Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of
Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila
charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders
for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita
districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved
on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the
respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the
ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963
(Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance
(now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels
and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.1wph1.t
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of
the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the
party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely
two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set
forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to the alleged
constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a
question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for
decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly
right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and
came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his
agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged
ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of
constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well
being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the
ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance
set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the
due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not
cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all
the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state
if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public

safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts,
speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to
the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus
become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the
clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill
up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several
other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and
guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It
would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing
vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or
operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and
prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is
smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power,
which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life,
liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered
as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action,
to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus
hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and
judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would
seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is
inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged
ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to
attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due
process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of
freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels
and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual
fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal
license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation
or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in
detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and
the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees
the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside
from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an
important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature
of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in
the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the
American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this

Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and
municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is
for public purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for
revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining
the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them
of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears
that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under
certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be
deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police
power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may
result from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or
the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full
payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory
note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between
the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners
cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice
Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly
apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and
the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of
the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of
the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within
the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty
and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where
the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How
justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of
the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room
With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections
which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its
owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked,
do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the
question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been
consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or
requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all
the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor
and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far
from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court
compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 122846
January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted
anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension
between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels
and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated
city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
"wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred
constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present
petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision3 in C.A.G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is
reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest,
health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted
terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than
twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be
concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon
conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not
exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a]
juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided,
further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall
automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or any
portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by
Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria
Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time
basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist
and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several
hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the
proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as
plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993,
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993
alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of
the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance
is constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case
involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and
void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation
that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for
a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the
legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an interprovince ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorariand
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the
power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the
Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom
of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.24 First, it
held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the
owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach
of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of
the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments
are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is
regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their petition and Memorandum,
petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments
offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also
allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is
whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal
protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the
law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is
built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the
judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution.27 The
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise
definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as
well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and
elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in
Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer
suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must
have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third
party's ability to protect his or her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which
appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such

special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be
construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke
the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a
reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections
available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held
that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a
statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The
United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties
who seek access to their market or function."38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of
the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in
effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech,
the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.39 In this
case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We
can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their
establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our
1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.40ErmitaMalate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as
name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging
house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A
purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was
sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities
covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been
severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate
the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a
room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The
awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our
nations legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of
the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees
to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the
political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection
questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they
exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another
form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate
many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third
political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious
and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous

and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching
constitutional questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on
government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process
concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary
government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive
legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it
may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of
constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal
result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due
process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the
proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with
the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of the
Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination
against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently, two standards of
judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for
evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been articulated in
equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.57 Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality
and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny
is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.61 The United States Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial access63and
interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners
at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury
to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard
the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up
rates to the lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of
political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the
people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
fundamental freedoms which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
constitutional consequence that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally
incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may
or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big
Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them
as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of
the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65] In accordance

with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will;
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City
asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and
fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus
became the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice
is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults
which is constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein
retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As
the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible;
indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real
sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified
by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose
pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to
wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person
or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having
sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise
of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power
whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a
blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in
illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of
places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the
unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home,76 and it is
skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city the Pearl of the Orient as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah
for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept
that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and
vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived
decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by
offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new
grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply
by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing
laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be

circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers
a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary
provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the promotion of
public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of
philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular
behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be
functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different
interests.79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as
a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to
legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws,
for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right
and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but
also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and
immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected
by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the
embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and
because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is
hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to
the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious,
less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No pronouncement as to costs.