1

33. Jison vs. CA, G.R. No. 124853, Feb. 24, 1998
Facts:
Francisco Jison, married to Lilia Lopez Jison, allegedly impregnated his daughters nanny, Esperanza
Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as the illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. She likewise alleged that
Francisco supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central
Bank Examiner.
Monina Jison instituted an action against Francisco for Recognition as Illegitimate Child. The case
was filed 20 years after her mothers death and when she was already 39 years of age. Monina was able to
present 11 witnesses.
Issue:

Whether or not Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

Held:
Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way
and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of
evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as
his, by continuous and clear manifestations of paternal affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but
also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.
The following facts were established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1. That Francsico was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was
employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.
Moninas evidence hurdles the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to
establish ones illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous possession.
Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
34. De la Cruz vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
Facts:
Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz, 21 years old, and Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino, 19 years old,
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. On September 4, 2005, Dominique
died. After almost two months, Jenie gave birth to her child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino. She applied for the
registration of the childs birth, in support of which, she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth,
Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father, which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father. Both affidavits attested that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been
questioned. Jenie also attached to the AUSF an unsigned Autobiography which Dominique, during his
lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting acknowledging the unborn child in the womb of his common-law
wife, Jenie. The Civil Registrar of Antipolo City denied said application. Thereafter, Jenie and the child filed
a complaint for Injuction/Registration of Name against Ronald Paul Gracia, in his capacy as the City Civil
Registrar.
Issue:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can
be considered as a recognition of paternity.
Held:
Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an
admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument. It does not explicitly state that there must
be
a
signature
by
the
putative
father
in
the
private
handwritten
instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent; and

2
2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Llaneta vs. Agrava

G.R. No. L-32504 May 15, 1974
Facts:

Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but
one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had
relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought
her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer.
Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and
throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth
certificate in Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a
scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered
surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.
On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had
been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the
court for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner be allowed to change her surname based on her alleged facts.

Ruling:
The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted.
The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can
remember. A sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta in order to conform to
that appearing in her birth certificate would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals
with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio, married civilly on September
21, 1934 and canonically on September 30, 1943. In 1943, her husband abandoned her. Carmen
discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmen prayed for the issuance of the
decree of legal separation. Eufemio amended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative.
Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. With these respondent
moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds; the petition was filed beyond 1-year
period and the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation.
Issue:

Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation before final decree abated the

action.
Ruling:

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of
the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by
allowing only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by
providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
Gandionco vs. Pearanda
G.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987
Facts:
Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco, filed with the RTC of Misamis
Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition
for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage against petitioner
with MTC of General Santos City. And again for the application for the provisional remedy of support
pendente lite. The respondent Judge Pearanda ordered the payment of support pendente lite.
Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto should be
suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage.

3
Issue:
Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on the case of concubinage.
Ruling:

Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead
of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to
recover civil liability arising from the offense.
Civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense even if both the civil
and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can
be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge.
PRESCRIPTION
G.R. No. L-10699

WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO

October 18, 1957

Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal
separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese
invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in
adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl. Brown learned of his wifes
misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment. Thereafter the spouse lived separately.
Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown lived martially with another woman and had
begotten children by her.
The court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Browns action had already
prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred,
because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil
Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.
Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
The courts can take cognizance of prescription as a defense because actions seeking a decree of
legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no
such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
50. Macadangdang vs. CA, 108 SCRA 314
Facts:
Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin Anahaw with four children, had intercourse with Antonio
Macadangdang sometime in March 1967. Due to the affair, she and her husband allegedly got separated.
Seven months thereafter, Elizabeth gave birth to a baby boy named Rolando Macadangdang. Elizabeth
filed an action for Recognition and Support against Antonio.
Issue:

Whether or not Rolando Macadangdang is an illegitimate child of Antonio.

Held:

No. The Rolando Macadangdang was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after March
1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between Elizabeth and Antonio took place and also,
seven months from their alleged separation. It must be noted that as of March 1967, Elizabeth and Crispin
Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been married years before such date. The birth of
Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and
before 300 days following the alleged separation between spouses Elizabeth and Crispin.
Paragraph 1 of Article 255 of the Civil Code provides that children born after one hundred and
eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Thus, the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.
49. Pacete vs. Carriaga, 231 SCRA 321
Facts:

4
Concepcion Alanis, married to Enrico Pacete, filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for Legal
Separation, Accounting and Separation of Property. Defendants failed to file their Answer and were
declared in default. The trial court ruled in favour of Alanis.
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court is right in declaring defendants in default and granting the Petition for
Legal Separation filed by Concepcion Alanis.
Held:

No. Article 58 of the Family Code mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the
parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile. Also, under Section 6, of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, there is no defaults in actions for
annulments of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether
or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order
to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
48. Bugayon vs. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, Dec. 28, 1956
Facts:

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez, while on furlough leave. The couple lived with their sisters. On July 1951, Leonila Ginez left the
dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her
mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local
college there.
Benjamin Bugayong learned of the alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On August 1952, the
spouses went to the house of Benjamins cousin where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as
husband and wife. Then they went to Benjamins house and again passed the night therein as husband
and wife. Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had
committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took
as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal
separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the act charged have been condoned by Benjamin.
Held:
Yes. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single
voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation
and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation. Further, Article 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.