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Right created by fiction of law where the representative is raised to the place and degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were living or could have inherited.
REPUDIATION
What is collation?
It is the process of adding the value of thing donated to the net value of hereditary estate. To collate is to bring back or return to the
hereditary mass, in fact or fiction, property which came from the estate of the decedent, during his lifetime, but which the law
considers as an advance from the inheritance. Collation is applicable to both donations to compulsory heirs and donations to
strangers.
General Rule:
Compulsory heirs are obliged to collate.
Exception:
1. When testator should have so expressly provided;
2. When compulsory heir repudiates his inheritance
2. Co-heirs Agreed that estate not be divided for period not more than 10 years, renewable for another 10 yrs
3. Prohibited by law
4. To partition estate would render it Unserviceable for use for which it was intended
SUCCESSION SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE
In Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006, there was a petition for the
probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated as Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana. The private respondents
moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will
of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his
eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
hence there was preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic
validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the authority of the probate court is
limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic
validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply
because Segundos will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for certiorari was filed where
petitioners argued as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively
mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof,
and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng
Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of
Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since
there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent
judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic
will.
Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa(Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of
the latters property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be construed more liberally
than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator. In this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the
testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the
will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
Preterition in Succession
With regard to the issue on preterition, the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was the testators last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of his eldest son. Also, he did not institute an
heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners in the document did not
operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between testator and his
son.
Considering that the questioned document is testators holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of
the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of
his property may be rendered nugatory. (Maninang v. CA, 114 SCRA 478).
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
(Cuenco v. CA, 53 SCRA 360).
What is preterition?
Preterition is the omission in testators will of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator. (Art. 854)
all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they
inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them
of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and
adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milgrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children,
namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes
Teves and his two legitimate children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis
supplied)
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of
Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument
entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July
1973. This instrument which constituted a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63,
among other properties, in favor of JLT Agro. On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, JLT Agro, Inc. sought the registration of the subject lot in its name. A
court, so it appeared, issued an order canceling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12 November
1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the name of JLT Agro. Since then, JLT Agro has been paying taxes
assessed on the subject lot.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the
execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and
Hilaria Cadayday. Lot No. 63 was sold to Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. After the death of Don Julian, Milagros Donio and
her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate where Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros and her two
children, Maria and Jose. Unaware that Lot No. 63 has been registered under the name of JLT Agro, Inc., Antonio and Hilaria tried to
register the deed of sale, but failed. They filed a complaint to declare the title of JLT Agro, Inc. void which was dismissed.
The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the interpretation of paragraph 13 of the
Compromise Agreement. It added that the direct adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise Agreement was only in
favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and Emilio. Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification of the
terms of the adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage.
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of
their deceased mother Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latters death. Thus, upon Don
Julians death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, except their proper share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties adjudicated in favor
of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don Julian
was under no impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4) children.
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words shall be:, the adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her
four (4) children was not final and operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian during hid lifetime. It cited
paragraph 14 of the Compromise Agreement in support of his conclusion. With Lot No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian
and Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto except as to the
conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of the latter.
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julians death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer part of his estate since
he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial partition
by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it. Had respondents exercised prudence
before buying the subject lot by investigating the registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds, they would have discovered
that five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203 had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner, the
trial court added.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision.
Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI decision dated 31 January 1964, particularly
paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julians two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate
except as regards his (Don Julians) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and
possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no loner dispose of
the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res judicata. Don Julian could have disposed of only
his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.
The CA likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document
like the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor of his heirs from the
second marriage.
Aggrieved by the CAs decision, JLT Agro appealed to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari, raising pure questions of
law, such as:
a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian;
b) that Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same for his heirs
from the second marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement;
c) that the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage; and
d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious for not containing entries on the Book No. and Page No.
On the basis of the Compromise Agreement, the Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don
Julian from the second marriage became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting
on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents.
JLT Agro argued that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved
prior to the death of Don Julian.
Stated otherwise, may future legitime be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of the owner of a
property? Why?
Held: No. In Blas v. Santos, 111 Phil. 503 (1961), future legitime was defined as any property or right not in existence or capable of
determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession, Article 1347, NCC provides:
ART. 1347. All things where are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the
object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
1. Where the change affects the essence of the will of the testator; Note: When the holographic will had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, and the same did not carry the requisite full signature of
the testator, the entirety of the will is voided or revoked.
Reason: What was cancelled here was the very essence of the will; it amounted to the revocation of the will. Therefore, neither the
altered text nor the original unaltered text can be given effect. (Kalaw v. Relova, G.R. No. L-40207, Sept. 28, 1984)
2. Where the alteration affects the date of the will or the signature of the testator.
3. If the words written by a 3rd person were contemporaneous with the execution of the will, even though authenticated by the
testator, the entire will is void for violation of the requisite that the holographic will must be entirely in the testators handwriting.
NOTARIAL WILLS
WITNESSES IN WILLS
Note: If the witness is instituted as heir, not as devisee or legatee, the rule would still apply, because undue influence or pressure on
the part of the attesting witness would still be present.
It is the law of the country where the will was executed that governs the form and solemnities of wills.
(Art. 17, 1st paragraph; Art. 815)
quite explicit: No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to
prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the
instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose
testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as
required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceedings to
establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is
a matter of public policy. (Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Baluyot v. Pao, 163 Phil. 81 (1976);
Roberts v. Leonilas, 214 Phil. 30 (1984)).
Since the will has not yet been probated, it has no effect whatsoever and it cannot be the
basis of any claim of any right of possession. The defendants have a better right of possession
based on the deed of conveyances executed by the owner in favor of the children, the defendants
herein. (Heirs of Rolando Lasam v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006).
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a
contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception is the
partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080. (Perillo v. Perillo, (CA), 48 O. G. 4444).
For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may
be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following
requisites concur:
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissory has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the general
rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
If the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article. The partition will of course be effective only
after death. It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring
ownership. Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here
after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition
here is merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 1056 of the old Civil Code. The only change in the provision
is that Article 1080 now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old) to partition his estate by act inter vivos. This was
intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a
will with all the formalities provided by law. (Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon, 144 Phil. 558 (1970); See also Zaragoza v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 106401, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 309, 315-316).
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them
among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which
is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives
its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the
intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. (Albela & Aebuya v. Albela & Allones, (CA) G.R. No. 5583-R, June 20, 1951).
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it
would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties
adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was bar hope of succession to the property of
their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the
interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist. (Johnson v. Breeding, 136 Tenn. 528 190 SW 545).
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of JLT Agro, Don Julian remained the
owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his
death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right
cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the
compromise agreement.
Second issue:
That Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to JLT Agro because he reserved it to his heirs from the second
marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement. It was contended that he validly transferred ownership of the said lot during his
lifetime to which the lower court agreed when he executed the Supplemental Deed. The CA reversed, ruling that it was a case of
prohibited preterition of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage. JLT Agro contended otherwise. Decide.
Held: The contention of JLT Agro is correct. There was no preterition. Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa
defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc.,
by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. (Aznar v. Duncan,
123 Phil. 1450 (1966). It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It consists in the silence of the
testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him
anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. But
there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of
a forced heir. (Reyes-Barreto v. Barreto-Datu, 125 Phil. 501 (1967)).
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as
evidence by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the
death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs
from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death.
What is probate?
It is a special proceeding mandatorily required for the purpose of establishing the validity of a will.
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. (Art. 838)
Note: Probate does not deal with the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions. Even if only one heir has been instituted, there
must still be a judicial order of adjudication. Even if a will has already been probated, if later on a subsequent will is discovered, the
latter may still be presented for probate, as long as two wills can be reconciled.