Per diem that respondent received was not contemplated under GSIS law.

GSIS vs CSC, G.R.

No. 98395 and
102449 (1995)

The clear intent of the Government Insurance Law was to exclude those extra incidental expenses or incurred on a daily basis covered by the traditional definition of the
term per diem. An important fact missed from our earlier decision was that, while respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis during her first holdover period as
Vice Governor she was subsequently paid a fixed salary, which apparently rectified an otherwise anomalous situation. The services rendered by respondent Belo
having been continuous, the disputed period should be credited for purposes of retirement.
The situation as far as private respondents and the GSIS are concerned could be rectified by deducting a reasonable amount corresponding to the contributions which
should have been deducted during the period from the amount of retirement benefits accruing to them. It would be grossly inequitable as it would violate the spirit
of the government retirement and insurance laws to permanently penalize both respondents Belo and Baradero by ignoring the fact of actual period of service to
government with compensation, and deny them the retirement privileges that they, for their unselfish service to the government justly deserve.
By express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the
exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General
Manager the authority to act on any matter the Board may deem proper.

Hilarion Beronilla
vs GSIS

In computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board, what is relevant is not the actual or, what petitioner calls, imputable knowledge of said Board of the
favorable action of the General Manager. Even if such knowledge had come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Petitioners letter, what is decisive is that it was only
thru petitioners letter that the Board got notice of the error in Gen Managers action. Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as petitioner himself
alleges, to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review the action of the General Manager, any knowledge thereof by the Board, whether actual or imputable, could
not, in logic and conscience, have placed the Board on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps taken by the Board to have the facts
alleged in said letter verified are inconsistent with the charge of unreasonable delay, much more of laches.
As to denial of due process, the court ruled that procedures established by GSIS does not require notice and hearing.
Finally, with regards to petitioners argument that the Boards action impaired his constitutional right of the obligations of his contract, the court ruled that retirement
of government employees is imposed by law and is not a result of any contractual stipulations.

Cena vs CSC

An administrative circular, such as a memorandum of the CSC cannot limit PD 1146(also known as Revised Govt Insurance Act) on extension of service of employees
who reach 65. While it is true that CSC is given the authority to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service, it cannot
extend to matters not covered. The CSCs authority is limited only to carrying into effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law.
The CSC Memorandum, being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that a regulation must be in harmony with the provisions
of the law and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. CSC has no power to supply or add perceived omissions in PD 1146.

Rabor vs CSC

CSCs resolution be upheld. CSC raised valid points on the extension of service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-

Profeta vs Drilon

Santiago vs COA

comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-inrank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examinations
but must wait for jobs to be vacated by 'extendees' who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to
complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension."
To allow the Office of the President to shorten the extension of service of petitioner by 3 and a half months would further reduce petitioner's service with the
government. Such reduction from petitioner's service would deprive her of the opportunity of availing of the old-age pension plan, based on the computation of the
GSIS. It is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D.
1146, based on its computation of a member's years of service with the government. We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's date of
retirement failed to take into account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner which was not reflected in her service record.
The term "appointment" was used in a general sense to include the term "designation." In other words, no distinction was intended between the two terms in Section 9
of Executive Order No. 966. We think this to be the more reasonable interpretation, especially considering that the provision includes in the highest salary rate
"compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity." This need not always be conferred by a permanent appointment.
Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was designated Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration. The position was then vacant and could
be filled either by permanent appointment or by temporary designation. It cannot be said that the second position was only an extension of the petitioner's office as
State Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have been no need for his designation thereto. The second office was distinct and separate from
his position in the Commission on Audit. For the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional compensation which, following the letter
and spirit of Section 9, should be included in his highest basic salary rate.
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing - that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof
must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.

Raro vs ECC

Ilo-ilo Dock and

Engineering vs
WCC

The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles.
The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for
work-connected death or disability. Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where
regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.
Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where
the work is to be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of
and in the course of employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words,
the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably,
as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where the work is to be done; but it is
clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of
the employer.

The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an
"access area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a
relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in
pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a
means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is,
against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures
over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT VS. AROSE OUT OF EMPLOYMENT
1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out of and in the course of employment.
2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both
factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary
link must first be shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it is presumed to have arisen
out of the employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where
the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of work, is not of the employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress
and egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal connection between the work and the
hazard.

Belarmino
vs ECC

Alano vs ECC

7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either increase
Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation enumerates the grounds for compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an
employee. The illness, septicemia post partum, which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line
of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the
conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result.
The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall
on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was
the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.
The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such
injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She
was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or
personal about the school principals being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

Petitioner Salavador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned in Malate, Manila. His regular duty is from 2PM-10PM. On June 18, 1986,
because security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked
permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice. On his way home, riding a jeepney, due to the slippery road, the
jeepney encountered an accident. He sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National
Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until July 25, 1986.
Lazo vs ECC

Petitioner had come from work and was on his way home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that
interruptions occurred in the journey. The applicability of PD 626 must extent to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with
the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable
period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises.
Presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation when the job required a person to be there at the time of the accident.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (E.C.C.), dated October 26, 1976, affirming the decision of the Government
Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for Compensation of income benefits due to the injuries sustained by her when on August 1, 1975, while on her way
to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies and other training and school aids for her office, she, together with others, were ambushed by unidentified men
believed to be communist insurgents.
At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to be found in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, which provides:

Enao vs ECC, G.R.

No. L-46046 April
5, 1985

SECTION 1. Grounds.(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours;
(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and
(3) The employee must have been performing his official function.
As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant Petitioner was actually then performing her official functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner
was then engaged in or discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's place of work. It is rather obvious that in proceeding to
purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working hours.
What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work- connected, which the Court finds to be so.

Gloria D. Menes vs
ECC (Yen) G.R. No.
L-48488 April 25,
1980

All public high school teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are subject to emotional strains
and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or non- academic assignments,
aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is
heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is situated in a tough area - Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements

and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner,
are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford nutritious
food.
Occupational disease:
An occupational disease is one "which results from the nature of the employment, and by nature is meant conditions to which all employees of a class are subject
and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of
occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general" (Goldberg vs. 954 Mancy Corp., 12 N. E. 2d 311; Emphasis supplied).

Nazaro vs ECC

Dabatian vs GSIS

the claimant must show proof of reasonable work-connection, not necessarily direct causal relation. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which
means such relevant evidence as will support a decision, or clear and convincing evidence. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable. To require proof of actual causes
or factors which lead to an ailment would not be consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee in favor of the workers.
Although strict roles of evidence are not applicable, yet the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. The nature of the work of the
deceased as Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor dealt with the detailed preparation of the budget, financial reports and review and/or examination of the
budget of other provincial and municipal offices. Full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the budget and/or financial reports were
necessary, such that the deceased had to sit for hours, and more often that not, delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt the flow of concentration. In
addition, tension and pressure must have aggravated the situation. Citing the case of Ceniza vs. ECC, the SC held that the cause of death of petitioners husband is
workconnected, i.e. the risk of contracting the illness was aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so that petitioner is entitled to receive compensation benefits
for the death of her husband.
The death of Sigfredo A. Dabatian is not compensable.
The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of
employment, the reason being "to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to
receive reparation for work- connected death or disability ... " It was found, and rightly so, that the old law, the Workmen's Compensation Act, destroyed the parity or
balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to workmen's compensation. The balance was tilted unduly in favor of the workmen
since it was possible to stretch the work-related nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational its.
Thus, under the present law, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have
resulted from either a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or b) any illness caused by employment subject to proof
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, the deceased's ailment was found not to be in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of
work. His ailment was principally traceable to factors which were definitely not work-connected, specifically, his inherent predisposition to drinking coffee heavily which
could have aggravated his contraction of the disease resulting to his death. However, aggravation of an illness is not a ground for compensation under the present
compensation law.
Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of her
husband's work increased the risk of contracting the disease.
Aside from the undisputed fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to

bolster the theory that her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the ailment. Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but,
aggravation of an illness is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law.

Rodriquez vs ECC

ECC vs CA

Claims on death benefits under Art. 194 must result from an occupational disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted and listed by the ECC or any illness
caused by the employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. If the disease is listed in
Annex A, no proof of causation is required. If it is not so listed, it has been held that the employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove, a positive
proposition, that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. Proof of direct causal relation is indispensably required. It is enough that
the claimant adduces proof of reasonable work connection, whereby the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature
of the job. Strict rules of evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. The
circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the evidence she presented are not enough to discharge the required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear
evidence as to when the diseased commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the deceaseds colon may have been growing for many years even
before he was employed as a teacher. The trauma that was supposed to have caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor
adequately proved.
Under PD 626 Rule 3 Sec 1 (b), for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the result of
an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimants working
conditions. This means that if the claimants illness or disease is not included in the said Annex A, then he is entitled to compensation only if he can prove that the risk of
contracting the illness or disease was increased by his working conditions.
Arreola concedes that her ailment, ureterolithiasis, is not included in Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation. Nevertheless, she asserts that she was
able to prove that the risk of contracting it was increased by the exigency and nature of her work. It is medically established that the environment, water or other fluid
intake and the nature of the occupation -- sedentary or otherwise -- are important factors in the development or inhibition of urinary stones or ureterolithiasis in
general. Certainly, too, the regularity of urination plays an important role since withholding urine for sometime may disturb the balance. It is not denied that her work
exposed her to drugs, insecticides, volatile poisons, fuels and inorganic compounds, and chemical laboratory equipment. Moreover, she attended to field cases and
rendered holiday and night duties once a week and helped the chemists in the examinations of incoming cases. Neither have the petitioners refuted the claim of the
private respondent that she missed some important health habits such as regularly drinking enough water and urination. As to the latter, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the exigency of her assigned tasks was such that she had to forego urination in order not to interrupt the flow of concentration.
Arreolas burden of evidence did not require the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt nor a preponderance of evidence. In cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, like the ECC, a fact is deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. It was enough that she was able to show that the nature of her work or her working conditions
increased the risk of her contracting ureterolithiasis. Therefore, GSIS is hereby ordered to pay private respondent Ms. Lilia B. Arreola the sum of P12,619.00 as
compensation.
Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provides:

Tancinco vs GSIS
SECTION 1. Grounds(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The aforesaid requirements have not been met. Anent the first, as part of the former Vice-President's security detail, the decedent was required to guard the person of
the former; hence, his presence was officially required wherever the Vice-President would go. At the time of his death, SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty since Vice-President
Estrada was out of the country. In fact, he was at home; it is not even known if he was temporarily re-assigned to another detail while the Vice-President was away.
Clearly, he was not at the place where his work required him to be.
As to the second requirement, it was not sufficiently established that SPO1 Tancinco died while performing his official functions. In this regard, we held that policemen
are regarded as being on 24 hour alert.
However, in the more recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,we clarified that not all deaths of policemen are compensable. Thus, At
any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the
guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be
sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless
basically police service in character.
In the present case, the decedent was repairing a service vehicle when he was killed. We have tried to view it from all possible angles, but the inescapable conclusion is
that he was not performing acts that are "basically police service in character." As a policeman, SPO1 Tancinco is part of "an organized civil force for maintaining order,
preventing and detecting crimes, and enforcing the laws xxx".14 Based on these parameters, it cannot be said that the deceased was discharging official functions; if
anything, repairing a service vehicle is only incidental to his job.
Neither was the last requirement satisfied. As the fatal incident occurred when SPO1 Tancinco was at home, it was incumbent on petitioner to show that her husband
was discharging a task pursuant to an order issued by his superiors. This also was not done.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary to support a claim is substantial evidence,15 which is that "amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." Unfortunately, the burden was not successfully met.
WE find the petitioner's claim meritorious. The theory of increased risk is applicable in the instant case. WE had the occasion to interpret the theory of increased risk in
the case of Cristobal vs. Employees Compensation Commission (103 SCRA, 336-337, L-49280, February 26, 1981):
Jimenez vs ECC

"To establish compensability under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial
evidence, which means 'such relevant evidence to support a decision' (Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear
and convincing evidence. xxx
WE are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities have given credence to the stand of the petitioner that her husband developed bronchogenic carcinoma while

working as a soldier with the Philippine Constabulary. The records show that when the deceased enlisted with the Philippine Constabulary in 1969, he was found to be
physically and mentally healthy. A soldier's life is a hard one. As a soldier assigned to field duty, exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest
is a common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals while handling ammunition and firearms cannot be discounted. WE take also fact that he became the security of one Dr.
Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan, and he always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.). Such assignment invariably involved irregular working
hours, exposure to different working conditions, and body fatigue, not to mention psychological stress and other similar factors which influenced the evolution of his
ailment.
This is in line with the avowed policy of the State as mandated by the Constitution (Article II, Section 9) and restated in the new Labor Code (Article 4), to give maximum
aid and protection to labor.

Panotes vs ECC

Respondent GSIS brings up the issue of the relation between the standard of reasonable work connection established by this Court in compensation cases and the
Court's statement in the case at bar that cause of the fatal disease is unknown (Emphasis supplied). Respondent's theory that, by granting petitioner's claim, the
standard of reasonable work-connection for compensation cases was rendered meaningless because this Court's findings in the present case that the cause of the fatal
disease cancer of the colon is still unknown, belies the finding that said fatal disease was caused by the nature of the work and/or the risk of contracting the same was
increased by the working conditions of the deceased. Respondent further submits the proposition that "if the cause of the ailment is unknown, then it cannot also be
said that the ailment is work-connected under the increased risk doctrine" (p. 73, rec., italics supplied). "To declare as compensable all ailments whose causes are
unknown would be to place the claimants with such types of ailments in a far better or superior position than those whose causes are known but cannot be proved as
work-connected", respondent adds (p. 71, rec.).
In its defense, the Court ruled that uncertainty as to the cause cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work- connected. To establish compensability of the
claim under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means
'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed
out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation.
The respondent court has no fault in finding the petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Ma-ao Sugar
centrol co vs CA

Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose because they were not connected and
fixed in place by fish plates. Although they could be removed only with special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at
the scene of the accident.
There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia of preventing derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this
responsibility was not discharged. According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment
in the milling district were frequent and there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour.3 The petitioner should therefore have taken more
prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence.

The fact that it is not easy to detect if the fish plates are missing is no excuse either. Indeed, it should stress all the more the need for the responsible employees of the
petitioner to make periodic checks and actually go down to the railroad tracks and see if the fish plates were in place. The fact that the fish plates were not found later at
the scene of the mishap may show they were never there at all to begin with or had been been removed long before.
At any rate, the absence of the fish plates - whatever the cause or reason - is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. Where the thing
which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition to prevent the derailments that
sometimes happened "every hour." Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms reporting derailments - which reports have not
been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments - is not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.
The Court also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his assigned station when the train was
derailed. That might have been a violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed to his injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to
suppose that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car rather than at the back and that he had been killed because he chose to ride in the
caboose.
It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body."6 There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he
recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.
(2) NO. The respondent court has no fault in disallowing the deductions made by the trial court. The amount to be paid by the SSS represents the usual pension
received by the heirs of a deceased employee who was a member of the SSS at the time of his death and had regularly contributed his premiums as required by the
System. The pension is the benefit derivable from such contributions. It does not represent the death benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act to
an employee who dies as a result of a work-connected injury. It does not indicate that the pension is to be taken from the funds of the ECC. The certification would
have said so if the pension represented the death benefits accruing to the heirs under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
To deny payment of social security benefits because the death or injury or confinement is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act would be to deprive
the employees members of the System of the statutory benefits bought and paid for by them, since they contributed their money to the general common fund out of
which benefits are paid. In other words, the benefits provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues to the employees concerned due to the hazards involved
in their employment and is made a burden on the employment itself. However, social security benefits are paid to the System's members, by reason of their
membership therein for which they contribute their money to a general common fund. . . .
It may be added that whereas social security benefits are intended to provide insurance or protection against the hazards or risks for which they are established, e.g.,
disability, sickness, old age or death, irrespective of whether they arose from or in the course of the employment or not, the compensation receivable under the
Workmen's Compensation law is in the nature of indemnity for the injury or damage suffered by the employee or his dependents on account of the employment.

The rule is well established that

Such acts as are reasonably necessary to the health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical
demands, or protecting himself from excessive cold, are nevertheless incidental to the employment, and injuries sustained in the performance of such act are generally
held to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment. (58 Am. Jur., sec. 236,p . 742, citing numerous cases.)
That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant's house and not at his usual place of work does not bring the case out of the operation of the rule previously quoted,
for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to that place through the appellant's fault in not providing an adequate supply of drinking water at the warehouse.
Appellant urges that the dog bite was provoked by Santos' trying to take the fish away from the puppy and hence, while he was engaged in an independent activity. We
do not regard such act as voluntary deviation from his duties, considering that the act of the deceased was practically an instinctive one, that would naturally be
expected from any person in his position. Moreover, it was motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a desire to protect the latter's property, that can not be
deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the laborer as such (71 C.J. 675). In fact, it has been held that the act of saving the employee's own property from an apparent
danger, is compensable (in re Brightman, 107 N.E. 527, cited in 71 C. J. 670). There, is was said:
the standard to be applied is not that which now, in the light of all that has happened, is seen to have been directly within the line of labor helpful to the master, but that
which the ordinary man required to act in such an emergency might do while actuated with a purpose to do his duty.

Chua Yeng vs
Roma

Compensation has been granted, even if the injury occurred while the order was not performing acts strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in an activity
either related or incidental to his duties, or doing an act in the interest of his employer. Thus, injury to an employee of a bus firm, occurring outside of assigned territory,
in undertaking to retrieve personal belongings of a passenger, was compensable (Vergoza vs. Arnaz Vda. de Cruz, L-7305, December 15, 1953); so was that of a laborer
who, trying to alight from a truck to pick up a sack which had fallen, belonging to his employer, was caught between the wheels (Ramos vs. Poblete, 40 Off. Gaz., 3474);
likewise, the death of a worker who tried to recover a price of board which had fallen into a molasses tank, and died from the deal fumes therein (Estandarte vs. Phil.
Motor Alcohol Corp., G. R. No. 39733, Nov. 1, 1933). In the foregoing, an impelling factor considered by the court was the fact that the employee was acting in the
interest of the employer.
To the argument that the employee sustained the injury not from drinking water but from driving away the puppy, suffice it to say that under the circumstances that
impelled him to act without opportunity for deliberate reflection, we are not prepared to say that his act was unreasonable or negligent. Driving away a puppy is not so
fraught with potent danger as to deter every man possessed of reasonable disposition. As has been said
. . . he was doing a thing which a man while working may reasonably doa workman of his sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his pipe, and he may
reasonably pick it up again. (Ramos vs. Poblete, supra., citing M'Lauchan vs. Anderson, S.C. 529.)
By analogy, the deceased in this case may reasonably get a drink of water to satisfy his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably see a puppy eating some fried fish
belonging to his employer; and he may reasonably be expected to make a motion with his hand to drive said puppy away.
At any rate, the resulting injury is not without causation in the conditions under which deceased was required to perform his work. It appears that there were no
adequate and sanitary means of water supply in the place of work; that petitioner's workers used, for drinking purposes, water from a well at the back of the warehouse;
that this well was out or order at the time of the incident, so that the deceased had to cross a wide public street to petitioner's house just to get a drink, thereby

exposing himself to hazards which may well have been avoided if there were drinking facilities at, or more proximate to, the place of work.
Finally, the Workmen's Compensation Act being a social legislation, and in line with the intent of the law to effect social justice, the provisions thereof should be liberally
construed in favor of the workingman
The decision and the resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Visayan Trans Co.

vs WCC

Natividad
Bellosillo vs. The
City of Manila, G.
R. No. 34522, Nov.
9, 1931
Batangas Transpo
Co. vs VDa De
Rivera

Davao Gulf lumber

Co vs Del Rosario

Marinduque Iron
Mines vs WCC

1) The case is covered by the provisions of Section 24, Workmens Compensation Act No. 3428, as amended, which dispenses with the requirement of filing a claim for
compensation if the employer had voluntarily made compensation payments. Petitioner had voluntarily paid the burial expenses in connection with the burial of Gutana.
Consequently, the late filing of the claim for compensation is not fatal.
(2) Due to the number of laborers engaged in the loading work, the sanitary facilities on board were rendered inadequate, thus compelling some of the laborers to
answer the call of nature by going down a barge tied along the right side of the ship. Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, it is but logical to consider the barge as
an extension of the premises where the laborers were working. They took their evening meal on board the ship and were supposed to resume their work (overtime
work) a reasonable time thereafter. As, because of this, they were not free to leave the vessel, the accident must be deemed to be one arising out of, or in the course of
employment.
The injury was caused by an accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment. The workman was then employed by the City and in the course of that
employment it was necessary for him to relieve himself. As there were no toilet accommodations available, he was compelled to cross the street. It cannot then be said
that the workman, to satisfy a call of nature, went to a dangerous and unauthorized place. Neither was there notorious negligence on the part of the deceased. The law
says notorious negligence which implies willful negligence, and that is not the equivalent of contributory negligence or simple negligence. The law would serve little
purpose if the general rules relating to damages and negligence were invariably invoked.
In the absence of proof that the injury or death supervening in the course of employment has arisen because of the nature of the same, the death or injury is, by
law, compensable, unless the employer clearly establishes that it was not caused or aggravated by such employment or work. Mere absence of evidence that the
mishap was traceable to the employment does not suffice to reject the claim; there must be credible showing that it was not so traceable (Batangas Trans. Co. vs.
Vda. de Rivera, G.R. No. L-7658, May 8, 1956; Bohol Land Trans. Co. vs. Vda. de Madanguit, 70 Phil. 685)
Concerning the non -registration of the truck in Motor Vehicle Office, and its defective condition there is no finding that the driver knew this at the time of driving.
Registration of the vehicle was not his concern.
As to the presence of members of his family in the vehicle, supposing it was in violation of company regulations, it is not certain that it caused the accident.Indeed, as his
wife and children were present, this driver must have been extremely careful not reckless. What happened must have been unforeseen, it may only be blamed upon
the worn-out condition of the motor transport or to "accident," for which the employer is responsible, it having arisen out of and in the course of the deceased's regular
duties as driver.
There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldnt be, because
transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular instance because there was the employers
prohibition.

However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of
negligence. Section 6 provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall
be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law;
and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall
succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: Provided, That in case the employer recovers from such third person damages in
excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the
expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the employee or
his dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.
It is the Petitioners contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its outcome constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such election
having the effect of releasing the employer. However, Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit for damages against the third person, it being alleged, without contradiction
that the heirs did not intervene therein and have not so far received the indemnity ordered by the court.
Indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the other person does not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation.
As to the alleged amicable settlement, it consists of an affidavit wherein, for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamadors widow promised to forgive Macunat for the wrong
committed and not to bring him before the authorities for prosecution. Upon making such promise Petitioner argues she elected one of the remedies, (against the
third person) and is barred from the other remedy (against the employer). The contention may not be sustained, inasmuch as all the widow promised was to forego the
offenders criminal prosecution. Note further that a question may be raised whether she could bind the other heirs of the deceased.

Vda de Inguillo vs
ECC (

Clement vs GSIS

Definitely, "esophageal edenocarcinoma with bone and cervical metastasis" can not be considered as an occupational disease since it is not one of those listed under
Annex "A' as provided in Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. Previous jurisprudence provides that cancer ailments, except for a specified few, are not
compensable since it is a disease that strikes people in general and the nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. However, ECC failed to
adequately take into consideration that there was another cause of death, which was "pneumonia." Which is a qualified occupational disease under Annex A. Further,
a review of the deceased's work activities, as janitor, will show that they included the regular use of "deleterious substances" and the performance of manual work
which resulted to inhalation of dust are some of the qualifying circumstances which lead to the pneumonia. Concededly, not "all" of the qualifying conditions to consider
pneumonia compensable concur, there is substantial compliance therewith, added to the fact that punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in
the interest of the working man.
Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. The degree of proof required under PD 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the
development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct
causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmens claim is bases is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where
there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability and not certainty is the touchstone.
YES. The major ailments of the deceased could be traced to bacterial and viral infections. In the case of leprosy, it is known that the source of infection is the discharge
from lesions of persons with active cases. It is believed that the bacillus enters the body through the skin or through the mucous membrane of the nose and throat. The
husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As a janitor of the skin clinic, he was exposed to different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had to clean the

Casumpang vs ECC

clinic itself where patients with different illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipment that had been used. He had to dispose of garbage and
wastes that accumulated in the course of each working day. He was the employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration of infected materials and not being a
medical practitioner, least likely to known how to avoid infection. It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Clementes working conditions definitely
increased the risk of his contracting the diseases
Cancer of the stomach is not an occupational disease considering the decedent's employment as prison guard. Cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood
forming, vessels was considered occupational only among woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and
plywood mills. The complained illness is therefore not compensable under the first group provided in the Labor Code. Also, there are no medical findings, reports,
affidavits or any indication that he was suffering from any pain or discomfort prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code which by liberal interpretation may have worked in
his favor. The former ailment was officially diagnosed in June 28, 1976. In his medical history, this was traced to hematemesis and melena which began in November
1975. In other words, all of his ailments were after January 1, 1975.
The petition is hereby dismissed. The decision of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are
affirmed.