Retired Police

Galvante vs. Casimiro

G. R. No. 162809, April 22, 2008
Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Feliciano Galvante, a former police officer, left his house to meet retired
police Percival Plaza and inquire about the retirement procedure for policemen.
Upon arrival at the house of Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked
petitioner's way. The 4 policemen were private respondents PO1 Avenido, PO1
Rufano, PO1 Degran and PO1 Balolot.
They all pointed their long firearms ready to fire at petitioner. Petitioner then heard
PO1 Avenido saying, ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG which means Give me your
firearm, to which he answered, WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL translated as I have no
firearm.
Mr. Plaza who came down from his house told them not to harass petitioner as he
was also a former police officer but they did not
- heed Mr. Plaza's statements.
While petitioner was raising his arms, SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near to
petitioner's owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which the petitioner asked
him if he has any search warrant.
Subsequently, they saw petitioner's super .38 pistol under the floormat of his jeep
and asked him of the MR of the firearm. Due to fear, petitioner searched his wallet
and gave the asked document. Immediately thereafter, the policemen left petitioner
without saying anything bringing with them the firearm.
Petitioner left Mr. Percival's house and went to a police station where he saw a
person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist, to which he asked the
police officers including those who searched his jeep to apprehend him also.
Nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to apprehend the armed
civilian person so petitioner went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who
immediately called the armed civilian to his office and when already inside his

office, the disarming was done. Thereafter, petitioner was put to jail with the said
person by Police Chief Rocacorba and was released only in the afternoon of May
16, 2001 after posting bail.
Case filed AGAINST the petitioner: Criminal Case of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3258
Cases filed BY petitioner:
An administrative case against private respondents before the DILG for grave
misconduct.
A criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for Arbitrary Detention,
Illegal Search and Grave Threats
During the Preliminary Investigation of the Ombudsman for Arbitrary Detention,
Illegal Search and Grave Threats, the DILG suspended private respondents for
committing an illegal search. However, the DILG noted that private respondents
were merely being enthusiastic in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty.
During the Preliminary Investigation of the Ombudsman for Arbitrary Detention,
Illegal Search and Grave Threats, the RTC. dismissed the criminal case filed against
the petitioner on the ground that the action of the policemen who conducted the
warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same
intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his property.
The Ombudsman, however, dismissed the action on the ground that there was no
probable cause and that the search was valid. A petition for certiorari was filed
before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal by the Ombudsman was proper.
Held: YES.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a
warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the RPC or any
other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches: Search
warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained
(ART. 129) and Searching domicile without witnesses (ART. 130). Petitioner did
not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint;
rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle
without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not
covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC. The remedy of petitioner against the
warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under Article 32, in relation to

Article 2219 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code and/or disciplinary and administrative
actions.
The criminal complaint for abitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by
public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be
shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender
detained the complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds. The
second element was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As
pointed out by private respondent Conde in his Comment and Memorandum,
petitioner himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief
Rocacorba who caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner
allege that private respondents effected his detention, or were in any other way
involved in it. There was, therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal
charge for arbitrary detention against private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the same is based merely on
petitioner's bare allegation that private respondents aimed their firearms at him.
Such bare allegation stands no chance against the well-entrenched rule applicable
in this case, that public officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official function. The DILG itself observed that private
respondents may have been carried away by their enthusiasm in the conduct of the
arrest in line of duty.
TRICKLER: VIOLATION OF DOMICILE, CAFGU
GEROCHE v. PEOPLE
GR. No. 179080, November 26, 2014
Peralta, J.
ACCUSED: Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil
VICTIM: Roberto Mallo and Bariliano Limbag
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of RPC
FACTS: Petitioners were charged of the crime of violation of domicile. It was
alleged that at about 10:00 in the evening of May 14, 1989, the accused Geroche
(Barangay Captain) and the rest being CAFGUs, armed with garand rifles, entered
the house of Roberto Mallo by forcibly breaking the door and searched the effects
of the house without previous consent of the owner and mauled the occupant
Bariliano Limbag. They looked for firearms but instead found and took away his
airgun. Baleriano suffered physical injuries which sould heal from seven to ten
days.

RTC: Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 (arresto mayor maximum).
They failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an essential
element of Article 128.
CA: Violation of Domicile considering that the judicial admissions of the accused
as barangay captain and members of CAFGU (indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
Months, One (1) Day of arresto mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1)
Day of prision [correccional] minimum with the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office and from the right to follow a professionor calling pursuant to
Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code)
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there is double jeopardy since the trial court already
acquitted them of violation of Domicile.
(2) WON the accused are guilty of Violation of Domicile.
(3) WON the penalty imposed by the CA is correct.
RULING: (1) An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question including one not raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from the
sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate
court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate.
Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial courts judgment of conviction for Less
Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke
the prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court
to correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment.
(2) The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their
testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither
Geroche denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that
they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered as
public officers/employees.
(3) As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under
Article 128 of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years)
if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not
constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made
by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while
they were sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.
In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law requires courts to impose upon the accused an

indeterminate sentence. The maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of the said Code. Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is
composed of only two, not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same
Code requires the division into three equal portions the time included in the
penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the provision,
the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed by Article
128 are:
Minimum 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days
Medium 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
Maximum 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years
Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium
period or from 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in
light of the provisions of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code that if there are no
other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the
crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that
prescribed by Article 128 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months).
The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the
Court hereby sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four ( 4)
years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
TICKLER: Communist Party of the Philippines, Satur Ocampo, chicken farm,
Crispin Beltran
VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B.
ECHANIS and REY CLARO C. CASAMBRE vs. SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO et al
G.R. Nos. 172070-72
x--------------------------x
LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO
A. CASIO, CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, and RAFAEL V. MARIANO vs. RAUL M.
GONZALEZ et al
G.R. Nos. 172074-76
x--------------------------x
CRISPIN B. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175013 June 1, 2007
FACTS:

Crispin B. Beltran, Liza L. Maza, Joel G. Virador, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro

A. Casio, and Rafael V. Mariano, are members of the House of Representatives
representing various party-list groups, while Vicente P. Ladlad, Nathanael S.
Santiago, Randall B. Echanis, and Rey Claro C. Casambre, are private individuals.
All of them face charges for Rebellion under Art. 134 in relation to Art. 135 of the
RPC.
A. BELTRAN PETITION
Following the issuance by Pres. Gloria Arroyo of Proclamation No. 1017,
declaring a State of National Emergency, police officers arrested Beltran while he
was en route to Bulacan and detained him in Camp Crame. Beltran was arrested
without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform him of the crime for
which he was arrested. Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall
of Justice for Inciting to Sedition based on a speech he gave during a rally. He was
subjected to a second inquest, this time, for Rebellion, based on two letters of
Yolanda Tanigue and of Rodolfo Mendoza, where Beltran, Maza, Virador,
Ocampo, Casio, Mariano, San Juan, and several others were implicated as leaders
and promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The
plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas. Also, Ruel Escala, in his
affidavit, alleged that he saw Beltran, Ocampo, Casio, Maza, Mariano, Virador,
and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal,
Padre Garcia, Batangas. Raul Cachuela, on the other hand, alleged that he was a
former member of the CPP and that he attended the CPPs 10th Plenum where he
saw Beltran, he took part in criminal activities, and the arms he and the other CPP
members used were purchased partly from contributions by Congressional
members like Beltran.
The DOJ issued a resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and the others
as leaders/promoters of Rebellion. An information was then filed with the RTC of
Makati. Beltran moved that the RTC make a judicial determination of probable
cause against him.
RTC: sustained the finding of probable cause. Hence, the petition.
B. MAZA and LADLAD PETITIONS
Based on the letters of Tanigue and Mendoza, the DOJ sent subpoenas to Mazas
and Ladlads group. During the preliminary investigation, a masked man identified
as Jaime Fuentes, was presented, who claimed to be an eyewitness against them.
Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor Emmanuel
Velasco. Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution
panel for lack of impartiality and independence.

DOJ panel of prosecutors: denied their motion. They sought reconsideration and
for the dismissal of their cases, but it was denied. Hence, the petition.
Meanwhile, after finding probable cause, the prosecutors filed an information with
the RTC Makati, charging petitioners and their co-accused as principals,
masterminds, or heads of a Rebellion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the inquest proceeding was valid.
2. Whether or not there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion.
HELD:
1. NO. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully
arrested without warrant. In this case, the officers arrested Beltran, without a
warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest
prosecutor could only have conducted as he did conduct an inquest for Inciting to
Sedition and no other. None of Beltrans arresting officers saw Beltran commit the
crime of Rebellion. They only alleged that they saw and heard Beltran make an
allegedly seditious speech.
2. NO. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by
rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1) That there be a public uprising and taking arms against the Government; and
2) That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or

(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or

(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers and prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving
crowd action done in furtherance of a political end.
In the case, the allegations are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for
taking part in an armed public uprising against the governments. None of the
affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or

heading a rebellion. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a

rebellion. Beltrans alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not
automatically make him a leader of a rebellion. Assuming that Beltran is a member
of the CPP, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion. As for the
alleged funding of the CPPs military equipment from Beltrans congressional
funds, Cachuelas affidavit merely contained a general conclusion without any
specific act showing such finding. He merely alleged that ang mga ibang mga
pondo namin ay galing sa mga party list na naihala sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN
MUNA pinamumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN. Such a
general conclusion does not establish probable cause. Assuming that Fuentes
affidavit is true, the allegations make out a case for Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion, not Rebellion. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans
to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts
constituting Rebellion. None of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting,
maintaining, or heading a rebellion.
CASES IN RTC MAKATI DISMISSED.

People v. Estonilo
GR No. 201565, October 13, 2014
FACTS:
Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005,the day before his father, Floro Casas (Floro),
was gunned down, he was with the latter and some teachers at the Celera Inocencio
Elementary School, Placer, Masbate; that they were working on the closing
ceremonies to be held the following day; that one Ranio Morales called on Floro
and told him that Mayor Carlos, Sr. wanted to see him at his (Ranio) house; that
Floro and Felix went to see Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that when they saw Mayor Carlos,
Sr., he showed them (Floro and Felix) a program of a celebration of the Federation
of 7th Day Adventist that contained the names of the governor, the congressman,
and Placer mayoralty candidate Vicente Cotero (Cotero), as guests of the said
activity; that Felix asked his father why Coteros picture was so big while Mayor
Carlos, Sr.s name was not mentioned in the program; that Floro replied that he
cannot help it because Cotero paid for the program; that the answer angered Mayor

Carlos, Sr. and he scolded Floro; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. said "you are now for
Cotero but youre only Estonilo when you ask for my signature to sign the voucher.
This is up to now thatyou will be the supervisor of Celera"; that Floro responded
"when are you a superintendent when you dont have any scholastic standing. Just
look if I will still vote for your son"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. replied "lets see if you
can still vote"; and that the following day, Floro was shot to death.
Prosecution witness Serapion testified that while he was printing the name of
Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela Pisa on the street facing the Celera
Elementary School on the night of April 5, 2004, he heard gunshots coming from
inside the compound of the school; that after two or three minutes, he saw more or
less six persons coming out of the school; that he was able to identify three of
themas present in the courtroom: Edel, Nonoy, and Nonong; that he saw the six
men approach Mayor Carlos, Sr.s vehicle, which was parked near the school; that
Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey came out of a house nearby; that upon reaching the
vehicle, Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos, Sr. "mission accomplished,
sir"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group to escape, which they did
using two motorbikes towards the direction of Cataingan; and thereafter, that
19
Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey drove towards the direction of Daraga.
Elsa was presented to testify on the probable motive for the killing of Floro, the
circumstances surrounding the killing and its discovery, their family background,
her husbands line of work, how she felt on their loss, and the expenses relative to
his killing. She testified that she heard there were people who were jealous of
Floros position because he could bring voters to his side during election time;that
Placer mayoralty candidate Cotero donated medals for the 2003-2004 closing
ceremony of the entire district of public schools; that during the closing ceremony,
the donors name was announced, which angered then Mayor Carlos, Sr.;23that
when Floro was processing a voucher worthP70,000.00, Mayor Carlos, Sr. refused
to sign the same and even threw the voucher on the floor saying "let this be signed
by Vicente Cotero"; and that Floros cousin, Diego Casas, helped Floro secure the
Mayors signature by ensuring Mayor Carlos, Sr. that Floro was for him, and only
then did Mayor Carlos, Sr. agree to sign the voucher.
Diego L. Casas corroborated Elsas testimony relative to the fact that he helped
Floro secure Mayor Carlos, Sr.s signature on the voucher.
Rosalinda testified that at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, 2004, Mayor Carlos, Sr. went to
her house and told her thathe would kill her husband following Floro; that she was
shocked and scared, thus, she went to the Placer Police Station and reported the
incident; that she went to see her husband, who was then campaigning for
mayoralty candidateCotero, and informed him of what happened; and that she went
to Elsashouse and informed the latter of the threat.

Servando attested that at about 7:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, he was in the house of
Mayor Carlos,Sr. together with said Mayor, Nonong, Edgar Estonilo, the group of
Bulldog, Negro, Alias "S" [Ace], Rollie, Nonong, Edel, and Gali; that he witnessed
Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas"; that Servando later learned
thatthe mayors men were unsuccessful in their goal because Floro was no longer
in Barangay Taberna, where they intended to execute the mayors order;and that
Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his men again planned to kill Floro at Celera Elementary
School on April 4, 2004.
DEFENSE: Essentially alibi and denial
Charged: Murder with Direct Assault
RTC: Murder with Direct Assault
The RTC pronounced that the evidence on record showed unity of purpose in the
furtherance of a common criminal design, that was the killing of Floro. Accusedappellants Nonoy and Negro were the gunmen, while accused-appellants Edel and
Nonong served as backup gunmen. Accused-appellant Bulldog, and accused Gali,
43
Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts.
The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have ordered
their co-accused to kill Floro based on the testimony of Servando, who was present
when the group planned to kill Floro. Thus, the RTC concluded that Ex-Mayor
Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-appellant Rey conspired
with his father. In sum, the prosecution was able to establish conspiracy and
44
evident premeditation among all the accused-appellants.
Court of Appeals: Affirmed.
Supreme Court: Affirmed
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be
established:53 (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed;
(2) Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey, Edel, Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine
perpetrators who killed him; (3) the killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses,
Servando and Antipolo, as well as treachery as below discussed; and (4) the killing

of Floro was neither parricide nor infanticide.

Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially contested by the
defense. The Court finds that the prosecution unquestionably established these two
elements.
For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when
joined together point to the accused-appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is
motive to kill Floro. It was Floros support for Vicente Cotero, who was Reys
opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate. Second, the prosecution
was able to establish that the accused appellants planned to kill Floro on two
separate occasions. The prosecution witness, Servando, was present in Mayor
Carlos, Sr.shouse when they were plotting to kill Floro. He also heard Mayor
Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas." Third, Antipolo was an eye witness to
the killing. His testimony was corroborated by another witness, Serapion, who
testified having seen the accused-appellants leaving the school a few minutes after
he heard the gunshots. Serapion also recounted having heard one of them said
"mission accomplished sir," after which, Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered them to leave.
Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and
circumstantial evidence. The testimony of the eyewitness Antipolo is direct
evidence of the commission of the crime.
As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness,
Servando, testified that he was present on the two occasions when the accusedappellants were planning tokill Floro. His categorical and straight forward
narration proves the existence of evident premeditation.
Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be present, two
elements must concur: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. In this case, accused-appellant Nonoy and accused
Negro successively fired at Floro about seven times and the victim sustained 13
gunshot wounds all found to have been inflicted at close range giving the latter no
chance at all to evade the attack and defend himself from the unexpected
onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding
their firearms to insure the success of their "mission" without risk to themselves;
and three others served as lookouts. Hence, there is no denying that their collective
acts point to a clear case of treachery.
On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that

they should be held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with
murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus
agentesunder Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants
committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be
an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in
authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing
his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the
victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the
intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or
an agent of a person in authority.
In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools,
Placer, Masbate, thus, was a person in authority. But contrary to the statement of
the RTC that there was direct assault just because Floro was a person in authority,
this Court clarifies that the finding of direct assault is based on the fact that the
attack or assault on Floro was, in reality, made by reason of the performance of his
duty as the District Supervisor.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for
that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or
homicide.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense,
to be imposed in the maximum period. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have been
death. Plus the fact that there exists an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to
Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is death. But
the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines";
thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon
accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Proper Indemnities
As to the proper monetary awards imposable for the crime charged, modifications
must be made herein. The award ofP100,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral
damages is proper to conform with current jurisprudence.
Further, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as
qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is justified under Article
223060 of the New Civil Code. Thus, conformably with the above, the legal heirs of
61
the victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary damages in the amount
of P100,000.00.

Lastly, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
the damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until
fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
At this point, notice must be made that on January 28, 2014, the Superintendent,
New Bilibid Prison informed this Court of the death of accused-appellant ExMayor Carlos, Sr. on January 9, 2013. In view thereof, the case against deceased
Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is hereby ordered dismissed.

Edmund Sydeco vs. People

November 12, 2014
TICKLER: Article 151; Drunk Driving; Checkpoints; Plain View Lang Boss;
FACTS: On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3
Benedict Cruz III and another officer were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas
Boulevard corner Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they
spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number XAE-988. Petitioner was behind
the wheel. The team members, all in uniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner
to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby, before he
resumes driving.
Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he
could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen
and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "Pg ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." Atthat
remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his team had seen him
swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrest petitioner who put up
resistance. Despite petitioners efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded
in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and
found to be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issued by that hospital,
marked as Exh. "F". Petitioner was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for disposition
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed to be a victim in the incident in question, adding in this
regard that he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary
detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his Counter-Affidavit petitioner averred that, in the
early morning of June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and
waitress, respectively, in his restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay City, were on the
way home from on board his pick-up when signaled to stop by police officers at the area
immediately referred to above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and its
occupants, the policemen then asked the petitioner to open the vehicles door and alight for a
body and vehicle search, a directive he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience.
Instead, he opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain view lang."
Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it turned out, then told
the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of empty beer bottles in the trunk of the
vehicle. Petitioners explanation about being sober and that the empty bottles adverted to came
from his restaurant was ignored and was harassed.
He was charged with: violation of Section 56(f) of RA 4136 and of resisting arrest under RA 151
of the RPC.
MeTC: Guilty

RTC: Affirmed
CA:Affirmed
SC: Petition is meritorious
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between
the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latters refusal to get off of the
vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only.
Petitioners twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order.28 He may
have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a
criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime
or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to
avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key
elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are:
(1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or
gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys
such person or his agent.
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority
or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioners act of
exercising ones right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the middle of the
night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in
contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and
under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but
in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.
Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning
policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body
search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a
crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action. As SPO4
Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was
not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention to invite him to Station 9 so
he could rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending
officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the
vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face. None of
the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioners allegation about being physically
hurt before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the
policemen claimed was that it took the three (3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old
petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136.
They relied on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner showed
no physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact challenged not only because the
petitioner insisted at every turn that he was not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating failed
to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian of the Ospital ng
Maynila, testified, but only to attest that the hospital has a record of the certificate.
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring ones innocence be duly taken into account. Given the deviation of the
police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by
perceived drivers under the influence of alcohol and executing an arrest, the blind reliance and
simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the
conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v. Ambrosio, the presumption
of regularity is merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which
when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this
presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if
not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offenders culpability. In the
present case, the absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving

coupled with the forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or
at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.
In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or
at least in favor of the milder form of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic,
almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution
which must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
hereby acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal Case No.
052528-CN.