Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2001, pp.

829849

On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice:

The Third Wave
John F. Dovidio*
Colgate University

This article examines how social and historical developments have influenced the
intellectual climate surrounding the study of prejudice and illustrates how these
advances are reflected in the study of one type of racial bias, aversive racism.
Three waves of research are identified. In the first wave, prejudice was assumed to
reflect psychopathology. In the second, it was viewed as rooted in normal processes. The third wave emphasizes the multidimensional aspect of prejudice and
takes advantage of new technologies to study processes that were earlier hypothesized but not directly measurable. Research on aversive racism is presented to
demonstrate the transition of research across the second and third waves and to
show how unconscious biases can significantly influence race relations.
Prejudice is commonly defined as an unfair negative attitude toward a social
group or a person perceived to be a member of that group. Racism is related to
concepts such as prejudice, but it is a more encompassing term (Jones, 1997). As
Feagin and Vera (1995) explain, Racism is more than a matter of individual prejudice and scattered episodes of discrimination (p. ix); it involves a widely accepted
racist ideology and the power to deny other racial groups the dignity, opportunities, freedoms, and rewards that are available to ones own group through a
socially organized set of ideas, attitudes, and practices (p. 7). The nature and
expression of prejudice and racism, however, depend on a number of dynamic
processes. This article examines how social and historical developments have
*Correspondence concerning this artricle should be addressed to John F. Dovidio, Department of
Psychology, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY 13346 [e-mail: jdovidio@mail.colgate.edu].
This article is based on the SPSSI Presidential Address presented at the meeting of the Society for
the Psychological Study of Social Issues, June 2000, in Minneapolis, MN. I gratefully acknowledge
Sam Gaertners contributions to the ideas presented in the article and his comments on an earlier version
of the work. I also thank Irene Hanson Frieze for her helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier
draft of the manuscript. Preparation of this manuscript was supported by NIMH grant no. MH 48721.
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influenced the intellectual climate surrounding the study of prejudice and illustrates how these advances are reflected in the study of one type of racial bias,
aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kovel, 1970).
As contemporary psychological research illustrates, the expression of racial
prejudice and intergroup bias more generally is sensitive to norms in the immediate
social context (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986;
McConahay, 1986), a perceivers goals and motivations (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg,
1990), and the actions of a target person (e.g., Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986).
The factors shaping the expression of prejudice also extend far beyond the immediate interaction between a particular perceiver and target. Prejudice serves a range
of individual, group, and social functions. As a consequence, the nature and
expression of prejudice are shaped by history, politics, and economics, as well as
by the individual-level factors that social psychologists typically study in the laboratory. Ultimately prejudice and racism are embedded fundamentally in peoples
group identities (Tajfel, 1970) and in a societys institutions and its culture (Jones,
1997).
The social and historical forces that shape prejudice and racism also influence
the orientation from which psychologists study these phenomena. Duckitt (1992),
for example, identified decade-by-decade shifts in how psychologists approached
the study of prejudice in the 20th century. In the remainder of this article, historical
trends in the study of prejudice are first considered. Three general theoretical
waves of research on prejudice over the past century are identified. Then, in the
two sections that follow, studies of aversive racism are reviewed to illustrate the
second and the third waves of research and to highlight recent advances in the study
of prejudice. The concluding section considers the practical and theoretical implications of these developments.
Trends in the Social Psychological Study of Racial Prejudice: Three Waves
Building on Duckitts (1992) insightful analysis historical trends in the study
of prejudice from 1920 to 1990 and extending it with the benefit of experiencing
another decade of research, I propose that we can identify three general waves of
scholarship, reflecting different assumptions and paradigms, in the social psychological study of racial prejudice. The first wave, which characterizes Duckitts
summaries of research from the 1920s through the 1950s, represents prejudice as
psychopathology. Prejudice was seen as not simply a disruption in rational processes, but as a dangerous aberration from normal thinking. As McConahay (1986)
remarked, Hitler [gave] racism a bad name (p. 121). By the 1950s, prejudice was
viewed as a social problem, in many ways a type of social cancer.
The research during this wave focused first on measuring and describing the
problem and monitoring the changes (e.g., Gilbert, 1951; Katz & Braly, 1933) and
then on understanding the source of the problem (e.g., in family relations, feelings

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of personal inadequacies, and psychodynamic processes; e.g., Adorno, FrenkelBrunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). One implication of this approach is that if
the problem, like a cancerous tumor, can be identified and removed or treated, the
problem will be contained, and the rest of the system will be healthy. This perspective thus led to a concentrated focus on identifying, through personality and attitude tests such as the authoritarian personality scales, who is prejudiced. If it could
be determined who was prejudiced and efforts at addressing the problem could be
focused on this subset of the population, the rest of society could be expected to
function fairly. This approach also directed attention toward a section of the population that was traditional, conservative, and not highly educateda group that
was quite unlike the academics who were studying prejudice.
The second wave of theorizing and research began with an opposite assumption: Prejudice is rooted in normal rather than abnormal processes. Thus, the focus
turned to how normal processes associated with socialization and social norms can
support prejudice and aid in its transmission. Changing social norms can thus also
be an important force for addressing prejudice not simply in a rare subset of individuals, but also among members of the society more generally (Pettigrew, 1958).
The traditional focus of social psychology in North America on the individual in a
social context was complemented by two other approaches in the 1970s. On the
one hand, at a more macro level, Tajfels work (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) persuasively demonstrated the important role of social identity, as well as individual
identity, in the processes underlying prejudice. Evidence of bias in the minimal
intergroup paradigm (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1970), in which the assignment of
people to groups often based on arbitrary criteria was sufficient to produce prejudices in favor of members of ones own group and sometimes against members
of another group, reinforced the emerging conception of prejudice as a normal
mechanism for raising self-esteem.
On the other hand, at a more micro level, the development of new theories and
instrumentation that supported research in social cognition further emphasized the
normality, and some would argue the inevitability, of prejudice. Prejudice, stereotyping, and bias were conceived as outcomes of normal cognitive processes associated with simplifying and storing information of overwhelming quantity and
complexity that people encounter daily (see Hamilton, 1981). To the extent that
social categorization was hypothesized to be a critical element in this process
(Hamilton & Trolier, 1986), this cognitive, intraindividual perspective complemented Tajfels motivational, group level approach in reinforcing the normality of
prejudice.
Together, these orientations helped to divert the focus away from the question,
Who is prejudiced? After all, to the extent that the processes underlying prejudice
are intertwined with normal cognitive processes and group life, as well as personal
needs and motivations, bias would be expected to be pervasiveto be the norm.
The issue thus turned to bias among the well-intentioned and to the apparent

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inconsistencies between the self-reported attitudes of White Americans indicating

that the vast majority were nonprejudiced and the continued evidence of racial
disparities and discrimination (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). The key question
therefore became, Who is truly not prejudiced? Theories of racial ambivalence
(Katz et al., 1986) and of subtle and unintentional types of biases, such as symbolic
racism (Sears, 1988), modern racism (McConahay, 1986), and aversive racism
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kovel, 1970) emerged during this period.
The metaphor of a wave of research is a particularly appropriate one here.
From a distance, it is difficult to discern where one wave begins and another one
ends. Although distinct and identifiable in many ways, the beginning of one wave
is intimately connected to the end of an earlier one. Similarly, the second wave of
research on prejudice has its beginnings within the first wave. In the 1950s, the
work of Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1954) in
the Robbers Cave study, in which prejudice and hostility between two groups of
boys at summer camp were aroused through competition and then alleviated
through the pursuit and attainment of shared, superordinate goals, demonstrated
the connection between prejudice and realistic, functional relationships between
groups. The ideas Allport (1954/1958) expressed in his classic book, The Nature of
Prejudice, anticipated many of the important theoretical developments typically
associated with later research. He identified the central role of categorization, particularly in terms of the distinction between ingroups and outgroups, which
became the cornerstone for social-cognitive (Hamilton, 1981) and social identity
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) approaches to prejudice. Allport (1954/1958) wrote, The
human mind must think with the aid of categories (p. 19), and he added that
in-groups are psychologically primary. . . . Hostility toward out-groups helps
strengthen our sense of belonging but it is not required (p. 41; see also Brewer,
1979). Allport recognized the importance of social structure and cultural values in
the expression of prejudice (see, for example, p. 202), and he suggested how different cultural, social, and psychological forces could produce inner conflict in the
person harboring prejudice . . . denial . . . [and] rationalization (p. 316).
The third wave of research on prejudice, which began in the mid-1990s and
characterizes much of the current research, emphasizes the multidimensional aspect
of prejudice and takes advantage of new technologies to study processes that were
earlier hypothesized but not directly measurable. For example, whereas aversive
racism, modern racism, and symbolic racism approaches to contemporary prejudice
assumed the existence of widespread unconscious negative feelings and beliefs by
Whites toward Blacks, new conceptual perspectives (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji,
1995) and technologies (e.g., response latency procedures; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) were developed to understand and measure implicit (i.e., automatic and unconscious) attitudes and beliefs. These new
technologies permit the assessment of individual differences in implicit, as well as
explicit, racial attitudes and may thus help distinguish traditional racists from

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aversive or modern racists from truly nonprejudiced Whites. They also open doors
for developing approaches to combat subtle forms of prejudice. The adaptation of
functional magnetic resonance imaging procedures to studying social phenomena
promise further links to cognitive neuropsychological processes and a more comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and multidimensional understanding of prejudice
(Phelps et al., 2000).
Besides addressing the multidimensional intrapersonal processes associated
with prejudice and racism, the current wave of research considers the interpersonal
and intergroup context more explicitly. That is, whereas previous research focused
largely on the nature of attitudes of the perceivers (i.e., of Whites) and the relationship of these attitudes to the evaluations, decisions, and actions of the perceivers,
work in the third wave considers the responses and adaptations of targets and the
consequences of prejudice in the interactions between perceivers and targets. Targets are no longer considered to be passive victims of bias. Years ago, Allport
(1954/1958) posed the question, What would happen to your personality if you
heard it said over and over again that you are lazy and had inferior blood? (p. 42).
And then he answered, Group oppression may destroy the integrity of the ego
entirely, and reverse its normal pride, and create a groveling self-image (p. 152).
Although current work does demonstrate that Blacks have internalized to some
extent the social biases of Whites and that these biases may be reflected in implicit
racial stereotypes of Blacks (Johnson, Trawalter, & Dovidio, 2000) that can
become activated in the absence of interaction with Whites and can have important
detrimental consequences under appropriate circumstances (Steele, 1997), the
consequences of stigmatization are now understood to be more dynamic and complex (see Crocker & Quinn, 2001; Miller & Major, 2000). Recent volumes consider in detail the ways that Blacks and other targets of prejudice adapt to and cope
with stigmatization (Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Hull, 2000; Oyserman & Swim,
2001; Swim & Stangor, 1998).
The remainder of this article presents research on aversive racism to illustrate
the types of research that characterize the second and third waves, those within
my professional lifetime, and to provide a personal case study of the evolution of
scholarship in this area. Because this article represents my presidential address for
The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI), it is a soleauthored piece. Nevertheless, the work on aversive racism described in this article
involves collaborations with more than 50 students and colleagues. I am most
indebted to one: Sam Gaertner, my mentor, friend, and colleague. Our ideas and
work are intertwined and inseparable, and I gratefully acknowledge his contributions to this article.
Aversive Racism: The Second Wave
Aversive racism is hypothesized to be a subtle, contemporary form of racial
prejudice. In part because of changing norms and the Civil Rights Act and other

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legislative interventions that have made discrimination not simply immoral but
also illegal, overt expressions of prejudice have declined significantly over the past
35 years (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997).
Contemporary forms of prejudice, however, continue to exist and affect the lives of
people in subtle but significant ways (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner &
Dovidio, 1986). For these more subtle, contemporary forms of prejudice, bias is
expressed in indirect, often unintentional ways. Nevertheless, the consequences of
these prejudices (e.g., the restriction of economic opportunity) may be as significant for people of color and as pernicious as those of the traditional, overt form of
discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Sears,
1988).
The work my colleagues and I have conducted mainly considers the influence
of contemporary racial biases of Whites toward Blacks because of the central role
that racial politics has played in the history of the United States. Nevertheless, we
note that many of the findings and principles we discuss extend to biases toward
other groups (e.g., Hispanics) as well (Dovidio, Gaertner, Anastasio, & Sanitioso,
1992). In addition, although much of the evidence in support of the aversive racism
framework has been obtained in studies of college students (who are generally
more liberal than the public at large; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, in press), the
genesis of the framework, both theoretically and empirically, relied on analyses
of adult populations (Gaertner, 1973; Kovel, 1970). Also, the principles of the
framework are consistent with the operation of subtle and blatant prejudices
toward immigrants exhibited by representative samples of European respondents
(Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) and with archival evidence of racial disparities in the
United States in industry, the military, and the federal government (see Dovidio &
Gaertner, 1998).
The Nature of Aversive Racism
In contrast to approaches in the first wave of research that emphasized the
psychopathology of prejudice, the negative feelings and beliefs that underlie contemporary forms of bias may be rooted in normal, often adaptive, psychological
processes. These processes involve both individual factors (such as cognitive and
motivational biases and socialization) and intergroup functions (such as realistic
group conflict or biases associated with the mere categorization of people into
ingroups and outgroups). These negative biases may occur spontaneously, automatically, and without the full awareness of the person who possesses them (see
Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998).
Many contemporary approaches to prejudice based on race, ethnicity, or sex
acknowledge the persistence of overt, intentional forms of prejudice but also consider the role of these unconscious biases and the consequent indirect expressions of
bias. With respect to the racial prejudice of White Americans toward Blacks, for

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example, in contrast to old-fashioned racism, which is blatant, aversive racism

represents a subtle, often unintentional form of bias that characterizes many White
Americans who possess strong egalitarian values and who believe that they are
nonprejudiced. Aversive racists also possess negative racial feelings and beliefs
(which develop through normal socialization or reflect social categorization biases)
of which they are unaware or which they try to dissociate from their nonprejudiced
self-images. Because aversive racists consciously endorse egalitarian values, they
will not discriminate directly and openly in ways that can be attributed to racism;
however, because of their negative feelings they will discriminate, often unintentionally, when their behavior can be justified on the basis of some factor other than
race (e.g., questionable qualifications for a position). Thus, aversive racists may
regularly engage in discrimination while they maintain a nonprejudiced self-image.
We have found consistent evidence in support of the aversive racism framework
across a broad range of situations (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner &
Dovidio, 1986). The next sections describe two examples, one early and the other
recent, of this line of research.
Emergency Intervention
In one of the early tests of our framework (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977), we
modeled a situation in the laboratory after a classic study by Darley and Latan
(1968) of diffusion of responsibility. The Darley and Latan research was inspired
by an incident in the mid-1960s in which 38 people witnessed the stabbing of a
woman, Kitty Genovese, without a single bystander intervening to help. The
researchers reasoned that when a person is the only witness to an emergency, the
bystander bears 100% responsibility for helping and 100% of the guilt and blame
for not helping. The appropriate behavior in this situation, helping, is clearly
defined. If, however, a person witnesses an emergency but believes that somebody
else is available who can help or will help, then that bystanders personal responsibility is less clearly defined. Under these circumstances, the bystander could rationalize not helping by coming to believe that someone else will intervene.
Consistent with their predictions, Darley and Latan found in their experiment that
bystanders were significantly less likely to help a person apparently having an
epileptic seizure when they believed that there were other witnesses to the emergency than when they believed that they were the only witness.
Like Darley and Latan (1968), we led some of our participants to believe that
they would be the only witness to an emergency, whereas we led others to believe
that there would be two other people present in this situation who heard the emergency as well (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977). As a second dimension, we varied the
race of the victim. In half of the cases the victim was White; in the other half the
victim was Black. The participants in the study were White, as were the other two
people who were sometimes presumed to be present.

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We predicted that when people were the only witness to the emergency,
aversive racists would not discriminate against the Black victim. In this situation,
appropriate behavior is clearly defined. Refusing to help a Black victim could
easily be interpreted, by oneself or others, as racial bias. We predicted, however,
that because aversive racists have unconscious negative feelings toward blacks,
they would discriminate when they could justify their behavior on the basis of some
factor other than race, such as the belief that someone else would help the victim.
Specifically, we expected that Blacks would be helped less than Whites only when
White bystanders believed that there were other witnesses to the emergency.
The results of the study supported our predictions. When White bystanders
were the only witness to the emergency, they helped very frequently and equivalently for Black and White victims (95% vs. 83%). There was no evidence of
old-fashioned racism. In contrast, when White bystanders were given an opportunity to rationalize not helping on the basis of the belief that the other witnesses
could intervene, they were less likely to help, particularly when the victim was
Black. When participants believed that there were two other bystanders, they
helped the Black victim half as often as they helped the White victim (38% vs.
75%). As we hypothesized, the nature of the situation determines whether discrimination does or does not occur. These effects have been conceptually replicated in a
range of studies from the late 1970s to the present (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998;
Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).
Selection Decisions
Subsequent research (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000) was designed to extend the
research on aversive racism by exploring its potential effects in more everyday
situations of potential discrimination, in this case, on hiring recommendations for a
Black or White candidate for a position as a peer counselor. The study examined
the hypothesis, derived from previous research within the aversive racism framework, that bias against Blacks will be more likely to be manifested when the appropriate decision is unclear, for example, because of ambiguous evidence about
whether the candidates qualifications meet employment criteria, than when the
appropriate response is perceived to be well-defined.
In this study, we asked participants to evaluate candidates for a position in an
ostensibly new program for peer counseling at their university on the basis of
excerpts from an interview. We developed three candidate profiles: one reflected
strong qualifications (pretested as being accepted about 85% of the time), one represented weak qualifications (pretested as being accepted about 15% of the time),
and the third involved moderate and marginally acceptable qualifications (pretested as being accepted about 50% of the time). Participants evaluated a single
candidate who was identifiable as Black or White from information in the excerpt.
We predicted that bias against Black applicants would be strongest when the match

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between the candidates qualifications and the position criteria was least clear: in
the moderate qualifications condition.
The data collected in this study also permitted an examination of potential
changes in racism over time, both in terms of aversive racism, as reflected in the
pattern of hiring recommendations, and overt racism, as represented by responses
on a self-report prejudice scale. In particular, the cross-sectional data represented
the responses of students to the same materials during the 198889 and the
199899 academic years. Although overt forms of racism have exhibited significant decreases over time (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998), aversive racism may be
more persistent. We have argued, for instance, that like a virus that has mutated,
racism has also evolved into different forms that are more difficult not only to recognize but also to combat (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, p. 25). Because it is more
subtle and difficult to recognize, aversive racism is more difficult to address, and
thus to reduce over time, than overt prejudice, both legally (Krieger, 1995) and
informally (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998).
Overall, the pattern of results obtained in this study is consistent with the
hypotheses derived from the aversive racism framework and illustrates the applicability of this perspective to the domain of personnel decisions. In particular, when
the candidates credentials clearly qualified them for the position or the credentials
clearly were not appropriate, across both time periods (198889 and 199899),
there was no discrimination against the Black candidate. Averaged across the two
time periods, in the Strong Qualifications condition the Black candidate was
recommended for the position 91% of the time, whereas the White candidate was
recommended 85% of the time. In the Weak Qualifications condition, the Black
candidate was recommended 13% of the time, and the White candidate was recommended 6% of the time. When candidates qualifications for the position were less
obvious, however, and the appropriate decision more ambiguous, White participants recommended the Black candidate significantly less often than the White
candidate (45% vs. 76%) with exactly the same credentials. When given latitude
for interpretation, as in the Moderate Qualifications condition, Whites may give
White candidates the benefit of the doubt, a benefit that is not extended to
outgroup members (i.e., to Black candidates). As a consequence, as demonstrated
in this study, moderate qualifications are responded to like strong qualifications
when the candidate is White but like weak qualifications when the candidate is
Black.
In addition, as expected, whereas self-reported prejudice on modern racism
items (see McConahay, 1986) was significantly lower in 199899 than in 198889,
evidence of aversive racism was as strong in 199899 as it was a decade earlier. For
the two periods, respectively, Black-White differences in recommendations for the
position in 198889 and 199899 were +6% and +8% in the Strong Qualifications
condition, 25% and 37% in the Moderate Qualifications condition, and +7% and
+7% in the Weak Qualifications condition.

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Aversive Racism and Subtle Bias

In general, the evidence we have presented in this section to illustrate the
existence of aversive racism makes its case either by demonstrating contrasting
results between overt self-report measures of bias and more subtle patterns of discrimination (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000) or by showing that self-report prejudice scales do not predict the the more subtle form of discrimination (e.g.,
Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977). These studies thus offer evidence for the phenomenon, but they do not identify who, in particular, is an aversive racist. Measures
originally developed to assess subtle prejudice, such as the Modern Racism Scale
(McConahay, 1986), are not sufficiently nonreactive and sensitive to predict these
patterns of responses (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). Thus, although
in this type of second-wave research we could argue that aversive racism is an
important and pervasive type of racial bias, the underlying negative feelings associated with aversive racism were assumed but not measured directly. In the third
wave of prejudice research, conscious and unconscious attitudes are more fully
distinguished conceptually and empirically.
Aversive Racism: The Third Wave
A cornerstone of the aversive racism framework, similar to the position of
other types of subtle biases such as modern or symbolic racism (McConahay,
1986), is the conflict between the denial of personal prejudice (i.e., explicit attitudes) and the underlying unconscious negative feelings and beliefs (i.e., implicit
attitudes and stereotypes). Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977) but substantially in the 1990s, the field of cognitive psychology
offered an important distinction between implicit and explicit memory processes
(e.g., Schacter, 1990). Implicit memory processes involve lack of awareness and
are unintentionally activated, whereas explicit processes are conscious, deliberative, and controllable.
A similar distinction emerged in the social psychological literature on attitudes and stereotyping (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Explicit attitudes and stereotyping operate in a conscious mode and are exemplified by traditional, self-report
measures of these constructs. Implicit attitudes and stereotypes, in contrast, are
evaluations and beliefs that are automatically activated by the mere presence
(actual or symbolic) of the attitude object. They commonly function in an unconscious fashion. Implicit attitudes and stereotypes are typically assessed using
response latency procedures, memory tasks, physiological measures (e.g., galvanic skin response, or GSR), and indirect self-report measures (e.g., involving
attributional biases). These techniques for assessing automatic activation offer
conceptually and empirically different perspectives on both attitudes and stereotypes than traditional self-report measures.

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Evidence of implicit negative racial attitudes of Whites toward Blacks has

been generally consistent and strong. Response latency procedures, in particular,
have demonstrated that racial attitudes and stereotypes may operate like other
stimuli to facilitate responses and decision making about related concepts (e.g.,
doctor-nurse). In general, the greater the associative strength between two stimuli,
the faster people can make decisions about them (e.g., Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler,
1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983). Convergent evidence has been obtained
with a variety of different priming procedures (see Blair, 2001; Dovidio,
Kawakami, & Beach, 2001), as well as with other response latency techniques such
as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). For example, we have
found, using subliminally presented schematic faces as primes, that White participants have faster response times to negative traits after Black than White primes
and faster response times to positive traits after White than Black primes (Dovidio,
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997, Study 1).
Dual Attitudes
Conceptually, implicit and explicit (i.e., self-report) attitudes have been considered as reflecting dual attitudes (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Dual
attitudes commonly arise developmentally. With experience or socialization, people change their attitudes. The original attitude is not replaced, however, but rather
is stored in memory and becomes implicit, whereas the newer attitude is conscious
and explicit. In general, explicit attitudes can change and evolve relatively easily,
whereas implicit attitudes, because they are rooted in overlearning and habitual
reactions, persist and are much more difficult to alter (see Wilson et al., 2000).
Because explicit attitudes may be a product of similar experience and learning
history and may, in fact, form the basis for the development of implicit attitudes
through repeated exposure or application (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), explicit
and implicit attitudes may sometimes correspond with one another. Other times,
they may not. One factor that may determine the evaluative correspondence of the
implicit and explicit evaluations involved in dual attitudes is the normative context
for the attitude object. For instance, people may initially acquire negative attitudes
toward groups through socialization within a particular cultural or historical context. Later, when norms change or the person is exposed to new normative proscriptions that dictate that people should not have these negative feelings toward
these groups, people adopt explicit unbiased or positive attitudes. Nevertheless,
negative implicit attitudes linger.
This reasoning suggests that there may be greater correspondence between
implicit and explicit attitudes for issues that are not socially sensitive than for those
that are socially sensitive or are associated with norms that are inconsistent with
historical norms or traditional socialization. Consistent with this notion, Fazio,
Williams, and Sanbonmatsu (1990) found that the correlation between explicit and

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implicit attitudes for objects that did not involve socially sensitive issues (e.g.,
snakes, dentists) was high (r = .63), whereas the correlation for objects associated
with socially sensitive issues (e.g., pornography, Blacks) was weak and, in fact,
negative (r = .11). Racial attitudes are also socially sensitive, and our metaanalysis of the relationship between implicit and explicit racial attitudes revealed,
as expected, only a modest relationship (Dovidio et al., 2001). Specifically, our
review of 27 studies from 19 separate research reports involving 1,562 participants
and using a range of different implicit measures of racial prejudice, including the
physiological measure of GSR as well as response latency measures, on the part of
Whites toward Blacks yielded a significant but weak-to-moderate positive relationship, mean r = .24. An examination of the relationship between implicit and
explicit attitudes across just the 14 tests involving priming measures revealed a
somewhat weaker relationship, mean r = .16. Thus, consistent with the aversive
racism framework, explicit (conscious) and implicit (unconscious) racial attitudes
are only weakly related.
In addition, implicit and explicit attitudes can influence behavior in different
ways and under different conditions (Dovidio & Fazio, 1992; Fazio, 1990; Wilson
et al., 2000). Explicit attitudes shape deliberative, well-considered responses for
which people have the motivation and opportunity to weigh the costs and benefits
of various courses of action. Implicit attitudes influence responses that are more
difficult to monitor and control (e.g., some nonverbal behaviors) or responses that
people do not view as an indication of their attitude and thus do not try to control.
Thus the relative impact of implicit and explicit attitudes is a function of the context in which the attitudinal object appears, the motivation and opportunity to
engage in deliberative processes, and the nature of the behavioral response.
Racial Attitudes and Behavior
Applying these ideas about dual attitudes but considering racial attitudes in
particular, we hypothesized that the relationship between racial attitudes and
behavior may be affected by the way attitudes are measured and the type of behavior being examined (Dovidio et al., 1997). Theoretically, racial attitudes may be
examined at two (or more) different levels. At one level are the conscious aspects
of racial attitudes. At another level are unconscious feelings and beliefs, which are
often different than publicly expressed attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
Which level represents a White persons true racial attitude? We argue that
both of these levels represent true aspects of the persons attitude and that the
central question should be instead, Which aspect of the attitude better predicts
which type of behavior? Our general position, which was guided by Fazios
(1990) MODE Model, was that implicit (unconscious) aspects of an attitude will
primarily predict spontaneous behaviors (e.g., nonverbal behaviors), whereas conscious, explicit attitudes will mainly predict deliberative and controlled actions
(e.g., evaluations or verbal behavior).

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One of our initial investigations of this framework involved the responses of

White participants toward Black and White partners during face-to-face interaction (Dovidio et al., 1997, Study 3). As a measure of deliberative behavior, participants were asked to evaluate both other interactants on a series of rating scales. The
nonverbal behaviors of eye contact and blinking were utilized as an index of more
spontaneous forms of behavior. Higher levels of visual contact (i.e., time spent
looking at another person) reflect greater attraction, intimacy, and respect. Higher
rates of blinking have been demonstrated to be related to higher levels of negative
arousal and tension. Both of these types of nonverbal behaviors are particularly difficult to monitor and control. We predicted that explicit measures of prejudice
would primarily relate to bias in the deliberative evaluations of Black relative to
White interviewers by White participants. In contrast, the response latency measure of implicit negative racial attitude was expected to be the best predictor of
more spontaneous nonverbal reactionsspecifically, higher rates of blinking and
less visual contact with the Black relative to the White interviewer.
The results supported the predictions. Bias in terms of more negative judgments about Black than White interviewers was correlated with the two explicit
self-report measures of prejudice, Old-Fashioned Racism (r = .37) and Modern
Racism (r = .54), but was uncorrelated with implicit prejudice (r = .02). In contrast,
implicit prejudice predicted lower levels of visual contact (r = .40) and higher
rates of blinking (r = .43), but Old-Fashioned Racism (rs = .02, .04) and Modern
Racism (rs = .20, .07) did not.
A second thrust of third-wave research on prejudice is a consideration of the
responses of targets of discrimination and on the emergent qualities of interactions
between perceivers and targets. The next series of studies we present examines the
impact of implicit and explicit racial biases on the nature, group processes, and outcomes of interactions between Whites and Blacks.
Bias and Interaction
Thus far, the research we have presented on implicit and explicit racial attitudes has demonstrated the existence of implicit negative racial attitudes that are
only weakly related to explicit attitudes, and we have shown that implicit and
explicit attitudes predict different behaviorsspontaneous and deliberativefor
Whites. Our focus has therefore been exclusively on Whites. We further hypothesize that the these different types of attitudes and behaviors can have profound,
although typically not fully recognized, effects of the responses of Blacks and the
nature of interactions involving Blacks and Whites.
We propose that during interracial interactions Whites and Blacks have fundamentally different perspectives on the attitudes and actions of Whites. Whites have
access to their conscious attitudes and are able to monitor and control their more
overt and deliberative behaviors. Thus, aversive racists, who sincerely believe that

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they are not prejudiced, would likely show relatively positive controllable behaviors, such as favorable verbal content, in their conversations with Blacks. On the
basis of their access to their conscious egalitarian attitudes and their monitoring of
their deliberative behaviors, aversive racists would also be likely to conclude that
they are making a favorable impression on their Black partner. From all of the
information they have available about themselves (i.e., their conscious thoughts
and deliberative actions), they have behaved in an appropriate and friendly
manner.
In contrast, the perspective of Blacks in the interaction encompasses the spontaneous as well as the deliberative behaviors of Whites. To the extent that aversive
racists have implicit negative attitudes that are reflected in negative nonverbal
behaviors (Dovidio et al., 1997), their nonverbal behaviors may belie their verbal
behaviors. That is, their positive efforts to say the right things may be undermined,
without their awareness, by how they are saying it. People generally rely heavily on
nonverbal behaviors when interpreting others behaviors (Dovidio & Ellyson,
1982), particularly when there is an inconsistency between verbal and nonverbal
behavior (Mehrabian, 1972). Moreover, Blacks may be particularly sensitive to the
nonverbal behaviors in interracial interactions. As Vorauer and Kumhyr (2001)
have recently demonstrated, minority-group members are attuned to negative
behaviors of majority-group members that could reveal their prejudice, and detecting these behaviors makes them less comfortable and less satisfied with the interaction. Thus, aversive racists and their Black partners may have two very different
perspectives and reactions, one positive and one negative, to their interracial interaction (see also see Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996; Fazio et al., 1995).
In one study (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, in press), we assessed the perceptions of interracial interactions by Whites and Blacks as a function of a White
participants explicit and implicit attitudes. We first assessed the implicit attitudes
(using our response latency priming technique) and explicit self-report racial attitudes (using Brighams Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale, 1993), and then arranged
interracial conversations around a series of relatively mundane and noncontroversial topics (e.g., What belongings are most useful to bring to college?). To provide
baseline interaction measures, participants also interacted with a White partner.
We videotaped the interactions and subsequently had coders rate the nonverbal
behaviors (from video portions of the tape without audio portions) and the verbal
behaviors (from audiotapes) of the White participant.
We hypothesized that in these interracial interactions White participants
would be able to reflect on their conscious racial attitudes and monitor their overt,
controllable behaviors (e.g., what they say). Consequently we predicted that
explicit racial attitudes and racial bias in the friendliness of their deliberative verbal
behaviors toward Blacks relative to Whites would be positively correlated. We
also anticipated, as in our previous research, that White participants implicit racial
attitudes, of which they were unaware, would predict bias in the friendliness of

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843

their nonverbal behaviors. We further hypothesized that impressions of biased

behavior of White participants by the White participants themselves and by their
partners would be based on different factors. White participants were expected to
base their impressions of their biased behavior on their conscious attitudes and
deliberative behaviors, whereas their partners, who could monitor both the Whites
deliberative actions (e.g., what they say) and more spontaneous and subtle behaviors (e.g., how they say it), were expected to base their impressions on bias in the
nonverbal behaviors of the White participant and on their implicit attitudes.
The results, which are summarized in Figure 1, are consistent with our predictions. Implicit attitudes predicted racial bias in nonverbal friendliness (r = .41) but
not bias in verbal friendliness (r = .04). Less implicitly biased Whites behaved in a
more friendly nonverbal manner toward Black relative to White partners. In contrast, the explicit self-report measure of prejudice predicted biases in verbal (r =
.40) but not nonverbal (r = .02) friendliness. Less explicitly prejudiced Whites had
more favorable verbal behaviors with the Black relative to White partner. Also as
anticipated, White participants and their partners developed very different impressions (see Figure 1) of the conversation that took place between them. More
racially biased impressions of the friendliness of the White participant as judged by
the partners were related to bias in the White participants nonverbal behavior (r =
.34) but not to bias in the White participants verbal behavior (r = .17). White participants impressions of bias in their own friendliness was related more to their
bias in their verbal behavior (r = .36) than to their bias in nonverbal behavior (r =
.07). Ultimately, the impressions of the racial bias in the friendliness of White
participants by themselves and by their partners were essentially unrelated (r =
.11). Thus, because of their very different perspectives and reliance on different
information, Whites and their partners left the same interaction with very different
impressions of the existence of racial biases.

Figure 1. Relationships (correlations) between measures of prejudice and participant behavior and
impressions.

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Aversive Racism and Group Processes

Besides manifesting itself in terms of different impressions and perceptions,
contemporary bias can influence personal relations and group processes in ways
that unintentionally but adversely affect outcomes for Blacks. For instance, Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1999) have argued that effective teamwork requires two
types of skills, those associated with the technical aspects of the job and those associated with being a member of the team. For this latter factor, team competencies
include the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required to work effectively with others. We further propose that for interracial teams, both implicit and explicit racial
attitudes are important for effective teamwork. To the extent that explicit attitudes
are manifested overtly in less friendly and less supportive actions, interracial interactions involving more highly prejudiced Whites would be expected to be less productive. To the extent that implicit racial attitudes may also be detected, at least by
a Black partner, through more subtle manifestations such as nonverbal behavior,
these unconscious biases can erode the trust between group members and have a
negative impact on group performance.
In our research on this issue (Dovidio, 1999), White college students were
classified on the basis of their self-reported racial attitudes and a response latency
measure of bias. A portion of the participants were identified as being low in prejudice on the self-report measure and unbiased on the unconscious (i.e., response
latency) measure (Nonprejudiced, about 25%). Another group appeared low in
prejudice on the self-report measure but had implicit racial biases (Aversive Racists, about 40%). A third group were relatively prejudiced on the self-report measure as well as biased on the implicit measure (Prejudiced, about 20%). (About
15% of the total sample could not be clearly classified into one of these three categories.) We then examined the impressions of the White and Black team members
and how effectively the group performed (i.e., how quickly they could decide
which items would be most valuable for am incoming student to bring to college).
The results for perceptions of friendliness replicated our earlier results (see
Table 1). Whites who appeared low in prejudice on the self-report measure (i.e.,
Nonprejudiced Whites and Aversive Racists) reported that they behaved more in a
more friendly way than those who scored high (Prejudiced Whites). Black partners
appeared to be more sensitive to the implicit attitudes: They perceived Whites who
were unbiased on the implicit response latency measure (Nonprejudiced Whites) to
be more friendly than those who had unconscious biases (Aversive Racists and
Prejudiced Whites). They were also less trustful of Aversive Racists and Prejudiced Whites than of Nonprejudiced Whites.
Efficiency of group problem-solving showed the same pattern: Teams with
Nonprejudiced Whites solved the problem most quickly (4 min 35 s) and had the
highest level of satisfaction with the outcome for both White and Black participants. Interracial teams involving Prejudiced Whites were next most efficient,

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845

Table 1. Aversive Racism and Interracial Team Impressions and Efficiency

Ratings of
Ratings by
White participants
Nonprejudiced
(low implicit/low
explicit prejudice)
Aversive racists
(high implicit/low
explicit prejudice)
Prejudiced
(high implicit/high
explicit prejudice)

Friendliness of the
White participant
White
Black
participant
partner

Trustworthiness of the
Satisfaction with the
White participant
interaction
White
Black
White
Black
participant
partner
participant
partner

5.6

5.5

5.8

5.3

4.4

4.5

5.8

4.6

5.9

4.2

4.8

4.0

4.6

4.4

5.4

4.7

4.1

3.7

completing the task in 5 min 45 s. Teams with Aversive Racists were the least efficient (6 min 10 s), although the time was not significantly longer than the time for
teams with Prejudiced Whites. Presumably, the conflicting messages displayed by
aversive racists and the divergent impressions of the team members interaction
interfered with the task effectiveness of the team. To the extent that Blacks are in
the minority in an organization and are dependent on highly prejudiced Whites or
aversive racists on work-related tasks, their performance is likely to be objectively
poorer than the performance of Whites who predominantly interact with other
Whites. Thus, even when Whites harbor unconscious and unintentional biases
toward Blacks, their actions can have effects, sometimes even more detrimental
than those of old-fashioned racists, on the outcomes and ultimately on the wellbeing of Blacks.
Conclusion
In summary, although overt expressions of prejudice have declined steadily
and significantly over time, subtleoften unconscious and unintentionalforms
continue to exist. Moreover, the present work supports our earlier argument that
although the expression of aversive racism may be subtle, the consequences are
not subtle. Aversive racism, like more blatant forms, may contribute to the restriction of opportunity for Blacks and other minorities (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, p.
31).
This subtle, rationalizable type of bias also poses unique challenges to the
legal system. Even though this subtle process underlying discrimination can be
identified and isolated in the controlled conditions of the laboratory, in organizational decision making, in which the controlled conditions of an experiment are
rarely possible, this process presents a substantial challenge to the equitable treatment of members of disadvantaged groups. For example, Krieger (1995), in the
Stanford Law Review, observed: Herein lies the practical problem. . . . Validating

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Dovidio

subjective decisionmaking systems is neither empirically nor economically feasible, especially for jobs where intangible qualities, such as interpersonal skills, creativity, and ability to make sound judgments under conditions of uncertainty are
critical (p. 1232). Moreover, to the extent that aversive racism adversely affects
the performance on Blacks in disproportionate ways on measurable, seemingly
objective outcomes, its operation may go largely unnoticed and unaddressed.
Finally, the nature of contemporary biases can also shape the everyday perceptions of White and Black Americans in ways that interfere with a foundation of
communication and trust that is critical to developing long-term positive intergroup relations. Although we recognize that a variety of historical and social forces
are involved, we suggest that the different perspectives and perceptions of Whites
and Blacks in interracial interaction that we illustrate in our research, which can
occur daily and have summative effects over time (Feagin & Vera, 1995), contribute to the climate of miscommunication, misperception, and distrust that characterizes contemporary race relations in the United States (Anderson, 1996; Crocker,
Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999).
The evolution of psychological research from the first wave to the second
wave, from a view of prejudice as psychopathology to a view of prejudice as
rooted in normal processes, increased awareness of the pervasiveness of racial
biases and the existence of subtle forms of biases. The movement of research from
the second wave to the third, in which the dynamics of prejudice are identified at
implicit as well as explicit levels and the responses of targets of prejudice and discrimination are fully considered, offers a more comprehensive view of how the
prejudices of Whites shape interpersonal and intergroup processes as well as outcomes and promises a more comprehensive understanding of race relations. It also
can help inform Whites and Blacks of the existence of their different perspectives
and help them appreciate the way that unintentional biases can influence race relations. In the context of this broader perspective, it is thus possible to illuminate the
complexity of subtle contemporary biases, such as aversive racism, to demonstrate persuasively that discrimination is not a thing of the past and to encourage
renewed efforts to develop new, effective techniques to combat contemporary
racial bias.
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JOHN F. DOVIDIO holds an MA and a PhD in social psychology from the University of Delaware. He is Charles A. Dana Professor of Psychology at Colgate University, where he is currently Interim Provost and Dean of the Faculty, and he has
previously served as director of the Division of University Studies and Director of
the Division of Natural Sciences and Mathematics. Dovidio has been editor of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin and is currently associate editor of Group
Processes and Intergroup Relations. He is a fellow of the American Psychological
Association and of the American Psychological Society. He has also served as
president of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues and chair of
the executive committee of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology.
Dovidios research interests are in improving intergroup relations; stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination; social power and nonverbal communication; and
altruism and helping.