1.

Introduction
Where the Court orders that the summons be served on the defendants in the manner provided in
rule 9 of Order V, it will direct the plaintiff to present as many copies of the plaint on plain paper
as there are defendants within seven days from the date of such order along with requisite fee for
service of summons on the defendants], (Order VII, Rule 9). The plaintiff shall within the time
fixed by the court pay the requisite fee for the service of summons on the defendants. [Order VII,
Rule 9(1-A)].
Rule 10 of Order VII provides for the return of plaint in all cases where a court is unable to
entertain it for want of jurisdiction territorial, pecuniary or other causes. If the court is satisfied
that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit, it is its duty to give effect to that on its own
initiative. To quote rule 10 of Order VIISubject to the provisions of Rule 10-A, the plaint
shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the court in which the suit should have
been instituted On returning a plaint the judge shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation
and return, the name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the reasons for returning
it.
The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
(a) Where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) Where the relief claimed is under-valued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to
correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
(c) Where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently
stamped, and the plaintiff on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp-paper
within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; and
(d) Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. (Order VII,
Rule 11).
(e) Where it is not filed in duplicate.
(f) Where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9. (Order IX Rule 11).

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2. Admission of Plaint
Procedure on admitting plaint(1) The plaintiff shall endorse on the plaint, or annex thereto, a list of the documents (if any)
which he has produced along with it; and, if the plaint is admitted, 39[shall present, within such
time as may be fixed by the Court or extended by it from time to time, as many copies] on plain
paper of the plaint as there are defendants, unless the Court by reason of the length of the plaint
or the number of the defendants, or for any other sufficient reason, permits him to present a like
number of concise statements of the nature of the claim made, or of the relief claimed in the suit,
in which case he shall present such statements.
(1A) the plaintiff shall, within the time fixed by the Court or extended by it under sub-rule (1),
pay the requisite fee for the service of summons on the defendants.
(2) Where the plaintiff sues, or the defendant or any of the defendants is sued, in a representative
capacity, such statements shall show in what capacity the plaintiff or defendant sues or is sued.
(3) The plaintiff may, by leave of the Court, amend such statements so as to make them
correspond with the plaint.
(4) The chief ministerial officer of the Court shall sign such list and copies or statements if, on
examination, he finds them to be correct.

3. Return of Plaint
Order 7 Rule 10 reads as follows:
Return of plaint(1) [Subject to the provisions of rule 10A, the plaint shall] at any stage of the
suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted.
[Explanation.For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that a Court of appeal or revision
may direct, after setting aside the decree passed in a suit, the return of the plaint under this subrule.]
(2) Procedure on returning plaint.On returning a plaint, the Judge shall endorse thereon the date
of its presentation and return, the name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the
reasons for returning it.
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Where at any stage of the suit the court finds that it has no jurisdiction either territorial,
pecuniary or with regard to subject matter, it should return the plaint to be presented in the
proper court in which the suit ought to have been filed. It is relevant now to look at the decision
in the case of R.S.D.V. Finance Company Private Limited v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works
Limited1.
The facts of the case are as follows. The appellant R.S.D.V. Finance Company Private Limited
(hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) filed a summary suit against the respondent Shree
Vallabh Glass Works Limited (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) in the ordinary original
civil jurisdiction of the High Court. The case of the plaintiff was that it had deposited a sum of
Rupees 10,00,000/- with interest to be charged @ 19% per annum, with the defendant. The said
deposit was to be for a period of 90 days. The aforesaid amount of Rupees 10,00,000/- was given
to the defendant-company through Cheque No. 933251 dated 5th July, 1983 in the bank account
of the defendant at Bombay. The defendant issued a deposit receipt for the aforesaid amount
dated- 11-7-1983. The aforesaid deposit receipt contained an endorsement to the effect Subject
to Anand jurisdiction. The date of maturity of the aforesaid amount was to expire on 3-10-1983.
According to the plaintiff the defendant failed to pay the amount of Rupees 10,00,000/- and
requested the plaintiff to continue the said deposit till the end of November, 1983 and for that
purpose, handed over to the plaintiff 5 post dated cheques of Rs. 2,00,000/- each drawn on a
Bombay bank. The defendant had also issued a cheque dated 30th November, 1983 for a sum of
Rs. 22,288.32 by way of interest on the said amount of Rs. 10,00,000/-. This cheque was also
drawn in favour of the plaintiff payable in Bombay. The plaintiff submitted the aforesaid 5
cheques for payment but the same were dishonoured for the reason insufficient funds. The
plaintiff in these circumstances filed a summary suit against the defendant for Rs. 10,00,000/- as
principal and interest at 19% per annum with 90 days rests.
A single judge of the High Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, causing the defendant to appeal
before a Division Bench of the High Court which by its order dated 24th October, 1991 held that
in the circumstances of the case, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. A
prayer made on behalf of the plaintiff seeking to amend the plaint was also rejected. The
Division Bench allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
Subsequently the case was brought before the Supreme Court on appeal by the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court held that the entire reading of the plaint clearly showed that the suit was based
not only on the basis of deposit receipts of rupees 10 lakhs but also on the basis of five postdated cheques. Even if there was any doubt in the mind of Division Bench the counsel for the
plaintiff had made a request for allowing him to amend the plaint which was refused by the
Division Bench. The Division Bench was totally wrong in passing or order of dismissal of the
suit itself when it had arrived to the conclusion that Bombay Court had no jurisdiction to try the
1 AIR 1993 SC 2094.
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suit. The only course to be adopted in such a situation was to return the plaint for presentation to
the proper court and not to dismiss the suit.
Thus if a court finds at any stage during the suit that it does not have jurisdiction, it is bound to
return the plaint for presentation in the proper forum and cannot simply dismiss the suit. In a case
of inaccurate valuation if it is found on proper valuation that the suit is beyond the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the court, the plaint is to be returned and not to be rejected.
In a situation where the Court has jurisdiction, but is not the Court of lowest grade competent to
try it, the plaint should be returned under O 7 r 10. The logic behind this is that, if such suits are
entertained then there will be overcrowding of the Courts of higher grade with such suits and it is
the object of the legislation to prevent the same. It should however be noted that this rule does
not compel a Court of a higher grade to return a plaint to be presented to a Court of a lower grade
in every instance irrespective of the circumstances of the case. It does however grant a discretion
to the higher court to be excircised in accordance with legal principles with respect to the facts of
each individual case in the interests of justice. Where in such a case the evidence has been gone
into and concluded, and the objection is raised at the time of arguments, the Court should instead
of returning the plaint proceed to decide the case.
The plaint can be returned under O 7, r 10, for the purpose of presentation of the same to the
court in which it should have been instituted. If however the suit, cannot be instituted in any civil
court then this rule will not have any effect and the suit will have to be dismissed.
It is clear from the section that if a suit is filed in a Revenue Court which should be tried in a
Civil Court then the court should not dismiss the suit but rather return the plaint so that it may be
filed in the appropriate forum (here the Civil Court). Similarly the opposite would also hold true
i.e. if a plaint is filed in a Civil Court which should have been filed in a Revenue Court, the court
should return the plaint so it may be filed in the Revenue Court. If a suit is instituted where in the
plaint it is alleged that the defendant is a trespasser and the court found that he was actually a
tenant then the plaint should not be returned to be presented to the Revenue Court (which had
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter) but that the suit should be dismissed.
O 7, r 10 is silent on whether when a plaint upon being returned is filed in the proper court it
should be treated as a continuation of the old suit or as a new one. The above was decided upon
by the Supreme Court in the case of Amar Chand v. Union of India 2. The facts of the case are as
follows. . The plaintiff in this case was an advocate practicing at the Ajmer bar. On the night
between December 31, 1957 and January 1, 1958, the plaintiff was traveling by passenger train
from Ambala Cantt. to Delhi. While the train was at Mohri Railway Station, the Janatha Express
train coming from Delhi collided with it and as a result the plaintiff sustained serious injuries on
his head and in the spine. The plaintiff filed the suit claiming damages under several heads. The
Trial Court found that the claim for damages was well founded to the extent of Rs. 33,503.00,
2 AIR 1973 SC 313.
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but dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The High Court, on appeal
by the plaintiff, confirmed the finding of the Trial Court that the suit was barred by limitation and
dismissed the appeal.
The main question, in the appeal, was whether the suit was filed within the period of limitation.
In this regard some more facts need to be looked at. There is no dispute that the Article
applicable to the suit is Article 22 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, hereinafter called the Act
which provided a period of one year for a suit for compensation for injury to the person from the
date when the injury was committed. The injury here was committed on January 1, 1958. But the
plaintiff had to issue a notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code before filing the suit.
The plaintiff issued the notice and it was served on the General Manager of the Railway in
question on December 29, 1958. The Suit was filed in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge
of Karnal, hereinafter called the Karnal Court, on March 2, 1959, as March 1, 1959, was a day
on which the Court was not open. For ministerial purposes, the suit was subsequently transferred
to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Panipat, hereinafter referred to as the Panipat Court,
which by its order, dated October 28, 1959, returned the plaint for presentation to the proper
court. That was on the basis of its finding that Mohri Railway Station, where the injury was
committed, was not situated within territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The plaint was thereafter
presented in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala, hereinafter referred to as the
Trial Court, on October 29, 1959, together with an application under Section 14 of the Act.
The counsel for the appellant argued that the suit instituted in the trial Court by the presentation
of plaint after it was returned for presentation to the proper court was a continuation of the suit
filed in the Karnal Court and, therefore the suit filed in the Karnal Court must be deemed to have
been filed in the Trial Court.
The Court however, held that when the plaint is returned for presentation to the proper Court and
is presented in that Court, the suit can be deemed to be instituted in the proper Court only when
the plaint was presented in that Court. Thus the Court held that the on return of plaint when the
plaint is filed in the proper forum it will not be regarded as a continuation of the old suit and
hence the suit instituted in the Trial Court upon the return of the plaint by the Panipat Court
could not be treated as a continuation of the suit filed in the Karnal Court.
The Supreme Court further held in the case of Hanamanthappa v. Chandrashekarappa 3 that such
a plaint (i.e. one which has been returned and then filed in the court which has jurisdiction)
would be treated as a fresh plaint subject to limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and payment of
court fees and hence no permission would be required from any of the courts involved to amend
a plaint upon its return. The facts of the case are as follows. The respondents filed O. S. No.
158/94, in the Court of District Munsiff, Navalagund. On grounds of lack of territorial
jurisdiction the plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court. Accordingly, after
3 (1997) 9 SCC 688.
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making necessary amendment to the plaint the respondents represented the suit, which came to
be numbered as O. S. No. 10/91, in Civil Court at Dharwad, The petitioners filed an application
for dismissal of the petition on the ground that the plaint was materially altered, without seeking
permission for amendment of the plaint as required under Order VI, Rule 17, C. P. C. The High
Court dismissed the petition. The court held that the object of Order VII, Rule 10 is that the
plaintiff, on return of the plaint, can either challenge in an appellate forum or represent to the
Court having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In substance, it is a suit filed afresh
subject to the limitation, pecuniary jurisdiction and payment of the Court fee as had rightly been
pointed out by the High Court. Therefore, it cannot be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff
made averments which did not find place in the original plaint presented before the Court of
District Munsiff, Navalgund.
The date of representation is the date of institution for the purpose of limitation, though the
plaintiff can have recourse to S. 14 of the Limitation Act for excluding the period during which
the proceedings were pending in the original court. The court-fee payable on the plaint is what is
payable under the law in force at the time of representation. The plaintiff will be entitled to the
benefit of the court fee paid in the original court but this can only be when the same plaint is
represented. Where after return of the plaint, it is substantially altered such that it is not
substantially the original plaint filed then a frsh court fee will have to be paid.
O 7, r 10 uses the phrase at any stage of the suit. This would cover any stage of the suit
beginning with the filing of the plaint till the judgment is given. This would also include a stage
prior to the filing of the written statement. It should be pointed out here that no court can blindly
accept any plaint without prima facie satisfaction of its jurisdiction to entertain the matter. If a
claim is overvalued and the fact appears on the face of the plaint, it is the duty of the court to
return the plaint to the plaintiff.
An appeal would lie from any order made under O 7, r 10 of the CPC under Section 104 of the
CPC as provided for in O 43 r 1 of the CPC. Thus an appeal would lie from an order returning
the plaint is made by the court of first instance or by the first appellate court under Section 107
of the CPC but there exists no right to a second appeal from the order of the first appellate court.
There is however one major complexity in this regard. Take a situation where A files a plaint in
the Munsifs court. The Munsif returns the plaint for presentation to the proper court, holding that
the suit is beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction. On the plaint being presented to the subordinate
court, it is once again returned on the ground that the Munsifs court had jurisdiction. Now the
question arises whether A is entitled to appeal to the District Court from the order of the Munsif
having regard to the fact that he in obedience with that order filed the plaint in the Subordinate
Judges Court. The question was answered in the negative by the Calcutta High Court in Beni
Madhub v. Jotindra Tagore4, on the ground that the party had, by electing to file a plaint in the
4 5 Cal LJ 580 cf Mulla 1916.
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Subordinate Court, forfeited his right of appeal under O 43 r 1 of the CPC. The question was
considered by the Madras High Court in Narayan Nair v. Cheria Kadhiri 5 and it was held that the
right of appeal conferred by O 43 r 1 of the CPC, could not be lost by reason of the order having
been complied with.
The Calcutta High Court has subsequently held in the case of Tarakanta Das v. Kali Prasad 6 that
if a party reserves the right to appeal against the order then the right is not lost. The facts of the
above mentioned case are as follows. The plaintiffs filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate
Judge of Barisal for a declaration of their zamindari right to some land and they valued the suit at
Rs. 5,100. The defendants urged that the valuation was excessive and that the true value was not
more than Rs. 1,000. The Subordinate Judge went into this question and found that the value of
the suit was Rs. 1,385. Since there was a Munsif Court in Barisal empowered to try suits upto Rs.
2,000, the Subordinate Judge returned the plaint to be filed in the Munsifs Court. The plaintiff
amended the plaint accordingly and filed it in the Munsifs court but with the following written on
the plaint : Amended under Courts order, but without giving up the right of appeal and re-filed
today without giving up the right to appeal
The Calcutta High Court distinguished this case from that of Beni Madhub v. Jotindra Tagore on
the basis that in this case the plaintiffs had declared that they were going to appeal. The Court
went on to hold that the action of filing the plaint in the Munsifs Court did not take away the
partys right to appeal.
The Researcher is of the view that the right to appeal should under no circumstances be lost even
if a party proceeds in accordance with the order of a court without reserving the right to appeal.
The only circumstance under which the party would lose his right to appeal would be if the
procedure laid out in O 7 r 10A is followed.
Sub Rule 2 of O 7, r 10 of the CPC basically lays down that certain indorsements are to be made
by the judge returning the plaint. The absence of this would only amount to an irregularity. It
would not make the order for return incomplete or ineffective.
O 7 r 10A reads as follows
Power of Court to fix a date of appearance in the Court where plaint is to be filed after its
return.(1) Where, in any suit, after the defendant has appeared, the Court is of opinion that the
plaint should be returned, it shall, before doing so, intimate its decision to the plaintiff.
(2) Where an intimation is given to the plaintiff under sub-rule (1), the plaintiff may make an
application to the Court
5 41 Mad 721 cf Mulla 1916
6 AIR 1919 Cal. 447.
10 | P a g e

(a) specifying the Court in which he proposes to present the plaint after its return,
(b) praying that the Court may fix a date for the appearance of the parties in the said Court, and
(c) requesting that the notice of the date so fixed may be given to him and to the defendant.
(3) Where an application is made by the plaintiff under sub-rule (2), the Court shall, before
returning the plaint and notwithstanding that the order for return of plaint was made by it on the
ground that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit,
(a) fix a date for the appearance of the parties in the Court in which the plaint is proposed to the
presented, and
(b) give to the plaintiff and to the defendant notice of such date for appearance.
(4) Where the notice of the date for appearance is given under sub-rule (3),
(a) it shall not be necessary for the Court in which the plaint is presented after its return, to serve
the defendant with a summons for appearance in the suit, unless that Court, for reasons to be
recorded, otherwise directs, and
(b) the said notice shall be deemed to be a summons for the appearance of the defendant in the
Court in which the plaint is presented on the date so fixed by the Court by which the plaint was
returned.
(5) Where the application made by the plaintiff under sub-rule (2) is allowed by the Court, the
plaintiff shall not be entitled to appeal against the order returning the plaint.
If after the defendant has appeared, the court is of the view that it has no jurisdiction and should,
therefore return the plaint, it must give intimation of such decision to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
thereupon, may make an application as described under sub-rule (2). The may in sub-rule (2)
shows that it is in his discretion to make or not make an application. It is not incumbent on him
to do so. If however the plaintiff does make the application and follows the procedure laid down,
the court shall fix the date of appearance of the parties in the court in which the plain is to be
presented and give notice of such date to the parties. Since the defendant by such notice is made
aware of the suit against him and the date when he has to appear, the notice is treated as a
summons. As the plaintiff chooses the procedure laid down in sub-rule (2) and obtains an order,
he naturally can have no right of appeal against the order returning the plaint Application by him
under sub-rule (2) is treated as acceptance of the order of return. O 43 r 1 of the CPC which
covers appealable orders clearly makes an exception where the plaintiff follows the procedure
laid down in O 7 r 10A of the CPC. Further where the plaintiff avails himself of the procedure of
applying to the court under O 7 r 10A(2) of the CPC and the application is granted by the court
11 | P a g e

then O 7 r 10A(5) bars an appeal against the order returning the plaint. On the return of plaint,
the procedure laid down in rules 10 and 10A are to be followed.
10B. Power of appellate Court to transfer suit to the proper Court.(1) Where, on an appeal
against an order for the return of plaint, the Court hearing the appeal confirms such order, the
Court of appeal may, if the plaintiff by an application so desires, while returning the plaint, direct
plaintiff to file the plaint, subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), in
the Court in which the suit should have been instituted (whether such Court is within or without
the State in which the Court hearing the appeal is situated), and fix a date for the appearance of
the parties in the Court in which the plaint is directed to be filed and when the date is so fixed it
shall not be necessary for the Court in which the plaint is filed to serve the defendant with the
summons for appearance in the suit, unless that Court in which the plaint is filed, for reasons to
be recorded, otherwise directs.
(2) The direction made by the Court under sub-rule (1) shall be without any prejudice to the
rights of the parties to question the jurisdiction of the Court, in which the plaint is filed, to try the
suit.]
Rule 10B empowers the court hearing an appeal against the order returning a plaint to order that
instead of returning the plaint, the suit may be transferred to the court where it should have been
filed. Such a court may or may not be within the State in which the appellate Court is situated.
Such an order can be passed only if the plaintiff makes an application and desires the suit to be
tranfered. The order is subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act and without prejudice to
the right of the parties to dispute the jurisdiction of the transferee court. Finally, fixing the date
for appearance does away with the necessity of a fresh service of summons.

4. Rejection of Plaint
O 7 r 11 of the CPC reads as follows :
Rejection of plaint.The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to
correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently
stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so ;
12 | P a g e

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law:
[(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;]
[(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply sub-rule (2) of rule 9;]
[Provided that the lime fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the
requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is
satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature for correcting the
valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the
Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]
Rejection of plaint is different from dismissal of suit. In the latter a decree is passed while in the
former is only a deemed decree as per Section 2(2) of the CPC. Dismissal for non-payment of
court-fee amounts to rejection of plaint and not really a dismissal of the suit. Rejection of plaint
does not preclude the filing of a fresh suit involving the same parties and the same cause of
action (i.e. it is not hit by res judicata).
To properly understand at what stage the court can use its power under O 7 r 11 the case of
Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra needs to be looked at. The facts of the case are as follows.
The appellant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
in the suits praying the court to dismiss the suits on the ground stated therein. It was stated that
the plaint is liable to be rejected under Clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. The
respondents also filed the application under Order VIII Rule 10 C.P.C. to pronounce judgment in
the suits as the appellant did not file his written statement. There was also an application by the
appellant under Section 151 C.P.C. praying the court to decide first the application under Order
VII Rule 11 C.P.C. By order dated 8th December, 2001, the Trial Judge dismissed the application
under Order VIII Rule 10 as well as the application filed under Section 151 C.P.C. Insofar as the
application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. was concerned, the Judge directed the appellant to
file his written statement. The appellant filed revision petitions before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh [Indore Bench]. On May 7, 2002, the High Court, while confirming the order of the Trial
Judge reiterated the direction given by the Trial Judge that the appellant should file his written
statement and observed that the trial court shall frame issues of law and facts arising out of
pleadings and that the trial court should record its finding on the preliminary issue in accordance
with law before proceeding to try the suit on facts. Aggrieved by this the petitioners approached
the Supreme Court.
The Apex Court held that the trial court can exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C.
at any stage of the suit before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant
at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under
Clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., the averments in the plaint are germane; the
pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage,
therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order
13 | P a g e

VII Rule 11 C.P.C. cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by
the trial court. The order, therefore, suffers from non-exercising of the jurisdiction vested in the
court as well as procedural irregularity.
O 7 Rule 11 does not place any restriction or limitation on the exercise of power of the court. It
does not either expressly or by necessary implication provide that the power should be exercised
at any particular stage only. In the absence of any statutory restriction, it is open to the court to
use this power at any stage.
The case of Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath7 dealt with whether the court could use its powers under
O 7 r 11 even after issues had been framed. This case also dealt with whether O 7 r 11 of the
CPC would be applicable to election petitions. The facts of the case are as follows. During the
General Elections held in the year 1984, the appellant filed his nomination paper for contesting
election to the Lok Sabha from 79-Hapur Parliamentary Constituency. The appellants
nomination paper was accepted and he was allotted symbol of Lion. The appellant, Kedar Nath
(the respondent), and 17 other candidates contested the election. The appellant could poll only
617 votes while Kedar Nath polled 2,55,828 votes and he was declared elected. The appellant
filed election petition challenging the respondents election on a number of grounds. The
respondent appeared before the High Court, filed written statement and contested the election
petition. On December 10, 1985 issues were framed, thereafter the respondent made an
application for rejecting the election petition under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the ground that it
disclosed no cause of action. A Single Judge of the High Court after hearing the parties at length
rejected the election petition on the finding that the election petition did not disclose any cause of
action. The appellant approached the Supreme Court challenging the correctness of the High
Court order. The appellant argued that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain any
application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC after the settlement of issues.
The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as applicable to trial of
suits have been made applicable under Section 92 to the trial of election petition as nearly as
possible. The provisions of the CPC do not apply in their entirety to the trial of the election
petition but the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 apply to an election petition and the High Court
has jurisdiction to reject a plaint which does not disclose any cause of action. It would be in the
interest of the parties to the petition and to the constituency and in public interest to dispose of
preliminary objection and to reject an election petition or a plaint if it does not disclose any cause
of action. If a plaint or an election petition does not disclose any cause of action, it does not stand
to reason as to why the defendant or the respondent should incur costs and waste public time in
producing evidence when the proceedings can be disposed of on the preliminary objection. Thus
the powers of the court under O 7 r 11 may be used even after the issues have been framed.

7 AIR 1987 SC 1926.

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A plaint cannot be rejected in part, it has to be rejected in toto. This was laid down in the case of
Kalepu Pala Subrahmanyam v. Tiguti Venkatta Peddiraju 8. The facts of the case are as follows.
The petitioner is had filed in a suit in forma pauperis for recovery of possession of plaint A to C
Schedule properties in the Sub-Court, Kakinada. The Court by its order D/- 2-3-1968 held that he
had means to pay and rejected his application to sue informa pauperis. This order was confirmed
by the High Court in revision and thereafter, the petitioner restrict his right only to a half share
and paid a court-fee of Rs. 2,602/-. Again, by his order dated 25-2-1969 the learned Subordinate
Judge held that the suit was barred by time in respect of items 1, 2 (a), 2 (b), 2 (c) and 3 (a) of
plaint B Schedule and items 1 and 2 (a) of plaint C Schedule. he, therefore, rejected the plaint in
respect of those items. As far as item 4 of plaint B Schedule was concerned, he directed the
plaintiff to file an application to treat the relief regarding Item 4 as one filed under Section 47,
Civil P.C. The plaintiff then filed a revision petition at the High Court.
The High Court dismissed the petition and directed the rejection of the entire plaint as opposed to
the action of the Subordinate Court. It held that under O 7 r 11, the entire plaint had to be
rejected and not just one or more parts.
Clause (a) When the plaint does not disclose a cause of action
The Court is bound to reject the plaint if it does not disclose a cause of action. A plea that there is
no cause of action is different from one that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. In the
latter case there is a duty upon the court to decide the issue before the issuing of summons. Also
the question as to whether the plaintiff had any cause of action or not would be decided by the
court on the basis of materials (other than the plaint), which may be produced at the appropriate
stage of the suit. For the limited purpose of determining whether the plaint should be rejected
under O7 r 11(a) of the CPC or not, only the averments made in the plaint are to be looked into
and nothing else. This
Clause (b) Where the relief claimed is undervalued
If the relief claimed is under valued and the valuation is not corrected within the time fixed by
the court, the plaint must be rejected and if the correct valuation would render the court
incompetent to entertain the suit then clause (b) does not apply and in such a case the correct
course of action would be for the plaint to be returned under O 7 rule 10 of the CPC. The court
however cannot itself fix a valuation in place of the plaintiffs valuation. The Court cannot pass a
composite order requiring the valuation to be corrected and the additional court fee to be paid on
the corrected valuation. When a suit is not valued properly, the correct order to pass is to call
upon the plaintiff to give the correct valuation.
In the case of Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. Venkatachalam Chettiar 9 the appellant filed the
suit praying for a decree against the respondent/defendant to render true and correct account of
8 AIR 1971 AP 313.
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all transactions of the respondent as petitioners agent from January 22, 1965 and also of all the
amounts received by him as the agent of the petitioner including the amount recovered by him
from Alagappa Chettiar and pay to the petitioner the amount found due on such rendition of
accounts. In the written statement filed by the defendant it was contended that the suit is not
properly valued and proper court-fee has not been paid. The trial court framed an issue as to
whether the suit had been properly valued and proper court-fee had been paid. It answered the
issue holding that the plaint has been properly valued and proper court-fee has been paid. The
suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff has not proved that the
defendant is liable to account and that the suit was barred by limitation. On an appeal by the
plaintiff to the High Court, the High Court found that the plaint made it clear that apart from the
money which the defendant is liable to pay to the plaintiff as his agent, the plaintiff has
quantified the amount at Rs. 9,74,598.35 as payable by the defendant to him which is made clear
in allegations in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the paint and therefore the plaintiff ought to have
valued the suit at Rs. 9,74,598.35. The appeal was disposed of on the ground that the plaint had
not been properly valued and hence the petitioner appeared before the Supreme Court.
The Court held that O 7 r 11(b) casts a duty on the court to reject the plaint when the relief
claimed is undervalued. If on the materials available before it the Court is satisfied that the value
of relief as estimated by the plaintiff in a suit for accounts is undervalued the plaint is liable to be
rejected. It is therefore necessary that the plaintiff should take care that the valuation is adequate
and reasonable taking into account the circumstances of the case. In coming to the conclusion
that the suit is undervalued the court will have to take into account that in a suit for accounts the
plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which would result after the taking of the
accounts. If he cannot estimate the exact amount he can put a tentative valuation upon the suit for
accounts which is adequate and reasonable. The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately
undervalue the relief. The only requirement is that there must be a genuine effort on the part of
plaintiff to estimate his relief and that the estimate should not be a deliberate underestimation.
The court further held that in the present case the estimate of the relief as given by the plaintiff
was not inadequate or unreasonable or a deliberate underestimation and hence the court allowed
the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Madras High Court.
Clause (c) Where the plaint is insufficiently stamped.
This provision will only have effect when there is some stamp on the paper. A situation where
there exists no stamp at all will not come under the purview of this rule. The Court would
exercise its power under this rule when the suit is properly valued but insufficiently stamped.
Section 149 of the CPC empowers the court at any stage to allow a plaintiff to make up a
deficiency in court fees, and provides in effect that when the deficiency has been made up, the
plaint is as valid as if it had been properly stamped when presented.
9 AIR 1979 SC 989.
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Clause (d) Where the suit appears to be barred by law

Where the suit appears from the statements in the plaint to by any law, the court should reject the
plaint. A good example of rejection of plaint under this head can be seen in the case of Tej Kiran
v. Sanjiva Reddy10. What happened in this case was a full bench of the High Court of Delhi;
rejected a plaint filed by the six appellants claiming a decree for Rs. 26,000/- as damages for
defamatory statements made by Shri Sanjiva Reddy (former Speaker of the Lok Sabha), Shri Y.
B. Chavan (Home Minister) and three members of Parliament on the floor of the Lok Sabha
during a Calling Attention Motion. The High Court held that no proceedings could be taken in a
Court of law in respect of what was said on the floor of Parliament in view of Article 105(2) of
the Constitution. The High Court, however, certified the case as fit for appeal to this Court under
Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the High Court as the filing of such a suit would be
barred by Article 105(2) of the Constitution.
Similarly if the plaint shows that the suit is barred by limitation, the plaint will have to be
rejected, however if the question of limitation is connected with the merits of the case, the matter
requires to be decided along with other issues.
The plaint may also be rejected if it is not filed in duplicate.
Non Compliance with statutory provisions
The grounds given under Section 11 are not exhaustive. In the case of T Arivadandam v.
Satyapal11, the Supreme Court held that if on a meaningful reading of the plaint it is manifestly
found to be vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the court
may exercise its power of rejection under this rule.
An order rejecting a plaint is a deemed decree as per Section 2(2) of the CPC, and hence would
be appealable under Section 96 of the CPC. It would be relevant here to look at the case of
Bibhas Mohan Mukherjee v. Hari Charan Banerjee 12 The suit out of which this reference arises
was one for a declaration that a certain preliminary decree is a suit for partition passed on
compromise was invalid, inoperative and fraudulent and for certain other reliefs one of which
was for a new preliminary decree. Initially the plaintiffs treated the reliefs claimed by them as for
partition only and paid a court-fee stamp of Rs. 15/- upon the plaint. On the objection of the
Court, however, the plaintiffs put in an additional court-fee stamp of Rs. 20/-. This court-fee was
10 AIR 1970 SC 1573.
11 AIR 1977 SC 2421.
12 AIR 1961 Cal. 491.
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tentatively accepted by the Court as sufficient subject to any objection that might be raised by the
defendants. After the defendants had entered appearance in the suit, they raised a point as to the
sufficiency of court-fees paid by the plaintiffs.
The issue as to sufficiency of court-fees was tried as a preliminary issue in the suit and upon that
issue the subordinate Judge held that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was not for partition but one
for a declaration with consequential reliefs under Section 7 (iv) (e) of the Court-fees Act and held
that the plaintiffs were required to pay ad valorem court-fees upon a sum of Rs. 8,000/-. The
learned Subordinate Judge directed the plaintiffs to pay deficit court-fee to the extent of Rs. 610/in default, the suit would stand dismissed under Section 8-B (3) of the Court-tees Act. After an
unsuccessful attempt to get an extension of time the plaintiffs eventually failed to deposit the
additional court-fees as directed by the Court with the result that the suit stood dismissed in
accordance with the provisions of Section 8-B (3) of the Court-fees Act. A decree was drawn up
by the Court and against that decree the plaintiffs filed an appeal to this Court. When the appeal
came up for hearing a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents on the
ground that the order passed by the Subordinate Judge under Section 8-B (3) of the Court fees
Act was not a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and as
such the appeal filed by the plaintiffs was not competent.
The court held that on the failure of the plaintiff to pay deficit court-fees after the registration of
the plaint the Court may exercise the powers conferred upon it by both Order 7, Rule 11 (c) of
the Code of Civil Procedure and also by Section 8-B (3) of the Court-fees Act. Under Order 7,
Rule 11 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure the plaint shall be rejected. Under Section 8-B(3) of
the Court-fees Act the suit shall be dismissed, In form, the order passed under Section 8-B (3) of
the Court-fees Act is an order of dismissal of the suit. In substance, the order is an order of
rejection of the plaint. Whether the suit he dismissed under Section 8-B (3) of the Court-fees Act
or whether the plaint be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in
either case there is no decision on the merits. In my opinion, the Order of dismissal of the suit
under Section 8-B (3) of the Court-fees Act is, in substance, an order of rejection of the plaint
and as such amounts to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Thus all cases of rejection of plaint under O 7 r 11 are appealable.

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