1.

MIGUEL BELUSO, NATIVIDAD BELUSO, PEDRO BELUSO,

ANGELITA BELUSO, RAMON BELUSO, and AMADA DANIEL,
substituted by her heirs represented by TERESITA ARROBANG,
Petitioners, vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ),
represented by its Mayor, VICENTE B. BERMEJO, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners are owners of parcels of land with a total area of about
20,424 square meters, covered by Free Patent. On November 8, 1995,
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No. 9529 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings. 4 A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed on
April 14, 1997 by the Municipality of Panay (respondent) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Roxas City.
*Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is not for public
use but only for the benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically
motivated because petitioners voted against the incumbent mayor and vicemayor;
ISSUE: w/n the municipal mayor has the authority to exercise the power of
eminent domain through a mere resolution
RULING: No, Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to
appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is
essentially lodged in the legislature. 21 While such power may be validly
delegated to local government units (LGUs), other public entities and public
utilities the exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not
absolute. 22 In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than
that of the delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to
its control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations. 23 Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of
eminent domain. 24 Thus, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain
delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it must
conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a
share in eminent domain. 25 The national legislature is still the principal of the
LGUs and the latter cannot go against the principals will or modify the same.
*Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local
governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power
of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
*Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of
eminent domain expressly provides: SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A
local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however,
That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and
such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the
fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,

That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be

determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property.
*requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power
of eminent domain
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article
III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
*The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government
unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere
resolution of its lawmaking body. 31 R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will
not suffice. 32
A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private
property; and the reason for this is settled:
x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a
law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the
two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance,
but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.
2. DEVORAH E. BARDILLON, petitioner, vs. BARANGAY MASILI of
Calamba, Laguna, respondent.
FACTS: this present [P]etition is the controversy surrounding the two (2)
[C]omplaints for eminent domain which were filed by herein respondent for
the purpose of expropriating a (144) square meter-parcel of land, otherwise
known as Lot 4381-D situated in Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna and
owned by herein petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383605 of
the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner acquired from Makiling
Consolidated Credit Corporation the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute
Sale which was executed by and between the former and the latter on
October 7, 1996.
ISSUE: whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case;
RULING: Petitioner claims that, since the value of the land is only P11,448, the
MTC had jurisdiction over the case.[9] On the other hand, the appellate court
held that the assessed value of the property was P28,960.[10] Thus, the MTC
did not have jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings, because the
amount involved was beyond the P20,000 jurisdictional amount cognizable by
MTCs.
*An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of
money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority

and right to take property for public use. [11] As such, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts.
*the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms,
for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This,
however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount
is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of
the expropriation.
*On the part of local government units, expropriation is also governed by
Section 19 of the Local Government Code. [19] Accordingly, in expropriation
proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1)
the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and
(2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market value
of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. [20]
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of
respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the
amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing
requisites.
3. BARANGAY SINDALAN, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
FACTS: On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by
the barangay council,
petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San
Fernando,
Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a
Complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Jose
Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the registered owners of a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117674-R. The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6756 and raffled to the San
Fernando, Pampanga RTC, Branch 43. Petitioner sought to convert a
portion of respondents land into Barangay Sindalans feeder road. The
alleged public purposes sought to be served by the expropriation were
stated in BarangayResolution No. 6, WHEREAS, said parcels of land
shall be used, when acquired, as a barangay feeder road for the
agricultural and other products of the residents, and just as inlet for
their basic needs;
WHEREAS, presently, residents have to take a long circuitous dirt road
before they can reach the concrete provincial road, entailing so much
time, effort and money, not to mention possible damage and/or spilage
[sic] on the products consigned to or coming from, the market outside
the barangay; and
WHEREAS, said lots, used as outlet or inlet road, shall contribute
greatly to the general welfare of the people residing therein social,
cultural and health among other things, beside economic. [
*Petitioner claimed that respondents property was the most practical
and nearest way to the municipal road
ISSUE: w/n the taking of the land was for a public purpose or use
RULING: Petitioners delegated power to expropriate is not at
issue. The legal question in this petition, however, is whether the
taking of the land was for a public purpose or use. In the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private
property must be for a public purpose. A corollary issue is whether
private property can be taken by law from one person and given to
another in the guise of public purpose.

*findings presented by brgy. Was not supported by evidence.

*One last word: the power of eminent domain can only be exercised for
public use and with just compensation. Taking an individuals private
property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher good
which is public use and can only be counterbalanced by just
compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of property would
not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also
constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individuals
basic right to property as well.
*For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting the rights
of the property owner and must perform a more thorough and diligent
scrutiny of the alleged public purpose behind the expropriation.
Extreme caution is called for in resolving complaints for condemnation,
such that when a serious doubt arises regarding the supposed public
use of property, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the property
owner and against the State.
4. REPUBLIC
vs. PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE
COMPANY,
FACTS: The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity
exercising governmental powers through its branches and
instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
*SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the
following powers and duties:
(a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radiotelegraph offices, stations, and facilities, and those to be established to
restore the pre-war telecommunication service under the Bureau of
Posts
(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain
wire-telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout
the Philippines
(c) To prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head,
equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system
(e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by the
International Telecommunication Convention relative to the accounting,
disposition and exchange of messages handled in the international
service,
*The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT
for short), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise,
Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate
and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to
carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the
Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of
other countries. 2 The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party
to the present case but has contractual relations with the parties) is an
American corporation authorized to transact business in the Philippines
and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate
a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long distance
wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operate broadcasting and radiotelephone and radio-telegraphic communications services (Act 3180).
*Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent
praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand

interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that

of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of
the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it
cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is
had between them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the
Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
the Republic may require the telephone company to permit
interconnection as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation, to be determined by the
court. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection
between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a
subject to an easement of right of way.
*the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is
affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of
the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system
upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may
determine to be just. Public service com. has no authority.
5. THE CITY OF MANILA, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET
AL.,
FACTS: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying
that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for
the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner, in
the second paragraph of the petition, alleged: That for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal
Avenue, Manila,it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in
fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo
of said city within Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdiction of
this court.
*The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese
Community of Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged
that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit
and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila;
*The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied
each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said
expropriation was not a public improvement; that it was not
necessary for the plaintiff to acquire the parcels of land in question;
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila can condemn private
property for public use
RULING: NO, The general power to exercise the right of eminent
domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a
particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal
corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to
exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the
courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not
be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The
moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the

authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying

the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular
case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
*The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present
case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to
the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the
purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of
these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it
cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance
with law.
6. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R.
VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129
authorizing the Prov. Gov. To purchase/expropriate property to establish
a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project
for the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur
filed 2 cases for expropriation against private respondents
RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price of
San Joaquins.
CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and
void, b) complaint for expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen to
give comment.
SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the exercise
of the SP of the right to eminent domin. However, approval of DAR
must first be secured (since this involves appropriation of agricultural
lands).
CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues
raised. The SC said that the CA assumed that the resolution is valid
and the expropriation is for a public use).
ISSUE: 1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is
WON the expropriation is for a public use.
2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is
restricted by the CAR Law?
3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the
ground of inadequacy of the compensation offered?
1) RULING: The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution
is authorized and valid. SC explained that there had been a shift from
the old to the new concept of public purpose:. Old concept is that the
property must actually be used by the general public. The new
concept, on the other hand, means public advantage, convenience or

benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the

prosperity of the whole community.
In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure to the
direct benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps. (How?) invaluable
info and tech on agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry, enhance
livelihood of farmers and fishermen, etc.
2) No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of the
Ardana case is that) the power of expropriation is superior to the power
to distribute lands under the land reform program.
Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure
approval of the Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to non-agri
use. Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law subjecting expropriation by
LGUs to the control of DAR.
Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is applicable
only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program.
This is limited only to applications for reclassification submitted by land
owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political subdivisions
cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the
valuation decalred in the tax declarations of their property, are
unfounded.
It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases
based on the value given either by the owners or the assessor. Rules
for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 ROC,
evidence must be submitted to justify what they consider is the just
compensation.
7. JESUS
IS
LORD
CHRISTIAN
SCHOOL
FOUNDATION,
INC., petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO
MANILA
FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R.
Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to
Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly
made of light materials, were located. The road had to be at least three
meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could
pass through in case of conflagration. [2] Likewise, the residents in the
area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. [3] The
municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the
1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching
Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. PT-66585,[4] which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance[5] authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation
proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund
therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified
of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public use as
an access road but they rejected the offer
ISSUE: whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under
Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer
to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint;

RULING: the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its

complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the
property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced
by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local
Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing
the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners,
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
*Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of
proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation.
[46]
It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all
the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
*The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units
is grounded on Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 which reads:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain
may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court based
on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local
government unit must be complied with:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted
*Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code provides:
ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale. (a) The offer to buy
private property for public use or purpose shall be in writing. It shall
specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its
acquisition, and the price offered.
(b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of
sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made.

(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price
higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call
them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the
selling price. The chairman of the appropriation or finance committee
of
the sanggunian,
or
in his
absence,
any
member
of
the sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in
the conference. When an agreement is reached by the parties, a
contract of sale shall be drawn and executed.
(d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive
to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the terms
and conditions to be embodied in the contract;
(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; and
(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds
together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or
spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the
property involved.
*The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first
made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the
expense and delay of a court action