PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Case Doctrines
(Diory Rabajante)
CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS
I. PRELIMINARY TITLES (Articles 1-18)
Article 2
Taada vs.
- The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. It must be
Tuvera
made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after 15 days from such publication or after a different
period provided by the legislature.
- (Nota Bene: Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987, modifying Article
2 of the Civil Code, now provides for the publication of laws either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
as a requirement for effectivity.)
- The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to fill in the details of the Central Bank
Act (RA 265) which that body is supposed to enforce.
People vs. Que Po
- Circulars which prescribe a penalty for their violation should be published
before becoming effective. This is based on the general principle and
Lay
theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provision, a law, regulation, or circular must first be published, and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and the
penalties for violation thereof.
-EXECUTIVE
ORDERS WITH PENAL SANCTIONS; PUBLICATION IN
Pesigan vs.
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE, INDISPENSABLE Executive Order No.
Angeles
626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and
forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to
another should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982
because it was published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
-LAWS (in Art. 2, Civil Code) INCLUDES CIRCULARS AND
REGULATIONS WHICH PRESCRIBE PENALTIES The word "laws" in
Article 2 (Article 1 of the Old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations
which prescribe penalties.
-* PURPOSE OF PUBLICATION Publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on persons affected thereby
-Case at Bar: PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
Phil.
under which applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples
International
Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export
Trading Corp. vs.
program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone
Judge Angeles
from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able
to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter
they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order
of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for
being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process

 Article 3
Delgado vs.
Alonso
People vs. Bitdu
(G.R. No. L-38230)

Article 4
Co vs. CA
Article 6
D.M. Consunji vs.
CA

and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and
regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133
issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking
the reversal of the said decision. Issue: Whether or not PITCs
Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.
-Ruling: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such
order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of
the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that
all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under
consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity since it is punitive in character.
- A person who charges usurious rates of interest cannot claim justification
in his ignorance of the Usury Law. He can, therefore, be made to pay
reasonable attorneys fees of the debtor.
-Case at bar: The defense presented no evidence to show that the
conditions prescribed by the Koran had been complied with by the parties
when they obtained their divorce before Datu Cuevas. Said divorce
therefore between the defendant and Halid does not satisfy the conditions
prescribed by the Koran and consequently said divorce seems to be of
doubtful religious validity. However, even admitting that this divorce was
secured in accordance with the conditions prescribed by Mohammedan
doctrines, is such divorce legal? The laws governing marriage and its
incidents are moral in nature and as such they are laws relating to public
policy.
-In the Philippine Islands we have a law (Act No. 2710) enumerating the
causes and the conditions under which divorce may be secured and
granted. Any divorce obtained in the Philippine Islands of causes and
under conditions other than those enumerated in said law, would have no
legal effect. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and
doctrines of a religion cannot be superior to or have precedence over
laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to
marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect
public policy.
-The court therefore is of the opinion that even if the divorce alleged by the
defense was secured in conformity with Mohammedan doctrines, such
divorce cannot prevail against the Divorce Law of the Philippine Islands
prescribing the causes and conditions under which divorce may be
obtained. In this case, as above demonstrated, the divorce in question
has not been obtained in accordance with the law.

-Case at bar: On November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of

D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City
to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, filed in the RTC of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M.
Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows
prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed

Cui vs. Arellano

University
[112 Phil 135]

Article 8
Floresca vs.
Philex Mining
Corporation

Article 15-16
Miciano vs. Brimo

Pilapil vs. IbaySomera

Roehr vs.
Rodriguez

the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not
the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.
- Ruling: The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of
their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation
Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held
that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death
benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
- Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private
Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition of merit and
not to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda
value. To look at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase
the business potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent
with sound public policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver
signed by the student, waiving his right to transfer to another school
unless he refunds to the university the equivalent of his scholarship
grants, is void.
- Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as
the statute itself. Article 8 of the Civil Code tells us that judicial decisions
that apply or interpret laws of the Constitution form part of our legal
system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, are evidence
of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the
court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of its enactment since
the Courts application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to
carry into effect.
- Case at bar: An alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines
stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law, and not that of his nation.
- The provision in the will is not valid. The Turkish law should govern the
disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16.
- In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
- As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof,
e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined
by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the
German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under
Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment

may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
- It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness
of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
- In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given
the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that
there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the
rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The
proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the
extent of private respondents participation in the proceedings in the
German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself
states that neither has she commented on the proceedings nor has she
given her opinion to the Social Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was
represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist
her in said proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment was
issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the
effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is
deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to
who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent
is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody,
care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.
This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare
Code that the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody.
Garcia vs. Receio

Bellis vs. Bellis

United Airlines
vs. Court of
Appeals
(G.R. No. 124110)

- Our Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are
not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved
in the negative.
- The 4 aspects of succession that are governed by the national law of the
decedent if he is a foreigner are:
1. The order of succession
2. The amount of successional rights
3. The intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions
4. The capacity to succeed.
- In case the testator, who is a foreigner, actually wanted to distribute his
estate in accordance with Philippine laws, and so, in his will, there is a
proviso to the effect that said estate shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine laws, the proviso in the will would be void. It is contrary to
the provision of Article 16 which explicitly declares that it will be the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration that
will govern.
- Neither do we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court
that private respondents failure to comply with the check-in requirement
will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied
with. Notably, the appellate court relied on the Code of Federal
Regulation Part on Oversales which states:
250.6 Exceptions to eligibility for denied boarding compensation.
A passenger denied board involuntarily from an oversold flight

shall not be eligible for denied board compensation if: a.

The passenger does not comply with the carriers

contract of carriage or tariff provisions regarding

ticketing, reconfirmation, check-in, and acceptability
for transformation.
The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United
States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law.
Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United
States, the tickets were purchased through petitioners agent in Manila. It
is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in Washington, D.C. however, such
fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered
into by the parties in Manila.
In the case of Zalanea vs. Court of Appeals, this Court applied the
doctrine of lex loci contractus. According to the doctrine, as a general
rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into
governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and
interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even though the place
where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be
performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of
performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply the law of the
place where the airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State
by the defendant airline.
The law of the forum on the subject matter is Economic Regulations No. 7
as amended by Boarding Priority and Denied Board Compensation of the
Civil Aeronautics Board which provides that the check-in requirement be
complied with before a passenger may claim against a carrier for being
denied boarding:
Sec. 5. Amount of Denied Boarding Compensation Subject to the
exceptions provided hereinafter under Section 6, carriers shall
pay to passengers holding confirmed reserved space and who
have presented themselves at the proper place and time and fully
complied with the carriers check-in and reconfirmation
procedures and who are acceptable for carriage under the
Carriers tariff but who have been denied boarding for lack of
space, a compensation at the rate of: xxx

II. Human Relations

Articles 19-22
Albenson
Enterprises vs. CA

Nikko Hotel vs.

Reyes

- A party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later
on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the
principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution.
- The principle of abuse of rights is based upon the famous maxim suum
jus summa injuria (the abuse of a right is the greatest possible wrong).
However, in order that it will be actionable, the following elements of an
abuse of right under Article 19 must be present:
1. There is a legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in bad faith;
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
- Article 19 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible."The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights

Spouses
Quisumbing vs.
MERALCO

but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the
following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or
intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain
herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Hence, Reyes invoked Article 21.
- Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with
intent to injure. Under Articles 19 and 21 the nature of the act to be able
to claim damages must be intentional. It has been proven in the case,
however, the Lims acts were otherwise.
- Doctrine of Violenti Non Fit Injuria (to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury) pertains to the self-inflicted injury which will
not entitle a person for damages because of the very fact that it in the first
place it was his fault on why he was injured. This doctrine was invoked by
Nikko Hotel in the petition, claiming that Reyes exposed himself to the
injury of being thrown out of the party as a gate crasher. The Court,
however, said that this is not applicable in this case because despite
Reyes improper behaviour of gate-crashing, Nikko Hotel and Lim should
still observe proper treatment towards him under Articles 19 and 21 as to
not expose him to humiliation and shame.
-Case at bar: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the
owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City.
Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendants inspectors headed by
Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot
inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as
standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the
plaintiffs secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had
been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who
conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors
advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further
verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant
had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an
hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and
asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01
representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected.
The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
-Issue: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent
manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs
rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them
accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.
-Ruling: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to
pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is
ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including
attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of
individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due
process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are
imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the
effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any
action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people.

University of the
East vs. Jader
(G.R. No. 132344)

Gashem Shookat
Baksh vs. CA
(G.R. No. 97336)

Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio
Corp. vs. CA

Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately
disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but
only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to
by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official
or ERB representative was present.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced
preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article
19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain
from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or
belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the
school that has access to those information and it is only the school that
can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and
policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of
grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the
way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance
with the schools rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is
the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over
the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the
students standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity
had any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or
injury.
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. In
civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no
intended injury that others will commit no internal aggressions upon
them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due
care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community
exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of
society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is
justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. Schools and
professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to
them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
In the light of the laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where
a mans promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance
of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him
in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
Thus, when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Art. 19 of the Code and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer

Pe vs. Pe

Wassmer vs. Velez

Hermosisima vs.
Ca

Constantino vs.
Mendez

St. Louis Realty

Corp. vs. CA
(G.R. No. L-46061)

must be held responsible.

- The circumstances under which the defendant tried to win the girls
affection cannot but lead to any other conclusion that it was he who,
through an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent
of making her fall in love with him. On the pretext of teaching her how to
pray the rosary, he was able to frequent the house of the plaintiff.
Because of this clever strategy, he was able to win the love of the young
girl and to have illicit relations with her. The wrong he caused her and her
family is indeed immeasurable considering that he is a married man.
Verily, he has committed an act which is actionable under Article 21.
- Mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable wrong, but to formally
set a wedding and go through all the preparation therefore, only to walk
out of it when the marriage is about to e solemnized is quite different.
Obviously, it is contrary to good customs, and the defendant consequently
must be held answerable for damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the
Code.
- In itself, mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable. However,
when there had been carnal knowledge and the woman becomes
pregnant and subsequently delivers, the breach may be actionable. Even
assuming the woman cannot recover moral damages for the breach,
nevertheless, she can recover compensatory damages for medical and
hospitalization expenses as well as attorneys fees.
- Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages
could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's
Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she
was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived
because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed
her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual
contact that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of
September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual
intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of
marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
- Case at bar: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the
faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover
damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St
Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis
published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart
is. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the
house featured was Dr Aramils house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the
company asked permission and the intended house to be published.
After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis
demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or
apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto,
the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramils
counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18,
1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but
nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a
complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of
rectification was published.
- Ruling: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely
circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology
and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier
"rectification ".

Tenchavez vs.
Escano

Article 36
Spouses Yu vs.
PCIB

Donato vs. Luna

- The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her
husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in
order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married
again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the
husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy for which No. 10 of Article 2219 authorizes an award for
moral damages.
- Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding
since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately
and take their own direction independently of each other.
- A case for annulment can be considered as a prejudicial question to the
bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioners
consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence,
and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent
marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the
basis for conviction. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determined juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
- The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into
by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean the prejudicial
questions are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of criminal case.

III. Civil Personality

Articles 37-41
Quimiguing vs.
Icao
(G.R. No. 26795)

Geluz vs. CA

-The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she
was carrying and an independent cause of action for damages. This is
because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of
the unborn child, which includes its right to support from its progenitors,
even it is only en ventre de sa mere. Article 742 of the same Code holds
that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons
that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and
Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for
reversal of order.
-Additionally, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to
his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused per Article 21 of
the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides
moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts.
- Only one with a juridical personality can die. Here the unborn child never
died because it never acquired a juridical personality. Article 40 limits the
provisional personality of a conceived child by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently born alive.
- Case at bar: Wife went to a medical clinic for abortion without the
knowledge of her husband. When the latter learned of the abortion, he
brought an action against the wife basing his claim upon the provision of
Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, which enumerates the damages recoverable
in case of death caused by a crime or quasi delict. The husbands claim is
untenable, the child being not considered alive when separated from the

De Jesus vs.
Syquia
(G.R. No. L-39110)
Article 43
Limjuco vs. Estate
of Pedro

mothers womb.
- The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was
long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status

- The estate of a deceased should be considered an artificial or juridical

person for purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which
includes the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of his rights
and the fulfillment of obligations which survived after his death.
-lack of jurisdiction over a dead person; civil personality is extinguished by
Dumlao vs.
death; even juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
Quality Plastics
relations, was lost through death.
IV. Citizenship and Domicile
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commission of
Immigration
Frivaldo vs.
COMELEC
RomualdezMarcos vs.
COMELEC

-alien woman/ man marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,

becomes ipso facto a Filipina/ Filipino provided she/he is not disqualified
to be a citizen of the Philippines.
-the forfeiture of being a naturalized American Citizen did not and could
not have the effect of automatically restoring ones citizenship in the
Philippines that one had earlier renounced. One must re-acquire the
Philippine Citizenship again.
-It must be noted that residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary, while domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. Residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.

FAMILY CODE PROVISIONS

I.

Requisites of Marriage

Article 1
Tuazon vs. CA

Estrada vs.
Escritor

-A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed

only in exception cases where there is no other available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available or adequate remedy.
When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a
motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial or
appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
Marriage is not subject to stipulations, but the waiver of the husband of
his right to present his evidences made the court to render judgment on
the basis solely of the stipulated facts by the wife.
-Escritor, a woman whose husband had already died, has been living with
Quilapio, who is also married, for twenty years. The cohabitation
produced one child. Both Escritor and Quilapio are members of the
Jehovahs Witnesses Church. With the attestation of the church leaders,
each of them signed Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness, which,
according to their church beliefs, honors their cohabitation before god
and man. This is to recognize the fact that they no longer have bonds to
their marriages, and that they declare faithfulness to each other.
-Is the marriage between Escritor and Quilapio (evidenced by the
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness) valid? No. The court does not
recognize the validity of marriage. Declarations of Pledging Faithfulness

Goitia vs.
Campos-Rueda

Balogbog vs. CA

Articles 2-6
Cosca vs.
Palaypayon

Enriquez vs. Velez

Wassmer vs. Velez

Silverio vs.
Republic
(G.R. No. 174689)
Articles 7-10
Navarro vs.
Domagtoy

are also not recognized as valid proof of their marriage.

-Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public
is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make.
-A husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty
to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful,
illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by
him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law
applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.
-Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. The
law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the
preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of
constitutional concern.
-An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the
testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since
the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital
commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an
exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its
absence.
-Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
failure to present the same is not proof that no marriage took place.
-The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
-The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected
by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to
the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or
ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is
of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
-Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
-Change of gender entry in one's birth certificate to allow marriage
between a man and another transgendered man is denied, as marriage is
a union BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN.
- The Court, by way of obiter dictum, held that a judges having solemnized
a marriage outside his jurisdiction is a mere irregularity that does not
render the marriage void.

Aranas vs. Judge

- Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority

Occiano

Laxamana vs.
Baltazar
People vs Whipkey
[69 O.G. No. 42, p.
9678 (1973)]
People vs.
Janssen

Article 22
Lim Tanhu vs.
Ramolete

Vda. De Chua vs.

CA

Article 25
Republic vs. CA

of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.
-Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Art. 3,
which while it may affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability (obiter dictum).
-The vice-mayor, by operation of law, assumes the office of the acting
municipal mayor during the suspension of the mayor.
-A marriage performed by a minister whose authority to solemnize a
marriage has expired is void ab initio.
-The solemnizing officer is not required to investigate w/n the license was
issued in the place required by law. It is sufficient to know that the license
has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty of
ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides
habitually in his municipality.
-Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting
parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth
in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and
the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence
of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract . While
a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the
absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the
certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not
admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract
or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented
to the court.
-In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M.
Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not,
therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to
unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity
of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second
assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part
of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not
testify, the same is hearsay.
-Case at bar: Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion
alleging that she was the true wife of Roberto. However, according to
Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter but a pretender to the
estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman
and died a bachelor.
-The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of
the decedent. She could not produce the original copy or authenticated
copy of their marriage certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such marriage contract
between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them,
attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have
solemnized the alleged marriage, that he has not solemnized such
alleged marriage. Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the
truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The
best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she failed to produce.
-The certification by the Civil Registrar that the alleged marriage license

and Castro
[236 SCRA 257
(1994)]

Article 26
Garcia vs. Recio

Pilapil vs. IbaySomera

Van Dorn vs.

could not be found in his records is adequate to prove that no license was
issued.
-Case at bar: Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony in the city court of Pasay w/o the knowledge of Angelina's
parents. The marriage lasted only for a couple of mos. Angelina decided
to migrate to the US but wanted to put in order her marital status bef.
leaving. She consulted a lawyer regarding the possible annulment of her
marriage. It was discovered that there was no license issued to Cardenas
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig. The Civil Registrar certified that the
alleged license no. does not appear from the records. The trial court
denied the petition. The CA reversed the trial court, hence, this petition
for review on certiorari. HELD: The presentation by the Civil Registrar is
sanctioned by Sec. 29, R 132, ROC. The certification of due search and
inability to find, issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by
any circumstance of suspicion, and pursuant to Sec. 29, R 132 of ROC, a
cert. of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office
did not issue the marriage license. There being no marriage license, the
marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio
-A divorce decree obtained abroad by a foreigner may be recognized in
the Philippine, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing national
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proved. Our
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments.
Both the divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must be
alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Therefore, before a
foreign divorce can be recognized by our Philippine courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.
-The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is
concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
-The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this
case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of
no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the
marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for
the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other.
-an American husband granted absolute divorce in his country is estopped

from asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines as

Romillo
[139 SCRA 139
(1985)]

Cang vs. CA
Tenchavez vs.
Escano
[15 SCRA 355
(1965)]

Republic vs.
Orbecido

conjugal property by him and his former wife. To maintain, as the

husband does, that under our laws, the wife has to be considered still
married to him and still subject to a wife's obligation under the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner wife should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to her husband. The
husband should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. SHE SHOULD NOT BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST
IN HER OWN COUNTRY IF THE ENDS OF JUSTICE ARE TO BE
SERVED.
-Where the wife, a Filipina, deserted her Filipino husband, obtained a
divorce in the U.S., married an American citizen, and later herself became
an American citizen, the Filipino husband is entitled to legal separation
conformably to Philippine law and to damages. (1) A foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
New Civil Code, is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines,
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced
consort, subsequenlty to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity
in this country. (2) Invalid divorce entitles innocent spouse to recover
damages (P25,000 as moral damages; basis - 2176). (3) An action for
alienation of affection against the parents of one consort does not lie in
the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
-Par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens but later on, one of them becomes a naturalized
citizen of a foreign country and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.

II. Marriages Exempt from the License Requirement (Articles 27 34)

Nial vs. Bayadog

Manzano vs.
Sanchez

-If a man and a woman have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage for at least 5 years, they are exempted
from securing a marriage license to marry. But such law requires that their
act of living together must be characterized by exclusivity and continuity.
-There must be no legal impediment to marry one another during the 5year cohabitation immediately before the day of the marriage. Otherwise,
if the 5-year period is computed without any distinction as to whether they
were capacitated or not to marry, the law would then be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common-law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who live faithfully with
their spouse (But see Manzano vs Sanchez).
-In order that Art. 34 of the Family Code regarding legal ratification of
cohabitation may apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage.
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other.
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of marriage (there is no mention as to whether the
fact of absence of legal impediment must be present during the 5year cohabitation period).
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years.
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no

legal impediment to their marriage.

-In the case at bar, not all of the aforesaid requirements are present. It is

Cosca vs.
Palaypayon

Mariategui vs. CA

significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed and sworn to

before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." The fact
that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family
Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to
live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds
are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true
all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
-Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and
Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really
Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that
they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization
and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living
together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With
respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that
there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the
signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is
hard to believe that it was simulated.
-On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized
marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34
of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering
that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been
living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However,
it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs
2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6
years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint
affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they
started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have
been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order
to avoid the marriage license requirement.
-Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.
-Case at bar: Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married
in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by
Lupo to his son who testified that when his father was still living, he was
able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be
such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present. Under
these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman,

deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful

contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no
divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things
have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
towards legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law.

III. Void and Voidable Marriages (Articles 35-54)

Article 36
Nial vs. Bayadog
Republic vs. CA
and Molina

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting

personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of
the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench
and the bar:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Louel Santos vs.

CA

Republic vs.
Quintero-Hamano
[G.R. No. 149498
(2004)]

Choa vs. Choa

(G.R. No. 143376)

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,

should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
- The failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband
Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological
incapacity.
- Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
- Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
- The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
- Psychological incapacity cannot be presumed from abandonment. It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
- In proving psychological incapacity, there should be no distinction
between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in
the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.
- Case at bar: Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury,
concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological
incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not
only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
- The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the
case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three
aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children,
immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of
these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
- Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere

Antonio vs. Reyes

Chi Ming Tsoi vs.

CA

showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does

not constitute psychological incapacity.
-Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to
identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It
just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that
could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The
totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical,
psychiatric or psychological examination.
-The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the
complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the
decision.
-Psychological incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of marriage, although the
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time.
-Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Phils., while not
controlling and decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
-In the case at bar, the respondent fabricated friends and made up letters
from fictitious characters well before the marriage. She even concealed
having an illegitimate son. The gravity of respondent's psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with
the
essential marital obligations (Art. 68) to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support. It is
difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar
would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.
-The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and
the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
is to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage.
-Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have
cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The
egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens
the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

Armida Ferraris
vs. Brix Ferraris

-The respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-thehouse" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during
epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of
support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than
his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but

Navarro vs.
Navarro

Suazo vs. Suazo

(G.R. No. 164493;
10 March 2010)

a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of

marriage. These do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a
marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
-Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
-Frequent squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep with petitioner and
be supportive to him do not constitute psychological incapacity. The
records show that petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the
first few years of their marriage, which bore them four children.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely
introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables compliance
with the contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete definition or, at
the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on
how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in
jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given

here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the

celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the
basic requirements of Santos.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
Pesca v. Pesca clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then
already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later

overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules)
promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently
provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations
of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence
presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature
and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to
consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert
testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to
us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was
the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. YuTe (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family
Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. Te thus assumes it
a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its
application.
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is
consistent with that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis,
that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final
and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not
a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that
when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form
of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic
marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the
resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by
which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards

in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and
be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its
own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at
other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting follows
Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning
Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant
of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an
accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the
parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact
that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in
the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts
shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina, merely stands for
a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its
evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases
on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of
the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness that
must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and

responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. It is not

enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse
integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36,
as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing
doctrinal validity.
Article 40
Domingo vs. CA
[226 SCRA 572
(1993)]

Morigo vs. People

Weigel vs.
Sempio-Dy
Terre vs. Terre
(211 SCRA 6)
Valdez vs. RTC

-The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another

cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both
parties or of one that their union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable
social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very
shaky foundation.
-On the other hand, the clause on the basis solely of a final judgment
delaring such marriage void in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is not only for purpose
of remarriage.
-The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised
together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
-Although it is stressed in Article 40 of the family code that a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry, it should also
be considered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its
elements concur. In this case, one of the elements of bigamy that is the
offender has been legally married is not present. Because legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete, with
reference to the fact that there is no authority from the solemnizing officer.
-He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
-Parties are not allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such
is the fact. They must file an action for declaration of nullity under Art. 40
before they remarry.
-The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs
(2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to
voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40
of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void

People vs. Aragon

Mercado vs. TanMercado

Bobis vs. Bobis

marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty
on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family
Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the
law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one
hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before
annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses
of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules
on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of
the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may
merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the
"family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime
of the spouses.
-Can Mercado invoke the absolute nullity of previous marriage to defend
his innocence in the crime of bigamy? No, because the declaration of
absolute nullity of his previous marriage came not before the celebration
of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy was already
tried in court. The declaration of nullity came only after the second
marriage was instituted, hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. Mercado is guilty of bigamy.
-In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very
same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his
cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do
is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack
of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage
license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining
a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage
is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy.
-IGNORANCE OF EXISTENCE OF ART. 40, FC: Ignorance of the
existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully
invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the
requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage
is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised
Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the
judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage,
why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in
order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his
own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the
previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents
his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
-PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code,
respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the

second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still

needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again;
otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that,
without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to
be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision
in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of
the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated
above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to
defeat the criminal action against him.
Articles 41-42
Republic vs.
Nolasco

Lukban vs.
Republic

Armas vs.
Calisterio
Republic vs.
Alegro

Articles 45-46
Anaya vs.
Paraloan
Buccat vs. Buccat

-Due diligence is required in searching for a missing spouse. When he

arrived in Antique, instead of seeking help from authorities or the British
embassy, Nolasco secured another contract and went to London, a city of
million people to look for his wife when in fact, the respondent met Monica
in a bar in Liverpool, some 350 km. away. The non-disclosure of Monica
about her personal background is too convenient an excuse to locate her.
The same can be said of the letters returned to him which were allegedly
lost in his voyage. The claim that he immediately asked leave from the
Captain of his ship in January 1983 is doubtful as he arrived in Antique
sometime in November of that year, a good 9 months thereafter.
-Lourdes Lukban has legal capacity to contract another marriage on the
basis of declaration of presumptive death of her husband who has been
absent for more than 20 years. In addition to that, the petitioner has a
well-founded belief that her husband is already dead after using all the
means to find him.

-In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than
Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present
Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he
allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. The
respondent also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding
Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have
enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his
parents-in-law about Leas whereabouts considering that Leas father was
the owner of Radio DYMS. The respondent did report and seek the help
of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an
afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his
petition in the RTC.
-Thus respondent was not able to establish that he had a well-founded
belief of his wifes death.
-The non-disclosure by the husband of a premarital relationship with
another woman is NOT a ground for the annulment of the marriage.
-Even assuming that the annulment is based on the fact that at the time of
the marriage, defendant was pregnant by a man other than her husband,
there would still be no ground because the law is explicit. There should
have been a concealment of such fact. If the defendant was already about

Aquino vs. Delizo

Jimenez vs.
Caizares

Articles 48-49
Sin vs. Sin

6 months pregnant at the time of marriage, there can be no possibility of

concealment. At such an advanced stage of pregnancy, concealment
would be impossible.
- Concealment of the wife the fact that at the time of the marriage she was
pregnant by a man other than his husband constitutes fraud and is a
ground for annulment of marriage.
- The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.
- Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking
part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in
court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or
be inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful
and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled
to by competent authority.
-

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires

vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance.
The protection of marriage as a sacred social institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.
Ocampo vs.
- Where there is evidence of adultery independently of the defendants
statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of legal separation
Florenciano
should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon
the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively on defendants confession.
Tuason vs. CA
- Article 48 of the Family Code is inapplicable. The role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.
Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates
the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by
any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.
IV. Legal Separation (Articles 55-67)
Lapuz-Sy vs.
Eufemio

Gaudencio vs.
Penarada
Bugayong vs
Ginez
(G.R. No. L-10033;
1956)

- An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bedand-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in
this jurisdiction) is purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows
that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action
itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
- A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
- Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the
wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and
the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband and
wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal

Brown vs.
Yambao
[54 O.G. 1827
(1957)]

Pacete vs.
Carriaga
(G.R. No. L-53880;
1994)

separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes
within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.
In an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery filed by the
husband, even though the defendant wife did not interpose the defense of
prescription, nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof,
because actions seeking a decree of legal separation or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no
such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record. Also, the husband was guilty of commission of the same offense
by living with another woman.
In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally
sanctioned. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between
the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for
the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The provision has been taken from Article 30 of the California Civil Code,
and it is, in substance, reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code.
Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should easily
explain the mandatory tenor of the law. In Brown v. Yambao, the Court
has observed:
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings
for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88),
is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a
social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its
continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon the
parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43
Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil.
252). It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal
should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate
whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified
or not.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,"
obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further
underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for
the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage
to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in
the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter
within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone
dictate.

- It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal
separation. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have
likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse
compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.
Macadangdang
vs. CA
[108 SCRA 314
(1981)]

- The death of a spouse AFTER a final decree of legal separation has no

effect on the legal separation. The law clearly spells out the effect of a
final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon
the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final
decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition
of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased
spouse.

V. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Articles 68-73)

Article 68
Potenciano vs. CA
(GR No. 139789,
139808; 19 July
2001)

Goitia vs.
Campos-Rueda

Ty vs. CA
(G.R. No. 127406)

Ilusorio vs.
Bildner
(G.R. No. 139789)

- Case at bar: Erlinda Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly

inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the
Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in
consortium. Issue: Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69
of Family Code to have custody of her husband in consortium.
- Ruling: The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses, they are duty bound
to live together and care for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69.
However, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. Only the
moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor for
making them observe the said duties and obligations which are highly
personal. Therefore, they deny the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
- Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the
rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the
parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those
rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated
by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way
should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to
support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed
pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the
option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant
to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was
forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and
physical assaults of the defendant.
- There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of
marital obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be
awarded in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment
of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should they
grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband pays the
wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the
application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates
against such incongruity.
- No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live
with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.

Article 69
Romualdez vs.
COMELEC
Article 73
Ayala
Investments vs.
CA

That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man
and womans free choice.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor
is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. The Court
defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with
"amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

- Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or

temporary, while domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
- The fruits of the paraphernal property, which form part of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and
expenses of the spouses (including those incurred in the legitimate
exercise of industry or profession), but not to the payment of the personal
obligations (guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless it is proved that
such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family. There
must be the requisite showing of some advantage, which clearly accrued
to the welfare of the spouses.
- If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligation for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Therefore, to hold the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss
resulting from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the
family must be presented.

VI. Property Relations in Marriages

Article 87
Agapay vs.
Palang
(276 SCRA 341)
Arcaba v.
Tabancura Vda.
De Batocael
(G.R. No. 146683)
San Luis vs. San
Luis
Articles 94-96
Uy vs. CA
(G.R. No. 109557)
Article 101
Dela Cruz vs.
Dela Cruz

- Donation is invalid in cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman

who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage.
- The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common-law
relationship wherein donation is not valid. Cohabitation means more than
sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is the
assumption of men and women of the marital relation, and dwelling
together as man and wife.
- A partner is capacitated after obtaining a valid foreign divorce, thus Art.
147 applies. But if the validity or the extent of the divorce must be proven,
otherwise Art. 148 applies.
- Administration does not include disposition and encumbrance.

- Physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term

"abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the

society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal

Partosa-Jo vs. CA

Article 102
BA Finance Corp.
vs. CA
(161 SCRA 608)

Johnson &
Johnson vs. CA
(262 SCRA 298)

Article 109
Spouses Laperal
vs. Spouses
Katigbak
(90 Phil 77)
Villanueva vs.
IAC

partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the
defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives
any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his
marital duties and rights.
- Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by a prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although
able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. In this case,
physical separation, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to
give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for judicial separation of their conjugal property.
- Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship established during
the marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only
one of the spouses. However, for the said property to be held liable, the
obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. In the case at bar, the obligation which the
petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by
the private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for
his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had
already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.
- The husband cannot be held liable for the debts of the wife which were
incurred without the husbands consent and which did not benefit the
conjugal partnership. Only the wife and her paraphernal property can be
held liable. And since the power of the court in execution of judgments
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment
debtor alone, the conjugal properties and the capital of the husband
cannot be levied upon.
- "Where the husband is alone liable, no action lies against the wife, and
she is not a necessary party defendant. The husband cannot by his
contract bind the paraphernal property unless its administration has been
transferred to him. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to
answer for debts incurred by the husband.
- If the properties are acquired during the marriage, the property is
conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal.
- Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the
will of one of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can
change the character of conjugal property.

Articles 115-116
BPI vs. Posadas
- Case at bar: A husband insured himself during his marriage and made his
estate, not his wife, as his beneficiary. The premiums paid were borne by
the conjugal partnership. Later, the husband died.
- The heirs of the husband as well as the wife are entitled to the proceeds
of the insurance. The proceeds of a life insurance policy payable to an
insured persons estate, on which the premiums were paid by the
conjugal partnership, constitute conjugal property, and belong one-half
exclusively to the husband and the other half to the wife. If the premiums
were paid partly with separate property, and partly with conjugal funds,
the proceeds are in like proportion separate in part, and conjugal in part.
This is the just interpretation of the article. To have the estate as the sole
beneficiary would be to sanction a fraud upon the wife.

Wong vs. IAC

- The properties were acquired during the marriage and in the absence of

proof that they are exclusive property of the husband, they are presumed
to be conjugal property. They cannot answer for the personal
indebtedness of one spouse as his or her rights to her share are inchoate
and only materialize upon dissolution of the property.
Articles 121-122
Ayala
- The fruits of the paraphernal property, which form part of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and
Investments vs.
expenses of the spouses (including those incurred in the legitimate
CA
exercise of industry or profession), but not to the payment of the personal
obligations (guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless it is proved that
such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family. There
must be the requisite showing of some advantage, which clearly accrued
to the welfare of the spouses.
- If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligation for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Carlos vs.
- A loan obtained to purchase the conjugal home may be charged against
the conjugal partnership as it has redounded to the benefit of the family.
Abelardo
Notwithstanding, therefore, the alleged lack of consent of the other
spouse, under Art. 121, the husband shall be solidarily liable for the loan
together with his wife.
VII.
Property Regime of Unions without Marriage
Article 147

Malilin vs. Castro

Valdes vs. RTC

Francisco vs.
Master Iron
Works
Construction
Corp.
(G.R. No. 151967)
Article 148
Agapay vs.
Palang
(276 SCRA 341)
Juaniza vs. Jose
(89 SCRA 306)

- Art 148 provides that properties acquired through the parties joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. The determination of the
contributions needs to be made in a judicial proceeding as it requires a
finding of facts.
- In a void marriage, regardless of the cause the property of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by Art 147 or 148 as the
case may be. Art 147 applies to a void marriage where the parties are
capacitated to marry each other. On the other hand Art 148 applies to
void marriages where the parties suffer from an impediment to marry
each other.
- Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that
invalidates such marriage, apply Art. 148. Absent proof that the
wife/husband has actually contributed money, property or industry to the
properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership
will not arise.

- An actual contribution is required under Art 148 in contrast to art 147

where care and maintenance of the family and the home will suffice.
Absent actual proof of such contribution, no co-ownership
- A married man is the registered owner of a jeepney which was involved in
an accident and was held liable for damages. His common-law wife
cannot claim co- ownership over the jeepney because Art. 144 CC (Art.
147 FC) applies only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry.
Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful
wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held
liable for damages caused by its operation.

Tumlos vs.
Fernandez
(G.R. No. 137650)

- Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her
claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent Mario.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not
justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides
that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its
acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of coownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership
of respondents.
VIII. The Family as an Institution

Article 149
Docena vs.
Lapesura
(G.R. No. 140153)

Article 150
Martinez vs.
Martinez
(G.R. No. 162084)

Hontiveros vs.
RTC
(G.R. No. 125465)

Article 151
Manalo vs. CA
(G.R. No. 129242)

- Unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both

spouse is required, joint management or administration does not require
that the husband and the wife always act together. Each spouse may
validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases. The husband, therefore, can file
against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being
joined by his wife. The reason is that it is a mere act of administration.
- As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder
and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same
family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the
family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates
deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, a partys failure to
comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint
against a family member would render such complaint premature.
- The phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife,
parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and
sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship
by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
- Case at bar: private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint
as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros,
who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are
considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.
- Case: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was
survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all
of legal age. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a
business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. The eight of
the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the
respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their
late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof. The trial court issued an order and set the reception
of evidence of the petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion
of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors
therein) who were granted then 10 days within which to file their
opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by
herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an
Omnibus Motion.
- Issue: Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition
for judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward a

Albano vs.
Gapusan
(A.M. No. 1022MJ)

compromise involving members of the same family have been made.

- Ruling: The petition was denied for lack of merit. Petitioners may not
validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules
of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of
the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
enough. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which
the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress
of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.
- To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers
as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife"
and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership".
- A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically
dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by
this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of
marriage and the family.

IX. The Family Home (Articles 152-162)

Modequillo vs.
Breva
(185 SCRA 766)

Manacop vs. CA
(277 SCRA 941)

- The provision of Article 162 does not mean that Arts. 152 and 153 have a
retroactive effect such that all family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Art. 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorder to a family home under the
Code. Art. 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
have a retroactive effect.
- Those enumerated in Art. 154 may include the in-laws where the family
home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely
excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries
contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home by
an overseer is insufficient compliance with the law.

X. Paternity and Filiation

Article 166
Andal vs.
Macaraig
(89 Phil 165)

Benitez-Badua vs.
CA

- The fact that the husband was seriously sick (suffering from tubercolosis)
is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. There are
cases where persons suffering from TB can do the carnal act even in the
most crucial stage of health because then they seem to be more inclined
to sexual intercourse. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that
it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his
wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of
the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include
absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent,
and incurable; and imprisonment, unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
The fact that the wife had illicit intercourse with a man other than the
husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between
said husband and wife.
- Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a
situation where a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological

(G.R. No. 105625)

Article 167
Concepcion vs. CA
(G.R. No. 123450)

Articles 170-171
Liyao vs. Liyao
(G.R. No. 138961)
Article 172
Eceta vs. Eceta
(G.R. No. 157037)
Constantino vs.
Mendez
(209 SCRA 18)
Bernabe vs. Alejo
(G.R. No. 140500)

Jison vs. CA
(G.R. No. 124853)
Article 173
Conde vs. Abaya
(13 Phil 249)

Article 176
Marquino vs. IAC
(G.R. No. 72078)
Articles 177-180
Abadilla vs.
Tabiliran
(249 SCRA 447)

child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where

the husband or his heirs denies as his own a child of his wife.
- A child is deemed born legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The
law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children, for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.
Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the
information contained therein is merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent
says it is.
- A child conceived or born during a valid marriage is presumed to belong
to that marriage, regardless of the existence of extramarital relationships.
A child cannot impugn his or her own legitimacy.
- Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is
deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.
- The standard of proof required to establish ones filiation is founded on
the principle that an order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family of the
parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established
by clear and convincing evidence.
- An action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether
the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent
is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that
illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs
filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.
- Filiation based only on testimonial evidence is allowed, only if they are of
HIGH STANDARD. Material evidence for filiation must belong to the class
of "FAMILY OBJECTS," as in family photos, family bibles, etc.
- The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal
character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child may
exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases
only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or she died
during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action had already
been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to
claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she
may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs.
The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not
transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.
- The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime, not during
the lifetime of the parents, and even after the death of the parents. In
other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives.
- Despite the subsequent marriage, a cannot be legitimated nor in any way
be considered legitimate if at the time he was born, there was an existing
valid marriage between a party and his / her former spouse. Legitimation

is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous

XI. Adoption

relations.

Teotico vs. Del

Val
(13 SCRA 406)

- the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter

and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting
parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by
law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the
collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an
heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998
Republic vs. CA
- Family Code provisions on adoption are NOT RETROACTIVE in so far as
they do not impede on the expediency of the adoption, because the prime
and Bobiles
consideration is the child's welfare, and should not be delayed.
(205 SCRA 356)
Tamargo vs. CA
- Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
(209 SCRA 518)
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to
hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would
be unfair and unconscionable.
XII.

Support (Articles 194-208)

Javier vs. Lucero

(GR No. L-6706)

- Alfredo Jr. indeed has reached the age of majority yet under the provision
of Family Code, the support may be given beyond the age of majority in
order enable him to complete his education, for some trade and
profession. If financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination
of the appeal, his education or the completion thereof would be unduly
delayed. This is a good reason for immediate execution. The father
claimed that based on the records, the son is no longer studying.
However, it might have resulted to lack of means to support his studies
Goitia vs.
- The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband,
without fault on her part, may maintain an action against the husband for
Campos-Rueda
separate maintenance when she has no other remedy, notwithstanding
(35 Phil 252, 262)
the provision of the law giving the person who is obliged to furnish support
the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining in his home the one having the right to the same.
De Asis vs. De
- The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a
third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a
Asis
compromise. The manifestation sent by private respondent amounted to
(303 SCRA 176)
renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the subject minor, the
right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.
Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and
private respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the nature
of a compromise, which cannot be countenanced. It violated the
prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.
XIII. Parental Authority
Espiritu vs. CA
(242 SCRA 362)
Exconde vs
Capuno

- Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion
must always be the child's interest. Discretion is always given to the court
to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the
custody on the basis of that consideration.
- Capuno, a student and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade, drove a
jeep recklessly resulting in the death of two passengers. Father was held
solidarily liable for damages. SC, in an obiter, exculpated the school (not
a party to the case) on the ground that it was not a school of arts and

Mercado vs CA

Palisoc vs
Brillantes
(41 SCRA 548)

Amadora vs. CA
(160 SCRA 315)

Pasco vs CFI

trades. Justice JBL Reyes, with whom Padilla concurred, dissented

arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable.
Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general;
and 2)heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying
clause "of establishment of arts and trades should apply only to "heads"
and not to "teachers".
(elaborates on the Exconde decision)
- A student cut a classmate with a razor blade. Parents of victim sued the
culprit's parents for damages. SC held in an obiter again (school not a
party again) that the school was not liable; it's not an establishment of arts
and trades.Custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents.
- (supersedes obiter in Exconde and Mercado) A 16 year old student killed by
classmate with fist blows in the school laboratory. Although wrongdoer
was already of age and was not boarding with the school, head and
teacher were held solidarily liable with him. The phrase "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability
to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and
board in the school as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta
in Mercado (as well as in Exconde on w/c it relied) w/c must now be
deemed to have been set aside.
- Note: (By JBL) Even students already of age were covered by the
provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and
subject to its discipline.
- Case at bar: Amadora's son was shot to death by Daffon, a classmate at
school auditorium. The son was in school to submit physics project. The
school contends that the semester had already ended.
- It is immaterial whether the semester has already ended for students
were there for a legitimate purpose. He was still in the custody of the
school authorities. Even the mere savoring of the company of his friends
in the school premises is a legitimate purpose w/c would also bring him in
the custody of the school. The school principal and dean are not liable
because they are not teachers-in-charge, but are merely exercising
general authority, not direct control and influence. But even the teacherin-charge is not liable because there is no showing that the teacher was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon nor had he waived
observance of school rules and regulations. His absence when the
tragedy happened cannot be considered against him bec. he was not
supposed or required to report to school on that day. So who is liable
here? It's probably the dean of the boys. He had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned it to the latter w/o
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. But
while he was clearly negligent, it does not necessarily link him to the
shooting since it was not shown that the gun was the one used to kill
petitioner's son. Who is really liable here? Nobody, since none of them
was found to have been charged w/ the custody of the offending student,
or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties. While the court deeply
sympathizes w/ the petitioners, the court cannot extend material relief as
a balm to their grief.
- Art. 2180, NCC which refers to liability of teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades for damages caused by students who

(160 SCRA 784)

Ylarde vs. Aquino
(163 SCRA 697)

St. Marys
Academy vs.
Carpetanos
(G.R. No. 143363)

Salvosa vs IAC
(166 SCRA 274)

Tamargo vs. CA
(209 SCRA 518)

are in their custody, does not apply to the school or the university itself or
to educational institutions which are not schools of arts and trades. The
provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads."
As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the
death of child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades. xxx Under Art. 2180, it is only the teacher and
not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts
committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of
arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable.
Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student following the first par. of the provision.
This is the gen. rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is
the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to
the gen. rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in
w/c case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus,
such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions, and
other affairs of the students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under the penultimate par. of Art. 2180, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain exten,
in loco parentis (as to the student) and (is) called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the (student.) Likewise, "the
phrase used in (Art. 2180)-- so long as the (students) remain in their
custody' means that the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority
is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was
yet lodged with the biological parents.
Ruling: GRANTED. The natural parents of Adelberto should be held liable
for damages caused by the child following the doctrine of IMPUTED
NEGLIGENCE. The simple reason is that the child was still under their
care and custody at the time of the incident. Parental liability is a
consequence of PARENTAL AUTHORITY.
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS:
Art. 2176: Quasi-delict Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict.
Art. 2180: Imputed Negligence The obligation imposed by Art.
2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.

Libi vs. IAC

(214 SCRA 16)

Luna vs IAC
(137 SCRA 7)

- The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
- The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and
child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Absent a showing of such diligence the parents
are directly and primarily liable for the damages arising from the acts of
their child.
- The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run
away from home if she should be taken away from the petitioners
(grandparents) and forced to live w/ her natural parents is a circumstance
that would make the execution of the judgment in the special proc.
inequitable, unfair, unjust, if not illegal. The threat may be proven empty,
but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her w/
love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling, and moral and
material security. But what if the threat is for real. Besides, in her letters
to the members of the court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as
selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not lover her.
To return her to the custody of the private resps. would be traumatic and
cause irreparable damage to the child.

CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS

Use of Surnames (Articles 364-380)
Laperal vs.
Republic
(G.R. No. L-18008)
Llaneta vs.
Agrava
(G.R. No. L-32504)

- legal separation does not dissolve marital bonds, thus the wife must still
use her MARRIED NAME and surname.
- the doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false
impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that
the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice
or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to
the community in general
- Case: Teresita's mother, Anatacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin
Ferrer w/ whom she had but 1 child. In 1942 Serafin F. died and about 4
yrs. later Anatacia had relations w/ another man out of w/c Teresita was
born. Shortly after Teresita's (T) birth, Atanacia (A) brought her to Mla.
where all of them lived w/ A's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. T
was raised in the household of the Ferrers, using the surname of Ferrer in
all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about 20
yrs. old, she applied for a copy of her birth cert. in Irosin, Sorsogon, where
she was born, as she was required to present it in connection w/ a
scholarship granted to her. It was then that she discovered that her
registered surname is Llaneta-- not Ferrer-- and that she is the illegitimate
child of A and an unknown father. On the ground that her use thenceforth
of the surname of Llaneta, instead of Ferrer, w/c she had been using
since she acquired reason ,would cause untold difficulties and confusion,
T petitioned the court below for change of name. After trial, resp. Judge,
denied her petition. Hence, the present recourse.
- The petition is granted. The petitioner has established that she has been
using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her
records in school and elsewhere, put her name down as T. Ferrer; that
her friends and associates know her only as T. Ferrer; and that even the
late Serafin F.'s nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use
of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner

Calderon vs.
Republic

to the name of T Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in the birth
cert.) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals
w/ and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of
her new name. The petitioner has established that she has been using
the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records
in school and elsewhere, put her name down as T. Ferrer; that her friends
and associates know her only as T. Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin
F.'s nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the
surname Ferrer.
- A child may successfully petition to change his surname from the real
fathers name to that of the stepfather, who has no objection thereto. An
illegitimate child need not bear the stigma of illegitimacy during his whole
lifetime. The change of name allowed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
does not alter ones status, rights, duties, or citizenship. It merely changes
the appellation by which a person is known, identified, or distinguished
from others.