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CONTENTS
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
JOURNAL ARTICLES
WORLD WAR II GERMAN CRYPTOLOGY
NSA Technical Journal Articles:
Cryptanalysis in The German Air Force - April 1959 - Vol. IV, No. 2
"'TOP 5EERH-
?_bjJ aUlet
The r~port from which this article is taken was prepared after World
War II at the request of an Army Air Corps team interrogating former
Axis COMINT personnel. The extract is published here for its general
interest to readers of the J ourna\.
I.
A SHORT HISTORICAl. SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TilE F.ASTERN CRYPTANALYSIS GROUP OF TilE GERMAN AIR FORCE
During the period of preparation for the establishment of the intercept equipment of the Air Force in 1936, the first State employees intended for cryptanalysis (who were all of them civilians up to the outbreak of the war) were sent to the permanent intercept posts of the
Army in the East for the purpose of basic training. The results of
this training were unsatisfactory because the Army was reticent in releasing even the most elementary information, and furthermore, because the individuals sent lacked in most cases the necessary qualifications for their work; the personnel officials made their selections on
anything but a proper basis, and appointed many persons who turned
out to be completely unsuitable for the work of a cryptanalyst. The
creation of a capable and successful cryptanalytic group was accomplished only in the course of the following years of tiresome work,
without outside assistance, and through an internal development
achieved by dropping numerous unsatisfactory elements.
In the summer of 1937, four cryptanalysts were working on Soviet
traffic at the Cryptanalytic Bureau of the Air Force (Chi-Stelle).
The other Eastern powers were either treated very superficially, largely
as a side issue by our Soviet section, or not processed at all. The
cryptanalytic groups of the outstations of the Air Force Intercept
Service (cover name: "Radio Weather Receiving Stations") also consisted of a few poorly trained and often incompetent workers. A
worth-while organization for breaking new systems was developed only
at the cryptographic bureau. The outstations were barely able to
decode the encoded messages with the code in front of them.
At the outbreak of the war in 1939, the cryptanalytic groups both
in the central office and in the outstations had grown to about 10 men
each, and they were included in the newly established intercept companies. .The training of the individual analyst was continuously improved through conferences, short training courges, and exchange
groups. of key men for instruction purposes.
73
JOP SEER!'!"
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W. WERTHER
GERMAN CRYPTANALYSIS
10' 5liCll.EI..
CRYPTANA'~YT'C
SM.,"TION.
The attitude to he taken on the problem, "Centralization or Decentralization," is determined by the present characteristics of the
Soviet cipher traffic (strong differentiation and regional division of
cryptographic material).
74
75
2.
GERMAN CRYPTANALYSIS
W. WERTHER
to assume direction of a cryptanalytic group without, or with insufficient, professional knowledge were always thoroughly disappointing.
For mere organizational activity (assignment of personnel, arranging
work schedules, etc.) without actual professional knowledge leads to
constant wrong decisions and has a most harmful effect.
All cryptanalytic work is a matter of trust; a man cannot be forced
to decrypt, and the actual amount of work done cannot be exactly measured, since unfortunately, the amount of work spent on cryptanalysis
does not always bear a direct relationship to the success achieved. For
these reasons, if for no others, the chief must be able to judge his colleagues not only professionally but also as to character.
By means of daily, even though short, conferences the chief must be
in a position to be able to follow continually the work of every individual man, in order to be available with advice and assistance when
the inevitable stoppages occur. In such conferences, moreover, current organizational ills and desirable transfers of personnel will become
evident.
Particularly difficult prohlems are handled personally by the chief
analyst with the assistance of especially good troubleshooters. He is
the man who is always there when.the wagon gets stuck in the mud;
once it gets going again, he cart simply turn his attention to new difficulties and leave further work on the old system to his colleagues.
Because of security, the work of the cryptanalyst must always go
unrecognized by the outside world. It is all the more the responsibility of the chief analyst to encourage his colleagues by just praise,
and to see that the accomplishments of his people are appropriately
valued by the "higher-ups" (say, at inspections).
c. Work Shifts
During the war, the personnel of the cryptanalytic section worked
on two (early and late) or three (continuous) shifts. The exact division of time depends on the amount of work and the size of the space
available, and must be adjusted to new conditions rather frequently.
The assignment of personnel to the shifts takes particular care,
because the abilities of the members of the shift must be carefully
balanced.
d. The Shift Chief
The shifts take care of the current reading of traffic and the simpler
decryptions. The organizational head of the shift is an experienced
and responsible man, who as such is responsible for the entire process
on his shift. He divides the work coming in in accordance with the
instructions of the chief cryptanalyst, and must be able to judge the
difficulty of the work processes in order to recognize and adjust over76
TOP 5EeRET
TOP SEeRET
'\
TOl' SECRET
TOP SEREL
GERMAN CRYPTANALYSIS
W. WERTHER
f. Further Treatment
By reworking the material returning to the cryptanalytic section
after exploitation, the codes are extended by additional recoveries.
During the first years of the war, the break-in could be considered as
the essential crypto-technical process, but lately the emphasis ha.~
shifted more and more to a processing of the system and reconstruction of the codes.
g. The "Gadgeteer"
It appears advisable to have a worker in each cryptanalytic section
who can make the various aids for additive-eneipherment solution,
such as sliding tables, drum systems, codes, and so on, in simple and
useful forms, and who is always available. By this specia1i?.ation of
one ingenious man much time can be saved, and the neatness and usefulness of the gadgets can he assured.
5.
IRINelrLf;~
a. Team Work
The most fruitful form of cryptanalytic work is the collaboration of
a few mutually sympathetic analysts, who naturally get together on
the handling of more difficult problems without direction from above,
and who supplement each other in their intellectual make-up. Alongside the precise, inexorably logical and constructive systematizer with
perhaps only a fair knowledge of the language, there are the superior
linguist who may not be so good at putting two and two together and
the sensitive artist whose strong point is intuition. When one of
these tires and begins to have his doubts, the common work is carried
on, nevertheless, by the impetus of the others. Discussions bridge
gaps in the ideas .of the individual, and arguments crystallize correct
knowledge and break down unclear and botched ideas. In short, the
problem is illuminated from all sides.
c. Statistics
The statistics are to the cryptanalytic expert at once the essence and
the chemical analysis of the message, and the most essential aid in his
work. A careless count can be worthless, leading to false deductions,
and thus seriously delay the course of solution. For this reason the
use of assistants who are employed on the basis of their previous tmin-
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79
Insofar as the necessary material is available, the message is immediately decoded, so that there may be no unnecessary time lags, suchas
may seriously reduce the value of the message.
c. Analysis
TOil
~!~REI
T8f 5EEORET
ing and limited 'intellectual penetration, as "mere statisticians" is extremely dangerous and objectionable. Each cryptanalyst must be, required to make the necessary statistics for his own work. The processing of very difficult and extensive systems, e. g., superencipherment with long keys, which requires weeks of mathematical and
statistical work, is, of course, an exception.
d. The ResponsiMlity of the Processor
e.
,Me~age
W.
GEllMAN CRYPTANALYSIS
Translation
tion sections do not know the language well enough-and that, unfortunately, was the situation except in the Regimental Evaluation
Unit--all messages solved must be translated.
At first, analysts were made responsible for the translation of their'
own meSsages. This procedure, however, proved to be most impractical, for a l;lrge part of the cryptanalytic personnel did not have a
good enough knowledge of the language to make a satisfactory translation of the difficult and partly garbled message texts:
As a result, mediocre cryptanalysts with very good language ability
were gathered together into a special translation group. Working
under Content }<;valuation they handled all solved material and could
be developed into good' translation specialists and at the same time
used as assistan l evaluators. Over and beyond that they i>e<'.ame something of a check on the work of the cryptanalytic section.
80
g.
WERTHER
TOP SE'AIiT
TilE
CRYPTANA,.YST~' TOOLS
a. General Aids
In the course of the continuous development of military language
the good linguist daily encounters unknown words, expressions and abbreviations. in this case, technical dictionaries, lists of abbreviations,
and training manuals of the enemy render, general1y speaking, good
service. But since the editing of such special aids usually takes a long
81
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",.'
GERMAN CRYPTANALYSIS
W. WERTHER
majority of the captured material was either well out of date (during
the first days of the War in the East, for example, codes were captured
dating' from the year 1935) or already superseded because of compromise. Moreover, air-ground tables from shot-down aircraft could
very seldom be exploited, because of the short effective period of these
tables (usually only one mission).
b. Special Tools
In working on a country for a long time the classical language statistics (monographic, digraphic, and trigraphic frequencies, etc.) drop
into the background. The few rules of thumb which are still used become general property.
Novices and less-sure linguists have used list.s, partly prepared by
themselves, in which characteristic expressions are analyzed. Sometimes, these "crib-lists" have served a good purpose, but they are
looked down on by experienced analysts.
The compilation of a vocabulary from the multiplicity of reconstructed and a few captured code books t.o form what we may call an "ideal
COdl' book," proved to be particularly useful in filling out partial recoveries. Such ideal code books were published a number of times
during the war.
In the course of the years, some twenty st.atistical procedures have
been developed, most of which have been used for 'current operations.
The archives of previously read messages are, of great value as
visualization material 'in work on new systems from known' nets and
in further training of cryptanalysts.
Daily summaries in the form of leaflets or card files on the occurrence of individual systems, on the relationship between systems on
the one hand, and call signs, address and signature groups, place names,
indicators, characteristic headings and characteristic message construction on the other, complete the list of aids for the cryptanalyst.
c. Explo'itation of Captured Material
Although the German Army intercept service captured a great many
codes during the advances in the East, the amount of captured material
in the Air Force (partly because of the more extensive front) was insignificant, sO that no reduction in the work load was noticeable. A
1.
82
83
Tap lij;Ai:r
1QP liiRET
TOI' 3EEORET
GERMAN CRYPTANALYSIS
them; that each technical specialty is, to a certain extent, a tool subject for the others; that an individual section can never work successfully alone. At the beginning of the war, there were attempts for
security reasons to keep the various sections separate from each other
and prevent any exchange of ideas; this insane plan was dropped very
shortl:v.
b. Cooperation of 1M Cryptanalytic Group with Other Cryptanalytic Units
W. WERTHER
TQP 5EERET
c. Cooperation with Other Branches of the Armed Forces and Foreign In-
tercept Services
Even thougb the field of work of the individual cryptanalysis sections
waS definitely limited by the nature of Soviet cryptographic methods,
New systems were exchanged constantly with the regiment by teleprinter, and their designations were selected by the regiment. An
exceptionwas made sO.that the radio star net.of the intercept service
in the East could be used for the exchange of communications between
the sections. A special cipher system was available for encoding radio
messages concerned with cryptanalysis. It may' be worth mentioning
that at times a Soviet code book was used a... the basis of this system.
Cooperation with the Navy was not so close, largely because of the.
difference in technical interests; otherwise, what has been said concerning cooperation with the Army also applies here.
.,er
SEAit.
84
85
fer
SEEAIiT
lOP :;EER!;T
8.
GERMAN CRYPTANALYSIS
THE CRYPTANALYST
a. Mental Requisites
The prime requisite is a lively interest in the work. A man with~ut
enthusiasm and interest in the work cannot be forced to accomphsh
anything. He is merely an obstructive foreign body.
The cryptanalyst must be intelligent and mentally very alert, but
the ability to associate ideas must be held in cheek by a well-developed
critical faculty. A mere day-dreamer is inconceivable as a cryptanalyst.
The ability to work scientifically, i. e. systematically, is a further
essential. The peculiar character of the profession all too often involves having the work of days, or even weeks, prove usel~ss ~nd
being continually obliged to try new ways of reachmg the obJectlVe;
in such a situation indomitable persistance is the only resource.
Good knowledge of languages is indispensable. At least, if a man
has no satisfactory knowledge of languages, he must show a pronounced feeling for languages.
The mathematical ability so often called for or. presupposed does
indeed belong among the essentials, but this talent is not to be confused with mathematical schooling. The best cryptanalysts with great
analytic and constructive talents have, as a rule, no notion of the
theory of combinations. The few mathematically trained workers on
the other hand often use their knowledge merely to calculate, on the
basis of well-known formulae, how many possibilities this or that system permits-the system being generally broken by others.
Two other elements must not be forgotten: intuition and--Iuck. I
mean that luck which in the long run falls only to the lot of the competent. These notes indicate sufficiently that, on the basis of the
requirements set forth, the professional ideal can. 0~1~ be reached by
very few. Hence in the interests of the work the mdIvIdual must have
a definite community feeling; he must not be a mere lone wolf. Most
successes in cryptanalysis are not the exclusive work of an individual
but are group accomplishments, which have resulted from technical
discussion, from mutual criticism, and from an integration of intuition,
systematic work and diligence.
There is no cryptanalyst whose knowledge covers the entire field.
The reason for this is to be found less in the mental acumen of the
analyst than in the inventors of the systems worked on, and in. the a~
cidental allocation of the individual, usually made on the basIs of hIS
linguistic knowledge. Each one is master only of t?C systems and the
tricks necessary for the solution of the systems whIch he has actually
worked on, and worked on not for a short time-perhaps at some school
or in a course-but in actual practice over a long period. An outstanding analyst, who has worked, let us say, for years only on the substitu-
'FOP
5~EAn
86
W. WERTHER
TOP
!!~IU:T
A cryptanalyst is developed almost exclusively by on-the-job training in a section. He is first apprenticed to some experienced analyst.
Of course, he doesn't have everything served him ona platter; he has
to inquire and work his way into each new point, and every trick of
87
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TOP SI!CRET
GERMAN CRYPTANALYSIS
W, WERTHER
88
89
"TOP 5EERST
lOP 91!CRET
,I
UNCLASSIFIED
In 1942 the U.S. Army Signal Corps was looking for college graduates to train in radar
work, which was then new and promising. I enlisted, and after, six months of pre-radar
courses in calculus, physics, chemistry, and radio theory at Rutgers University, I found
myself in Camp Crowder, Missouri, the Signal Corps basic training center.
Once I was there, a classification sergeant informed me that Camp Murphy, the radar
facility in Florida, was overcrowded and that I'd be assigned to some other training.
Checking my academic record and Army Classification Test score, he suddenly asked me if
I had ever heard of "cryptography."
As he thumbed through his manual, my memory reverted to a cryptanalysis course
that my fiancee had taken at Brooklyn College, given by Professor Jack Wolfe of the math
department. She and I would sit in a sunny meadow in Prospect Park, and I helped with
the frequency counts. My reverie was broken by the information that I was to be sent to
Vint Hill Farms Station, near Warrenton, Virginia - close enough to my New York home
and my wife-to-be to please me no end.
Vint Hill was an unusual army camp - in a bucolic setting, with evergreen trees
surrounding the barracks and woods all around. It was a hush-hush place, and we were
constantly warned to keep it so. One of its two parts was devoted to cryptanalysis studies,
and the other was a working radio facility.
The students were men of strong academic backgrounds and achievements. Of course,
there was a large supporting cast of administrative cadre who tormented us with the usual
army routine - drills, hikes, KP, inspections, and the like. However, there was
communion among the "crypt" people as a result of the learning atmosphere and the
intellectual interest engendered by these new and uncommon studies.
Our classes were taught by sergeants. Once in a while an officer would appear from
Arlington Hall, but Vint Hill was an enlisted men's camp and school. We religiously
followed the texts of William Friedman and considered him our mentor. Men left after
unpredictable time periods to join active units in both main theaters of the war. Most
seemed to end up in our own signal centers and were involved with security matters.
After seven months I was called in for an interview, and I was asked if I knew any
German. I had studied the language for two years in high school and was able to read and
translate a newspaper handed to me by an officer. He said that would do just fine, and I
was assigned to a special class being formed.
31
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY
The new class of about thirty men was taught by a very bright Sergeant Dineen. He
hadjust returned from Arlington Hall where he had been briefed on two German systemsone a lower-grade code and the other a medium-grade field cipher which the British had
started to break. We learned about the cryptographic nature of the systems and then
something of the analysis procedures. I knew then that working on them would be
intriguing beyond compare. I found out I was right when I got a chance to work on the
cipher as a member of Signal Security Detachment D, an element of General Omar
Bradley's Twelfth Army Group.
In April 1944, I and other embryonic codebreakers debarked from a large troop ship in
the bombed-out port of Liverpool, England. Our group was brought to London and billeted
near Marble Arch. The next day we were brought to an apartment building on Weymouth
Street that had been given to the Signal Corps for its intelligence work. A number of
comrades and I were assigned to a breaking section working on the German army mediumgrade cipher. We had been familiarized with it during our last month at Vint Hill and
were told that the British had made good progress with the breaking. The system was
used by all levels of the German army, from army groups on down, seemingly where the
highest-level means (Enigma) were not necessary or available. The encryption method
was a clever variation of the Playfair that rendered breaking very difficult. We called it
NI, short for Non-Indicator, as the early intercepts showed no indicator. To the enemy it
was Doppelkastenschliissel (Two-Box Cipher).
At Weymouth Street it became apparent that all the operational work was performed
by us enlisted men. This contrasted with the British army, where our equivalents were
officers. Our men and officers were mostly professional people and scholars. On the whole
they were older than the average G.!.
Our first weeks were spent on practice problems and perfecting our skills. We also
took a class in military German. Although all of the men had had some past school contact
with the language, this taught us likely army vocabulary. Oddly, however, many of the
people who succeeded best in code breaking had limited facility with German. The
language experts, both trained and German-born, tended to see more than really was
present in cipher text, and they neglected the more important principles as frequency and
combination, which led to gradual but surer results.
Soon we were thrown in with the earlier arrivals, and we began to work on current
intercepts. Before the 1944 invasion, the enemy signal units on the Atlantic Wall
practiced their cryptography and radio transmission constantly. Often they sent personal
messages, newspaper articles, nursery rhymes, and the like. As they practiced, so could
we, and thus our skills were improved.
When the Normandy invasion began, the breaking proceeded apace. We gleaned both
tactical and strategic information that was coordinated with other forms of signal
intelligence, such as direction finding and traffic analysis. As our armies pressed inland,
it was decided to form a mobile unit to accompany the advancing allied armies. This was
necessary for two reasons. Firstly, our radio-intercept companies had to be near the front
UNCLASSIFIED
32
UNCLASSIFIED
in order to read enemy traffic more accurately. Secondly, they could send intercepts to us
quickly by messenger.
I was chosen for this unit along with a mixture of the newer and the more experienced
men. The unit was called Signal Security Detachment D, afterwards always S.S.D.D., and
it was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Allen. We were attached to General
Omar Bradley's Twelfth Army Group, but we always stayed by ourselves in the field.
S.S.D.D. consisted of various sections representing all phases of signal intelligence:
1. Cipher-breaking Team. This was my group. It was headed by Sergeant Howard
Arnold, a fine cryptanalyst from Providence, Rhode Island, who later became president of
a large department store in his home city. Besides continuing his own breaking activity,
Howard supervised the group in a laid-back and thoughtful manner.
33
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY
headquarters of Generals Bradley and Dwight Eisenhower in the Hotel Alfa. After the
Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, we went through parts of Belgium, entered
Germany at Aachen, and after four months of movement, ended the war in Forchheim,
north of Nuremberg.
As noted previously, all the operational work was performed by enlisted men. Many of
the officers were sent by the Signal Corps to supervise subsidiary functions, such as
transport and billeting, and had little knowledge of our work. Occasionally, men from the
intercept units drifted in and out of the central groups, seemingly to absorb some notion of
what was being done. Of course we had our own intelligence officers, and two in particular
deserve special note for their hands-on attitude and productive work.
The officer supervising my cipher-breaking section was the very erudite Captain
Benjamin Schwartz. He was a family man, over forty-five, who had volunteered to
contribute his expertise to the war effort. Schwartz was skilled in Sanskrit, other ancient
Indic languages, and several modern tongues, and he had headed departments for those
exotic languages in the New York Public Library and the Library of Congress. He
instructed us in cryptanalysis, watched over our daily efforts, and assumed a rather
paternal role toward his men. He was a person who cared, and that meant a great deal.
Captain Howard Mendel supervised the traffic analysis team. He worked at it
incessantly, and he was an intelligent and effective participant throughout. He was
wounded in Luxembourg when a stray airplane bullet went through his side, but much to
the reliefofhis men, their Howie soon recovered and came back.
Soon after we landed, an unexpected development struck our cipher-breaking section.
Many of the approximately sixteen cryptanalysts - no matter how adept they had been in
training classes - seemed unable to cope with a real-life situation in which a solution
might not exist. A substantial portion of the enemy traffic could not be solved, and this
uncertainty created a psychological barrier that stopped men before they started. As a
consequence, many faltered and produced few results.
Four of our men did most of our breaking. They were George Hussey of Bronxville,
New York, and Eric Porter of EI Segundo, California, who worked marvelously together,
Howard Arnold, and this writer.
Though we were the signal intelligence arm of the Twelfth Army Group, S.S.D.D.
traveled by itself in the field. We were an isolated outfit, known only to the intelligence
people. Our security and secrecy were superb, even within the outfit. People in one section
knew very little about the doings in other sections. On a few occasions, senior officers from
headquarters stopped by to express appreciation for our results, and they would mention a
specific case or two that were outstanding.
Our daily intelligence production was notable from the start, but it reached a
crescendo during the three months in Luxembourg. Our deciphered intercepts, traffic
analysis, and direction finding indicated unusual enemy activity before the Battle of the
Bulge began on 16 December 1944. tjudge that people at army group headquarters simply
UNCLASSIFIED
34
UNCLASSIFIED
did not evaluate these data properly. It probably seemed impossible to them for the
Germans to stage a major armored offensive over unfavorable terrain, especially when
most of their forces were tied up on the Russian front. After the Ardennes offensive was
stopped a month later, the cipher section broke the radio traffic to the German units
retreating from the Bulge. It revealed the detailed instructions to each unit as to exactly
where it should be virtually every minute of the day. With the skies now clear, the Allied
air forces made very effective use of this information.
In January, S.S.D.D. moved again through different parts of Belgium and entered
Germany, remaining there until the end of the war. We stayed near Cologne, crossed the
Rhine at Remagen, camped at Bad Wildungen, and were in Forchheim, Bavaria, on VE
Day. We then moved to the town of Russelsheim, where everyone wondered what our
destination would be in the war with Japan. But that soon ended, and gradually we
worked our separate ways home.
Many of us had a strong affection for S.S.D.D. Our fellow soldiers were often quite
accomplished and thoughtful. There were professors, attorneys, classical musicians,
writers, and businessmen-all on their way tojoin the hopeful postwar world.
A short, personal epilogue: Several years later, I visited Captain Schwartz in
Washington, D.C. He had stayed in the army and had become a colonel in Army Signal
Intelligence. We were happy to see each other and had much to discuss. He thanked me
for my wartime efforts and then offered me an immediate commission to reenlist and come
to work with him. I'm afraid that my destiny was as a civilian, but it was gratifying to
have the praise and appreciation of the boss.
35
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY
System Rules
The NI cipher combines a transposition, or more precisely, a seriation of the plain text,
and then two Playfair-Iike encipherments. The apparatus of the system consists of two 5x5
random-alphabet squares (which omit J) such as those in figure 1.
Box 1
K
E
X
M
Q
A
Box2
0
F
W
C
Z
B
V
G
D
G
V
B
U
K
P
I
U
T
S
F
N
I
L
0
Z
C
M
A
H
Y
W
Q
X
A plaintext bigram, say ED, is enciphered by finding the first letter in Box 1 and the
second letter in Box 2. In this case E is on row 2 of Box 1, and U is on row 4 of Box 2. The
two letters are considered as diagonal corners of a rectangle, and the intermediate cipher
bigram is those two letters which complete the rectangle, namely VR.
Box 1
K
E
L
R
H
Q
A
Box 2
N
0
F
P
I
Z
B
V
G
G
V
B
U
K
S
F
N
I
L
Z
C
M
P
Y
E
D
R
W
Q
X
T
The bigram VR is now itself enciphered just as the original plaintext bigram was and
the resultant diagonals form the final cipher letters - QZ.
Box 1
K
E
Box 2
Z
B
L
R
F
W
C
V
G
D
G
V
B
P
I
U
U
K
UNCLASSIFIED
36
S
F
N
I
L
Y
E
D
C
M
R
W
Q
X
T
UNCLASSIFIED
If the two letters of a bigram to be encrypted lie along the same line in both boxes, we
take the letters immediately to the left as cipher values. These we called liners. .For
example, DL = KC. The rectangular cases we called diagonals.
Box 1
K
E
L
R
H
X
M
Q
A
S
Box 2
N
0
U
T
G
V
B
U
K
H
Y
E
N
I
L
0
Z
C
M
R
W
Q
X
T
D-L
L-D
L-L
Plain text
en
ea
gi
yr
Intermediate
FL
HK
uw
oz
Cipher text
NC
TT
XP
HM
The seriation of the plain text consists of writing in blocks of two lines of twenty-one
letters each. For example, using the first line of Heine's poem "Die Lorelei":
Ich weiss nicht was soll es bedeuten
dass ich so traurig bin
and replacing the common ch combination with q:
q w e i s s n i q t w a s s 0 1 1 e s b
e d e u t e n d a s s i q s 0 t r a u r i
g b
i
The vertical bigrams (I-E, Q-D, W-E, etc.) are the pairs actually enciphered:
G G y Q Q D C M A R N E R Q WM B G Q T B
i q w e i s s n i q t w a s s 0 1 1 e s b
e d e u t e n d a s s i q S 0 t r a u r i
U Z Y Z S Z I Q I Q I y A R U F S T Z U N
X B
g b
i n
p 0
37
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY
The cipher text is then read off horizontally in groups of five letters for transmission.
GGYQQ
UFSTZ
DeMAR
UNXBP
NERQW
MBGQT
BUZYZ
SZIQI
WIYAR
Each German division had its own set of cipher boxes. It was assigned six different
boxes for each day. These were paired in different combinations for each day's eight threehour periods. In effect, there were eight keys per day.
The German encipherers followed certain conventions, though they grew lax as the
war progressed. They placed an X before and after all numbers, proper names, place
names, sentences, within abbreviations, and at the end of plain texts having an odd
number of letters. As a result, plaintext X had an abnormally high frequency and tended
to mask the identification ofthe usual high-frequency German letters.
The word zuiei ("two") was changed to zwo, and ch plain text was changed to q,
distorting the frequency of q also. The use of occasional "quatsch" (German for nonsense)
sequences was encouraged to distort combinations and frequencies.
All in all, the Germans seemed to feel that the NI system was impervious to timely
cryptanalysis. They had readied a different system on general security grounds but kept
the NI right to the end.
UNCLASSIFIED
38
UNCLASSIFIED
1205
MXY
URT
A-V 0 L V V K X R K C X V R B X A B A S K D
D F X E G K M N Z I W B T A W P F Y 0 K E
B- G K S Q A V I S K S N U T E K 0 C K C G F
V U A Z N R I M Z R W I F G K K K L T T D
c, W P
N M Y Y K G C C D Y M W0 K F I S M Q
T D Q Y C X K D Y P 0 P I S Z F L S 0 A E
D-U Q D 0 U N K I N D H G 0 Y P H M K N Y B
I Q M Q Y D K B F A G Q D M D A A I 0 Y F
E-D 0 E R F B P V P U
L K D I 0 R E M Q 0
1215
REX
IXY
F-M U
M V I
P Q K 0 I
B V 0
WD U
1240
ZBT
QLS
G-K L 0 A Z W S E Z U C K S P K 0 T X C y U
K S L F Q M F D X D P Z Q X N M 0 V K D S
H-C X S Z 0 K W
K C A C M K P
1305
RLS
BNQ
1- K N D C V M K S A N I
K
U P 0 K Z K A Q I
L Y S M C A P WB Q
K C L S K W S X C G
J- Y K C S I U T 0 S G M D 0 G K K C K o 0 H
W L D MZ Z P K A S Y A R Z K Q M K V Z B
K-N C F Y K F
L U T T Z A
39
UNCLASSIFIED
CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY
UNCLASSIFIED'
1340
DEF
GHI
L-K U G Y X K W S K R M K A U 0 V H K K N C
K K B W W Z H M M Z U K E B K B G K F I P
M-V C G 0 S 0
CK0 K I WA S VKF S U A
B Q Q 0 V S R P L K Q I
B F R M K S X I N
N- S N 0 0 V A
A Z M K R P
1350
paR
CLV
0- T C K U
N U K 0
1415
QZB
LTS
P- V D L V V K B U 0 U S H W V D Y E B Q 0 G
D F X E G K Z WZ K A Z X D F P D 0 A Z Q
U K y L K U G 0 K I X WZ L a X F K C
K P 0 K E W I o VK T M M X C S N R X B P
Q-K F
R- X P B T M K F a T L S C 0 A N I M P S P Z
N Q F B D K S Z Q p A A B R I I P Q A X T
Fig. 5. Transcribed messages for a single period
Usually we needed a sufficient number ofletters in the same key to make inroads into
the cipher. We were delighted if many more letters arrived for a three-hour period, but
often not enough traffic was intercepted to afford us an entry.
To illustrate the solution of the cipher, I have composed a sample problem of eighteen
lines of cipher text supposedly intercepted from units of one division during a three-hour
period. Also listed are the times of transmission and the callsigns of the sending and
receiving radio stations. Each pair oflines is given a line identification letter (see Fig. 5).
The messages have been manipulated to allow showing a number of techniques in a
relatively short space. This sample is much less difficult than the messages we
encountered, although the language is typical of the German radio traffic ~fthe time.
Knowing how the system worked, we were able immediately to rewrite the intercepted
messages in two lines of twenty-one letters each. Once the messages were in this form, we
made a bigram frequency - one of our most useful tools. The count was made in a 25x25
matrix on graph paper.
Each line of the problem was given an identifying letter at the left, as can be seen in
-figute-6: "When a bigram was entered on the frequency count, that line-identification
letter was entered in the appropriate square instead of a tally mark allowing us to locate
the occurrences rapidly (see Fig. 6).
UNCLASSI FIED
40
UNCLASSIFIED
With the frequency count as a guide, we attacked the messages using a technique we
called anagramming. This started with an assumption - an educated guess - followed by a
good deal of trial and error. The intent was to substitute these plaintext assumptions
throughout the problem, check surrounding values, and search for clues to expand our
guesses.
We could not immediately start reconstructing the boxes even when our assumptions
were corroborated because of the double-encipherment feature. The middle bigram is
unknown, and a workable number of plaintext values must be ascertained before a start
can be made in forming the boxes.
In the frequency count, we find that KK cipher text stands out with the highest count
by far. We can start by assuming that it represents ee. We replace KK with ee throughout
the text and see where it leads us.
The Germans often sent very short messages that reflected basic military necessities
and which were therefore constantly repeated. The most common six-, eight-, ten-, and
twelve-letter messages were known to us. Curiously, we were almost never given
information about the military situation that might yield more specific probable words for
our attacks. I don't know why. Perhaps it was security, perhaps ignorance, perhaps lack of
time.
Note Line 0 in our sample problem:
Line 0-
T C K U
N U K 0
To the experienced eye, this is a dead giveaway. The Germans were constantly asking,
"What is your position?" or wie lage. The phrase might be preceded by a "please" or
"request" or an addressee, but time was critical, and the eight-letter message was common.
We thus have assurance that our KK = ee assumption is probably correct, and we
have:
Line 0-
wi e 1
T CKU
N U K 0
age x
Our initial assumption has grown: We now have plaintext pairs wa, wg, and lx.
The Germans used many stereotyped openings. With experience, we cryptanalysts
could recognize them. For instance, messages frequently began with an ("to") followed by
the person or unit receiving the signal.
We are fortunate in having three of our practice messages begin with KK cipher text.
In German military text, about 95 percent ofthe time a message starts with e, the opening
41
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
A
A
CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY
OJ
GM
Q R S
AN
BGH
U V W
Y
A
I
F
I!
GL
APP
KO
r,tR
DM
P
CL
DI
CD
~~
DM
JM
FI
LR
LM
BJ
0
BOM
Cl
HQ
UNCLASSIFIED
EO
LO
AFP
AP
P
rJp
fR-
GR
B
A
AC
8M
BM
AQ
BM
C
PQ
Q
CP
K
G
42
FI
L
M
~Q
CJ
A
I
E
BHJ
NPR
R
ERR
I
~C
I}Q
1
Cl
0
GH
N
J
Q
FR
EJL BJ
MO
BQ
JL
~!U
LL
BEl
MR
DL
CD
DI
lwR
MQ
BM
EGP
G
H
G H
C IR
D
JL
R
AL
C
G
UNCLASSIFIED
words will be one of four: erbitte C'request"), eigene C'our, our own"), ein C'a"), and eins
C'one"). Let us see how this works in our text.
If we try erbitte in Line I, the final e falls on ciphertext KZ, which has a high frequency.
(Frequencies are always our strong ally.)
Line I -
e r bit t e
K N D C V M K SA.
K SUP 0 K Z K A
e
Line L-
e i g e nee
K U G Y X K WS K R MK A .
K K B WWZ H MM Z U K E .
e
e
Although these are only the upper values of bigrams, when they are substituted
throughout the text, we gain opportunities for assumptions for additional anagramrning.
For example, bigram CP in Line I has a rather high frequency, and it is a good assumption
that the bottom plaintext letter is e.
We now examine other lines, with our assumed plain text entered, and see what can be
done:
Line A -
e nne
VDLVVKXRKCXVRBXABASKD
DFXEGKMNZIWBTANPFYOKE
e
Units in the field constantly sent reports to various headquarters. German operations
officers in a unit's staff (G-3 in American nomenclature) had the designator 1a. Messages
to higher headquarters often began "an roem eins Anton" C'to roman numeral one Anton" "Anton" being the German phonetic equivalent of our "Able"). Line A has several values
that fit this possibility:
Line A -
anxroernxeinsxanton e
VDLVVKXRKCXVRBXABASKD
DFXEGKMNZIWBTANPFYOKE
e
Often this opening was followed by "enemy something or other" as "enemy tanks, or
planes, or troops." ("Enemy" is "Feind" [noun) or "FeindIiche" [adjective] in German.)
That seems a likely entry here because of the KK (ee) second from the end on top and
around the bottom where "Feindliqe" connects with it. Now we have six more probable
equivalents to substitute throughout.
43
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Line A -
CRYPTOLOGICQUARTERLY
anxroemxeinsxantonfei
VDLVVKXRKCXVRBXABASKD
DFXEGKMNZIWBTANPFYOKE
ndliqe
e
Let us examine one more short message to see if anything can be made of it:
Line F -
t tea
MUM V I B V 0
P Q K 0 I WD U
That first word just has to be bitte ("please"). But please what? A common request was
for a situation report, and a frequent sixteen-letter message was therefore bitte lage
meldung ("situation report, please"). Checking the frequency chart also shows higher
counts for a few of the cipher bigrams that accord well with their plaintext equivalents
(e.g., II = e d has a count of 5 and VD = an a count of 3). We always looked for frequency
indications that tended to confirm what were still only assumptions. Thus we have eight
more probable bigrams:
Line F -
bit tel a g
MUM V I B V 0
P Q K 0 I WD U
e mel dun g
It was a good break if we found two messages with the same beginning. It was
especially helpful if the beginning was longer than twenty-one letters and thus continued
on the second line. Such a case may be seen in Lines A and P. We have already
anagrammed some of Line A, and it seems as though it may share the first twenty-seven
letters with Line P. Note the six-bigram repeated block at the beginning of Lines A and P
and the repetition of vertical bigrams at positions 1 and 14 of Line P.
Line A -
Line P -
anxroemxeinsxantonfei
VDLVVKXRKCXVRBXABASKD
DFXEGKMNZIWBTANPFYOKE
ndliqe
e
anxroemxeinsxantonfei
VDLVVKBUOUSHWVDYEBQOG
DFXEGKZWZKAZXDFPDOAZQ
ndliqe
nd
Thus it seems we have another fifteen upper letters to substitute in the problem.
One of the greatest helps to the cryptanalyst is to know what the enemy is likely to
talk about. There were plenty of the German equivalents of "enemy," "aircraft," "troops,"
"armor," and so on. But by far the most common words were the cardinal numbers: eins,
UNCLASSIFIED
44
WWIIGERMANARMYFIELD CIPHER
UNCLASSIFIED
zwo, drei, etc. Supply reports, casualty figures, radio frequencies, times of day, location
grids, and much more all required numbers.
Often when no other openings were visible, numbers could be spotted in the middle of
messages - after some judicious assumptions based on frequency and combinations. The
ten digits were frequently used in groups (e.g., four digits for the time of day plus uhre,
"hours") and were separated one from another by X.
Security violations and operator mistakes greatly helped us. Of course, we were
always looking for that rare happening - the same message sent in plain and cipher textbut that was rare.
Let us examine Line G of the problem:
Line G -
e
e ie
KLOAZWSEZUCKSPKOTXCYU
KSLFQMFDXDPZQXNMOVKDS
e
We already have some letters of Line G, one of them being an initial e. Now look in
figure 5 at the header of the message:
ZBT
QLS
1240
The alert cryptanalyst now rubs his hands in glee because he realizes that the careless
German code clerk has included the time of day at the beginning of the message. (This
occurred once in a long while.) We now have the following:
Line G -
einsxzwoxvierxnulluhr
KLOAZWSEZUCKSPKOTXCYU
KSLFQMFDXDPZQXNMOVKDS
e
There is a slight problem here because the code clerk accidentally omitted the X after
null, but that is seen when uhre fits into the bottom e of cipher KK.
The above examples should give a good idea of how the initial plaintext wedges were
made. Again, I caution that the sample problem is contrived - it was never this easy. Very
few of these entry points, if any, appeared within the same three-hour period. It took a
very patient cryptanalyst to find correct plain text in the average set of messages.
This involved daring assumptions and detailed tracking of surrounding bigrams to
find promising combinations. Trial and error, persistence, and some sixth sense could lead
to progress. We stuck with a three-hour period as long as it seemed to show promise - a
large volume, a good frequency count, likely plain texts. Conversely, we abandoned a
period for a new one - usually on the basis of instinct and experience - when we were
getting nowhere.
45
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY
Once a sufficient number of bigrams was recovered - one cannot quantify it exactly we set about trying to reconstruct the cipher squares, a process we called "boxing." This
could be the most daunting task of all. As the squares were completely random, we did not
get help from any pattern or keyword.
The first step was to make "encipher" and "decipher" charts. These were large sheets
with 25x25 matrices, each cell with four quadrants (see Fig. 7).
II
"\I cI IIII
T: GI:
B
Ii
L
I Q II
AI
II
Ii
II
II
I,
GI I,
II
Ii
I
II
I
Ii
I [
I Z II I G II
I W I
II L I
E\
1-:
ID
II
Ii P
I Q II
Ii Q I
/I P
I
/I
II
Ii
Ii .
II
Ii
Ii
I
I 5
II
..
II
/I
I""
II
/I
II K
II
/I
/I
1M
II
II
I Mil
II
1101
II . I
I K II I K II
I
"I
II Z I
I
I.
I
I E II ~
I
Ii . I
I
I
I !\ Ii I
10/1
/I
I! li I
I /I
I
/I
1
/I
/I
I
I
I
I
II
II
I
I C /I
I
C
/I
I
/I
,
I
II r I
II
II
I
I
II
I
II
II
\I
/I
II
II
II
p;
II
I B
11
BI
II A I
I \V II Y
FI
II
II
II
I
I
I
I'"I A
II
I
II
II P
II
Ii
II
The charts were over a foot square and were preprinted for us in horizontal sets of two,
which made it easier for us to fill in and work from both at the same time.
In the encipher chart, the bigrarn coordinates of the matrix represented the plain text,
with the cipher equivalents written in the appropriate square. The first letter of the cipher
bigram was written in the upper right quadrant of the square, and the second letter in the
lower left quadrant, thus serving as a reminder of which letter belonged in which box.
The decipher chart was the reverse. The coordinates were the cipher bigrams, with the
plaintext bigrams written in the upper right and lower left quadrants of the inner squares.
The upper left and lower right quadrants were reserved for the unknown intermediate
bigrams of the cipher which might be discovered as we progressed with pencil and paper.
These charts now served as the the software for the computer in the cryptanalysts' minds.
With graph paper and pencils, the problem then was to somehow string these letters
together so as to recover the original cipher boxes. For a start we used numbers to
represent the middle letters, and then by using other related values we tried to "hook"
UNCLASSIFIED
46
UNCLASSIFIED
some of the letters together. Except in the unlikely event of a very great amount of
anagrammed plain text, this became an eye-twisting exercise in frustration for several
reasons.
First, we had no idea of the middle bigram. Second, as I explained earlier, the final
cipher bigram can be the result of four possible enciphering combinations: diagonaldiagonal, liner-diagonal, diagonal-liner, and liner-liner. Third, we had no idea of which
letters in each box were on the same line, or in the same column, or opposite which line in
the other box.
Fortunately, the inherent properties of the boxes and the enciphering method offered
ways to help reconstruct the boxes. I will use the cipher boxes of figure 1 to illustrate the
three most useful phenomena.
1. Reversibles - If the middle bigram of the encipherment is a repeated letter, the
result of the second must be the reverse of the original plaintext bigram:
ed
= HH = DE
This can result only from a double diagonal, which is a clue we really need in our
boxing effort.
2. Reciprocal - Assume a plaintext bigram enciphered via two diagonals. If the
reverse of its cipher bigram happens to be a plaintext bigram, its own cipher equivalent is
the reverse of the original plaintext bigram:
(1) ne
= AW = XM
(2) mx = WA
= EN
ke
xe
ne
ze
ye
= AR
= AA
= AW
= AG
= AU
47
= XX
= EX
= XM
= UX
= XR
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY
When the middle bigram is reenciphered, since the first letter (in this case A) is always
the same, the final bigram can consist of only one of five values in each box, instead of the
usual twenty-five: (in this case U, I, E, M, or X in Box 2, and X, M, Q, A, or S in Box lor
letters to the left when a liner is involved).
So if we find a pattern of repeats going down a column of our charts, there is a greater
than normal chance that the corresponding outside letters on the left are on the same line
in their box. This can be fortified if another column shows a similar pattern. None of this
is certain, but it bolsters the odds.
From this point, the cryptanalyst resorts to trial-and-error boxing. If the reader has
experience with a particularly difficult Playfair cipher, where it appears that some letters
must be all at once on the same row, in the same column, and on the diagonal with others,
he will have some appreciation of what we faced.
Common Boxes
As mentioned earlier, each German unit was supplied with a group of six boxes for the
day. Since two boxes were necessary for each of eight three-hour periods, some of the boxes
were used more than once. For instance, Boxes 1 through 6 might be used as follows:
Time of Day
Box Combination
0001-0300
0301-0600
0601-0900
0901-1200
1201-1500
1501-1800
1801-2100
2101-2400
1&2
3&4
4&1
5&6
3&5
2&6
5&2
6&3
The difficult and crucial breaking was of the first workable period that appeared
during the day. This was not necessarily the 0001-0300 slot but the first period with
enough text to attack. We called that the original period. Which it would be was not
predictable; no period was regularly the busiest. After that a search was made for other
periods that used one of the two boxes now known. If one was discovered, its period was a
rather easy one to solve.
Locating a common box in the double encipherment was not simple. A period had to be
anagrammed and boxing started before there was a basis for comparison. However, once a
common box was spotted, an experienced analyst could quickly reconstruct the second one.
I would like to discuss the major reasons for the NI cipher-breaking being so difficult
and daunting.
1. Volume:
The enemy changed its boxes every three hours of every day. The
quantity of cipher text available in a three-hour period was often insufficient to work with,
or just marginally sufficient, and might not bear fruit.
UNCLASSIFIED
48
UNCLASSIFIED
YY I
i q w
e d e
U S .A
V Q D L A Y N L U X L P WQ Y V T F
e i s s n i q t w a s s 0 1 1 e s b
u t e n d a s s i q s 0 t r a u r i
T AQC YXYAQXX C KK R X G
Ct: YYIVQ DLAYN LULXP WQYVT FUSAR TAQCY XYAQX XCKKR XG
R
It will be seen that our task was much simplified. The diabolical middle bigram no
longer exists, and the analyst can use a reciprocal process of simultaneous anagramming
and boxing. Some salient helping points are as follows:
1. When enciphered, a plaintext letter must result in a different cipher letter in the
same box. Thus, for example, bigram ab cannot possibly show a cipher B on top or a cipher
A on bottom. This helps prevent wrong anagramming.
49
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CRYPTOLOGIC QUARTERLY
I, and that Y in Box 1 is in the same column as u in Box I, or in the same line adjacent to u.
Single values are far less useful in double encipherment.
3. Plaintext assumptions lead more quickly to boxing contradictions than they do in
double encipherment, letting us discover anagramming errors much earlier.
Unfortunately, while these aids are valid, they were rather moot in practice. Often the
reason was the lack of sufficient traffic in any three-hour period. Add to this the numerous
garbles, and breaking the cipher was still difficult - especially in a usable time frame.
Nevertheless a large vol ume of the single encipherment was broken in time to be of use.
Because of security necessities and our isolation, we were largely in the dark as to the use
of our information, but we were assured by officers from General Bradley's headquarters
that it was of constant and great value.
To sum up, I found that breaking the NI cipher system was a complex and often mindbending process. It would be interesting to learn if it were the last of the "pencil-andpaper" systems used by a major army in a major conflict. It was tempting to think of it as
"interesting" or "intriguing," but in wartime that seems incongruous. Perhaps now, many
years later, we can study it with a greater degree of academic equanimity.
UNCLASSIFIED
50
/
(b) (3)-P.L.
86-36
~]9-29-2CHJ8
1918-1945
1918-1938
Cryptolol!,ic Bureaus
The three cryptologic bureaus which existed during
World War I continued in operation after the Armistice.
The responsibilities of these bureaus were clearly defined.
and they functioned, so far as can be determined. as the
main cryptologic organi7.ations within the German
Government until )933.
The first of these, the Cipher Bureau of the Ministry of
Defense, was responsible for workinJt on foreign army
cryptographic systems. The second, the Cipher Bureau of
the Forei,gn Office. was assiJtned foreign diplomatic
systems, and the third. the Cipher Bureau of the German
Navy. forei}(n navy systems. All three were also
responsible for insuring the security of counterpart
German communications.
~.,
.iCRE"- 25
til
thetxlStlll,l:
Other Cr,'Yptolof!.ic
26
SECR~T
Efforts
Authori~y
MiniSlr~'
llf
[he
...
~27
:iECRE~
di~fus~illns
28
!SECitEY
iiAKDLE
e IX
t.O.Vhi4 i
(.Ph\J4.4[L~
OPiI.Y
Conclusions
I
Ijoined NSA in 1956; since then he
has worked mainly in the collection and SRA fields.
and at present With the NCS Press. He has contrib.
uted a number of, ~rticles to Spectrum and other
Agency publications.
(b) (3)-P.L.
'(:JJ:'z~JtJl:J.!i
UNI.Y
86-36
..sECRET
29
UNCLASSIFIED
David Kahn
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Unlike political circles, the military welcomed
communications intelligence. In fact, in the field it
became the most important source of enemy intelligence.
In only one place does the Treaty of Versaillesmention
intelligence agencies. Its table listing German infantry
division strengths allowed the signal detachment to
include an intercept section. The German army did not
use the men for the low-level work that had been
intended, but assigned them instead to the army's 12
major radio stations. In 1925, with Germany increasingly
departing from the Versailles restrictions, the army set up
six posts specifically for interception. Each had three or
four receivers served around the clock by about 20
radiomen, The difficulty of following foreign maneuver
traffic from these fixed locations led in 1928 to the
erection of mobile direction finders near the borders, and
two years later to the creation of mobile interception units
which evolved into mobile intercept companies. Directing
this work was first the Cipher Center and then the new
agency organized by about 1939 in the army command:
the Main Intercept Post.
The intercept organization was part of the signal corps,
which was headed by General Erich Fellgiebel. He was
subordinated in wartime to the chief of the general staff;
he served simultaneously as head of armed-forces
communications, making him also the superior officer of
OKW/Chi, A bespectacled, kindly, well-liked officer in
his early fifties, divorced and remarried, a former chief of
the Cipher Center, Fellgiebel won high praise from the
OKW chief, Keitel: "In his field a pronounced leader
type with broad vision, a gi ft for organization, full
energy, , , satisfied even the most unexpected and
difficult requirements." But Keitel added that Fellgiebel
inclined to an "unconsidered mania of criticism" towards
Naziism. And indeed FellgiebeJ participated in the 1944
attempt to kill Hitler. His hesitancy in sealing off
communications to the Fuhrer headquarters after the
bomb went off contributed to the failure of the plot, for
which the conspirators, including himself, paid with their
lives. He was succeeded in both his army and armed
forces offices by General Albert Pr aun, 49, a short,
pleasant, extremely capable signal officer who had also
led an infantry division and who was, Chief of Staff
Guderian wrote, a "good National Socialist."
These two men, especially FellgiebeJ. presided over the
remarkable expansion of German army communications
intelligence in World War II. It provides a classic case
history of how an intelligence organization develops in
response to the requirements of intelligence consumers
and its success in satisfying them.
At the stan of the war, army communications
intelligence operated on four levels: the Main Intercept
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
delivered the most valuable enemy intelligence that came
to German army generals during World War II.
The work of many of the officers in many of these
posts can be illustrated by the daily routine of a young
lieutenant, who despite his low rank became in effect the
commander of Communications Reconnaissance 2, the
regiment that served Army Group Center. He was Fritz
Neeb, a stubby young Viennese who had been interested
in cryptology as a teenager. He read everything he could
find on it in the Austrian National Library and cracked
the cryptograms that friends made up for him. Through
some blunder on the part of the German army, he was
actually put into the kind of work 'for which he was best
suited. He served in communications in the Polish and
French campaigns and the first part of the Russian-early
in which, while a member of the 137th Communications
Batallion, he captured 130 Russians 20 miles behind
their lines. One day his major met an old friend, the
colonel commanding the Army Group Center
communications reconnaissance regiment. The colonel
told the major of some of his problems, and the major
responded that he had a young lieutenant who had
resolved those same problems within his battalion. Three
days later Neeb was at the regiment's headquarters.
Codenamed HEINRICH EAST, it was located on rwo
floors of a former Russian secret police building in
Smolensk. Neeb was at first just one of several able
evaluators but as first one and then another of the officers
departed, and eventually the chief himself was
transferred, Neeb became virtually the commander of
HEINRICH EAST, with its 400 men, and made the
daily reports to the army group G 2 Colonel Rudolf
Christian Baron von Gersdorff.
His day began when he got up about 11 p.m., after the
most important reports from the subordinate companies
came in. He looked through these, gave assignments as to
how they were to be handled, and from about 3 to 5 a.m.
assembled the daily report, either by dictating it or by
simply assembling the rewritten drafts of the subordinate
companies' reports. Between 5 and 7 a.m. these reports
were teletyped to the Main Post for Communications
Reconnaissance and to the subordinate armies'
communications reconnaissance companies. Five or six
copies went to the G 2 and other officers of his own army
group. If no immediate questions came in, Neeb could
then go to sleep about 6 or 6: 30; otherwise, 7: 30. He
awoke again around noon, ate in the officer's mess, put
out a short so-called "advance report" of four or five
pages with the most important new information, and then
prepared for the daily G 2 situation conference in
Gersdorffs office. These began at 4 p.m. and sometimes
lasted three hours. Here the leaders of the various organs
of specialized reconnaissance submitted their results and
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of the transmission, the calling station's sign, the called
station's sign, and cipher recognition groups as he wrote
down the intercept.
These intercepts poured out of the radio room, where
the monitors sat with their headphones on, into an
evaluation center. Each command level had such a center,
corresponding in size co the volume and complexity of its
work. The centers divided into subsections for traffic
evaluation, direction-finding evaluation, contents
evaluation, and final evaluation. The raw data could often
reveal much. Long wave lengths often meant higher
staffs; short waves, corps and division staffs; ultrashort
waves, armor. Since not every unit held every cipher, the
cipher recognition groups helped define communications
nets and so, by implication, command organizations.
Supplementing this was direction-finding. Monitors in
widely separated locations turned the movable antennas
of their specialized radio sets until they heard an enemy
transmitter at its quietest. A calculation indicated in
which direction it was. They reported this direction to the
direction-finding evaluation subseccion. It plotted, on a
map, the bearings given by several monitors. Where these
lines crossed marked the location of the enemy
transmitter.
The traffic evaluacors then listed on cards all stations
using a certain frequency, all stations called by a
particular call sign, and all known locations of the
different stations. They diagramed these relationships and
saw what patterns emerged. One station addresses
messages to many others, which seldom
intercommunicate; direction finding shows it further to
the rear. The evaluators deduce that it represents a higher
echelon commanding the others. A higher volume of
traffic on one circuit may portend an attack, a withdrawal,
a relief, perhaps only a disciplinary problem, but almost
certainly something. The evaluacors followed the
movements of the stations. Often they were extremely
acute. Once the Russians sent an armored army toward
Stalingrad while leaving some of the army's radiomen in
its old location to give the impression that it was still
there. But on the march, one of the radiomen who had
gone along inadvertently transmitted. The Germans
picked up his transmission, recognized him, and
concluded that the armored force was moving south,
probably toward Stalingrad.
Valuable as these inferences from the traffic patterns
were, they could seldom provide the insights that the
actual contents of the enemy messages could. Many of
these were unenciphered. Indeed, at the lowest level, such
cleartext radio or wire intercepts provided about 95
percent of communications intelligence. Sometimes they
shocked with their revelations of enemy attitudes. In
Russia on 17 February 1944, the 17th Panzer Division
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Tochka:
Rokot:
Tochka:
Rokot:
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a division. At the higher echelons, where orders live
longer and therefore allow more time for encipherrnent,
the proportion of cryptograms increased, until at the top,
practically all messages were enciphered. They were
obviously of far greater importance than those in clear.
To get to their contents, the Germans had to crack open
their cryptographic armor. As the enemy improved his
cryptographic protection during the war and extended it
to more classes of messages, the German army's
cryptanalytic establishment grew to keep pace.
The Main Intercept Post had only a handful of
cryptanalysts at the beginning of the war-five for all
Britain, for example. By 1942, it had 200, divided into
country sections and such service sections as those for
Hollerith machine processing and for archives. It attacked
not only the enemy high command systems but also those
unsolvable by field echelons, which worked on the
simpler cryptosystems of the enemy units on their level
opposite them.
At first the Germans had relatively good success with
the Russian codes. The solved messages, said the
cryptanalysts of Army Group North in 1944, "contain
operational combat reports, statements about assembly
areas, command posts, loss and replacement reports,
reports about chain of command and positions prepared
for the attack (e.g., messages of the 122nd Armored
Brigade on 14 and 17 February)." These results came
from only a small proportion of the intercepts. In the
thirteen months from 1 May 1943 to 31 May 1944,
Army Group North intercepted 46,342 Russian
cryptograms. It solved 13,312, or less than one in four.
Its commander of communications reconnaissance
explained why:
"It is only infrequently possible to get enough
identically enciphered messages from the same net to be
able to solve the current systems." Later he adduced
additional reasons:" ... a growing complication in the
systems used by the enemy ... a greater care in
enciphering ... (avoidance of identical addresses and
signatures; names and phrases with characteristic endings
and patterns, which must be given in code form in
individual letters or syJlables, were either enciphered
abbreviated or were inserted in cleartext)."
In other words, as Russian code construction and
discipline improved, German cryptanalytic success
declined. Whereas from May to August 1943 the Army
Group North code breakers always solved more than 34
percent of all intercepts, from January to May 1944, with
even greater monthly volume, they never solved more
than 33 percent. These almost never included the toplevel command systems. It was the same for the western
Allies. In general, the Germans failed to read the
messages moving in the higher command nets.
The cryptanalysts passed their solutions CO the contents
evaluators, who passed their conclusions in turn to the
final evaluators. They combined these conclusions with
those of the traffic evaluators. Often their analysis could
precipitate precious observations. The evaluators of
Intercept Company 3.jN.7 Ord company of
Communications (Nachrichten) Battalion 7) did so for
the 11 th Army in March of 1942.
In its drive to conquer the Crimea, the 11 th Army had
split the Russian forces on that peninsula. It had penned
some in Sevasropol in the west; it had not yet swept away
those in the eastern portion, an elongated peninsula
ending in the city of Kerch. These Russian eastern forces,
controlled by the Crimean Front, continued to assemble
troops for a counteroffensive. The intercept company
concentrated much of its effort at determining the
composition of these forces, since this would help the
Germans know how many of their own troops they might
have to use to repel the Russian attacks in their rear.
This was the situation when, at 7: 16 a.m. on 13
March, the company intercepted a message to an
unknown radio station with call sign SOTD. It was
addressed "To the chief of communications of the 44th
Army." This indicated pretty clearly that SOTO was the
44th Army, and since company's records showed that
direction-finding had located SOTO transmitting from
near Kerch, the company could report a few hours later to
the intelligence officer of the 11 th Army, .. 44th
Army definitely on the Kerch Peninsula." It was one
more element in his picture of the enemy.
Though these chains of hypotheses might seem to have
led to freq uent error, constant observations corrected
wild reasoning and kept the results close to the facts. A
few days after the intercept comr.any identified the 44th
Army, it assigned radio station OPWCH {O the air staff
of the enemy's 51st Army on the similar basis of a message
address. But the following day, it recognized that the net
to which OPWCH belonged was in fact identical to a net
of the 44th Army .. according to the net construction,
frequency notifications, and statements of the
monitoring radiomen." OPWCH was therefore a station
of the 44th Army, the company concluded, and had
probably merely accepted the message for forwarding
tothe51stArmy.
Through such detailed and often wearisome activity,
German radio intelligence units contributed enormously
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to German tactical and operational intelligence. In these
low and middle echelons, it warned of enemy attacks,
provided solid information on enemy order of battle and
enemy weaknesses, and saw through both radio silence
and radio deceptions.
In Russia, for example, the Main Post for
Communications Reconnaissance issued a report each day
listing all enemy troop units recognized or confirmed
through communications intelligence. A typical such
report ran 14 pages for Soviet army units, 2 for partisan
forces, and 2 for air units. From the south to the north of
the long Russian front, it dealt with the major commands,
as far down as divisions. "5th Guards Army. Directionfinding for the army command from 24 August [1944 J
indicate the area southeast of Staszow [Poland].
According to a message of 7: 30 a.m. 25 August it is
changing its location," read one entry. Another entry,
based on a Moscow broadcast praising heroic units, listed
a score of divisions, their commanders, their location, and
their subordination. This top-secret report, produced in
37 copies, went to Foreign Armies East, where it joined
other sources in creating a picture of the Soviet forces
opposite the German.
In France in 1944, the higher commander of
communications reconnaissance likewise achieved good
accuracy in determining American order of battle.
Between D-Day and 25 June, it recognized the presence
of the U.S. 1st Army, 4 corps, and 15 divisions or pares of
divisions. Under the VIIIth Corps, for example, it
correctly listed the lOlst and 82nd Airborne Divisions
and parts of the 90th Infantry Division. Much of this
information later appeared in the order of battle reports
of the G2 of the commander-in-chief west. Toward the
end of June 1944, the breaking of a logistical code used
by the senior officer, Ferry Control, in the area of the
British 2nd Army in Normandy gave the Germans exact
figures on the personnel and e<J uipment brought in there
for the bridgehead. They learned, for example, that in the
24 hours starting at 6 p.m. 1 July, the Allies unloaded
4,371 tons of supplies, 1,232 vehicles, and 1,700 men.
Of more direct value were those results that told of
upcoming enemy measures. On 14 June 1944, German
radio reconnaissance in Normandy ascertained the
bringing up of the U.S. XIXth Corps and concluded the
following day that a major attack would take place in that
area. The attack did occur-and was halted that same
day well short of its objectives by stubborn German
resistance. On the 19th radio reconnaissance intercepted
orders for Allied air units to take aerial photographs west
and southwest of Caen, with a deadline of the 25th. This
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But communications intelligence did not invariably
enable the Germans to win victories. Sometimes its
information. though correct when delivered, was falsi fied
by enemy plan changes that it did not detect. For
example, in 1943, the commander of communications
reconnaissance of Army Group North reported: "An
intended Russian attack on Staraya Russa was recognized
on 25 June, which was to begin at 2300 hours 25 June
and in which 6 armored battalions, among others, were to
take part. The attack, however, was not carried out,
probably because of the unfavorable weather conditions."
Communications intelligence was also often nullified
by any of the host of nonintelligence factors that
determine success and failure in battle. On 9 August
1944, the Main Post for Communications
Reconnaissance disclosed in its report that "11th Guard
Army gets order to improve clothing, get new underwear.
all airplanes to be overhauled and prepared for flight,
provisions to be improved and three hot meals a day
served." The next day, the Germans, who were preparing
a relief operation, learned through radio intelligence that
two of the 11th Guard Army divisions were ordered to be
ready to go into action against enemy attacks by 5 p.m.
When the Germans began their drive on the l oth, the
11 th Guard Army responded with a counterthrust, just as
predicted. But this forewarning did not enable the
Germans to stop the Russians, one of whose platoons
carried the ground war. for the first time, onto the soil of
the Reich.
And sometimes communications intelligence simply
failed. The evidence on which it rested was
ethereal-peepings in rad iornen' s earphones-and could
be suppressed or faked. Occasionally the Germans turned
radio silence against its users: the 7th Army G 2 declared
in France in November 1944 that radio silence suggested
Allied attack preparations. But in North Africa, the
British concealed a division very close to the front by
shutting off their radios for several weeks. Radio silence
also preserved surprise for many Allied landings in Sicily
and Italy. Radio deceptions sought to fool the Germans.
The Russians tried this every few weeks, but the Germans
always seemed to see through them. On the other hand,
the British successfully covered the transfer of three
armored divisions from one point in the line to another
during the Normandy battles through radio deception.
Perhaps the most common failure was simply
rnisevaluation. In November 1940, the chief of the
general staff, Halder, thought that an intercepted message
referring to a transfer of headquarters might mean that
the English were about to occupy all of Ireland to get the
western harbors. He was all wrong. Before Leningrad in
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have permitted the solution of a dozen or so would have
taken too many cryptanalysts away from work that,
though lower in echelon, was more certain of results. So
the Germans did not seek to crack these high-level
messages, and after a while they even gave up intercepting
them. This was their unacknowledged admission of defeat
in the most vital sector of the secret war.
10
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Wilhelm Flicke
In
the West
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25
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Germany would not fail. Anyhow, one could not count
on a conciliatory attitude in either France or England.
On 'l:7 January was broadcast Churchill's speech in
which he said: "Hitler has already lost his best
opportunity. "
On 9 April the German people were suprised by the
information that "German troops have undertaken the
protection of Denmark and Norway." The National
Socialist Government tried, naturally, to throw all
blame on the English and Norwegians. Of course no
mention was made of the fact that the invasion might
not have been successful, if the intercept service of
the German Navy had not ascertained the position of
the British naval forces and calculated the time so
that no suprises need be feared from that quarter.
Despite heroic resistance, all Norway was occupied
within four weeks during which the German intercept
service played a notable role against both land and
naval forces. At Narvik, both the British and Norwegians used radio very incautiously. The course of
British ships could be followed perfectly at all times.
Several Norwegian units were encircled and captured
because of their incautious use of radio, and the
capture of Bergen with its war stores was possible only
because of frivolous use of radio.
Of course the Germans sometimes made mistakes,
too, and the British followed German ship movements.
Simultaneous with increase in military radio traffic
at the beginning of these operations was the enormous
increase in diplomatic and press traffic. It was interesting to see how the German advance against the two
northern countries affected neutral lands. While the
German press tried to characterize the whole action
as a "British Crime" against which the entire press of
the world was clamoring indignantly and while German
papers were printing quotations from foreign papers,
which had been paid for with German money, intercepts from foreign countries gave a very different
picture. British action against Norway had been
started only after Germany's intention had become
known to England at the last moment. Consequently
it was not England but Germany that had attacked,
and this unjustified attack in defiance of all international law lost Germany the respect of the world and
laid the groundwork for her defeat.
On 9 May one of the leading German newspapers
carried the headline: "Stupid British Diversionary
Maneuver." The content was to the effect that the
discovery by Germany of ostensible British plans had
produced such an impression in England that they
were resorting to diversionary maneuvers; news was
being spread abroad that Holland was sorely threatened by Germany. There was a false report that two
26
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out with the aid of the fleet. Both were right everything depends on the point of view.
Once again there came a period of tense expectation.
What would happen? Would the Germans turn south
and attack the French divisions on the Aisne and the
Somme, or would they follow British troops across the
Channel? The word "invasion" began to spook around.
The German High Command diligently spread the
news that it was preparing to invade at once. In any
case the fate of France was virtually sealed. This
seemed to be a suitable time for Italy to enter the
war. Pressure was put on Mussolini. A feverish exchange of telegrams between Berlin and Rome began.
And finally it happened. On 10 June 1940, from the
balcony of the Palazzo Venezia, Mussolini proclaimed
to the Italian people and to the world Italy's entry
into the war on the side of Germany. This was
speculating on a cheap victory, on sharing the spoils
after France had been completely subdued and England had pulled out of the war, as it was expected to
do.
But even in this seemingly so favorable situation,
the true attitude of a large part of the Italian Officer
Corps, in particular General Staff Officers, was and
remained adverse both to the war and to Germany. A
not inconsiderable group of officers was outright antiGerman in sympathy to such a degree that this could
be clearly recognized from intercepted Italian traffic.
We shall have occasion to speak of this later. For the
moment, however, the chances seemed to favor the
two Axis Powers and for the moment this outweighed
everything else.
The battle along the Aisne and the Somme began
and in a few days the French army was split into four
groups. On 15 June, German troops crossed the Loire.
On 18 June Hitler and Mussolini met in Munich to
discuss the terms of an armistice. On 22 June, the
armistice was concluded in the Forest of Compiegne;
the French fleet remained in French harbors.
France was beaten. Hopelessly beaten in an astoundingly short time. How could this country, protected by
the most modern line of fortification and with its
strong army, be conquered so easily? For one thing
the Germans, contrary to French expectation, had not
hesitated to attack two neutral and almost defenseless
countries, Holland and Belgium, and thus to reach the
French frontier where it was least well protected.
Moreover at the beginning of the war France was
distinctly inferior in materiel. There was lack of
planes, armoured tanks and other war equipment.
Despite all warnings, including repeated reports to the
Deuxieme Bureau regarding German armament, those
in control refused to believe there was any serious
danger.
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that England had no thought of submission. Moreover,
voices from America also had to be taken seriously.
While the public was thus forced to settle back and
wait for the invasion which Hitler said was coming, it
was remarkable that all preparations for invasion were
carried on in the open instead of being carefully
camouflaged as usual. Details which normally would
have been strictly secret could be heard everywhere,
until one almost had the impression that the invasion
was nothing but a bluff.
Interception of English traffic, however, gave the
impression that the British were counting on an
attempted landing. Their air reconnaissance of points
where the Germans were concentrating small boats
became intensive and the assemblies were bombed
constantly.
Meanwhile the air war against England began. It
was supposed to break the will of the people to resist,
but it soon brought two disappointments: first, the
British fighter defense proved far stronger than expected; second, the effect of the bombs was by no
means as great as had been expected. Furthermore,
German aircraft losses increased rather than decreased
- some days a hundred or more machines were lost.
Careful monitoring of all radio traffic between Great
Britain and the U. S. A. showed no indication of any
letup in England's will to resist. Week by week the
United States was growing closer and closer to Great
Britain. Unmistakably there was a resolve to put an
end to the conquest of one country after another by
National Socialism. The attitude of the U.S. A. was
expressed in a speech in Philadelphia on 18 August by
Mr. Bullitt, former ambassador to France.
Since the air war was not achieving its purpose, the
German Government proclaimed in August a "total
blockade of England." This step was aimed primarily
at the U.S.A., but its effect was like pouring oil on a
fire. It really betokened German weakness rather than
strength.
While the German press printed long-winded articles
on the effect of German air attacks on London, only
small type was available on 10 September for the news
that the House of Representatives had on the day
before accepted the Bill for Compulsory Military
Service. The question was no longer, "Will the U.S.A.
fight?" but, "When?"
Supposedly, the invasion was to take place during
the night of 15-16 September 1940, but the English
fighter defense was still too strong, the Navy was still
intact, and German preparations were too inadequate.
Only a few of the 1,000 large transport gliders called
for had been completed. The espionage service had
almost completely failed to function; in particular the
establishment of a network of radio agents had never
28
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for the organization of a large scale spy network for
the English secret service. The reverse of the medal
lay in the fact that the Polish Government in London
talked too much out of school in its exchange of
telegrams.
The cryptographic systems of the Polish Government
in Exile for the most part had been solved in Germany.
Consequently, insight was obtained into the thinking
and the plans of influential English offices. It could be
seen that the British took the invasion seriously for
only a short time. In any case, they were ready to
accept it and were resolved, in case it succeeded, to
continue the struggle from overseas. The fleet was to
go to America and the struggle would be organized
anew from there. Africa was to constitute the starting
point for the attack on the Axis Powers. There were
similar revelations in the intercepted traffic of diplomats representing other nations.
The German plan aimed, by threatening British
possessions in the Far East, to force Britain to change
her military dispositions. The idea appeared very
clever and in those days Ribbentrop was considered in
Germany a very competent and clever diplomat. However, he had neglected one important factor: should
Japan try to disturb the balance of power in the Far
East, this would inevitably arouse opposition in the
U. S. A., and relations between the two countries were
already tense due to the conflict in China. When the
Japanese raised 'this objection, Ribbentrop assured
Wilhelm Flicke worked in German cryptologic organizations, as an analyst and administrator, from World War I through World War
II. The rights to his Kriegsgeheimnisse in
Aetber, which covers both wars, was purchased
by the U.S. Government shortly after World
War II.
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29
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Critical Analysis of
German Operational Intelligence
Part II
Sources of Intelligence
16 UNCLASSIFIED
work, and many German field orders stress the importance of the capture, preservation, and quick evaluation of enemy documents; but they paid scant attention to adequate training of personnel, and no
outstanding work seems to have been done. During the
second half of the war, the amount of captured
documents in German hands decreased, owing to the
nature of their defensive warfare, and the opportunity
for good document work became fewer.
That the Germans were capable of good detailed
work is shown by their practice in the Internment
Center for Captured Air Force Personnel at Oberursel,
where all Allied air crews were first interrogated. The
German specialists here realized the value of combined
document and interrogation work, and devised an
excellent system of analysis. In order to identify the
units of their prisoners - a matter of the highest
importance to the Germans so as to analyze the
steadily increasing size of Allied air fleets - they
went so far as keeping card files on the types of ration
cards issued to the Americans, or the type of photographs used for their identification papers, etc. Generally speaking, so exhaustive a study was unknown in
the Army.
A major contributory cause of the weakness of
German intelligence was their loss, toward the end of
the war of an important source of intelligence - air
reconnaissance. The failure of the German Air Force
to stay in the air during the last two years of the war,
meant an almost paralyzing loss of eye-sight to the
German Army. The Germans expended much ingenuity
in the development of other sources of intelligence,
but for the long-range exploration of enemy intentions,
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the loss of air reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, remained a severe handicap. There was practically no air reconnaissance over England prior to Dday, with great consequent advantages to the Allies at
a time when their preparations and concentrations
could hardly have been concealed from the air.
This failure was a purely physical one, for the early
campaigns of the war, when the Germans had air
superiority, showed that they fully realized the value
of serial photographs as a source of intelligence in the
planning of tactical operations. In the planning of the
campaign in France, the field echelons were given
aerial photographs of the Maginot Line, both verticals
and obliques, in sufficient quantities for distribution
down to companies. This undoubtedly helped their
successful campaign against the line.
As the war progressed, there was a definite shift of
emphasis in photographic interpretation from tactical
to strategic considerations, i.e., to photographic reconnaissance and interpretation of enemy air forces,
air fields (France), enemy navies, ports and shipments
(England), air fields and landing places for parachute
troops (Crete), roads and supply routes (Russia). Until
late 1942, photographic reconnaissance planes remained under the commander of the air support
(Koluft ), the officer who was responsible for supplying
photographic coverage to field units. After 1942, such
available planes were taken over by the Air Force and,
though theoretically they were to function as previously, flight missions for photographic reconnaissance
were no longer automatic but had to be requested.
Not only did the quantity of necessary photographic
missions decrease, but the quality of photographic
reconnaissance also deteriorated rapidly when Allied
air strength forced photographic reconnaissance planes
to be equipped to fight and to be flown by men who
were primarily fighter pilots.
Along with the reorganization, useful experiments
which were in progress ceased altogether. Developments in night photography, so important in Russia,
infra-red photography, and penetration of non-transparent intermediaries were either curtailed or stopped
altogether. Technically trained civilian personnel (e.g.,
from the Hansa Luftbild Company j were absorbed
elsewhere, and there was no one left who had either
the technical knowledge or the energy to pursue further
developments in this field. Because of lack of supervision, the entire field of photogrammetry, with the
exception of rectification, was ignored. Finally, there
was no coordinating authority, nor anyone of sufficiently high rank to sponsor air photographs at higher
headquarters. Such were the conditions on the higher
levels. It must be emphasized that, fundamentally,
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17
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the division concerned, where so much more was known
of the terrain and the local problems; and it was often
necessary to refer back a questionable interpretation
to the photographic reproduction section at army
(Stabia) to clear it up. Systematic and continuous
coverage, so necessary for a proper interpretation, was
seldom possible, in view of the many limitations, as
well as the lengthy front of an army and, correspondingly, the sector of a division.
On the eastern front, the Germans attributed the
shortcomings of their photographic intelligence to the
skillful camouflage of the Russians, their excellent
road discipline, and their ability to transport great
numbers of troops at night. Perhaps a more accurate
explanation was the lack of planes and equipment in
the German Army, their poor technique, and the
inadequacy of their personnel, both in quantity and
training. Finally, there was a lack of supervision and
control in the filling of the requirements of ground
force field echelons when the interpretation was done
by Air Force personnel. Technically, German air
reconnaissance, as long as it could be practiced, was
sound; interpretation, even in the first two campaigns
of the war, was never really well-developed or organized.
The loss of air reconnaissance was an incentive to
the Germans to develop their methods of radio intercept work, and signal intelligence later became important on all fronts. In the West, it accounted for
approximately 60 per cent of all intelligence received.
With the development of signal intercept, although
it made no essential difference to the attitude of the
General Staff, there could be found the beginnings of
a higher prestige for intelligence work. Good intercept
work, producing, as it did, almost 90 per cent reliable
information, was invaluable for helping the intelligence
officer to sell himself; and the efforts expanded by the
Germans in this field, in training specialists and
equipping field units with intercept teams, reflect the
greater value they attached to it.
It is true to say that this was the only field of
intelligence in which the Germans came near to an
adequate personnel and technical solution. They
trained and prepared a sufficient number of specialists,
from operators and technicians to mathematicians and
linguists; the amount of equipment at their disposal
was limited by the shortage of labor and materials
and does not seem to have been very plentiful, but, on
the whole, was sufficient to meet the steady expansion
and improvement of the service.
Another important factor in their success was the
close cooperation built up between the intercept agencies and the G-2s of the various command echelons.
This was insured by locating the command posts of
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or at least far behind the actual front lines. They sent
agents who were not employed on front-line activities
through neutral countries, or by parachute, far into
the rear of enemy territory. It has not been possible
to check the German claim that these agents were
reasonably successful, especially in the West. Coverage
of English invasion bases prior to D-day, for example,
was claimed to be adequate, and, until fairly late in
the western campaign, there were no surprises so far
as order of battle was concerned.
Prior to their attack in 1941, the knowledge about
Russia which the Germans possessed was scanty.
Although it is said that the German attache in Moscow
repeatedly informed his superiors of the strength of
the Soviet Union, the Germans either disbelieved his
reports or did not have enough information on that
point from other secret sources. Intelligence on the
whole had greater difficulties to overcome in Russian
than in the West, and the Germans themselves admit
that most of the material available before the inception of the campaign was of doubtful value.
In the short-range secret intelligence the Germans
obtained their greatest successes in Russia and in
Italy, and were least successful in the West. This type
of work was in the hands of Abwehr units and subunits,
which, after the reorganization in 1944, were renamed
intelligence reconnaissance units and subunits (FAKs,
FATs). They were mobile units attached to army
groups and army. For operational intelligence they
were important in two ways: FAKs I (or Abwehr I)
sent agents through the enemy front lines, FAKs ill
(or Abwehr ill) were engaged in counterespionage and
the apprehension of Allied agents behind the German
lines. The counterespionage work of FAKs ill, which
seems to have been most successful in the East in the
appreciation of the Russian employment of agents and
the knowledge of the various missions assigned to
them, formed one of the most important bases upon
which the operational intentions of the enemy could
be estimated. It was complemented by signal intelligence. FAKs ill furnished a consolidated report on the
activities of Russian agents every ten days. These
reports were evaluated by the sections dealing with
partisan matters, where a map was kept showing when
and where the agent was detected or apprehended
and, if known, by whom he was sent out. Army
information concerning the agent's mission was included in a legend to the map. It was found, by
experience, that the entries, as they increased in
density in certain sectors of the front, indicated very
clearly where the Russians were planning to engage in
large-scale operations. It was also found that on those
sectors of the front where a large number of agents
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of Ukrainians, White Russians, and Cossacks, were to
some extent pro-German. This made penetration of
enemy organizations by agents comparatively easy.
Only SS stupidity and unwillingness to arrive at a
political compromise with some of the anti-Soviet
groups in Russia and Poland ruined this fertile ground
for German espionage. In the West, on the other hand,
the Germans were faced by solid blocks of hostile
populations. England, favored by the insular character
of the country, was a particularly difficult problem for
agents. By 1944, France also had become almost
solidly united against the Germans as a result of the
short-sighted manner in which the Germans treated
the French.
Directing secret service work is, perhaps more than
any other kind of intelligence work, largely a question
of personalities. Many agents do not work directly for
a cause, but are mercenaries working for the officer
who hired them. Often they do not even realize what
cause they are working for. This requires a great deal
of personal skill and knowledge of psychology on the
part of the directing officer. In addition he must have
detailed and accurate knowledge of the enemy, of local
conditions and habits, and of tactical situations. He
must work relentlessly and have a love for anonymity.
Altogether the German character, so easily given to
illusions, romantic speculations, and spectacular deeds
does not lend itself too well to secret work. In that
sense, the Germans obviously did not have the right
personalities available when the invasion started. It is
quite typical that, in order to reinforce their organization in the West, the Germans brought, from an
army group in the East, the experienced commander
of a FAK, an officer who had never worked in the
West, but who knew France. It is reported that this
officer, although at first quite unfamiliar with local
conditions, achieved more in two weeks than his
predecessor had attained in six months.
In the East, there was no continuous front line, and
the employment of agents, their infiltration through
the enemy lines, and their return were comparatively
easy. In Italy, the long coastal stretches on both sides
of the country favored the employment of agents, since
they could enter and return from enemy occupied
territory by water around either end of the front. In
the West, however, more or less continuous front lines
existed - at least during the static phase of the war
- that hampered the regularity of such movements.
The Allied employment of agents in the West gave
the Germans little indication of Allied intentions. In
the East, -communications behind the front lines were
exceedingly poor as compared to the West, and the
Russians, in order to gain important data about the
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in the eyes of the rest of the staff. Second, it lessened
the contact between intelligence officers of different
echelons. Many divisions, for example, instead of
placing reliance on the enemy division history folders
produced for them by higher authority (a good feature
of German intelligence), preferred to compile and keep
up their own. The 65th Division in Italy, for example,
built up its own division folder, relying largely on the
results of its own interrogations.
This extent of self-reliance often caused a lack of
harmony in the solutions of the day-to-day problems
in interrogation and appreciation which repeatedly
plagued division, corps, and army intelligence officers.
Foreign Armies
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ployed more than 100 people, whereas Foreign Armies
East had, at its peak, several times that many.
Foreign Armies West, not equipped to deal with
economic matters, gave these only secondary treatment, and relied, to all practical purposes,on the
efforts and results of the Field Economic Office (Feldwirtschaftsamt) in the OKW. Foreign Armies East
paid increasing attention to the questions of the
Russian industrial and armament potential, and organized Subsection IT for that purpose. Foreign Armies
East even joined efforts with the Field Economics
Office by taking as chief of Subsection II an officer
who was also a specialist on Russia in the Field
Economic Office, so that the work of both agencies
was properly coordinated, and each office could utilize
directly the facilities of the other for carrying out its
work.
Through Gehlen's outstanding personality, Branch
Foreign Armies East gained direct influence over
agencies whose efficient functioning was important to
its success. The tactical employment of agents came
directly under the branch, which was able to direct
short-range secret intelligence in accordance with its
day-to-day needs. In the West, there was no such
simple chain of command, and the intellignece reconnaissance units did not do nearly so well.
Such were the main reasons for the noticeable
difference in efficiency between Foreign Armies East
and West. Because of outstanding leadership, Foreign
Armies East received all the support and cooperation
it needed in order to increase its intelligence effort
according to the needs of the German Army. Foreign
Armies West, lacking such support, remained a small
agency too busy with the day-to-day technical details
of work to develop into the large central intelligence
agency which the Germans needed for their great fight
in the West. In neither case, however, while the
Army's and the High Command's attitude toward
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