SELECTEDTOPICS

CriminalLaw

LimitationofHoldingRecognizedbyU.S.v.Heredia,9thCir.(Ariz.),October24,2005

Trial
IllegalSaleofWhisky

OriginalImageof532F.2d697(PDF)

Prosecutions

532F.2d697

U.S.v.Jewell
UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals,NinthCircuit.

ImportationofControlledSubstancesUnder
ComprehensiveDrugAbusePrevention

February27,1976
532F.2d697 (Approx.15pages)
UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals,

NinthCircuit.

ControlledSubstances

UNITEDSTATESofAmerica,PlaintiffAppellee,
v.
CharlesDemoreJEWELL,DefendantAppellant.

Prosecutions
ElementofCrimeofPossessionofatLeast
FiveOuncesofControlledDangerous
Substance

SecondarySources

No.742832.
Feb.27,1976.

APPENDIXIVGUIDANCEAND
TECHNICALASSISTANCEMANUALS

DefendantwasconvictedinDistrictCourt,JamesA.Walsh,J.,ofviolationof
ComprehensiveDrugAbusePreventionandControlActof1970,andheappealed.The
CourtofAppeals,Browning,CircuitJudge,heldthatevidencewassufficienttoshowthat
defendanthadknowinglyattemptedtodriveautomobilecontainingcontrolledsubstance
acrossborder.

ADAComplianceGuideAppendixIV
...UndertheAmericanswithDisabilitiesActof
1990(theADA),anemployermayask
disabilityrelatedquestionsandrequire
medicalexaminationsofanapplicantonly
aftertheapplicanthasbeengiven...

P1900INTRODUCTION

Affirmed.

MandatedHealthBenefitsCOBRAGuide
1900

AnthonyM.Kennedy,CircuitJudge,dissentedandfiledopinion,inwhichEly,Hufstedler
andWallace,CircuitJudges,joined.

...Tab1900providesacomprehensivelistof
thecourtdecisionsinwhichCOBRAfigured
prominently,andthegenerallegalprinciples
involvedinthesecases.Thetabincludesthe
followingsections:1.A...

WestHeadnotes(7)

APPENDIXIIFEDERALREGULATIONS

ChangeView
1

ControlledSubstances
KnowledgeandIntent
Statuteprohibitingpossessionofcontrolledsubstanceisviolatedonlyif
possessionisaccompaniedbothbyknowledgeofnatureofactandalsoby
intenttomanufacture,distributeordispense.ComprehensiveDrugAbuse
PreventionandControlActof1970,401(a)(1),21U.S.C.A.841(a)(1).

...Additionally,subscriberswillfindother
federalregulationsinthisappendixthatare
relevanttoADAcompliance.ADA
architecturalstandardsarereprintedin
AppendixIIIoftheGuide.Anoteabout...
SeeMoreSecondarySources

Briefs

5Casesthatcitethisheadnote

BriefforStateofNewYork
Respondents

ControlledSubstances
KnowledgeandIntent
Defendantwhohasknowledgethathepossessescontrolledsubstancemay
havestateofmindnecessaryforconviction,evenifhedoesnotknowwhich
controlledsubstancehepossesses.ComprehensiveDrugAbusePrevention
andControlActof1970,401(a)(1),21U.S.C.A.841(a)(1).

2004WL2190371
JuanitaSWEDENBURG,etal.,Petitioners,v.
EdwardD.KELLY,etal.,Respondents.
SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates
Sep.23,2004

16Casesthatcitethisheadnote
3

ADAComplianceGuideAppendixII

ControlledSubstances
Importation
Evidencethatdefendantdeclinedoffertosmugglemarihuana,butaccepted
subsequentoffer,madebysameperson,todriveautomobilefromTijuana,
Mexico,intoCaliforniaforpriceof$100,thatdefendantsuspectedthatthere
wasprobablysomethingwrongbutthathissearchofautomobilerevealed
nothing,andthatbordersearchofautomobilerevealed110poundsof
marihuanainsecretcompartment,wassufficienttoestablishthatdefendant
knowinglyviolatedComprehensiveDrugAbusePreventionandControlAct.
ComprehensiveDrugAbusePreventionandControlActof1970,401(a)(1),
21U.S.C.A.841(a)(1).
10Casesthatcitethisheadnote

...FN*CounselofRecordSincetherepealof
Prohibition,NewYorkhascloselyregulated
theimportation,distribution,andsaleof
alcoholicbeverages.Likemanyotherstates,
NewYorkemploysathreeti...

BriefforPrivateRespondents
2004WL576218
JuanitaSWEDENBURG,inherowncapacity,
etal.,Petitioners,v.EdwardD.KELLY,
ChairmanoftheStateLiquorAuthority,
DivisionofAlcoholicBeverageControl,State
ofNewYork,inhisofficialcapacities,etal.,
Respondents.
SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates
Mar.19,2004
...Petitioners,plaintiffsappelleesbelow,are
JuanitaSwedenburg,inherowncapacity,
JuanitaSwedenburg,asproprietorof
SwedenburgWinery,aVirginiapartnership,
DavidLucas,inhisowncapacity,D...

MotionforLeavetoFileBriefas
AmicusCuriaeandBriefofWineand
SpiritsWholesalersofAmerica,Inc.,as

ControlledSubstances
Sale,Distribution,Delivery,Transferor
Trafficking
Wheredefendanthadbeengiven$100todriveautomobileacrossborder,and
borderinspectiondiscovered110poundsofmarihuanahiddeninsecret
compartmentbetweentrunkandrearseat,trialcourtproperlyinstructedjury
thatGovernmenthaddutyofprovingbeyondreasonabledoubtthatdefendant
knowinglypossessedmarihuanaandbroughtitintoUnitedStates,andthat
termknowinglymeantvoluntarilyandintentionally,andnotbyaccidentor
mistakeorotherinnocentreason,butthatknowinglyincludeddeliberate
ignorancecontrivedwithaconsciouspurposetoavoidlearningthetruth.
ComprehensiveDrugAbusePreventionandControlActof1970,401(a)(1),
21U.S.C.A.841(a)(1).
120Casesthatcitethisheadnote

CriminalLaw
IgnoranceorMistakeofFact
Whereadefendantisawareoffactsindicatingahighprobabilityofillegalitybut
purposelyfailstoinvestigateonaccountofhisdesiretostayignorant,hehas
knowledgeofillegality.
31Casesthatcitethisheadnote

SpiritsWholesalersofAmerica,Inc.,as
AmicusCuriaeinSupportofAppellee
1986WL728246
BROWNFORMANDISTILLERS
CORPORATION,Appellant,v.STATEOF
NEWYORKLIQUORAUTHORITY,Appellee.
SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates
Jan.10,1986
...PursuanttoRule42oftherulesofthe
Court,theWineandSpiritsWholesalersof
America,Inc.(WSWA)respectfullymoves
forleavetofiletheaccompanyingbriefas
amicuscuriae.Appelleehascons...
SeeMoreBriefs

TrialCourtDocuments
InreRealMexRestaurants,Inc.
2012WL1071656
Inre:REALMEXRESTAURANTS,INC.,et
al.,Debtors.
UnitedStatesBankruptcyCourt,D.
Delaware.
Mar.26,2012
...FN1.TheDebtorsinthesechapter11
cases,alongwiththelastfourdigitsofeachof
theDebtors'federaltaxidentificationnumbers,
are:RealMexRestaurants,Inc.(2902)RM
RestaurantHoldingCor...

CriminalLaw
CriminalIntentandMalice
Termknowinglyasusedincriminalstatuteisnotlimitedtopositive
knowledge,butincludesstateofmindofonewhoactswithanawarenessof
thehighprobabilityofthefactinquestion,suchasonewhodoesnotpossess
positiveknowledgeonlybecauseheconsciouslyavoidsit.

U.S.v.Bear

53Casesthatcitethisheadnote

...pleadedguiltytocount(s)Two(2)ofthe
Indictmentpleadednolocontendereto
count(s)_whichwasacceptedbythecourt.
wasfoundguiltyoncount(s)_afterapleaof
notguilty.Thedefendanti...

ControlledSubstances
Trafficking

Sale,Distribution,Delivery,Transferor

CriminalLaw
ScopeandEffectofObjection
Wherebordercheckdiscoveredmarihuanainautomobile,whichdefendant
hadreceived$100todriveacrossborder,juryshouldhavebeeninstructed
moredirectlythatrequiredknowledgenecessarytoshowthatdefendant
knowinglypossessedmarihuanawouldbeestablishedifdefendantwere
awareofhighprobabilityofitsexistenceinautomobile,unlessdefendant
actuallybelieveditnottoexist,butsuchdeficiencydidnotrequirereversal,
especiallysincedefendantdidnotobjecttoinstructionsgiven.Comprehensive
DrugAbusePreventionandControlActof1970,401(a)(1),21U.S.C.A.
841(a)(1).
55Casesthatcitethisheadnote

AttorneysandLawFirms
*698RobertW.Ripley,Jr.,SanDiego,Cal.,fordefendantappellant.
HarryD.Steward,U.S.Atty.,SanDiego,Cal.,forplaintiffappellee.
OPINION
BeforeCHAMBERS,KOELSCH,BROWNING,DUNIWAY,ELY,HUFSTEDLER,WRIGHT,
TRASK,CHOY,GOODWIN,WALLACE,SNEEDandKENNEDY,CircuitJudges.
BROWNING,CircuitJudge:
1 Wetookthiscaseinbanctoperformasimplebutnecessaryhousekeeping
chore.TheopinioninUnitedStatesv.Davis,501F.2d1344(9thCir.1974),refersto
possessionofacontrolledsubstance,prohibitedby21U.S.C.s841(a)(1),asageneral
intentcrime.Ifthismeansthatthementalstaterequiredforconvictionundersection
841(a)(1)isonlythattheaccusedintendtodotheactthestatuteprohibits,the
characterizationisincorrect.Thestatuteisviolatedonlyifpossessionisaccompanied
bothbyknowledgeofthenatureoftheactandalsobytheintenttomanufacture,
distribute,ordispense.UnitedStatesv.Clark,475F.2d240,24849(2dCir.1973).
Thejurywassoinstructedinthiscase.Weareunanimouslyoftheviewthatthis

2014WL11125721
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA,v.Danielle
BobtailBEAR.
UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,D.North
Dakota.
Aug.11,2014

U.S.v.Herrera
2014WL11125722
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA,v.Brandy
HERRERA,f/k/aBrandyBobtailBear.
UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,D.North
Dakota.
Sep.30,2014
...pleadedguiltytocount(s)Three(3)ofthe
Indictmentpleadednolocontendereto
count(s)_whichwasacceptedbythecourt.
wasfoundguiltyoncount(s)_afterapleaof
notguilty.Thedefendant...
SeeMoreTrialCourtDocuments

instructionreflectstheonlypossibleinterpretationofthestatute.Thecontrarylanguagein
Davisisdisapproved.
2 ThisdoesnotmeanthatwedisapprovetheholdinginDavis.Onthecontrary,we
areunanimouslyoftheviewthatthepanelinDavisproperlyheldthatThegovernmentis
notrequiredtoprovethatthedefendantactuallyknewtheexactnatureofthesubstance
withwhichhewasdealing.501F.2dat1346.WerestrictDavistotheprinciplethata
defendantwhohasknowledgethathepossessesacontrolledsubstancemayhavethe
stateofmindnecessaryforconvictionevenifhedoesnotknowwhichcontrolled
substancehepossesses.Cf.UnitedStatesv.Moser,509F.2d1089,109293(7thCir.
1975).
Inthecourseofinbancconsiderationofthiscase,wehaveencounteredanother
problemthatdividesus.
Appellantdefinesknowinglyin21U.S.C.ss841and960torequirethatpositive
knowledgethatacontrolledsubstanceisinvolvedbeestablishedasanelementofeach
offense.Onthebasisofthisinterpretation,appellantarguesthatitwasreversibleerrorto
instructthejurythatthedefendantcouldbeconvicteduponproofbeyondareasonable
doubtthatifhedidnothavepositiveknowledgethatacontrolledsubstancewas
concealedintheautomobilehedroveovertheborder,itwassolelyandentirelybecause
oftheconsciouspurposeonhisparttoavoidlearningthetruth.Themajorityconcludes
thatthiscontentioniswronginprinciple,andhasnosupportinauthorityorinthe
languageorlegislativehistoryofthestatute.
3 ItisundisputedthatappellantenteredtheUnitedStatesdrivinganautomobilein
which110poundsofmarihuanaworth$6,250hadbeenconcealedinasecret
compartmentbetweenthetrunkandrearseat.Appellanttestifiedthathedidnotknowthe
marijuanawaspresent.Therewascircumstantialevidencefromwhichthejurycouldinfer
thatappellanthadpositiveknowledgeofthepresenceofthemarihuana,andthathis
contrarytestimonywas*699false. 1 Ontheotherhandtherewasevidencefromwhich
thejurycouldconcludethatappellantspokethetruththatalthoughappellantknewofthe
presenceofthesecretcompartmentandhadknowledgeoffactsindicatingthatit
containedmarijuana,hedeliberatelyavoidedpositiveknowledgeofthepresenceofthe
contrabandtoavoidresponsibilityintheeventofdiscovery. 2 Ifthejuryconcludedthe
latterwasindeedthesituation,andifpositiveknowledgeisrequiredtoconvict,thejury
wouldhavenochoiceconsistentwithitsoathbuttofindappellantnotguiltyeventhough
hedeliberatelycontrivedhislackofpositiveknowledge.Appellanturgesthisview.The
trialcourtrejectedthepremisethatonlypositiveknowledgewouldsuffice,andproperly
so.
Appellanttenderedaninstructionthattoreturnaguiltyverdictthejurymustfindthatthe
defendantknewhewasinpossessionofmarihuana.Thetrialjudgerejectedthe
instructionbecauseitsuggestedthatabsolutely,positively,hehastoknowthatit's
there.Thecourtsaid,Ithink,inthiscase,it'snottoosoundaninstructionbecausewe
haveevidencethatifthejurybelievesit,they'dbejustifiedinfindingheactuallydidn't
knowwhatitwashedidn'tbecausehedidn'twanttofindit.
4
5 Thecourtinstructedthejurythatknowinglymeantvoluntarilyand
intentionallyandnotbyaccidentormistake. 3 *700Thecourttoldthejurythatthe
governmentmustprovebeyondareasonabledoubtthatthedefendantknowingly
broughtthemarihuanaintotheUnitedStates(count1:21U.S.C.s952(a)),andthathe
knowinglypossessedthemarihuana(count2:21U.S.C.s841(a)(1)).Thecourt
continued:
TheGovernmentcancompletetheirburdenofproofbyproving,beyondareasonable
doubt,thatifthedefendantwasnotactuallyawarethattherewasmarijuanainthevehicle
hewasdrivingwhenheenteredtheUnitedStateshisignoranceinthatregardwas
solelyandentirelyaresultofhishavingmadeaconsciouspurposetodisregardthe
natureofthatwhichwasinthevehicle,withaconsciouspurposetoavoidlearningthe
truth.
Thelegalpremiseoftheseinstructionsisfirmlysupportedbyleadingcommentatorshere
andinEngland.ProfessorRollinM.Perkinswrites,Onewithadeliberateantisocial
purposeinmind...maydeliberatelyshuthiseyes'toavoidknowingwhatwould
otherwisebeobvioustoview.Insuchcases,sofarascriminallawisconcerned,the
personactsathisperilinthisregard,andistreatedashavingknowledgeofthefactsas
theyareultimatelydiscoveredtobe. 4 J.Ll.J.Edwards,writingin1954,introduceda

surveyofEnglishcaseswiththestatement,Forwellnighahundredyears,ithasbeen
clearfromtheauthoritiesthatapersonwhodeliberatelyshutshiseyestoanobvious
meansofknowledgehassufficientmensreaforanoffencebasedonsuchwordsas...
knowingly. 5 ProfessorGlanvilleWilliamsstates,onthebasisbothEnglishand
Americanauthorities,Totherequirementofactualknowledgethereisonestrictlylimited
exception....(T)heruleisthatifapartyhashissuspicionarousedbutthendeliberately
omitstomakefurtherenquiries,becausehewishestoremaininignorance,heisdeemed
tohaveknowledge. 6 ProfessorWilliamsconcludes,Therulethatwilfulblindnessis
equivalenttoknowledgeisessential,andisfoundthroughoutthecriminallaw. 7
Thesubstantivejustificationfortheruleisthatdeliberateignoranceandpositive
knowledgeareequallyculpable.Thetextualjustificationisthatincommonunderstanding
oneknowsfactsofwhichheislessthanabsolutelycertain.Toactknowingly,
therefore,isnotnecessarilytoactonlywithpositiveknowledge,butalsotoactwithan
awarenessofthehighprobabilityoftheexistenceofthefactinquestion.Whensuch
awarenessispresent,positiveknowledgeisnotrequired.
ThisistheanalysisadoptedintheModelPenalCode.Section2.02(7)states:When
knowledgeoftheexistenceofaparticularfactisanelementofanoffense,such*701
knowledgeisestablishedifapersonisawareofahighprobabilityofitsexistence,unless
heactuallybelievesthatitdoesnotexist. 8 AstheCommenttothisprovisionexplains,
Paragraph(7)dealswiththesituationBritishcommentatorshavedenominatedwilful
blindness'orconnivance,thecaseoftheactorwhoisawareoftheprobableexistenceof
amaterialfactbutdoesnotsatisfyhimselfthatitdoesnotinfactexist. 9
TheSupremeCourt,inLearyv.UnitedStates,395U.S.6,46n.93,89S.Ct.1532,1553,
23L.Ed.2d57,87(1969),appliedtheModelPenalCodedefinitionofknowledgein
determiningthemeaningofknowinginformer21U.S.C.s176a.InTurnerv.United
States,396U.S.398,416&n.29,90S.Ct.642,652,24L.Ed.2d610,623(1970),the
CourtadoptedtheModelPenalCodedefinitionindefiningknowinglyin21U.S.C.s
174. 10 TheTurneropinionrecognizesthatthisdefinitionofknowinglymakesactual
knowledgeunnecessary:(T)hosewhotrafficinheroinwillinevitablybecomeawarethat
theproducttheydealinissmuggled,unlesstheypracticeastudiedignorancetowhich
theyarenotentitled.396U.S.at417,90S.Ct.at653,24L.Ed.2dat624.(footnotes
omitted,emphasisadded),citingGriegov.UnitedStates,298F.2d845,849(10thCir.
1962).Griegoremandedasection174chargeforanewtrial,stating,Inthe
circumstancesofthiscasethejuryshouldbeinstructedonthetendereddefenseofno
knowledgeandtoldthatthedefenseisnotavailableifthejuryfindsfromalltheevidence
beyondareasonabledoubtthatthedefendanthadaconsciouspurposetoavoidlearning
thesourceoftheheroin.298F.2dat849.TheSupremeCourtagainadoptedtheModel
PenalCodedefinitionofknowledgeandapprovedthelanguageofGriegoinBarnesv.
UnitedStates,412U.S.837,845&n.10,93S.Ct.2357,2362,37L.Ed.2d380,387
(1973).
ItistruethatneitherLeary,Turner,norBarnesinvolvedajuryinstruction.However,
UnitedStatesv.Squires,440F.2d859,86364&n.12(2dCir.1971),andUnited
Statesv.Jacobs,475F.2d270,28788(2dCir.1973),recognizethattheSupreme
Court'sapprovaloftheModelPenalCodedefinitionofknowledgeimpliesapprovalofan
instructionthattherequirementofknowledgeissatisfiedbyproofofaconscious
purposetoavoidlearningthetruth. 11 Theimplicationseemsinevitable,*702inviewof
theapprovalofGriegoinTurnerandBarnes.
6 Deliberateignoranceinstructionshavebeenapprovedinprosecutionsunder
criminalstatutesprohibitingknowingconductbytheCourtsofAppealsoftheSecond,
Sixth,Seventh,andTenthCircuits. 12 Inmanyothercases,CourtsofAppealsreviewing
thesufficiencyofevidencehaveapprovedthepremisethatknowinglyincriminal
statutesisnotlimitedtopositiveknowledge,butincludesthestateofmindofonewho
doesnotpossesspositiveknowledgeonlybecauseheconsciouslyavoidedit. 13 These
linesofauthority*703appearunbroken.Neitherthedissentnorthebriefsofeitherparty
hascitedacaseholdingthatsuchaninstructioniserrororthatsuchevidenceisnot
sufficienttoestablishknowledge. 14
Thereisnoreasontoreachadifferentresultunderthestatuteinvolvedinthiscase.
DoingsowouldputthiscourtindirectconflictwithCourtsofAppealsintwoothercircuits
thathaveapproveddeliberateignoranceinstructionsinprosecutionsunder21U.S.C.s
841(a),oritspredecessor,21U.S.C.s174. 15 Nothingiscitedfromthelegislativehistory
oftheDrugControlActindicatingthatCongressusedthetermknowinglyinasenseat

oddswithpriorauthority.Rather,Congressispresumedtohaveknownandadoptedthe
clusterofideasattachedtosuchafamiliartermofart.Morissettev.UnitedStates,342
U.S.246,263,72S.Ct.240,249,96L.Ed.288,300(1952).Congresswasawareof
LearyandTurner, 16 andexpressednodissatisfactionwiththeirdefinitionoftheterm.
Appellant'snarrowinterpretationofknowinglyisinconsistentwiththeDrugControlAct's
generalpurposetodealmoreeffectivelywiththegrowingmenaceofdrugabuseinthe
UnitedStates. 17 Holdingthatthistermintroducesarequirementofpositiveknowledge
wouldmakedeliberateignoranceadefense.Itcannotbedoubtedthatthosewhotrafficin
drugswouldmakethemostofit.Thisisevidentfromthenumberofappellatedecisions
reflectingconsciousavoidanceofpositiveknowledgeofthepresenceofcontrabandin
thecardrivenbythedefendantorinwhichheisapassenger,inthesuitcaseorpackage
hecarries,intheparcelconcealedinhisclothing.Seenotes12,13,and15.
Itisnoanswertosaythatinsuchcasesthefactfindermayinferpositiveknowledge.Itis
probablethatmanywhoperformedthetransportationfunction,essentialtothedrug
traffic,cantruthfullytestifythattheyhavenopositiveknowledgeoftheloadtheycarry.
Underappellant'sinterpretationofthestatute,suchpersonswillbeconvictedonlyifthe
factfindererrsinevaluatingthecredibilityofthewitnessordeliberatelydisregardsthe
law.
Itbegsthequestiontoassertthatadeliberateignoranceinstructionpermitsthejuryto
convictwithoutfindingthattheaccusedpossessedtheknowledgerequiredbythestatute.
Suchanassertionassumesthatthestatuterequirespositiveknowledge.Butthequestion
isthemeaningofthetermknowinglyinthestatute.Ifitmeanspositiveknowledge,then,
ofcourse,*704nothinglesswilldo.Butifknowinglyincludesamentalstateinwhichthe
defendantisawarethatthefactinquestionishighlyprobablebutconsciouslyavoids
enlightenment,thestatuteissatisfiedbysuchproof. 18
7 Itisworthemphasizingthattherequiredstateofminddiffersfrompositive
knowledgeonlysofarasnecessarytoencompassacalculatedefforttoavoidthe
sanctionsofthestatutewhileviolatingitssubstance. 19 Acourtcanproperlyfindwilful
blindnessonlywhereitcanalmostbesaidthatthedefendantactuallyknew. 20 Inthe
languageoftheinstructioninthiscase,thegovernmentmustprove,beyonda
reasonabledoubt,thatifthedefendantwasnotactuallyaware...hisignoranceinthat
regardwassolelyandentirelyaresultof...aconsciouspurposetoavoidlearningthe
truth. 21
Nolegitimateinterestofanaccusedisprejudicedbysuchastandard,andsociety's
interestinasystemofcriminallawthatisenforceableandthatimposessanctionsupon
allwhoareequallyculpablerequiresit.
Theconvictionisaffirmed.
*705ANTHONYM.KENNEDY,CircuitJudge,withwhomELY,HUFSTEDLERand
WALLACE,CircuitJudges,join(dissenting).
Jewellwasconvictedandreceivedconcurrentsentencesontwocounts:(1)knowinglyor
intentionallyimportingacontrolledsubstance,21U.S.C.ss952(a),960(a)(1)(2)
knowinglyorintentionallypossessing,withintenttodistribute,acontrolledsubstance,id.
s841(a)(1).Weagreewiththemajoritythatthejurywasnotrequiredtofind,astocount
one,thatthedefendantknewwhichcontrolledsubstancehepossessed.Wefurther
agreethattheadditionalstateofmindrequiredbycounttwointenttodistributethe
substancemustbespecificallyprovenasanelementofasection841(a)(1)violation.
Thesolequestionraisedbyappellantiswhetherthefollowingjuryinstructionconstitutes
reversibleerror:
TheGovernmenthastheburdenofprovingbeyondareasonabledoubt,astoCount2:
1.ThatthedefendantknowinglybroughtthemarijuanaintotheUnitedStatesandwith
respecttoCount2thatheknowinglypossessedthemarijuanaascharged.
TheGovernmentcancompletetheirburdenofproofbyproving,beyondareasonable
doubt,thatifthedefendantwasnotactuallyawarethattherewasmarijuanainthevehicle
hewasdrivingwhenheenteredtheUnitedStateshisignoranceinthatregardwas
solelyandentirelyaresultofhishavingmadeaconsciouspurposetodisregardthe
natureofthatwhichwasinthevehicle,withaconsciouspurposetoavoidlearningthe
truth.

Attheoutset,itisarguablethattheconsciouspurposetoavoidlearningthetruth
instructionisinherentlyinconsistentwiththeadditionalmensrearequiredforcounttwo
intenttodistribute.Itisdifficulttoexplainthatadefendantcanspecificallyintendto
distributeasubstanceunlessheknowsthathepossessesit. 1 Inanyevent,wewouldnot
approvetheconsciouspurposeinstructioninthiscase,becauseitfallsshortofthe
scienterindependentlyrequiredunderbothcounts. 2
Themajorityopinionjustifiestheconsciouspurposejuryinstructionasanapplicationof
thewilfulblindnessdoctrinerecognizedprimarilybyEnglishauthorities.Aclassic
illustrationofthisdoctrineistheconnivanceofaninnkeeperwhodeliberatelyarranges
nottogointohisbackroomandthusavoidsvisualconfirmationofthegamblinghe
believesistakingplace. 3 Thedoctrineiscommonlysaidtoapplyindecidingwhetherone
whoacquirespropertyundersuspiciouscircumstancesshouldbechargedwith
knowledgethatitwasstolen. 4
Oneproblemwiththewilfulblindnessdoctrineisitsbiastowardsvisualmeansof
acquiringknowledge.Wemayknowfactsfromdirectimpressionsoftheothersensesor
bydeductionfromcircumstantialevidence,andsuchknowledgeisnonethelessactual.
Moreover,visualsenseimpressions*706donotconsistentlyprovidecompletecertainty. 5
AnotherproblemisthattheEnglishauthoritiesseemtoconsiderwilfulblindnessastateof
minddistinctfrom,butequallyculpableas,actualknowledge. 6 Whenastatute
specificallyrequiresknowledgeasanelementofacrime,however,thesubstitutionof
someotherstateofmindcannotbejustifiedevenifthecourtdeemsthatbothareequally
blameworthy. 7
Finally,thewilfulblindnessdoctrineisuncertaininscope.Thereisdisagreementasto
whetherrecklessdisregardfortheexistenceofafactconstituteswilfulblindnessorsome
lesserdegreeofculpability. 8 Somecaseshaveheldthatastatute'sscienterrequirement
issatisfiedbytheconstructiveknowledgeimputedtoonewhosimplyfailstodischargea
dutytoinformhimself. 9 Thereisalsothequestionofwhethertouseanobjectivetest
basedonthereasonableman,ortoconsiderthedefendant'ssubjectivebeliefas
dispositive. 10
Theapproachadoptedinsection2.02(7)oftheModelPenalCodeclarifies,and,in
importantwaysrestricts, 11 theEnglishdoctrine:
Whenknowledgeoftheexistenceofaparticularfactisanelementofanoffense,such
knowledgeisestablishedifapersonisawareofahighprobabilityof*707itsexistence,
unlessheactuallybelievesthatitdoesnotexist.
Thisprovisionrequiresanawarenessofahighprobabilitythatafactexists,notmerelya
recklessdisregard,orasuspicionfollowedbyafailuretomakefurtherinquiry.Italso
establishesknowledgeasamatterofsubjectivebelief,animportantsafeguardagainst
dilutingtheguiltystateofmindrequiredforconviction.Itisimportanttonotethatsection
2.02(7)isadefinitionofknowledge,notasubstituteforitassuch,ithasbeencitedwith
approvalbytheSupremeCourt.Turnerv.UnitedStates,396U.S.398,416&n.29,90
S.Ct.642,652,24L.Ed.2d610,623(1970)Learyv.UnitedStates,395U.S.6,46n.93,
89S.Ct.1532,1553,23L.Ed.2d57,87(1969).
InlightoftheModelPenalCode'sdefinition,theconsciouspurposejuryinstructionis
defectiveinthreerespects.First,itfailstomentiontherequirementthatJewellhave
beenawareofahighprobabilitythatacontrolledsubstancewasinthecar.Itisnot
culpabletoformaconsciouspurposetoavoidlearningthetruthunlessoneisawareof
factsindicatingahighprobabilityofthattruth.Toillustrate,achildgivenagiftwrapped
packagebyhismotherwhileonvacationinMexicomayformaconsciouspurposetotake
ithomewithoutlearningwhatisinsideyethisstateofmindistotallyinnocentunlessheis
awareofahighprobabilitythatthepackagecontainsacontrolledsubstance.Thus,a
consciouspurposeinstructionisonlyproperwhencoupledwitharequirementthatone
beawareofahighprobabilityofthetruth.
TheseconddefectintheinstructionasgivenisthatitdidnotalertthejurythatJewell
couldnotbeconvictedifheactuallybelievedtherewasnocontrolledsubstanceinthe
car.Thefailuretoemphasize,asdoestheModelPenalCode,thatsubjectivebeliefisthe
determinativefactor,mayallowajurytoconvictonanobjectivetheoryofknowledgethat
areasonablemanshouldhaveinspectedthecarandwouldhavediscoveredwhatwas
hiddeninside.Onerecentdecisionreversedajuryinstructionforthisverydeficiency
failuretobalanceaconsciouspurposeinstructionwithawarningthatthedefendantcould

notbeconvictedifheactuallybelievedtothecontrary.UnitedStatesv.Bright,517F.2d
584,58689(2dCir.1975).
Third,thejuryinstructionclearlystatesthatJewellcouldhavebeenconvictedevenif
foundignorantornotactuallyawarethatthecarcontainedacontrolledsubstance.This
isunacceptablebecausetrueignorance,nomatterhowunreasonable,cannotprovidea
basisforcriminalliabilitywhenthestatuterequiresknowledge. 12 Aproperjuryinstruction
basedontheModelPenalCodewouldbepresentedasawayofdefiningknowledge,and
notasanalternativetoit.
Themajorityopinioncitesthreecases,allintheSecondCircuit,whichapproveconscious
purposeinstructionsinprosecutionsunderthesamestatuteasJewellwascharged.In
twoofthesecasesthejuryinstructionincludedoneoftheelementsoftheModelPenal
Codeprovisionwhichwasomittedintheinstantcase. 13 Ofcourse,juryinstructions
shouldbeconsideredincontextandnotsubjectedtoundulytechnicalanalysis.Yetwe
remainconvincedthattheinstructionsgiveninthiscasewereerroneoustheycouldhave
permittedthejurytoconvictJewellwithoutbeingcertainbeyondareasonabledoubtthat
hepossessedthemensrearequiredforknowingpossessionorimportationunder21
U.S.C.ss841(a)&960(a).
Wedonotagreewiththemajoritythatwecanonlyreverseiftheconsciouspurpose
instructionconstitutedplainerror.Beforetheinstructionwasgiven,thedefense*708
counselobjectedstrenuouslyonthebasisthatthejurycouldconvictJewellforfailureto
makeanadequateattempttocheckoutthecar.Whenthetrialjudgerejectedthis
argument,thedefensecounselfurtherrequestedthatheaddanaddendumtothe
chargesothejurywouldunderstanditproperly.Thetrialcourtrejectedthissuggestionas
well,andcutofffurtherargument,sayingTherecordmayshowyourobjection.
Althoughthedefensecounseldidnotfullyanticipateouranalysisoftheconscious
purposeinstruction,hecameclose.(1)Hegaveareasonforhisobjectionthatthe
instructionwouldallowconvictionwithoutproofofthescienterelement.(2)Hefurther
suggestedaddinganaddendumtowarnthejuryagainstmisinterpretingtheinstruction.
Webelievetheseobjectionsweresufficienttorequirereversalonappealunlessthe
deficienciesintheinstructionwereharmlesserror. 14
Wedonotquestionthesufficiencyoftheevidenceinthiscasetosupportconvictionbya
properlyinstructedjury. 15 Aswithallstatesofmind,knowledgemustnormallybeproven
bycircumstantialevidence.Thereisevidencewhichcouldsupportaconclusionthat
Jewellwasawareofahighprobabilitythatthecarcontainedacontrolledsubstanceand
thathehadnobelieftothecontrary.However,wecannotsaythattheevidencewasso
overwhelmingthattheerroneousjuryinstructionwasharmless.Accordingly,wewould
reversethejudgmentonthisappeal.

AllCitations
532F.2d697

Footnotes
1

Appellanttestifiedthataweekbeforetheincidentinquestionhesoldhiscar
for$100toobtainfundstohaveagoodtime.Hethenrentedacarfor
about$100,andheandafrienddrovetherentedcartoMexico.Appellant
andhisfriendwereunabletoadequatelyexplaintheirwhereaboutsduring
theperiodofabout11hoursbetweenthetimetheyleftLosAngelesandthe
timetheyadmittedarrivinginMexico.
Theirtestimonyregardingacquisitionoftheloadcarfollowsapattern
commoninthesecases:theywereapproachedinaTijuanabarbya
strangerwhoidentifiedhimselfonlybyhisfirstnameRay.Heaskedthem
iftheywantedtobuymarihuana,andofferedtopaythem$100fordrivinga
carnorthacrosstheborder.Appellantacceptedtheofferanddrovetheload
carback,alone.Appellant'sfrienddroveappellant'srentedcarbacktoLos
Angeles.
Appellanttestifiedthatthestrangerinstructedhimtoleavetheloadcarat
theaddressonthecarregistrationslipwiththekeysintheashtray.The
personlivingatthataddresstestifiedthathehadsoldthecarayearearlier
andhadnotseenitsince.WhentheCustomsagentaskedappellantabout

thesecretcompartmentinthecar,appellantdidnotdenyknowledgeofits
existence,butstatedthatitwasinthecarwhenhegotit.
Thereweremanydiscrepanciesandinconsistenciesintheevidence
reflectinguponappellant'scredibility.Takingtherecordasawhole,thejury
couldhaveconcludedthattheevidenceestablishedanabortivescheme,
concoctedandcarriedoutbyappellantfromthebeginning,toacquirea
loadofmarihuanainMexicoandreturnittoLosAngelesfordistributionfor
profit.
2

Bothappellantandhiscompaniontestifiedthatthestrangeridentifiedas
Rayofferedtosellthemmarihuanaand,whentheydeclined,askedifthey
wantedtodriveacarbacktoLosAngelesfor$100.Appellant'scompanion
wantednopartofdrivingthevehicle.Hetestified,Itdidn'tsoundrightto
me.Appellantacceptedtheoffer.TheDrugEnforcementAdministration
agenttestifiedthatappellantstatedhethoughttherewasprobably
somethingwrongandsomethingillegalinthevehicle,butthathecheckedit
over.Helookedinthegloveboxandunderthefrontseatandinthetrunk,
priortodrivingit.Hedidn'tfindanything,and,therefore,heassumedthat
thepeopleattheborderwouldn'tfindanythingeither(emphasisadded).
Appellantwasaskedattrialwhetherhehadseenthespecialcompartment
whenheopenedthetrunk.Heresponded,Well,youknow,Isawavoid
there,butIdidn'tknowwhatitwas.Hetestifiedthathedidnotinvestigate
further.TheCustomsagenttestifiedthatwhenheopenedthetrunkand
sawthepartitionheaskedappellantwhenhehadthatputin.Appellant
toldtheagentthatitwasinthecarwhenhegotit.
Thejurywouldhavebeenjustifiedinacceptingallofthetestimonyastrue
andconcludingthatalthoughappellantwasawareoffactsmakingitvirtually
certainthatthesecretcompartmentconcealedmarihuana,hedeliberately
refrainedfromacquiringpositiveknowledgeofthefact.

Thecourtsaid:
Anactisdoneknowinglyifit'sdonevoluntarilyandintentionallyandnot
becauseofmistakeoraccidentorotherinnocentreason.
Thepurposeofaddingthewordknowinglywastoinsurethatnoone
wouldbeconvictedforactsdonebecauseofanomissionorfailuretoact
duetomistakeoraccidentorotherinnocentreason.

R.Perkins,CriminalLaw776(2ded.1969).

Edwards,TheCriminalDegreesofKnowledge,17ModernL.Rev.294,298
(1954).LaterinhisdiscussionMr.Edwardswrites,(N)orealdoubthas
beencastonthepropositionthatconnivanceisasculpableasactual
knowledge.Wehavealreadyseenthediversefashionsinwhichthisstateof
mindhasbeendefined,rangingfromtheoriginalexpressionwilfulshutting
oftheeyes'anditsclosestcounterpartwilfulblindness,tothelessforceful
butequallysatisfactoryformulaepurposelyabstainingfromascertaining
andwilfullyabstainingfromknowing.Id.at302.

G.Williams,CriminalLaw:TheGeneralPart,s57at157(2ded.1961).

Id.at159.Mr.Williams'concludingparagraphreadsinitsentirety:
Therulethatwilfulblindnessisequivalenttoknowledgeisessential,andis
foundthroughoutthecriminallaw.Itis,atthesametime,anunstablerule,
becausejudgesareapttoforgetitsverylimitedscope.Acourtcanproperly
findwilfulblindnessonlywhereitcanalmostbesaidthatthedefendant
actuallyknew.Hesuspectedthefactherealiseditsprobabilitybuthe
refrainedfromobtainingthefinalconfirmationbecausehewantedinthe
eventtobeabletodenyknowledge.This,andthisalone,iswilfulblindness.
Itrequiresineffectafindingthatthedefendantintendedtocheatthe
administrationofjustice.Anywiderdefinitionwouldmakethedoctrineof
wilfulblindnessindistinguishablefromthecivildoctrineofnegligenceinnot
obtainingknowledge.

ModelPenalCode27(Prop.OfficialDraft1962).

ModelPenalCode12930(Tent.DraftNo.4,1955).Comment9readsin
fullasfollows:

Paragraph(7)dealswiththesituationBritishcommentatorshave
denominatedwilfulblindnessorconnivance,thecaseoftheactorwhois
awareoftheprobableexistenceofamaterialfactbutdoesnotsatisfy
himselfthatitdoesnotinfactexist.SeeEdwards,TheCriminalDegreesof
Knowledge,17ModernL.Rev.294(1954)(G.Williams,CriminalLaw:The
GeneralParts41(1sted.1953)).Whethersuchcasesshouldbeviewedas
instancesofactingrecklesslyorknowinglypresentsasubtlebutimportant
question.
Thedraftproposesthatthecasebeviewedasoneofactingknowingly
whenwhatisinvolvedisamatterofexistingfact,butnotwhenwhatis
involvedistheresultofthedefendant'sconduct,necessarilyamatterofthe
futureatthetimeofacting.Thepositionreflectswhatwebelievetobethe
normalpolicyofcriminalenactmentswhichrestliabilityonacting
knowingly,asissocommonlydone.Theinferenceofknowledgeofan
existingfactisusuallydrawnfromproofofnoticeofsubstantialprobabilityof
itsexistence,unlessthedefendantestablishesanhonest,contrarybelief.
Thedraftsolidifiesthisusualresultandclarifiesthetermsinwhichtheissue
issubmittedtothejury.
10

SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Freed,401U.S.601,613n.5,91S.Ct.1112,
1120,28L.Ed.2d356,364(1971)(Brennan,J.,concurring).

11

Jacobsinvolvedconvictionsunder18U.S.C.ss2314and2315prohibiting
dealingsinsecuritiesknowingthesametohavebeenstolen.Thecharge
read:
Thethirdelementoftheoffenseisthatthedefendantknewthatthe
TreasuryBillshadbeenstolen.Knowledgeisnotsomethingthatyoucan
seewiththeeyeortouchwiththefinger.Itisseldompossibletoproveitby
directevidence.Thegovernmentrelieslargelyoncircumstantialevidencein
thiscasetoestablishknowledge.
Indecidingwhetheraparticulardefendantunderconsiderationbyyouknew
thebillswerestolenyoushouldconsiderallthecircumstancessuchashow
thedefendanthandledthetransaction,howheconductedhimself.Dohis
actionsbetrayguiltyknowledgethathewasdealingwithstolensecuritiesor
arehisactionsthoseofaduped,innocentman?
Guiltyknowledgecannotbeestablishedbydemonstratingmerely
negligenceorevenfoolishnessonthepartofadefendant.However,itisnot
necessarythatthegovernmentprovetoacertaintythatadefendantknew
thebillswerestolen.Suchknowledgeisestablishedifthedefendantwas
awareofahighprobabilitythatthebillswerestolen,unlessthedefendant
actuallybelievedthatthebillswerenotstolen.
Knowledgethatthegoodshavebeenstolenmaybeinferredfrom
circumstancesthatwouldconvinceamanofordinaryintelligencethatthisis
thefact.Theelementofknowledgemaybesatisfiedbyproofthata
defendantdeliberatelyclosedhiseyestowhatotherwisewouldhavebeen
obvioustohim.
Thusifyoufindthatadefendantactedwithrecklessdisregardofwhether
thebillswerestolenandwithaconsciouspurposetoavoidlearningthe
truththerequirementofknowledgewouldbesatisfied,unlessthedefendant
actuallybelievedtheywerenotstolen.
Furthermore,Iinstructyouthatproofofasaleandpurchaseata
substantiallydiscountedpricepermitsaninferencethatthepartiestothe
transactionknewoftheillicitcharacteroftheitemssold.
Youshouldscrutinizetheentireconductofthedefendantatornearthetime
theoffensesareallegedtohavebeencommitted.
475F.2dat287n.37(emphasisadded).

12

UnitedStatesv.Dozier,522F.2d224,226(2dCir.1975)(21U.S.C.s
841(a)(1)upheldthefollowingjuryinstruction:Ifyoufindfromallthe
evidencebeyondareasonabledoubteitherthatthedefendantknewthat
shewashelpinginacocainetransaction,orthatshehadaconscious
purposetoavoidfindingouttheidentityofthesubstancesoastocloseher
eyestothefacts,youcouldfindsufficientevidencetofindherguiltybeyond
areasonabledoubt)UnitedStatesv.OlivaresVega,495F.2d827,830
(2dCir.1974)(21U.S.C.ss952(a)&841(a)(1))UnitedStatesv.Joly,493
F.2d672(2dCir.1974)(21U.S.C.ss841(a)(1),952(a),955,960(a)(1)&
(2)UnitedStatesv.Thomas,484F.2d909,91213(6thCir.1973)(18

U.S.C.s922(a)(6):firearms)UnitedStatesv.Jacobs,475F.2d270,287
88(2dCir.1973)(conspiracytoviolate18U.S.C.ss2314&2315:stolen
securities)UnitedStatesv.Grizaffi,471F.2d69,75(7thCir.1972)(18
U.S.C.ss371,1008,1341LaBuyInstructionNo.4.05,33F.R.D.553
(1965),approved)UnitedStatesv.Sarantos,455F.2d877,88081(2d
Cir.1972)(18U.S.C.ss371,1001,1546)UnitedStatesv.Squires,440
F.2d859,864&n.12(2dCir.1971)(18U.S.C.s922(a)(6)ModelPenal
Codefollowedjuryinstructionrejectedbecauseitshouldhaveincluded
deliberateignorance)UnitedStatesv.Llanes,374F.2d712,716(2dCir.
1967)(convictionunderformer21U.S.C.ss173&174instructions
properlyrefusedsincetheyfailedtoincludetheelementofaconscious
purposetoavoidlearningthesourceoftheheroin)UnitedStatesv.
Joyce,499F.2d9,23(7thCir.1974)(18U.S.C.s1341LaBuyInstruction
No.4.05approved)Griegov.UnitedStates,298F.2d845,849(10thCir.
1962)(reversalofconvictionunderformer21U.S.C.s174juryshouldbe
givendeliberateignoranceinstruction).
UnitedStatesv.Bright,517F.2d584,58688(2dCir.1975),reverseda
convictionbecausethetrialcourtrefusedtoaddtoadeliberateignorance
instructionthequalificationunlessheactuallybelievesitdidnotexist,
foundinModelPenalCodes2.02(7).Thisquestionwasnotraisedbelow,
orinthiscourt,perhapsbecausetheevidencetosupportitwaslacking.See
note2supra.SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Dozier,522F.2d224,228(2dCir.
1975)(onpetitionforrehearing).
13

UnitedStatesv.DeGarces,518F.2d1156,1160(2dCir.1975)(21U.S.C.
ss952(a),960(a)(1))UnitedStatesv.Frank,494F.2d145,15253(2d
Cir.1974)(transportingstolenmoney,18U.S.C.ss371,13411343,2314)
UnitedStatesv.Brawer,482F.2d117,12627(2dCir.1973)(18U.S.C.ss
2,371&2314,transportingstolensecurities)UnitedStatesv.Egenberg,
441F.2d441,444(2dCir.1971)(falsestatements,18U.S.C.s1001,26
U.S.C.s7206(2))UnitedStatesv.Abrams,427F.2d86,91(2dCir.1970)
(falsestatements,18U.S.C.ss2,1001)UnitedStatesv.Sheiner,410
F.2d337,34041(2dCir.1969)(18U.S.C.s331andothers)Verdugov.
UnitedStates,402F.2d599,604(9thCir.1968)(former21U.S.C.s174)
seeUnitedStatesv.Moser,509F.2d1089,109293(7thCir.1975)
(specificintentin21U.S.C.s841(a)(1))UnitedStatesv.Yasser,114F.2d
558,560(3dCir.1940)(predecessorof18U.S.C.s152dicta)cf.United
Statesv.CooperativeGrain&SupplyCo.,476F.2d47,59(8thCir.1973)
(dictathatguiltyavoidanceofknowledgecansupplantpositiveknowledge
under18U.S.C.s287)Rachmilv.UnitedStates,43F.2d878,881(9th
Cir.1930)(percuriam)(dictaregardingpredecessorto18U.S.C.s152).

14

Thecasescitedinappellant'sbriefsholdonlythatknowledgethatthe
substancepossessedisanarcoticorcontrolledsubstancewasanelement
oftheparticularoffensesinvolved.Noneholdsthatsuchknowledgecannot
beestablishedbyproofthatthepossessorwasawareoffactsmakingit
highlyprobablethatthesubstancewasanarcoticorcontrolledsubstance
andlackedpositiveknowledgeonlybecauseheconsciouslyavoidedit.

15

UnitedStatesv.Dozier,522F.2d224,226(2dCir.1975)UnitedStatesv.
OlivaresVega,495F.2d827,830(2dCir.1974)UnitedStatesv.Joly,493
F.2d672(2dCir.1974)UnitedStatesv.Llanes,374F.2d712,716(2d
Cir.1967)(underformer21U.S.C.ss173&174,instructionproperly
refusedbecauseitdidnotincludedeliberateignorance)Griegov.United
States,298F.2d845,849(10thCir.1962)(onremandunderformer21
U.S.C.s174,juryshouldbeinstructedondeliberateignorance)see
UnitedStatesv.Moser,509F.2d1089,109293(7thCir.1975)(under21
U.S.C.s841(a)(1)sufficiencyofevidenceofspecificintenttopossessand
distributeLSD).

16

See,e.g.,DrugAbuseControlAmendments1970,Hearingsbeforethe
Subcomm.onPublicHealth&WelfareoftheHouseComm.onInterstate&
ForeignCommerce,91stCong.,2dSess.,at697,70506(1970)116
Cong.Rec.33661(1970)(col.2).

17

See,e.g.,H.R.No.911444,Sept.10,1970,91stCong.,2dSess.,3
U.S.CodeCong.&Admin.News4566,4567(1970).

18

Theargumentthatadeliberateignoranceinstructionrelievesthejuryof
findingknowledgewasrejectedinUnitedStatesv.OlivaresVega,495
F.2d827,830(2dCir.1974).

19

AsJudgeFeinbergsaidinUnitedStatesv.Sarantos,455F.2d877,881
(2dCir.1972),thepurposeofthedeliberateignoranceinstructionisto
preventanindividual...fromcircumventingcriminalsanctionsmerelyby
deliberatelyclosinghiseyestotheobviousriskthatheisengagingin
unlawfulconduct.

20

G.Williams,supranote6,at159.

21

Wedonotsuggestthattheinstructiongiveninthiscasewasamodelinall
respects.Thejuryshouldhavebeeninstructedmoredirectly(1)thatthe
requiredknowledgeisestablishediftheaccusedisawareofahigh
probabilityoftheexistenceofthefactinquestion,(2)unlessheactually
believesitdoesnotexist.
Thedeficiencyintheinstructiondoesnotrequirereversal,however.
Appellantdidnotobjecttotheinstructiononthisgroundeitherbeloworin
thiscourt.Sincebothoftheelementsreferredtoareimpliedinthe
instruction,thedeficiencyintheinstructionsisnotsosubstantialastojustify
reversalforplainerror.SeeUnitedStatesv.Dozier,522F.2d224,228(2d
Cir.1975)(onpetitionforrehearing).
Appellantdidnotarguebeloworinthiscourtthattheinstructiondidnot
requireanawarenessofahighprobabilitythatthecontrolledsubstancewas
present.Anobjectiononthisgroundwouldhavelittlemerit.Theinstruction
given(that(appellant's)ignoranceinthatregardwassolelyandentirelythe
resultofhishavingmadeaconsciouspurposetodisregardthenatureof
thatwhichwasinthevehicle)suggeststhattheaccusedmustbeawareof
factsmakingthepresenceofthecontrabandallbutcertain.Onlyifthe
accusedwereawareofsuchfactscouldhisignoranceofthepresenceof
themarihuanabesolelyandentirelytheresultofhisconsciouspurpose
toavoidthetruth.Underthisinstruction,neitherrecklessdisregardnor
suspicionfollowedbyfailuretomakefullinquirywouldbeenough.
Nordidappellantsuggestinthecourtbeloworinthiscourtthatthe
instructiongivenwasdeficientbecauseitfailedtostatespecifically(aswe
thinkwouldhavebeenpreferable)thatappellantcouldnotbeconvictedif
heactuallybelievedtherewasnocontrolledsubstanceinthecar.The
reasonappellantdoesnotraisethisobjectionmaybe,again,thatthe
instructiongivenincludesthelimitationbyreasonableinference.Ifappellant
wereignorantofthepresenceofcontrabandsolelyandentirelybecausehe
madeaconsciouspurposetodisregardthenatureofthatwhichwasinthe
vehicle,astheinstructiongivenrequires,itwouldhardlybearealistic
possibilitythathemightatthesametimehaveentertainedagoodfaith
beliefthattherewasnocontrabandpresent.Nordidtheinstructionpermit
thejurytoconvictonanobjectiveratherthansubjectivetheoryofthe
knowledgerequirementthatis,onthetheorythatappellantwaschargeable
withknowledgebecauseareasonablemanwouldhaveinspectedthecar
morethoroughlyanddiscoveredthecontrabandinside.SeeUnitedStates
v.Bright,517F.2d584,58788(2dCir.1975).Thenegligencetheorywas
advancedbythegovernmentbutwasrejectedbythetrialcourt.The
instructiongivenbythetrialcourtrequiredthejurytofindthatappellanthad
adeliberatepurposetoavoidthetruth.Moreover,thejurywasexpressly
informedthatanactwasnotdoneknowinglywithinthemeaningofthe
statuteifitwasdonebymistakeoraccidentorotherinnocentpurpose.
Inthecircumstancesofthiscase,itwasnotplainerrorrequiringreversalfor
theinstructiontofailtodefineknowledgeexplicitlyintermsofanawareness
ofahighprobabilityofthepresenceofthecontrabandandtheabsenceofa
beliefthatthecontrabandwasnotpresent.

Wantofknowledge...maydisprovetheexistenceofaspecificintent.
Thusonecannotintendtostealpropertywhichhebelievestobehisown
howevercarelesshemayhavebeenincomingtothatbelief.R.Perkins,
CriminalLaw778(2ded.1969)(footnoteomitted).

Thechallengedinstructionwasgivenforcounttwoonly,butitwouldseem
tobeapplicableaswelltothestateofmindrequiredforcountone.Ajury

wouldbeeasilyconfusedbytheapparentdifferenceinstandards,atleast
absentexplicitinstructionsonthepoint.Thereforewethinkitwouldbe
inappropriatetoinvoketheconcurrentsentenceruletoaffirmJewell's
convictiononthebasisofcountone.
3

See,e.g.,Bosleyv.Davies,(1875)L.R.1Q.B.84.

See2R.Anderson,Wharton'sCriminalLawandProcedures568(1957&
Supp.1975).Thissituationuseofcircumstantialevidencetoprovea
contemporaneousstateofmindshouldbedistinguishedfromtheuseofone
facttosupporttheinferenceofapreviousevent.SeeMcAbeev.United
States,434F.2d361,36263(9thCir.1970)(permissiveinferencethat
possessorofpropertyrecentlystoleninanotherstatewasthethiefandhad
transporteditininterstatecommerce).

SeeUnitedStatesv.Wade,388U.S.218,22829,87S.Ct.1926,1932,18
L.Ed.2d1149,1158(1967).

SeeG.Williams,CriminalLaw:TheGeneralParts57,at157(2ded.1961)
(Totherequirementofactualknowledgethereisonestrictlylimited
exception.)Edwards,TheCriminalDegreesofKnowledge,17Modern
L.Rev.294,302(1954)(wilfulblindnessisasculpableasactual
knowledge).
Theuseofthetermactualknowledgeinthismannerismisleadingin
suggestingthepossibilityofachievingastateoftotalcertainty,andthatonly
suchknowledgeisactual.Infact,wecommonlyactonlessthancomplete
informationandinthisworldmayneverknowonehundredpercent
certainty.
Absoluteknowledgecanbehadofveryfewthings,saidtheMassachusetts
court,andthephilosophermightaddifany.Formostpracticalpurposes
knowledgeisnotconfinedtowhatwehavepersonallyobservedortowhat
wehaveevolvedbyourowncognitivefaculties.
R.Perkins,supranote1,at775,quotingStoryv.Buffam,90Mass.35,38
(8Allen)(1864),andStatev.Ransberger,106Mo.135,140,17S.W.290,
292(1891).

ThiscasedoesnotpresentthequestionofhowfarCongresscouldreduce
therequirementofamensreaforpossessionofdrugs.Thestatutesuse
thetermsknowinglyorintentionally.Itistruethatastrictinterpretationof
thescienterrequirementmayproducefewerconvictionsincombatingthe
growingmenaceofdrugabuse.ButtheSupremeCourthascautionedthat
thepurposeofeverystatutewouldbeobstructedbyrequiringafindingof
intent,ifweassumethatithadapurposetoconvictwithoutit.Morissettev.
UnitedStates,342U.S.246,259,72S.Ct.240,247,96L.Ed.288,298
(1952).HereitisclearthatCongressintendedtorequireknowledgeasan
elementoftheseoffenses.
Thespiritofthedoctrinewhichdeniestothefederaljudiciarypowerto
createcrimesforthrightlyadmonishesthatweshouldnotenlargethereach
ofenactedcrimesbyconstitutingthemfromanythinglessthanthe
incriminatingcomponentscontemplatedbythewordsusedinthestatute.
Id.at263,72S.Ct.at249,96L.Ed.at300.

CompareG.Williams,supranote6,at15859,withEdwards,supranote6,
at30306.Arecklessdisregardinstructionwasapprovedinonecase
relieduponbythemajority.SeeUnitedStatesv.Thomas,484F.2d909,
91213(6thCir.1973),cert.denied,415U.S.924,94S.Ct.1428,39
L.Ed.2d480(1974).

E.g.,Spurrv.UnitedStates,174U.S.728,735,19S.Ct.812,815,43
L.Ed.1150,1153(1899).Thesecasesgenerallyinvolveregulatorystatutes,
theviolationofwhichismalumprohibitum.Riss&Co.v.UnitedStates,262
F.2d245,24851(8thCir.1958).Yetonecaserelieduponbythemajority
regardedSpurrascomparabletotheformernarcoticsimportationstatute.
SeeGriegov.UnitedStates,298F.2d845,849(10thCir.1962).

10

SeeR.Perkins,supranote1,at778&n.77R.Anderson,supranote4,at
28182&nn.68.

11

ProfessorPerkinsobservesthatsection2.02(7)oftheModelPenalCode
coversmustlessthanknowledgeasithasbeeninterpretedasamens
rearequirementinthecommonlaw.Withregardtothereceiptofstolen
property,hecriticizestheCodefornotimposingliabilityinthecaseofthe
manwhohasnobeliefonewayortheother,buthasbeenputonnotice
thatitmaybestolenandshutshiseyes'inordernottofindout.R.Perkins,
supranote1,at799.

12

Seenote7supra.

13

SeeUnitedStatesv.OlivaresVega,495F.2d827,830nn.10&11(2d
Cir.),cert.denied,419U.S.1020,95S.Ct.494,42L.Ed.2d293(1974)
(instructionrequiredacquittalifdefendantbelievedhedidnotpossess
controlledsubstance)UnitedStatesv.Joly,493F.2d672,674(2dCir.
1974)(consciouspurposetoavoidenlightenmentwhenhehadevery
reasontobelievehepossessedacontrolledsubstance).Thethirdcase
citedbythemajorityisdiscussedinnote14infra.

14

ThustheinstantcaseisdistinguishablefromUnitedStatesv.Dozier,522
F.2d224(2dCir.1975).Therecounselmadenoobjectiontothejury
charge,andtheSecondCircuitheldtheconsciouspurposeinstructionwas
notsounbalancedastoconstituteplainerror.Id.at228.

15

Thuswehavenodisagreementwiththesufficiencyofevidencecasescited
innote13ofthemajorityopinion.However,theyarenotinpointforthe
instantappeal.

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