Agrarian Transformation and The New Rurality in Western Uttar Pradesh 0

Economic & Political Weekly
EPW
Published on Saturday,
JUNE 25, 2016
vol lI nos 26 & 27
61
REVIEW OF RURAL AFFAIRS
Agrarian Transformation and the New Rurality

in Western Uttar Pradesh
Satendra Kumar
Based on a multisite ethnographic restudy of villages in

western Uttar Pradesh, a decade after the first study in
200405, the rise of rural non-farm economy, changing
demographics, growing educational opportunities,
and increasing mobility across castes and communities
are mapped. Also, an analysis of how these changes
redefine the nature and culture of rural life in the region
is attempted.
I am thankful to Eveleen Sidana for her useful and constructive

comments.
Satendra Kumar (satendrakumar1@gmail.com) is visiting fellow at the
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi.
ndias urban population, as also the number of cities and

towns, has seen a steady increase over the past four or five
decades. However, the village has not disappeared as has
been claimed (Gupta 2005). On the contrary, the village has
persisted and the population in the Indian countryside has
been increasing. While it is now widely accepted throughout
India that the countryside is under distress and urbanrural
inequalities have grown since the economic reforms were
introduced, we know very little about how a large number of
rural people who are not farming manage to eke out a livelihood. One could ask how people in rural India live and survive
while the contribution of agriculture to Indian economy is
declining. What is the nature of this emerging non-agricultural
or farm economy and its implications on rural social structure
and the village? The unravelling story of the rural and agrarian transformation is an important one, particularly against
the backdrop of a rising non-farm economy, changing rural
power structure, increasing migration, and dozens of rural
development and welfare programmes initiated by the Indian
state to help the poor. In the last two decades, investments in
rural infrastructure and the arrival of new technology have
not only changed the character of the rural but also of the village. It is useful to ask the question: what makes a village in
India today amidst changing landscapes?
The neo-liberal economic reforms coincided with the introduction of panchayati raj (local government), and the rise of
marginalised groups in national politics generated dramatic
economic and political changes across Uttar Pradesh (UP) over
the last three decades. This paper focuses on how a village in
Meerut district is responding to macro- and micro-structural
changes.1 It provides a grounded yet diverse picture of socioeconomic transformations and their background, using data
pertaining to how rising non-farm employment, changing demography, growing educational opportunities, and increasing
mobility and aspirations led to the emergence of a new rurality.
In rural western UP, there is an emerging trend of villagers
across castes and classes moving away from agriculture and
entering into non-agriculture or non-farm employment. Increasingly, villagers are condemned to work in an insecure, lowpaid informal service sector job market. This has changed the
nature of production in the village and the culture of village as
a place of living. While all caste groups are diversifying economically in the neo-liberal political economy, they are doing
so with an unequal effect. I argue that while the new rurality
has changed the village and its culture, it also provides the
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basis for the village to sustain and persist in the neo-liberal

economy, democratic politics and a globalising world.
The diversification of village and rural economy is producing contradictory picture. Although this diversification is
reducing caste domination in general, inequalities based on
caste determine the ability of different groups to move into
more or less remunerative and high-status positions and improve their well-being in the new economy. Therefore, caste
continues to manifest itself in class terms, although class
cannot be understood simply in classic Marxist terms. This is
because social and cultural capital such as social networks and
education are also key factors.
Though it affected only a few selected regions in India, the
green revolution changed the landscape of rural India during
the 1970s and after. The revolution brought prosperity in general to the countryside. However, it also created a class of rich
farmers who largely belonged to the locally dominant caste
groups. These rich farmers also became a powerful political
group influencing North Indian politics. In western UP in the
late 1980s, the Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU) attracted national
and international media attention, demanding a raise in farm
subsidies and free electricity.
However, the joy of green revolution did not last very long.
By the mid-1980s, a sense of stagnation began to eclipse the
Indian countryside. Subsequently, in the early 1990s, the introduction of new liberal reforms further enhanced this stagnation. The decline of investment in agriculture along with
declining subsidies coincided with climate precarity leading to
the so-called agriculture crisis. To infuse life and speed up
development in the countryside, the state introduced panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) in the early 1990s. However, it had
contradictory implications. While new liberal reforms along
with other factors created a crisis in agriculture, the introduction of the PRIs generated political and social change, which to
some extent favoured lower caste groups. This contradictory
picture of distress and hope has divided academicians, journalists, and policymakers debating its consequences into
opposing camps. However, we need a holistic picture to make
sense of the rural and the village today.
Political Economy of Uttar Pradesh
Despite UPs large population and its central position in national politics, it is one of the most socio-economically backward
states (Jeffery and Lerche 2003).2 UPs population can be divided
into three social blocs. First, there are the upper-caste Hindus,
mainly Brahmins, Rajputs and Banias, who comprise roughly
20% of the population and dominate government jobs and
landownership in the state (Hasan 1998). The second bloc
constitutes the Hindu middle castes (about another 20%),
which include the Jats. The upper sections of this group, such
as Gujjars, Yadavs and Kurmis, have been categorised as Other
Backward Classes (OBCs). The rest of the population mainly
comprises Muslims (17%), Scheduled Castes (SCs) (21%), and
Most Backward Classes, whose share in the population is also
around 20%. Some of the Muslims and SCs are rich and can be
classified as middle class, but the majority of them are poor
and concentrated in informal sector jobs, working in extremely exploitative and insecure conditions.
While UPs development record in terms of public health,
education, and transport is dreadful, there are regional differences. The western part of the state fares well in many ways
compared to other regions in the state (Jeffery and Lerche
2003). Western UP, along with Haryana and Punjab, was the
epicentre of the first green revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. It
is located mainly between the Ganges and Yamuna rivers,
with sugar cane and wheat being the main crops. While Jats,
Gujjars and Tyagis have dominated landownership in large
parts of the region (Jeffrey 2010; Raheja 1988), SCs and Muslims are the numerically larger groups. Among the SCs,
Chamars form the majority, as they are the single largest caste
group in the state.
In this region, land reforms benefited Jats, Gujjars, Yadavs,
and Kurmis but made no significant difference to the lives of
the poorer OBCs and SCs, especially in the rural areas. Between
the mid-1960s and the late 1980s, private tube well irrigation,
high yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and sugar cane, and
new fertilisers increased the profitability of cash crops and
strengthened the position of these castes, who were the main
beneficiaries of the redistribution of the land previously held
by zamindars (Jeffrey 2010; Michelutti 2008; Singh 1992). By
the 1980s, this green revolution had produced an elite category
of rich farmers across the country, including western UP
(Jeffrey 2010; Rutten 1995; Upadhya 1988a, 1988b).
Demography and Social Ecology in Khanpur
Khanpur is 30 km north of Meerut city in the Mawana block of

Meerut district. In 2005, the village had 447 households and a
population of 2,910 (Table 1) divided into 15 castes. Among
these, two were upper castes (Brahmin and Bania), two SCs
(Chamar and Valmiki) and 11 OBCs. In 2015, the number of
households increased to 530, and the population increased to
3,491. Historically, the village was part of Mir-Baraha, a sociogeographical region ruled by Muslim zamindars.3 In UP, during the land reforms of the 1950s and 1960s, large plots of land
were transferred from the zamindars to their middle- and
lower-caste tenants.4 Those who were already farming substantial areas of land on direct tenancy arrangements in Khanpur were from three castesYadavs, Gujjars and Gaderiyas.
While a few Gaderiyas became big and middle farmers, the
Balmikis remained landless labourers. The artisan/service
castes depended on either traditional skills or daily wages.
Table 1: Total Number of Households and Population in Khanpur
Year
No of Households
201415
530
200405
447
% Increase
18.56
Total Population
3,491
2,910
% Increase
19.96
Source: 2005 and 2015 field data.
Khanpur is well connected with a metalled road to a town

called Phalawada, which is three kilometres north-west. Phalawada is a small town, and nearby villagers depend on it for
everyday household and farm needs. In 2015, Phalawada had
two inter-colleges, three hospitals, two petrol pumps, a police
station, and vegetable and grain mandis (market). A weekly
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cattle fair/market is also held there. Villagers walk and cycle

to Phalawada. Many of the villagers from Khanpur work in
Phalawada as labourers and run their small businesses. Some
of them have a regular job there. Similarly, Khanpur is also
well connected with Mawana, a tehsil and block headquarter,
located nine kilometres to the south-east. Mawana is bigger
than Phalawada, and has four graduate and five intermediate
colleges where young men and women of Khanpur prefer to go
for education. Mawana also has a sugar factory which was
established in 1934. Some of the villagers have been working
in the sugar factory. Hence, villagers have been exposed to
town life for a long time. However, over the years, the interaction with towns and cities has increased multifold and in multiple ways. In terms of day-to-day economic, educational, medical, and bureaucratic needs, Khanpur is highly dependent on
Phalawada and Mawana.
While in 2005, physical and demographic expansion led to
blurring between different galis (streets) and mohallas (localities), these changes became explicitly visible in 2015. The 2015
field visits revealed that new streets had come up along with
new houses in old streets, which used to be divided along caste
lines. In the last three decades, the residential pattern of the
village has completely transformed. For example, the most
noticeable change was that Balmikis and Chamars (SCs) were
living alongside Gujjars. They no longer live away from the
village in segregated mohallas. In another example, Brahmins
and Muslim artisans were also living in each others streets
since a couple of Muslims had migrated to Mawana. The
village has also grown in all directions, and in some cases
Chamars (SCs) and Sainis (an OBC caste of gardeners) live
together on the same street. The temple and mosque which
were outside the village and visible from a distance were now
surrounded by residential houses.
The village has grown demographically. Outmigration has
been rather slow. Even when the villagers go out to work or
run businesses in nearby towns, they do not leave the village.
Almost everyone has pucca/cemented houses. This positive
development can be witnessed in nearby villages too and has
become a common feature of the region. In 2005, the village
had several common trees. In 2015, the number of trees in public
spaces decreased from 10 to two. Similarly, except one village
pond, all ponds have been encroached upon and engulfed
within the concrete jungle. Interestingly, these village commons were not just encroached upon by the dominant castes
but by all residents opportunistically. While there was only
one temple in the village earlier, in 2015, two more new temples came up. One of them was built in the Saini mohalla and
another in Dhimvar mohalla. All village roads have been
bricked. However, roads that connect the nearby villages still
remain mud trails.
The village boundaries have become fluid over the years
with blurring of boundaries between residential area and
agricultural land or between villages. The residential area was
supposed to be closed and bound by a ritual during the spread
of diseases, draught or danger emanating from outside. The
physical boundary of the village ended where the agricultural
farms of the other village began. This was called the rakba
(area) of the village. The rakba included all farmland, commons such as grazing land or forests and trees as well as
ponds, etc. In 2005, Khanpur lost some of its rakba when farmers from nearby villages bought around 50 acres of its farmland. Further in 2015, Khanpur again lost around 50 more
acres of its farmland to outsiders. Many of the farmers whose
land was acquired by the government in the National Capital
Region (NCR) bought 50 acres in Khanpur. Most of these farmers were Gujjars and Brahmins. Some of them also bought
houses in the village but do not live there. They were non-residential farmers and gave their land on a yearly contract to the
villagers, particularly to their kin.
This intrusion into the village has also led to several longterm sociological and political implications. It has changed the
cognitive, social, and physical boundaries of the village. These
boundaries have become visibly porous, since outsiders now
own land and houses in the village. Those who have bought
land and houses are called Baharwalle (outsiders) or Noidawalle (those from Noida). It is a derogatory term and is used to
demarcate villagers from the outsiders, who have always been
seen with suspicion. Their presences in dispute resolutions
have been avoided. However, the entry of new people has
changed the social and economic dynamics of the village,
since some of the outsiders are rich and possess cash from selling their land in Noida. They have tried to influence the outcome of village panchayat elections by funding them or giving
credits to poor and lower-caste people. The land compensations given in Noida and Meerut also raised the land prices in
the village and made land expensive for villagers to buy.
Caste-Communities and Their Profile
Jati or samaj (caste) is an important category of identification

in village life. In everyday parlance, the village population was
classified by jatis or caste-communities. It is common to ask an
outsider: Kinme jaoge? (Which caste are you visiting?) Villages
are known as Jat village, Gujjar village or Chamar village.
Some of the caste groups have done better than others. For
example, over the last 10 years, Chamars and Sainis have done
economically well along with Gujjars and Yadavs, but the position of the Brahmins and Dhimvar has remained the same.
The status and economic position of the dhobis has worsened.
After Partition, some of the Muslim zamindars left for Pakistan and some settled in Phalawada. Those who had left for
Pakistan had their land captured by or allotted to Gujjar and
Yadav tenants. Those who settled in Phalawada either sold
their land at cheap rates or donated it to their lower-caste
servants such as the Gaderiyas or Fakirs. In 2005, none of the
ex-zamindars had land in Khanpur. Eventually the Gujjars and
Yadavs emerged as economically powerful local dominant
caste groups in the village as in all of western UP after independence. In particular, after the Jats, the Gujjars dominated
the village and nearby areas, emerging as regionally dominant
caste in terms of land and numbers. The Yadavs being numerically smaller in this region could not assert themselves
independently. They often aligned with either the Gujjars or
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the Jats against the Chamars and lower OBCs, depending on

their interests.
In 2015, the largest caste-community of the village was that
of the Chamars (179 households). Except for one household,
which owned 10 acres of land, a majority of them were marginal farmers and non-farm labourers (168 households).
Though two Chamars worked as attached labourers for Gujjar
farmers in 2005, but none were found working in the same
capacity in 2015. Another SC community was the Balmikis
(seven households) (Table 2). In the village and local parlance,
they were called Chuhras. In 2005, it was common for non-SC
villagers to use the term chuhra during interactions. In 2015,
while non-SC villagers still used the Balmikis old caste name
in conversations with me, but while interacting with them
they addressed them as Balmikis. None of the Balmikis worked
as scavengers or removed night soil. The morale of Chamars
has been high due to the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).
Some of the young educated Chamars proudly called themselves Chamars. However, when the older generations (aged
60 or above) refer to themselves as Chamar, it carries connotations of inferiority. Older generations prefer to call themselves
Harijans. Non-SCs use Harijan and SC interchangeably while
interacting with Chamars. Hardly anyone addressed Balmikis
by the term SC. The Chamars treated Balmikis as untouchables
and did not allow them to sit on chairs/cot at their houses. But
the Chamars protested against a similar treatment meted out
to them at a Gujjar house.
Table 2: Caste Composition in Khanpur
Caste
Year 2015
No of
% of the
Households Total
SCs (Jatav, Balmiki)

Other OBCs (Fakir)
Artisan-service OBCs (Kumhar, Lohar, Badhai,
Nai, Dhobi, Saini, Gadariya, Dhimyar)
Lower OBCs (Saini, Gadariya, Dhimvar)
Upper OBCs (Gujjar, Ahir/Yadav)
Upper Castes (Brahmin, Bania)
Total
Year 2005
No of
% of the
Households Total
186
28
36
35.1
5.2
6.8
154
23
35
34.5
5.2
7.8
163
95
22
530
30.8
17.9
4.1
100
136
85
14
447
30.4
19.2
3.1
100
Source: 2005 and 2015 field data.5
The second largest caste-community of the village is that of

the Sainis (92 households). It is a caste of gardeners and listed
under OBCs. They are also called Malis and divided into two
groups (sub-castes), Bhagirathi and Golle. Mostly Sainis are
marginal and small farmers in Khanpur as well as the rest of
western UP. They grow vegetables and have gained substantial
upward social mobility in the region. After gaining some financial
security, they are now entering into politics and securing seats in
the Vidhan Sabha and the Parliament. They are emerging as
strong political contenders to Jats and Gujjars in the region.
The third big community is that of the Yadavs (48 households). The Yadavs, unlike the Gujjars, were mostly tenants of
the Muslim zamindars and benefited a lot when the zamindars
left the village. Three Yadavs were big farmers while 18 were
middle and small farmers.
The Gujjars (47 households) were similar to the Yadavs.
They had been a pastoral caste, engaging in cattle-rearing and
selling milk in the region. Despite being landowners in 2005

and before, around one-third of the Gujjars were not interested
in agriculture. However, in 2015, during fieldwork it was found
that almost all Gujjar households were engaged in agriculture.
None of them were involved in cattle theft, as shared by one
of my Gujjar respondents. In some parts of western UP, the
Gujjars had been declared a criminal tribe by the British
government. They still carry this stigma.
Khanpur also had Brahmins (21 households). Except one, a
majority of them were small landowners. Brahmins did not see
themselves as being superior to the other two dominant castecommunities, Gujjars and Yadavs. However, in the recent past,
Brahmins have become powerful and rich in the village but
have lost their land due to family divisions.
A good chunk of the population was in the category of Most
Backward Castes, which were however listed among the
OBCs. Unlike SC, the OBC had not yet become a popular category of description in Khanpur and its neighbourhood in everyday life. The word backward or raiya meaning low-caste
people kamins has been in use for a long time. Since the early
1970s, much before the Mandal Commission, the state government has been giving reservations in government jobs for listed backward castes at the state level. However, there has been
a difference between traditionally landowning castes such as
Yadavs, Jats and Gujjars, and the raiya or service castes such
as Sainis, Dhimvars, Gaderiyas who have also been landowning cultivators, though the average size of their landholdings
has been smaller than the Gujjars and Yadavs. The 2001 Social
Justice Committee Report trifurcated the OBCs into Backward
Castes, Most Backward Castes and Extremely Backward
Castes. While Yadavs were put into the first, the Sainis, Gaderiays and Dhimvars were listed as the most backward and the
artisan castes such as Kumhars, Lohars, Dhobis (Muslim), etc,
were listed in the extremely backward category. The Samajwadi government, however, rejected this categorisation and
issued a government order for including 17 OBCs under the SCs.
The Gaderiyas and Dhimvars liked being called PalBaghel
Rajputs and Tanvar Rajputs respectively and both caste groups
together had 71 households.6 While the Gaderiyas were largely
small and marginal landowners, the majority of Dhimvars
were engaged in repairing and making bore wells, which
became a lucrative occupation for the Dhimvars due to electrification and the popularity of tube wells and submersibles in
western UP. Some of the Dhimvars are very poor. Being mostly
marginal landowners and landless, their economic and political position has been worse than that of the Chamars in the
village. However, some of them have done well in the last 10
years, particularly those who went into the business of digging
bore wells and handpumps.
The village caste composition also includes artisan-service
caste groups such as the Kumhars, Lohars, Badhais (carpenters), Nais and Dhobis (36 households). The Kumhars have
begun to call themselves Prajapats. While the Kumhars are
Hindus, the Lohars, Badhais and Nais are Muslims in Khanpur.
Traditionally, the Kumhars have been potters. They also kept
mules and donkeys for carriage work. Interestingly, two of the
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households are selling earthen pots in Shahdara, Delhi and

are doing economically better than they were in 2005. The
other four households have not been able to cope with the economic changes, and their traditional occupation has become
redundant. Being landless, they have no other resources to
start new businesses. One of them has been running a grocery
shop and earns her livelihood from it. Similarly, Lohars and
Badhais called themselves Saifis. All of them stopped working
with their patrons in 2015, and diversified their occupational
activities according to the market. Though there have been
some success stories, a majority of them end up working in low
paid insecure jobs such as making covers for oxen and horses.
Some of them have started working at furniture shops or
showrooms in nearby towns.
The story of Nais has been quite interesting. They call themselves Salmanis. None of the Nais worked for their patrons in
the village in 2015. A Majority of them are marginal landowners, and a few of them are landless. A couple of young Nai men
started working in Meerut and Noida in mens saloon and
beauty parlours. After earning some money, some of them
started their own saloons in Mawana and Meerut. A couple of
them also started their own barber shops to provide hair cut
services in the village and Phalawada. During weddings, they
are hired on a cash basis and sometimes also paid in kind.
However, the presence of a Nai during a wedding is still considered auspicious in the village and young Nais also take up
the job happily as a moral duty.
The Fakirs had 28 households in the village. They were Muslim mendicants and traditionally begged for a living. In 2015,
none of them were involved in their traditional occupation,
while in 2005, two of them had been engaged in begging. They
are extremely poor, and a majority of them are landless, and a
few of them are marginal landowners.
Economic Life and Occupational Diversification
Rural life has always been identified with agriculture. However, a section of households has never owned land. For example, a large number of SC households are landless but depend
on agriculture for their livelihoods in Khanpur. Similarly, a
majority of artisan and service caste groups are either landless
or marginal farmers. Marginal farmers have been unable to
survive on land alone and have had to supplement their
income from other sources such as farm and non-farm work.
Mostly, the landless either worked as casual/attached labourers with the cultivators or provided other supporting services
to the cultivators. Farmers and artisans had been associated
through a system of patronclient relationships called jajmani,
mediated by caste in rural western UP.
The commercialisation of agriculture, urbanisation, and
migration have weakened the system of jajmani ties over the
past three decades. These processes had begun during the colonial period. The system completely disintegrated by the late
1990s. While aged artisans have started working on a cash
basis, some of the young men from these artisan caste groups
have taken up jobs which are different from their parents.
However, more than a decade ago, Khanpur still had a
predominantly agrarian character, with agriculture at the centre of the rural life. A majority of the population depended on
agriculture. Rich farmers were big employers of the poor SCs
and other landless villagers who, from time to time, also got
credit from them. The informal credit had worked as a tool of
exploitation. The big and rich farmers also controlled political
institutions at the local level and commanded respect and authority. Now these farmers either have entered into non-farm
businesses and run franchises of different commercial companies or have become builders and contractors.
Only 23.7% of all households identified cultivation as their
primary occupation (Table 3, p 66). As is evident from Table 3,
the largest proportion of the households is in the category of
labourers. However, they were not necessarily agricultural labourers. In fact, a majority of them earned a substantial portion of their livelihood from working outside the agricultural
sector and only occasionally worked on land. The majority of
them avoided working in the village, particularly on the farms
of dominant castes such as Gujjars and Yadavs. Running a
small shop emerged as a primary occupation for almost 12%
villagers across caste groups. These shops/businesses have
come up inside as well as outside the village. Two days in a
week a roadside market (paith or haat) is held in the village
where these small shopkeepers put up their stalls too. A subsistence non-farm economy is emerging in the village, and can
be considered as a significant shift in the village economy.
Around 21% of the villagers, mainly men, are employed outside the village. A majority of them worked in factories, shopping centres and construction sites. A few of them also work in
government offices. A majority of land is still owned by upper
and dominant castes and they are the main cultivators in
Khanpur. While 90% of all the cultivators were from upper
and dominant castes, more than 80% of those who reported
their primary occupation as labourers were either SCs or were
from other OBCs, artisans and lower OBCs.
Despite the concentration of landownership among a few
upper caste and upper OBC households, diversification of the
village economy has been dramatic. Diversification of occupation has occurred among all caste groups. Table 4 shows that a
good proportion of households in each category have a primary occupation outside agriculture. The SCs are doing better
than other OBCs. Interestingly, the proportion of SCs with government and urban salaried jobs was the highest and that of
the other and artisan-service OBCs the lowest. The other
(Fakir) and artisan-service OBCs are largely Muslims and suffered from a double disadvantage. Though all these caste
groups are poor and lack social and cultural capital required
for securing a regular job, SCs have been able to get these jobs
partly because of reservation and aggressive political mobilisation. Other, artisan-service and lower OBCs have been worse
than the SCs. In fact, Muslim OBCs (Fakirs, etc) are far behind
the SCs and Hindu OBCs.
One of the major implications of growing diversification
was that the households in rural western UP were increasingly becoming pluri-active (Jodhka 2006a). This means
different members of the household have begun pursuing
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different and simultaneously multiple occupations (Table 4).

A significant number of respondents had been engaged in
Table 3: Primary Occupation of the Respondent Households
Primary Occupation
2015
(In number and %)
Cultivators
Labourers
Shopkeepers/business
Government job
Urban salaried job
No regular employment
Total
126 (23.7)
177 (33.4)
62 (11.7)
57 (10.8)
55 (10.4)
53 (10.0)
530 (100)
2005
% Increase (+)/
(In number and %) Decrease (-)
133 (29.8)
143 (31.9)
32 (7.3)
49 (10.9)
46 (10.2)
44 (9.8)
447 (100)
-(6.1)
+(1.5)
+(4.4)
-(0.1)
+(0.2)
+(0.2)
more than one occupation, and many of them reported having

a secondary occupation either within the village or outside.
For example, a teacher was involved in part-time agriculture
or running a photocopy shop or a marginal farmer was also
putting up his vegetable stall in the weekly market. Increasingly, farm and non-farm households are not only occupationally diversified but also their members are pursuing
multiple occupations.
In Khanpur, there is an emerging market which has expanded manifold over the last decade. It has also spread outside the
village. Ten years back the number of shops in the village was
around 32, and most of them were grocery shops, which provided almost everything for daily consumption. Most of the
Table 4: Caste-wise Primary Occupation of the Respondent Households
in 2015, Khanpur
Caste
Farming
SCs
7 (3.8)
Other OBCs
1 (3.5)
Artisan-service
OBCs
1 (2.8)
Lower OBCs 57 (35.0)
Upper OBCs 55 (57.9)
Upper castes 5 (22.7)
Total
126 (23.7)
Wage
Labour
101 (54.3)
20 (71.4)
Shop/ Government Urban No Regular

Business
Job
Salaried Employment
Total
5 (2.7) 27 (14.5) 25 (13.4) 21 (11.3) 186 (100)

2 (7.1)
- 5 (17.9) 28 (100)
19 (52.8) 6 (16.7) 3 (8.3) 3 (8.3) 4 (11.1)

28(17.2) 29 (17.8) 12 (7.4) 21 (12.9) 16 (9.8)
6 (6.3) 16 (16.8) 12 (12.6) 1 (1.1)
5 (5.3)
3 (13.6) 4 (18.2) 3 (13.6) 5 (22.7)
2 (9.1)
177 (33.4) 62 (11.7) 57 (10.8) 55 (10.4) 53 (10.0)
36 (100)
163 (100)
95 (100)
22 (100)
530 (100)
Figures in brackets are percentages.

Source: 2015 field data.
shops were owned and run by the village and local Banias but
some were also owned by artisan castes. There has been a significant change over the years. In 2015, the number of shops
went up to 62, almost a 100% increase (Table 6). More importantly, the village market had also witnessed diversity and
differentiation of various kinds such as social composition of
shop owners changed significantly (Table 5). In 2015, the
monopoly over local market and shops of the upper castes and
OBCs had broken down. Interestingly, five shops out of 62
were run by SCs (Chamars). However, the caste elements continued to be significant in the village market. SC shopkeepers
are much less than their proportion in the total population.
Most importantly, SC shopkeepers provide menial services
such as hair cutting, cycle repairing, or mobile repairing.
Thus, caste continues to mediate the new rural non-farm
economy in a way that it produces unequal results, and benefits the upper and middle castes who historically owned land
and had social capital.
Agrarian Structure and Ownership of Land

As I mentioned before, despite the declining contribution of
agriculture to the gross domestic product (GDP), it continues to
employ the largest number of working people. In Khanpur,
there is clearly a declining trend in the number of people
working on land. It is very interesting to note that around 24%
Table 5: Caste-wise Shop/Business Ownership of Households in Khanpur
Caste
SCs
Other OBCs
Artisan-service OBCs
Lower OBCs
Upper OBCs
Upper castes
Total
2015
5 (8.0)
4 (6.5)
7 (11.3)
15 (24.2)
25 (40.3)
6 (9.7)
62 (100)
2005
Number and % Increase
3 (9.4)
2 (6.3)
4 (12.5)
7 (21.8)
13 (40.6)
3 (9.4)
32 (100)
2 (66.7)
2 (100)
3 (75.0)
8 (114)
12 (92.3)
3 (100)
30 (93.8)
Figures in brackets are percentage of shop-owning households in each category of

households.
of the households reported agriculture as their primary occupation in the village. While upper OBCs, constituting 17% of
the total households, owned around 50% of the total agriculture land, the SCs who are 35% held less than 10% of the total
agriculture land. This shows significant disparities in the landownership patterns. As evident from Table 7 (p 67), around
21% of the households in the village reported owning no land
at all. On the other hand, Table 6: Types of Services Provided by
a small number of upper Village Shops in Khanpur
2015 2005 Number and
OBC households owned Types of shops
% Increase
big plots of land.
Barber shops
4
2
2
Table 7 reconfirms the Grocery shops
8
5
3
close relationship bet- STD booths
2
1
1
3
2
1
ween caste and owner- Tent houses
2
1
1
ship of land. Still majori- (Mo)bike repair
1
1
0
ty of the SCs are landless Tractor/car repair
2
1
1
or marginal farmers. Electric shops
Mobile repair
2
0
2
Marginal farmers from
TV/refrigerator repair 2
0
2
the SCs and other OBCs
Vegetable shops
3
2
1
owned around one or Tailors
5
3
2
two bighas (1 acre = 5 Photo studios
2
0
2
bighas) of land which is Medical stores
2
1
1
barely viable for a house- Doctor shops
4
2
2
hold to survive. All these Sweet shops
2
1
1
2
2
0
households have to sup- Chat/snacks shops
2
1
1
plement their income Flour mills
3
2
1
from wages earned by ei- Furniture shops
1
0
1
ther working outside the Fertiliser stores
Battery repair
1
1
0
village or working in
Beauty parlours
2
0
2
Mahatma Gandhi National
Coaching shops
3
2
1
Rural Employment Guar- Buffalo shops
2
1
1
antee Act (MGNREGA) Handpump and
schemes. Despite many bore-well repair shops 2
1
1
62
32 30 (93.8)
radical changes in rural Total
life and the rise of BSP, a Source: 2005 and 2015 field data.
Dalit political party in UP, the agrarian economy of the village
continues to be almost exclusively under the control of dominant and upper castes, those who have traditionally been the
landowning and agrarian communities. As is evident from
Table 7, nearly 70% of the SCs, other OBCs and artisan-service
EPW
JUNE 25, 2016
67
vol lI nos 26 & 27
castes have been completely landless. On the contrary, only

around 9% of the dominant caste households were landless.
More importantly, these upper and dominant castes are aggressively investing in the emerging land market near commercial places in small towns.
However, in the last 30 years there have been very important changes in the agrarian social structure, both in terms of
size of landholdings and attitudes towards agriculture as an
occupational choice. In 2015, most of the labour needs of the
farmers were met by casual and contractual labour, mostly on
a fixed cash rate basis. Today it is hard to find an attached or
monthly paid regular servant in Khanpur. However, one needs
to show caution when one asserts that there is a linear development from attached to contractual labour in this context.
Rather, attached labourers are inventing new ways of sharecropping which is a new mode of labour control. A good proportion of the peak season work was done by migrant labour
from Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and eastern UP. However, local
SCs and other local labourers also worked on farms and did a
good amount of peak season work. Most of the middle and big
farmers, who owned more than 10 acres of land now no longer
exist. In the last 10 years, eight families which owned more
than 10 acres of land have been reduced to two after divisions
and subdivisions of their landholdings between brothers
and sons.
Education, Rising Aspirations and Future of Agriculture
In 2015, there were four schools and one coaching centre in

Khanpur. Of the four, there was one government primary
school and three were private schools. The government primary school has been there since the early 1980s. The so-called
private English medium schools came up after 2005 and were
run by educated unemployed Gaderiya, Dhimvar and Yadav
youth. These three private schools were different from each
other in terms of student enrolment, number of teachers, and
other infrastructure. In 2006, a Yadav family invited a Gaderiya (Pal) young man from Mawana to start a private school
at its gher (male sitting room/place). This person slowly developed this place into a school. The private school is now run
in two rooms given by the Yadav family whose kids are taught
for free. The Pal teacher charged students from first to third
standard `100 per month and `150 each from the fourth and
fifth standard. He taught 70 students with the help of two
more teachers who were paid `2,000 each per month in 2011.
Later the school upgraded to class eighth and an affiliation
certificate was obtained from the Basic Education Officer and

the Board of the State Primary Education.
In 2015, the school had 120 students and a total of four
teachers and was still run in the same gher, belonging to the
Yadav family. The students sit on the brick floor on sacks during the winter and summer season. During extreme summer,
the students are made to sit under trees on a dirty floor under
open skies. The other two private schools are run in an almost
similar manner, except three rooms have been added to one of
the schools. All teachers in the private school are educated in
Hindi medium schools and have not even passed the Bachelor
of Education (BEd) exam. Despite that, they now run English
medium schools.
The government primary school looks better from the outside. The school has a proper building with two large rooms
and one veranda. In total, there are three teachers. According
to the villagers, at a time only one or two teachers come to the
school, and the remaining are either on leave or busy with
other work given by the district administration. The number of
students enrolled in 2015 was 96, of which four were from the
general category, 32 from the OBCs and 60 from the SCs. The
regular students were only 42 according to the teachers and
what we found in the attendance register. The remaining
students never attended classes. Their names remained only
on the register. Some of the students who are enrolled in the
government school attend classes in a private school where
they pay a regular monthly fee. Upper caste and upper OBCs,
including better off households from other caste groups, consider that the government school is for the poor, particularly
the Chamars and kamins. More and more villagers who are in
a slightly better economic position and do not face abject poverty send their kids to private English medium schools either
in the village or outside. This is a clear emerging trend. People are investing heavily in education, even more than in
health. Chamars who are economically better off also send
their kids to private schools. In 2015, more than 90% of the
households enrolled their kids in different schools in the
village and outside it.7
Villagers across caste and class have been making heavy
investments in education, which has raised their expectations
and aspirations. Interestingly, parents still showed a strong
attachment to land but did not see agriculture as a suitable
occupation for their children. The younger generation across
caste groups disliked farming as an occupation, and only
approximately 5% showed interest in it (Table 8). Surprisingly,
Table 7: Landownership Patterns across Caste Groups in Khanpur

No Land
SCs
Other OBCs
Lower OBCs
Upper OBCs
Upper Castes
Total
<1 Acre
2015
2005
2015
43 (23.1)
13 (46.4)
11(30.5)
30 (18.4)
9(9.5)
5 (22.7)
111 (21)
29 (18.8)
11 (47.8)
11(31.4)
33 (24.3)
6 (7)
3 (21.4)
93 (20.7)
139 (74.8)
14 (50.0)
24(66.7)
83(50.9)
260(49.0)
Figures in brackets are percentages.

2005
25 Acres
2015
2005
114 (74)
4 (2.2)
11 (47.8)
1 (3.6)
23(65.7)
1(2.8)
70(51.5) 44(26.9)
44(46.3)
13 (59.0)
218 (48.7) 107 (20.2)
10 (6.5)
1 (4.4)
1(2.8)
31(22.7)
35(41.1)
9(64.2)
87 (19.5)
2015
510 Acres
2005
6 (3.7)
40 (42.1)
4(18.2)
50 (9.4)
1 (0.6)
2(1.5)
36(42.4)
2 (14.3)
41(9.2)
2015
10+ Acres
2005
2(2.1)
2 (0.4)
8 (9.5)
8 (1.8)
Total
2015
2005
186 (100)
28 (100)
36 (100)
163 (100)
95 (100)
22 (100)
530 (100)
154 (100)
23 (100)
35 (100)
136 (100)
85 (100)
14 (100)
447 (100)
68
JUNE 25, 2016
vol lI nos 26 & 27
EPW
entrepreneurship (Krishna 2001) and growing Dalit assertions

(Pai 2002; Jodhka 2006b).
Under the Panchayati Raj Amendment Act of UP government 1994, as per the roster system, the pradhans (panchayat
head) seat was reserved for an SC candidate in 1995 and an
OBC candidate in 2000. The SC person elected as pradhan in
1995 was a Jatav, and the pradhan elected in 2000 belonged to
the Gujjar caste.
The Khanpur village panchayat is divided into 13 wards. In
the village panchayat election, besides the pradhan, a BDC
(Block Development Councillor) is also elected. Ward members elect the deputy pradhan or up-pradhan. In some cases, a
ward is coterminous with a particular caste. For instance,
ward three is practically coterminous with the Dhimvars
street. And yet, the village panchayat does not have representatives of each caste. BDCs elect a block pramukh (block head)
from amongst themselves. A block is the second tier of the
PRIs. The third tier is the district panchayat for which members are elected at the same time. Members of the district panchayat elect the district panchayat president.
In 2015, of the 13 members of the village panchayat, two
were Gujjars, one Yadav, two Saini, one Dhimvar, one Fakir
and six Jatavs (SCs). One of the Saini members was the deputy
pradhan. There were four women ward members, and one
Gaderiya woman was the BDC. A Gaderiya or Pal man was
elected as the pradhan, first time in the village history. Thus,
the PRI has deepened the democracy in the village and restructured the power relations, electing a Jatav and Gaderiya after
1994. The panchayati raj has empowered hitherto excluded
groups such as SCs, lower OBCs and women to a large extent.
The Gujjars and Yadavs used to manoeuvre the panchayat
elections due to their massive landholdings and their ability
to provide credit. However, things changed after 1994 since
Jatavs emerged as a new powerful bloc in the village.
There have been some interesting changes in the village
power structure over the last three decades.
Table 8: Preferred Occupation for Their Children in 2015
(In number and as a percentage of the total)
No single caste (such as Gujjar or Yadav or
Caste Group
Government
Professionals
Private
Business
Agriculture
No
Total
Brahmin) wields unquestioned power unJob
(Doctor, Engineer Sector Job
Response
and Lawyer)
like the past. As mentioned above, the GujSCs
91 (49.0)
53 (28.5) 21 (11.2)
12 (6.4)
0 (0.0)
9 (4.8) 186 (100)
jars and Brahmins lost their power substanOther OBCs
6 (21.4)
1 (3.5)
9 (32.1) 7 (25.0)
2 (7.1) 3 (10.7) 28 (100)
tially to Gaderiyas, Sainis and SCs
17 (47.2)
3 (8.3)
0 (0.0) 15 (41.6)
0 (0.0)
2 (5.5) 36 (100)
(Chamars) who have been elected as village
Lower OBCs
69 (42.3)
27 (16.5) 32 (19.6)
11 (6.7) 17 (10.4)
7 (4.2) 163 (100)
pradhans in the recent years. Vertical unity
Upper OBCs
38 (40.0)
21 (22.1) 16 (16.8)
9 (9.4)
8 (8.4)
3 (3.1) 95 (100)
along the factions of dominant caste has
Upper Caste
8 (36.6)
9 (40.1)
3 (13.6)
2 (9.1)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0) 22 (100)
disintegrated, and it has given way to caste
Total
228 (43.2) 114 (21.5) 81 (15.2) 56 (10.5)
27 (5.1) 24 (4.5) 530 (100)
unity and caste identity. Khanpur has now
Source: 2015 field data.
multiple centres of power, and the power
Local Power and Panchayat
from Gujjars mohalla has shifted to other mohallas such as
In rural UP, caste and land have been two major sources of Chamar and Gaderiya mohallas. Another important shift is
power. However, numerical strength has emerged as a crucial that the village politics has been integrated with regional polisource of power with the increasing democratisation of the tics and new parties such as BSP and Samajwadi Party (SP) have
political processes post independence. Further, the introduc- produced a new leadership among the SCs and other lower
tion of the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) after the 73rd caste groups. These are young men with some education and
amendment changed rural power structure drastically across have skills to navigate government offices and police stations.
UP and India as well. This change has also been pointed out by With these skills, they are able to help the villagers and some of
scholars emphasising the growing role of individual political them earn their livelihood from this kind of work.
SCs and upper castes have shown no interest (0%) in agriculture as an occupation. The younger generation in these families do not want to stay in farming. Following the upper caste
largely, the upper OBCs showed little interest (8.4%). Among
the lower artisan-service and other OBCs, the lower OBCs
have been most interested (10.4%). More than 40% villagers
wanted to have government jobs across caste and class.
While majority of the upper castes want to become professionals such as doctors and engineers, SCs prefer government
jobs. Muslims have not shown much enthusiasm for government jobs; rather they are more inclined towards small businesses and urban jobs.
For small and marginal farmers, agriculture is no longer
an economically viable occupation, yet there is no clear sign
of proletarianisation. On the contrary, small and marginal
farmers retain their small plots of land which give them a
sense of security. Moreover, landless households also try to
invest in farm or residential land which not only provides
them security but also status and a sense of belongingness.
Gradually, land has been turning into a commodity which
can be sold and bought. However, different communities
have different levels of attachment with land. Comparatively, the Jats attachment to land is higher than that of Gujjars.
In Khanpur, some Gujjar families have sold land to their relatives from Noida. However, there is no move towards corporate agriculture or contract farming. There is a clear sign
that for the younger generation agriculture is no longer an
occupational choice. In the village, parents across caste
groups increasingly aspire for their children to attain a middle-class lifestyle and secure government jobs. However, aspirations are shaped by caste, class, and gender positions as
well. Most of the parents send their daughters to colleges not
to prepare them for a job/work but to enhance their marriage
prospects. Hardly, any parent wants to get their daughter
married in a village.
69
Economic & Political Weekly EPW Published on Saturday, JUNE 25, 2016 vol lI nos 26 & 27
changing village and community life has simultaneously also

Technology and New Sociality
Across caste groups, individuals and households are acquiring transformed the social and cultural worlds of people. Most of
consumer and luxury goods aggressively in Khanpur. One can the time young men are seen watching television soaps rather
say that they have become urbanised. They own cars, motor- than chatting in peer groups at common spaces or gher (male
bikes, mobile phones and televisions. Around 4% of the house- sitting place). There is also a growing disconnect between
holds owned a car for personal use, which they received in younger and older generations in terms of choices in entertaindowry. More than 40% of the households owned motorbikes, ment. The rapid urbanisation has brought the rural and urban
which definitely improved mobility of the villagers. Mobile closer in a way that the ruralisation of u
rban and urbanisation
phones have become very common. More than 60% of the of rural is taking place at multiple levels in western UP.
Access to new technology has given a new dimension to caste
households owned mobile phone and televisions (Table 9).
consciousness
and religiosity as well as its public expression.
These new means of transport and communication along with
new entertainment technologies Table 9: Caste-wise Ownership of Consumer Goods (in number and as a % of the total)
have restructured village and rural Caste Groups
Car
Motorcycle Refrigerator
LPG
TV
Telephone Cell Phone Computer
Total
Households
society integrating it with the urban
0 (0.0) 37 (19.8) 35 18.8) 42 (22.5) 89 (47.8) 2 (1.1) 95 (51.1) 3 (1.6) 186 (100)
society in western UP. The construc- SCs
Other OBCs
0 (0.0)
3 (10.7) 3 (10.7) 4 (14.2)
6 (21.4) 0 (0.0) 15 (53.5) 0 (0.0) 28 (100)
tion of all-weather roads and the
Artisan-service OBCs 0 (0.0) 16 (44.4)
9 (25) 8 (22.2) 19 (52.7) 0 (0.0) 20 (55.5) 0 (0.0) 36 (100)
increasing availability of various
Lower OBCs
6 (3.7) 79(48.4) 55 (33.7) 57 (34.9) 61(37.4) 0 (0.0) 98 (60.1) 4 (2.4) 163 (100)
modes of transport have enhanced Upper OBCs
12 (12.6) 61(64.2) 59 (62.1) 63 (66.3) 72 (75.7) 4 (4.2) 82 (86.3) 6 (6.3) 95 (100)
the connectivity between villages, Upper castes
3 (13.6) 14 (63.6) 13 (59.0) 14 (63.6) 17 (77.2) 1 (4.5) 19 (86.5) 2 (9.1) 22 (100)
towns, and cities on the one hand. Total
21 (3.9) 210 (39.6) 174 (32.8) 188 (35.4) 264 (49.8) 7 (1.3) 329 (62.1) 15 (2.8) 530 (100)
On the other, the arrival of the tele- Figures in brackets are percentages.
vision, telephone, motorbikes, cars, Source: 2015 field data.
mobiles, and social networking sites (such as Facebook) have Increasingly, villagers are inclined to watch spiritual and relihad a tremendous influence on socio-economic and political gious television programmes and interact within their kin,
interactions. These new means of communication have not caste and religious community members beyond the village
only created new ways of forging social and economic connec- and nation state. For instance, QTV and Peace TV are quite poptions, but also provided spaces for new sociopolitical forma- ular among the Muslims in this region. These TV channels
tions. For instance, the arrival of new technology whilst through different programmes teach one how to become a
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70
JUNE 25, 2016
vol lI nos 26 & 27
EPW
good and pious Muslim. Young Muslims who work in Gulf

countries call their parents and friends in the village and share
their experience of being a Muslim in this part of the world.
Over the last three decades in rural western UP, backward
Muslims have become more religious and are exhibiting religious symbols at public places. The ideas, norms, and practices
of the Tablighi Jamaat have affected the Muslim identity in
significant ways. Muslims keep beards without moustache,
wear a long kurta with relatively short pyjamas, and a white
skullcap that are observable markers of a typical Islamised
identity of a male Muslim in the region.
Similarly, more and more Gujjars, Yadavs and Sainis in
Khanpur and rural Meerut have been joining religious and
spiritual sects such as the Dera Sacha Sauda or Radhaswami
or Kali Kholiwale recently. They are also embracing Hindu
rituals and festivals such as Navratras and participating in
kirtans (hymns) and religious meetings and functions. Jagrans
and Mata ki Chowki (religious functions) which were purely
urban things are now being organised in Khanpur. During our
interviews, the villagers told that while the frequency of Ramlilas and saangs (folk theatre) have declined, the number of
Jagrans and Mata ki chowki has increased. The artists for
these shows come from Meerut and Mawana. Amongst the
Hindu villagers, TV channels such as Astha have become quite
popular. Largely, agriculture and village festivals have declined, and pan-Hindu rituals are being embraced and celebrated. The increased interactions with the wider world have
changed their sense of caste and community. This creates the
feeling of becoming a part of the larger generalised Hindu
identity and emerging middle class. The emerging agricultural crisis and the undermining of the farmers identity have further pushed dominant castes such as Gujjars to demand ST status or subdivision within the OBC category. A dignified place in
the new economy and dreams of urban life make them aspire
for the Hindu middle-class identity.
Conclusions: Emergence of New Rurality
The socio-economic and political landscape of Khanpur village has changed drastically. The emerging ruralurban
networks have reconstituted the village at multiple levels, and
it has emerged as a multi-level settlement. Shifting village
economy from agriculture to rural non-farm service linked to
the urban has changed inter-caste relationships. There has
been a sharp decline in the number of cultivators. Agriculture
has increasingly been mechanised. Non-farm employment
Notes
1
This paper is based on a field research conducted between September 2004 to August 2005,
and revisits made between September 2014 and
March 2015 to the Khanpur village and its neighbouring villages in western UP. It involved living
in the village and collecting data through participant observation, interviews, semi-structured
questionnaires and a household survey. Besides,
in 201415, 100 long interviews were conducted
across caste, class, gender and age group in order to get a comprehensive picture of socio-economic and political change in village and its region. The name of the village has been changed.
accounts for more than 50% of all employment. There has

been a decline in SCs and artisan-service OBCs dependence on
agriculture. Young SC men prefer working outside the village,
even when they choose to live in the village. The supply of
rural labour to the expanding non-farm urban service sector
and the flow of urban aspirations to the rural world have
rapidly increased over the years. Many marginal landowners,
landless labourers and lower caste people have become a
part of the informal economy, which though precarious, has
transformed class relations and influenced caste relations in
the village.
The population of the village has doubled and has not decreased despite outmigration. The flow of urban ethos, aspirations and tastes through the rural-urban material and cultural
exchanges has integrated the rural and the urban more intimately than before. The new means of communication and
transport increase the mobility of villagers, and integrate
them with the urban and the emerging middle-class culture.
Changes in aspirations and identities, forged by the new
mediatised culture and mobilities, have created an altered
socio-cultural landscape. The traditional unquestioned hierarchy in the village of the upper castes has been challenged and
the hitherto excluded castes assert their identity as well as
compete with the upper caste for political power and claim to
public spaces. At the same time, the emerging technomediated sociality (increasing interaction on social and mass
media) has reduced face to face interaction in common
spaces substantially. The sense of collective identity that
villagers shared has also weakened along with the hierarchical social order.
The interactional complexity becomes evident when one
considers residential patterns in the village, caste communities and their profiles, occupational patterns of households,
agriculture as an occupation, and patterns of landownership
along with the technologically-mediated sociality. The residential pattern of the village is morphed when it comes to
caste. The outsiders have made inroads into the village with
its material and symbolic boundaries being challenged. The
decrease in agricultural landownership across castes, opening up of franchises and commercial shops, and increasing
aspirations to be part of a burgeoning middle class in the
village, reveals a centripetal force pulling the village closer to
the city and the rural closer to urban so that the sociality of
the village is transforming due to a diversification of work
within groups.
The earlier categorisation of BIMARU (Bihar,

Madhya Pradesh (MP), Rajasthan and UP) has
been changed to BIU (Bihar and UP), since MP
and Rajasthan have shown some signs of development and improvement. UP is still considered a site of backwardness.
During the colonial period, a group of revenue
villages in Sardhana estate under Begum Samaru acquired a cultural connotation as MirBaraha (Mir-Wada in local parlance), as they
had been under the Mirs, a Muslim high-caste
zamindari. This part of Meerut district was
also known as Mithawasa (literally sweet
belt).
The Muslim zamindari system has had a huge

impact on the present agrarian structure of the
village. The zamindars were not keen cultivators and, therefore, the transfer of land was
easier under them than under the bhaichara
system. During the process of the abolition of
the zamindari system and the enactment of a
ceiling on the size of landholdings, large plots
of land were transferred to the OBCs from the
erstwhile Muslim zamindars.
Caste categories used in Table 2 and throughout the paper emerged from local and village
understandings of the ways in which different
caste groups distinguish themselves from each
EPW
JUNE 25, 2016
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7
other. These are a combination of government

categorisation and popular understanding.
Particularly, the OBCs could be divided into
four categories on the basis of peoples understanding which resonates with regional, social
and economic structures. The OBCs includes
the so-called dominant castes such as Jat, Gujjar, Yadav and Kurmi along with the agriculture caste groups such as Saini and Gaderiya;
artisan and service (peshewar occupational)
caste groups such as Lohar and Kumhar. Besides, there are groups who are most marginalised socially, economically, and politically, and
these groups cannot be fit into the above three
categories and can be clubbed into a separate
category such as OBCs.
Dhimvars are also called Jhimmars and they
also use Kashyap Rajput as their title (Jodhka
2014).
However, we did not gather data on the dropout rate which varies from one caste to another.
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JUNE 25, 2016

vol lI nos 26 & 27

REVIEW OF RURAL AFFAIRS